    Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern
    Command's Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau,
    but Gaps Remain (16-APR-08, GAO-08-252).

    In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S.
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil
    support missions on U.S. soil. It is particularly important that
    NORTHCOM coordinate with the National Guard Bureau (NGB), because
    NGB has experience dealing with state and local authorities
    during incidents and functions as NORTHCOM's formal link to the
    states. GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which
    NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to coordinate with the states and
    NGB in planning, exercises and other preparedness activities and
    (2) identify the extent to which there are any gaps in this
    coordination. To do this, GAO surveyed the state adjutants
    general, the highest ranking guardsman in each state, and
    received a 100 percent response rate, and reviewed interagency
    coordination plans and guidance.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-252
        ACCNO:   A81693
      TITLE:     Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S.
    Northern Command's Coordination with States and the National
    Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain
         DATE:   04/16/2008
      SUBJECT:   Agency missions
    	     Civil defense
    	     Civil support
    	     Defense contingency planning
    	     Defense operations
    	     Emergency preparedness
    	     Emergency response plans
    	     Emergency response procedures
    	     Federal/state relations
    	     Homeland security
    	     Intergovernmental relations
    	     Local governments
    	     Military forces
    	     Military operations
    	     National defense operations
    	     National Guard
    	     Regional planning
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Crisis communications
    	     Program coordination

    ******************************************************************
    ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
    ** GAO Product.                                                 **
    **                                                              **
    ** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
    ** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
    ** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
    **                                                              **
    ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
    ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
    ** document's contents.                                         **
    **                                                              **
    ******************************************************************
    GAO-08-252

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
    in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
    may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
    material separately.

    Report to Congressional Requesters:

    United States Government Accountability Office: GAO:

    April 2008:

    Homeland Defense:

    Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command's Coordination
    with States and the National Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain:

    GAO-08-252:

    GAO Highlights:

    Highlights of GAO-08-252, a report to congressional requesters.

    Why GAO Did This Study:

    In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern
    Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil support
    missions in and around the United States. It is important that NORTHCOM
    coordinate with the National Guard Bureau (NGB), because NGB has
    experience dealing with state and local authorities during incidents
    and functions as NORTHCOM�s formal link to the states. GAO was asked to
    (1) determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to
    coordinate with the states and NGB in planning, exercises and other
    preparedness activities and (2) identify the extent to which there are
    any gaps in this coordination. To do this, GAO surveyed the state
    adjutants general, the highest ranking guardsman in each state, and
    received a 100 percent response rate, and reviewed interagency
    coordination plans and guidance.

    What GAO Found:

    NORTHCOM has several ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the
    states and NGB in planning for its missions and responding to requests
    for civil support. For example, during hurricane season NORTHCOM
    facilitates weekly conferences with the relevant local, state, and
    federal emergency management officials, through which it has begun to
    build more productive relationships. NORTHCOM also conducted two large-
    scale exercises and participated in over 30 smaller regional, state,
    and local exercises annually to help responders prepare for man-made
    and natural disasters. In addition, NORTHCOM has been informally
    including NGB in reviewing its plans.

    We identified gaps in coordination between NORTHCOM, the states, and
    NGB in three areas.

    * NORTHCOM officials minimally involved the states in the development
    of its homeland defense and civil support plans. Less than 25 percent
    of the state adjutants general reported that they were involved in
    developing and reviewing these plans. For civil support, NORTHCOM
    officials told us that they are reaching out directly to states to
    better understand states� plans and capabilities, but for homeland
    defense, they rely on NGB to provide states� perspectives.

    * NORTHCOM was not familiar with state emergency response plans and has
    no process for obtaining this information. Fifty-four percent of the
    state adjutants general reported that they believed that NORTHCOM was
    not at all or only slightly familiar with their states� emergency
    response plans. This may be attributable, in part, to the fact that
    NORTHCOM does not have an established and thorough process for
    cooperating and interacting with the states. By not obtaining and using
    information on states� plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the
    risk that it will not be prepared to respond to an incident with the
    needed resources to support civil authorities.

    * A 2005 agreement, which is intended to provide the procedures by
    which NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not clearly define each agency�s
    roles and responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil
    support. The lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities has
    resulted in confusion and duplicative or wasted efforts. For example,
    as required in NORTHCOM�s homeland defense plan, NGB compiled the
    states� homeland defense plans and made them available to NORTHCOM;
    however, NORTHCOM planners told us that they neither requested nor
    needed access to this information. Without clearly defined roles and
    responsibilities, there is a risk that NORTHCOM�s and NGB�s responses
    to an event could be fragmented and uncoordinated.

    Addressing these gaps could help integrate intergovernmental planning
    for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall coordination, and help
    ensure that NORTHCOM�s plans for its missions and responses to
    incidents are as effective as possible.

    What GAO Recommends:

    To improve NORTHCOM�s coordination with the states, GAO recommends that
    NORTHCOM develop an established and thorough process to guide its
    coordination with the states. To improve the command�s coordination
    with NGB, GAO recommends that NORTHCOM and NGB revise their agreement
    to more fully and clearly define how they will coordinate and the
    responsibilities each will have. DOD generally agreed with our
    recommendations and suggested ongoing and future efforts to satisfy the
    intent of the recommendations.

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-252]. For more
    information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or
    dagostinod@gao.gov.

    [End of section]

    Contents:

    Letter:

    Results in Brief:

    Background:

    NORTHCOM Has Ongoing Efforts to Improve Coordination with the States
    and NGB in Planning for Its Missions:

    Gaps Remain in NORTHCOM's Coordination with the States and NGB:

    Conclusions:

    Recommendations for Executive Action:

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

    Appendix I: Questionnaire and Survey Results:

    Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:

    Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

    Related GAO Products:

    Tables:

    Table 1: State Participation in NORTHCOM Exercises:

    Table 2: TAG Familiarity with NORTHCOM's Plans:

    Table 3: TAG Involvement in NORTHCOM's Plan Development:

    Table 4: NORTHCOM's Familiarity with State Emergency Response Plans:

    Figures:

    Figure 1: NORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility:

    Figure 2: Homeland Defense Response:

    Figure 3: Defense Support of Civil Authorities Response:

    Figure 4: FEMA Regions:

    Abbreviations:

    CBRNE: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
    explosive:

    DCO: defense coordinating officer:

    DHS: Department of Homeland Security:

    DOD: Department of Defense:

    EMAC: Emergency Management Assistance Compact:

    EPLO: emergency preparedness liaison officer:

    FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:

    JPEC: Joint Planning and Execution Community:

    JTF-CS: Joint Task Force Civil Support:

    NGB: National Guard Bureau:

    NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command:

    TAG: state adjutant general:

    [End of section]

    United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:

    April 16, 2008:

    Congressional Requesters:

    The United States homeland continues to face an uncertain, complex
    security environment with the potential for terrorist incidents and
    natural disasters. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the
    President established the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to provide
    and manage homeland defense and civil support. The Department of
    Defense (DOD) considers homeland defense to be NORTHCOM's primary
    mission and defines it as the protection of U.S. sovereignty,
    territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure
    against external threats and aggression against the United
    States.[Footnote 1] Civil support or defense support of civil
    authorities[Footnote 2] includes the use of federal military forces,
    the department's career civilian and contractor personnel, and DOD
    agency and component assets for domestic emergencies and for designated
    law enforcement and other activities.[Footnote 3] DOD is not the
    primary federal agency for such missions (unless designated so by the
    President) and thus operates in support of civil authorities only when
    directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
    NORTHCOM's area of responsibility for its homeland defense mission
    includes the contiguous United States, Alaska, Canada, and
    Mexico.[Footnote 4] NORTHCOM's area of responsibility for its civil
    support mission includes the contiguous United States, Alaska, and U.S.
    territorial waters.[Footnote 5]

    NORTHCOM faces the critical and unique challenge of preparing for its
    missions within the legal and historical limits of the constitutional
    federal-state structure that includes the 49 North American U.S. states
    and the District of Columbia. Numerous local, state, and federal
    agencies and organizations, including the National Guard Bureau
    (NGB),[Footnote 6] have jurisdiction over or can coordinate resources
    within the homeland and, therefore, may be involved in a response to an
    incident.[Footnote 7] Because protecting and defending the homeland is
    a shared responsibility with states potentially requiring assistance
    from federal agencies and organizations, effective coordination and
    integrated planning across all levels are critical for an effective
    national response.[Footnote 8] We have previously reported that to
    facilitate rapid and effective decision making during a crisis, legal
    authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all
    government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated,
    and well understood.[Footnote 9] NORTHCOM also recognizes the
    importance of coordination with other federal agencies and states for
    its missions, especially in support of civil authorities, stating that
    such coordination will facilitate the creation and implementation of
    coordinated policies, collaborative plans, and unified operations.
    [Footnote 10]

    Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and, more recently, the
    uncoordinated national response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress and
    other organizations have emphasized the need to improve the national
    response to an incident.[Footnote 11] For example, the Commission on
    the National Guard and Reserves found that reform is necessary to
    increase coordination among DOD entities and commands--including NGB
    and NORTHCOM--to ensure better national security outcomes.[Footnote 12]
    The relationship of NORTHCOM and NGB is even more important with
    Congress's recent passing of legislation to elevate NGB to a joint
    activity of DOD and expand NGB's functions to include assisting the
    Secretary of Defense with coordinating the use of National Guard forces
    and resources with other federal agencies, the adjutants general of the
    states, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and NORTHCOM for their use in
    operations conducted under Title 32 or in support of state
    missions.[Footnote 13] Although NGB is NORTHCOM's formal channel of
    coordination with states for National Guard related matters, NORTHCOM
    also coordinates with the states through the state adjutants general,
    known as TAGs--the highest-ranking guardsman in each state. As the
    commander of the state's National Guard units, the governor of each
    state commands the National Guard through the TAG.

    To better understand NORTHCOM's efforts to effectively prepare for its
    homeland defense and civil support missions, we were asked to review
    NORTHCOM's processes for planning for, coordinating, and executing its
    missions. For this report, our objectives were to (1) determine the
    extent to which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to coordinate with the
    states and NGB in planning exercises and other preparedness activities
    and (2) identify the extent to which there are any gaps in this
    coordination. We prepared a separate report to address (1) the status
    of NORTHCOM's plans and the challenges it faces in planning and
    conducting operations, (2) the adequacy of planning personnel, and (3)
    the extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates with other federal agencies.
    [Footnote 14]

    In conducting this review, we focused our scope on NORTHCOM's
    coordination with the states and NGB in planning and preparing for its
    homeland defense and civil support missions. Our review focused on
    NORTHCOM's coordination efforts since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. To
    determine the states' perspectives on the extent to which NORTHCOM is
    coordinating with the states and identify any gaps, we surveyed the
    TAGs who are within NORTHCOM's area of responsibility.[Footnote 15]
    When we discuss NORTHCOM's coordination with the states, we are
    primarily referring to coordination with the TAGs. The survey
    questionnaire and results can be found in appendix I. The survey was
    administered via electronic mail to the TAGs and their chiefs of staff,
    and responses were collected from April through September 2007; we had
    a 100 percent response rate. We also reviewed documents and conducted
    interviews with the TAGS from Florida, Indiana, Nebraska, and
    Washington. To augment the information we obtained from the TAGs, we
    reviewed documents and conducted interviews with officials from
    NORTHCOM and several of its subordinate commands, including Joint Task
    Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), Joint Force Headquarters National Capital
    Region, and Army Forces North, as well as officials from NGB
    headquarters and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office. In addition, we
    conducted interviews with officials from the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security's
    (DHS) interagency Incident Management Planning Team. We conducted our
    review from April 2007 to April 2008 in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
    plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
    to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
    our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
    reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
    objectives. Appendix II is a detailed discussion of our scope and
    methodology.

    Results in Brief:

    NORTHCOM has several ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the
    states and NGB in planning for its missions and responding to requests
    for civil support. NORTHCOM's strategic vision includes facilitating
    the synchronization of national, state, and local assets and
    capabilities to defend the nation and support civilian authorities.
    [Footnote 16] One of NORTHCOM's ongoing efforts to improve coordination
    includes facilitating weekly hurricane conferences during hurricane
    season with a wide variety of relevant local, state, and federal
    emergency management officials. Similarly, NORTHCOM monitors wildfire
    activity and sets up teleconferences with the National Interagency Fire
    Center, which includes state emergency response officials, if it
    appears that NORTHCOM may need to assist in fighting the fires.
    NORTHCOM also conducts two large-scale exercises--Ardent Sentry and
    Vigilant Shield--and participates in over 30 smaller regional, state,
    and local exercises annually to help all potential responders prepare
    for potential man-made and natural disasters. As a result of this
    frequent interaction, NORTHCOM has begun to build more productive and
    effective relationships with the participating states and agencies. In
    addition, NORTHCOM has been informally including NGB in reviewing its
    plans, both in the early stages during concept development workshops as
    well as during final coordination.

    We identified gaps in coordination between NORTHCOM, the states, and
    NGB in three areas.

    * NORTHCOM officials minimally involve the states in the development of
    NORTHCOM's major homeland defense and civil support plans. Less than 25
    percent of the TAGs reported that they were involved in developing and
    reviewing these plans. NORTHCOM officials told us that they are
    starting to reach out directly to states to obtain their perspectives
    on NORTHCOM's defense support of civil authorities plan, but for
    homeland defense, they rely on NGB to provide states' perspectives. By
    only relying on NGB, NORTHCOM may not be able to maintain awareness of
    the environment in which it may be operating, which is critical to
    fully carrying out its homeland defense mission. In either homeland
    defense or civil support, increasing the current level of state
    involvement in the development of NORTHCOM's plans could help integrate
    intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall
    coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM's plans for its missions
    and responses to incidents are as effective as possible.[Footnote 17]

    * NORTHCOM was not familiar with state emergency response plans or
    capabilities and has no established and thorough process for gaining
    access to this information. Fifty-four percent of the TAGs reported
    that they believe that NORTHCOM is either slightly or not at all
    familiar with their states' plans. This may be attributable in part to
    the fact that NORTHCOM does not have a plan for cooperating and
    interacting with the states. By not obtaining and using information on
    states' plans and capabilities, it is difficult for NORTHCOM to plan in
    advance for the types, numbers, and timing of capabilities (trained
    personnel and equipment) needed to actually conduct an operation either
    for homeland defense or for a civil support operation in support of
    another primary agency.[Footnote 18]

    * A 2005 memorandum of agreement, which is intended to provide the
    procedures by which NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not clearly define
    the responsibilities of the two entities for homeland defense and civil
    support. The lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities has
    resulted in confusion and duplicative or potentially wasted efforts
    between the two agencies. For example, as required in NORTHCOM's
    homeland defense plan, NGB compiled the states' homeland defense plans
    and made them available to NORTHCOM; however, NORTHCOM planners told us
    that they neither requested nor needed access to this information.
    Without clearly defined responsibilities, there is a risk that
    NORTHCOM's and NGB's responses to an event could be fragmented and
    uncoordinated.

    To improve NORTHCOM's coordination with the states, we are recommending
    that NORTHCOM develop an established and thorough process to guide its
    coordination with the states to (1) involve the states in NORTHCOM's
    planning processes, (2) obtain information on state emergency response
    plans and capabilities, and (3) use such information to improve the
    development and execution of its concept plans. To improve the
    command's coordination with NGB, we are recommending that NORTHCOM and
    NGB revise their memorandum of agreement and more fully and clearly
    define the roles and responsibilities that each will have.

    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed
    with our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking and planning
    to take to address the recommendations. DOD's comments are discussed in
    more detail at the end of this report and are reproduced in full in
    appendix III. DOD and FEMA also provided us with technical comments,
    which have been incorporated where appropriate.

    Background:

    Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOD realized the
    need for a more integrated civilian and military response capability
    for any future attack on the United States. In response, DOD
    established NORTHCOM in October 2002[Footnote 19] to provide command
    and control in homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense
    support of civil authorities within its area of responsibility (see
    fig. 1).[Footnote 20]

    Figure 1: NORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a map of North America illustrating NORTHCOM's Area of
    Responsibility, including the United States, Canada and Mexico. Alaska
    falls within NORTHCOM�s area of responsibility, but military forces in
    the state are assigned to U.S. Pacific Command.

    Source: GAO analysis; Map Resources (map).

    [End of figure]

    NORTHCOM's mission consists of (1) homeland defense and (2) civil
    support. It is important to understand the relationships between
    NORTHCOM's missions and homeland security. Homeland defense and
    homeland security are not synonymous. Homeland security is a concerted
    national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States,
    reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage
    and recover from attacks that do occur.[Footnote 21] The DHS is the
    primary federal agency for homeland security issues. DHS's
    responsibilities extend beyond terrorism to preventing, preparing for,
    responding to, and recovering from a wide range of matter domestic
    disasters and other emergencies. DOD contributes to homeland security
    through its military missions overseas and homeland defense and civil
    support operations.

    While the terrorism portion of homeland security is concerned with
    preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, DOD's concerns
    include responding to conventional and unconventional attacks by any
    adversary as well as terrorists. When DOD is designated as the primary
    federal agency by the President or Secretary of Defense for conducting
    military missions to defend the people or territory of the homeland, it
    is considered to be homeland defense. Homeland defense is the
    protection of U.S territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and
    critical defense infrastructure against external threats and
    aggression. DOD activity in support of a National Response Framework
    primary or coordinating agency is considered to be civil support. Civil
    support is DOD support to U.S. civilian authorities, such as DHS, for
    domestic emergencies, both natural and man-made, and includes the use
    of DOD personnel--federal military forces and DOD's career civilian and
    contractor personnel--and DOD agency and component resources.[Footnote
    22] Because these missions are complex and interrelated, they require
    significant interagency coordination.

    NORTHCOM's Homeland Defense Mission:

    To carry out its homeland defense mission, NORTHCOM is to conduct
    operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed
    at the United States. According to Joint Publication 3-27, DOD is the
    primary federal agency for homeland defense operations, and NORTHCOM is
    the combatant command responsible for commanding and coordinating a
    response to a homeland defense incident. In this case, the chain of
    command is relatively straightforward: other DOD commands and federal
    agencies provide support to NORTHCOM for homeland defense operations
    (see fig. 2). Although NORTHCOM has few forces assigned to its command,
    during an incident it requests forces through the Joint Staff. The
    Joint Staff will direct Joint Forces Command, which is DOD's joint
    force provider, to assign appropriate and available forces to
    NORTHCOM.[Footnote 23] The President may decide to federalize National
    Guard units in order to provide these forces.[Footnote 24]

    Figure 2: Homeland Defense Response:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is an illustration of the Homeland Defense Response, as
    follows:

    Incident/attack occurs:

    DOD: As the lead federal agency, commands the operation;

    USNORTHCOM: Commands military efforts;
    Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps Units and federalized Guard units
    assigned to NORTHCOM command.

    President: May federalize National Guard troops;

    NGB: Coordinates use of National Guard forces;

    Other DOD commands/agencies: Support NORTHCOM operations.

    Source: GAO.

    [End of figure]

    While the states do not have an operational role in homeland defense,
    NORTHCOM's homeland defense mission includes protecting the territory
    or domestic population of the United States as well as the
    infrastructure or other assets determined by the Secretary of Defense
    to be critical to national security. In order to protect these critical
    assets, NORTHCOM must maintain awareness of the environment in which it
    may be operating, including critical infrastructure locations relevant
    to its operations.

    NORTHCOM's Civil Support Mission:

    NORTHCOM's second mission is civil support or defense support of civil
    authorities. Civil support missions include domestic disaster relief
    operations for incidents such as fires, hurricanes, floods, and
    earthquakes. Such support also includes counterdrug operations and
    management of the consequences of a terrorist incident employing a
    weapon of mass destruction. DOD is not the primary federal agency for
    such missions (unless so designated by the President) and thus provides
    defense support of civil authorities only when (1) state, local, and
    other federal resources are overwhelmed or unique military capabilities
    are required; (2) assistance is requested by the primary federal
    agency; and (3) NORTHCOM is directed to do so by the President or the
    Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 25]

    Civil support is based on a tiered response to an incident; that is,
    incidents must be managed at the lowest jurisdictional levels and
    supported by additional response capabilities when needed (see fig. 3).
    Local and county governments respond to emergencies daily using their
    own resources and rely on mutual aid agreements and other types of
    assistance agreements with neighboring governments when they need
    additional resources. For example, county and local authorities are
    likely to have the resources needed to adequately respond to a small-
    scale incident, such as a local flood, and therefore will not request
    additional resources. For larger-scale incidents, when resources are
    overwhelmed, local and county governments will request assistance from
    the state. States have capabilities, such as the National Guard, that
    can help communities respond and recover. If additional resources are
    required, the state may request assistance from other states through
    interstate mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency Management
    Assistance Compact (EMAC).[Footnote 26] If an incident is beyond the
    community and state capabilities, the governor can seek federal
    assistance. The federal government has a wide array of capabilities and
    resources that can be made available to assist state and local agencies
    to respond to incidents.

    Figure 3: Defense Support of Civil Authorities Response:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is an illustration of the Defense Support of Civil
    Authorities Response, as follows:

    Incident occurs:

    Local first responders:
    Arrive first on scene;

    Local government:
    Requests mutual aid and state assistance;

    State government:
    Assesses damage; requests presidential declaration;

    FEMA:
    Recommends presidential declaration;

    President:
    Declares major disaster or emergency;
    Federal assistance: Provided by applicable agencies;
    NORTHCOM: Provides military assistance, if requested/required.

    Source: GAO.

    [End of figure]

    Overall coordination of federal incident management activities, other
    than those conducted for homeland defense, is generally the
    responsibility of DHS. Within DHS and as an executive agent for the
    National Preparedness System,[Footnote 27] FEMA is responsible for
    coordinating and integrating the preparedness of federal, state, local,
    tribal, and nongovernmental entities.

    In accordance with the National Response Framework[Footnote 28] and
    applicable laws including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
    Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act),[Footnote 29] various federal
    departments or agencies may play primary, coordinating, or supporting
    roles, based on their authorities and resources and the nature of the
    threat or incident. In some instances, national defense assets may be
    needed to assist FEMA or another agency in the national response to an
    incident. Defense resources are committed after approval by the
    Secretary of Defense or at the direction of the President. When
    deciding to commit defense resources, officials consider military
    readiness, appropriateness of the circumstances, and whether the
    response is in accordance with the law.[Footnote 30] For example, the
    Posse Comitatus Act[Footnote 31] allows military forces to provide
    civil support, but these forces generally cannot become directly
    involved in law enforcement.

    When it is determined that defense assistance is appropriate and is
    requested by FEMA, NORTHCOM is responsible for leading DOD's response.
    In the same manner as is applicable to homeland defense, NORTHCOM
    generally operates through established joint task forces that are
    subordinate to the command. In most cases, support will be localized,
    limited, and specific. When the scope of the disaster is reduced to the
    point where the primary federal agency can again assume full control
    and management without military assistance, NORTHCOM will exit.

    NORTHCOM's Planning for Homeland Defense and Support of Civil
    Authorities:

    In order to prepare for its homeland defense and civil support
    missions, NORTHCOM has developed plans based on various incident
    scenarios, including 14 of DHS's 15 national planning scenarios.
    [Footnote 32] NORTHCOM develops contingency plans to outline its role
    in potential disaster situations. NORTHCOM currently develops strategic-
    level concept plans rather than more detailed operational plans,
    because the potential threats that it is planning for are varied and
    nonspecific, ranging from terrorist threats to hurricanes and
    wildfires.[Footnote 33] NORTHCOM uses the adaptive planning process for
    developing its plans--that is, the joint capability to create and
    revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require.
    Interagency coordination is a key part of the plan development process
    in adaptive planning.

    States' and NGB's Roles in Preparing for Homeland Defense and Civil
    Support:

    In each state, the National Guard plays a crucial role in preparing for
    both homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities, in its
    dual roles as a national reserve force for the Army and Air Force and
    as a state militia. As the only military force shared by the states and
    the federal government, the National Guard provides a natural and
    effective bridge to accomplish collaboration between NORTHCOM and key
    state partners. The National Guard's federal mission is to provide
    trained units available for active duty in the armed forces, in the
    time of war or national emergency, and at such times as national
    security may require. NORTHCOM is responsible for the planning,
    exercising, and command and control of the National Guard for its
    federal missions conducted under the command and control of the
    President within its area of responsibility.[Footnote 34] As a state
    militia, the National Guard of each state responds to state
    emergencies, including natural disasters, civil disturbances, and acts
    of terrorism, and provides support to law enforcement in the war on
    drugs under the command and control of the state governor. The governor
    commands the National Guard through the TAG, who heads the joint force
    headquarters of the state. According to NGB officials, the state's
    joint force headquarters' mission is to maintain trained and equipped
    National Guard forces and to provide expertise and situational
    awareness to facilitate the integration of federal and state
    activities.

    NGB is a joint activity of DOD, with unique statutory, regulatory, and
    policy-based responsibilities and authorities, including serving as the
    official channel of communications between the Departments of the Army
    and the Air Force and the states on National Guard matters.[Footnote
    35] NGB administers DOD, Department of the Army, and Department of the
    Air Force policies, programs, and plans pertaining to National Guard
    matters and facilitates the integration of federal and state
    activities, including facilitating mutual support among the states.
    Although NGB does not command or control forces, it assists the states
    in the organization, maintenance, and operation of their Army National
    Guard and Air National Guard units located in the states and
    coordinates the movement of nonfederalized National Guard
    forces.[Footnote 36] NGB also maintains and provides information on
    National Guard matters affecting homeland defense and civil support to
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the combatant commands,
    including NORTHCOM; and others. During civil support missions, NGB
    provides policy guidance and facilitates National Guard assistance to
    the TAGs. Because of their interrelated missions, coordination between
    NORTHCOM and NGB is critical in planning for homeland defense and civil
    support.

    NORTHCOM Has Ongoing Efforts to Improve Coordination with the States
    and NGB in Planning for Its Missions:

    In analyzing the survey results as well as during meetings with
    NORTHCOM and NGB officials, we found that NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts
    to improve coordination with the states and NGB in planning for its
    missions and responding to requests for civil support missions. As part
    of NORTHCOM's strategic vision, its goal is to facilitate the
    synchronization of national, state, and local assets and capabilities
    to defend the nation and support civilian authorities.[Footnote 37] We
    found six areas in which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to improve
    coordination with the states and NGB, ranging from including states in
    its exercises to a new state engagement strategy for reaching out
    directly to state leaders. Some of these efforts are intended to help
    NORTHCOM plan for both of its missions, while others are intended to
    improve how it responds to requests for civil support.

    States' Participation in NORTHCOM's Exercises Enhances Coordination:

    NORTHCOM conducts or participates in training exercises to improve
    planning for its missions and responses to requests for civil support.
    The command conducts two large-scale exercises--Ardent Sentry and
    Vigilant Shield--and participates in over 30 smaller regional, state,
    and local exercises annually to help potential responders prepare for
    man-made and natural disasters. Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield
    alternate between emphasizing the homeland defense mission and the
    civil support mission. Each training event exercises one of the key
    missions while at the same time including elements of the other.
    Practicing and training for emergency responses together not only helps
    to identify problem areas or lessons learned, but also helps state
    responders to build relationships with NORTHCOM and improve
    coordination. One TAG told us that he did not have any communications
    with NORTHCOM prior to his state's participation in Ardent Sentry, but
    has since developed a close working relationship with NORTHCOM
    officials. Table 1 shows the percentage of states participating in
    Ardent Sentry, Vigilant Shield, or other events, according to our
    survey of TAGs.

    Table 1: State Participation in NORTHCOM Exercises:

    Exercise: Ardent Sentry;
    States participating: 24 (49%).

    Exercise: Vigilant Shield;
    States participating: 12 (25%).

    Exercise: Other[A];
    States participating: 16 (32%).

    Source: GAO TAG survey responses.

    Note: Forty-nine TAGs responded to the Ardent Sentry question, 48 TAGs
    responded to the Vigilant Shield question, and all 50 responded to the
    question regarding "Other" exercises.

    [A] Other includes field exercises, state-led exercises, and other
    federal exercises that involved NORTHCOM participation.

    [End of table]

    NORTHCOM's Training and Exercise Directorate continues to work with
    state and National Guard entities to plan and conduct exercises and to
    develop a robust Vigilant Guard regional exercise program.

    Including NGB in the Development of NORTHCOM's Plans Provides National
    Guard Perspective:

    NORTHCOM has been informally including NGB in reviewing its plans, in
    the early stages, during concept development workshops, and during
    final coordination. NGB officials told us that regularly scheduled
    conferences between the planning directorates at NORTHCOM and NGB have
    greatly enhanced coordination over the past few months. In addition,
    NGB officials confirmed that NORTHCOM has been routinely providing its
    draft plans to them for comment/review to get the National Guard's
    perspectives. This review process will be formalized in the next few
    months, when NGB becomes an officially recognized member of the Joint
    Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).[Footnote 38] JPEC coordinates
    DOD efforts and ensures unity in the planning and execution of joint
    operations, and includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
    services, the combatant commands and their component commands, sub-
    unified commands, joint task forces, and defense agencies.

    Participation of TAGs and Their Staffs in Joint Force Orientation
    Program Provides Information on NORTHCOM's Supporting Role to the
    States:

    NORTHCOM has also established a Joint Force Orientation Program to
    improve the states' knowledge on NORTHCOM's role in response to
    requests for civil support. Several TAGs reported that their and their
    staffs' involvement in this program enhanced coordination with
    NORTHCOM. The primary objectives of this program are to facilitate a
    mutual understanding of joint operational concepts and information
    sharing between NORTHCOM and the states to help clarify NORTHCOM's
    supporting role to the states and to improve overall coordination. At
    the time of our audit, the Joint Force Orientation Program was
    organized into three phases.[Footnote 39] The first phase included an
    overall command briefing and individual briefings from each NORTHCOM
    directorate, including discussions about NORTHCOM's training and
    exercise programs. The second phase of the Joint Force Orientation
    Program discussed more in-depth information about NORTHCOM, NGB, and
    the Joint Forces Command. This phase generally covers warfighter
    doctrine and operational application, including joint concepts and
    terminology, joint operational environment, command relationships,
    joint planning, and joint logistics. The third phase of the program is
    designed to be state specific, where the process for requesting federal
    assistance is reviewed and issues--such as intelligence sharing and
    oversight, mobile communications, planning, and logistics--are
    discussed in more detail. NORTHCOM provided us with the most recent
    participation data, and we found that all of the states within
    NORTHCOM's area of responsibility have received the first phase of
    Joint Force Orientation Program training, 46 states have received phase
    2 training, and 19 states have received phase 3 training.[Footnote 40]
    NORTHCOM told us that it is working toward providing phase 3 training
    to the remaining states. The willingness of the TAGs to participate and
    send their staffs to this training shows how useful the information
    exchanged and relationships developed with NORTHCOM during the training
    are to them.

    Hurricane and Wildfire Conferences Are Beginning to Build Effective
    Relationships between Participating Officials:

    Other ongoing efforts include NORTHCOM's weekly teleconferences
    throughout the hurricane season to coordinate with local, state, and
    federal partners and discuss potential storms; available resources,
    including EMAC;[Footnote 41] and potential needs or unique capabilities
    that DOD may be asked to provide. For instance, if a hurricane is
    projected to affect the mid-Atlantic states, officials in those states
    may inquire about resources potentially needed--such as helicopters,
    trucks, or other equipment--in advance of the incident, thereby helping
    affected states to more effectively plan their responses. Similarly,
    NORTHCOM monitors wildfire activity and sets up teleconferences with
    the National Interagency Fire Center--which includes state emergency
    response officials--if it appears NORTHCOM may need to assist in
    fighting the fires. As a result of this frequent interaction, NORTHCOM
    has begun to build more productive and effective relationships with the
    participating states and agencies.

    Locating Defense Coordinating Officers in the FEMA Regional Offices
    Improves NORTHCOM's Relationship with State and Local Officials:

    As part of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM has
    placed a defense coordinating officer (DCO) in each of FEMA's 10
    regional offices and placed greater emphasis on the DCOs' mission (see
    fig. 4).[Footnote 42] DCOs are senior-level military officers with
    joint experience and training on the National Response Framework,
    defense support to civil authorities, and DHS's National Incident
    Management System.[Footnote 43] They are responsible for assisting
    civil authorities when requested by FEMA, providing liaison support and
    requirements validation, and serving as single points of contact for
    state, local, and other federal authorities that need DOD support. DCOs
    work closely with federal, state, and local officials to determine what
    unique DOD capabilities can be used to assist in mitigating the effects
    of a natural or man-made disaster. According to TAGs, FEMA, and
    NORTHCOM officials, placing DCOs in all of the FEMA regional offices
    and emphasizing the DCOs' mission has improved NORTHCOM's relationships
    and coordination with state and local officials, as well as with FEMA
    in day-to-day planning and when an incident occurs. For example, in
    response to FEMA's request during the California wildfires in October
    2007, NORTHCOM's subordinate command, Army Forces North, deployed the
    Region 9 DCO to support the Joint Field Office in Pasadena, California
    and assess and coordinate defense support of civil authorities with
    FEMA. Based on the requirements identified by state and federal
    officials in consultation with the DCO, DOD and the National Guard
    deployed six aircraft equipped with the Modular Air Firefighting System
    to California to assist in fighting wildfires.

    Figure 4: FEMA Regions:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a map illustrating the areas included in each of the ten
    FEMA regions.

    Source: FEMA; Map Resources (map).

    [End of figure]

    NORTHCOM's New State Engagement Strategy Is Intended to Build
    Relationships with States:

    While NORTHCOM relies on NGB as its channel of communications for
    National Guard matters, NORTHCOM's commander believes that developing
    relationships directly with states will contribute to success in saving
    lives, protecting infrastructure, and promoting a resilient society.
    NORTHCOM is currently developing a state engagement strategy to build
    relationships with appropriate state leadership, including governors,
    TAGs, state homeland security advisors, and emergency managers of major
    metropolitan areas. As part of this strategy, NORTHCOM's Commander has
    personally met with several state governors and TAGs to discuss
    NORTHCOM's roles and missions and determine how they can coordinate
    when responding to an incident. For example, the Commander met with
    TAGs from the northeast region in November 2007 to discuss both
    military coordination and interagency coordination for regional
    domestic operations. The draft strategy also recognizes the importance
    of NORTHCOM working with the states in close coordination with the
    organizations such as NGB and DHS/FEMA, which are responsible for
    coordinating with the states regarding federal matters related to
    incident management. NGB officials told us that working with the states
    will provide NORTHCOM with a greater appreciation for the role and
    authority of the governor and sensitivity to the sovereignty and rights
    of states. While the strategy is designed to build the relationships
    needed for national planning and execution, it does not include
    established and thorough processes for involving states in the
    development of NORTHCOM's plans, obtaining state emergency response
    plans, or facilitating integrated intergovernmental planning.

    Gaps Remain in NORTHCOM's Coordination with the States and NGB:

    We identified three areas in which there are gaps in coordination with
    the states and NGB. First, NORTHCOM officials involve the states
    minimally in the development of NORTHCOM's major homeland defense and
    civil support plans, and they are not required to do so. Second,
    NORTHCOM generally was not familiar with state emergency response plans
    and capabilities and has no established and thorough process for
    gaining access to this information. Third, a 2005 memorandum of
    agreement, which is intended to provide the procedures by which
    NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not clearly define each agency's roles
    and responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil
    support. Improvements in these areas may help to effectively align
    NORTHCOM's efforts with other national efforts, as required by the new
    annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on national
    planning;[Footnote 44] help NORTHCOM to manage its overall risk; and
    better ensure that it will be able to fully respond when called upon to
    perform either of its missions.

    NORTHCOM Only Minimally Involves States in Planning:

    Although the majority of TAGs are familiar to varying degrees with
    NORTHCOM's homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities
    plans (see table 2), in our survey less than 25 percent reported that
    they were involved in developing and reviewing these plans (see table
    3). NORTHCOM is not required by DOD specifically to involve states in
    the development and review of its homeland defense and support of civil
    authorities plans. However, its strategic vision set forth in its
    Concept of Operations and the recent annex to Homeland Security
    Presidential Directive 8 emphasize that plans and capabilities should
    be synchronized at the national, state, and local levels.[Footnote 45]
    According to several TAGs, NORTHCOM should coordinate more with state
    and local organizations, particularly with the National Guard, to
    develop a good planning and operational relationship and to enhance the
    ability of all organizations to plan and respond rapidly in a crisis.
    We previously reported on the need to include state and local
    jurisdictions in the development of response plans because they are key
    stakeholders and would be on the front lines if an incident
    occurs.[Footnote 46]

    Table 2: TAG Familiarity with NORTHCOM's Plans:

    Question: How familiar are you with NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan?;
    Very familiar: 10 (20%);
    Somewhat familiar: 27 (55%);
    Slightly familiar: 9 (18%);
    Not at all: 3 (6%).

    Question: How familiar are you with NORTHCOM's defense support of civil
    authorities plan?;
    Very familiar: 12 (24%);
    Somewhat familiar: 20 (41%);
    Slightly familiar: 12 (24%);
    Not at all: 5 (10%).

    Source: GAO analysis of TAG survey responses.

    [End of table]

    Table 3: TAG Involvement in NORTHCOM's Plan Development:

    Plan: Homeland defense;
    Planning process: Attend meetings;
    Yes: 7 (14%);
    No: 43 (86%).

    Plan: Homeland defense;
    Planning process: Comment on draft;
    Yes: 12 (24%);
    No: 38 (76%).

    Plan: Homeland defense;
    Planning process: Comment on final;
    Yes: 7 (14%);
    No: 43 (86%).

    Plan: Defense support of civil authorities;
    Planning process: Attend meetings; Yes: 7 (14%);
    No: 43 (86%).

    Plan: Defense support of civil authorities;
    Planning process: Comment on draft;
    Yes: 12 (24%);
    No: 38 (76%).

    Plan: Defense support of civil authorities;
    Planning process: Comment on final;
    Yes: 9 (18%);
    No: 41 (82%).

    Source: GAO analysis of TAG survey responses.

    [End of table]

    In the case of homeland defense, NORTHCOM planners told us that, as the
    official channel of communication for National Guard related matters,
    NGB provides the states' perspectives when commenting on NORTHCOM's
    plans. The planners also said that further state involvement in the
    development of NORTHCOM's plan is not required because (1) this is a
    strategic-level concept plan[Footnote 47] that does not require such
    detail and (2) NORTHCOM is the lead during a homeland defense incident.
    NGB officials told us that as requested in NORTHCOM homeland defense
    plan, they have collected and reviewed states' supporting homeland
    defense plans and, to the extent possible, have attempted to represent
    these perspectives when commenting on NORTHCOM's homeland defense
    plan.[Footnote 48] However, an NGB planning official told us that the
    states have differing perspectives, and NORTHCOM could better learn
    about these differences by reviewing the individual state plans. In
    addition, while NGB provides information of National Guard
    capabilities, the states may have other capabilities and requirements
    that NORTHCOM should be aware of. By only relying on NGB, NORTHCOM may
    not be able to maintain awareness of the environment in which the
    command may be operating, including critical infrastructure locations
    relevant to its operations, which is important to fully carrying out
    its homeland defense mission.

    In the case of civil support and as outlined in the National Response
    Framework, because NORTHCOM plays a supporting role to other federal
    agencies and subsequently to state and local governments, NORTHCOM
    officials told us that they are starting to reach out directly to
    states to obtain their perspectives and incorporate these into future
    revisions of NORTHCOM's defense support of civil authorities plan. In
    order to effectively develop a civil support plan, NORTHCOM needs to
    know what its requirements may be. DOD recognizes that these
    requirements are driven both by the capabilities gaps of the primary
    federal agencies and those of the state and local governments.[Footnote
    49] In either homeland defense or civil support, increasing the current
    level of state involvement in the development of NORTHCOM's plans could
    help integrate intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents,
    enhance overall coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM's plans for
    its missions and responses to incidents are as effective as possible.
    [Footnote 50]

    NORTHCOM Lacks Familiarity with State Emergency Response Plans and May
    Not Be Aware of Capabilities and Potential Gaps:

    We found that NORTHCOM generally was not familiar with state emergency
    response plans and has not obtained detailed information on states'
    plans and capabilities to determine the specific challenges it may face
    in conducting homeland defense or civil support operations. According
    to our survey, 54 percent of the TAGs believe that NORTHCOM is not at
    all or only slightly familiar with their states' plan (see table 4). In
    written comments in our survey, several TAGs reported that NORTHCOM
    should be more familiar with state emergency response plans, and should
    determine how best to support the states' plans and, where appropriate,
    incorporate these plans to ensure a unified effort. Developing a
    synchronized and coordinated planning capability at all levels of
    government is important for a coordinated national response to domestic
    incidents.[Footnote 51] In part, NORTHCOM is not more familiar with
    these plans because it has no established and thorough process
    regarding coordination with the states or for gaining access to
    emergency response plans, and it is not specifically required by DOD to
    obtain information on state emergency response plans or determine state
    and local capabilities and potential resource gaps.[Footnote 52]
    NORTHCOM planners told us that they do not need access to state
    emergency response plans because they are doing strategic-level concept
    plans and this level of detail would be more appropriate for tactical
    level planning, such as planning done by NORTHCOM's subordinate
    commands, like Army Forces North.[Footnote 53] However, NGB and FEMA
    officials told us that one of NORTHCOM's biggest challenges is its
    current inability to anticipate the capabilities and requirements of
    state and local governments during a civil support incident because of
    the lack of advanced planning and coordination between NORTHCOM,
    states, and local governments. Furthermore, NORTHCOM officials told us
    that the complexity of the planning involved for a large-scale disaster
    is such that even if states can adequately plan for the resources they
    will need, they do not always have adequate multistate plans to
    integrate the state, local, federal, and nongovernmental responses. By
    not obtaining and using information on state plans and capabilities,
    NORTHCOM increases the risk that it will not be adequately prepared to
    respond to an incident with the needed resources, including the types,
    numbers, and timing of capabilities (trained personnel and equipment).

    Table 4: NORTHCOM's Familiarity with State Emergency Response Plans:

    Question: How familiar, if at all, do you think NORTHCOM is with your
    state's Homeland Security/Emergency Operations Plan?;
    Very familiar: 1 (4%);
    Somewhat familiar: 11 (42%);
    Slightly familiar: 12 (46%);
    Not at all: 2 (8%).

    Source: GAO analysis of TAG survey responses.

    Note: TAGs were asked to respond to this question if they had provided
    NORTHCOM with a copy of the state's Homeland Security/Emergency
    Operations Plan, and 26 TAGs responded.

    [End of table]

    One of NORTHCOM's subordinate commands, JTF-CS,[Footnote 54] has been
    collecting state emergency response plans so that if called upon to
    provide assistance in a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or
    high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident, its Commander will have as much
    advance information as possible regarding state plans, resources, and
    potential areas where assistance may be required. JTF-CS found that
    some state and local governments are reluctant to share their plans
    because they fear that DOD will "grade" their plans or that potential
    capability gaps will be made public, with an accompanying political
    cost. A NORTHCOM official told us that there will always be some
    tension between the states and DOD and other federal agencies as a
    result of the nation's constitutional structure. JTF-CS is therefore
    extremely careful about how it shares its emergency plan analyses and
    has made progress in gaining access to these plans through DHS.

    DHS has collected and assessed state emergency response plans as part
    of a nationwide plan review to determine the status of catastrophic
    planning for states and 75 of the nation's largest urban
    areas.[Footnote 55] Participation in the review was a prerequisite for
    receipt of fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant funds. The
    review concluded that no individual plan or resource base can fully
    absorb and respond to a catastrophe and that unsystematic planning and
    the absence of an integrated planning system is a national operational
    vulnerability. The annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8,
    issued in December 2007, directs the establishment of a comprehensive
    approach to national planning through an integrated planning
    system.[Footnote 56] This system is to include, among other things, a
    description of the process that (1) links regional, state, local, and
    tribal plans, planning cycles, and processes and allows these plans to
    inform the development of federal plans and (2) fosters the integration
    of such plans and allows for state, local, and tribal capability
    assessments to feed into federal plans. DHS may, therefore, be one
    source from which NORTHCOM could obtain information on state emergency
    response plans and capabilities.

    Given its relationship with the states, NGB could also be a conduit for
    NORTHCOM to share its plans with states and obtain information on
    states plans and capabilities. In addition, NGB officials suggested
    that emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLO) could be a
    potential conduit for NORTHCOM and states to share plans. EPLOs are
    senior reserve officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
    Corps who represent the federal military in each state and in each of
    the 10 FEMA regional offices. EPLOs coordinate the provision of
    military personnel, equipment, and supplies to support the emergency
    relief and cleanup efforts of civil authorities. According to NGB
    officials, expanding the EPLO program to include sharing plans with
    states would provide a closer link between NORTHCOM and the states
    without the sensitivity of state sovereignty issues. The DCOs who are
    also located in FEMA's 10 regional offices could potentially serve as
    NORTHCOM's points of contact for the EPLOs.

    NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of its homeland
    defense and civil support plans and operations with federal
    agencies.[Footnote 57] However, in its role either in support of other
    federal agencies or as the primary agency in homeland defense
    incidents, NORTHCOM does not have adequate information on states' plans
    and capabilities. By minimally involving the states in its homeland
    defense and civil support plans and not becoming familiar with
    information on states' emergency response plans and capabilities,
    NORTHCOM increases the risk that it may not be prepared with the needed
    resources to respond to an incident. These gaps may be attributable in
    part to the fact that NORTHCOM does not have an established and
    thorough process for cooperating and interacting with the states. One
    model of such a process is NORTHCOM's security cooperation plans with
    Canada and Mexico, since the states are each separate governments
    within the federal system.[Footnote 58] For example, NORTHCOM's
    cooperation plan with Canada and Mexico outlines a strategy for
    planning, assessing, and executing security objectives and other
    strategic priorities. These objectives include advancing common
    interests, reducing impediments to cooperation, encouraging improved
    capabilities and willingness to operate in coalition, and improving
    combined homeland defense capabilities. Without a similar kind of
    cooperation plan for the states within its area of responsibility,
    NORTHCOM cannot optimally involve the TAGs and other state or local
    officials in its planning activities and develop a process for
    obtaining and using information on state emergency plans and
    capabilities. Moreover, without such a cooperation plan, NORTHCOM is
    not likely to reduce confusion, facilitate effective planning, and
    facilitate effective and efficient responses to incidents.

    NORTHCOM and NGB Responsibilities for Homeland Defense and Civil
    Support Are Not Clearly Defined:

    DHS's National Response Framework and NORTHCOM's Concept of Operations
    both emphasize that NORTHCOM should coordinate with federal, state, and
    local partners before, during, and after an incident.[Footnote 59]
    Coordination with NGB is particularly important, because NGB has
    experience working with state and local authorities during incidents
    and it functions as NORTHCOM's formal link to the states. We previously
    reported that as with preparing for and responding to any type of
    disaster, leadership roles and responsibilities must be clearly
    defined, effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate
    rapid and effective decision making. Furthermore, we reported that
    without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, the potential
    remains for confusion and gaps or duplication by the combatant commands
    relative to other agencies.[Footnote 60] The National Strategy for
    Homeland Security also emphasizes that a lack of clarity regarding
    roles and responsibilities across all levels of government can lead to
    gaps in the national response and delay the ability to provide life-
    saving support when needed.[Footnote 61]

    In July 2005, NORTHCOM and NGB signed a memorandum of agreement
    outlining their command and coordination relationship. This memorandum,
    which is intended to provide the procedures by which the two entities
    interact, broadly establishes that NORTHCOM and NGB "will coordinate on
    policy, program and planning actions related to missions and
    requirements affecting the National Guard." The memorandum further
    provides for the location of a small NGB office at NORTHCOM to advise
    NORTHCOM's Commander regarding National Guard-related issues.[Footnote
    62] The mission of this office is to advise and assist NORTHCOM's
    Commander on all matters involving the National Guard, provide a
    conduit to NGB leaders and staff, and promote integration of National
    Guard priorities and capabilities into NORTHCOM's plans and operations.
    The staff members of this office provide input to numerous requests for
    information from NORTHCOM. This office is not intended to serve as the
    only point of coordination between NORTHCOM and NGB. Officials told us
    that there is no formal process in place for the NORTHCOM National
    Guard Office to coordinate with NGB headquarters. Such a process could
    improve coordination between the NGB liaison office and NGB
    headquarters.

    Our analysis of the memorandum, NORTHCOM's Concept of Operations, the
    regulation describing the organization and function of NGB, and other
    documents showed that there is no detailed guidance on NORTHCOM's and
    NGB's roles and responsibilities for homeland defense and defense
    support of civil authorities. Clearly defined responsibilities help to
    ensure unity of effort, prevent duplication, and enable efficient use
    of resources. As a result of the lack of clearly defined roles and
    responsibilities between NORTHCOM and NGB, we found several instances
    in which there was confusion and duplicate or potentially wasted
    efforts. For example, some TAGs survey responses indicated that because
    responsibilities are not clearly defined, both NGB and NORTHCOM are
    requesting the same information during an incident. In addition,
    NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan required NGB to collect state homeland
    defense plans and make them available to NORTHCOM. NGB compiled and
    reviewed these plans from the states and territories within NORTHCOM's
    area of responsibility and made them available to NORTHCOM on its Web
    portal. However, NORTHCOM planning officials told us that they did not
    request that NGB compile these plans and that, in fact, they do not
    have a need for state supporting plans because such plans will not
    affect how NORTHCOM's strategic-level homeland defense concept plan is
    written. Nevertheless, NGB spent resources collecting information that
    has not been used by NORTHCOM. As discussed above, we believe NORTHCOM
    officials should be reviewing these plans to ensure that they have
    sufficient awareness of the environment in which they may be operating
    to fully carry out the command's homeland defense mission.

    In addition, we found that NGB has developed a Joint Capabilities
    Database that includes all National Guard capabilities and has made
    this database available for NORTHCOM's use. However, NORTHCOM officials
    told us that rather than use the database, they prefer to rely on NGB
    staff to provide them National Guard readiness and capabilities data.
    NGB officials also told us that they have not encouraged NORTHCOM to
    use the database thus far because they are still finalizing the
    procedure for maintaining and updating the database with information
    from all states and territories. The officials said that they expect to
    have these issues worked out within the next few months in advance of
    the hurricane season and to begin to encourage NORTHCOM to make use of
    the database. NGB's goal with the database is to provide a national
    look at the National Guard's capabilities.

    Without clearly defined lines of coordination and roles and
    responsibility, federal efforts may not be used in the most effective
    and efficient manner. This is increasingly important as DOD is
    currently developing a database of federal emergency response
    capabilities, including those for active and reserve DOD units and
    National Guard capabilities in each state,[Footnote 63] and FEMA is
    currently developing a list of organizations and functions within DOD
    that may be used to provide support to civil authorities during natural
    or man-made disasters.[Footnote 64] Coordinating all of these efforts
    will be critical to ensuring the efficient use of federal resources as
    well as to reduce the risk of potential capabilities gaps.

    An NGB official told us that NORTHCOM and NGB have not revised the 2005
    memorandum of agreement to more clearly define their responsibilities
    because they were waiting for the National Guard Empowerment
    Act,[Footnote 65] which was partially incorporated into the National
    Defense Authorization Act for 2008,[Footnote 66] to be signed into law
    and, subsequently, for a new NGB charter to be developed and issued by
    the Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 67] The National Guard Empowerment
    Act includes provisions that may enhance the level of coordination
    between NORTHCOM and NGB. For example, the Secretary of Defense is
    required to prepare a plan coordinating the use of the National Guard
    and members of the armed forces on active duty when responding to an
    incident and include protocols for DOD, NGB, and the governors of the
    states to carry out operations in coordination with one
    another.[Footnote 68] An NGB official told us that the process of
    preparing this plan will require more coordination between NORTHCOM and
    NGB. More important, NGB's charter, which is currently undergoing
    revision based on the new act, potentially could resolve a number of
    ambiguities by more clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of
    NGB and its relationships with other agencies, such as NORTHCOM.
    Further, the NGB official told us that the revised charter will greatly
    simplify negotiations of a revised memorandum between the two agencies.
    Without clearly defined responsibilities for NORTHCOM and NGB, there is
    the potential for a lack of effective coordination between the two
    agencies and duplicative or wasted efforts. Clearly identifying roles
    and responsibilities is increasingly important because responding to a
    major disaster in the United States--natural or man-made--is a shared
    responsibility of many agencies across all levels of government and
    cannot be effectively accomplished by one agency.[Footnote 69] Without
    effective interagency coordination and planning and clearly defined
    roles and responsibilities, there is a risk that NORTHCOM's, NGB's, and
    other nationwide efforts to respond to an incident may be fragmented
    and uncoordinated, such as in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
    [Footnote 70]

    Conclusions:

    Within the federal government, there is an increasing realization that
    the nation needs to integrate not just the response to an incident, but
    also the plans of many entities at all the levels involved in
    responding to such incidents. This planning integration will help
    ensure that when the federal government responds, its response will be
    as effective as possible. NORTHCOM's recent efforts to coordinate with
    states and NGB have helped address some of the uncertainty in the
    homeland defense and civil support planning process and have improved
    NORTHCOM's ability to coordinate in the event of an actual incident.
    However, without an established and thorough process for requesting,
    obtaining, and using information on state emergency plans and
    capabilities--whether from coordination with DHS or NGB or from direct
    interaction with states--NORTHCOM may be missing opportunities to
    better plan its missions and manage its risk in a more informed manner.
    Moreover, NORTHCOM may not be fully prepared to support states,
    resulting in ineffective planning and fragmented, uncoordinated
    responses to incidents.

    Given that NORTHCOM and NGB both have increasingly important
    responsibilities for homeland defense and defense support of civil
    authorities, it is imperative that these entities work together to
    effectively prepare for DOD's response to an incident. Without fully
    and clearly defined responsibilities for NORTHCOM and NGB, confusion
    and duplicative or potentially wasted efforts may result, causing an
    inefficient use of DOD resources during a time of increased military
    operations and a growing fiscal imbalance. Further, without clear
    guidance on their responsibilities, the risk is increased that these
    agencies' responses to an incident may be ineffective and inefficient,
    potentially increasing response time and risking the safety of the U.S.
    population and infrastructure.

    Recommendations for Executive Action:

    To improve NORTHCOM's coordination with the states, we recommend that
    the Secretary of Defense direct NORTHCOM to develop an established and
    thorough process to guide its coordination with the states, including
    provisions for:

    * involving the states in NORTHCOM's planning processes,

    * obtaining information on state emergency response plans and
    capabilities, and:

    * using such information to improve the development and execution of
    its concept plans.

    To improve NORTHCOM's coordination with NGB, we recommend that the
    Secretary of Defense direct NORTHCOM and NGB to revise the memorandum
    of agreement or develop an alternate document to include fully and
    clearly defined roles and responsibilities for NORTHCOM, NGB, and the
    NORTHCOM National Guard Office.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

    In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the
    intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking and
    planning to take to address the recommendations. DOD and FEMA also
    provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report
    where appropriate.

    In response to our recommendation that NORTHCOM develop an established
    and thorough process to guide its coordination with the states, DOD
    agreed that such a process should be developed to guide the
    coordination between local, state, and federal governments. Homeland
    Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1 requires that DHS develop an
    integrated planning system consisting of a synchronized system of plans
    that integrates federal, state, and local operational capabilities to
    affect a coordinated national response. DOD told us that the Office of
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
    Security Affairs, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, and NGB are currently in
    coordination with DHS in developing the integrated planning system. We
    believe that developing this system would meet the intent of our
    recommendation if it provides NORTHCOM with an established and thorough
    process for requesting, obtaining, and using information on state
    emergency plans and capabilities and improves the development and
    execution of their concept plans, thereby helping NORTHCOM to manage
    its risk in a more informed manner.

    DOD agreed with our recommendation that NORTHCOM and NGB revise their
    memorandum of agreement or develop an alternate document to include
    fully and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for NORTHCOM, NGB,
    and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office and stated that a revision to
    the memorandum is currently being coordinated. We believe that
    providing clear guidance on roles and responsibilities will help to
    ensure that these agencies' responses to an incident will be effective
    and efficient, potentially reducing response time and enhancing the
    safety of the U.S. population and infrastructure.

    DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix III.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and
    other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others
    on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
    GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for
    our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
    on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
    listed in appendix IV.

    Signed by:

    Davi M. D'Agostino:
    Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:

    List of Requesters:

    The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
    Chairman:
    Committee on Homeland Security:
    House of Representatives:

    The Honorable Tom Davis:
    Ranking Member:
    Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
    House of Representatives:

    The Honorable Christopher Shays:
    Ranking Member:
    Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
    Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
    House of Representatives:

    The Honorable Kit Bond:
    United States Senate:

    The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
    United States Senate:

    The Honorable Gene Taylor:
    House of Representatives:

    [End of section]

    Appendix I: Questionnaire and Survey Results:

    United States Government Accountability Office:
    Survey of State Adjutants General:

    The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, non-
    partisan agency that assists Congress in evaluating federal programs.
    We are conducting an audit of U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM)
    planning and preparedness for its homeland defense and defense support
    of civil authorities missions. As a part of this audit we are looking
    at NORTHCOM's sharing and coordination of plans with the states as well
    as its interagency coordination efforts in general.

    We are conducting this survey to find out more about your experiences
    in working and communicating with NORTHCOM. Your responses will help us
    to make actionable recommendations, if needed, for furthering
    coordination and cooperation between NORTHCOM and the states.

    Your responses may be presented in larger groupings for summary
    purposes and may be used individually as illustrative examples in our
    report. However, neither you nor your state will be expressly
    identified. If you have a question about the non-attribution of your
    answers please contact us.

    Contact Information:

    1. Please enter the following information about the person completing
    this survey and with whom we can follow up, if needed:
    Name:
    Title:
    Rank:
    State:
    FEMA Region:
    Phone #:
    E-mail:

    Section l: Homeland Defense Plan:

    2. How familiar are you with NORTHCOM's Homeland Defense plan?
    very familiar: 20%;
    somewhat familiar: 55%;
    slightly familiar: 18%;
    not at all familiar: 6%.

    3. Were you or your staff involved in any of the following NORTHCOM
    activities related to the Homeland Defense plan?

    a) attending plan development meetings with NORTHCOM:
    No: 86%;
    Yes: 14%.

    b) providing comments on a draft version of NORTHCOM's plan:
    No: 76%;
    Yes: 24%.

    c) providing comments on the final version of NORTHCOM's plan:
    No: 86%;
    Yes: 14%.

    d) attending NORTHCOM meetings for your FEMA region:
    No: 66%;
    Yes: 34%.

    Section 2: Defense Support of Civil Authorities Plan:

    4. How familiar are you with NORTHCOM's Defense Support of Civil
    Authorities plan?

    very familiar: 24%;
    somewhat familiar: 41%;
    slightly familiar: 24%;
    not at all familiar: 10%.

    5. Were you or your staff involved in any of the following NORTHCOM
    activities related to the Defense Support of Civil Authorities plan?

    a) attending plan development meetings with NORTHCOM:
    No: 86%;
    Yes: 14%.

    b) providing comments on a draft version of NORTHCOM's plan:
    No: 76%;
    Yes: 24%.

    c) providing comments on the final version of NORTHCOM's plan:
    No: 82%;
    Yes: 18%.

    d) attending NORTHCOM meetings for your FEMA region:
    No: 76%;
    Yes: 24%.

    Section 3: Exercises:

    6. Have officials in your state participated in the following NORTHCOM
    exercises? If so, in what year?

    a) Ardent Sentry:
    No: 51%;
    Yes: 49%;
    Year(s):

    b) Vigilant Shield:
    No: 75%;
    Yes: 25%;
    Year(s):

    7. Have officials in your state participated in any NORTHCOM exercises
    other than Ardent Sentry or Vigilant Shield?
    Yes: 32%; Which exercises?
    No: 68%.

    8. Has your state conducted homeland defense or emergency response
    exercises since September 11, 2001?
    Yes: 100%; What exercises?
    No: 0; Skip To Question #12.

    9. Did you invite NORTHCOM officials to participate in your state
    exercises?
    Yes: 50%;
    No: 50%; Skip To Question #12.

    10. Did NORTHCOM officials participate in your state exercises?
    Yes: 96%;
    No: 4%; Skip To Question #12.

    11.In your opinion, did NORTHCOM send the appropriate staff to
    participate in your exercises?
    Yes: 91%.
    No: 4%; Please explain.

    Section 4: NORTHCOM Overview:

    12. Please describe your state's coordination and communication with
    NORTHCOM regarding planning and/or operations for homeland defense and
    defense support of civil authorities.

    13. Does your state have a Homeland Security/Emergency Operations Plan?
    Yes: 100%;
    No: 0; Skip To Question #16.

    14. Did you or your staff provide and/or discuss your state Homeland
    Security/Emergency Operations Plan with NORTHCOM?
    Yes: 50%;
    No: 50%; Skip To Question #16.

    15. How familiar, if at all, do you think NORTHCOM is with your state's
    Homeland Security/Emergency Operations Plan?
    very familiar: 4%;
    somewhat familiar: 42%;
    slightly familiar: 46%;
    not at all familiar: 8%.

    16. Please describe your expectation for NORTHCOM's involvement in the
    event of an incident in your state.

    17. How would this expectation change, if at all, if the incident
    involved federal military property in your state?

    18. Did you or your staff participate in NORTHCOM's Joint Force
    Orientation Program?
    Yes: 8%; Please explain your participation:
    No: 12%.

    19. From your perspective, what are the strengths of NORTHCOM's current
    coordination and communication with your state?

    20. From your perspective, what are the weaknesses of NORTHCOM's
    current coordination and communication with your state?

    21. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving
    coordination and communication between NORTHCOM and your state?

    22. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving NORTHCOM's
    Homeland Defense plan?

    23. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving NORTHCOM's
    Defense Support of Civil Authorities plan?

    24.Any additional comments?

    Thank you for your time.

    [End of section]

    Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:

    In conducting this review, we focused our scope on U.S. Northern
    Command's (NORTHCOM) coordination with the states and the National
    Guard Bureau (NGB). We excluded NORTHCOM's coordination with other
    federal agencies and organizations and nongovernmental organizations
    because this is addressed in a companion report. Our review focused on
    NORTHCOM's coordination efforts occurring since Hurricane Katrina in
    2005. In addressing our objectives, we interviewed and obtained
    information and related documents from officials at the following
    locations:

    * NORTHCOM Headquarters, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs,
    Colorado:

    * Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia:

    * The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

    * The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.

    * Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Fort Monroe, Virginia:

    * U.S. Army North, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas:

    * Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region, Fort McNair,
    Washington, D.C.

    * NGB, Arlington, Virginia:

    * Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Washington, D.C.

    * U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

    * Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, D.C.

    We also conducted semistructured telephone interviews with the state
    adjutants general, also known as TAGs, from Florida, Indiana, Nebraska,
    and Washington.

    To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM is coordinating with the
    states, we surveyed the TAGs who are within NORTHCOM's area of
    responsibility. We asked respondents about their familiarity and
    involvement in NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan and the defense support
    of civil authorities plan. We also asked about their experiences in
    working and communicating with NORTHCOM, including their participation
    in NORTHCOM exercises and involvement of NORTHCOM in their state
    exercises. The questionnaire and survey responses can be found in
    appendix I. We sent a questionnaire to TAGs of all 49 states in
    NORTHCOM's area of responsibility and the District of Columbia.
    [Footnote 71]

    The self-administered electronic survey was sent via electronic mail to
    the TAGs and their chiefs of staff. More specifically, we sent the
    questionnaire by e-mail in an attached Microsoft Word form that
    respondents could return electronically after marking checkboxes or
    entering narrative responses into open answer boxes. Alternatively,
    respondents could return it by mail after printing the form and
    completing it by hand. We sent the original electronic questionnaire on
    April 4, 2007. We sent out reminder e-mail messages, with replacement
    surveys, at different time intervals to all nonrespondents in order to
    encourage a higher response rate. In addition, we made several courtesy
    telephone calls to nonrespondents to encourage their completion. All
    questionnaires were returned by September 19, 2007. We achieved a 100
    percent response rate.

    The survey used was not a sample survey because it included the
    universe of respondents. Therefore, the survey has no sampling errors.
    However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may
    introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For
    example, difficulties in interpreting a particular question, sources of
    information available to respondents, or entering data into a database
    or analyzing them can introduce unwanted variability into the survey
    results. We took steps in developing the questionnaire, collecting the
    data, and analyzing them to minimize such nonsampling errors. For
    example, social science survey specialists designed the questionnaire
    in collaboration with GAO staff who had subject matter expertise. In
    addition to an internal expert technical review by GAO's Survey
    Coordination Group, we pretested the survey with two TAGs by telephone
    to ensure that the questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to
    understand. Since there were relatively few changes based on the
    pretests and we were conducting surveys with the universe of
    respondents, we did not find it necessary to conduct additional
    pretests. Instead, changes to the content and format of the
    questionnaire were made after the pretests based on the feedback we
    received. When we analyzed the data, an independent analyst checked all
    computer programs. All data were double keyed during the data-entry
    process, and GAO staff verified a sample of the resulting data to
    ensure accuracy.

    In addition to analyzing the frequency and distribution of marked
    checkbox survey responses, we also analyzed the open-ended narrative
    survey responses for trends and recurring themes. For instance,
    although we did not directly ask a question about the defense
    coordinating officers (DCO) now located in each FEMA region, the DCOs
    were cited several times by TAGs as improving their communications with
    NORTHCOM. When the TAGs were not in agreement or had different
    perspectives on issues, we also summarized conflicting responses to
    illustrate the complexity of NORTHCOM's unique relationship with the
    states and any ongoing efforts to resolve these issues. For example,
    some TAGs believed that NGB should be the state's primary channel of
    communication with NORTHCOM, but others disagreed.

    To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM is coordinating with the
    states and NGB, we reviewed plans, guidance, and other documents,
    including the memorandum of agreement between NORTHCOM and NGB. In
    addition, we conducted semistructured interviews with officials from
    NORTHCOM and several of its subordinate commands, including the Joint
    Task Force-Civil Support, Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol
    Region, and Army Forces North, as well as officials from NGB
    headquarters and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office. We also conducted
    interviews with the officials from FEMA and DHS's interagency Incident
    Management Planning Team. Additionally, we observed a major exercise
    (Ardent Sentry/Northern Edge) in the Indianapolis area in May 2007.

    We conducted our review from April 2007 to April 2008 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
    require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
    appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
    obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
    based on our audit objectives.

    [End of section]

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:

    Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
    Homeland Defense:
    2600 Defense Pentagon:
    Washington, DC 20301-2600:

    April 1, 2008:

    Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
    Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
    U.S. Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street, NW:
    Washington, DC 20548:

    Dear Ms. D'Agostino:

    The Department of Defense response to the Government Accountability
    Office draft report GAO-08-252, "HOMELAND DEFENSE: Steps Have Been
    Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command's Coordination with States and
    the National Guard Bureau, But Gaps Remain", dated February 26, 2008 is
    attached.

    The Department appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the
    draft report.

    Sincerely,

    Signed by:

    Paul McHale

    Enclosure: As stated:

    GAO Draft Report � Dated February 26, 2008:
    GAO 08-252/(351091):

    "Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S.
    Northern Command's Coordination with States and the National Guard
    Bureau, But Gaps Remain"

    Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:

    Recommendation 1: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct
    United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to develop an established
    and thorough process to guide its coordination with the states,
    including provisions for:

    * involving the states in USNORTHCOM planning process;
    * obtaining information on state emergency response plans and
    capabilities, and;
    * using such information to improve the development and execution of
    its concept plans.

    Department Of Defense Response: Partially concur. The Department of
    Defense (DoD) agrees that an established and thorough planning process
    should be developed to guide the coordination between the local, state
    and federal governments. This process should include United States
    Northern Command, United States Pacific Command, and United States
    Southern Command. The DoD is coordinating with the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) in developing this process and a comprehensive
    planning solution that empowers state emergency planners to participate
    with a synchronized system of plans that integrates federal, state, and
    local operational capabilities to affect a coordinated national
    response.

    Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1 requires DHS to
    produce an Integrated Planning System (IPS). The Office of the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
    Security Affairs, the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM, and National Guard
    Bureau are in coordination with the DHS in developing the IPS. The IPS
    will consist of federal, state and local planning, and a vertical and
    horizontal integration process. The IPS will provide all of the
    combatant commands and in particular USNORTHCOM information on state
    emergency response plans and their capabilities. The IPS will support
    combatant commands with improving the development and execution of
    their concept plans.

    The coordination and planning process between the combatant commands
    and the states will become fully integrated through the efforts of the
    Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and the Emergency Preparedness
    Liaison Officer (EPLO). There is a permanently assigned DCO and
    Regional EPLO at each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency
    (FEMA) Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs). Additionally,
    there are State EPLOs assigned to the National Guard's Joint Force
    Headquarters � State, or State Emergency Operations Center in each
    State, territory, and the District of Columbia. The DCOs and the
    Regional and State EPLOs will facilitate the process of coordinating
    emergency response plans and capabilities between the combatant
    commands and the States, territories and the District of Columbia.

    In order to better integrate the planning activities of the DCOs and
    EPLOs the DoD has recently proposed a planning concept called Task
    Force for Emergency Response (TFER). The TFER concept is currently
    under review by DoD interagency partners.

    Recommendation 2: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct
    USNORTHCOM and National Guard Bureau to revise the Memorandum of
    Agreement or develop an alternative document to include fully and
    clearly defined roles and responsibilities for USNORTHCOM, National
    Guard Bureau and the National Guard Bureau office located at
    USNORTHCOM.

    Department Of Defense Response: Concur. A revision to the Memorandum of
    Agreement between USNORTHCOM and National Guard Bureau is in
    coordination.

    [End of section]

    Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

    GAO Contact:

    Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagonstinod@gao.gov:

    Acknowledgments:

    In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St. James, Assistant
    Director; Yecenia Camarillo; Joanna Chan; Angela Jacobs; David Keefer;
    Joseph Kirschbaum; Joanne Landesman; Erin Noel; Terry Richardson; and
    Jena Whitley made key contributions to this report.

    [End of section]

    Related GAO Products:

    Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to
    Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues.
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251]. Washington,
    D.C.: April 16, 2008.

    Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs'
    Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs' Impact on
    National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-488T]. Washington, D.C.: March
    11, 2008.

    Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made in Implementation of
    Management and Mission Functions, but More Work Remains. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-457T]. Washington, D.C.:
    February 13, 2008.

    Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical
    Infrastructure Protection Challenges That Require Federal and Private
    Sector Coordination. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
    08-36]. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007.

    Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to
    Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1241T].
    Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007.

    Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Clarify Federal Leadership
    Roles and Improve Pandemic Planning. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
    bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1257T]. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2007.

    Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of
    Mission and Management Functions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
    bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1240T]. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.

    Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
    and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
    Recommendations and Legislation. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
    bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1142T]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007.

    Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness Efforts Could
    Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk
    Mitigation. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-696].
    Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.

    Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic
    Equipment Requirements and Readiness. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60]. Washington, D.C.: January
    26, 2007.

    Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to Close
    the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National
    Priorities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-143].
    Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.

    Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st
    Century Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
    06-1109T]. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2006.

    Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
    Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
    Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618]. Washington, D.C.:
    September 6, 2006.

    Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery
    Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-903]. Washington, D.C.: July
    31, 2006.

    Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support
    Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-498]. Washington, D.C.: May
    31, 2006.

    Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the
    Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-808T]. Washington, D.C.: May
    25, 2006.

    Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
    Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-643]. Washington, D.C.: May
    15, 2006.

    Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
    Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-442T]. Washington, D.C.: March
    8, 2006.

    Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
    Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-467T]. Washington, D.C.:
    February 23, 2006.

    Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment
    Need to be Reexamined. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
    bin/getrpt?GAO-06-170T]. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005.

    Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
    Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-652]. Washington, D.C.: July
    11, 2005.

    Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for
    Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-21]. Washington, D.C.:
    November 10, 2004.

    Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas
    and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-670T]. Washington, D.C.: April
    29, 2004.

    Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally
    Chartered Commissions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
    bin/getrpt?GAO-04-591]. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.

    Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for
    Domestic Military Missions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
    bin/getrpt?GAO-03-670]. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.

    Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-822]. Washington,
    D.C.: September 20, 2001.

    [End of section]

    Footnotes:

    [1] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
    Support (Washington, D.C.: June 2005), 5.

    [2] DOD refers to civil support operations conducted in accordance with
    the National Response Framework as Defense Support of Civil
    Authorities. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support,
    GL-7.

    [3] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
    Support, 5-6.

    [4] Hawaii and Guam are under the area of responsibility of U.S.
    Pacific Command, and Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are under
    the area of responsibility of U.S. Southern Command.

    [5] NORTHCOM's geographical boundaries for defense support of civil
    authorities do not include Canada and Mexico unless coordinated in
    advance with the State Department.

    [6] NGB is a joint activity of DOD. It coordinates the deployment of
    nonfederalized National Guard forces and provides NORTHCOM with
    situational awareness of National Guard issues and activities,
    including capabilities and requirements. NGB does not have jurisdiction
    over resources. Nonfederalized or Title 32 forces are under the control
    of the governor of the state. During a presidential call-up, National
    Guard forces can be mobilized under Title 10 and federalized. In this
    case, they are under the control of the President.

    [7] An incident refers to a natural or man-made disaster, ranging from
    a hurricane to a terrorist attack, that requires action to prevent or
    minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or natural resources.

    [8] Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security
    (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007).

    [9] GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to
    Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address
    Related Recommendations and Legislation, [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1142T] (Washington, D.C.: July
    31, 2007). A list of related products is included at the end of this
    report.

    [10] U.S. Northern Command, State and Tribal Engagement Strategy, Draft
    (Colorado Springs, Colo., undated).

    [11] White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
    Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006); House of Representatives, A
    Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee
    to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
    (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006); U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A
    Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006); and GAO,
    Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
    Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-808T] (Washington, D.C.: May
    25, 2006).

    [12] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Strengthening
    America's Defenses in the New Security Environment (Washington, D.C.:
    Mar. 1, 2007).

    [13] Pub. L. No. 110-181, �� 1812 and 1813 (2008), which are codified
    at 10 U.S.C. �� 10501 and 10503 (2007).

    [14] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but
    Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other
    Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251]
    (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008).

    [15] This includes those in the 48 contiguous states as well as Alaska
    and the District of Columbia.

    [16] U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations (Colorado Springs,
    Colo.: June 13, 2005).

    [17] Catastrophic incidents by their nature cut across geographic and
    political boundaries, and these events require fully integrated
    intergovernmental actions. See Department of Homeland Security,
    Nationwide Plan Review: Phase 2 Report (Washington, D.C.: June 16,
    2006).

    [18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251].

    [19] The command was created in April 2002 as part of a revised Unified
    Command Plan, which outlines the areas of responsibility for the
    combatant commands.

    [20] NORTHCOM's area of responsibility for its homeland defense mission
    includes the contiguous United States, Alaska, U.S. territorial waters,
    and Canada and Mexico. NORTHCOM's area of responsibility for its civil
    support mission includes the contiguous United States, Alaska, and U.S.
    territorial waters.

    [21] Homeland defense is considered DOD's portion of the broader area
    of homeland security. Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for
    Homeland Security, 3, and Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland
    Defense and Civil Support, 5.

    [22] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
    Support, 5-6.

    [23] NORTHCOM and the other combatant commands transmit their force
    requirements (forces needed to execute their planned operations) to
    Joint Forces Command, and the latter determines which mix of trained
    military service units (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) will provide
    the requested forces. Joint Forces Command assigns these forces to
    combatant commanders when requested by the Joint Staff. See White
    House, Unified Command Plan (Washington, D.C., May 5, 2006) and Joint
    Pub. 5), Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 26, 2006), I-10. In addition,
    any other combatant command to which forces have been assigned by DOD,
    such as U.S. Pacific Command, could also be directed to provide forces
    to NORTHCOM.

    [24] During a presidential call-up, National Guard forces can be
    mobilized under Title 10 and federalized. In this case, they are under
    the control of the President. Nonfederalized or Title 32 forces are
    under the control of the governor of the state.

    [25] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework
    (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2008), and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-
    28, Civil Support (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2007).

    [26] EMAC is a mutual aid agreement among member states and is
    administered by the National Emergency Management Association. States
    affected by disasters have increasingly relied on EMAC as a means to
    access resources from other states, including emergency managers,
    National Guard assets, and first responders. GAO, Emergency Management
    Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's Collaborative and Administrative
    Capacity Should Improve National Disaster Response, [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-854] (Washington, D.C.: June
    29, 2007).

    [27] The National Preparedness System (NPS) provides a tool to assist
    jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations at all levels to plan for,
    assess, and track capabilities in a shared environment. It integrates
    various efforts to provide the comprehensive picture of preparedness
    and progress toward achieving the goal.

    [28] The National Response Framework is a guide to how the nation
    conducts all-hazards incident response. It is built upon flexible,
    scalable, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and
    responsibilities across the nation, linking all levels of government
    and private sector businesses and non-governmental organizations.
    Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework.

    [29] The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
    Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, signed into law November 23, 1988, amended
    the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288. This act
    constitutes the statutory authority for most federal disaster response
    activities, especially as they pertain to FEMA and FEMA programs.

    [30] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, II-4,
    (Sept. 14, 2007).

    [31] 18 U.S.C. � 1385 (2007).

    [32] The federal interagency community developed 15 all-hazards
    planning scenarios--the national planning scenarios--for use in
    federal, state, and local homeland security preparedness activities.
    The scenarios are planning tools and are representative of the range of
    potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters and related impacts
    facing the United States, including nuclear detonation; biological,
    chemical, radiological, and explosive attacks; as well as a major
    hurricane or earthquake. NORTHCOM does not use the 15TH scenario
    dealing with cyberattacks because this is in the area of responsibility
    of U.S. Strategic Command.

    [33] Generally, a contingency plan does not contain a list of specific
    forces needed to carry out missions, or even specific mission tasks.
    Instead, tools such as standing execute orders match types of units on
    potential call for use to plans, but specific units usually are not
    identified. Recently approved national planning guidance may soon
    require DOD and other federal agencies to prepare more detailed plans.
    White House, National Planning, Homeland Security Presidential
    Directive 8 Annex 1 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007).

    [34] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
    Support, 8; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-27, Homeland Defense,
    II-14-II-15, A-1-A-6, (Jul. 12, 2007); and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
    Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, (Sep. 14, 2007), II-11-II-14.

    [35] This includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and U.S.
    possessions and territories.

    [36] Army Regulation 130-5/AFMD 10, Organization and Functions of
    National Guard Bureau (Dec. 30, 2001).

    [37] U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations, 3-11.

    [38] The Chief of NGB initiated the inclusion of NGB as part of JPEC
    via a letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    [39] NORTHCOM merged the first two phases of the Joint Force
    Orientation Program in September 2007, so there are currently only two
    phases of this program. NORTHCOM's goal in merging these phases and
    scheduling the program over weekends is to save state officials travel
    and training expenses and enable guardsmen to take fewer days off from
    their civilian jobs.

    [40] This updates the information we obtained in our survey on the
    numbers of TAGs and their staff who have completed this training (44
    TAGs reported that they or their staff had participated in the Joint
    Force Orientation Program). See app. I. The survey did not did not
    break out the data by training phases.

    [41] EMAC provides a means for states affected by disasters to access
    resources from other states, including emergency managers, National
    Guard assets, and first responders. In a major disaster requiring
    assistance from multiple states, EMAC will be a principal avenue for
    requesting resources. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
    07-854].

    [42] Prior to October 1, 2006, training support brigade commanders of
    the First and Fifth Continental U.S. Armies also served as DCOs
    whenever requested by FEMA or another federal agency. Upon
    establishment of Fifth U.S. Army as the Army component to NORTHCOM, 10
    full-time regional DCOs were established and located in the FEMA
    regional offices.

    [43] The National Incident Management System provides a consistent
    nationwide template to enable all government, private sector, and
    nongovernmental organizations to work together to better respond to
    natural disasters and emergencies, including acts of terrorism. This
    system offers a unified approach to incidents and emphasizes standard
    command structures, preparedness, mutual aid, and resource management.
    Training for this system is administered by FEMA's Emergency Management
    Institute.

    [44] White House, National Planning.

    [45] U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations; White House,
    Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness
    (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003); and White House, National Planning.

    [46] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Clarify Federal
    Leadership Roles and Improve Pandemic Planning, [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1257T] (Washington, D.C.:
    Sept. 26, 2007).

    [47] Because NORTHCOM's plans are broader concept plans rather than
    more detailed operational plans, they are not focused on specific
    scenarios and discrete sets of required capabilities needed to
    accomplish objectives.

    [48] NORTHCOM's homeland defense concept plan specifically requested
    that NGB facilitate the states in providing supporting plans and
    forward these to NORTHCOM. NGB received no indication that these plans
    had been reviewed, and NORTHCOM officials were not clear about the
    status and completeness of these supporting plans.

    [49] As we reported separately, NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve
    the coordination of its homeland defense and civil support plans and
    operations with other federal agencies. However, NORTHCOM lacks formal
    guidance to coordinate its planning effort with its agency partners.
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251].

    [50] Catastrophic incidents by their nature cut across geographic and
    political boundaries, and these events require fully integrated
    intergovernmental actions. Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide
    Plan Review: Phase 2 Report.

    [51] The annex to the 2003 National Preparedness Homeland Security
    Presidential Directive, issued in December 2007, establishes a
    comprehensive approach to national planning for homeland security and
    requires that the federal government more closely integrate federal,
    state, local, and tribal plans with respect to capability assessments.
    White House, National Planning, 4.

    [52] DHS has compiled and reviewed the state emergency response plans.
    Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review: Phase 2
    Report.

    [53] NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities
    it may need in part because DOD has required NORTHCOM to complete
    concept plans, which are more general plans that do not entail the
    assignment of specific forces. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
    bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251]. Recently approved national planning guidance
    requires DOD and other federal agencies to prepare more detailed plans.
    White House, National Planning.

    [54] JTF-CS is a subordinate command to NORTHCOM and is responsible for
    planning and integrating DOD support to states or other federal
    agencies following a CBRNE incident. JTF-CS facilitates the development
    of capability-based force packages and modules to meet various CBRNE
    incident management options. When directed by NORTHCOM to respond to an
    incident, JTF-CS will arrive on site to gain situational awareness and
    report back to NORTHCOM for preparation of an estimate of what is
    needed from DOD. JTF-CS was performing this mission 3 years prior to
    NORTHCOM being established in 2002.

    [55] Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 1
    Report (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2006), and Nationwide Plan Review
    Phase 2 Report.

    [56] White House, National Planning.

    [57] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251].

    [58] DOD requires combatant commanders to have security cooperation
    plans with foreign governments. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0,
    Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 26, 2006), I-3, I-4, GL-21.

    [59] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, and
    U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations.

    [60] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness
    Efforts Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and
    Risk Mitigation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
    696] (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007); Homeland Security: Preparing
    for and Responding to Disasters, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
    bin/getrpt?GAO-07-395T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2007); and Emergency
    Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated with
    Major Emergency Incidents, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
    bin/getrpt?GAO-06-467T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).

    [61] Homeland Security council, National Strategy for Homeland
    Security, 32.

    [62] The memorandum limits the staff in the NGB liaison office to
    eight; there are currently four staff assigned to the office.

    [63] Pub. L. No. 109-364, � 1406 (2006).

    [64] Pub. L. No. 109-295 � 651 (2006).

    [65] Pub. L. No. 110-181, � 1801 (2008).

    [66] Pub. L. No. 110-181, �� 1811-1813 (2008).

    [67] This act was passed in January 2008, and NGB's charter is
    currently being revised.

    [68] Pub. L. No. 110-181, � 1814 (2008).

    [69] Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland
    Security.

    [70] White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
    Learned; House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: Final
    Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
    Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina; U.S. Senate,
    Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared; and [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-808T].

    [71] Since Hawaii falls under U.S. Pacific Command's area of
    responsibility, it was not within the scope of this study.

    [End of section]

    GAO's Mission:

    The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
    investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
    its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
    and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
    GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
    policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
    to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
    decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
    values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

    Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:

    The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
    cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
    weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
    correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
    posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
    and select "E-mail Updates."

    Order by Mail or Phone:

    The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
    each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
    of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
    more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
    Orders should be sent to:

    U.S. Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street NW, Room LM:
    Washington, D.C. 20548:

    To order by Phone:
    Voice: (202) 512-6000:
    TDD: (202) 512-2537:
    Fax: (202) 512-6061:

    To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:

    Contact:

    Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
    E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
    Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:

    Congressional Relations:

    Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
    (202) 512-4400:
    U.S. Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
    Washington, D.C. 20548:

    Public Affairs:

    Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
    (202) 512-4800:
    U.S. Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
    Washington, D.C. 20548:

    *** End of document. ***