Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern 
Command's Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau,
but Gaps Remain (16-APR-08, GAO-08-252).			 
                                                                 
In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S.	 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil
support missions on U.S. soil. It is particularly important that 
NORTHCOM coordinate with the National Guard Bureau (NGB), because
NGB has experience dealing with state and local authorities	 
during incidents and functions as NORTHCOM's formal link to the  
states. GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which	 
NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to coordinate with the states and	 
NGB in planning, exercises and other preparedness activities and 
(2) identify the extent to which there are any gaps in this	 
coordination. To do this, GAO surveyed the state adjutants	 
general, the highest ranking guardsman in each state, and	 
received a 100 percent response rate, and reviewed interagency	 
coordination plans and guidance.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-252 					        
    ACCNO:   A81693						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S.  
Northern Command's Coordination with States and the National	 
Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain					 
     DATE:   04/16/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Civil defense					 
	     Civil support					 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Emergency response plans				 
	     Emergency response procedures			 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Intergovernmental relations			 
	     Local governments					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military operations				 
	     National defense operations			 
	     National Guard					 
	     Regional planning					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Crisis communications				 
	     Program coordination				 

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GAO-08-252

   

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material separately. 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: GAO: 

April 2008: 

Homeland Defense: 

Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command's Coordination 
with States and the National Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain: 

GAO-08-252: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-252, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil support 
missions in and around the United States. It is important that NORTHCOM 
coordinate with the National Guard Bureau (NGB), because NGB has 
experience dealing with state and local authorities during incidents 
and functions as NORTHCOMï¿½s formal link to the states. GAO was asked to 
(1) determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to 
coordinate with the states and NGB in planning, exercises and other 
preparedness activities and (2) identify the extent to which there are 
any gaps in this coordination. To do this, GAO surveyed the state 
adjutants general, the highest ranking guardsman in each state, and 
received a 100 percent response rate, and reviewed interagency 
coordination plans and guidance. 

What GAO Found: 

NORTHCOM has several ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the 
states and NGB in planning for its missions and responding to requests 
for civil support. For example, during hurricane season NORTHCOM 
facilitates weekly conferences with the relevant local, state, and 
federal emergency management officials, through which it has begun to 
build more productive relationships. NORTHCOM also conducted two large-
scale exercises and participated in over 30 smaller regional, state, 
and local exercises annually to help responders prepare for man-made 
and natural disasters. In addition, NORTHCOM has been informally 
including NGB in reviewing its plans. 

We identified gaps in coordination between NORTHCOM, the states, and 
NGB in three areas. 

* NORTHCOM officials minimally involved the states in the development 
of its homeland defense and civil support plans. Less than 25 percent 
of the state adjutants general reported that they were involved in 
developing and reviewing these plans. For civil support, NORTHCOM 
officials told us that they are reaching out directly to states to 
better understand statesï¿½ plans and capabilities, but for homeland 
defense, they rely on NGB to provide statesï¿½ perspectives. 

* NORTHCOM was not familiar with state emergency response plans and has 
no process for obtaining this information. Fifty-four percent of the 
state adjutants general reported that they believed that NORTHCOM was 
not at all or only slightly familiar with their statesï¿½ emergency 
response plans. This may be attributable, in part, to the fact that 
NORTHCOM does not have an established and thorough process for 
cooperating and interacting with the states. By not obtaining and using 
information on statesï¿½ plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the 
risk that it will not be prepared to respond to an incident with the 
needed resources to support civil authorities. 

* A 2005 agreement, which is intended to provide the procedures by 
which NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not clearly define each agencyï¿½s 
roles and responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil 
support. The lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities has 
resulted in confusion and duplicative or wasted efforts. For example, 
as required in NORTHCOMï¿½s homeland defense plan, NGB compiled the 
statesï¿½ homeland defense plans and made them available to NORTHCOM; 
however, NORTHCOM planners told us that they neither requested nor 
needed access to this information. Without clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities, there is a risk that NORTHCOMï¿½s and NGBï¿½s responses 
to an event could be fragmented and uncoordinated. 

Addressing these gaps could help integrate intergovernmental planning 
for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall coordination, and help 
ensure that NORTHCOMï¿½s plans for its missions and responses to 
incidents are as effective as possible. 

What GAO Recommends: 

To improve NORTHCOMï¿½s coordination with the states, GAO recommends that 
NORTHCOM develop an established and thorough process to guide its 
coordination with the states. To improve the commandï¿½s coordination 
with NGB, GAO recommends that NORTHCOM and NGB revise their agreement 
to more fully and clearly define how they will coordinate and the 
responsibilities each will have. DOD generally agreed with our 
recommendations and suggested ongoing and future efforts to satisfy the 
intent of the recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-252]. For more 
information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

NORTHCOM Has Ongoing Efforts to Improve Coordination with the States 
and NGB in Planning for Its Missions: 

Gaps Remain in NORTHCOM's Coordination with the States and NGB: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Questionnaire and Survey Results: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: State Participation in NORTHCOM Exercises: 

Table 2: TAG Familiarity with NORTHCOM's Plans: 

Table 3: TAG Involvement in NORTHCOM's Plan Development: 

Table 4: NORTHCOM's Familiarity with State Emergency Response Plans: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: NORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility: 

Figure 2: Homeland Defense Response: 

Figure 3: Defense Support of Civil Authorities Response: 

Figure 4: FEMA Regions: 

Abbreviations: 

CBRNE: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 
explosive: 

DCO: defense coordinating officer: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

EMAC: Emergency Management Assistance Compact: 

EPLO: emergency preparedness liaison officer: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

JPEC: Joint Planning and Execution Community: 

JTF-CS: Joint Task Force Civil Support: 

NGB: National Guard Bureau: 

NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command: 

TAG: state adjutant general: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548: 

April 16, 2008: 

Congressional Requesters: 

The United States homeland continues to face an uncertain, complex 
security environment with the potential for terrorist incidents and 
natural disasters. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 
President established the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to provide 
and manage homeland defense and civil support. The Department of 
Defense (DOD) considers homeland defense to be NORTHCOM's primary 
mission and defines it as the protection of U.S. sovereignty, 
territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure 
against external threats and aggression against the United 
States.[Footnote 1] Civil support or defense support of civil 
authorities[Footnote 2] includes the use of federal military forces, 
the department's career civilian and contractor personnel, and DOD 
agency and component assets for domestic emergencies and for designated 
law enforcement and other activities.[Footnote 3] DOD is not the 
primary federal agency for such missions (unless designated so by the 
President) and thus operates in support of civil authorities only when 
directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense. 
NORTHCOM's area of responsibility for its homeland defense mission 
includes the contiguous United States, Alaska, Canada, and 
Mexico.[Footnote 4] NORTHCOM's area of responsibility for its civil 
support mission includes the contiguous United States, Alaska, and U.S. 
territorial waters.[Footnote 5] 

NORTHCOM faces the critical and unique challenge of preparing for its 
missions within the legal and historical limits of the constitutional 
federal-state structure that includes the 49 North American U.S. states 
and the District of Columbia. Numerous local, state, and federal 
agencies and organizations, including the National Guard Bureau 
(NGB),[Footnote 6] have jurisdiction over or can coordinate resources 
within the homeland and, therefore, may be involved in a response to an 
incident.[Footnote 7] Because protecting and defending the homeland is 
a shared responsibility with states potentially requiring assistance 
from federal agencies and organizations, effective coordination and 
integrated planning across all levels are critical for an effective 
national response.[Footnote 8] We have previously reported that to 
facilitate rapid and effective decision making during a crisis, legal 
authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all 
government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, 
and well understood.[Footnote 9] NORTHCOM also recognizes the 
importance of coordination with other federal agencies and states for 
its missions, especially in support of civil authorities, stating that 
such coordination will facilitate the creation and implementation of 
coordinated policies, collaborative plans, and unified operations. 
[Footnote 10] 

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and, more recently, the 
uncoordinated national response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress and 
other organizations have emphasized the need to improve the national 
response to an incident.[Footnote 11] For example, the Commission on 
the National Guard and Reserves found that reform is necessary to 
increase coordination among DOD entities and commands--including NGB 
and NORTHCOM--to ensure better national security outcomes.[Footnote 12] 
The relationship of NORTHCOM and NGB is even more important with 
Congress's recent passing of legislation to elevate NGB to a joint 
activity of DOD and expand NGB's functions to include assisting the 
Secretary of Defense with coordinating the use of National Guard forces 
and resources with other federal agencies, the adjutants general of the 
states, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and NORTHCOM for their use in 
operations conducted under Title 32 or in support of state 
missions.[Footnote 13] Although NGB is NORTHCOM's formal channel of 
coordination with states for National Guard related matters, NORTHCOM 
also coordinates with the states through the state adjutants general, 
known as TAGs--the highest-ranking guardsman in each state. As the 
commander of the state's National Guard units, the governor of each 
state commands the National Guard through the TAG. 

To better understand NORTHCOM's efforts to effectively prepare for its 
homeland defense and civil support missions, we were asked to review 
NORTHCOM's processes for planning for, coordinating, and executing its 
missions. For this report, our objectives were to (1) determine the 
extent to which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to coordinate with the 
states and NGB in planning exercises and other preparedness activities 
and (2) identify the extent to which there are any gaps in this 
coordination. We prepared a separate report to address (1) the status 
of NORTHCOM's plans and the challenges it faces in planning and 
conducting operations, (2) the adequacy of planning personnel, and (3) 
the extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates with other federal agencies. 
[Footnote 14] 

In conducting this review, we focused our scope on NORTHCOM's 
coordination with the states and NGB in planning and preparing for its 
homeland defense and civil support missions. Our review focused on 
NORTHCOM's coordination efforts since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. To 
determine the states' perspectives on the extent to which NORTHCOM is 
coordinating with the states and identify any gaps, we surveyed the 
TAGs who are within NORTHCOM's area of responsibility.[Footnote 15] 
When we discuss NORTHCOM's coordination with the states, we are 
primarily referring to coordination with the TAGs. The survey 
questionnaire and results can be found in appendix I. The survey was 
administered via electronic mail to the TAGs and their chiefs of staff, 
and responses were collected from April through September 2007; we had 
a 100 percent response rate. We also reviewed documents and conducted 
interviews with the TAGS from Florida, Indiana, Nebraska, and 
Washington. To augment the information we obtained from the TAGs, we 
reviewed documents and conducted interviews with officials from 
NORTHCOM and several of its subordinate commands, including Joint Task 
Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), Joint Force Headquarters National Capital 
Region, and Army Forces North, as well as officials from NGB 
headquarters and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office. In addition, we 
conducted interviews with officials from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security's 
(DHS) interagency Incident Management Planning Team. We conducted our 
review from April 2007 to April 2008 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence 
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. Appendix II is a detailed discussion of our scope and 
methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

NORTHCOM has several ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the 
states and NGB in planning for its missions and responding to requests 
for civil support. NORTHCOM's strategic vision includes facilitating 
the synchronization of national, state, and local assets and 
capabilities to defend the nation and support civilian authorities. 
[Footnote 16] One of NORTHCOM's ongoing efforts to improve coordination 
includes facilitating weekly hurricane conferences during hurricane 
season with a wide variety of relevant local, state, and federal 
emergency management officials. Similarly, NORTHCOM monitors wildfire 
activity and sets up teleconferences with the National Interagency Fire 
Center, which includes state emergency response officials, if it 
appears that NORTHCOM may need to assist in fighting the fires. 
NORTHCOM also conducts two large-scale exercises--Ardent Sentry and 
Vigilant Shield--and participates in over 30 smaller regional, state, 
and local exercises annually to help all potential responders prepare 
for potential man-made and natural disasters. As a result of this 
frequent interaction, NORTHCOM has begun to build more productive and 
effective relationships with the participating states and agencies. In 
addition, NORTHCOM has been informally including NGB in reviewing its 
plans, both in the early stages during concept development workshops as 
well as during final coordination. 

We identified gaps in coordination between NORTHCOM, the states, and 
NGB in three areas. 

* NORTHCOM officials minimally involve the states in the development of 
NORTHCOM's major homeland defense and civil support plans. Less than 25 
percent of the TAGs reported that they were involved in developing and 
reviewing these plans. NORTHCOM officials told us that they are 
starting to reach out directly to states to obtain their perspectives 
on NORTHCOM's defense support of civil authorities plan, but for 
homeland defense, they rely on NGB to provide states' perspectives. By 
only relying on NGB, NORTHCOM may not be able to maintain awareness of 
the environment in which it may be operating, which is critical to 
fully carrying out its homeland defense mission. In either homeland 
defense or civil support, increasing the current level of state 
involvement in the development of NORTHCOM's plans could help integrate 
intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall 
coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM's plans for its missions 
and responses to incidents are as effective as possible.[Footnote 17] 

* NORTHCOM was not familiar with state emergency response plans or 
capabilities and has no established and thorough process for gaining 
access to this information. Fifty-four percent of the TAGs reported 
that they believe that NORTHCOM is either slightly or not at all 
familiar with their states' plans. This may be attributable in part to 
the fact that NORTHCOM does not have a plan for cooperating and 
interacting with the states. By not obtaining and using information on 
states' plans and capabilities, it is difficult for NORTHCOM to plan in 
advance for the types, numbers, and timing of capabilities (trained 
personnel and equipment) needed to actually conduct an operation either 
for homeland defense or for a civil support operation in support of 
another primary agency.[Footnote 18] 

* A 2005 memorandum of agreement, which is intended to provide the 
procedures by which NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not clearly define 
the responsibilities of the two entities for homeland defense and civil 
support. The lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities has 
resulted in confusion and duplicative or potentially wasted efforts 
between the two agencies. For example, as required in NORTHCOM's 
homeland defense plan, NGB compiled the states' homeland defense plans 
and made them available to NORTHCOM; however, NORTHCOM planners told us 
that they neither requested nor needed access to this information. 
Without clearly defined responsibilities, there is a risk that 
NORTHCOM's and NGB's responses to an event could be fragmented and 
uncoordinated. 

To improve NORTHCOM's coordination with the states, we are recommending 
that NORTHCOM develop an established and thorough process to guide its 
coordination with the states to (1) involve the states in NORTHCOM's 
planning processes, (2) obtain information on state emergency response 
plans and capabilities, and (3) use such information to improve the 
development and execution of its concept plans. To improve the 
command's coordination with NGB, we are recommending that NORTHCOM and 
NGB revise their memorandum of agreement and more fully and clearly 
define the roles and responsibilities that each will have. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed 
with our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking and planning 
to take to address the recommendations. DOD's comments are discussed in 
more detail at the end of this report and are reproduced in full in 
appendix III. DOD and FEMA also provided us with technical comments, 
which have been incorporated where appropriate. 

Background: 

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOD realized the 
need for a more integrated civilian and military response capability 
for any future attack on the United States. In response, DOD 
established NORTHCOM in October 2002[Footnote 19] to provide command 
and control in homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense 
support of civil authorities within its area of responsibility (see 
fig. 1).[Footnote 20] 

Figure 1: NORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of North America illustrating NORTHCOM's Area of 
Responsibility, including the United States, Canada and Mexico. Alaska 
falls within NORTHCOMï¿½s area of responsibility, but military forces in 
the state are assigned to U.S. Pacific Command. 

Source: GAO analysis; Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

NORTHCOM's mission consists of (1) homeland defense and (2) civil 
support. It is important to understand the relationships between 
NORTHCOM's missions and homeland security. Homeland defense and 
homeland security are not synonymous. Homeland security is a concerted 
national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, 
reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage 
and recover from attacks that do occur.[Footnote 21] The DHS is the 
primary federal agency for homeland security issues. DHS's 
responsibilities extend beyond terrorism to preventing, preparing for, 
responding to, and recovering from a wide range of matter domestic 
disasters and other emergencies. DOD contributes to homeland security 
through its military missions overseas and homeland defense and civil 
support operations. 

While the terrorism portion of homeland security is concerned with 
preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, DOD's concerns 
include responding to conventional and unconventional attacks by any 
adversary as well as terrorists. When DOD is designated as the primary 
federal agency by the President or Secretary of Defense for conducting 
military missions to defend the people or territory of the homeland, it 
is considered to be homeland defense. Homeland defense is the 
protection of U.S territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and 
critical defense infrastructure against external threats and 
aggression. DOD activity in support of a National Response Framework 
primary or coordinating agency is considered to be civil support. Civil 
support is DOD support to U.S. civilian authorities, such as DHS, for 
domestic emergencies, both natural and man-made, and includes the use 
of DOD personnel--federal military forces and DOD's career civilian and 
contractor personnel--and DOD agency and component resources.[Footnote 
22] Because these missions are complex and interrelated, they require 
significant interagency coordination. 

NORTHCOM's Homeland Defense Mission: 

To carry out its homeland defense mission, NORTHCOM is to conduct 
operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed 
at the United States. According to Joint Publication 3-27, DOD is the 
primary federal agency for homeland defense operations, and NORTHCOM is 
the combatant command responsible for commanding and coordinating a 
response to a homeland defense incident. In this case, the chain of 
command is relatively straightforward: other DOD commands and federal 
agencies provide support to NORTHCOM for homeland defense operations 
(see fig. 2). Although NORTHCOM has few forces assigned to its command, 
during an incident it requests forces through the Joint Staff. The 
Joint Staff will direct Joint Forces Command, which is DOD's joint 
force provider, to assign appropriate and available forces to 
NORTHCOM.[Footnote 23] The President may decide to federalize National 
Guard units in order to provide these forces.[Footnote 24] 

Figure 2: Homeland Defense Response: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the Homeland Defense Response, as 
follows: 

Incident/attack occurs: 

DOD: As the lead federal agency, commands the operation; 

USNORTHCOM: Commands military efforts; 
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps Units and federalized Guard units 
assigned to NORTHCOM command. 

President: May federalize National Guard troops; 

NGB: Coordinates use of National Guard forces; 

Other DOD commands/agencies: Support NORTHCOM operations. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

While the states do not have an operational role in homeland defense, 
NORTHCOM's homeland defense mission includes protecting the territory 
or domestic population of the United States as well as the 
infrastructure or other assets determined by the Secretary of Defense 
to be critical to national security. In order to protect these critical 
assets, NORTHCOM must maintain awareness of the environment in which it 
may be operating, including critical infrastructure locations relevant 
to its operations. 

NORTHCOM's Civil Support Mission: 

NORTHCOM's second mission is civil support or defense support of civil 
authorities. Civil support missions include domestic disaster relief 
operations for incidents such as fires, hurricanes, floods, and 
earthquakes. Such support also includes counterdrug operations and 
management of the consequences of a terrorist incident employing a 
weapon of mass destruction. DOD is not the primary federal agency for 
such missions (unless so designated by the President) and thus provides 
defense support of civil authorities only when (1) state, local, and 
other federal resources are overwhelmed or unique military capabilities 
are required; (2) assistance is requested by the primary federal 
agency; and (3) NORTHCOM is directed to do so by the President or the 
Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 25] 

Civil support is based on a tiered response to an incident; that is, 
incidents must be managed at the lowest jurisdictional levels and 
supported by additional response capabilities when needed (see fig. 3). 
Local and county governments respond to emergencies daily using their 
own resources and rely on mutual aid agreements and other types of 
assistance agreements with neighboring governments when they need 
additional resources. For example, county and local authorities are 
likely to have the resources needed to adequately respond to a small- 
scale incident, such as a local flood, and therefore will not request 
additional resources. For larger-scale incidents, when resources are 
overwhelmed, local and county governments will request assistance from 
the state. States have capabilities, such as the National Guard, that 
can help communities respond and recover. If additional resources are 
required, the state may request assistance from other states through 
interstate mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact (EMAC).[Footnote 26] If an incident is beyond the 
community and state capabilities, the governor can seek federal 
assistance. The federal government has a wide array of capabilities and 
resources that can be made available to assist state and local agencies 
to respond to incidents. 

Figure 3: Defense Support of Civil Authorities Response: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities Response, as follows: 

Incident occurs: 

Local first responders: 
Arrive first on scene; 

Local government: 
Requests mutual aid and state assistance; 

State government: 
Assesses damage; requests presidential declaration; 

FEMA: 
Recommends presidential declaration; 

President: 
Declares major disaster or emergency; 
Federal assistance: Provided by applicable agencies; 
NORTHCOM: Provides military assistance, if requested/required. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Overall coordination of federal incident management activities, other 
than those conducted for homeland defense, is generally the 
responsibility of DHS. Within DHS and as an executive agent for the 
National Preparedness System,[Footnote 27] FEMA is responsible for 
coordinating and integrating the preparedness of federal, state, local, 
tribal, and nongovernmental entities. 

In accordance with the National Response Framework[Footnote 28] and 
applicable laws including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act),[Footnote 29] various federal 
departments or agencies may play primary, coordinating, or supporting 
roles, based on their authorities and resources and the nature of the 
threat or incident. In some instances, national defense assets may be 
needed to assist FEMA or another agency in the national response to an 
incident. Defense resources are committed after approval by the 
Secretary of Defense or at the direction of the President. When 
deciding to commit defense resources, officials consider military 
readiness, appropriateness of the circumstances, and whether the 
response is in accordance with the law.[Footnote 30] For example, the 
Posse Comitatus Act[Footnote 31] allows military forces to provide 
civil support, but these forces generally cannot become directly 
involved in law enforcement. 

When it is determined that defense assistance is appropriate and is 
requested by FEMA, NORTHCOM is responsible for leading DOD's response. 
In the same manner as is applicable to homeland defense, NORTHCOM 
generally operates through established joint task forces that are 
subordinate to the command. In most cases, support will be localized, 
limited, and specific. When the scope of the disaster is reduced to the 
point where the primary federal agency can again assume full control 
and management without military assistance, NORTHCOM will exit. 

NORTHCOM's Planning for Homeland Defense and Support of Civil 
Authorities: 

In order to prepare for its homeland defense and civil support 
missions, NORTHCOM has developed plans based on various incident 
scenarios, including 14 of DHS's 15 national planning scenarios. 
[Footnote 32] NORTHCOM develops contingency plans to outline its role 
in potential disaster situations. NORTHCOM currently develops strategic-
level concept plans rather than more detailed operational plans, 
because the potential threats that it is planning for are varied and 
nonspecific, ranging from terrorist threats to hurricanes and 
wildfires.[Footnote 33] NORTHCOM uses the adaptive planning process for 
developing its plans--that is, the joint capability to create and 
revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require. 
Interagency coordination is a key part of the plan development process 
in adaptive planning. 

States' and NGB's Roles in Preparing for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support: 

In each state, the National Guard plays a crucial role in preparing for 
both homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities, in its 
dual roles as a national reserve force for the Army and Air Force and 
as a state militia. As the only military force shared by the states and 
the federal government, the National Guard provides a natural and 
effective bridge to accomplish collaboration between NORTHCOM and key 
state partners. The National Guard's federal mission is to provide 
trained units available for active duty in the armed forces, in the 
time of war or national emergency, and at such times as national 
security may require. NORTHCOM is responsible for the planning, 
exercising, and command and control of the National Guard for its 
federal missions conducted under the command and control of the 
President within its area of responsibility.[Footnote 34] As a state 
militia, the National Guard of each state responds to state 
emergencies, including natural disasters, civil disturbances, and acts 
of terrorism, and provides support to law enforcement in the war on 
drugs under the command and control of the state governor. The governor 
commands the National Guard through the TAG, who heads the joint force 
headquarters of the state. According to NGB officials, the state's 
joint force headquarters' mission is to maintain trained and equipped 
National Guard forces and to provide expertise and situational 
awareness to facilitate the integration of federal and state 
activities. 

NGB is a joint activity of DOD, with unique statutory, regulatory, and 
policy-based responsibilities and authorities, including serving as the 
official channel of communications between the Departments of the Army 
and the Air Force and the states on National Guard matters.[Footnote 
35] NGB administers DOD, Department of the Army, and Department of the 
Air Force policies, programs, and plans pertaining to National Guard 
matters and facilitates the integration of federal and state 
activities, including facilitating mutual support among the states. 
Although NGB does not command or control forces, it assists the states 
in the organization, maintenance, and operation of their Army National 
Guard and Air National Guard units located in the states and 
coordinates the movement of nonfederalized National Guard 
forces.[Footnote 36] NGB also maintains and provides information on 
National Guard matters affecting homeland defense and civil support to 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the combatant commands, 
including NORTHCOM; and others. During civil support missions, NGB 
provides policy guidance and facilitates National Guard assistance to 
the TAGs. Because of their interrelated missions, coordination between 
NORTHCOM and NGB is critical in planning for homeland defense and civil 
support. 

NORTHCOM Has Ongoing Efforts to Improve Coordination with the States 
and NGB in Planning for Its Missions: 

In analyzing the survey results as well as during meetings with 
NORTHCOM and NGB officials, we found that NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts 
to improve coordination with the states and NGB in planning for its 
missions and responding to requests for civil support missions. As part 
of NORTHCOM's strategic vision, its goal is to facilitate the 
synchronization of national, state, and local assets and capabilities 
to defend the nation and support civilian authorities.[Footnote 37] We 
found six areas in which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to improve 
coordination with the states and NGB, ranging from including states in 
its exercises to a new state engagement strategy for reaching out 
directly to state leaders. Some of these efforts are intended to help 
NORTHCOM plan for both of its missions, while others are intended to 
improve how it responds to requests for civil support. 

States' Participation in NORTHCOM's Exercises Enhances Coordination: 

NORTHCOM conducts or participates in training exercises to improve 
planning for its missions and responses to requests for civil support. 
The command conducts two large-scale exercises--Ardent Sentry and 
Vigilant Shield--and participates in over 30 smaller regional, state, 
and local exercises annually to help potential responders prepare for 
man-made and natural disasters. Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield 
alternate between emphasizing the homeland defense mission and the 
civil support mission. Each training event exercises one of the key 
missions while at the same time including elements of the other. 
Practicing and training for emergency responses together not only helps 
to identify problem areas or lessons learned, but also helps state 
responders to build relationships with NORTHCOM and improve 
coordination. One TAG told us that he did not have any communications 
with NORTHCOM prior to his state's participation in Ardent Sentry, but 
has since developed a close working relationship with NORTHCOM 
officials. Table 1 shows the percentage of states participating in 
Ardent Sentry, Vigilant Shield, or other events, according to our 
survey of TAGs. 

Table 1: State Participation in NORTHCOM Exercises: 

Exercise: Ardent Sentry; 
States participating: 24 (49%). 

Exercise: Vigilant Shield; 
States participating: 12 (25%). 

Exercise: Other[A]; 
States participating: 16 (32%). 

Source: GAO TAG survey responses. 

Note: Forty-nine TAGs responded to the Ardent Sentry question, 48 TAGs 
responded to the Vigilant Shield question, and all 50 responded to the 
question regarding "Other" exercises. 

[A] Other includes field exercises, state-led exercises, and other 
federal exercises that involved NORTHCOM participation. 

[End of table] 

NORTHCOM's Training and Exercise Directorate continues to work with 
state and National Guard entities to plan and conduct exercises and to 
develop a robust Vigilant Guard regional exercise program. 

Including NGB in the Development of NORTHCOM's Plans Provides National 
Guard Perspective: 

NORTHCOM has been informally including NGB in reviewing its plans, in 
the early stages, during concept development workshops, and during 
final coordination. NGB officials told us that regularly scheduled 
conferences between the planning directorates at NORTHCOM and NGB have 
greatly enhanced coordination over the past few months. In addition, 
NGB officials confirmed that NORTHCOM has been routinely providing its 
draft plans to them for comment/review to get the National Guard's 
perspectives. This review process will be formalized in the next few 
months, when NGB becomes an officially recognized member of the Joint 
Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).[Footnote 38] JPEC coordinates 
DOD efforts and ensures unity in the planning and execution of joint 
operations, and includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
services, the combatant commands and their component commands, sub- 
unified commands, joint task forces, and defense agencies. 

Participation of TAGs and Their Staffs in Joint Force Orientation 
Program Provides Information on NORTHCOM's Supporting Role to the 
States: 

NORTHCOM has also established a Joint Force Orientation Program to 
improve the states' knowledge on NORTHCOM's role in response to 
requests for civil support. Several TAGs reported that their and their 
staffs' involvement in this program enhanced coordination with 
NORTHCOM. The primary objectives of this program are to facilitate a 
mutual understanding of joint operational concepts and information 
sharing between NORTHCOM and the states to help clarify NORTHCOM's 
supporting role to the states and to improve overall coordination. At 
the time of our audit, the Joint Force Orientation Program was 
organized into three phases.[Footnote 39] The first phase included an 
overall command briefing and individual briefings from each NORTHCOM 
directorate, including discussions about NORTHCOM's training and 
exercise programs. The second phase of the Joint Force Orientation 
Program discussed more in-depth information about NORTHCOM, NGB, and 
the Joint Forces Command. This phase generally covers warfighter 
doctrine and operational application, including joint concepts and 
terminology, joint operational environment, command relationships, 
joint planning, and joint logistics. The third phase of the program is 
designed to be state specific, where the process for requesting federal 
assistance is reviewed and issues--such as intelligence sharing and 
oversight, mobile communications, planning, and logistics--are 
discussed in more detail. NORTHCOM provided us with the most recent 
participation data, and we found that all of the states within 
NORTHCOM's area of responsibility have received the first phase of 
Joint Force Orientation Program training, 46 states have received phase 
2 training, and 19 states have received phase 3 training.[Footnote 40] 
NORTHCOM told us that it is working toward providing phase 3 training 
to the remaining states. The willingness of the TAGs to participate and 
send their staffs to this training shows how useful the information 
exchanged and relationships developed with NORTHCOM during the training 
are to them. 

Hurricane and Wildfire Conferences Are Beginning to Build Effective 
Relationships between Participating Officials: 

Other ongoing efforts include NORTHCOM's weekly teleconferences 
throughout the hurricane season to coordinate with local, state, and 
federal partners and discuss potential storms; available resources, 
including EMAC;[Footnote 41] and potential needs or unique capabilities 
that DOD may be asked to provide. For instance, if a hurricane is 
projected to affect the mid-Atlantic states, officials in those states 
may inquire about resources potentially needed--such as helicopters, 
trucks, or other equipment--in advance of the incident, thereby helping 
affected states to more effectively plan their responses. Similarly, 
NORTHCOM monitors wildfire activity and sets up teleconferences with 
the National Interagency Fire Center--which includes state emergency 
response officials--if it appears NORTHCOM may need to assist in 
fighting the fires. As a result of this frequent interaction, NORTHCOM 
has begun to build more productive and effective relationships with the 
participating states and agencies. 

Locating Defense Coordinating Officers in the FEMA Regional Offices 
Improves NORTHCOM's Relationship with State and Local Officials: 

As part of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM has 
placed a defense coordinating officer (DCO) in each of FEMA's 10 
regional offices and placed greater emphasis on the DCOs' mission (see 
fig. 4).[Footnote 42] DCOs are senior-level military officers with 
joint experience and training on the National Response Framework, 
defense support to civil authorities, and DHS's National Incident 
Management System.[Footnote 43] They are responsible for assisting 
civil authorities when requested by FEMA, providing liaison support and 
requirements validation, and serving as single points of contact for 
state, local, and other federal authorities that need DOD support. DCOs 
work closely with federal, state, and local officials to determine what 
unique DOD capabilities can be used to assist in mitigating the effects 
of a natural or man-made disaster. According to TAGs, FEMA, and 
NORTHCOM officials, placing DCOs in all of the FEMA regional offices 
and emphasizing the DCOs' mission has improved NORTHCOM's relationships 
and coordination with state and local officials, as well as with FEMA 
in day-to-day planning and when an incident occurs. For example, in 
response to FEMA's request during the California wildfires in October 
2007, NORTHCOM's subordinate command, Army Forces North, deployed the 
Region 9 DCO to support the Joint Field Office in Pasadena, California 
and assess and coordinate defense support of civil authorities with 
FEMA. Based on the requirements identified by state and federal 
officials in consultation with the DCO, DOD and the National Guard 
deployed six aircraft equipped with the Modular Air Firefighting System 
to California to assist in fighting wildfires. 

Figure 4: FEMA Regions: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map illustrating the areas included in each of the ten 
FEMA regions. 

Source: FEMA; Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

NORTHCOM's New State Engagement Strategy Is Intended to Build 
Relationships with States: 

While NORTHCOM relies on NGB as its channel of communications for 
National Guard matters, NORTHCOM's commander believes that developing 
relationships directly with states will contribute to success in saving 
lives, protecting infrastructure, and promoting a resilient society. 
NORTHCOM is currently developing a state engagement strategy to build 
relationships with appropriate state leadership, including governors, 
TAGs, state homeland security advisors, and emergency managers of major 
metropolitan areas. As part of this strategy, NORTHCOM's Commander has 
personally met with several state governors and TAGs to discuss 
NORTHCOM's roles and missions and determine how they can coordinate 
when responding to an incident. For example, the Commander met with 
TAGs from the northeast region in November 2007 to discuss both 
military coordination and interagency coordination for regional 
domestic operations. The draft strategy also recognizes the importance 
of NORTHCOM working with the states in close coordination with the 
organizations such as NGB and DHS/FEMA, which are responsible for 
coordinating with the states regarding federal matters related to 
incident management. NGB officials told us that working with the states 
will provide NORTHCOM with a greater appreciation for the role and 
authority of the governor and sensitivity to the sovereignty and rights 
of states. While the strategy is designed to build the relationships 
needed for national planning and execution, it does not include 
established and thorough processes for involving states in the 
development of NORTHCOM's plans, obtaining state emergency response 
plans, or facilitating integrated intergovernmental planning. 

Gaps Remain in NORTHCOM's Coordination with the States and NGB: 

We identified three areas in which there are gaps in coordination with 
the states and NGB. First, NORTHCOM officials involve the states 
minimally in the development of NORTHCOM's major homeland defense and 
civil support plans, and they are not required to do so. Second, 
NORTHCOM generally was not familiar with state emergency response plans 
and capabilities and has no established and thorough process for 
gaining access to this information. Third, a 2005 memorandum of 
agreement, which is intended to provide the procedures by which 
NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not clearly define each agency's roles 
and responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil 
support. Improvements in these areas may help to effectively align 
NORTHCOM's efforts with other national efforts, as required by the new 
annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on national 
planning;[Footnote 44] help NORTHCOM to manage its overall risk; and 
better ensure that it will be able to fully respond when called upon to 
perform either of its missions. 

NORTHCOM Only Minimally Involves States in Planning: 

Although the majority of TAGs are familiar to varying degrees with 
NORTHCOM's homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities 
plans (see table 2), in our survey less than 25 percent reported that 
they were involved in developing and reviewing these plans (see table 
3). NORTHCOM is not required by DOD specifically to involve states in 
the development and review of its homeland defense and support of civil 
authorities plans. However, its strategic vision set forth in its 
Concept of Operations and the recent annex to Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8 emphasize that plans and capabilities should 
be synchronized at the national, state, and local levels.[Footnote 45] 
According to several TAGs, NORTHCOM should coordinate more with state 
and local organizations, particularly with the National Guard, to 
develop a good planning and operational relationship and to enhance the 
ability of all organizations to plan and respond rapidly in a crisis. 
We previously reported on the need to include state and local 
jurisdictions in the development of response plans because they are key 
stakeholders and would be on the front lines if an incident 
occurs.[Footnote 46] 

Table 2: TAG Familiarity with NORTHCOM's Plans: 

Question: How familiar are you with NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan?; 
Very familiar: 10 (20%); 
Somewhat familiar: 27 (55%); 
Slightly familiar: 9 (18%); 
Not at all: 3 (6%). 

Question: How familiar are you with NORTHCOM's defense support of civil 
authorities plan?; 
Very familiar: 12 (24%); 
Somewhat familiar: 20 (41%); 
Slightly familiar: 12 (24%); 
Not at all: 5 (10%). 

Source: GAO analysis of TAG survey responses. 

[End of table] 

Table 3: TAG Involvement in NORTHCOM's Plan Development: 

Plan: Homeland defense; 
Planning process: Attend meetings; 
Yes: 7 (14%); 
No: 43 (86%). 

Plan: Homeland defense; 
Planning process: Comment on draft; 
Yes: 12 (24%); 
No: 38 (76%). 

Plan: Homeland defense; 
Planning process: Comment on final; 
Yes: 7 (14%); 
No: 43 (86%). 

Plan: Defense support of civil authorities; 
Planning process: Attend meetings; Yes: 7 (14%); 
No: 43 (86%). 

Plan: Defense support of civil authorities; 
Planning process: Comment on draft; 
Yes: 12 (24%); 
No: 38 (76%). 

Plan: Defense support of civil authorities; 
Planning process: Comment on final; 
Yes: 9 (18%); 
No: 41 (82%). 

Source: GAO analysis of TAG survey responses. 

[End of table] 

In the case of homeland defense, NORTHCOM planners told us that, as the 
official channel of communication for National Guard related matters, 
NGB provides the states' perspectives when commenting on NORTHCOM's 
plans. The planners also said that further state involvement in the 
development of NORTHCOM's plan is not required because (1) this is a 
strategic-level concept plan[Footnote 47] that does not require such 
detail and (2) NORTHCOM is the lead during a homeland defense incident. 
NGB officials told us that as requested in NORTHCOM homeland defense 
plan, they have collected and reviewed states' supporting homeland 
defense plans and, to the extent possible, have attempted to represent 
these perspectives when commenting on NORTHCOM's homeland defense 
plan.[Footnote 48] However, an NGB planning official told us that the 
states have differing perspectives, and NORTHCOM could better learn 
about these differences by reviewing the individual state plans. In 
addition, while NGB provides information of National Guard 
capabilities, the states may have other capabilities and requirements 
that NORTHCOM should be aware of. By only relying on NGB, NORTHCOM may 
not be able to maintain awareness of the environment in which the 
command may be operating, including critical infrastructure locations 
relevant to its operations, which is important to fully carrying out 
its homeland defense mission. 

In the case of civil support and as outlined in the National Response 
Framework, because NORTHCOM plays a supporting role to other federal 
agencies and subsequently to state and local governments, NORTHCOM 
officials told us that they are starting to reach out directly to 
states to obtain their perspectives and incorporate these into future 
revisions of NORTHCOM's defense support of civil authorities plan. In 
order to effectively develop a civil support plan, NORTHCOM needs to 
know what its requirements may be. DOD recognizes that these 
requirements are driven both by the capabilities gaps of the primary 
federal agencies and those of the state and local governments.[Footnote 
49] In either homeland defense or civil support, increasing the current 
level of state involvement in the development of NORTHCOM's plans could 
help integrate intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents, 
enhance overall coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM's plans for 
its missions and responses to incidents are as effective as possible. 
[Footnote 50] 

NORTHCOM Lacks Familiarity with State Emergency Response Plans and May 
Not Be Aware of Capabilities and Potential Gaps: 

We found that NORTHCOM generally was not familiar with state emergency 
response plans and has not obtained detailed information on states' 
plans and capabilities to determine the specific challenges it may face 
in conducting homeland defense or civil support operations. According 
to our survey, 54 percent of the TAGs believe that NORTHCOM is not at 
all or only slightly familiar with their states' plan (see table 4). In 
written comments in our survey, several TAGs reported that NORTHCOM 
should be more familiar with state emergency response plans, and should 
determine how best to support the states' plans and, where appropriate, 
incorporate these plans to ensure a unified effort. Developing a 
synchronized and coordinated planning capability at all levels of 
government is important for a coordinated national response to domestic 
incidents.[Footnote 51] In part, NORTHCOM is not more familiar with 
these plans because it has no established and thorough process 
regarding coordination with the states or for gaining access to 
emergency response plans, and it is not specifically required by DOD to 
obtain information on state emergency response plans or determine state 
and local capabilities and potential resource gaps.[Footnote 52] 
NORTHCOM planners told us that they do not need access to state 
emergency response plans because they are doing strategic-level concept 
plans and this level of detail would be more appropriate for tactical 
level planning, such as planning done by NORTHCOM's subordinate 
commands, like Army Forces North.[Footnote 53] However, NGB and FEMA 
officials told us that one of NORTHCOM's biggest challenges is its 
current inability to anticipate the capabilities and requirements of 
state and local governments during a civil support incident because of 
the lack of advanced planning and coordination between NORTHCOM, 
states, and local governments. Furthermore, NORTHCOM officials told us 
that the complexity of the planning involved for a large-scale disaster 
is such that even if states can adequately plan for the resources they 
will need, they do not always have adequate multistate plans to 
integrate the state, local, federal, and nongovernmental responses. By 
not obtaining and using information on state plans and capabilities, 
NORTHCOM increases the risk that it will not be adequately prepared to 
respond to an incident with the needed resources, including the types, 
numbers, and timing of capabilities (trained personnel and equipment). 

Table 4: NORTHCOM's Familiarity with State Emergency Response Plans: 

Question: How familiar, if at all, do you think NORTHCOM is with your 
state's Homeland Security/Emergency Operations Plan?; 
Very familiar: 1 (4%); 
Somewhat familiar: 11 (42%); 
Slightly familiar: 12 (46%); 
Not at all: 2 (8%). 

Source: GAO analysis of TAG survey responses. 

Note: TAGs were asked to respond to this question if they had provided 
NORTHCOM with a copy of the state's Homeland Security/Emergency 
Operations Plan, and 26 TAGs responded. 

[End of table] 

One of NORTHCOM's subordinate commands, JTF-CS,[Footnote 54] has been 
collecting state emergency response plans so that if called upon to 
provide assistance in a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or 
high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident, its Commander will have as much 
advance information as possible regarding state plans, resources, and 
potential areas where assistance may be required. JTF-CS found that 
some state and local governments are reluctant to share their plans 
because they fear that DOD will "grade" their plans or that potential 
capability gaps will be made public, with an accompanying political 
cost. A NORTHCOM official told us that there will always be some 
tension between the states and DOD and other federal agencies as a 
result of the nation's constitutional structure. JTF-CS is therefore 
extremely careful about how it shares its emergency plan analyses and 
has made progress in gaining access to these plans through DHS. 

DHS has collected and assessed state emergency response plans as part 
of a nationwide plan review to determine the status of catastrophic 
planning for states and 75 of the nation's largest urban 
areas.[Footnote 55] Participation in the review was a prerequisite for 
receipt of fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant funds. The 
review concluded that no individual plan or resource base can fully 
absorb and respond to a catastrophe and that unsystematic planning and 
the absence of an integrated planning system is a national operational 
vulnerability. The annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, 
issued in December 2007, directs the establishment of a comprehensive 
approach to national planning through an integrated planning 
system.[Footnote 56] This system is to include, among other things, a 
description of the process that (1) links regional, state, local, and 
tribal plans, planning cycles, and processes and allows these plans to 
inform the development of federal plans and (2) fosters the integration 
of such plans and allows for state, local, and tribal capability 
assessments to feed into federal plans. DHS may, therefore, be one 
source from which NORTHCOM could obtain information on state emergency 
response plans and capabilities. 

Given its relationship with the states, NGB could also be a conduit for 
NORTHCOM to share its plans with states and obtain information on 
states plans and capabilities. In addition, NGB officials suggested 
that emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLO) could be a 
potential conduit for NORTHCOM and states to share plans. EPLOs are 
senior reserve officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 
Corps who represent the federal military in each state and in each of 
the 10 FEMA regional offices. EPLOs coordinate the provision of 
military personnel, equipment, and supplies to support the emergency 
relief and cleanup efforts of civil authorities. According to NGB 
officials, expanding the EPLO program to include sharing plans with 
states would provide a closer link between NORTHCOM and the states 
without the sensitivity of state sovereignty issues. The DCOs who are 
also located in FEMA's 10 regional offices could potentially serve as 
NORTHCOM's points of contact for the EPLOs. 

NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of its homeland 
defense and civil support plans and operations with federal 
agencies.[Footnote 57] However, in its role either in support of other 
federal agencies or as the primary agency in homeland defense 
incidents, NORTHCOM does not have adequate information on states' plans 
and capabilities. By minimally involving the states in its homeland 
defense and civil support plans and not becoming familiar with 
information on states' emergency response plans and capabilities, 
NORTHCOM increases the risk that it may not be prepared with the needed 
resources to respond to an incident. These gaps may be attributable in 
part to the fact that NORTHCOM does not have an established and 
thorough process for cooperating and interacting with the states. One 
model of such a process is NORTHCOM's security cooperation plans with 
Canada and Mexico, since the states are each separate governments 
within the federal system.[Footnote 58] For example, NORTHCOM's 
cooperation plan with Canada and Mexico outlines a strategy for 
planning, assessing, and executing security objectives and other 
strategic priorities. These objectives include advancing common 
interests, reducing impediments to cooperation, encouraging improved 
capabilities and willingness to operate in coalition, and improving 
combined homeland defense capabilities. Without a similar kind of 
cooperation plan for the states within its area of responsibility, 
NORTHCOM cannot optimally involve the TAGs and other state or local 
officials in its planning activities and develop a process for 
obtaining and using information on state emergency plans and 
capabilities. Moreover, without such a cooperation plan, NORTHCOM is 
not likely to reduce confusion, facilitate effective planning, and 
facilitate effective and efficient responses to incidents. 

NORTHCOM and NGB Responsibilities for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support Are Not Clearly Defined: 

DHS's National Response Framework and NORTHCOM's Concept of Operations 
both emphasize that NORTHCOM should coordinate with federal, state, and 
local partners before, during, and after an incident.[Footnote 59] 
Coordination with NGB is particularly important, because NGB has 
experience working with state and local authorities during incidents 
and it functions as NORTHCOM's formal link to the states. We previously 
reported that as with preparing for and responding to any type of 
disaster, leadership roles and responsibilities must be clearly 
defined, effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate 
rapid and effective decision making. Furthermore, we reported that 
without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, the potential 
remains for confusion and gaps or duplication by the combatant commands 
relative to other agencies.[Footnote 60] The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security also emphasizes that a lack of clarity regarding 
roles and responsibilities across all levels of government can lead to 
gaps in the national response and delay the ability to provide life- 
saving support when needed.[Footnote 61] 

In July 2005, NORTHCOM and NGB signed a memorandum of agreement 
outlining their command and coordination relationship. This memorandum, 
which is intended to provide the procedures by which the two entities 
interact, broadly establishes that NORTHCOM and NGB "will coordinate on 
policy, program and planning actions related to missions and 
requirements affecting the National Guard." The memorandum further 
provides for the location of a small NGB office at NORTHCOM to advise 
NORTHCOM's Commander regarding National Guard-related issues.[Footnote 
62] The mission of this office is to advise and assist NORTHCOM's 
Commander on all matters involving the National Guard, provide a 
conduit to NGB leaders and staff, and promote integration of National 
Guard priorities and capabilities into NORTHCOM's plans and operations. 
The staff members of this office provide input to numerous requests for 
information from NORTHCOM. This office is not intended to serve as the 
only point of coordination between NORTHCOM and NGB. Officials told us 
that there is no formal process in place for the NORTHCOM National 
Guard Office to coordinate with NGB headquarters. Such a process could 
improve coordination between the NGB liaison office and NGB 
headquarters. 

Our analysis of the memorandum, NORTHCOM's Concept of Operations, the 
regulation describing the organization and function of NGB, and other 
documents showed that there is no detailed guidance on NORTHCOM's and 
NGB's roles and responsibilities for homeland defense and defense 
support of civil authorities. Clearly defined responsibilities help to 
ensure unity of effort, prevent duplication, and enable efficient use 
of resources. As a result of the lack of clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities between NORTHCOM and NGB, we found several instances 
in which there was confusion and duplicate or potentially wasted 
efforts. For example, some TAGs survey responses indicated that because 
responsibilities are not clearly defined, both NGB and NORTHCOM are 
requesting the same information during an incident. In addition, 
NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan required NGB to collect state homeland 
defense plans and make them available to NORTHCOM. NGB compiled and 
reviewed these plans from the states and territories within NORTHCOM's 
area of responsibility and made them available to NORTHCOM on its Web 
portal. However, NORTHCOM planning officials told us that they did not 
request that NGB compile these plans and that, in fact, they do not 
have a need for state supporting plans because such plans will not 
affect how NORTHCOM's strategic-level homeland defense concept plan is 
written. Nevertheless, NGB spent resources collecting information that 
has not been used by NORTHCOM. As discussed above, we believe NORTHCOM 
officials should be reviewing these plans to ensure that they have 
sufficient awareness of the environment in which they may be operating 
to fully carry out the command's homeland defense mission. 

In addition, we found that NGB has developed a Joint Capabilities 
Database that includes all National Guard capabilities and has made 
this database available for NORTHCOM's use. However, NORTHCOM officials 
told us that rather than use the database, they prefer to rely on NGB 
staff to provide them National Guard readiness and capabilities data. 
NGB officials also told us that they have not encouraged NORTHCOM to 
use the database thus far because they are still finalizing the 
procedure for maintaining and updating the database with information 
from all states and territories. The officials said that they expect to 
have these issues worked out within the next few months in advance of 
the hurricane season and to begin to encourage NORTHCOM to make use of 
the database. NGB's goal with the database is to provide a national 
look at the National Guard's capabilities. 

Without clearly defined lines of coordination and roles and 
responsibility, federal efforts may not be used in the most effective 
and efficient manner. This is increasingly important as DOD is 
currently developing a database of federal emergency response 
capabilities, including those for active and reserve DOD units and 
National Guard capabilities in each state,[Footnote 63] and FEMA is 
currently developing a list of organizations and functions within DOD 
that may be used to provide support to civil authorities during natural 
or man-made disasters.[Footnote 64] Coordinating all of these efforts 
will be critical to ensuring the efficient use of federal resources as 
well as to reduce the risk of potential capabilities gaps. 

An NGB official told us that NORTHCOM and NGB have not revised the 2005 
memorandum of agreement to more clearly define their responsibilities 
because they were waiting for the National Guard Empowerment 
Act,[Footnote 65] which was partially incorporated into the National 
Defense Authorization Act for 2008,[Footnote 66] to be signed into law 
and, subsequently, for a new NGB charter to be developed and issued by 
the Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 67] The National Guard Empowerment 
Act includes provisions that may enhance the level of coordination 
between NORTHCOM and NGB. For example, the Secretary of Defense is 
required to prepare a plan coordinating the use of the National Guard 
and members of the armed forces on active duty when responding to an 
incident and include protocols for DOD, NGB, and the governors of the 
states to carry out operations in coordination with one 
another.[Footnote 68] An NGB official told us that the process of 
preparing this plan will require more coordination between NORTHCOM and 
NGB. More important, NGB's charter, which is currently undergoing 
revision based on the new act, potentially could resolve a number of 
ambiguities by more clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of 
NGB and its relationships with other agencies, such as NORTHCOM. 
Further, the NGB official told us that the revised charter will greatly 
simplify negotiations of a revised memorandum between the two agencies. 
Without clearly defined responsibilities for NORTHCOM and NGB, there is 
the potential for a lack of effective coordination between the two 
agencies and duplicative or wasted efforts. Clearly identifying roles 
and responsibilities is increasingly important because responding to a 
major disaster in the United States--natural or man-made--is a shared 
responsibility of many agencies across all levels of government and 
cannot be effectively accomplished by one agency.[Footnote 69] Without 
effective interagency coordination and planning and clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities, there is a risk that NORTHCOM's, NGB's, and 
other nationwide efforts to respond to an incident may be fragmented 
and uncoordinated, such as in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 
[Footnote 70] 

Conclusions: 

Within the federal government, there is an increasing realization that 
the nation needs to integrate not just the response to an incident, but 
also the plans of many entities at all the levels involved in 
responding to such incidents. This planning integration will help 
ensure that when the federal government responds, its response will be 
as effective as possible. NORTHCOM's recent efforts to coordinate with 
states and NGB have helped address some of the uncertainty in the 
homeland defense and civil support planning process and have improved 
NORTHCOM's ability to coordinate in the event of an actual incident. 
However, without an established and thorough process for requesting, 
obtaining, and using information on state emergency plans and 
capabilities--whether from coordination with DHS or NGB or from direct 
interaction with states--NORTHCOM may be missing opportunities to 
better plan its missions and manage its risk in a more informed manner. 
Moreover, NORTHCOM may not be fully prepared to support states, 
resulting in ineffective planning and fragmented, uncoordinated 
responses to incidents. 

Given that NORTHCOM and NGB both have increasingly important 
responsibilities for homeland defense and defense support of civil 
authorities, it is imperative that these entities work together to 
effectively prepare for DOD's response to an incident. Without fully 
and clearly defined responsibilities for NORTHCOM and NGB, confusion 
and duplicative or potentially wasted efforts may result, causing an 
inefficient use of DOD resources during a time of increased military 
operations and a growing fiscal imbalance. Further, without clear 
guidance on their responsibilities, the risk is increased that these 
agencies' responses to an incident may be ineffective and inefficient, 
potentially increasing response time and risking the safety of the U.S. 
population and infrastructure. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve NORTHCOM's coordination with the states, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense direct NORTHCOM to develop an established and 
thorough process to guide its coordination with the states, including 
provisions for: 

* involving the states in NORTHCOM's planning processes, 

* obtaining information on state emergency response plans and 
capabilities, and: 

* using such information to improve the development and execution of 
its concept plans. 

To improve NORTHCOM's coordination with NGB, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense direct NORTHCOM and NGB to revise the memorandum 
of agreement or develop an alternate document to include fully and 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities for NORTHCOM, NGB, and the 
NORTHCOM National Guard Office. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the 
intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking and 
planning to take to address the recommendations. DOD and FEMA also 
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report 
where appropriate. 

In response to our recommendation that NORTHCOM develop an established 
and thorough process to guide its coordination with the states, DOD 
agreed that such a process should be developed to guide the 
coordination between local, state, and federal governments. Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1 requires that DHS develop an 
integrated planning system consisting of a synchronized system of plans 
that integrates federal, state, and local operational capabilities to 
affect a coordinated national response. DOD told us that the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 
Security Affairs, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, and NGB are currently in 
coordination with DHS in developing the integrated planning system. We 
believe that developing this system would meet the intent of our 
recommendation if it provides NORTHCOM with an established and thorough 
process for requesting, obtaining, and using information on state 
emergency plans and capabilities and improves the development and 
execution of their concept plans, thereby helping NORTHCOM to manage 
its risk in a more informed manner. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that NORTHCOM and NGB revise their 
memorandum of agreement or develop an alternate document to include 
fully and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for NORTHCOM, NGB, 
and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office and stated that a revision to 
the memorandum is currently being coordinated. We believe that 
providing clear guidance on roles and responsibilities will help to 
ensure that these agencies' responses to an incident will be effective 
and efficient, potentially reducing response time and enhancing the 
safety of the U.S. population and infrastructure. 

DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix III. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and 
other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others 
on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or [email protected]. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Kit Bond:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Gene Taylor: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Questionnaire and Survey Results: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Survey of State Adjutants General: 

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, non-
partisan agency that assists Congress in evaluating federal programs. 
We are conducting an audit of U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) 
planning and preparedness for its homeland defense and defense support 
of civil authorities missions. As a part of this audit we are looking 
at NORTHCOM's sharing and coordination of plans with the states as well 
as its interagency coordination efforts in general. 

We are conducting this survey to find out more about your experiences 
in working and communicating with NORTHCOM. Your responses will help us 
to make actionable recommendations, if needed, for furthering 
coordination and cooperation between NORTHCOM and the states. 

Your responses may be presented in larger groupings for summary 
purposes and may be used individually as illustrative examples in our 
report. However, neither you nor your state will be expressly 
identified. If you have a question about the non-attribution of your 
answers please contact us. 

Contact Information: 

1. Please enter the following information about the person completing 
this survey and with whom we can follow up, if needed:
Name: 
Title: 
Rank: 
State:
FEMA Region:
Phone #: 
E-mail: 

Section l: Homeland Defense Plan: 

2. How familiar are you with NORTHCOM's Homeland Defense plan? 
very familiar: 20%; 
somewhat familiar: 55%; 
slightly familiar: 18%; 
not at all familiar: 6%. 

3. Were you or your staff involved in any of the following NORTHCOM 
activities related to the Homeland Defense plan? 

a) attending plan development meetings with NORTHCOM: 
No: 86%; 
Yes: 14%. 

b) providing comments on a draft version of NORTHCOM's plan: 
No: 76%; 
Yes: 24%. 

c) providing comments on the final version of NORTHCOM's plan: 
No: 86%; 
Yes: 14%. 

d) attending NORTHCOM meetings for your FEMA region: 
No: 66%; 
Yes: 34%. 

Section 2: Defense Support of Civil Authorities Plan: 

4. How familiar are you with NORTHCOM's Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities plan? 

very familiar: 24%; 
somewhat familiar: 41%; 
slightly familiar: 24%; 
not at all familiar: 10%. 

5. Were you or your staff involved in any of the following NORTHCOM 
activities related to the Defense Support of Civil Authorities plan? 

a) attending plan development meetings with NORTHCOM: 
No: 86%; 
Yes: 14%. 

b) providing comments on a draft version of NORTHCOM's plan: 
No: 76%; 
Yes: 24%. 

c) providing comments on the final version of NORTHCOM's plan: 
No: 82%; 
Yes: 18%. 

d) attending NORTHCOM meetings for your FEMA region: 
No: 76%; 
Yes: 24%. 

Section 3: Exercises: 

6. Have officials in your state participated in the following NORTHCOM 
exercises? If so, in what year? 

a) Ardent Sentry: 
No: 51%; 
Yes: 49%; 
Year(s): 
	
b) Vigilant Shield: 
No: 75%; 
Yes: 25%; 
Year(s): 

7. Have officials in your state participated in any NORTHCOM exercises 
other than Ardent Sentry or Vigilant Shield? 
Yes: 32%; Which exercises? 
No: 68%. 

8. Has your state conducted homeland defense or emergency response 
exercises since September 11, 2001? 
Yes: 100%; What exercises?
No: 0; Skip To Question #12. 

9. Did you invite NORTHCOM officials to participate in your state 
exercises? 
Yes: 50%; 
No: 50%; Skip To Question #12. 

10. Did NORTHCOM officials participate in your state exercises?
Yes: 96%; 
No: 4%; Skip To Question #12. 

11.In your opinion, did NORTHCOM send the appropriate staff to 
participate in your exercises? 
Yes: 91%. 
No: 4%; Please explain. 

Section 4: NORTHCOM Overview: 

12. Please describe your state's coordination and communication with 
NORTHCOM regarding planning and/or operations for homeland defense and 
defense support of civil authorities. 

13. Does your state have a Homeland Security/Emergency Operations Plan? 
Yes: 100%; 
No: 0; Skip To Question #16. 

14. Did you or your staff provide and/or discuss your state Homeland 
Security/Emergency Operations Plan with NORTHCOM? 
Yes: 50%; 
No: 50%; Skip To Question #16. 

15. How familiar, if at all, do you think NORTHCOM is with your state's 
Homeland Security/Emergency Operations Plan?
very familiar: 4%; 
somewhat familiar: 42%; 
slightly familiar: 46%; 
not at all familiar: 8%. 

16. Please describe your expectation for NORTHCOM's involvement in the 
event of an incident in your state. 

17. How would this expectation change, if at all, if the incident 
involved federal military property in your state? 

18. Did you or your staff participate in NORTHCOM's Joint Force 
Orientation Program? 
Yes: 8%; Please explain your participation: 
No: 12%. 

19. From your perspective, what are the strengths of NORTHCOM's current 
coordination and communication with your state? 

20. From your perspective, what are the weaknesses of NORTHCOM's 
current coordination and communication with your state? 

21. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving 
coordination and communication between NORTHCOM and your state? 

22. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving NORTHCOM's 
Homeland Defense plan? 

23. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving NORTHCOM's 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities plan? 

24.Any additional comments? 

Thank you for your time. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

In conducting this review, we focused our scope on U.S. Northern 
Command's (NORTHCOM) coordination with the states and the National 
Guard Bureau (NGB). We excluded NORTHCOM's coordination with other 
federal agencies and organizations and nongovernmental organizations 
because this is addressed in a companion report. Our review focused on 
NORTHCOM's coordination efforts occurring since Hurricane Katrina in 
2005. In addressing our objectives, we interviewed and obtained 
information and related documents from officials at the following 
locations: 

* NORTHCOM Headquarters, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, 
Colorado: 

* Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia: 

* The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 

* The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 

* Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Fort Monroe, Virginia: 

* U.S. Army North, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas: 

* Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region, Fort McNair, 
Washington, D.C. 

* NGB, Arlington, Virginia: 

* Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Washington, D.C. 

* U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

* Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, D.C. 

We also conducted semistructured telephone interviews with the state 
adjutants general, also known as TAGs, from Florida, Indiana, Nebraska, 
and Washington. 

To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM is coordinating with the 
states, we surveyed the TAGs who are within NORTHCOM's area of 
responsibility. We asked respondents about their familiarity and 
involvement in NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan and the defense support 
of civil authorities plan. We also asked about their experiences in 
working and communicating with NORTHCOM, including their participation 
in NORTHCOM exercises and involvement of NORTHCOM in their state 
exercises. The questionnaire and survey responses can be found in 
appendix I. We sent a questionnaire to TAGs of all 49 states in 
NORTHCOM's area of responsibility and the District of Columbia. 
[Footnote 71] 

The self-administered electronic survey was sent via electronic mail to 
the TAGs and their chiefs of staff. More specifically, we sent the 
questionnaire by e-mail in an attached Microsoft Word form that 
respondents could return electronically after marking checkboxes or 
entering narrative responses into open answer boxes. Alternatively, 
respondents could return it by mail after printing the form and 
completing it by hand. We sent the original electronic questionnaire on 
April 4, 2007. We sent out reminder e-mail messages, with replacement 
surveys, at different time intervals to all nonrespondents in order to 
encourage a higher response rate. In addition, we made several courtesy 
telephone calls to nonrespondents to encourage their completion. All 
questionnaires were returned by September 19, 2007. We achieved a 100 
percent response rate. 

The survey used was not a sample survey because it included the 
universe of respondents. Therefore, the survey has no sampling errors. 
However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may 
introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For 
example, difficulties in interpreting a particular question, sources of 
information available to respondents, or entering data into a database 
or analyzing them can introduce unwanted variability into the survey 
results. We took steps in developing the questionnaire, collecting the 
data, and analyzing them to minimize such nonsampling errors. For 
example, social science survey specialists designed the questionnaire 
in collaboration with GAO staff who had subject matter expertise. In 
addition to an internal expert technical review by GAO's Survey 
Coordination Group, we pretested the survey with two TAGs by telephone 
to ensure that the questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to 
understand. Since there were relatively few changes based on the 
pretests and we were conducting surveys with the universe of 
respondents, we did not find it necessary to conduct additional 
pretests. Instead, changes to the content and format of the 
questionnaire were made after the pretests based on the feedback we 
received. When we analyzed the data, an independent analyst checked all 
computer programs. All data were double keyed during the data-entry 
process, and GAO staff verified a sample of the resulting data to 
ensure accuracy. 

In addition to analyzing the frequency and distribution of marked 
checkbox survey responses, we also analyzed the open-ended narrative 
survey responses for trends and recurring themes. For instance, 
although we did not directly ask a question about the defense 
coordinating officers (DCO) now located in each FEMA region, the DCOs 
were cited several times by TAGs as improving their communications with 
NORTHCOM. When the TAGs were not in agreement or had different 
perspectives on issues, we also summarized conflicting responses to 
illustrate the complexity of NORTHCOM's unique relationship with the 
states and any ongoing efforts to resolve these issues. For example, 
some TAGs believed that NGB should be the state's primary channel of 
communication with NORTHCOM, but others disagreed. 

To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM is coordinating with the 
states and NGB, we reviewed plans, guidance, and other documents, 
including the memorandum of agreement between NORTHCOM and NGB. In 
addition, we conducted semistructured interviews with officials from 
NORTHCOM and several of its subordinate commands, including the Joint 
Task Force-Civil Support, Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol 
Region, and Army Forces North, as well as officials from NGB 
headquarters and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office. We also conducted 
interviews with the officials from FEMA and DHS's interagency Incident 
Management Planning Team. Additionally, we observed a major exercise 
(Ardent Sentry/Northern Edge) in the Indianapolis area in May 2007. 

We conducted our review from April 2007 to April 2008 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Homeland Defense: 
2600 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-2600: 

April 1, 2008: 

Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. D'Agostino: 

The Department of Defense response to the Government Accountability 
Office draft report GAO-08-252, "HOMELAND DEFENSE: Steps Have Been 
Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command's Coordination with States and 
the National Guard Bureau, But Gaps Remain", dated February 26, 2008 is 
attached. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the 
draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Paul McHale 

Enclosure: As stated: 

GAO Draft Report ï¿½ Dated February 26, 2008: 
GAO 08-252/(351091): 

"Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S.
Northern Command's Coordination with States and the National Guard
Bureau, But Gaps Remain" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct 
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to develop an established 
and thorough process to guide its coordination with the states, 
including provisions for: 

* involving the states in USNORTHCOM planning process; 
* obtaining information on state emergency response plans and 
capabilities, and; 
* using such information to improve the development and execution of 
its concept plans. 

Department Of Defense Response: Partially concur. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) agrees that an established and thorough planning process 
should be developed to guide the coordination between the local, state 
and federal governments. This process should include United States 
Northern Command, United States Pacific Command, and United States 
Southern Command. The DoD is coordinating with the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in developing this process and a comprehensive 
planning solution that empowers state emergency planners to participate 
with a synchronized system of plans that integrates federal, state, and 
local operational capabilities to affect a coordinated national 
response. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1 requires DHS to 
produce an Integrated Planning System (IPS). The Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 
Security Affairs, the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM, and National Guard 
Bureau are in coordination with the DHS in developing the IPS. The IPS 
will consist of federal, state and local planning, and a vertical and 
horizontal integration process. The IPS will provide all of the 
combatant commands and in particular USNORTHCOM information on state 
emergency response plans and their capabilities. The IPS will support 
combatant commands with improving the development and execution of 
their concept plans. 

The coordination and planning process between the combatant commands 
and the states will become fully integrated through the efforts of the 
Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and the Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officer (EPLO). There is a permanently assigned DCO and 
Regional EPLO at each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs). Additionally, 
there are State EPLOs assigned to the National Guard's Joint Force 
Headquarters ï¿½ State, or State Emergency Operations Center in each 
State, territory, and the District of Columbia. The DCOs and the 
Regional and State EPLOs will facilitate the process of coordinating 
emergency response plans and capabilities between the combatant 
commands and the States, territories and the District of Columbia. 

In order to better integrate the planning activities of the DCOs and 
EPLOs the DoD has recently proposed a planning concept called Task 
Force for Emergency Response (TFER). The TFER concept is currently 
under review by DoD interagency partners. 

Recommendation 2: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct 
USNORTHCOM and National Guard Bureau to revise the Memorandum of 
Agreement or develop an alternative document to include fully and 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities for USNORTHCOM, National 
Guard Bureau and the National Guard Bureau office located at 
USNORTHCOM. 

Department Of Defense Response: Concur. A revision to the Memorandum of 
Agreement between USNORTHCOM and National Guard Bureau is in 
coordination. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St. James, Assistant 
Director; Yecenia Camarillo; Joanna Chan; Angela Jacobs; David Keefer; 
Joseph Kirschbaum; Joanne Landesman; Erin Noel; Terry Richardson; and 
Jena Whitley made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to 
Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251]. Washington, 
D.C.: April 16, 2008. 

Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs' 
Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs' Impact on 
National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-488T]. Washington, D.C.: March 
11, 2008. 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made in Implementation of 
Management and Mission Functions, but More Work Remains. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-457T]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 13, 2008. 

Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Challenges That Require Federal and Private 
Sector Coordination. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
08-36]. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to 
Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1241T]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007. 

Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Clarify Federal Leadership 
Roles and Improve Pandemic Planning. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1257T]. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2007. 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of 
Mission and Management Functions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1240T]. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for 
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related 
Recommendations and Legislation. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1142T]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007. 

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness Efforts Could 
Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk 
Mitigation. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-696]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007. 

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic 
Equipment Requirements and Readiness. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60]. Washington, D.C.: January 
26, 2007. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to Close 
the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National 
Priorities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-143]. 
Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st 
Century Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
06-1109T]. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2006. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 6, 2006. 

Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery 
Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-903]. Washington, D.C.: July 
31, 2006. 

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support 
Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-498]. Washington, D.C.: May 
31, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the 
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-808T]. Washington, D.C.: May 
25, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-643]. Washington, D.C.: May 
15, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-442T]. Washington, D.C.: March 
8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-467T]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 23, 2006. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment 
Need to be Reexamined. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-170T]. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005. 

Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All- 
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-652]. Washington, D.C.: July 
11, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for 
Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-21]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 10, 2004. 

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas 
and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-670T]. Washington, D.C.: April 
29, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally 
Chartered Commissions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-04-591]. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004. 

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for 
Domestic Military Missions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-03-670]. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-822]. Washington, 
D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support (Washington, D.C.: June 2005), 5. 

[2] DOD refers to civil support operations conducted in accordance with 
the National Response Framework as Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, 
GL-7. 

[3] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support, 5-6. 

[4] Hawaii and Guam are under the area of responsibility of U.S. 
Pacific Command, and Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are under 
the area of responsibility of U.S. Southern Command. 

[5] NORTHCOM's geographical boundaries for defense support of civil 
authorities do not include Canada and Mexico unless coordinated in 
advance with the State Department. 

[6] NGB is a joint activity of DOD. It coordinates the deployment of 
nonfederalized National Guard forces and provides NORTHCOM with 
situational awareness of National Guard issues and activities, 
including capabilities and requirements. NGB does not have jurisdiction 
over resources. Nonfederalized or Title 32 forces are under the control 
of the governor of the state. During a presidential call-up, National 
Guard forces can be mobilized under Title 10 and federalized. In this 
case, they are under the control of the President. 

[7] An incident refers to a natural or man-made disaster, ranging from 
a hurricane to a terrorist attack, that requires action to prevent or 
minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or natural resources. 

[8] Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007). 

[9] GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to 
Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address 
Related Recommendations and Legislation, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1142T] (Washington, D.C.: July 
31, 2007). A list of related products is included at the end of this 
report. 

[10] U.S. Northern Command, State and Tribal Engagement Strategy, Draft 
(Colorado Springs, Colo., undated). 

[11] White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006); House of Representatives, A 
Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006); U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A 
Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006); and GAO, 
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-808T] (Washington, D.C.: May 
25, 2006). 

[12] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Strengthening 
America's Defenses in the New Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 1, 2007). 

[13] Pub. L. No. 110-181, ï¿½ï¿½ 1812 and 1813 (2008), which are codified 
at 10 U.S.C. ï¿½ï¿½ 10501 and 10503 (2007). 

[14] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but 
Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other 
Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008). 

[15] This includes those in the 48 contiguous states as well as Alaska 
and the District of Columbia. 

[16] U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations (Colorado Springs, 
Colo.: June 13, 2005). 

[17] Catastrophic incidents by their nature cut across geographic and 
political boundaries, and these events require fully integrated 
intergovernmental actions. See Department of Homeland Security, 
Nationwide Plan Review: Phase 2 Report (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 
2006). 

[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251]. 

[19] The command was created in April 2002 as part of a revised Unified 
Command Plan, which outlines the areas of responsibility for the 
combatant commands. 

[20] NORTHCOM's area of responsibility for its homeland defense mission 
includes the contiguous United States, Alaska, U.S. territorial waters, 
and Canada and Mexico. NORTHCOM's area of responsibility for its civil 
support mission includes the contiguous United States, Alaska, and U.S. 
territorial waters. 

[21] Homeland defense is considered DOD's portion of the broader area 
of homeland security. Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, 3, and Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support, 5. 

[22] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support, 5-6. 

[23] NORTHCOM and the other combatant commands transmit their force 
requirements (forces needed to execute their planned operations) to 
Joint Forces Command, and the latter determines which mix of trained 
military service units (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) will provide 
the requested forces. Joint Forces Command assigns these forces to 
combatant commanders when requested by the Joint Staff. See White 
House, Unified Command Plan (Washington, D.C., May 5, 2006) and Joint 
Pub. 5), Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 26, 2006), I-10. In addition, 
any other combatant command to which forces have been assigned by DOD, 
such as U.S. Pacific Command, could also be directed to provide forces 
to NORTHCOM. 

[24] During a presidential call-up, National Guard forces can be 
mobilized under Title 10 and federalized. In this case, they are under 
the control of the President. Nonfederalized or Title 32 forces are 
under the control of the governor of the state. 

[25] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2008), and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-
28, Civil Support (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2007). 

[26] EMAC is a mutual aid agreement among member states and is 
administered by the National Emergency Management Association. States 
affected by disasters have increasingly relied on EMAC as a means to 
access resources from other states, including emergency managers, 
National Guard assets, and first responders. GAO, Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's Collaborative and Administrative 
Capacity Should Improve National Disaster Response, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-854] (Washington, D.C.: June 
29, 2007). 

[27] The National Preparedness System (NPS) provides a tool to assist 
jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations at all levels to plan for, 
assess, and track capabilities in a shared environment. It integrates 
various efforts to provide the comprehensive picture of preparedness 
and progress toward achieving the goal. 

[28] The National Response Framework is a guide to how the nation 
conducts all-hazards incident response. It is built upon flexible, 
scalable, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and 
responsibilities across the nation, linking all levels of government 
and private sector businesses and non-governmental organizations. 
Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework. 

[29] The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, signed into law November 23, 1988, amended 
the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288. This act 
constitutes the statutory authority for most federal disaster response 
activities, especially as they pertain to FEMA and FEMA programs. 

[30] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, II-4, 
(Sept. 14, 2007). 

[31] 18 U.S.C. ï¿½ 1385 (2007). 

[32] The federal interagency community developed 15 all-hazards 
planning scenarios--the national planning scenarios--for use in 
federal, state, and local homeland security preparedness activities. 
The scenarios are planning tools and are representative of the range of 
potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters and related impacts 
facing the United States, including nuclear detonation; biological, 
chemical, radiological, and explosive attacks; as well as a major 
hurricane or earthquake. NORTHCOM does not use the 15TH scenario 
dealing with cyberattacks because this is in the area of responsibility 
of U.S. Strategic Command. 

[33] Generally, a contingency plan does not contain a list of specific 
forces needed to carry out missions, or even specific mission tasks. 
Instead, tools such as standing execute orders match types of units on 
potential call for use to plans, but specific units usually are not 
identified. Recently approved national planning guidance may soon 
require DOD and other federal agencies to prepare more detailed plans. 
White House, National Planning, Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 8 Annex 1 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007). 

[34] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support, 8; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-27, Homeland Defense, 
II-14-II-15, A-1-A-6, (Jul. 12, 2007); and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 
Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, (Sep. 14, 2007), II-11-II-14. 

[35] This includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and U.S. 
possessions and territories. 

[36] Army Regulation 130-5/AFMD 10, Organization and Functions of 
National Guard Bureau (Dec. 30, 2001). 

[37] U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations, 3-11. 

[38] The Chief of NGB initiated the inclusion of NGB as part of JPEC 
via a letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

[39] NORTHCOM merged the first two phases of the Joint Force 
Orientation Program in September 2007, so there are currently only two 
phases of this program. NORTHCOM's goal in merging these phases and 
scheduling the program over weekends is to save state officials travel 
and training expenses and enable guardsmen to take fewer days off from 
their civilian jobs. 

[40] This updates the information we obtained in our survey on the 
numbers of TAGs and their staff who have completed this training (44 
TAGs reported that they or their staff had participated in the Joint 
Force Orientation Program). See app. I. The survey did not did not 
break out the data by training phases. 

[41] EMAC provides a means for states affected by disasters to access 
resources from other states, including emergency managers, National 
Guard assets, and first responders. In a major disaster requiring 
assistance from multiple states, EMAC will be a principal avenue for 
requesting resources. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
07-854]. 

[42] Prior to October 1, 2006, training support brigade commanders of 
the First and Fifth Continental U.S. Armies also served as DCOs 
whenever requested by FEMA or another federal agency. Upon 
establishment of Fifth U.S. Army as the Army component to NORTHCOM, 10 
full-time regional DCOs were established and located in the FEMA 
regional offices. 

[43] The National Incident Management System provides a consistent 
nationwide template to enable all government, private sector, and 
nongovernmental organizations to work together to better respond to 
natural disasters and emergencies, including acts of terrorism. This 
system offers a unified approach to incidents and emphasizes standard 
command structures, preparedness, mutual aid, and resource management. 
Training for this system is administered by FEMA's Emergency Management 
Institute. 

[44] White House, National Planning. 

[45] U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations; White House, 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003); and White House, National Planning. 

[46] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Clarify Federal 
Leadership Roles and Improve Pandemic Planning, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1257T] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 26, 2007). 

[47] Because NORTHCOM's plans are broader concept plans rather than 
more detailed operational plans, they are not focused on specific 
scenarios and discrete sets of required capabilities needed to 
accomplish objectives. 

[48] NORTHCOM's homeland defense concept plan specifically requested 
that NGB facilitate the states in providing supporting plans and 
forward these to NORTHCOM. NGB received no indication that these plans 
had been reviewed, and NORTHCOM officials were not clear about the 
status and completeness of these supporting plans. 

[49] As we reported separately, NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve 
the coordination of its homeland defense and civil support plans and 
operations with other federal agencies. However, NORTHCOM lacks formal 
guidance to coordinate its planning effort with its agency partners. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251]. 

[50] Catastrophic incidents by their nature cut across geographic and 
political boundaries, and these events require fully integrated 
intergovernmental actions. Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide 
Plan Review: Phase 2 Report. 

[51] The annex to the 2003 National Preparedness Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive, issued in December 2007, establishes a 
comprehensive approach to national planning for homeland security and 
requires that the federal government more closely integrate federal, 
state, local, and tribal plans with respect to capability assessments. 
White House, National Planning, 4. 

[52] DHS has compiled and reviewed the state emergency response plans. 
Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review: Phase 2 
Report. 

[53] NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities 
it may need in part because DOD has required NORTHCOM to complete 
concept plans, which are more general plans that do not entail the 
assignment of specific forces. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251]. Recently approved national planning guidance 
requires DOD and other federal agencies to prepare more detailed plans. 
White House, National Planning. 

[54] JTF-CS is a subordinate command to NORTHCOM and is responsible for 
planning and integrating DOD support to states or other federal 
agencies following a CBRNE incident. JTF-CS facilitates the development 
of capability-based force packages and modules to meet various CBRNE 
incident management options. When directed by NORTHCOM to respond to an 
incident, JTF-CS will arrive on site to gain situational awareness and 
report back to NORTHCOM for preparation of an estimate of what is 
needed from DOD. JTF-CS was performing this mission 3 years prior to 
NORTHCOM being established in 2002. 

[55] Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 1 
Report (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2006), and Nationwide Plan Review 
Phase 2 Report. 

[56] White House, National Planning. 

[57] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251]. 

[58] DOD requires combatant commanders to have security cooperation 
plans with foreign governments. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, 
Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 26, 2006), I-3, I-4, GL-21. 

[59] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, and 
U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations. 

[60] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness 
Efforts Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and 
Risk Mitigation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
696] (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007); Homeland Security: Preparing 
for and Responding to Disasters, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-395T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2007); and Emergency 
Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated with 
Major Emergency Incidents, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-467T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006). 

[61] Homeland Security council, National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, 32. 

[62] The memorandum limits the staff in the NGB liaison office to 
eight; there are currently four staff assigned to the office. 

[63] Pub. L. No. 109-364, ï¿½ 1406 (2006). 

[64] Pub. L. No. 109-295 ï¿½ 651 (2006). 

[65] Pub. L. No. 110-181, ï¿½ 1801 (2008). 

[66] Pub. L. No. 110-181, ï¿½ï¿½ 1811-1813 (2008). 

[67] This act was passed in January 2008, and NGB's charter is 
currently being revised. 

[68] Pub. L. No. 110-181, ï¿½ 1814 (2008). 

[69] Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland 
Security. 

[70] White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned; House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: Final 
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina; U.S. Senate, 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared; and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-808T]. 

[71] Since Hawaii falls under U.S. Pacific Command's area of 
responsibility, it was not within the scope of this study. 

[End of section] 

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