Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to	 
Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Key Emergency	 
Response Facilities Could Be Strengthened (15-NOV-07,		 
GAO-08-285T).							 
                                                                 
The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains emergency response	 
capabilities and assets to quickly respond to potential nuclear  
and radiological threats in the United States. These capabilities
are primarily found at DOE's two key emergency response 	 
facilities--the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force  
Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These	 
capabilities took on increased significance after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, because of heightened concern that terrorists
may try to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in a major  
U.S. city. DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for	 
addressing nuclear and radiological threats. The Department of	 
Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for preparing the country 
to prevent and respond to a potential nuclear or radiological	 
attack. This testimony discusses (1) the benefits of using DOE's 
aerial background radiation surveys to enhance emergency response
capabilities and (2) the physical security measures in place at  
DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they are 
consistent with DOE guidance. It is based on GAO's report on	 
DOE's nuclear and radiological emergency response capabilities,  
issued in September 2006 (Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal	 
Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to	 
Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could be Strengthened	 
[Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006]).				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-285T					        
    ACCNO:   A78189						        
  TITLE:     Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond  
to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Key Emergency 
Response Facilities Could Be Strengthened			 
     DATE:   11/15/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Contamination					 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Emergency response 				 
	     Facility security					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Nuclear warfare					 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Physical security					 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 

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GAO-08-285T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background
     * [3]Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiati

          * [4]Completing Baseline Aerial Surveys Can Later Help to Detect
          * [5]DOE Has Conducted a Survey of Only One Major City
          * [6]Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE nor DHS Has Mission Respon

     * [7]DOE's Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficie

          * [8]DOE Is Protecting Its Key Emergency Response Facilities with
          * [9]DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at T

     * [10]Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
     * [11]GAO's Mission
     * [12]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [13]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [14]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [15]Congressional Relations
     * [16]Public Affairs

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST
Thursday, November 15, 2007

COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to
Protect Key Emergency Response Facilities Could Be Strengthened

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director
Natural Resources and Environment

GAO-08-285T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Energy's (DOE)
use of aerial background radiation surveys, and physical security measures
at DOE's two key emergency response facilities. DOE has long maintained an
emergency response capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and
radiological threats in the United States. This capability took on
increased significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because of
heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or
radiological materials into the United States and detonate a nuclear or a
radiological dispersal device, otherwise known as a dirty bomb, in a major
U.S. city. Detonating either type of device would have serious
consequences for our national and economic interests, including
potentially causing numerous deaths and undermining citizens' confidence
in the government's ability to protect the homeland.

To respond to such threats, DOE has developed the technical expertise to
search for and locate potential nuclear and radiological threats in U.S.
cities and also to help minimize the consequences of a radiological
incident by, among other things, measuring the extent of contamination.
One of DOE's unique capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial
background radiation surveys. Helicopters or planes equipped with
radiation detectors fly over an area and collect information on existing
background radiation sources, such as granite statues in a city or medical
isotopes located at hospitals. This exercise can help DOE establish
baseline radiation levels against which future radiation levels can be
compared in order to more easily detect new radiation sources that may
pose a security or public health threat.

After September 11, 2001, DOE began dispersing its emergency response
capabilities across the country. However, a number of critical
capabilities and assets are primarily concentrated at two key facilities,
known as Remote Sensing Laboratories, located at Nellis Air Force Base,
Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These two facilities house,
among other things, specialized search teams that locate and identify
nuclear and radiological devices; planes and helicopters used to measure
contamination; and research and development laboratories that design
specialized equipment. DOE requires that these facilities be adequately
protected with security measures to defend against potential terrorist
attacks.^1

DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for detecting nuclear and
radiological materials. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) that is responsible for
developing, testing, and deploying radiation detection equipment to detect
and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials at U.S.
points of entry, such as seaports and border crossings. DNDO is also
responsible for helping state and local governments improve their
capability to detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological
materials. DHS also provides grants to state and local governments to help
them better prepare and respond to a potential terrorist attack. DHS has
provided $11.6 billion in grants to state and local governments in the
last 6 fiscal years--from fiscal years 2002 to 2007. If DHS cannot prevent
the smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials into the United States,
it relies on DOE's emergency response capabilities to search for and
locate the materials.

For this testimony, you asked us to discuss (1) the benefits of using
DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they are
consistent with DOE guidance and (2) the physical security measures in
place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they are
consistent with DOE guidance. My remarks will focus on our September 2006
report on DOE's nuclear and radiological emergency response efforts.^2 To
update this information, we also collected documentation and interviewed
officials from DOE's Office of Emergency Response, DHS's Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, DOE's Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force
Base, and the Counter Terrorism Bureau of the New York City Police
Department. We conducted our work in November 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

^1DOE uses different levels of physical protection to secure its
facilities. The levels of protection are specific to the type of security
interests and the significance of the targets. They are provided in a
graded fashion in accordance with potential risks.

^2GAO, Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear
and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities
Could be Strengthened, [17]GAO-06-1015 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006).

Summary

There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation
surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used to compare
changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in
U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a
radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts.
Despite the benefits, there has been only one survey of a major U.S. city
because neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for conducting the
surveys. In the event of a dirty-bomb threat, if a city had a completed
survey, DOE could then conduct a new survey and compare baseline radiation
data from the previous survey to identify locations with new sources of
radiation. Focusing their attention on these new locations, law
enforcement officials may be able to locate a nuclear or radiological
device more quickly. In addition, using baseline information from a prior
survey, DOE could assess contamination levels after a radiological attack
to assist cleanup efforts. DOE officials estimated that information from
the surveys could save millions of dollars in cleanup costs because
cleanup efforts could be targeted to decontaminating buildings and other
areas up to pre-existing levels of radiation rather than fully removing
all traces of radiation. Without baseline information from the surveys,
law enforcement officials may lose valuable time investigating
pre-existing sources of radiation that do not pose a threat, and the time
and cost of cleanup after an attack may increase significantly. DOE
officials explained that surveys do have some limitations, noting that it
is difficult to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded radiological
materials. Weather conditions and the type of building being surveyed may
also limit the ability to detect nuclear and radiological devices.

Nevertheless, in 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked
DOE to conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. The cost of the
survey--about $800,000--was funded through DHS grants. NYPD officials
indicated that the survey was tremendously valuable because it identified
more than 80 locations with radiological sources that required further
investigation to determine their risk. In addition to identifying
potential terrorist threats, NYPD officials told us a secondary benefit of
the survey was identifying threats to public health. While investigating
the 80 locations, they found an old industrial site contaminated with
radium--a radiological material linked to diseases such as bone
cancer--and used this information to close the area and protect the
public. Despite these benefits, neither DOE nor DHS has embraced mission
responsibility for funding and conducting surveys or notifying city
officials that such a capability exists. DOE officials told us they are
reluctant to conduct additional surveys because they have a limited number
of helicopters, and these are needed for emergency response functions, and
because it is DHS's mission to protect cities from potential terrorist
attacks. DHS officials disagreed with DOE, stating they do not have the
expertise or capability to conduct surveys. However, DHS does have a
program to help state and local governments detect illicit nuclear and
radiological materials, and in fiscal year 2007, made available
approximately $1.7 billion in grant funding to state and local governments
for terrorism preparedness. In the absence of clear mission
responsibility, DOE and DHS have not conducted additional surveys, in
part, because DOE and DHS are not informing cities about the benefits of
these surveys.

DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories, which house a number of unique
emergency response capabilities and assets, are protected at the lowest
level of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to
DOE, emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed across
the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. Under DOE policy
guidance for safeguarding and securing facilities issued in November 2005,
DOE facilities can be protected at the lowest level of physical security
if their capabilities and assets exist at other locations and can be
easily and quickly reconstituted. However, we found that there are a
number of critical capabilities and assets that are available only at the
Remote Sensing Laboratories and their loss would significantly hamper
DOE's ability to quickly prevent or respond to a nuclear or radiological
emergency. These capabilities and assets include the most highly trained
teams to help manage and minimize the consequences of a nuclear or
radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes that can readily
help locate nuclear or radiological devices and measure contamination
levels after a radiological attack. Since these capabilities and assets
have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not
be sufficient to protect the facilities against a terrorist attack. Under
DOE's physical security guidance, a facility in the lowest level of
physical security can meet the requirements by having walls and doors but
no other physical security measures. For example, the Remote Sensing
Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base does not have a fence, vehicle
barriers, or any other protective measures around the building, but DOE
has determined that it meets physical security requirements. Furthermore,
while the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may appear to provide
an additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews Air Force
Bases is not strictly limited, and anyone with federal government
identification may gain entry. In fact, GAO staff gained access to the
bases multiple times with little or no scrutiny of their identification.
Security officials told us that the laboratories are not designed to
withstand certain types of terrorist attacks. However, officials have not
taken any steps to strengthen security because of DOE's assumption that
their capabilities and assets are fully dispersed. Furthermore, DOE has
not developed contingency plans that would identify capabilities and
assets that would be used in the event that one or both Remote Sensing
Laboratories were attacked.

Background

DOE's predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established a
program to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies in
1974 after an extortionist threatened to detonate a nuclear device in
Boston unless he received $200,000.^3 Even though the threat turned out to
be a hoax, AEC recognized that it lacked the capability to quickly respond
to a nuclear or radiological incident. To address this deficiency, AEC
established the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) to provide technical
assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department
of State, which is the lead federal agency for terrorism response outside
the United States. Under the Atomic Energy Act, the FBI is responsible for
investigating illegal activities involving the use of nuclear materials
within the United States, including terrorist threats. The NEST program
was designed to assist the FBI in searching for, identifying, and
deactivating nuclear and radiological devices. However, the deployments of
search teams were large scale and often slow because they were designed to
respond to threats, such as extortion, when there was time to find the
device.

With the threat of nuclear terrorism and the events of September 11, 2001,
DOE's capabilities have evolved to more rapidly respond to nuclear and
radiological threats. While NEST activities to prevent terrorists from
detonating a nuclear or radiological device remain the core mission, DOE's
emergency response activities have expanded to include actions to minimize
the consequences of a nuclear or radiological incident. For example, DOE
maintains an aerial capability to detect, measure, and track radioactive
material to determine contamination levels at the site of an emergency.
DOE has used this capability to conduct background radiation surveys of
most nuclear power plants in the country for the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the event of an accident
at a nuclear power plant, a new radiation survey could be performed to
help determine the location and amount of contamination.

^3DOE was established in 1977.

Currently, about 950 scientists, engineers, and technicians from the
national laboratories and the Remote Sensing Laboratories are dedicated to
preventing and responding to a nuclear or radiological threat. In fiscal
year 2006, DOE had a budget of about $100 million for emergency response
activities. Under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the
Office of Emergency Response manages DOE's efforts to prevent and respond
to nuclear or radiological emergencies.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that
terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the
United States. These materials could be used to produce either an
improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device, known as a
dirty bomb. An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear bomb made with
highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation experts estimate
that a successful improvised nuclear device could have yields in the 10 to
20 kiloton range (the equivalent to 10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT). A
20-kiloton yield would be the equivalent of the yield of the bomb that
destroyed Nagasaki and could devastate the heart of a medium-size U.S.
city and result in thousands of casualties and radiation contamination
over a wider area.

A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with
radioactive material,^4 using explosive force to disperse the radioactive
material over a large area, such as multiple city blocks. The extent of
contamination would depend on a number of factors, including the size of
the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, and
weather conditions. While much less destructive than an improvised nuclear
device, the dispersed radioactive material could cause radiation sickness
for people nearby and produce serious economic costs and psychological and
social disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of
the contaminated areas. While no terrorists have detonated a dirty bomb in
a city, Chechen separatists placed a canister containing cesium-137 in a
Moscow park in the mid-1990s. Although the device was not detonated and no
radioactive material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that
terrorists have the capability and willingness to use radiological
materials as weapons of terrorism.

^4Different types of radioactive material that could be used by terrorists
for a dirty bomb include cesium-137, cobalt-60, plutonium-238,
plutonium-239, and strontium-90.

Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, They
Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility for
Funding and Conducting Them

There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation
surveys of U.S. cities. Once surveys are complete, they can later be used
to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological
threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure radiation levels after
a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup
efforts. Despite the benefits, only one major U.S. city has been surveyed.
Since neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for funding and
conducting surveys, they have not conducted additional surveys nor
informed cities about their benefits.

Completing Baseline Aerial Surveys Can Later Help to Detect Radiological Threats
in U.S. Cities and Measure Radiation Levels in the Event of a Radiological
Attack

DOE can conduct aerial background radiation surveys to record the location
of radiation sources and produce maps showing existing radiation levels
within U.S. cities. Background radiation can come from a variety of
sources, such as rock quarries, granite found in buildings, statues, or
cemeteries; medical isotopes used at hospitals; and areas treated with
high amounts of fertilizer, such as golf courses. DOE uses helicopters
mounted with external radiation detectors and equipped with a global
position system to fly over an area and gather data in a systematic grid
pattern. Figure 1 illustrates a helicopter conducting an aerial survey and
collecting information on radiation sources in a city.

Figure 1: Illustration of a Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background
Radiation Survey

Onboard computers record radiation levels and the position of the
helicopter. This initial, or baseline, survey allows DOE technicians and
scientists to produce maps of a city showing the locations of high
radiation concentrations, also known as "hot spots." DOE uses helicopters
rather than airplanes because their lower altitude and lower speed permit
a more precise reading. While conducting the baseline survey, DOE ground
teams and law enforcement officials can investigate these hot spots to
determine whether the source of radiation is used for industrial, medical
or other routine purposes. DOE officials told us that this baseline
information would be beneficial for all major cities because law
enforcement officials could immediately investigate any potentially
dangerous nuclear or radiological source and DOE could later use the data
in the event of an emergency to find a device more quickly or assist in
cleanup efforts. For example, in 2002, DOE conducted a survey of the
National Mall in Washington, D.C., just prior to July Fourth celebrations.
Law enforcement officials used the survey to investigate unusual radiation
sources and ensure the Mall area was safe for the public.

Data from the baseline survey would help DOE and law enforcement detect
new radiological threats more quickly. In the event of a dirty-bomb
threat, DOE could conduct a new, or follow-up, survey and compare that
radiation data to the baseline survey data to identify locations with new
sources of radiation. Law enforcement officials looking for a nuclear or
radiological device would focus their attention on these new locations and
might be able to distinguish between pre-existing sources and potential
threats in order to locate a dirty bomb or nuclear device more quickly.
Conducting baseline surveys also provides a training opportunity for DOE
personnel. DOE officials told us that regular deployments helped to keep
job performance standards high for pilots, field detection specialists,
and the technicians who analyze the data.

DOE can also use a baseline radiation survey to assess changes in
radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist with cleanup
efforts. A follow-up survey could be taken afterward to compare changes
against the baseline radiation levels. This information can be used to
determine which areas need to be cleaned and to what levels. In 2004, DOD
funded a survey of the area around the Pentagon in Northern Virginia in
order to assist with cleanup efforts in case of nuclear or radiological
attack. While no study has reliably determined the cleanup costs of a
dirty-bomb explosion in an urban area, DOE estimates that cleaning up
after the detonation of a small to medium-size radiological device may
cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. DOE officials estimated
that information from background radiation surveys could save several
million dollars in cleanup costs because cleanup efforts could be focused
on decontaminating buildings and other areas to pre-existing levels of
radiation. Without a baseline radiation survey, cleanup crews would not
know the extent to which they would have to decontaminate the area.
Efforts to completely clean areas with levels of pre-existing radiation,
such as granite buildings or hospitals, would be wasteful and expensive.

DOE officials cautioned that background radiation surveys have limitations
and cannot be relied upon to detect all nuclear or radiological devices.
Aerial surveys may not be able to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded
radiological materials. Weather conditions and the type of building being
surveyed may also reduce the effectiveness of detection systems.
Furthermore, DOE may have to rely on good intelligence to find a device.
Law enforcement officials would need intelligence information to narrow
the search to a specific part of a city. Lastly, according to DOE
officials, baseline background radiation surveys may need to be conducted
periodically because radiation sources may change over time, especially in
urban areas. For example, new construction using granite, the installation
of medical equipment, or the heavy use of fertilizer all could change a
city's radiation background. Despite these limitations, without baseline
survey information, law enforcement officials may lose valuable time when
searching for nuclear or radiological threats by investigating
pre-existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. In addition, if
there were a nuclear or radiological attack, a lack of baseline
radiological data would likely make the cleanup more costly and time
consuming.

DOE Has Conducted a Survey of Only One Major City

In 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked DOE to survey
the New York City metro area. NYPD officials were aware that DOE had the
capability to measure background radiation and locate hot spots by
helicopter because DOE had used this capability at the World Trade Center
site in the days following September 11, 2001. DHS provided the city with
about $30 million in grant money to develop a regional radiological
detection and monitoring system. NYPD decided to spend part of this money
on a complete aerial survey of all five boroughs. DOE conducted the survey
in about 4 weeks in the summer of 2005, requiring over 100 flight hours to
complete at a cost of about $800,000.

According to NYPD officials, the aerial background radiation survey
exceeded their expectations, and they cited a number of significant
benefits that may help them better respond to a radiological incident.
First, NYPD officials said that in the course of conducting the survey,
they identified over 80 locations with unexplained radiological sources.
Teams of NYPD officers accompanied by DOE scientists and technicians
investigated each of these hot spots and determined whether they posed a
danger to the public. While most of these hot spots were medical isotopes
located at medical facilities and hospitals, according to NYPD officials,
awareness of these locations will allow them to distinguish false alarms
from real radiological threats and locate a radiological device more
quickly. Second, NYPD officers are now trained in investigating hot spots
and they have real-life experience in locating radiological sources.
Third, NYPD officials now have a baseline radiological survey of the city
to assist with cleanup efforts in the event of a radiological release.

In addition to identifying potential terrorist threats, a secondary
benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public health. One of the
over 80 locations with a radiological signature was a local park that was
once the site of an industrial plant. According to NYPD officials, the
survey disclosed that the soil there was contaminated by large quantities
of radium.^5 Brush fires in the area posed an imminent threat to public
health because traditional fire mitigation tactics of pushing flammable
debris into the middle of the park could release radiological
contamination into the air. Investigating locations with unexplained
radiological sources identified by the aerial background radiation survey
alerted NYPD officials to this threat, and they were able to prevent
public exposure to the material.

Because the extent to which the background radiation of a city changes
over time is not clear, NYPD officials have requested that DHS provide
money to fund a survey every year. With periodic surveys, NYPD hopes to
get a better understanding of how and to what extent background radiation
changes over time. NYPD officials also want to continue identifying
radiological sources in the city and to provide relevant training to their
officers.

Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility for Aerial
Background Radiation Surveys, Which Has Discouraged Both Agencies from
Developing a Strategy to Inform Cities about the Surveys

Despite the benefits of aerial background radiation surveys, neither DOE
nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and conducting
surveys. While DOE and DHS have taken some steps toward making greater use
of aerial surveys, they still have not developed a strategy to notify city
officials that such a capability exists, explained the benefits and
limitations of aerial surveys, and determined how to pay for the surveys.
According to DOE and DHS officials, New York City is the only city where a
background radiation survey has been completed.

As we reported in September 2006, we found that neither DOE nor DHS was
notifying city officials of the potential benefits of aerial surveys or of
the availability of such a capability. In addition, neither department had
evaluated the costs, benefits, or limitations of the aerial surveys to
help cities decide whether to request a survey. As a result, we
recommended that DOE and DHS conduct such an evaluation. After completing
this evaluation, we then recommended that DOE and DHS develop a strategy
to notify state and local government officials about the benefits and
limitations of the surveys so government officials could decide whether
they would benefit from the surveys. According to DOE officials, in April
2007, DOE began meeting with DHS to conduct the evaluation and the
departments are drafting a document that would describe the benefits and
limitations. They plan to distribute this document to state and local
governments to inform them about the surveys. However, the departments
have no specific timeframe for completing this document. In addition, DOE
and DHS notified one city--Chicago--about the benefits of the surveys
since we issued our report. DOE and DHS are working with the Chicago
Police Department to install radiation detection equipment on planes or
helicopters owned by the Chicago Police Department to conduct aerial
background radiation surveys. DOE officials told us that this approach may
be less costly and state and local governments may be able respond more
quickly to an emergency by using their own aircraft. If this approach is
successful, DOE officials told us they would recommend that other cities
also purchase and install radiation detection equipment on their own
aircraft. However, DOE officials did not provide a timeframe for
completing this project.

^5According to the Environmental Protection Agency, long-term exposure to
radium increases the risk of developing diseases such as lymphoma, bone
cancer, and leukemia.

DOE officials told us that the department is reluctant to conduct large
numbers of additional surveys if cities request them because they have a
limited number of helicopters, and these are needed to prevent and respond
to nuclear and radiological emergencies. Furthermore, they assert that DOE
does not have sufficient funding to conduct aerial background radiation
surveys. In fiscal year 2006, the emergency response budget for aerial
radiation detection was approximately $11 million for costs such as
aircraft maintenance, personnel, fuel, and detection equipment. DOE relies
on federal agencies and cities to reimburse them for the costs of surveys.
However, even if DHS funded cities to pay for surveys, as it did in New
York's case, DOE officials stated that payment would need to include costs
associated with the wear and tear on the helicopters. Furthermore, the
extra costs could not be completely recovered by increasing the charges to
the city because, according to DOE officials, DOE cannot accumulate money
from year to year to pay for future lump-sum repairs. In addition, DOE
officials view background radiation surveys as part of the homeland
security mission to prepare state and local officials against terrorist
attacks, not as part of DOE's emergency response mission. However, DOE
officials told us that because they possess the assets and expertise, they
would be willing to conduct additional surveys if DHS funded the full cost
of the surveys and covered the wear and tear on DOE's equipment.

DHS officials told us that it is not DHS's responsibility to conduct
aerial background radiation surveys or to develop such a capability.
According to DNDO, it does not have the expertise or capability to conduct
surveys, which are DOE's responsibility. However, DNDO is responsible for
assisting state and local governments' efforts to detect and identify
illicit nuclear and radiological materials, develop mobile detection
systems, and advise cities about different radiation detection technology
to help state and local officials decide which technologies would be most
beneficial. DNDO does not plan to conduct background surveys as part of
this effort, but it plans to work with DOE to advise cities and states on
the potential benefits of background surveys.

DHS also has a grant program to improve the capacity of state and local
governments to prevent and respond to terrorist and catastrophic events,
including nuclear and radiological attacks. In fiscal year 2007, about
$1.7 billion was available in grant funding for state and local
governments. DHS officials told us that this grant funding could be used
for radiation surveys if cities requested them. However, according to DHS
officials, the agency has not received any requests for funding other than
the 2005 request by New York City. While it is DHS's responsibility to
inform state and local governments about radiation detection technology,
it has neither an outreach effort nor does it maintain a central database
for informing cities and states about background radiation surveys.
Instead, DHS maintains a lessons-learned information-sharing database,
which is a national online network of best practices and lessons learned
to help plan and prepare for a terrorist attack. State and local
governments can enter information into this database, and DHS officials
told us they were not aware if New York City officials had done so.

More than a year after we issued our report, the status on background
radiation surveys remains largely unchanged. In short, in the absence of
clear mission responsibility, neither DOE nor DHS has any plans to conduct
additional surveys. In addition, no other city has requested one, in part,
because DOE and DHS have informed only one city--Chicago--about the
benefits of these surveys.

DOE's Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect Its
Key Emergency Response Facilities

DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of
physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, their
emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed across the
country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a
number of critical emergency response capabilities and assets are
available only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss would
significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly respond to a nuclear or
radiological threat. Because these capabilities and assets have not been
fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient
for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.

DOE Is Protecting Its Key Emergency Response Facilities with the Lowest Level of
Physical Security Measures Allowed under Its Guidance Because Some Capabilities
and Assets Have Been Dispersed

DOE is protecting its two Remote Sensing Laboratories at the lowest level
of physical security allowed under DOE guidance. According to DOE
officials, the lowest level of security is adequate because emergency
response assets and capabilities have been dispersed across the country
and are no longer concentrated at these facilities. DOE's November 2005
policy guidance for safeguarding and securing facilities required a review
of facilities protected at the lowest level of physical security to
determine whether they were "mission critical." Mission-critical
facilities have capabilities and assets that are not available at any
other location and cannot be easily and quickly reconstituted. Under DOE
guidance, facilities designated as mission critical must be protected at a
higher level of physical security. For example, DOE headquarters was
designated as mission critical because the loss of decision makers during
an emergency would impair the deployment and coordination of DOE
resources. As a result, DOE strengthened the physical security measures
around DOE headquarters by, among other things, adding vehicle barriers
around the facility.

In April 2006, the Office of Emergency Response reviewed the capabilities
and assets at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and determined that they
were not mission critical because if either one or both laboratories were
attacked and destroyed, DOE would be able to easily reconstitute their
capabilities and assets to meet mission requirements. Since September 11,
2001, DOE has dispersed some of the assets and capabilities once found
exclusively at the Remote Sensing Laboratories. Specifically, DOE has
expanded its search mission to include Radiological Assistance Program
(RAP) teams that are located at eight sites across the country. These
teams receive training and equipment similar to the search teams at the
Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as radiation detectors mounted in
backpacks and vehicles. They have also participated in a number of search
missions, including addressing potential threats at sporting events and
national political conventions, or assisting customs officials with
investigating cargo entering ports and border crossings.

DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at The Two Facilities,
and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper DOE's Ability to Respond to Nuclear
and Radiological Threats

Contrary to DOE's assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories'
capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the
country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique
emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would significantly
undermine DOE's ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological threat.
The critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the laboratories
include (1) teams that help minimize the consequences of a nuclear or
radiological attack, (2) planes and helicopters designed to measure
contamination levels and assist search teams in locating nuclear or
radiological devices, and (3) a sophisticated mapping system that tracks
contamination and the location of radiological sources in U.S. cities.
Furthermore, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching
for nuclear or radiological devices, the teams at the Remote Sensing
Laboratories remain the most highly trained and experienced search teams.

The consequence management teams that would respond within the first 24
hours of a nuclear or radiological attack are located at the Remote
Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams have specialized
equipment for monitoring and assessing the type, amount, and extent of
contamination. These teams are responsible for establishing an operations
center near the site of contamination to coordinate all of DOE's
radiological monitoring and assessment activities and to analyze
information coming from the field, including aerial survey data provided
by helicopters, planes, and ground teams monitoring radiation levels.

At these two laboratories, the teams also have specialized
equipment--emergency response planes and helicopters--that are designed to
detect, measure, and track radioactive material at the site of a nuclear
or radiological release to determine contamination levels. DOE has a
limited number of planes and helicopters designed for this mission at the
Remote Sensing Laboratories. The planes and helicopters use a
sophisticated radiation detection system to gather radiological
information and produce maps of radiation exposure and concentrations. It
is anticipated that the planes would arrive at an emergency scene first
and be used to determine the location and extent of ground contamination.
The helicopters would then be used to perform more detailed surveys of any
contamination. According to DOE officials, the planes and helicopters can
gather information on a wide area, in a shorter amount of time, without
placing ground teams at risk. Without this capability, DOE could not
quickly obtain comprehensive information about the extent of
contamination. The helicopters can also be used by search teams to locate
nuclear or radiological devices in U.S. cities. The helicopters can cover
a larger area in a shorter amount of time than teams on foot or in
vehicles. The ground search teams can conduct secondary inspections of
locations with unusual radiation levels identified by the helicopters.

The Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base also maintains a
sophisticated mapping system that can be used by consequence management
teams to track contamination in U.S. cities after a nuclear or
radiological attack. DOE collects information from its planes and
helicopters, ground monitoring teams, and computer modeling and uses this
system to provide detailed maps of the extent and level of contamination
in a city. Without this system, DOE would not be able to quickly analyze
the information collected by various emergency response capabilities and
determine how to respond most effectively to a nuclear or radiological
attack. This mapping system can also be used to help find nuclear or
radiological devices more quickly before they are detonated.

DOE officials told us the loss of these capabilities and assets that are
unique to the Remote Sensing Laboratories would devastate DOE's ability to
respond to a nuclear or radiological attack. State and local governments
would not receive information--such as the location and extent of
contamination--that they need in a timely manner in order to manage the
consequences of an attack and reduce the harm to public health and
property. Despite the importance of these capabilities and assets, DOE has
not developed contingency plans identifying capabilities and assets at
other locations that could be used in the event that one or both Remote
Sensing Laboratories were attacked. Specifically, DOE has not identified
which RAP team would assume responsibility for coordinating contamination
monitoring and assessment activities in the place of the consequence
management teams from Nellis. During an emergency, the lack of clearly
defined roles may hamper emergency response efforts.

DOE officials told us that in the event that the capabilities and assets
of both Remote Sensing Laboratories were destroyed, they could mobilize
and deploy personnel and equipment from the RAP teams or national
laboratories. The RAP teams and some national laboratories, such as
Sandia, have similar equipment that could be used to measure contamination
in a limited area. However, if both Remote Sensing Laboratories were
destroyed, the RAP teams and the national laboratories would not have
planes and helicopters to conduct large-scale contamination monitoring and
assessment. The RAP teams also do not have the equipment or expertise to
set up an operations center and analyze data that field teams would
collect on contamination levels. In April 2006, DOE's Office of
Independent Oversight, which is responsible for independently evaluating,
among other things, the effectiveness of DOE's programs, reported that
during performance tests, the RAP teams could not quickly provide state
and local governments with recommendations on what actions to take to
avoid or reduce the public's exposure to radiation and whether to evacuate
contaminated areas.^6 In addition, DOE officials told us, based on
training exercises, the demands of responding to two simultaneous nuclear
or radiological events strained all of DOE's capabilities to manage the
consequences. According to DOE officials, if the consequence management
teams at Nellis could not respond and there were multiple, simultaneous
attacks, DOE's capabilities to minimize the impact of a nuclear or
radiological attack would be significantly hampered.

DOE officials also told us that if Nellis Air Force Base were attacked,
their aerial contamination measuring assets would not be lost unless the
aircraft at Andrews Air Force Base were also destroyed. However, DOE
policy generally requires that some of its aerial assets stationed at
Andrews remain in the Washington, D.C., area to protect top government
decision makers and other key government assets. During a nuclear or
radiological emergency, DOE would need to rely on a limited airborne
capability to measure contamination levels. In addition, if there were
multiple simultaneous events, there would be considerable delay in
providing information to state and local governments about the extent of
contamination because DOE could assist only one city at a time.

Some DOE officials suggested that if DOE helicopters were not available to
provide assistance, DOE could request another helicopter and fit it with
radiation detectors. However, during an emergency, we found that DOE would
face a number of challenges in equipping a helicopter not designed for
measuring contamination. DOE officials told us that DOE has a memorandum
of understanding with the Department of Defense and other federal and
state agencies to use their helicopters and planes for transport and other
mission requirements, but that it is unlikely that DOD or any other agency
would provide them with aircraft during an emergency because those
agencies' priority would be to carry out their own missions, not to assist
DOE. Even if DOE were provided with helicopters, it does not have spare
radiation detectors like those found on its own helicopters, and even if
it did have spares, it would not have time to mount radiation detectors on
the exterior of the aircraft. DOE officials told us that radiation
detectors, like those found on their vehicles, could be placed inside an
airplane or helicopter, but the ability to measure contamination would be
significantly reduced compared with an exterior-mounted detector.

^6Department of Energy, Office of Security and Safety Performance
Assurance, Independent Oversight Inspection of the Radiological Assistance
Program (Washington, D.C., April 2006).

Furthermore, DOE does not conduct training exercises to simulate the
actions necessary to reconstitute the capabilities and assets unique to
the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as placing radiation detectors on
helicopters or testing the ability of RAP teams to conduct large-scale
contamination monitoring and assessment without the assistance of the
consequence management teams from Nellis. DOE officials told us that all
of their training scenarios and exercises involve the use of consequence
management teams and the planes and helicopters from the Remote Sensing
Laboratories. As a result, DOE does not know whether it would be able to
accomplish mission objectives without the capabilities and assets of the
Remote Sensing Laboratories.

Lastly, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching for
nuclear or radiological devices, Remote Sensing Laboratories have the most
highly trained and experienced search teams. For example, the search teams
at the Remote Sensing Laboratories are the only teams trained to conduct
physically demanding maritime searches to locate potential nuclear or
radiological devices at sea before they arrive at a U.S. port. The search
teams can also repair radiation equipment for search missions in the
field. Furthermore, these search teams are more prepared than the RAP
teams to enter environments where there is a threat of hazards other than
those associated with radiological materials, such as explosives. If there
is a threat of explosives in an area where a search mission would be
conducted, these teams have specialized equipment to detect explosives and
can more quickly request FBI ordnance disposal assistance in order to
complete their search mission. In April 2006, the Office of Independent
Oversight reported that the RAP teams did not always complete their search
missions when there was a high level of risk to the lives of the RAP team
members from explosives. The Office also reported that some RAP teams
refused to perform the mission unless all risk from explosives around a
device was removed and others completed the mission only after certain
safety criteria were met. According to this study, leaders of the RAP
teams had to make on-the-spot judgments weighing the safety of RAP team
members against their ability to complete the search mission because there
was a lack of guidance on how to respond.

Because of these concerns, we recommended in September 2006 that DOE
review the physical security measures at the Remote Sensing Laboratories
and determine whether additional measures should be taken to protect the
facilities against a loss of critical emergency response capabilities or
whether it was more cost-effective to fully disperse its capabilities and
assets to multiple areas of the country. Since we issued our report, DOE
has not made any upgrades or other changes to security at the Remote
Sensing Laboratories. In written comments responding to our
recommendations, DOE concluded that it was not cost-effective to further
disperse emergency response capabilities. In addition, DOE noted that it
would not be making any changes to the security of the Remote Sensing
Laboratories because the security measures were reviewed separately by the
Associate Administrator for Emergency Response and the Associate
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security and they agreed that security
measures were adequate. While DOE may have reviewed the physical security
measures at the Remote Sensing Laboratories, it did not specifically
address the security issues we raised. We continue to believe that these
measures may not be sufficient to protect unique and critical emergency
response capabilities at these facilities.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have
at this time.

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Gene Aloise
at (202) 512-3841. Leland Cogliani, Omari Norman, Carol Herrnstadt
Shulman, and Ned Woodward made key contributions to this testimony.

(360908)

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Highlights of GAO-08-285T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate

November 2007

COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to
Protect Key Emergency Response Facilities Could Be Strengthened

The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains emergency response capabilities
and assets to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological
threats in the United States. These capabilities are primarily found at
DOE's two key emergency response facilities--the Remote Sensing
Laboratories at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base,
Maryland. These capabilities took on increased significance after the
attacks of September 11, 2001, because of heightened concern that
terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in a major
U.S. city. DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for addressing
nuclear and radiological threats. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) is responsible for preparing the country to prevent and respond to a
potential nuclear or radiological attack.

This testimony discusses (1) the benefits of using DOE's aerial background
radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities and (2) the
physical security measures in place at DOE's two key emergency response
facilities and whether they are consistent with DOE guidance. It is based
on GAO's report on DOE's nuclear and radiological emergency response
capabilities, issued in September 2006 (Combating Nuclear Terrorism:
Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to
Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could be Strengthened [Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006]).

DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear
or radiological attack in the United States. One of these unique
capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial background radiation
surveys. These surveys can be used to compare changes in radiation levels
to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and
(2) measure contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist in
and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, only one
major city has been surveyed. Neither DOE nor DHS has mission
responsibility for conducting these surveys. DOE and DHS disagree about
which department is responsible for informing cities about the surveys,
and funding and conducting surveys if cities request them. In the absence
of clear mission responsibility, DOE and DHS have not informed cities
about the surveys and have not conducted any additional surveys.

DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of
physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,
capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological
emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are not
concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of critical
capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories
and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent
and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These capabilities
include the most highly trained teams for minimizing the consequences of a
nuclear or radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes than
can readily help locate nuclear or radiological devices or measure
contamination levels after a radiological attack. Because these
capabilities and assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical
security measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities
against a terrorist attack.

DOE Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background Radiation Survey

Source: DOE.

References

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