Military Readiness: Navy Is Making Progress Implementing Its	 
Fleet Response Plan, but Has Not Fully Developed Goals, Measures,
and Resource Needs (01-FEB-08, GAO-08-264).			 
                                                                 
The Navy initiated its Fleet Response Plan (FRP) in March 2003 as
a critical enabler to help meet the new demands of the		 
twenty-first century security environment. FRP represents a major
change in the way the Navy manages its forces, and is intended to
more rapidly prepare and then sustain readiness in ships and	 
squadrons. To achieve the desired capabilities under FRP, the	 
Navy has altered its training, maintenance, and manning 	 
practices. The Navy expects this new readiness approach will	 
enable its forces to provide presence and engagement in forward  
areas, as well as surge a greater number of ships on short	 
notice. The Navy intends to achieve this goal without increasing 
its operations and maintenance budget of about $40 billion for	 
each of the next 5 years. However, GAO previously reported that  
the Navy had not fully incorporated a sound management approach  
to guide and assess implementation of FRP. As a result, GAO was  
asked to examine the extent to which the Navy has (1) made	 
progress in implementing a sound management approach for FRP and 
(2) evaluated the long-term risks and tradeoffs of FRP-related	 
changes.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-264 					        
    ACCNO:   A80371						        
  TITLE:     Military Readiness: Navy Is Making Progress Implementing 
Its Fleet Response Plan, but Has Not Fully Developed Goals,	 
Measures, and Resource Needs					 
     DATE:   02/01/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Budget administration				 
	     Budgeting						 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military vessels					 
	     Naval operations					 
	     Naval personnel					 
	     Naval training					 
	     Naval warfare					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Ships						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Force structure					 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 
	     DOD Fleet Response Plan				 

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GAO-08-264

   

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: GAO: 

February 2008: 

Military Readiness: 

Navy Is Making Progress Implementing Its Fleet Response Plan, but Has 
Not Fully Developed Goals, Measures, and Resource Needs: 

Military Readiness: 

GAO-08-264: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-264, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Navy initiated its Fleet Response Plan (FRP) in March 2003 as a 
critical enabler to help meet the new demands of the twenty-first 
century security environment. FRP represents a major change in the way 
the Navy manages its forces, and is intended to more rapidly prepare 
and then sustain readiness in ships and squadrons. To achieve the 
desired capabilities under FRP, the Navy has altered its training, 
maintenance, and manning practices. The Navy expects this new readiness 
approach will enable its forces to provide presence and engagement in 
forward areas, as well as surge a greater number of ships on short 
notice. The Navy intends to achieve this goal without increasing its 
operations and maintenance budget of about $40 billion for each of the 
next 5 years. However, GAO previously reported that the Navy had not 
fully incorporated a sound management approach to guide and assess 
implementation of FRP. As a result, GAO was asked to examine the extent 
to which the Navy has (1) made progress in implementing a sound 
management approach for FRP and (2) evaluated the long-term risks and 
tradeoffs of FRP-related changes. 

What GAO Found: 

The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound 
management approach for FRP, but has not developed implementation 
goals, fully developed performance measures, or comprehensively 
assessed and identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals. 
GAOï¿½s prior work has shown that key elements of a sound management 
approach include: defining clear missions and desired outcomes, 
establishing implementation goals, measuring performance, and aligning 
activities with resources. The Navy has made progress in implementing 
FRP since GAOï¿½s prior reports. For example, it has established a goal 
of having three carrier strike groups deployed, three ready to deploy 
within 30 days of being ordered to do so, and one more within 90 days 
(referred to as 3+3+1). The Navy also has established a framework to 
set implementation goals for all forces, established some performance 
measures that are linked to the FRP phases, and begun efforts to 
identify needed resources. However, the Navy has not yet established a 
specific implementation goal for expeditionary strike groups and other 
forces. In addition, the Navy has not fully developed performance 
measures to enable it to assess whether carrier strike groups have 
achieved adequate readiness levels to deploy in support of the 3+3+1 
goal. Moreover, the Navy has not fully identified the resources 
required to achieve FRP goals. Until the Navyï¿½s management approach 
fully incorporates the key elements, the Navy may not be able to 
measure how well FRP is achieving its goals or develop budget requests 
based on the resources needed to achieve expected readiness levels. 

The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs 
associated with the changes made as FRP has been implemented, such as 
carrier operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. The 
Navy has extended the intervals between carrier dry-dock maintenance 
periods from 6 years to 8 years and begun a test program that will 
extend some carrier dry-dock intervals to as much as 12 years, and it 
has lengthened operational cycles for carriers and their airwings to 32 
months. GAO previously advocated that the Department of Defense adopt a 
risk management approach to aid in its decision making that includes 
assessing the risks of various courses of action. However, the Navy has 
not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of these recent 
changes because it has not performed a comprehensive assessment of how 
the changes, taken as a whole, might affect its ability to meet FRP 
goals and perform its missions. In addition, while the Navy has 
developed force structure plans that include two upcoming periods when 
the number of available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 
10, the plans included optimistic assumptions about the length of the 
gaps and the availability of existing carriers and did not fully 
analyze how the Navy would continue to meet FRP goals with fewer 
carriers. Until the Navy develops plans that use realistic assumptions 
and accurately identify the levels of risk the Navy is willing to 
accept during these gap periods, senior Navy leadership may not have 
the information it needs to make informed tradeoff decisions. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Navy take actions to fully develop 
implementation goals, performance measures, and links to resources for 
FRP and to assess the risks to its ability to meet these goals under 
changing conditions. The Navy generally concurred with the 
recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-264]. For more information, contact Janet 
St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

The Navy Has Taken Several Positive Steps, but Has Not Fully Developed 
Goals, Measures, and Resource Needs: 

The Navy Has Not Fully Considered Long-term Risks and Tradeoffs of 
Changes: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: FRP Phases: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

February 1, 2008: 

Congressional Committees: 

The twenty-first century security environment has created new demands 
for Navy forces, particularly with continued operations in support of 
the Global War on Terrorism. One initiative that the Navy is continuing 
to implement and mature to help meet these demands is its Fleet 
Response Plan (FRP). In March 2003, the Chief of Naval Operations 
initiated FRP to more rapidly prepare and then sustain readiness in 
ships and squadrons. Fleet Forces Command, the Navy command that holds 
principal responsibility for managing fleet personnel, training, 
requirements, maintenance, and operations, began to implement FRP in 
May 2003. To achieve the desired capabilities under FRP, the Navy has 
altered prior training, maintenance, and manning practices. The Navy 
expects this new readiness approach will enable its forces to provide 
not only presence and engagement in forward areas, but also surge a 
greater number of ships on short notice. The Navy's operations and 
maintenance budget is projected to remain at about $40 billion in 
constant dollars over the next 5 years. 

The Fleet Response Plan modifies the Navy's pre-2001 deployment 
pattern, replacing 6-month routine deployments with more flexible 
deployment options intended to enable the quick response of naval 
forces to crises, conflicts, or homeland defense needs. FRP set 
specific requirements for carrier strike groups, which typically 
include an aircraft carrier with an airwing, two destroyers, a frigate, 
cruiser, and support ship, and possibly, depending on the mission, a 
submarine. In June 2007, the Navy began extending FRP to expeditionary 
strike groups, which may include amphibious ships with a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit, aircraft, and landing craft; surface combatants 
such as a cruiser, a destroyer, and a frigate; and possibly, depending 
on the mission, a submarine and a land-based maritime patrol aircraft. 

We have previously reported on the Navy's implementation of 
FRP.[Footnote 1] In November 2005, we reported that while FRP 
represents a major change in the way the Navy manages its forces, it 
had not fully incorporated a sound management approach needed to guide 
and assess implementation. Moreover, the Navy had not fully tested and 
evaluated FRP or developed lessons learned to identify the 
effectiveness of its implementation. In 2005, we recommended that the 
Navy develop a comprehensive management plan with goals and performance 
measures to facilitate implementation of FRP and that it develop a 
comprehensive testing and evaluation plan to help determine whether FRP 
has been successful. The Department of Defense (DOD) generally agreed 
with our recommendations, citing several actions it had underway or 
planned. In 2004 we examined the maintenance impacts of FRP, and we 
observed that FRP did not shorten aircraft carrier maintenance 
intervals and that the impact of FRP on the Navy's maintenance budget 
was unknown. 

The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 
required us to report on a variety of issues pertaining to FRP 
management, readiness, and program expansion. [Footnote 2] These issues 
included: the Navy's management approaches to implementing FRP; the 
adequacy of Navy directives and guidance with respect to maintenance 
and training requirements and procedures; the adequacy of the Navy's 
evaluation criteria for the plan; the Navy's progress in identifying 
the amount of funding required to effectively implement the operations 
and maintenance requirements of the plan and the effect of providing 
less funding the identified amount; Navy data on aircraft carriers, 
destroyers, and cruisers that participated in the plan with respect to 
readiness, response time, and availability for routine or unforeseen 
deployments; and any recommendations pertaining to expanding the plan 
to include expeditionary strike groups. 

In April 2007, we briefed your offices on our preliminary observations. 
This report updates the information provided in the briefing and 
provides further detail based on the work we have completed since that 
time. Specifically, our objectives for this report were to assess the 
extent to which the Navy has (1) made progress in implementing a sound 
management approach for FRP, and (2) evaluated the long-term risks and 
tradeoffs of FRP-related changes. 

To assess the Navy's progress in developing a sound management 
approach, we reviewed and analyzed guidance and instructions on 
manning, maintenance, and training; and key studies, messages, and 
planning documents and compared these to best practices for managing 
and implementing major efforts identified in our prior reports. We also 
interviewed officials in the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Fleet Forces Command and 
Pacific Fleet; Naval Air and Sea Systems Commands; and Marine Corps 
Forces Command to obtain information about initiatives that the Navy 
has undertaken. To assess the extent to which the Navy has evaluated 
the long-term risks and tradeoffs of FRP-related changes, we analyzed 
historical and long-range carrier maintenance schedules, analyzed the 
Navy's plans for meeting FRP goals during periods when only 10 aircraft 
carriers are available, and interviewed Navy readiness officials in the 
offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and Fleet Forces Command. We 
addressed both of these objectives for both carrier and expeditionary 
strike groups. We conducted our review from November 2006 through 
October 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. The scope and methodology used in our review are described 
in further detail in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound 
management approach for FRP, but has not developed implementation 
goals, fully developed performance measures, or comprehensively 
assessed and identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals. 
Our prior work has shown that key elements of a sound management 
approach include defining clear missions and desired outcomes, 
establishing implementation goals, measuring performance, and aligning 
activities with resources.[Footnote 3] Since our prior reports, the 
Navy has made progress in implementing FRP by issuing two instructions 
that describe the FRP mission, define the four FRP phases, and 
establish responsibility for oversight and execution of the plan. In 
addition, the Navy has established a goal of having three carrier 
strike groups deployed, three ready to deploy within 30 days of being 
ordered to do so, and one more within 90 days (referred to as 3+3+1). 
The Navy has also established a framework to set implementation goals 
for all forces, established some performance measures that are linked 
to the FRP phases, and has begun efforts to identify needed resources. 
However, the Navy has not yet fully developed a sound management 
approach to FRP because the Navy still considers FRP an evolving 
construct and is continuing to work on each element. Specifically, the 
Navy has not yet established a specific implementation goal for 
expeditionary strike groups and other forces. Moreover, the Navy has 
not fully developed performance measures that enable it to assess 
whether carrier strike groups have achieved adequate readiness levels 
to deploy in support of the 3+3+1 goal. Existing performance measures 
also lack some details about acceptable levels of performance and 
scope. In addition, the Navy has not fully identified the resources 
required to achieve FRP goals. While the Navy has sponsored several 
studies to identify FRP costs, these studies used assumptions that are 
now outdated, such as a 12-carrier fleet, and did not link resources to 
readiness requirements. The Navy has recently established a board to 
identify training requirements and costs by FRP phase, and a task force 
to link operation and maintenance costs to FRP goals for a specific 
readiness level; however, it is not clear when these efforts will be 
complete or whether the results will be used to develop long-term 
guidance. Until the Navy's management approach fully incorporates all 
of the key elements, the Navy may not be able to measure how well FRP 
is achieving its goals or develop budget requests based on the 
resources needed to achieve expected readiness levels. We are 
recommending that the Navy establish implementation goals for the 
application of FRP to other forces; establish required overall 
readiness levels for each FRP phase; develop additional performance 
measures; and fully develop its ability to identify how resources 
should be linked to FRP phases, goals, and readiness levels. 

The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs 
associated with the changes made as FRP has been implemented, such as 
carrier operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. The 
Navy has extended the intervals between carrier dry-dock maintenance 
periods from 6 years to 8 years and begun a test program that will 
extend some carrier dry-dock intervals to as much as 12 years, and it 
has lengthened operational cycles for carriers and their airwings to 32 
months. We have previously advocated that DOD adopt a comprehensive 
risk management approach to aid in its decision making that includes, 
among other things, assessing the risks of various courses of action 
for both near-and long-term challenges. Prior to making changes to its 
maintenance cycle in the past, the Navy has conducted assessments of 
the potential effects of the changes. However, the Navy has not fully 
considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of these recent changes 
because it has not performed a comprehensive assessment of how the 
changes, taken as a whole, might affect its ability to meet FRP goals 
and perform its missions. Without assessing the short-and long-term 
risks and tradeoffs associated with the changes in maintenance and 
operational cycles, it will be difficult for the Navy to determine the 
extent to which these changes could affect its ability to meet FRP 
goals and perform its full range of missions. In addition, while the 
Navy has developed force structure plans that include two upcoming 
periods when the number of available[Footnote 4] aircraft carriers 
temporarily drops from 11 to 10, the plans included optimistic 
assumptions about the length of the gaps and the availability of 
existing carriers and did not fully analyze how the Navy would continue 
to meet FRP goals with fewer carriers. Until the Navy develops plans 
that use realistic assumptions and accurately identify the levels of 
risk the Navy is willing to accept during these gap periods, senior 
Navy leadership may not have the information it needs to make informed 
tradeoff decisions. To improve the Navy's ability to weigh the 
tradeoffs associated with meeting FRP goals, we recommend that the Navy 
perform a risk assessment that considers the effects of changes in 
carrier strike group operational and maintenance cycles under a range 
of force structure assumptions, and that identifies strategies to 
mitigate potential risks. Such a risk assessment should integrate plans 
to meet FRP goals during two upcoming periods when the number of 
available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 10. 

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our 
recommendation to identify how resources should be linked to the Fleet 
Response Plan phases, goals, and readiness levels and publish 
appropriate guidance, and partially agreed with our other 
recommendations. However, the department did not identify what, if any, 
specific actions it would take beyond those it has already begun and 
which we evaluated as part of our review. For example, in response to 
our recommendation that the Navy perform a risk assessment that 
considers the effects of changes on carrier strike group operational 
and maintenance cycles under a range of force structure assumptions, 
DOD stated no further direction from the Secretary of Defense was 
needed but the Navy would continue to update its plans based on current 
risk assessments. In light of the possible impact on operations and 
potential financial impacts, we continue to believe that the Navy 
should initiate an integrated risk assessment. 

Background: 

Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, only those Navy 
ships and air squadrons at peak readiness were deployed overseas, 
usually for 6 months at a time. Most of the Navy's remaining units were 
not available because they were in the early stages of their 
maintenance or training cycles, or because the Navy did not have good 
visibility of the readiness of these units. This prompted the Chief of 
Naval Operations in March 2003 to task the Commander of Fleet Forces 
Command to develop the FRP concept to enhance the Navy's surge 
capability. The Chief of Naval Operations approved the concept and 
directed the Commander of Fleet Forces Command to be responsible and 
accountable for effectively implementing the plan. The Commander of 
Fleet Forces Command is responsible for overall coordination, 
establishment, and implementation of integrated requirements and 
policies for manning, equipping, and training both Atlantic and Pacific 
fleet units[Footnote 5] throughout the training cycle and is 
responsible for articulating all fleet warfighting and readiness 
requirements to the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Composition of Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups: 

Carrier strike groups are typically centered around an aircraft carrier 
and its airwing, and also include a guided missile cruiser; two guided 
missile destroyers; a frigate; an attack submarine; and one or more 
supply ships with ammunition, fuel, and supplies (such as food and 
spare parts). The Navy currently has 11 aircraft carriers in service, 
with two additional carriers under construction. (The carriers are 
listed in app. III.) Generally, three carrier strike groups are 
deployed at any given time. The three deployed carriers include the USS 
Kitty Hawk, which is home ported in Japan and is counted as being 
continuously deployed. This carrier provides most of the U.S. naval 
presence in the western Pacific Ocean region and some in the Indian 
Ocean/Arabian Sea region. Carriers originating from the eastern and 
western United States have traditionally provided presence in the 
Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea regions, respectively. 
There are also 10 carrier airwings, one of which accompanies each 
deployed carrier. While the composition of each airwing can be tailored 
to the carrier's specific mission, each airwing typically includes a 
helicopter squadron as well as squadrons of aircraft for attack 
(composed of aircraft such as the F/A-18), electronic warfare (composed 
of aircraft such as the EA-6B), and reconnaissance (composed of 
aircraft such as the E-2C) missions. The Navy cites a variety of roles 
in which carrier strike groups may be employed, for example they (1) 
are deployed worldwide in support of U.S. interests and commitments; 
(2) respond to global crises from peacetime to full-scale war; (3) can 
operate as the cornerstone of joint/allied maritime expeditionary 
forces in times of crisis; and (4) can operate and support aircraft 
attacks on enemies, protect friendly forces, and engage in sustained 
independent operations of war. 

Expeditionary strike groups are typically centered on amphibious ships 
with a Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit, aircraft, and landing 
craft. Each expeditionary strike group notionally includes one 
amphibious assault ship, one amphibious transport dock ship, and one 
dock landing ship. These amphibious ships together can embark a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit consisting of about 2,200 Marines, their aircraft, 
their landing craft, their combat equipment, and about 15 days worth of 
supplies. Like a carrier strike group, the expeditionary strike group 
may also include several surface combatants such as a cruiser, 
destroyer, and frigate; an attack submarine; and one or more P-3 long- 
range, land-based, maritime patrol aircraft. Expeditionary strike 
groups are designed to be independently deployable, strike-capable 
naval formations, but they can also operate in conjunction with carrier 
strike groups to form larger naval task forces. Generally, two or three 
expeditionary strike groups are forward-deployed at any given time. 

FRP Cycle: 

FRP represents a change in the way the Navy manages its forces. The 
plan changes the manner in which the Navy maintains, trains, mans, and 
deploys its ships to allow a greater number of ships to surge on short 
notice while at the same time meeting forward-presence requirements. 
Four phases within the FRP cycle serve as the framework to more rapidly 
prepare and sustain the readiness of ships, aircraft, and personnel. As 
depicted in figure 1, the four FRP phases are (1) basic, or unit-level 
training; (2) integrated training; (3) sustainment (which may include 
one or more extended periods of deployment); and (4) maintenance. 

Figure 1: FRP Phases: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a representation of the FRP Phases. The following data 
is depicted: 

Basic: 
Complete unit-level training; 
Aircraft squadrons focus on basic capabilities and limited tactical 
skills in their highest priority mission areas. 

Integrated: 
Independent unit ready for tasking or maritime security surge ready; 

Sustainment: 
Major combat operations surge, then, major combat operations ready; 
Routine deployment; 
Aircraft squadrons receive highest priority for resources during this 
phase. 

Maintenance: 
Approximately 9 weeks for surface combatants; 
Up to 11 months for carriers. 

Total time cycle: 27ï¿½32 months[a]. 

Sources: GAO analysis of U.S. Navy data; Art Explosion (clipart). 

[A] The length of the FRP cycle varies by type of ship or aircraft. 

[End of figure] 

At the end of the basic phase, a unit is characterized as an 
"independent unit ready for tasking" and may be assigned independent 
operations in support of homeland security, counternarcotics missions, 
or assigned to provide disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. As 
the training progresses, the capabilities of the units increase 
accordingly as do the roles and missions assigned. Once the basic phase 
is completed and the integrated phase begins, training can be tailored 
to meet a combatant commander's request for a specific capability, such 
as to support antipiracy operations, and the unit is characterized as 
"maritime security surge" capable. Upon completion of the integrated 
phase, a unit begins the sustainment phase and is characterized as 
"major combat operations surge" capable, meaning the unit is ready for 
operational employment, but is not necessarily able to lead combat 
force operations. Once a unit is certified through advanced integrated 
training and is fully capable of conducting all forward-deployed 
operations, it attains the status of "major combat operations ready." 
Routine deployments occur during the sustainment phase. Finally, ships 
spend time in maintenance phase, when major shipyard or depot-level 
repairs, upgrades, and modernization occur. The Fleet Forces Command 
and Pacific Fleet commanders have delegated responsibility to their 
subordinate force commanders (such as air, submarine, and surface) for 
overseeing the FRP's basic phase; and they have delegated their 
geographical fleet commanders (such as the Seventh Fleet, which 
operates in the Western Pacific) responsibility for overseeing the 
integrated and sustainment phases. 

The Navy Has Taken Several Positive Steps, but Has Not Fully Developed 
Goals, Measures, and Resource Needs: 

The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound 
management approach for FRP, but has not fully developed such an 
approach because the Navy's implementation of FRP is still evolving. 
The Navy's implementation of FRP has included some key elements of a 
sound management approach, such as defining clear missions and desired 
outcomes, developing some performance measures, and beginning to 
identify needed resources. However, the Navy has not fully incorporated 
certain key elements, such as fully developing implementation goals or 
performance measures and aligning activities with resources. 

The Navy Has Taken Several Positive Steps to Implement a Sound 
Management Approach for FRP: 

The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound 
management approach for FRP since our prior reports. Our prior work has 
shown that key elements of a sound management approach include defining 
clear missions and desired outcomes, establishing implementation goals, 
measuring performance, and aligning activities with resources.[Footnote 
6] The Navy's implementation of FRP has included some of these 
elements. For example, the Navy has issued two FRP instructions, one in 
August 2006 and another in August 2007.[Footnote 7] The August 2007 
instruction defined the FRP mission as providing ready Navy forces to 
meet combatant commanders' requests for forces in support of the 
nation's maritime security. These forces consist of forward operating 
and U.S.-based assets that may rotationally deploy or surge. Both 
instructions also defined the four FRP phases, defined notional lengths 
for each phase, and established responsibility for oversight and 
execution of the plan with Fleet Forces and Pacific Fleet commanders 
and their subordinate force and geographic fleet commanders. 

The Navy has also updated instructions in the areas of personnel, 
maintenance, and training to reflect desired outcomes under FRP. For 
example, in January 2007, the Navy revised its personnel instruction 
that provided guidelines on personnel deployment length under 
FRP.[Footnote 8] The new instruction sets limits on the length of 
deployments, dwell times between deployments, and requirements for time 
spent in home port. The Chief of Naval Operations must grant a waiver 
if those limits are exceeded. In the absence of a waiver, deployments 
are limited to 7 months for units with a single deployment and 6 months 
for units with multiple deployments within the same FRP cycle. In 
addition, units must spend at least as much time between any two 
deployments as they did on their most recent deployment; and units must 
spend a minimum of 50 percent of the time in their home port over an 
FRP cycle. With regard to maintenance, the Navy has revised notional 
depot maintenance schedules to reflect the FRP cycle, and developed 
guidelines on out-of-depot continuous maintenance. With regard to 
training, the Navy revised surface, carrier, and air squadron training 
readiness instructions to reflect changes in training phases and to 
show the exercises that are expected to be completed in each phase. 

In addition, the Navy established a 6+1 implementation goal for carrier 
strike groups, meaning that it aims to have six carrier strike groups 
available to deploy within 30 days and one more within 90 
days.[Footnote 9] In its August 2007 instruction, the Navy modified 
this goal to 3+3+1 and linked the goal to the FRP phases. As that 
instruction noted, 3+3+1 means that the Navy's goal is to have three 
carrier strike groups deployed, three ready to deploy within 30 days of 
being ordered to do so (in the FRP sustainment or integrated phases), 
and one prepared to deploy within 90 days (in the FRP basic phase). The 
Navy plans to use this same framework, which took the form X+Y+Z, to 
set implementation goals for all forces. The first variable (X) refers 
to the number of ships or aircraft deployed, the second (Y) refers to 
the number that will be in a surge status, and (Z) refers to the number 
that will be in a Ready for Tasking[Footnote 10] status. 

Furthermore, the Navy has developed some performance measures to use in 
evaluating its performance under FRP. In its August 2007 instruction, 
the Navy established some performance measures for each FRP phase. For 
example, two principal measures will be used to assess performance in 
the maintenance phase: on-time completion of maintenance periods and 
assessment scores for the level of maintenance completed.[Footnote 11] 
The instruction also delineates performance measures for training in 
FRP phases. The array of performance measures spelled out in the 
instruction broke new ground by reaching across the entire FRP cycle 
with measures that can be associated with a numeric goal and evaluated 
over time. For example, one measure of maintenance efficiency was "on- 
time completion of maintenance," and the Navy associated the measure 
with a numeric goal of delivering ships within 30 days of the scheduled 
completion date. Lastly, the Navy's aviation community has developed 
the Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program training and 
readiness funding profiles. That program has developed a matrix that 
sets out expected readiness levels for aircraft squadrons, expressed in 
terms of the current readiness reporting system's 5-point scale (with 1 
being the highest and 5 the lowest), by squadron type and month of the 
FRP cycle. Available resources are allocated based on a tiered 
readiness profile, with the highest priority given to deployed units 
and units in pre-deployment sustainment. For example, an F-18 A/B/C/D 
squadron could expect 50 percent of required funding in the first month 
of its maintenance phase in order to achieve a training readiness level 
of 2.9, compared to 80 percent of required funding in the fifth month 
of sustainment phase (which corresponds to the first month of a typical 
deployment) in order to achieve a training readiness level of 1.9. 

The Navy has also been working on other initiatives that include 
identifying and validating the cost of the fleet response training 
plans, calculating the notional training costs of a carrier strike 
group through the FRP phases, and developing metrics to link operations 
and maintenance costs for current and future years to FRP 
implementation goals. 

The Navy Has Not Developed Comprehensive Implementation Goals, Fully 
Developed Performance Measures, or Fully Identified Resources Required 
to Achieve FRP Goals: 

The Navy has not developed comprehensive implementation goals for all 
Navy assets, finished developing performance measures, or fully 
identified all the resources required to achieve FRP goals-which are 
all key elements of a sound management approach. Specifically, the Navy 
has not yet established a specific implementation goal for 
expeditionary strike groups and other forces that is analogous to the 
3+3+1 goal for carrier strike groups. In addition, the Navy has not 
fully developed performance measures because it has not established 
required readiness levels that would enable it to measure whether the 
carrier strike groups can meet the 3+3+1 goal, and existing performance 
measures also lack some details about acceptable levels of performance 
and scope. Furthermore, the Navy has not shown that it has identified 
all resources required to achieve FRP goals or fully aligned needed 
resources with FRP activities. 

The Navy Has Not Established Implementation Goals for Expeditionary 
Strike Groups or Other Forces: 

The Navy has not yet established implementation goals for expeditionary 
strike groups and other forces.[Footnote 12] While the Navy began 
extending FRP to expeditionary strike groups in June 2007, it has not 
developed an implementation goal for expeditionary strike groups that 
would be analogous to the 3+3+1 goal for carrier strike groups because 
it has only recently begun to apply FRP to expeditionary strike groups. 
Marine Corps officials view FRP's goal of promoting increased readiness 
of amphibious ships as promising, so long as it does not have the 
effect of reducing the forward presence of the Marine Expeditionary 
Units that embark on those ships. The Navy has also applied the FRP 
concept to ship configurations that operate outside the umbrella of 
either type of strike group, for both missions related to the Global 
War on Terrorism and relief efforts, such as Hurricane 
Katrina.[Footnote 13] However, the Navy has not established specific 
FRP implementation goals for these other forces, other than a general 
goal to have some forces deployed, some preparing for deployment, and 
some in the basic phase of FRP. Navy officials agree that specific FRP 
goals for these other forces are needed, and officials at Fleet Forces 
Command said that preliminary goals have been developed for submarines, 
surface ships, and other types of forces. However, these goals had not 
been finalized at the time of our review and are not yet being used to 
guide FRP implementation. Moreover, the preliminary goal for surface 
ships was expressed in a single aggregated figure that included 
destroyers, cruisers, frigates, amphibious ships, and minesweepers. An 
aggregate figure may not provide a meaningful goal, though, as some 
ships, such as destroyers, may be used in a variety of roles: as 
components of carrier or expeditionary strike groups or as part of 
smaller task forces. Until the Navy develops implementation goals for 
all force configurations, it will not know whether it has enough ships 
to be distributed among all possible roles. Furthermore, without goals 
that establish how many expeditionary strike groups and other forces 
are needed to be ready to deploy, the Navy may not be able to determine 
whether it can provide all desired capabilities under FRP. 

The Navy Has Not Fully Developed FRP Performance Measures: 

Although the Navy has developed some performance measures in its 2007 
FRP instruction and linked these measures to the four FRP phases, its 
performance measures are not fully developed for two reasons. First, 
the Navy has not established required readiness levels in its current 
readiness system that would enable it to measure whether the carrier 
strike groups are ready to deploy in support of the 3+3+1 goal. The 
Navy currently reports unit readiness in terms of the Status of 
Resources and Training System (SORTS), but DOD plans to transition to a 
new system in 2009. SORTS uses a 5-point scale to assess units' ability 
to meet the full range of their wartime missions, including major 
combat operations. Overall SORTS scores, as well as individual scores 
in each of five subcategories,[Footnote 14] are presented to the Chief 
of Naval Operations in weekly and monthly readiness briefings, and 
readiness is also reported to Congress quarterly, as required by law. 
[Footnote 15] However, the Navy has not defined what overall readiness 
levels are required to move ships from one FRP phase to another. The 
Navy has established one phase-specific overall readiness measure. 
Units must reach an overall readiness level of C-2, which is the next- 
to-highest level, by the end of the integrated phase of FRP. The Navy 
has also specified that units must achieve a certain training readiness 
level by the end of the basic phase of FRP, but an overall readiness 
level has not been specified. Moreover, although units are supposed to 
be able to perform major combat operations while in the sustainment 
phase, the Navy has not established a readiness level that would enable 
it to measure when a unit was ready to transition from surge-to 
deployment-ready status. While some Navy officials have said that they 
believe that the requirement for deploying beyond the continental 
United States--regardless of mission or FRP phase--is C-2, they were 
unaware of any formal guidance to that effect. 

The Navy relies on institutional knowledge and the commanders' judgment 
to make the determination of when a unit such as a carrier strike group 
is ready to deploy. Further, the Navy has not fully defined required 
readiness levels because Navy officials are reluctant to invest in 
developing measures based on SORTS, a legacy system that DOD will 
discontinue as it introduces the new Defense Readiness Reporting System 
by the middle of fiscal year 2009. Officials plan to continue to report 
readiness information to Congress using SORTS until the new system is 
fully in place. Under the new system, the Secretary of the Navy is 
charged with defining the mission-essential tasks that will be used to 
assess units' readiness for a range of potential missions. However, 
these tasks have not yet been fully defined. Without a clear 
requirement, senior leadership may not be able to determine whether 
implementation goals are being met, and might instead use imprecise 
proxy measures--such as the raw number of carriers that are not in 
depot maintenance--as a way of estimating how many carrier strike 
groups are available for deployment. Moreover, planners may not know 
what required readiness level to use as a standard when developing 
budget requests and making resource allocation decisions. 

Second, the August 2007 FRP instruction outlined several performance 
measures for specific tasks, but some of these measures lacked details 
about acceptable levels of performance and scope. Navy 
guidance[Footnote 16] directs that each complete standard for 
determining whether a task can be accomplished should consist of one or 
more measures as well as a criterion, or quantitative description of 
the acceptable level of performance, for each measure. For example, a 
measure might be "on-time maintenance," and its associated criterion 
might be "within 30 days of promised completion date." However, in some 
cases the measures described in the FRP instruction lacked criteria. 
For example, the instruction contained five measures of basic phase 
performance,[Footnote 17] but none of these measures specified criteria 
about how well units must perform. Although information for one of the 
measures (the M-rating--required training readiness under the current 
readiness reporting system) could be inferred from Navy training 
manuals, the other four measures lacked quantitative descriptions. For 
example, the "cost performance" measure did not provide a quantitative 
description (e.g., percentage of budgeted funds expended) or a numeric 
goal (e.g., 95 percent). 

The FRP instruction also did not fully address the scope of some of the 
performance measures. For example, the maintenance phase performance 
measure dealing with on-time maintenance completion did not indicate 
whether it was applicable to aircraft as well as ships; nor did four of 
the five basic phase performance measures. In addition, while FRP 
changes the manner in which the Navy maintains, trains, mans, and 
deploys its ships, the instruction outlines performance measures 
pertaining to maintenance, training, and deployment, but it did not 
contain performance measures pertaining to manning. Navy officials have 
said that they believe there is a goal of fully manning all ships and 
aircraft at all times. Although this goal has appeared in various Navy 
briefings, it is not documented in official Navy guidance. Navy 
officials observed that FRP is still an evolving construct, and stated 
that the Fleet Readiness Enterprise, which includes representatives 
from training and readiness directorates, is developing appropriate 
criteria that will delineate acceptable levels of performance. 
Moreover, a Navy official noted that work that will provide further 
details for the established performance measures is underway at lower 
levels of command. However, until the FRP performance measures are 
fully linked to quantified levels of acceptable performance, encompass 
ships and aircraft, as applicable, and provide measures to assess 
appropriate manning levels, decision makers may be unable to determine 
the extent to which FRP is achieving its goals. 

The Navy Has Not Fully Identified Resources Needed to Implement FRP: 

The Navy also has not fully identified all resources required to 
achieve FRP goals or aligned needed resources with FRP activities. In 
the past, the Navy sponsored several studies to identify FRP costs, but 
these are of limited utility to the Navy's understanding of links 
between resources and FRP activities because they included a goal that 
FRP would be cost-neutral, relied on assumptions that are now outdated, 
and lacked other details. The Navy's principal studies[Footnote 18] 
consequently did not reflect a bottom-up assessment of the resources 
needed to implement FRP and achieve certain required readiness levels. 
Additionally, these studies used assumptions that are now outdated, 
such as a 12-carrier fleet, the former "6+2" carrier strike group 
implementation goal, and a 27-month carrier strike group operational 
cycle. These assumptions affect the proportion of time that carriers 
spend in maintenance over their life cycles and the urgency with which 
any single carrier might have to be readied to surge, either of which 
would have resource implications. In addition, the studies did not 
analyze the cost impact of relying more heavily on pier-side continuous 
maintenance rather than depot maintenance, deploying for more than 6 
months at a time or more than once in the same operational cycle, or 
preparing for an actual surge. In case of a surge, for example, several 
ships might need to be readied within the same 30-day period, imposing 
additional costs on shipyards, and aircraft might need to be 
transferred from one airwing to another, raising transportation costs. 

More recently, the Navy established several task forces and initiatives 
to help identify training requirements and costs, and to link costs to 
expected readiness levels. However, these efforts are ongoing and have 
not yet produced a comprehensive approach for aligning activities with 
resources. For example, the Navy has established at least two bodies, 
the Fleet Training Board of Directors and a Task Force on Readiness, 
whose work should help the Navy align its FRP activities with its 
resources and funding needs. The Fleet Training Board is tasked with 
establishing a process for calculating and tracking fleet training 
costs, which involves validating all costs associated with training as 
well as identifying excesses and gaps in the training process.[Footnote 
19] Although the Fleet Training Board has defined time frames for 
presenting briefings to senior Navy leadership, its charter was still 
in draft as of September 2007. The Navy's Task Force on Readiness, 
whose charter was approved in April 2007, aims to develop a 
comprehensive set of metrics linked to cost in order to inform current- 
year execution of readiness objectives and future-year planning, 
programming, and budgeting of readiness requirements. This linkage will 
allow the Navy to identify the operations and maintenance funding 
needed to execute various FRP implementation goals, such as the carrier 
strike group's goal of 3+3+1, at specific readiness levels. However, 
the task force has not yet shown how the three variables-funding, 
implementation goals, and readiness levels-would interact and how a 
change in one variable would affect the outcomes for the other two. The 
task force on readiness has set a goal of having its results 
incorporated into the development of the fiscal year 2010 budget. 
However, it is not clear how the results of this task force will be 
disseminated or whether they will be used to develop formal guidance 
that could be used to develop future budgets. While the groups are 
taking steps in the right direction, without a thorough analysis of the 
costs of FRP that is based on updated information about force 
structure, goals, and operations and maintenance cycles and that links 
resource inputs to expected readiness outputs, the Navy may be unable 
to identify what resources would be needed to achieve the intended 
benefits under FRP and to develop its budget requests to reflect those 
needs. 

The Navy Has Not Fully Considered Long-term Risks and Tradeoffs of 
Changes: 

The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs 
associated with the changes it has made in areas such as carrier 
operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. Specifically, 
the Navy has made several changes in its maintenance and operational 
cycles to facilitate FRP; however, the Navy has not performed an 
integrated assessment of how the changes would, taken as a whole, 
affect its ability to meet FRP goals and perform its full range of 
missions. Moreover, although the Navy has developed plans to show how 
it would continue to meet FRP goals during two upcoming periods when 
the number of available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 
10, these plans do not consider several issues. 

The Navy Has Not Fully Assessed Changes in Carrier Maintenance and 
Operational Cycles: 

The Navy has made several changes to maintenance and operational cycles 
to facilitate FRP, but it has not fully assessed the implications of 
these changes. Specifically, the Navy has extended the intervals 
between carrier dry-dock maintenance periods from 6 years to 8 years 
and begun a test program that will extend some carrier dry-dock 
intervals to as much as 12 years, or only three times during their life 
cycles. It has also lengthened operational cycles for carriers and 
their airwings to 32 months. We have previously advocated that DOD 
adopt a comprehensive risk management approach to aid in its decision 
making that includes, among other things, assessing the risks of 
various courses of action for both near-and long-term challenges. 
[Footnote 20] 

Prior to making changes to its maintenance cycle in the past, the Navy 
has conducted assessments of the potential effects of the changes. For 
example, when the Navy altered its previous system for scheduling depot 
maintenance[Footnote 21] about a decade ago, the engineering community 
conducted a formal study to determine which types of maintenance could 
be performed at greater intervals without having a negative impact on 
the integrity of the carrier or its expected total service life. A 
similar study was completed in 2005 and used as the basis for revising 
the notional depot maintenance schedule the following year to extend 
the dry-docking cycle from 6 to 8 years. At that time, officials 
concluded that the proposed extension was technically acceptable and 
contained a manageable level of risk. Since then, the Navy has again 
extended the dry-docking cycle, with a 12-year cycle planned for the 
Nimitz as a test case and possible further extensions for other 
carriers on a case by case basis. However, the Nimitz, which is the 
oldest ship in its class, has spent more time in depot maintenance 
during the first half of its service life than is planned for newer 
ships and therefore might be an atypical example of the class. 
Officials have stated that, while they will not conduct a comprehensive 
study of the entire class of ships, they are confident that their test 
study of the Nimitz will suffice to collect the data they need to 
inform their decision as to whether to extend the cycle for other 
ships. 

The Navy has also extended the carrier operational cycle from the pre- 
FRP 27 months to 32 months. Operational cycles were extended to 32 
months in tandem with the extension of carrier dry-docking cycles, and 
the technical studies that were performed at the time to determine the 
effect on carriers applied to both operational and maintenance cycles. 
However, these studies did not examine the full impact on carriers' 
accompanying airwings, even though an effect of the extension of the 
operational cycle is a corresponding increase in the air squadron 
operational cycle. As a result of the extension of the operational 
cycle, which may now last as long as 32 months, a Navy official stated 
that one capstone pilot training exercise is conducted less frequently 
than in the past. Pilots participate in this exercise, at Naval Air 
Station Fallon, once per training cycle, normally shortly after they 
complete the basic phase. During the air squadron training cycle that 
existed prior to FRP, pilots participated once every 2 years; now they 
are only required to do so once per FRP cycle, which is every 27 to 32 
months. While Navy officials have told us that they were unsure what 
effect less frequent Fallon exercises would have on pilot skills and 
are reviewing the extent to which Fallon exercises may need to be 
repeated during a multiple-deployment FRP cycle, they did not provide 
us with documentation of their review or evidence that they had studied 
the issue at the time the decision to extend the operational cycle was 
made. 

The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of 
these changes to its maintenance and operational cycles because it has 
not performed a comprehensive assessment of how the changes, 
interacting with one another, might affect its ability to meet FRP 
goals and perform its full range of missions. As a combined result of 
increases to both maintenance and operational cycles, carriers have 
fewer opportunities to be inspected in dry dock. In addition, they 
spend about 22 percent less time in any type of depot maintenance 
period compared to the pre-FRP 24-month cycle.[Footnote 22] Since the 
oldest Nimitz-class carrier was commissioned about 32 years ago and the 
newest is still under construction, neither we nor the Navy can know, 
based on experience, all the effects that maintenance or operational 
cycle increases could have on the carriers. Two possibilities have 
arisen in discussions with Navy officials: extensions could have an 
impact on total service life, and extending dry docking cycles beyond 8 
years or operational cycles beyond 32 months could limit the 
maintenance community's ability to respond to problems quickly. 
However, there was no consensus about the likelihood or possible 
severity of either of these outcomes. 

Some evidence suggests that lengthening intervals between depot 
maintenance periods may be associated with a reduction in total carrier 
service life. For example, the 2006 guidance from the Chief of Naval 
Operations[Footnote 23] on maintenance intervals projected that the 
service life for Nimitz-class nuclear carriers would be slightly 
reduced compared to past estimates. Moreover, FRP was developed to 
enable carriers to be deployed for more time than before and under 
conditions--such as short-notice surges with a premium on providing a 
quick response--that tend to use up reactor fuel in nuclear carriers 
more rapidly than would be the case with longer deployments with longer 
transit time at slower speeds. In Nimitz-class carriers, reactor fuel 
is replenished only once, at the midpoint of a carrier's life cycle, at 
about the 23-year mark. Therefore, if reactor fuel is used up in less 
than the scheduled time, the carrier may reach both the midpoint and 
end of its service life earlier than planned. In addition, the Navy's 
analysis leading to the operational cycle extension from 27 to 32 
months assumed that operating tempo would not increase and carriers 
would not make multiple deployments in a single FRP cycle. If the Navy 
did have to replace carriers sooner than planned, there could 
potentially be significant effects on long-term Navy budget 
requirements. Without assessing the short-and long-term risks and trade-
offs associated with the changes in maintenance and operational cycles, 
it will be difficult for the Navy to determine the extent to which 
these changes could affect its ability to meet FRP goals and perform 
its full range of missions. 

The Navy Has Not Fully Analyzed Ability to Meet FRP Goals during 
Periods When Less than 11 Carriers Will Be Available: 

The Navy has reported that FRP is supportable with 11 carriers and has 
developed plans to show how it would continue to meet FRP goals during 
two upcoming periods when the number of available[Footnote 24] aircraft 
carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 10. However, these plans have not 
fully analyzed the risks that could arise because they may make 
optimistic assumptions about the length of the gaps and lack some 
details about how the Navy would mitigate these gaps. The first period 
is expected to begin in fall 2008, after the Kitty Hawk's scheduled 
November 2008 decommissioning, and will last until the Bush is prepared 
for its first deployment in the summer of 2010, a gap of nearly 2 
years. According to the Navy, the second period is scheduled to begin 
in fall 2012 when the Enterprise is decommissioned, and will last for 
33 months until the Ford is commissioned in fiscal year 2015. 

The Navy's plans may have presented optimistic assumptions about the 
total length of the gap. For example, the first plan projected that the 
Bush would be operationally ready in the summer of 2010, which is about 
a year after its scheduled commissioning date, but the second plan did 
not address the time between the Ford's projected commissioning date 
and its operational readiness date. According to a December 2006 DOD 
report on the Ford's progress,[Footnote 25] the carrier is scheduled to 
reach initial operational capability in September 2016, for a total gap 
of 45 months, as opposed to the gap of 33 months in the Navy's report. 
In addition, we have recently reported that the Ford is encountering 
delays in technology development that could affect its delivery 
schedule.[Footnote 26] In both cases, there may even be additional time 
between operational readiness and actual first deployment. The average 
interval between commissioning and deployment for all Nimitz-class 
carriers was nearly 2 years, and no carrier since the Vinson (which 
first deployed in 1983) has deployed within 1 year of its commissioning 
date. 

Both of the Navy's plans lack some details about how the Navy would 
mitigate these gaps. The first plan reported that there would be 5 
months between the scheduled decommissioning date of the Kitty Hawk and 
the projected operational readiness date of the Bush when carrier 
readiness status would fall below 6+1, and noted that these could be 
mitigated with adjustments to scheduled maintenance periods or by 
accelerating scheduled training. The first plan lacked specific 
information about the carriers and their projected FRP phases for each 
month of the gap period, so we could not validate the plan's 
assumptions about how many carriers would be surge-ready during any 
particular month. In addition, the plan did not link specific 
mitigations, such as extending a carrier's maintenance interval or 
accelerating unit-level training, to specific months in which surge- 
ready availability fell below 6+1. Without such information, we could 
not evaluate whether the Navy had weighed the possibilities and 
determined the most appropriate way of mitigating a potential 
shortfall. Moreover, applying the expected durations of basic and 
integrated phases of FRP that the Navy formalized in the August 2007 
FRP instruction, we identified at least 6 months in the first gap 
period after the Kitty Hawk retires when there will not be enough 
carriers in the right FRP phases to meet the 6+1 or 3+3+1 
implementation goals, a difference that could affect the Navy's 
mitigation planning. 

The second plan showed the baseline depot maintenance schedule, and 
presented several alternative ways in which identified gaps in the 
Navy's ability to deploy 6+1 carriers between the scheduled 
decommissioning date of the Enterprise and the projected commissioning 
date of the Ford could be filled. These included: extending the carrier 
depot maintenance cycle or operational schedules, deferring some global 
presence deployments, or delaying the decommissioning date of the Kitty 
Hawk. Applying the same expected durations of basic and integrated 
phases of FRP to the second gap period, we identified at least 13 
months when there will not be enough carriers to meet the 6+1 or 3+3+1 
implementation goals. The second plan did not address how the Navy 
could simultaneously have enough carriers available to surge to meet 
FRP goals without stretching out some maintenance intervals beyond 
currently approved limits. The Navy's decision to lengthen intervals 
between depot maintenance periods, as discussed, was based on the 
assumption that there would be 11 carriers at all times. Therefore, 
during these periods the Navy may have to choose among not meeting FRP 
carrier strike group goals, further extending carrier maintenance 
cycles, shortening training, or some combination of these tradeoffs. 

Until the Navy develops plans that use realistic schedule assumptions 
and that can depict the likely challenges to implementation goals 
during these gap periods, senior Navy leadership may not have the 
information it needs to make informed trade-off decisions. As a result, 

the Navy may not be able to achieve an optimal balance between 
maximizing carrier strike groups' ability to surge on short notice in 
support of FRP and performing the full range of Navy missions. 

Conclusions: 

The Navy considers FRP to be a critical enabler in meeting challenges 
of the twenty-first century security environment. Although the Navy has 
taken several important steps toward fully developing a sound 
management approach for FRP, such as establishing oversight and 
execution responsibility, developing implementation goals for carrier 
strike groups, and identifying some key performance measures, this 
process is incomplete. Without implementation goals for extending FRP 
to expeditionary strike groups and other ship configurations; 
performance measures that identify readiness levels and are fully 
linked to acceptable levels of performance for FRP phases; and a 
completed analysis that links needed resources to FRP phases, goals, 
and readiness levels, the Navy may not be able to develop budget 
requests based on the resources needed to achieve required readiness 
levels or demonstrate to senior DOD officials and Congress whether it 
can achieve the intended benefits under FRP. 

The Navy has studied the effects of some aspects of changes it has made 
during FRP's first years, such as extensions of operational and 
maintenance cycles, and has begun to pursue other studies. However, 
until the Navy performs a comprehensive risk assessment that addresses 
the cumulative impact of changes to operational and maintenance cycles, 
and the possible effects of having fewer carriers in the force 
structure in the future, it will be unable to weigh the trade offs 
associated with meeting FRP goals within projected budgets. Further, 
assessing risk becomes increasingly important as the Navy expands FRP 
to include other forces and as its force structure faces periods with 
10 instead of 11 available carriers. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve the Navy's management as FRP continues to evolve and as the 
Navy moves forward with implementation, we recommend that the Secretary 
of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following four 
actions: 

* establish implementation goals for the application of FRP to other 
forces; 

* establish required overall readiness levels for each FRP phase in its 
readiness reporting system; 

* develop additional performance measures that identify acceptable 
levels of performance and scope; and: 

* identify how resources should be linked to the FRP phases, goals, and 
readiness levels and publish appropriate guidance. 

To improve the Navy's ability to weigh the trade offs associated with 
meeting FRP goals within current resource and force structure plans, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 
Navy to take the following action: 

* perform a risk assessment that integrates consideration of the 
effects of changes in carrier strike group operational and maintenance 
cycles under a range of force structure assumptions, and that 
identifies strategies to mitigate potential risks. Such a risk 
assessment should integrate plans to meet FRP goals during two upcoming 
periods when the number of available aircraft carriers temporarily 
drops from 11 to 10. 

Agency Comments and our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with 
one recommendation, and partially agreed with four recommendations. 
DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy establish 
implementation goals for the application of the Fleet Response Plan to 
other forces. DOD stated that the Navy has developed preliminary goals 
for submarines, surface combatants, and other types of forces, and will 
continue to include additional Navy forces beyond those of the carrier 
strike group. While we laud this progress, we urge the Navy to take 
steps to finalize these goals as soon as possible. In addition, we 
reiterate that the preliminary goal for surface ships was expressed in 
a single aggregated figure that included destroyers, cruisers, 
frigates, amphibious ships, and minesweepers. As discussed in the 
report, an aggregate figure may not provide a meaningful goal, because 
some ships, such as destroyers, may be used in a variety of roles: as 
components of carrier or expeditionary strike groups or as part of 
smaller task forces. Without implementation goals for all force 
configurations, the Navy may not know whether it has enough ships to be 
distributed among all possible roles and provide all desired 
capabilities under FRP. Furthermore, since the Navy's system for 
aligning resource inputs with readiness outputs is linked to its 
implementation goals, identifying separate goals is a prerequisite to 
identifying appropriate levels of funding. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy develop 
required overall readiness levels for each Fleet Response Plan phase in 
its readiness reporting system. DOD stated that, under the Defense 
Readiness Reporting System, the Navy will be able to rapidly and 
accurately assess a unit's readiness and ability to conduct missions 
throughout the FRP continuum. While we hope that DOD can realize its 
expectations for this system, we note that it is not scheduled to be 
fully implemented for another year or more. Therefore, we urge DOD to 
direct the Navy to develop a readiness level requirement within 
existing systems so that it will have visibility over whether the 
Navy's goals are being met up until the Defense Readiness Reporting 
System is fully implemented, and ensure that this new system allows DOD 
to assess units' readiness for each FRP phase. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy develop 
additional performance measures that identify acceptable levels of 
performance and scope. DOD stated that the Fleet Readiness Enterprise 
is developing criteria that will show acceptable levels of performance. 
While we support DOD's efforts to develop criteria, we urge the Navy to 
take steps to finalize these criteria as soon as possible. DOD also 
stated that the Navy has Figures of Merit to guide the allocation of 
resources in specific areas, and furthermore trusts its unit commanders 
to accurately report their ability to meet FRP requirements. At the 
time of our review, these measures were still under development, so it 
is unclear whether they will be sufficient to provide the necessary 
information about the scope and acceptable levels of performance to 
enable consistent and accurate measurement of performance. We continue 
to believe that our recommendation merits further action and that DOD 
needs to direct the Navy to fully link the FRP performance measures to 
quantified levels of acceptable performance, encompass ships and 
aircraft as applicable, and provide measures to assess appropriate 
manning levels, so that decision makers will be able to determine the 
extent to which FRP is achieving its goals. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation to identify how resources should be 
linked to the Fleet Response Plan phases, goals, and readiness levels 
and publish appropriate guidance. DOD stated that the Navy is in the 
process of developing a comprehensive set of top-level metrics that 
will provide the Navy with the ability to link readiness outputs to 
required resource inputs. When development is complete, the Navy will 
have a set of quantifiable and traceable relationships between its 
financial system and Fleet readiness. We agree that the actions cited 
represent positive steps and urge the Navy to press forward with these 
efforts. We note that we also recommended that the Navy publish 
appropriate guidance upon completion. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy perform a 
risk assessment that integrates consideration of the effects of changes 
in carrier strike group operational and maintenance cycles under a 
range of force structure assumptions and identify strategies to 
mitigate potential risks. DOD stated that it understands that 
modifications to existing plans will have numerous consequences and 
indicated that the Navy will continue to update its plans based on 
current risk assessments. DOD concluded that there was no need for 
further direction from the Secretary of Defense in this matter. We 
disagree, and continue to believe that the Navy should conduct an 
integrated risk assessment and identify strategies to mitigate 
potential risks. As discussed in the report, prior to making changes to 
its maintenance cycle in the past, the Navy has conducted assessments 
of the potential effects of the changes, and we emphasize the 
interrelated nature of the changes that the Navy has made to implement 
FRP. For example, as we discussed in our report, changing carrier 
operational cycles may have repercussions on the opportunities 
available for aircraft pilot training. In view of the possible impact 
on the Navy's ability to perform its full range of missions and the 
potential financial implications of intensifying operational tempo or 
decreasing maintenance of the Navy's carriers to the point where their 
planned service life could be jeopardized, we continue to believe that 
it is critical for the Navy to fully consider the long-term risks and 
trade offs of these changes through a comprehensive and integrated risk 
assessment. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations. We will also 
make copies available to other interested parties upon request. In 
addition, this report will be made available at no charge on the GAO 
Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have 
any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or 
[email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. Staff members who made key contributions to this report are 
listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Managing Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the Navy's progress in developing a sound management 
approach, we reviewed and analyzed guidance and instructions on 
manning, maintenance, and training; key studies, messages, and planning 
documents. We reviewed prior GAO products to identify best practices 
for managing and implementing major efforts and compared these best 
practices to the Navy documents we analyzed.[Footnote 27] We also 
interviewed officials in the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations 
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.; Fleet 
Forces Command; Commander, Air Forces Atlantic; Commander, Surface 
Forces Atlantic; Commander, Submarine Forces Atlantic, Norfolk, 
Virginia; Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland; Naval 
Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.; and Marine Corps Forces Command, 
Norfolk, Virginia; about initiatives the Navy has undertaken. We also 
contacted officials at the office of the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; 
Commander, Naval Air Forces, San Diego, California; and Carrier 
Planning Activity, Chesapeake, Virginia. 

We also analyzed data from the Navy's current readiness reporting 
system. Readiness data include ships' and airwings' scores under the 
Status of Resources and Training System, which measures inputs such as 
numbers of personnel, amount and condition of equipment on-board, and 
completion of training exercises, and combines them under a five-point 
rating system. Status of Resources and Training System data are limited 
in that they only measure readiness against the standard of major 
combat operations and do not specifically show readiness at each FRP 
phase. DOD has recognized this limitation and has begun to develop a 
new, capabilities-based system called the Defense Readiness Reporting 
System, which was designed to measure units' ability to perform 
specific tasks. The Navy has begun the transition to the Defense 
Readiness Reporting System, full implementation of which it believes 
will address the gaps in performance measures that we identified in our 
review. However, this transition was not yet complete at the time we 
conducted our review. The Navy continues to report Status of Resources 
and Training System data in the Type Commanders' Readiness Management 
System, and to use Status of Resources and Training System data as the 
foundation of its weekly and monthly readiness reports to the Chief of 
Naval Operations. With these noted limitations, we determined that the 
data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To assess the extent to which the Navy has considered the long-term 
risks and trade offs of FRP-related changes, we interviewed Navy 
readiness officials in the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Arlington, Virginia; and program managers at Naval Sea Systems Command, 
Washington, D.C., and Chesapeake, Virginia; and Fleet Forces Command, 
Norfolk, Virginia. To assess whether the Navy had sufficiently taken 
into account the possibility of not having enough carriers available to 
meet either a 6+1 implementation goal or a 3+3+1 construct during the 
years in which 10 carriers will be available, we analyzed the quarterly 
long-range carrier maintenance schedule that was published in July 2007 
and noted, based on the notional durations for each of the FRP phases 
that were published in the August 2007 FRP instruction, how many 
carriers would be in each phase during each month during fiscal years 
2008 through 2010 and 2013 through 2016. For purposes of our analysis, 
we assumed that no carrier would remain in any FRP phase for longer 
than the planned time, and that the George Washington, which is 
scheduled to be at its home port in Japan in 2009, would be deployable 
at any time that it was not in depot maintenance. We also analyzed a 
Navy risk mitigation plan for the years following the decommissioning 
of the Enterprise and a less detailed plan that covered the years 
following the decommissioning of the Kitty Hawk, and discussed our 
observations with Navy readiness and carrier program officials. 

We performed our work from November 2006 through October 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Personnel And Readiness: 
4000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000: 

January 8, 2008: 

Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. St. Laurent: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-08-264, "Military Readiness: Navy is Making Progress in 
Implementing Its Fleet Response Plan, But Has Not Fully Developed 
Goals, Measures, and Resource Needs," dated December 5, 2007 (GAO Code 
350930). 

DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. DoD 
partially concurs with Recommendations 1, 2, 3, and 5 and concurs with 
Recommendation 4. Detailed comments on the GAO recommendations and 
report are enclosed. 

Signed by: 

Paul W. Mayberry: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness): 

Enclosure: As Stated: 

GAO Draft Report ï¿½ Dated December 5, 2007: 
GAO Code 350930 /GAO-08-264: 

"Military Readiness: Navy Is Making Progress in Implementing Its Fleet 
Response Plan, But Has Not Fully Developed Goals, Measures, and 
Resource Needs" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to establish implementation goals for 
the application of the Fleet Response Plan to other forces. 

DOD Response: Partially Concur. The Navy needs to have implementation 
goals, and as stated in the report, the Navy began to extend the Fleet 
Response Plan to Expeditionary Strike Groups in June 2007. The Navy is 
also developing Fleet Response Plan goals for Naval forces beyond the 
Carrier Strike Group. Although not finalized at the time of this draft 
review, officials at Fleet Forces Command have stated that preliminary 
goals have been developed for submarines, surface combatants, and other 
types of forces. The Department of the Navy shall continue to develop, 
apply and refine the Fleet Response Plan to include Navy forces beyond 
the Carrier Strike Group. No further direction from the Secretary of 
Defense is necessary at this time. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to establish required overall 
readiness levels for each Fleet Response Plan phase in its readiness 
reporting system. 

Dod Response: Partially Concur. As part of the Fleet Response Plan, 
units are required to perform various types of missions at increasing 
levels of complexity. Readiness to perform missions is based on the 
unit's ability to accomplish various mission essential tasks. The 
Defense Readiness Reporting System is being used to capture what 
capabilities and tasks units are able and ready to perform. Under the 
Defense Readiness Reporting System, the Navy will be able to rapidly 
and accurately assess a unit's readiness and therefore the unit's 
ability to conduct and complete missions assigned throughout the Fleet 
Response Plan continuum. The Defense Readiness Reporting System uses a 
mission assessment framework, so "readiness levels" are no longer 
appropriate or desirable. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop additional performance 
measures that identify acceptable levels of performance and scope. 

DOD Response: Partially Concur. As stated within the report, the Fleet 
Readiness Enterprise is currently developing appropriate criteria that 
will delineate acceptable levels of competency in the performance of 
mission essential tasks. In addition to these metrics, the Navy has 
Figures of Merit in resource areas such as Personnel, Equipment, 
Supply, Training and Ordnance. These Figures of Merit will allow the 
Navy to judiciously allocate limited resources where they are most 
needed. As noted in the report, the Navy relies heavily on its unit 
commanders to accurately report their units' ability to attain FRP 
timeline requirements and holds them fully accountable. In addition, 
the Navy entrusts those commands, whose responsibility it is to 
evaluate the performance of units as they finish various phases of 
training, to enforce high levels of competence for the forces that they 
evaluate. There is no need for further direction in this area from the 
Secretary of Defense. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to identify how resources should be 
linked to the Fleet Response Plan phases, goals, and readiness levels 
and publish appropriate guidance. 

DOD Response: Concur. Full implementation of the Fleet Response Plan 
will give the Navy a solid framework to associate resources to mission 
readiness in a way that is scalable and measurable. This will allow the 
full impact of financial decisions to be expressed in terms of 
capabilities. In order to have common metrics for describing the Fleet 
Response Plan for Navy units beyond Carrier Strike Groups, the Navy 
established an interdisciplinary team, Task Force Readiness, which is 
linked to the Fleet Readiness Enterprise Executive Committee. This Task 
Force is chartered to develop and implement a comprehensive set of top-
level metrics based on the concept of Operational Availability. 
Development of these metrics continues; when completed, it will provide 
the ability to link readiness outputs to the required resource inputs. 
In this way, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
process will be directly associated with a unit's overall readiness. 
The end state is a set of quantifiable and traceable relationships 
between the Navy's financial systems and Fleet readiness. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to perform a risk assessment that 
integrates consideration of the effects of changes in carrier strike 
group operational and maintenance cycles under a range of force 
structure assumptions, and that identifies strategies to mitigate 
potential risks. Such a risk assessment should integrate plans to meet 
Fleet Response Plan goals during two upcoming periods when the number 
of available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 10. 

DOD Response: Partially Concur. For areas of significant technical or 
operational risk, the Navy does conduct risk assessments, even if not 
documented in a single formal treatise. As referenced many times 
throughout the report, 6+1 or 3+3+1 is a goal, and a non-fiscally 
constrained requirement for minimum risk in supporting operational 
contingencies. It is also an average, which implies the actual measure 
of surge ready forces is above and below the stated number at various 
times throughout any given year. If operational necessity dictates, the 
Navy has identified numerous ways to ensure asset availability. For 
example, most maintenance periods can be moved or modified. This, 
however, may result in a significant unprogrammed cost, along with 
longer-term shipyard capacity and Fleet Response Plan goal attainment 
challenges. The Navy realizes the dynamic environment within which it 
operates and understands that modifications to existing plans will have 
numerous consequences. The Fleet Response Plan remains an evolving 
construct, and the Navy shall continue to update their plans based on 
current risk assessments dependent upon operational needs, validated 
assumptions and the most current information available. There is no 
need for further direction from the Secretary of Defense in this 
matter. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers: 

Name: Kitty Hawk; 
Year commissioned: 1961; 
Home port: Japan. 

Name: Enterprise; 
Year commissioned: 1961; 
Home port: Norfolk, Virginia. 

Name: Nimitz; 
Year commissioned: 1975; 
Home port: San Diego, California. 

Name: Dwight D. Eisenhower; 
Year commissioned: 1977; 
Home port: Norfolk. 

Name: Carl Vinson; 
Year commissioned: 1982; 
Home port: Bremerton, Washington. 

Name: Theodore Roosevelt; 
Year commissioned: 1986; 
Home port: Norfolk. 

Name: Abraham Lincoln; 
Year commissioned: 1989; 
Home port: Everett, Washington. 

Name: George Washington; 
Year commissioned: 1992; 
Home port: Norfolk. 

Name: John C. Stennis; 
Year commissioned: 1995; 
Home port: Bremerton. 

Name: Harry S. Truman; 
Year commissioned: 1998; 
Home port: Norfolk. 

Name: Ronald Reagan; 
Year commissioned: 2003; 
Home port: San Diego. 

Name: George H. W. Bush; 
Year commissioned: Under construction; 
Home port: [Empty]. 

Name: Gerald Ford; 
Year commissioned: Under construction; 
Home port: [Empty]. 

Source: The Navy. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Janet St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Patricia W. Lentini, Assistant 
Director; Renee S. Brown; Janine Cantin; Alissa Czyz; Karen Nicole 
Harms; Matthew S. Lee; Sally Newman; Maria-Alaina Rambus; Rebecca Shea; 
and Nicole Volchko made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See GAO, Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would 
Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing, 
GAO-06-84 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005); and Defense Logistics: 
GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects of the Navy's Fleet Response 
Plan, GAO-04-724R (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004). 

[2] Pub. L. No. 109-364, ï¿½ 341 (2006). 

[3] See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2003). 

[4] For purposes of this review, we considered a new-construction 
carrier to be available when it is ready to deploy. 

[5] Units include ships, submarines, and aircraft. 

[6] See, GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003) and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the 
Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, 
D.C.: June 1996). 

[7] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Instruction 3000.15, 
Fleet Response Plan (FRP) (Aug. 31, 2006); Commander, Fleet Forces 
Command and Commander, Pacific Fleet, Instruction 3000.15, Fleet 
Response Plan (Aug. 21, 2007). 

[8] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Instruction 
3000.13C, Personnel Tempo of Operations Program (Jan. 16, 2007). 

[9] Until 2006, the FRP implementation goal was 6+2 carrier strike 
groups. 

[10] Ready for Tasking means that the unit has successfully completed 
the basic phase. 

[11] The Fleet Forces Command's and Pacific Fleet Command's readiness 
divisions use a tool called the Maintenance Figure of Merit to measure 
ships' readiness based on the material conditions of their systems, 
subsystems, components, and other facets. 

[12] Examples of other forces could include units that are 
characterized as "Independent Unit Ready for Tasking" and may be 
assigned independent operations in support of homeland security, such 
as counter-narcotics missions, or assigned to provide disaster relief 
or humanitarian assistance. These units may consist of one or more 
ships. 

[13] Department of the Navy, Sea Power for a New Era: A Program Guide 
to the U.S. Navy, 2006. 

[14] The categories are personnel, equipment condition, supply, 
training, and ordnance. For each category, as well as for the overall 
level, units are assigned a score ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 being the 
highest. 

[15] 10 U.S.C. ï¿½482. Unit commanders also may report readiness using a 
measure called percent effectiveness, which allows them to render a 
subjective judgment about how prepared their units are to perform 
nontraditional missions that fall short of major combat operations. 

[16] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Instruction 
3500.38B/MCO 3500.26/USCG Command Instruction 3500.1B, Universal Naval 
Task List, January 2007. 

[17] The five performance measures for the basic phase are: entitled 
versus actual readiness, ready-for-tasking accomplishment, M-rating/ 
Navy Mission Essential Task List, flying/steaming hour accomplishment, 
and cost performance. 

[18] See Center for Naval Analyses, Explorations of the Fleet Response 
Plan: Definitions, Cost, Capabilities, Risks (Alexandria, Virginia, 
November 2005); Selected Costs of a Carrier Strike Group Across the 
Fleet Response Plan Phases (Alexandria, Virginia, November 2005); 
Budgeting for FRP Surge: The Ship Training Model (Alexandria, Virginia: 
July 2006); Budgeting for FRP Surge: The Airwing (Alexandria, Virginia: 
July 2006); and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV N814, 
Estimating Costs for Fleet Response Plan Postures (Arlington, Virginia: 
Aug. 27, 2004). 

[19] The board is using the Fleet Training Capability Cost System, 
which is an activity based costing and management system designed to 
trace fleet resource utilization and costs, to help identify notional 
training costs for a carrier strike group. 

[20] GAO, Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance 
DOD's Risk-Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions, GAO-06-13 
(Washington, D.C: Nov. 15, 2005). 

[21] The previous system, known as the Engineered Operating Cycle, 
provided for repairs to be made at fixed time intervals. The system 
that was introduced in 1994, known as the Incremental Maintenance Plan, 
provided for repairs to be made depending on their condition. Major 
carrier repairs and modernization are performed during depot 
maintenance periods, or availabilities. There are three major types of 
availabilities: planned depot periods, which last about 6 months; dry- 
docking, which lasts about 10 ï¿½ months and which provides a unique 
opportunity to perform some types of hull and rudder maintenance; and 
refueling complex overhaul, which lasts for 3 years or more. During 
these availabilities, the carrier is unavailable to deploy. 

[22] If carriers are operated throughout their service lives under a 24-
month operational cycle, they would spend 6 months in maintenance and 
then 18 months preparing to deploy (or deployed) in every 24-month 
period. Every third depot maintenance period would entail dry docking, 
so over the course of a 6-year cycle they would have two ordinary depot 
periods and one dry-docking period. 

[23] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Notice 4700, 
Representative Intervals, Durations, Maintenance Cycles, and Repair 
Mandays for Depot Level Maintenance Availabilities of U.S. Navy Ships 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2006). 

[24] For purposes of this review, we considered a new-construction 
carrier to be available when it is ready to deploy. The carrier is 
ready to deploy after it has completed these steps: commissioning, 
completion of initial (shakedown) cruise and post-shakedown maintenance 
period, and initial unit-level training period. 

[25] DOD, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), CVN 21, December 31, 2006. 

[26] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Navy Faces Challenges Constructing 
the Aircraft Carrier Gerald R. Ford Within Budget, GAO-07-866 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2007). 

[27] See GAO, Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would 
Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing, 
GAO-06-84 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005) and Results-Oriented 
Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational 
Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2003). 

[End of section] 

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