Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but	 
Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and  
Other Issues (16-APR-08, GAO-08-251).				 
                                                                 
It has been 5 years since the Department of Defense (DOD)	 
established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland 
defense and civil support missions in the United States. Planning
operations in the United States poses unique challenges for	 
traditional military planning. GAO was asked to assess (1) the	 
status of NORTHCOM's plans and the challenges it faces in	 
planning and conducting operations, (2) the number, experience,  
and training of planning personnel, and (3) the extent to which  
NORTHCOM coordinates with other federal agencies. To do this, GAO
reviewed available NORTHCOM plans, compared them to joint	 
operational planning criteria, compared planning staff with those
at other commands, and reviewed documentation and mechanisms for 
interagency coordination.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-251 					        
    ACCNO:   A81692						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress
but Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps,  
and Other Issues						 
     DATE:   04/16/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Civil support					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Disaster planning					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Force planning					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Military training					 
	     National defense operations			 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Requirements definition				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Staff utilization					 
	     State governments					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Program coordination				 
	     Homeland Security Presidential Directive		 
	     8							 
                                                                 
	     National Response Framework			 

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GAO-08-251

   

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material separately. 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

April 2008: 

Homeland Defense: 

U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force 
Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues: 

Homeland Defense: 

GAO-08-251: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-251, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

It has been 5 years since the Department of Defense (DOD) established 
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil 
support missions in the United States. Planning operations in the 
United States poses unique challenges for traditional military 
planning. GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of NORTHCOMï¿½s plans 
and the challenges it faces in planning and conducting operations, (2) 
the number, experience, and training of planning personnel, and (3) the 
extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates with other federal agencies. To do 
this, GAO reviewed available NORTHCOM plans, compared them to joint 
operational planning criteria, compared planning staff with those at 
other commands, and reviewed documentation and mechanisms for 
interagency coordination. 

What GAO Found: 

NORTHCOM has completedï¿½or is in the process of revisingï¿½all of the 
major plans it is required to prepare for its homeland defense and 
civil support missions, but it faces a number of challenges in planning 
for and conducting these missions. NORTHCOM has completed its nine 
required plans. However, NORTHCOM does not know whether supporting 
plans that must be developed by other DOD organizations to assist 
NORTHCOM are complete because it has only recently begun to develop a 
process to track and assess these plans. NORTHCOM faces challenges in 
three key planning areas. First, NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying 
requirements for capabilities it may need in part because NORTHCOM does 
not have more detailed information from the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) or the states on the specific requirements needed from 
the military in the event of a disaster. Second, NORTHCOM has few 
regularly allocated forces and few capabilities allocated to its plans. 
DOD could allocate forces to NORTHCOM and assign specific forces to the 
commandï¿½s plans, but this would not guarantee that those forces would 
not have to be deployed elsewhere. However, it would provide DOD and 
the NORTHCOM commander with a better basis on which to assess the risk 
that the command would be unable to successfully execute one or more of 
its missions. Third, NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness 
of military units for its civil support mission because its plans do 
not specify mission tasks against which units can be assessed. NORTHCOM 
has undertaken mitigation efforts to address each challenge, and new 
national planning guidance may further assist NORTHCOM and DOD in 
addressing the challenges. Nevertheless, NORTHCOM and DOD can take 
additional actions to reduce the risk from these gaps and reduce the 
risk due to the overall uncertainty that stems from the nature of its 
mission. 

NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and the command 
is pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for 
staff needed to perform the commandï¿½s planning function. NORTHCOMï¿½s 
planning staff is filled at over 96 percent of its authorized 
positions. NORTHCOMï¿½s military planning staff receives the same 
planning training and education as planners in other combatant 
commands. To draw upon experience in planning and conducting domestic 
operations, NORTHCOM has integrated National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard 
personnel into its headquarters staff. NORTHCOM has also developed a 
curriculum for required mission-related training courses. 

Although NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve coordination of its 
homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal 
agencies, it lacks formalized guidance and proceduresï¿½such as 
memorandums of understanding or chartersï¿½to help ensure that 
interagency coordination efforts or agreements that are reached can be 
fully relied on. This is important because responding to a major 
disaster in the United Statesï¿½natural or man-madeï¿½is a shared 
responsibility of many government agencies with states often requiring 
federal assistance from DHS and DOD. 


What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is making several recommendations to DOD to direct NORTHCOM to take 
actions to address the challenges it faces in its planning and 
interagency coordination efforts. GAO is also recommending that DOD 
develop metrics by which to measure readiness for civil support 
missions. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations and suggested 
ongoing and future efforts to satisfy the intent of the 
recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251]. For more 
information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background 1: 

NORTHCOM Has Completed Major Plans but Faces Considerable Challenges 
That Increase the Overall Risk to Its Ability to Execute Its Plans 1: 

NORTHCOM's Planning Personnel Have Adequate Staff Level and Are 
Expanding Experience and Training 1: 

NORTHCOM Has Taken Actions to Improve Interagency Coordination but 
Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure That Coordination Efforts Are Adopted 
1: 

Conclusions 1: 

Recommendations for Executive Action 1: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 1: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 84: 

Appendix II: NORHTCOM's 25 Prescripted Mission Assignments 87: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 89: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 95: 

Related GAO Products 95: 
 
Tables: 

Table 1: Status of NORTHCOM's Plans 1: 

Table 2: Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios 
Incorporated into NORTHCOM Plans 1: 

Table 3: Staffing Level of Planning Personnel, by Combatant Command 1: 

Table 4: Military, Civilian, and Contractor Planners, by Combatant 
Command 1: 

Table 5: Agencies and Organizations Represented at NORTHCOM 1: 

Table 6: Prescripted Mission Assignments 1: 
 
Figures: 

Figure 1: NORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility 1: 

Figure 2: NORTHCOM Organization 1: 

Figure 3: FEMA Regions 1: 

Abbreviations: 

CBRNE: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 
explosive: 

CCMRF: CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force: 

CONPLAN: concept plan: 

DC:O defense coordinating officer: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

IMPT: Incident Management Planning Team: 

JIACG: Joint Interagency Coordination Group: 

OPLAN: operations plan: 

NGB: National Guard Bureau: 

NORAD: North American Aerospace Defense Command: 

NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

April 16, 2008: 

Congressional Requesters: 

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) recognized the need for a more integrated 
military response to an attack on the homeland. In response, DOD 
established the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)[Footnote 1] in October 
2002 to provide command and control of DOD homeland defense efforts and 
to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. These two 
activities are among DOD's contribution to homeland security. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead federal agency for 
homeland security, which is a national effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do 
occur.[Footnote 2] DOD contributes to homeland security through its 
military missions overseas and homeland defense and civil support 
operations. DOD is the lead federal agency for homeland defense, which 
it defines as the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic 
population, and critical defense infrastructure against external 
threats and aggression against the United States.[Footnote 3] This 
involves strictly military actions, such as air defense. Civil support 
is DOD support to US civil authorities--such as DHS or other agency-- 
for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other 
activities.[Footnote 4] 

NORTHCOM differs from the other combatant commands--such as the U.S. 
European Command and U.S. Central Command--in that, in addition to 
Canada and Mexico, its area of responsibility includes all 49 states on 
the North American continent and the District of Columbia. This poses a 
unique challenge for military planning and coordination in a U.S. 
domestic context and with respect to 49 separate and individual state 
governments. NORTHCOM also has to coordinate with numerous federal 
agencies that also have a role in planning for and responding to a wide 
variety of incidents in the homeland as reflected in the National 
Response Framework.[Footnote 5] 

Since NORTHCOM was established in October 2002,[Footnote 6] we have 
periodically evaluated and reported on issues related to its ability to 
carry out its missions. In our first report in July 2003, we reported 
that at the time it was too early to assess the adequacy of NORTHCOM's 
planning for operations in the homeland but that there was a need for 
an assessment of the DOD force structure necessary to conduct homeland 
defense and civil support missions.[Footnote 7] Reports since then have 
consistently shown the need for clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities among responder agencies, the need for state and local 
involvement in the development of response plans, and the need to 
ensure response capabilities are developed and ready.[Footnote 8] Many 
of these issues were highlighted in 2005, when despite a massive 
deployment of resources and support from both military and civil 
agencies in response to Hurricane Katrina, confusion arose as to what 
responsibilities the military had and what capabilities it would 
provide in planning and responding to a catastrophic event. 

Homeland defense and civil support operations are major 
responsibilities of NORTHCOM. DOD is the lead federal agency for 
homeland defense operations, and NORTHCOM is to command federal 
military forces conducting homeland defense operations in the United 
States. For civil support operations, although disaster preparedness 
and response is primarily the responsibility of the civilian government 
and its agencies, NORTHCOM must be prepared to assist when requested or 
when an incident overwhelms local, state, tribal, and other federal 
authorities.[Footnote 9] DOD is not the lead federal agency for civil 
support missions (unless designated so by the President) and operates 
in support of civil authorities only when directed to do so by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM would command only the 
federal military[Footnote 10] portion of such operations and would do 
so in direct support of another federal agency, such as the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).[Footnote 11] 

In planning for both homeland defense and civil support missions, 
NORTHCOM relies on other DOD organizations and commands to prepare 
plans that will support NORTHCOM in its missions. These organizations 
include NORTHCOM's subordinate commands, such as Joint Task Force 
Alaska and Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region; component 
commands, such as Army Forces North, Air Forces North, and Marine 
Forces North; and supporting commands, such as Navy Fleet Forces 
Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and DOD agencies such as the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency. 
Following the joint planning process,[Footnote 12] NORTHCOM provides 
its subordinate commands with planning guidance, such as types of 
incidents to prepare for, and collectively these plans should help to 
facilitate an adequate response to an incident in the homeland. 
Moreover, the joint planning process calls for required capabilities to 
be identified and allocated to ensure mission success and for the 
readiness of those units providing the capabilities for assigned 
missions to be monitored. 

As requested, this report addresses the extent to which NORTHCOM (1) 
has prepared plans to conduct its homeland defense and civil support 
missions and the challenges it faces in planning for and conducting 
these operations, (2) has an adequate number of planning personnel with 
the relevant experience and training to perform the planning function 
for the command, and (3) coordinates the development of its plans and 
operations with federal agencies and other organizations. We prepared a 
separate report to address NORTHCOM's coordination with the National 
Guard Bureau (NGB) and the states.[Footnote 13]As agreed with your 
staff, we will address matters related to NORTHCOM exercises and 
training as part of a follow-on effort. 

To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has prepared plans to execute 
its homeland defense and civil support missions, we reviewed NORTHCOM's 
available major plans and supporting plans, comparing them to 
established DOD joint operational planning criteria for completeness 
and adequacy. We also met with knowledgeable NORTHCOM officials to 
discuss the status of each of the plans NORTHCOM is required to prepare 
and the process by which the plans were developed and assessed. 
Although we reviewed the assumptions, constraints, and other portions 
of the plans for general adherence to DOD's joint operational planning 
criteria, we did not independently validate those elements. Therefore, 
we did not attempt to determine the extent to which NORTHCOM's plans 
are executable. To assess the challenges NORTHCOM faces in planning for 
and conducting homeland defense and civil support operations, we 
developed a methodology comparing a series of questions and topics for 
joint operational planning to the information related to the plans 
themselves. The methodology was based on DOD's standards for joint 
operational planning for identifying needed capabilities, allocating 
those capabilities to accomplish the mission, monitoring the readiness 
of military units to meet the capability requirements of their 
missions, and capturing and incorporating lessons learned into 
planning. We used the results of this analysis and our discussions with 
a broad range of DOD officials to determine what gaps, if any, exist in 
NORTHCOM's planning efforts stemming from these challenges. Although we 
reviewed all of NORTHCOM's plans according to these criteria, we 
concentrated on the two primary homeland defense and civil support 
plans. To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM's planning personnel 
have relevant and adequate training and experience, we discussed 
staffing and training with a wide range of NORTHCOM and DOD officials 
and compared information on planning personnel at NORTHCOM with that of 
other combatant commands. We assessed the reliability of these data and 
found them to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 
To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates in planning for 
and conducting its missions, we reviewed the documentation and 
mechanisms for coordination with organizations outside NORTHCOM and 
interviewed officials from NORTHCOM's subordinate commands, DHS, the 
FEMA, and NGB. Additional information on our scope and methodology 
appears in appendix I. 

We conducted our review from May 2006 to April 2008 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains further detail on 
our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

NORTHCOM has completed--or is in the process of revising--all of the 
major plans it is required to prepare for its homeland defense and 
civil support missions, but it faces a number of challenges in planning 
for and conducting these missions. NORTHCOM has completed the nine 
major plans required by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and 
other DOD guidance and is in the process of revising four plans, 
including its Homeland Defense plan.[Footnote 14] However, it does not 
know whether supporting plans that must be developed by other DOD 
organizations to assist NORTHCOM are complete because it has only 
recently begun to develop a process to track and assess these plans. 
Further, although NORTHCOM's plans adhere to DOD standards, the 
challenges NORTHCOM faces in three key planning areas increase the risk 
to NORTHCOM's ability to execute its homeland defense and civil support 
plans. First, NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying requirements for 
capabilities it may need in part because NORTHCOM does not have more 
detailed information from DHS and the states on the specific 
requirements needed from the military in the event of a disaster. 
Second, NORTHCOM has few regularly assigned military forces (units, 
trained personnel, and equipment), and it has only one major plan with 
which specific forces and units are associated. NORTHCOM therefore 
faces uncertainty about which DOD forces or capabilities are available 
to it to respond to a mission requirement. Although DOD stresses that 
homeland defense is a major priority, it has routinely chosen not to 
assign forces to NORTHCOM. DOD could allocate forces to NORTHCOM and 
assign specific forces to the command's plans, but this would not 
guarantee that those forces would not have to be deployed elsewhere. 
However, it would provide DOD and the NORTHCOM Commander with a better 
basis to assess the risk that the command would be unable to 
successfully execute one or more of its missions. Third, NORTHCOM has 
difficulty monitoring the readiness of military units for its civil 
support mission because, in addition to having few forces associated 
with plans, most of NORTHCOM's plans do not specify tasks against which 
units can be assessed in DOD's existing readiness system.[Footnote 15] 
NORTHCOM has begun risk mitigation efforts for these challenges, and 
new national planning guidance and requirements may further assist 
NORTHCOM and DOD in addressing the challenges.[Footnote 16] However, 
there are additional actions that NORTHCOM and DOD could take-- 
independently or as part of newly required planning efforts--that would 
reduce the overall risk to NORTHCOM's ability to execute its missions. 
We are recommending that (1) NORTHCOM track the status and assess the 
suitability of all supporting plans, (2) DOD assign forces to NORTHCOM 
and require NORTHCOM to develop dedicated force deployment lists for 
each of its major plans, and (3) NORTHCOM develop mission tasks for its 
civil support plans. DOD generally agreed with the intent of our 
recommendations and discussed steps it is taking or planning to take to 
ensure that NORTHCOM reviews supporting plans, assign certain 
specialized forces to NORTHCOM, and develop metrics against which 
military units can be measured for readiness for the civil support 
mission. 

NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and they are 
pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for staff 
needed to perform the command's planning function. Because of the need 
to plan for and conduct operations within the United States, NORTHCOM 
presents a challenge to most planners who have functioned solely in a 
military planning environment. NORTHCOM has over 96 percent of its 
authorized planning positions, which is higher than the percentages for 
the other combatant commands, except U.S. Central Command. The military 
officers who serve as NORTHCOM planners receive the same basic planning 
training and education as planners in other combatant commands. 
NORTHCOM has also integrated 36 National Guard and 22 U.S. Coast Guard 
personnel--who have experience working in the state environment--into 
most of the directorates that conducts some form of operational 
planning. This improves the command's ability to plan for and 
coordinate with non-DOD entities to accomplish its domestic missions. 
NORTHCOM also supplements military planning training and education with 
mission-specific training that provides planners with the skills they 
need to properly plan its missions. NORTHCOM has also developed a 
curriculum for its staff and monitors this training to ensure the 
completion of curriculum courses in a timely manner. Expanding the 
knowledge base of military staff at NORTHCOM should help improve the 
level of homeland defense and civil support knowledge in planners 
throughout DOD. At some point, this may allow NORTHCOM to require 
homeland defense and civil support training, education, and experience 
requirements for military personnel wishing to transfer to the command 
in a planning position and for civilian employees the command may hire. 

Although NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of its 
homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal 
agencies, it lacks formalized procedures--such as memorandums of 
understanding or charters--to ensure that agreements or arrangements 
made between the command and agency representatives can be relied on 
for planning purposes. NORTHCOM has improved interagency coordination 
through such efforts as establishing a headquarters directorate focused 
solely on coordination and integrating representatives from 40 agencies 
into the command's headquarters. However, we found that federal agency 
representatives at NORTHCOM have varying degrees of authority from 
their respective headquarters to agree on coordination efforts. 
Moreover, several agency representatives told us that as they rotate 
out of NORTHCOM, previously made agreements with these representatives 
may change as new representatives rotate in. As a result, NORTHCOM may 
base its plans or responses on information that is not fully vetted and 
risks the possibility of planning with invalid information or 
responding to an incident with inadequate resources. Among other 
actions it has taken to improve coordination, the command participates 
in an interagency incident management planning team. However, officials 
from several agencies on the team expressed concern that their 
agreements with NORTHCOM may not be completely viable because there was 
no formal process to obtain their headquarters' concurrence with their 
agreements made with NORTHCOM. As we have reported, key practices that 
can enhance and sustain interagency coordination efforts include 
formalizing interagency agreements on such things as roles and 
responsibilities through a memorandum of understanding, a charter, or 
some other formal planning document between partner agencies.[Footnote 
17] This is important because responding to a major disaster in the 
United States--natural or man-made--is a shared responsibility of many 
government agencies with states often requiring federal assistance from 
DHS and DOD. Without effective interagency coordination and planning, 
there is a risk that NORTHCOM'S, DOD's, and other federal agencies' 
response to an incident may be fragmented and uncoordinated, such as in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 18] The new integrated 
planning system required by national planning guidance issued by the 
President and DHS may help address the gaps we identified. Therefore, 
in conjunction with the development of the integrated planning system, 
we are recommending that NORTHCOM, in consultation with its federal 
interagency partners, develop clear guidance and procedures for 
interagency planning coordination efforts. DOD agreed with this 
recommendation and stated that it has begun to incorporate such 
direction into its major planning documents. 

Background: 

As with other joint combatant commands, NORTHCOM's organization 
includes subordinate commands that report directly to NORTHCOM; 
component commands, which are military service commands that assist 
NORTHCOM operations; and other supporting commands and DOD agencies. 
Each of these has a significant role in planning for NORTHCOM's 
missions. NORTHCOM planning efforts are guided by DOD policies and 
procedures on joint planning that specify what should be included in 
the plans as well as what organizations are required to submit plans in 
order for the command to complete its planning process. 

NORTHCOM Mission and Organization: 

NORTHCOM is the military command responsible for the planning, 
organizing, and executing DOD's homeland defense mission within its 
area of responsibility--the continental United States (including 
Alaska) and territorial waters--and civil support missions within the 
United States[Footnote 19] (see fig. 1). Homeland defense is the 
protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and 
critical defense infrastructure against external attacks and 
aggression. DOD is the lead federal agency for homeland defense 
operations, such as air defense.[Footnote 20] Other federal agencies 
would act in support of DOD in those circumstances. NORTHCOM's homeland 
defense mission incorporates air and space defense, land defense, and 
maritime defense against external threats. One example of how the 
homeland defense mission is conducted is Operation Noble Eagle, the 
ongoing effort to protect against an air attack, such as those that 
occurred on September 11, 2001. 

Figure 1: NORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility: 

This figure is a map showing area of NORTHCOM responsibility. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis; Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

NORTHCOM consists of a combatant command headquarters, a series of 
smaller subordinate commands focused on particular missions or regions, 
and component commands of the military services, which support 
NORTHCOM's planning and operations and command the land, maritime, and 
air portions of a NORTHCOM joint operation. The NORTHCOM Commander also 
commands the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a bi- 
national U.S. and Canadian organization charged with air and maritime 
warning and airspace control. Figure 2 shows NORTHCOM's structure. 

Figure 2: NORTHCOM Organization: 

This figure is a chart showing the NORTHCOM organization. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of NORTHCOM information. 

[End of figure] 

Civil support is DOD support to US civil authorities--such as DHS or 
other agency--for domestic emergencies and for designated law 
enforcement and other activities.[Footnote 21] DOD is not a lead 
federal agency for such missions and thus operates in support of civil 
authorities only when directed to do so by the President or the 
Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM would command only the federal military 
portion of such operations and would do so in direct support of another 
federal agency, such as FEMA.[Footnote 22] 

Response to disasters or other catastrophic events in the United States 
is guided by the National Response Framework, which involves a stepped 
series of response, beginning with local authorities, state 
authorities, and outside assistance from other states. Only when these 
capabilities are exceeded would federal assistance become involved. It 
is at this point that DOD may be asked to provide assistance.[Footnote 
23] NORTHCOM would command that DOD assistance. For civil support 
operations, there are three primary situations in which DOD takes part 
in a federal response to a domestic incident. Federal assistance, 
including assistance from DOD, can be provided (1) at the direction of 
the President, (2) at the request of another federal agency, such as 
DHS or FEMA, or (3) in response to a request from local authorities 
when time is of the essence.[Footnote 24] 

The Joint Operation Planning Process: 

Guidance for developing plans, such as NORTHCOM's homeland defense and 
civil support plans, is provided by DOD's joint operation planning 
process.[Footnote 25] This process establishes objectives, assesses 
threats, identifies capabilities needed to achieve the objectives in a 
given environment, and ensures that capabilities (and the military 
forces to deliver those capabilities) are allocated to ensure mission 
success. Joint operation planning and execution procedures also include 
assessing and monitoring the readiness of those units providing the 
capabilities for the missions they are assigned. Overall, the purpose 
of joint operation planning is to reduce the risks inherent in military 
operations. 

Joint operations plans themselves can take several forms, from the more 
detailed to the more general. Examples of more detailed operations 
plans include those prepared by several combatant commands for the 
kinds of military operations dictated by a specific foreign threat or 
scenario, such as the need to oppose a landward invasion of the 
territory of a U.S. ally by a hostile nation. Such operations plans 
(OPLAN) are meant to cover contingencies that are critical to U.S. 
national security and require detailed planning in order to reduce risk 
to potential operations. These plans are accompanied by detailed lists 
of military forces that would provide required capabilities in order to 
execute the plan. Other plans are prepared for less compelling but 
otherwise important national interest contingencies and for unspecific 
threats (e.g., disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, or peace 
operations fall under this category). These are referred to as concept 
plans (CONPLAN) and are much more general in nature but nonetheless are 
required to adhere to joint operational planning standards.[Footnote 
26] All of NORTHCOM's plans are currently categorized as CONPLANs. 

Once a plan is drafted, it is reviewed several times by a number of DOD 
stakeholders, primarily from the Joint Planning and Execution 
Community, which consists of a broad range of military stakeholders, 
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the military 
services, the combatant commands, and the major DOD agencies. These 
stakeholders provide input into all phases of planning, from mission 
analysis to the final detailed plan. 

In the last several years, DOD has begun to use what it refers to as an 
adaptive planning process, whereby major plans are reviewed much more 
often than in the past. All plans are now reviewed by DOD stakeholders 
every 6 months. 

NORTHCOM Planning Process for Homeland Defense and Civil Support: 

Part of NORTHCOM's responsibility is to create plans to address its 
role in various potential threats to the homeland, whether from 
potential enemy attack or a natural disaster. Because the potential 
threats are so broad, whether they involve terrorist attacks or 
potential natural disasters, the plans NORTHCOM was required to develop 
by DOD usually take the form of CONPLANs. Among the specific areas for 
which NORTHCOM prepares plans are chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence management; 
pandemic influenza; and nuclear accident response. 

The specific contingencies for which NORTHCOM should plan are directed 
by the President and the Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM follows several 
sets of strategies and guidance when planning for homeland defense and 
civil support. Homeland defense planning follows DOD guidance, such as 
the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, the 
Unified Command Plan, and Contingency Planning Guidance. Civil support 
planning requires additional guidance. In addition to the military 
guidance, because DOD is not the lead federal agency for civil support 
missions involving domestic emergencies, natural disasters, and similar 
events, it also follows the guidance prepared by the Homeland Security 
Council and DHS in order to frame its civil support planning, including 
the National Response Framework. To further guide planning efforts for 
all hazards, the Homeland Security Council and DHS--along with the 
federal interagency, and state and local homeland security agencies-- 
created the national planning scenarios. The scenarios provide 
parameters for 15 highly plausible terrorist attack and natural 
disaster situations, such as the detonation of a nuclear device by 
terrorists or a major earthquake. The scenarios focus on the 
consequences that federal, state, and local first responders will have 
to address and are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of 
large-scale, catastrophic events for which the nation needs to be 
prepared. 

NORTHCOM prepares individual plans to cover its broad homeland defense 
and civil support missions as well as subsets of those missions. For 
example, while NORTHCOM has a major plan each for homeland defense and 
civil support, it also has plans for air defense and for CBRNE 
consequence management. NORTHCOM's plans provide its subordinate, 
component, and supporting commands and agencies with planning guidance, 
such as types of incidents to prepare for and what kinds of plans to 
prepare to support NORTHCOM's plans. 

NORTHCOM Has Completed Major Plans but Faces Considerable Challenges 
That Increase the Overall Risk to Its Ability to Execute Its Plans: 

NORTHCOM has completed--or is in the process of revising--all of its 
major plans. However, NORTHCOM does not regularly track or assess the 
required supporting plans from other DOD commands and agencies. This 
heightens the risk that NORTHCOM cannot properly assess whether the 
supporting organizations have adequately planned to assist the command 
when an event takes place. Further, although NORTHCOM plans adhere to 
military guidance in both content and structure, the command faces 
additional challenges in such areas as (1) identifying required civil 
support capabilities, (2) allocating capabilities (units, trained 
personnel, and equipment) to meet potential requirements, and (3) 
monitoring the readiness of forces delivering those capabilities. 
NORTHCOM and DOD have some risk mitigation efforts under way in each of 
these areas that partially address the challenges we found. However, it 
could take additional steps to reduce the remaining level of risk to 
its ability to effectively achieve its mission. 

Major Plans Are Complete or Are Undergoing Revision: 

To date, NORTHCOM has completed nine major homeland defense and civil 
support plans required by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and 
DOD guidance, and is in the process of revising several of its plans in 
accordance with the DOD requirement to review plans every 6 months for 
potential revision,[Footnote 27] including its homeland defense plan. 
NORTHCOM officials told us that they have placed priority on completing 
all of their major plans over the last 2 years. In addition, NORTHCOM's 
plans are now undergoing review and consideration for major revision 
more often than when the command was first established. Table 1 lists 
NORTHCOM's required major plans and the status of each with estimated 
completion and revision dates where applicable. 

Table 1: Status of NORTHCOM's Plans: 

NORTHCOM plan: Defense Support of Civil Authorities; 
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete. Plan currently undergoing 
revision; 
Estimated completion/revision date: Revision due March 2008 but 
postponed. 


NORTHCOM plan: Homeland Defense; 
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete. Plan currently undergoing 
major revisions to delineate air, land, and maritime domains; 
NORTHCOM also coordinated with an interagency planning team for 
interagency coordination annex; 
Estimated completion/revision date: Revision due March 2008. 

NORTHCOM plan: Pandemic Influenza; 
Status of draft or revision: Global plan complete and approved; 
regional plan completed and approved in January 2008; 
Estimated completion/revision date: Complete. 

NORTHCOM plan: CBRNE Consequence Management; 
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete. Plan currently undergoing 
revision; 
Estimated completion/revision date: Revision due April 2008. 

NORTHCOM plan: Civil Disturbance; 
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete. Plan undergoing its first 
revision; 
Estimated completion/ revision date: Revision due February 2008. 

NORTHCOM plan: National Capital Region Emergency Preparedness; 
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete. Its first revision is 
upcoming, but NORTHCOM officials do not anticipate major changes; 
Estimated completion/revision date: Complete. 

NORTHCOM plan: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; 
Status of draft or revision: Plan completed; 
Estimated completion/revision date: Complete. 

NORTHCOM plan: Aerospace Defense; 
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete. Long-established NORAD 
plan; 
Estimated completion/revision date: Complete. 

NORTHCOM plan: Nuclear Weapon Accident Response; 
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete; 
Estimated completion/revision date: Complete. 

Source: NORTHCOM. 

Notes: One additional plan dealing with Caribbean mass migration was 
previously considered by NORTHCOM, but U.S. Southern Command has 
assumed responsibility for this plan because a major portion of its 
area of responsibility includes the majority of the Caribbean Sea, 
including the islands in the sea and Central and South America. 
NORTHCOM officials told us that their responsibility for mass migration 
issues once people arrive in the United States is covered in the civil 
support plan, in support of DHS as the lead agency. Some of these 
changes were caused by DOD's decision in 2006 to shift some land and 
ocean areas in the Caribbean (including Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands) from NORTHCOM's to U.S. Southern Command's area of 
responsibility. 

[End of table] 

NORTHCOM has also anticipated that DOD will require a 10th plan-- 
Strategic Communications--and has fully drafted a plan in advance of 
this guidance. 

NORTHCOM Plans Adhere to Military Guidance: 

Although the majority of our review was focused on the two major 
homeland defense and civil support plans, we also reviewed each of the 
other plans and compared them to DOD's established joint planning 
standards for concept plans as well as NORTHCOM's own concept of 
operations for how it should plan for and conduct its missions. We 
found that the plans met DOD's standards for completeness in accordance 
with DOD's joint planning doctrine and adhered to NORTHCOM's overall 
concept of operations. For example, the plans include the required 
concept, objectives, assumptions, and constraints sections that frame 
the rest of the plan. We also reviewed the assumptions listed in the 
plans for potential contradictions between one or more plans and found 
none. We did not, however, independently validate the assumptions in 
the plans. Some assumptions--such as assuming that adequate DOD forces 
would be available to execute a plan--seemed broad and had the 
potential to affect the entire plan if the assumption was proved 
invalid during a crisis. However, NORTHCOM planning officials told us 
that some broad assumptions are always necessary in order to even begin 
planning. They said that once a plan needs to be executed, the 
assumptions are reviewed again and the plan altered to account for an 
assumption that was determined to be invalid. We also found that 
NORTHCOM's civil support plan adheres closely to the National Response 
Framework concept in that NORTHCOM is to provide support for civil 
authorities upon request by a lead federal agency. 

NORTHCOM Plans Incorporate National Planning Scenarios: 

We also found that NORTHCOM's plans incorporate 14 of the 15 national 
planning scenarios developed by the Homeland Security Council in order 
to guide federal agencies' general planning and exercises. The one 
scenario not incorporated into NORTHCOM's plans is the cyber attack 
planning scenario, which falls under U.S. Strategic Command's area of 
responsibility.[Footnote 28] Table 2 summarizes each of the 15 planning 
scenarios and indicates where NORTHCOM planners have taken these 
scenarios into consideration in their plans. 

Table 2: Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios 
Incorporated into NORTHCOM Plans: 

Planning scenario: Nuclear detonation; 
Planning scenario description: Terrorists detonate a 10-kiloton nuclear 
device in a large city; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management; 
* Defense Support of Civil Authorities; 
* Homeland Defense; 
* Regional War on Terror[A]. 

Planning scenario: Biological attack; 
Planning scenario description: Terrorists spray anthrax spores in a 
city using a concealed spray device; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management; 
* Homeland Defense; 
* Regional War on Terror. 

Planning scenario: Biological disease outbreak--pandemic influenza; 
Planning scenario description: Natural outbreak of pandemic influenza 
that begins in China and spreads to other countries; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * Global and Regional Pandemic 
Influenza. 

Planning scenario: Biological attack--plague; 
Planning scenario description: Terrorists release pneumonic plague into 
three areas of a large city; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management; 
* Homeland Defense; 
* Regional War on Terror. 

Planning scenario: Chemical attack--blister agent; 
Planning scenario description: Terrorists spray a combination of 
blister agents into a crowded football stadium; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management; 
* Homeland Defense; 
* Regional War on Terror. 

Planning scenario: Chemical attack--toxic industrial chemicals; 
Planning scenario description: Terrorists use grenades and explosive 
devices at petroleum facilities; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: 
* CBRNE Consequence Management; 
* Homeland Defense; 
* Regional War on Terror. 

Planning scenario: Chemical attack--nerve agent; 
Planning scenario description: Terrorists spray Sarin into the 
ventilation system of three commercial buildings in a city; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management; 
* Homeland Defense; 
* Regional War on Terror. 

Planning scenario: Chemical attack--chlorine tank explosion; 
Planning scenario description: Terrorists use explosives to release a 
large quantity of chlorine gas; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management; 
* Homeland Defense; 
* Regional War on Terror. 

Planning scenario: Natural disaster--major earthquake; 
Planning scenario description: A 7.2 magnitude earthquake occurs in a 
major metropolitan area; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities. 

Planning scenario: Natural disaster--major hurricane; 
Planning scenario description: Category 5 hurricane strikes a major 
city; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities. 

Planning scenario: Radiological attack--radiological dispersal device; 
Planning scenario description: Terrorists detonate "dirty bombs" in 
three cities in proximity to each other; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management; 
* Homeland Defense; 
* Regional War on Terror. 

Planning scenario: Explosives attack--bombing using improvised 
explosive devise; 
Planning scenario description: Terrorists detonate improvised explosive 
device in a sports arena, and use suicide bombers in a public transit 
concourse and in a parking facility; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management; 
* Homeland Defense; 
* Regional War on Terror. 

Planning scenario: Biological attack--food contamination; 
Planning scenario description: Terrorists contaminate food with anthrax 
in processing facilities; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management; 
* Homeland Defense; 
* Regional War on Terror. 

Planning scenario: Biological attack--Foreign Animal Disease; 
Planning scenario description: Terrorists infect livestock at specific 
locations; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management; 
* Homeland Defense; 
* Regional War on Terror. 

Planning scenario: Cyber attack; 
Planning scenario description: Terrorists conduct cyber attacks on U.S. 
financial infrastructure; 
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * NORTHCOM does not plan against 
civilian computer system attacks. This is addressed in U.S. Strategic 
Command's plans. 

Source: NORTHCOM. 

Note: The scenarios appear in the same order they were published by the 
Homeland Security Council. They are not in any order of probability or 
impact. 

[A] NORTHCOM's Regional War on Terror plan is a supporting plan for 
U.S. Special Operations Command's main plan. 

[End of table] 

Limited Progress in Tracking and Reviewing Supporting Plans Increases 
Risk to the Planning Process: 

Because NORTHCOM officials have spent considerable time and effort in 
completing or revising their major plans, they have not focused 
adequately on the supporting plans that have been--or are to be-- 
developed by other organizations within DOD to assist NORTHCOM. Like 
all CONPLANs, NORTHCOM's plans require supporting plans from NORTHCOM's 
subordinate and component commands as well as other DOD agencies to 
assist the responsible command--NORTHCOM--when an event occurs. Because 
NORTHCOM's major plans are less detailed and focused than the 
operational plans of other combatant commands, these supporting plans 
are critical for providing the operational level detail that is 
otherwise lacking in the major plans. Supporting plans must also adhere 
to the same joint doctrine standards as the broader plans and should 
contain objectives, assumptions and constraints, and sections on such 
areas as command and control, task organization, intelligence, and 
logistics.[Footnote 29] Although there is no explicit DOD requirement 
that NORTHCOM systematically review and track supporting plans, DOD 
guidance on joint operation planning indicates that "in the absence of 
Joint Staff instructions to the contrary, the supported commander will 
review and approve supporting plans."[Footnote 30] Regardless of 
whether there is an explicit requirement, we believe it is prudent to 
perform these reviews to reduce the risk that supporting agencies have 
not adequately planned to support NORTHCOM when needed following a 
natural or man-made disaster. 

The number of supporting plans required varies with the type of major 
plan. For example, NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan required supporting 
plans from 25 commands and agencies, whereas the civil support plan 
required supporting plans from only 6 commands and agencies. Of the 6 
supporting plans required by the civil support concept plan, NORTHCOM 
officials had 4 in their possession when we reviewed the plans at 
NORTHCOM headquarters. Similarly, of the 25 supporting plans required 
by NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan, NORTHCOM also had only 3 at the 
time we reviewed plans. Some of the other 22 organizations expected to 
develop supporting plans for homeland defense are the Defense 
Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency, and Defense Contract Management Agency. With the 
exception of supporting plans by NORTHCOM's subordinate commands--such 
as Joint Task Force Alaska and Joint Task Force Civil Support--and the 
component commands[Footnote 31] whose plans they could provide copies 
of, NORTHCOM officials could not report to us how many of the other 
supporting plans are completed. As we report separately, NORTHCOM 
officials were uncertain about the status and completeness of the 
supporting plans that the homeland defense CONPLAN required NGB to 
coordinate with the states and forward to the command.[Footnote 32] 

We reviewed all the supporting plans NORTHCOM was able to locate for 
the Homeland Defense, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, and CBRNE 
Consequence Management plans, as well as several others we saw during 
visits to other commands and DOD organizations. We found that in 
general the supporting plans met the intent and objectives of the major 
strategic-level plans and had compatible assumptions. We did not, 
however, review the supporting plans to the degree NORTHCOM officials 
would have to in order to satisfy themselves that the plans meet the 
command's needs, nor did we independently validate the assumptions in 
the supporting plans. NORTHCOM officials acknowledged that because they 
had devoted most of their effort to completing and revising the major 
plans, until recently they had not devoted enough attention to the 
supporting plans. NORTHCOM officials told us that they are developing a 
process to track the status of subordinate commands' supporting plans. 
In fact, the officials provided us an update on the status of these 
supporting plans. But this did not include other DOD agencies, such as 
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and 
Defense Information Support Agency, that are also supposed to be 
developing supporting plans for some of NORTHCOM's concept plans. 
Additionally, NORTHCOM officials told us that they were planning to 
start reviewing supporting plans in a manner similar to how DOD 
stakeholders[Footnote 33] review major plans. As long as this approach 
encompasses all supporting plans, it could provide NORTHCOM planning 
and operations officials with a much more detailed analysis of the 
extent to which supporting plans meet their needs as well as help them 
identify potential planning gaps. Without knowledge about the 
completeness of supporting plans and the extent to which these plans 
address NORTHCOM's objectives, NORTHCOM officials face increased 
uncertainty about the extent of planning and preparedness of other DOD 
agencies if and when these agencies are called to respond. 

NORTHCOM Has Difficulty Determining Required Capabilities for Its Civil 
Support Mission Because It Lacks Information on States: 

According to the strategic vision contained in NORTHCOM's concept of 
operations, NORTHCOM should facilitate the synchronization of national, 
state, and local assets and capabilities to defend the nation and 
support civilian authorities.[Footnote 34] One of the fundamental 
elements of operational planning is determining the capabilities 
requirements for the mission to be performed. Because NORTHCOM's plans 
are broader CONPLANs rather than more detailed OPLANs, they are not 
focused on specific scenarios and discrete sets of required 
capabilities needed to accomplish objectives. Without an understanding 
of the capabilities necessary for DOD to conduct an operation, it is 
more difficult to plan in advance for the types, numbers, and timing of 
capabilities (trained personnel and equipment) to actually conduct an 
operation. For NORTHCOM's homeland defense mission, the required 
capabilities are based on an assessment of threats and a number of 
factors that NORTHCOM and other DOD commands and organizations assess. 
For NORTHCOM's civil support mission, the requirements the command 
faces are established by the needs of the federal, state, and local 
agencies and organizations that DOD would be supporting in an actual 
event. 

Given the diverse environment that NORTHCOM is responsible for within 
its area of responsibility, its civil support role varies by area, 
incident, and other factors, which makes NORTHCOM's ability to know its 
capability requirements for any given civil support operation 
uncertain. Further, NORTHCOM officials told us that they do not have 
access to enough detail about from DHS or from the states in order to 
know what capabilities exist at the state level and the extent to which 
there are capability gaps. DHS has reported on the weaknesses in state 
and federal emergency plans both in terms of the adequacy of the plans 
themselves and the lack of information on required 
capabilities.[Footnote 35] As we report in a separate letter, NORTHCOM 
has also not systematically reviewed state emergency plans in order to 
obtain detailed information about the specific challenges it may face 
in conducting homeland defense or civil support operations. 
Coordination between NORTHCOM, DHS, NGB, and the states is therefore 
important for emergency planning, particularly for civil support 
operations. 

NORTHCOM officials told us that understanding National Guard 
capabilities is also problematic. For example, as we have reported, 
neither DOD nor the states have fully determined the National Guard's 
requirements for civil support operations in the United 
States.[Footnote 36] The National Guard serves as a critical portion of 
the response to a disaster, whether in its normal role under the direct 
command of a state governor or as part of a federal response once the 
President has made a determination to federalize the Guard. In either 
case, uncertainty about the National Guard's civil support capabilities 
increases the risk to the adequacy of NORTHCOM's and DOD's overall 
civil support planning effort. 

In 2006, Congress required that DOD develop and maintain a database 
that includes the types of emergency response capabilities DOD may be 
able to provide in support of the National Response Framework's 
emergency support functions[Footnote 37] and the types of emergency 
response capabilities each state's National Guard may be able to 
provide in response to a domestic natural or man-made 
disaster.[Footnote 38] DOD is also required to identify in this 
database the specific units that are able to provide these 
capabilities.[Footnote 39] Also, in 2006, Congress required FEMA to 
accelerate the completion of an inventory of federal response 
capabilities and to develop a list of organizations and functions 
within DOD that may be used to provide support to civil authorities 
during natural or man-made disasters.[Footnote 40] FEMA is still 
developing this list, and DOD is still developing the required 
database. In January 2008, Congress required DOD to work with DHS to 
determine the military-unique capabilities DOD needs to provide for 
civil support operations and to prepare a plan to provide funds and 
resources to maintain existing military-unique civil support 
capabilities or any additional capabilities required for homeland 
defense and civil support missions.[Footnote 41] In addition to 
descriptions of the emergency support functions, the annexes to the 
previous National Response Plan[Footnote 42]--such as the catastrophic 
incident annex--contain information about agency roles and 
responsibilities as well as descriptions of capabilities. These annexes 
are being revised as part of the new National Response Framework. 

Until these efforts are completed and are coordinated with similar 
information from the states, there remains a gap in knowledge about 
what capabilities exist at all levels for responding to natural and man-
made disasters. This, in turn, limits NORTHCOM's ability to fully 
identify the civil support requirements for DOD forces. 

NORTHCOM and DOD have taken some steps to mitigate the uncertainty in 
civil support requirements. NORTHCOM officials reported to us that 
through analyzing past disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, and 
potential disasters--such as those represented by the national planning 
scenarios--they can reasonably determine the types of capabilities 
necessary to support civil authorities. NORTHCOM officials said that 
this allows them to anticipate the needs of states and local 
authorities in the event of a disaster to some extent but that they can 
only "lean forward" so far without infringing on the intent of the 
National Response Framework or the prerogatives of the state 
governments. NORTHCOM and the Joint Staff are also assessing NORTHCOM's 
major plans (including Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities) in order to determine where the potential gaps in required 
capabilities may be and what specific military capabilities are 
potentially required to address them. This may better inform 
capabilities requirements and resource decisions. 

NORTHCOM has also worked with FEMA and DOD officials to develop 
prescripted mission assignments, which are descriptions of a set of 
capabilities civil authorities might need from DOD in an emergency and 
are written in such a way as to provide a common understanding of a 
capability. NORTHCOM officials told us that the intent was to avoid 
requests for specific DOD equipment that may or may not be suitable or 
available to meet the request and to base requests on capabilities a 
requesting agency needs that could potentially be addressed by a 
broader range of DOD assets. For example, FEMA might request the 
capability to move by air 40 metric tons rather than requesting a 
specific aircraft. This enables DOD to apply a wide range of resources 
for solving a problem and reduces confusion associated with varying 
requirements and terminology across agencies. These mission assignments 
are designed to leverage DOD's areas of expertise and capabilities 
where civil agencies typically fall short. Appendix II shows the 25 
prescriptive mission assignments that NORTHCOM and DOD have worked out 
with FEMA. 

These mitigation efforts help reduce the uncertainty NORTHCOM faces in 
determining requirements for civil support planning. But only a broader 
effort by NORTHCOM, DOD, DHS, and the states to comprehensively assess 
capabilities and capability gaps will help all stakeholders understand 
the true extent of requirements in order to plan for natural and man- 
made disasters in the United States. 

Few Capabilities Are Allocated to Execute NORTHCOM's Plans: 

One of the major challenges NORTHCOM faces in planning for and 
conducting both homeland defense and civil support operations is 
ensuring that it has adequate capabilities assigned to conduct those 
missions as required. The major combatant commands, such as U.S. 
European Command and U.S. Pacific Command, normally have forces 
allocated to their operational control on a regular basis to meet their 
general capabilities requirements and to perform other missions, such 
as demonstrations of military presence in support of U.S. foreign 
policy objectives. Further, the OPLANs prepared by combatant commands 
normally have lists that detail which military units will respond to 
the plan, if needed, and the timing of that deployment. DOD refers to 
this information as time-phased force deployment data. The combination 
of regularly assigned forces and force deployment lists associated with 
the more detailed operations plans provides combatant commanders with a 
reasonable level of assurance that sufficient forces will be available 
to execute a plan if necessary and allows the commander to monitor the 
readiness of the units assigned to the respective area of 
responsibility or specific plan. 

Since NORTHCOM was established in October 2002, DOD has routinely 
considered the regular assignment of forces to the combatant commands 
in what DOD refers to as a "Forces For Unified Commands" document. 
However, despite the priority placed on homeland defense in the 
National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and other DOD 
strategic guidance, DOD has only routinely assigned air defense and 
supporting forces to NORTHCOM. A contributing factor may be that the 
pace and scope of ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
elsewhere in the world has severely limited the number and types of 
units available to respond to missions in the homeland. The assignment 
of forces to combatant commands provides commanders with a means to 
know which specific military forces are committed to that area of 
responsibility and, conversely, allows commanders to perform risk 
assessments if those forces must be committed elsewhere. 

In addition to lacking regularly assigned forces, NORTHCOM officials 
told us that their plans usually do not have lists that detail the 
military units that will be used because the plans are meant to cover a 
less-specific and broader range of threats, rather than specific 
scenarios. Only one NORTHCOM plan--the CBRNE Consequence Management 
plan--had a force deployment list at the time of our review of the 
plans. NORTHCOM has since developed force deployment lists as part of 
the revised homeland defense plan but not for the civil support plan. 
NORTHCOM officials told us that they created the CBRNE consequence 
management list in order to stress the importance of providing forces 
to the CBRNE mission. The force deployment list lays out the 
capabilities for what DOD calls the CBRNE Consequence Management 
Response Force (CCMRF), which is intended to be a series of separate 
units totaling roughly 15,000 personnel to provide initial response 
assistance to civil authorities in the event of a major CBRNE incident 
in the country. We reported previously on the lack of adequate 
training, equipment, and availability of active and reserve chemical 
and biological units and the potential difficulty DOD faced in meeting 
NORTHCOM's CBRNE requirements.[Footnote 43] Despite being the only set 
of capabilities dedicated to a NORTHCOM civil support plan, the CCMRF 
has never been fully manned and equipped by DOD because many of the 
units that would make up the force have been deployed to their wartime 
missions or because of other availability or sourcing issues. DOD and 
National Guard officials are currently negotiating a plan whereby Guard 
units may provide the majority of CCMRF capabilities for a certain 
period until the Active Army can resume responsibility. However, lack 
of agreement between DOD and National Guard Bureau stakeholders on 
sources of funding and command and control issues continues to delay 
the effort.[Footnote 44] 

While a force deployment list does not guarantee that the appropriate 
units, trained personnel, and equipment will be available to execute a 
military plan, such a list provides a known set of capabilities against 
which to measure readiness and assess risk if all or part of the forces 
on the list are unavailable. None of NORTHCOM's other civil support 
plans have force deployment lists, which limits NORTHCOM's ability to 
know which military units may respond to its homeland defense or civil 
support missions if the need arises. 

To help mitigate the uncertainties caused by the lack of forces being 
assigned to execute NORTHCOM's plans, NORTHCOM and DOD have developed a 
series of standing "execute orders" in the homeland defense and civil 
support areas. These orders identify the general types and numbers of 
forces necessary to execute missions in such areas as air and maritime 
homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. One example 
is the domestic air defense order associated with Operation Noble 
Eagle. Additionally, during periods of heightened specific threats, 
such as the yearly hurricane season, NORTHCOM and the Joint Staff have 
prepared temporary execute orders that detail more specific military 
forces that can be called upon to meet an emerging NORTHCOM need to 
support civil authorities. The execute orders serve as the gateway to 
the "request for forces" process whereby NORTHCOM requests forces from 
U.S. Joint Forces Command,[Footnote 45] through the Joint Staff, and 
Joint Forces Command assigns specific military forces from the services 
to meet the specific requirement, if possible. The orders also allow 
NORTHCOM to place units on notice to prepare to deploy for a short time 
in advance of their actual assignment to NORTHCOM. 

According to Joint Forces Command and NORTHCOM officials, about 40,000 
military personnel are associated with all of NORTHCOM's execute orders 
and the CBRNE Consequence Management plan. However, with the exception 
of the dedicated homeland defense orders--such as Operation Noble 
Eagle--the CCMRF deployment list and civil support execute orders have 
very few units actually sourced to them.[Footnote 46] This means an 
increased level of uncertainty about whether the appropriate number of 
properly trained personnel and the correct equipment will be available 
when a plan needs to be executed. NORTHCOM officials are concerned 
about the high number of unsourced units and the corresponding level of 
uncertainty about the availability of appropriate military forces to 
meet their homeland defense and civil support needs. It should be 
noted, however, that we found no instances where Joint Forces Command 
could not meet NORTHCOM's operational needs for an actual homeland 
defense or civil support mission. Fortunately, NORTHCOM's homeland 
defense and civil support operations have mostly been manageable and 
not large-scale events. For example, in addition to Operation Noble 
Eagle, which NORTHCOM carries out every day, the command conducts 
anticipated and unanticipated operations in support of civil 
authorities, such as the response to the Minneapolis bridge collapse 
and Hurricane Dean in August 2007 and in response to the California 
wildfires in October 2007. 

NORTHCOM officials told us that the execute order process has provided 
them some limited measure of assurance that adequate military forces 
will be available for their homeland defense and civil support plans. 
However, the absence of regularly assigned forces in NORTHCOM's area of 
responsibility and the lack of units specifically identified to execute 
NORTHCOM's plans may increase the level of risk to homeland defense or 
civil support operations in terms of the availability of a sufficient 
number of personnel with the appropriate level of training and 
equipment for conducting the domestic mission. 

NORTHCOM's Ability to Monitor the Readiness of Forces to Respond to 
Civil Support Missions Is Hampered: 

NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of individual military 
units because in part, few requirements or units that may respond to a 
request for civil support have been identified. In contrast, through 
its planning process for homeland defense, NORTHCOM has determined the 
forces it needs for this mission and, through the services, monitors 
the readiness of these forces. DOD normally measures the readiness of 
military units by (1) assigning them to conduct missions associated 
with specific plans and (2) using lists of mission-essential tasks that 
correlate to the actual mission they would perform. The degree to which 
units have the numbers of trained personnel and the equipment necessary 
to accomplish those mission-essential tasks serves as the overall 
measure of a unit's readiness. 

According to NORTHCOM, Joint Forces Command, Joint Staff, and U.S. Army 
Forces Command officials, DOD generally assumes that a unit capable of 
performing its military mission is also capable of performing a civil 
support mission, but this may not always be true. Neither NORTHCOM nor 
the military services have developed mission-essential tasks for civil 
support missions. We have reported on the mismatch between assessments 
of readiness based solely on wartime missions and the requirements of 
domestic civil support missions. Whereas homeland defense missions in 
and around the United States would be similar to traditional wartime 
missions, those same mission tasks do not necessarily provide a 
complete picture of readiness for a domestic civil support 
mission.[Footnote 47] As a result, DOD does not have a direct method to 
measure the readiness of units for the civil support mission. 

DOD officials told us that it is often possible for a unit to be 
considered not ready for its wartime mission but be able to execute a 
civil support mission. For example, a U.S. Army air defense unit whose 
surface-to-air missile launchers are still overseas or undergoing depot 
repair is not considered ready to conduct its wartime mission. However, 
to the extent that personnel, trucks, and other equipment were still 
with the unit, it may be ready to conduct a civil support mission, such 
as delivering supplies to a disaster area. This is not captured in 
DOD's readiness system. Further, the lack of mission-essential tasks 
for the range of civil support missions leads to a potential gap in 
DOD's knowledge of whether sufficient trained personnel and equipment 
are available. For example, NORTHCOM's civil disturbance plan assumes 
that nonlethal equipment and methods would be necessary and that the 
forces required to conduct such operations have been trained in 
nonlethal methods. But without a set of mission tasks against which to 
measure unit readiness, there is no objective means of determining if 
military units can meet these tasks. 

Because at the time of our review only one of NORTHCOM's major plans 
has actual units assigned to it (CBRNE Consequence Management), 
NORTHCOM officials were unable to monitor readiness of units that may 
be asked to respond to other plans, even if there were specific civil 
support-related mission tasks. We have work under way reviewing DOD's 
Readiness Reporting System, and we did not assess the accuracy of that 
system as part of this review. However, we asked NORTHCOM officials to 
show us the extent to which they could use DOD's readiness systems to 
monitor readiness for both its homeland defense and civil support 
missions. 

For the ability to respond to potential CBRNE attacks, NORTHCOM has 
developed mission-essential tasks for the CCMRF. However, Joint Staff 
and National Guard officials told us that they estimated that the 
wartime military tasks of the units only met about 70 percent of the 
CCMRF's total mission, which further indicates the mismatch between 
wartime tasks a unit may face in comparison to tasks it may face in a 
domestic, non-wartime environment. Joint Task Force Civil Support, 
NORTHCOM's subordinate command for CBRNE consequence management, 
routinely uses the CCMRF's mission-essential tasks, the existing DOD 
readiness system, and direct interaction with Joint Forces Command and 
Army officials to monitor the readiness of CCMRF forces on a routine 
basis. Even with this effort, NORTHCOM and Joint Task Force Civil 
Support officials told us that it is difficult to track readiness 
because, as we indicated earlier, so few of the units are actually 
filled with the personnel and equipment necessary. Nonetheless, the 
fact that the CBRNE forces have mission tasks against which to measure 
readiness in the existing system provides a level of knowledge about 
the overall state of readiness to execute the CBRNE plan. This, in 
turn, provides the NORTHCOM Commander and DOD with a clearer picture of 
the risk they face in that area. Because no mission tasks exist for 
general civil support missions, NORTHCOM and DOD face greater 
uncertainty about their ability to execute these plans. 

Mission-essential tasks are also critical guides for training military 
units for their missions and for conducting and evaluating exercises. 
NORTHCOM conducts two major exercises each year that include both 
homeland defense and civil support elements. The command also 
participates in other commands' live exercises as well as tabletop 
simulations of various homeland defense and civil support operations. 
Further, NORTHCOM has a system for incorporating lessons learned from 
training exercises into plans and future training exercises. The system 
has a good structure for submitting and processing lessons, including 
multiple layers of review to assess the validity of lessons and the 
assignment of individuals with the responsibility of managing and 
addressing lessons. NORTHCOM officials believe that the system is 
adequate, and they continue to seek ways to improve the process. 
Ensuring that appropriate mission-essential tasks are associated with 
each of the missions for which NORTHCOM is responsible would further 
help NORTHCOM officials evaluate exercises and actual operations and 
incorporate lessons learned into future exercises and plan revisions. 
The command would also be in a better position to conduct meaningful 
analysis to identify recurring lessons and understand the causes of 
various systemic issues. This, in turn, would allow NORTHCOM and DOD to 
identify those areas where increased effort--and possibly resources-- 
may be required. 

To mitigate the uncertainties in readiness for civil support 
operations, NORTHCOM has worked with Joint Forces Command and the 
military services in advance of some potential incidents, such as 
hurricanes and wildfires, to gain a better understanding of what units 
were likely to be assigned, if necessary. This interaction has allowed 
NORTHCOM and other DOD stakeholders to directly monitor the personnel 
and equipment status of military units to determine if they would be 
prepared to adequately respond to a civil support mission. For the 
remainder of NORTHCOM's potential civil support missions, NORTHCOM 
still lacks an objective means to determine if the units that will be 
conducting civil support operations in fact have the capabilities 
needed to fully conduct these missions. 

New National Planning Requirements May Help NORTHCOM Address Planning 
Challenges: 

In December 2007, the President issued an annex to the 2003 Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8 that establishes a standard and 
comprehensive approach to national planning for homeland 
security.[Footnote 48] Included in the new instructions is a 
requirement that the federal government more closely integrate federal, 
state, local, and tribal plans with respect to capability assessments. 
This may further assist NORTHCOM in more accurately determining its 
capability requirements for civil support missions. 

Among the new requirements was also a series of cascading plans at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. For example, all relevant 
federal agencies are now required to prepare more detailed OPLANs with 
respect to their specific homeland security missions. Thus far, 
NORTHCOM has been required only to prepare less detailed CONPLANs. The 
definition for OPLANs in the new guidance includes a requirement that 
such a plan "identifies detailed resource, personnel and asset 
allocations."[Footnote 49] This is similar to the level of detail DOD 
requires in its OPLANs, including the force deployment lists we 
discussed. 

If these comprehensive national planning processes are pursued by DOD, 
in coordination with DHS, NORTHCOM may be able to further address some 
of the challenges and gaps we highlight. 

NORTHCOM's Planning Personnel Have Adequate Staff Level and Are 
Expanding Experience and Training: 

NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and the command 
is pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for 
staff needed to perform the command's planning function. While the 
unique characteristics associated with a domestic military command 
present challenges, NORTHCOM officials address these circumstances by 
integrating National Guard and Coast Guard personnel with NORTHCOM 
staff. NORTHCOM, independently and with other organizations, is also 
developing educational opportunities that address the challenges 
associated with the interagency and state/federal environment that 
planners face. 

NORTHCOM Planning Positions Staffed at High Levels: 

We compared the numbers and general qualifications of NORTHCOM's 
planning staff with those of other combatant commands as a way of 
gaining a rough understanding of what NORTHCOM's staff looks like in 
comparison to commands that have been established for a longer period 
of time. NORTHCOM's planning staff is assigned at over 96 percent of 
the command's authorized staffing level. These staff members include 
all headquarters staff who have some form of planning function and not 
just the staff of the plans directorates or those personnel with 
specific designations as planners. As shown in table 3, with the 
exception of the U.S. Central Command, NORTHCOM also has a greater 
number of staff it considers to be planners and was staffed at a higher 
percentage of its authorization than all other combatant commands 
responding to our information requests. 

Table 3: Staffing Level of Planning Personnel, by Combatant Command: 

Combatant command: U.S. Central Command; 
Authorized staffing level: 189; 
Actual staffing level: 184; 
Percentage of authorization: 97.4. 

Combatant command: U.S. Northern Command; 
Authorized staffing level: 171; 
Actual staffing level: 165; 
Percentage of authorization: 96.5. 

Combatant command: U.S. European Command; 
Authorized staffing level: 144; 
Actual staffing level: 128; 
Percentage of authorization: 88.9. 

Combatant command: U.S. Southern Command; 
Authorized staffing level: 93; 
Actual staffing level: 74; 
Percentage of authorization: 79.6. 

Combatant command: U.S. Pacific Command; 
Authorized staffing level: 123; 
Actual staffing level: 110; 
Percentage of authorization: 89.4. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

Note: These numbers are only general comparisons of personnel who have 
planning functions at the commands and are not meant to reflect 
specific personnel or budget-related categories. 

[End of table] 

We did not independently validate NORTHCOM's requirements for planning 
personnel. However, NORTHCOM officials said that they believe they have 
an adequate number of planning personnel. Further, NORTHCOM has been 
conducting an ongoing assessment of its overall manpower needs and is 
evaluating the extent to which changes in requirements for personnel 
may be needed. 

NORTHCOM officials stated that partially because of the need to support 
other operations, such as ongoing military operations overseas, the 
command attempts to maximize the use of civilian staff in its workforce 
to maintain continuity and consistency. Civilian staff provides an 
institutional knowledge base and experience level that compliments the 
capabilities of military officers who rotate through the command's 
directorates. Over one-half of the command's planning staff is civilian 
or contractor personnel. As shown in table 4, two other commands in our 
review, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command, also rely 
heavily on civilian or contract personnel. 

Table 4: Military, Civilian, and Contractor Planners, by Combatant 
Command: 

Combatant command: U.S. Central Command; 
Military personnel: Number: 73; 
Military personnel: Percentage of total: 39.7; 
Civilian personnel: Number: 20; 
Civilian personnel: Percentage of total: 10.9; 
Contractor Personnel: Number: 91; 
Contractor Personnel: Percentage of total: 49.5. 

Combatant command: U.S. Northern Command; 
Military personnel: Number: 70; 
Military personnel: Percentage of total: 42.4; 
Civilian personnel: Number: 52; 
Civilian personnel: Percentage of total: 31.5; 
Contractor Personnel: Number: 43; 
Contractor Personnel: Percentage of total: 26.1. 

Combatant command: U.S. Southern Command; 
Military personnel: Number: 61; 
Military personnel: Percentage of total: 82.4; 
Civilian personnel: Number: 13; 
Civilian personnel: Percentage of total: 17.6; 
Contractor Personnel: Number: a; 
Contractor Personnel: Percentage of total: a. 

Combatant command: U.S. European Command; 
Military personnel: Number: 110; 
Military personnel: Percentage of total: 85.9; 
Civilian personnel: Number: 8; 
Civilian personnel: Percentage of total: 6.3; 
Contractor Personnel: Number: 10; 
Contractor Personnel: Percentage of total: 7.8. 

Combatant command: U.S. Pacific Command; 
Military personnel: Number: 53; 
Military personnel: Percentage of total: 48.2; 
Civilian personnel: Number: 7; 
Civilian personnel: Percentage of total: 6.4; 
Contractor Personnel: Number: 50; 
Contractor Personnel: Percentage of total: 45.5. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

[A] U.S. Southern Command did not provide information on contractor 
personnel. 

[End of table] 

The military personnel who serve as NORTHCOM planners receive basic 
planning-related training similar to that of planners in other 
combatant commands. DOD and the services provide educational 
opportunities for members of the U.S. Armed Forces, international 
officers, and federal government civilians. These opportunities provide 
a broad body of knowledge that enables students to develop expertise in 
the art and science of war. Many of NORTHCOM's military planners have 
completed some of these courses. A number of these courses are also 
offered to civilian planning personnel. 

NORTHCOM's Staff Includes National Guard and Coast Guard Personnel: 

To accomplish its homeland defense and civil support missions, NORTHCOM 
must plan for and interact with other federal, state, and territorial 
government agencies in addition to Canada and Mexico. The need to plan 
for and conduct operations (1) within the United States and (2) in 
support of other federal agencies, 49 state governments, and Canada and 
Mexico presents a challenge to most planners who have functioned solely 
in a military environment. 

NORTHCOM has sought to address this challenge by integrating personnel 
from the National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard into NORTHCOM's 
headquarters staff. These personnel have experience working in the 
state environment and are incorporated into most, if not all, of the 
NORTHCOM directorates that conduct some form of operational planning. 
Thirty-six National Guard and 22 U.S. Coast Guard personnel are 
stationed at NORTHCOM. These personnel provide command planners and 
operations personnel with co-workers who have experience planning for 
and conducting operations with other federal and state agencies. 

In January 2008, Congress required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to review the military and civilian positions, job descriptions, 
and assignments at NORTHCOM. The goal is to determine the feasibility 
of increasing the number of reserve component military personnel or 
civilian staff with experience in homeland defense and civil support at 
NORTHCOM.[Footnote 50] 

NORTHCOM Has Efforts Under Way to Train DOD Planners for Domestic 
Operations: 

Having an adequate number of properly trained personnel to ensure that 
missions are successfully planned is a decisive factor in the success 
of any mission. NORTHCOM officials have been attempting to establish 
and maintain a cadre of personnel in the active military with knowledge 
and experience in NORTHCOM planning, homeland defense, civil support, 
and interagency planning and coordination that go beyond the basic 
level training the military provides in joint planning. These efforts 
extend from the level of basic orientation training all the way to 
programs at the graduate level. 

NORTHCOM planners are required to complete an orientation course that 
serves as a "crosswalk" between DOD's homeland defense and civil 
support plans and the plans of their agency partners. The orientation 
course also provides students with a better understanding of DOD policy 
regarding the protection of the homeland. DOD officials told us that 
additional such planning courses are now offered at other DOD schools, 
such as the Army's Command and General Staff College and School of 
Advanced Military Studies. 

As recommended in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, NORTHCOM 
has taken steps to create training programs and partner with other 
agencies and private institutions. The goal is to develop educational 
opportunities for interagency and state/federal environment planners to 
inform them of other agencies' homeland security responsibilities to 
improve overall cooperation and coordination. For example, NORTHCOM has 
developed a course for DOD and interagency personnel that focuses on 
support to civil authorities. While the course does not directly 
address the detailed aspects of planning, it provides an overview of 
DOD and other agencies' responsibility for homeland security. Officials 
from the Joint Forces Staff College believe this is a valuable course 
and they are considering requiring students to complete it before they 
can take certain other courses at the college. In addition, NORTHCOM 
has developed a training curriculum for each of its planning personnel. 
NORTHCOM officials stated that each planner's progress in completing 
the curriculum is automatically tracked to ensure timely completion. 
Several of the courses in the curriculum must be completed within 
specific time periods. 

To further expand the educational opportunities for its own staff as 
well as staff from agencies across the federal government, NORTHCOM has 
also partnered with the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs to 
develop the Center for Homeland Security, located on the campus of the 
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, which provides research and 
educational capabilities to meet specific needs regarding protection of 
the homeland. One of the accomplishments of the center is the creation 
of several programs of study in homeland defense, including 
undergraduate and graduate certificates in homeland security and 
homeland defense. According to a senior official with the center, the 
four courses required for the graduate certificate can also be applied 
toward a master of business administration and a master of public 
affairs. The center, in cooperation with several of its partners, 
including NORTHCOM, is also in the process of developing other 
educational programs, such as a master of arts and a doctoral program 
in homeland security. 

According to NORTHCOM officials, a cooperative effort among the 
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, the Naval Postgraduate 
School, and NORTHCOM helped found the Homeland Security/Defense 
Education Consortium, which is a network of teaching and research 
institutions focused on promoting education, research, and cooperation 
related to and supporting the homeland security/defense mission. The 
consortium conducts two symposia annually, one at NORTHCOM and a second 
at a FEMA location. The Naval Postgraduate School also has a master's 
degree program through its Center for Homeland Defense and Security. 
This program, designed in cooperation with FEMA, includes strategy 
development, organizational, planning, and interagency coordination 
aspects. NORTHCOM personnel have started to take advantage of these 
programs on a case-by-case basis, but there are no command requirements 
for NORTHCOM staff to attend any of these courses or programs. 

NORTHCOM's efforts to provide additional training and education for its 
staff should help the command expand its experience in planning and 
conducting operations with partners at the international, federal, and 
state levels. NORTHCOM officials have recognized the need for such 
education opportunities at all levels for their own staff as well as 
for other military and civilian personnel. At some point, NORTHCOM may 
be in a position to require certain prerequisites in this area for 
military or civilian staff who may be considered for assignment to the 
command. 

NORTHCOM Has Taken Actions to Improve Interagency Coordination but 
Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure That Coordination Efforts Are Adopted: 

NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of its homeland 
defense and civil support plans and operations with federal agencies. 
Such coordination is important for ensuring that proper planning in 
advance of an attack or a natural disaster and that such operations 
proceed as smoothly as possible if they need to be conducted. However, 
NORTHCOM lacks formal guidance to coordinate its planning effort with 
its agency partners. This results in uncertainty about which planning 
coordination efforts are continued or agreed to by higher authorities 
and an increased risk that interagency planning will not be done 
effectively. 

NORTHCOM Has Taken Steps to Improve Coordination: 

We found several areas in which NORTHCOM has taken steps to improve 
coordination with other agencies and organizations, many resulting from 
the lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina. Coordination is 
important not just for interagency planning but also to ensure that 
NORTHCOM and its agency partners work together effectively when an 
incident actually occurs. For example, NORTHCOM created an Interagency 
Coordination Directorate in 2002 to assist in its collaboration 
efforts. Today, 40 agencies and organizations are represented at 
NORTHCOM, including a senior executive official from DHS as well as 
officials from FEMA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
Central Intelligence Agency. The directorate is designed to help build 
effective relationships by facilitating, coordinating, and 
synchronizing information sharing across organizational boundaries. 
NORTHCOM and U.S. Southern Command are the only combatant commands with 
directorates dedicated solely to interagency coordination. Table 5 
shows the agencies currently represented at NORTHCOM. 

Table 5: Agencies and Organizations Represented at NORTHCOM: 

Department or agency of origin: DOD; 
Represented agency: Defense Threat Reduction Agency; 
NGB; 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; 
U.S. Special Operations Command. 

Department or agency of origin: DHS; 
Represented agency: FEMA; 
U.S. Coast Guard; 
Customs and Border Protection; 
Transportation Security Administration; 
Federal Air Marshal Service. 

Department or agency of origin: Other federal agencies; 
Represented agency: Department of State; 
Department of Agriculture; 
Department of the Interior; 
Department of Health and Human Services; 
U.S. Public Health Service; 
Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
Director of National Intelligence; 
Central Intelligence Agency; 
Environmental Protection Agency; 
U.S. Geological Survey; 
Federal Aviation Administration; 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 

Department or agency of origin: Canada and Mexico; 
Represented agency: Canadian Forces Liaison Office; 
Canadian Department of Public Safety and Royal Canadian Mounted Police; 
Mexico Civil Response/Protection Organization. 

Department or agency of origin: Other; 
Represented agency: Humanitarian International Services Group. 

Source: NORTHCOM. 

[End of table] 

The presence of agency representatives provides a regular opportunity 
for direct interaction between them and NORTHCOM staff. NORTHCOM and 
other agency officials with whom we spoke agreed that this level of 
regular contact is beneficial for coordinating plans in advance but 
also for the more immediate needs of coordination when an event 
actually occurs. Such agency representatives should therefore have the 
experience to provide an effective link to their parent agencies and 
possess the appropriate level of access to agency leadership in order 
to facilitate interagency decision-making. When a major incident 
occurs, the agency representatives, known as the Interagency 
Coordination Center, become a direct adjunct to the NORTHCOM 
Commander's battle staff, assisting the command in its immediate crisis 
planning and providing a direct link to their parent agencies. 

The Interagency Directorate also administers NORAD-NORTHCOM's Joint 
Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), which is composed primarily of 
the 40 resident agency representatives who are experts in interagency 
planning and operations on the command's staff. The JIACG's role is to 
coordinate with civilian federal agency partners to facilitate 
interagency operational planning in contingency operations. All 
combatant commands are establishing JIACGs. The JIACG supports day-to- 
day planning and advises NORTHCOM planners regarding civilian agency 
operations, capabilities, and limitations. Further, the JIACG provides 
the command with day-to-day knowledge of the interagency situation and 
links directly with agency partners at the command and in other 
locations when an operation is necessary. The JIACG also conducts 
focused planning on specific issues. For example, the group met with 
officials from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the 
Department of Health and Human Services in August 2006 to coordinate 
federal efforts for responding to a potential influenza pandemic. The 
JIACG also formed a working group to integrate private sector 
capabilities and interests into NORTHCOM plans and operations as 
appropriate. Specifically, the group's objectives were to determine how 
to provide NORTHCOM with private sector information regarding 
facilities and operations, achieve coordination and cooperation with 
the private sector, and gain and maintain awareness of technological 
initiatives developed in the private sector. The JIACG also formed 
working groups for law enforcement issues, earthquakes, and prescripted 
mission assignments. 

According to FEMA's Director, one of the most important interagency 
planning tools developed as a result of the lessons learned during 
Hurricane Katrina is the prescripted mission assignments discussed 
earlier.[Footnote 51] NORTHCOM collaborated with FEMA and other 
agencies to identify the most likely tasks DOD would be asked to 
fulfill and drafted generic mission assignments for those tasks in 
terms of capability requirements rather than specific resources. Twenty-
five prescripted mission assignments are included in NORTHCOM's 
standing Defense Support for Civil Authorities Execute Order. 

These mission assignments also include defense coordinating officers 
(DCO) who are located in each of FEMA's 10 regional offices (see fig. 
3). Officials from several agencies told us that locating the DCOs in 
the FEMA regions and assigning greater emphasis to the DCOs' missions 
has enhanced interagency coordination, particularly with states. The 
DCOs are senior military officers with joint experience and training on 
the National Response Framework, defense support to civil authorities, 
and DHS's National Incident Management System. They are responsible for 
assisting civil authorities, when requested by FEMA, by providing 
liaison support and capabilities requirements validation. DCOs serve as 
single points of contact for state, local, and other federal 
authorities that need DOD support. DCOs work closely with federal, 
state, and local officials to determine what unique DOD capabilities 
are necessary and can be used to help mitigate the effects of a natural 
or man-made disaster. For example, during the recent California 
wildfires, NORTHCOM's subordinate command, Army Forces North, deployed 
the Region IX DCO to support the Joint Field Office in Pasadena, 
California, and assess and coordinate defense support of civil 
authorities to FEMA. Based on the requirements identified by state and 
federal officials in consultation with the DCO, DOD and the National 
Guard deployed six aircraft equipped with the Modular Airborne 
Firefighting System to California to assist in fighting the wildfires. 

Figure 3: FEMA Regions: 

This figure is a picture map of FEMA regions. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: FEMA; Map Resources (maps). 

[End of figure] 

NORTHCOM has also improved interagency coordination through its 
involvement in hurricane preparation with a wide range of state and 
federal partners, including state adjutants general, FEMA, NGB, and 
state and local emergency managers. NORTHCOM facilitates weekly 
hurricane teleconferences throughout the hurricane season, which lasts 
from June to November every year, to provide the opportunity for 
agencies to discuss potential storms; resources available in the 
affected area as well as through other sources, such as the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)[Footnote 52] or FEMA; and 
potential needs or unique capabilities that DOD may be asked to 
provide. As a result of this frequent interaction, NORTHCOM, DHS, and 
state officials believe the command has begun to build more productive 
and effective relationships with the hurricane states and participating 
agencies. For example, in anticipation of Hurricane Dean being upgraded 
from a tropical storm in August 2007, at FEMA's request NORTHCOM 
deployed a DCO and supporting team to the Caribbean in preparation for 
landfall. The DCO was prepared to coordinate requests for military 
assistance and resources and provide direct support to federal, state, 
and local agencies responding to the incident. 

In addition to efforts to coordinate with federal agencies and 
organizations, NORTHCOM recently began efforts to increase coordination 
with private sector businesses and nongovernmental organizations in 
planning for and responding to disasters to help NORTHCOM better focus 
resources and ensure that efforts are not duplicated. For example, 
during Hurricane Katrina, Wal-Mart was able to deliver bottled water to 
some locations more quickly than federal agencies could. Since many of 
NORTHCOM's coordination efforts with nongovernmental organizations are 
recent, it is too soon to determine how successful they will be. 

NORTHCOM Lacks Formal Procedures to Ensure That Integrated Planning 
Will Be Fully Adopted: 

Despite the steps that NORTHCOM has taken to improve federal 
interagency coordination, we found that it lacks formalized procedures-
-such as memorandums of understanding or charters--to ensure that 
agreements or arrangements made between the command and agency 
representatives can be relied on for planning purposes. As we have 
reported in the past, key practices that can enhance and sustain 
interagency planning coordination efforts include--among others-- 
establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, agreeing on 
roles and responsibilities, and identifying and addressing needs by 
leveraging resources. We also reported that interagency coordination 
can be enhanced by articulating agreements in formal documents, such as 
a memorandum of understanding, interagency guidance, or interagency 
planning document, signed by senior officials in the respective 
agencies.[Footnote 53] DOD's adaptive planning--that is, the joint 
capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as 
circumstances require--includes interagency coordination as a key part 
of the plan development process. Further, the nature of NORTHCOM's 
homeland defense and civil support missions requires interagency 
coordination and support throughout all levels of planning and 
operations. This is particularly important since so many government 
agencies share the responsibility to ensure an effective response to 
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. It is therefore crucial that DOD-
-through NORTHCOM--plan and coordinate thoroughly with all relevant 
federal agencies. 

NORTHCOM planners have achieved some success in coordinating NORTHCOM's 
homeland defense plan with an Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT), 
an interagency team created by DHS to provide contingency and crisis 
action incident management planning based on the 15 national planning 
scenarios.[Footnote 54] However, the planners told us that their 
successful collaboration with the IMPT is largely because of the 
dedicated personalities involved. For example, NORTHCOM planners have 
informally instituted workshops and biweekly teleconferences with the 
IMPT core and on-call groups to review NORTHCOM's homeland defense 
plan, as well as to discuss the overarching objectives of homeland 
defense and security. NORTHCOM officials told us that the IMPT offers a 
unique avenue of coordination direct to various agency partners and has 
helped to break down institutional barriers by promoting more 
constructive relationships between the agencies involved. However, 
without a formal charter or memorandum of understanding that 
institutionalizes the structure for integrated interagency planning, 
there is a risk that these efforts to coordinate with agency partners 
will not continue when the current planning staff move to their next 
assignments. Further, these and other coordination efforts do not have 
mechanisms for obtaining parent agency approval of agreements reached, 
and it is unclear what will be done with the results of their efforts. 
Consequently, many otherwise valuable interagency efforts may not be 
sufficiently supported by one or more participating agencies, and key 
agency staff can be confused about which coordination mechanisms serve 
a particular function. 

As part of the new Homeland Security Presidential Directive annex on 
national planning, DHS is required to coordinate with the heads of 
other federal agencies and develop an integrated planning system. This 
planning system is required to: 

1. provide common processes for developing plans; 

2. serve to implement phase one of DHS's Homeland Security Management 
System; and: 

3. include the following: 

* national planning doctrine and planning guidance, instruction, and 
process to ensure consistent planning across the federal government; 

* a mechanism that provides for concept development to identify and 
analyze the mission and potential courses of action; 

* a description of the process that allows for plan refinement and 
proper execution to reflect developments in risk, capabilities, or 
policies, as well as to incorporate lessons learned from exercises and 
actual events; 

* a description of the process that links regional, state, local, and 
tribal plans, planning cycles, and processes and allows these plans to 
inform the development of federal plans; 

* a process for fostering vertical and horizontal integration of 
federal, state, local, and tribal plans that allows for state, local, 
and tribal capability assessments to feed into federal plans; and: 

* a guide for all-hazards planning, with comprehensive, practical 
guidance and instruction on fundamental planning principles that can be 
used at federal, state, local, and tribal levels to assist the planning 
process.[Footnote 55] 

Such an integrated planning system, if developed and institutionalized 
across the federal government in coordination with state and local 
governments, should further address the interagency coordination gaps 
we identified. 

Conclusions: 

After being in operation for over 5 years, NORTHCOM has begun to 
establish itself as a major combatant command and plan for its role in 
leading homeland defense operations and assisting civil authorities in 
the event of major disasters. 

NORTHCOM has developed, refined, and is now revising a body of major 
homeland defense and civil support plans. Nonetheless, NORTHCOM's 
limited progress in adequately tracking and assessing the supporting 
plans necessary to carry out homeland defense and civil support 
operations introduces increased risk in the planning process. The 
review process NORTHCOM officials told us they are developing to track 
and assess supporting plans from other commands and agencies should 
help them close this gap, but only if their process is consistently 
applied and includes supporting plans from all commands, organizations, 
and agencies required to submit them. Further, the considerable 
challenges NORTHCOM faces in planning for and conducting homeland 
defense and civil support missions are exacerbated by decisions DOD and 
the command have made. DOD's decision not to assign regular forces to 
NORTHCOM, the decision not to associate specific military capabilities 
and units with NORTHCOM's plans, and the decision not to develop 
mission-essential tasks for civil support missions each introduce 
increased uncertainty into NORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil 
support planning efforts. When considering their compounding effects 
together, the risk to NORTHCOM's planning effort are increased even 
further. To some degree, NORTHCOM will always face challenges and risk 
in planning because it has to be prepared for a wide variety of 
incidents that can range from a regional flood to a catastrophic 
nuclear incident to a widespread terrorist attack. The capabilities 
allocation and other planning challenges we discuss can be further 
addressed, but there is no guarantee that this will compensate for the 
scarcity of units and equipment because of the pace of ongoing 
operations overseas. However, addressing the planning gaps we 
identified would permit NORTHCOM and DOD a much more accurate 
understanding of the risk associated with homeland defense and civil 
support operations in the United States. Such risk mitigation efforts 
have recently been required as part of the President's and DHS's 
national preparedness guidance on national planning, and these 
requirements provide an opportunity for DOD and NORTHCOM to address the 
gaps we identified. 

NORTHCOM's federal interagency coordination efforts have helped address 
some of the uncertainty in the homeland defense and civil support 
planning process and have improved NORTHCOM's ability to coordinate in 
the event of actual incidents. This is important because responding to 
a major disaster in the United States--natural or man-made--is a shared 
responsibility of many government agencies with states often requiring 
federal assistance from DHS and DOD. Without clear guidance and 
procedures on interagency roles and responsibilities across the federal 
government and an understanding about which interagency planning 
efforts or coordination mechanisms are authoritative, the multiple 
interagency efforts that have been ongoing might not meet their 
potential for integrating operational planning dealing with all threats 
to the homeland, natural or man-made. If the integrated planning system 
required by the President's new homeland security guidance is developed 
and institutionalized across the federal government in coordination 
with state and local governments, it should further assist NORTHCOM and 
DOD in addressing the interagency coordination gaps we identified. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help NORTHCOM reduce the level of risk to its homeland defense and 
civil support planning efforts, in conjunction with the new national 
planning requirements of the National Response Framework and the 
national planning annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, 
we are making three recommendations: 

* We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of 
NORTHCOM to complete the process to track the status of all supporting 
plans, coordinate the completion of those plans by other commands and 
agencies, and assess the suitability of those plans to meet the intent 
and objectives of NORTHCOM's major plans. 

* Given the priority DOD places on homeland defense, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense assign forces to NORTHCOM--as is done for 
other combatant commands--as well as require NORTHCOM to develop 
dedicated time-phased force deployment data lists for each of its major 
plans. 

* We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of 
NORTHCOM, in consultation and coordination with the services, to 
develop mission-essential tasks for its civil support plans. Individual 
units required for these missions should be identified, and these 
mission-essential tasks should be included as part of DOD's readiness 
assessment systems in order to permit consistent tracking of readiness 
for specific elements of NORTHCOM's plans. 

To help NORTHCOM and DOD better integrate their operational planning 
practices into the interagency and national preparedness structure, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Commander of NORTHCOM and other appropriate federal agencies, develop 
clear guidance and procedures for interagency planning efforts, 
including appropriate memorandums of understanding and charters for 
interagency planning groups. This should be done in conjunction with 
the integrated planning system required in the national planning annex 
to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the 
intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking and 
planning to take to address these recommendations. DOD also provided 
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where 
appropriate. 

In response to our recommendation that NORTHCOM complete the process to 
track the status of supporting plans, coordinate the completion of 
those plans by other commands and agencies, and assess the suitability 
of those plans to meet the intent and objectives of NORTHCOM's major 
plans, DOD agreed with the need for these actions but stated that the 
existing guidance we noted in our report already provides sufficient 
direction. We agree that further formal guidance or direction may be 
unnecessary as long as NORTHCOM consistently pursues its effort to 
review supporting plans, including the supporting plans of all 
commands, agencies, and organizations required to prepare such plans. 
For example, some plans call for other DOD agencies and even non-DOD 
agencies to prepare supporting plans. In these cases, while NORTHCOM 
may not have the authority to compel compliance, it should nevertheless 
review these supporting plans for adequacy. 

In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense assign 
forces to NORTHCOM, DOD agreed that certain specialized forces, such as 
those trained and equipped for CBRNE consequence management, should be 
regularly assigned to NORTHCOM but said that it was not practical to 
attempt to assign general purpose forces to meet all possible civil 
support contingencies. DOD did not agree that all NORTHCOM plans should 
have force deployment lists because it would not provide the level of 
readiness tracking that we highlighted as being necessary in our 
report. We agree that it is not practical to assign forces to NORTHCOM 
in an attempt to cover all possible contingencies. Our concern was that 
the NORTHCOM Commander should have a similar level of flexibility and 
day-to-day readiness assurance that regularly assigned forces provide 
to other combatant commanders. Assigning some specialized forces to 
NORTHCOM would contribute to providing such flexibility and assurance. 
DOD stated that it will work to develop civil support readiness metrics 
for general purpose forces rather than prepare specific force 
deployment lists for individual plans that were not already required to 
have them. We believe this effort would help institutionalize the 
importance of DOD's domestic mission and provide NORTHCOM and other DOD 
authorities a means of monitoring readiness to accomplish domestic 
missions. 

With respect to our recommendation that DOD develop mission-essential 
tasks for NORTHCOM's civil support plans and identify the units 
required for these missions, DOD agreed with our assessment that 
NORTHCOM needs to track units' readiness to complete civil support 
missions but said that identifying units for all its civil support 
tasks would be impractical. DOD reiterated its proposal to develop 
civil support-specific metrics against which all general purpose forces 
could be measured. We believe that developing such metrics would meet 
the intent of our recommendation and would further institutionalize 
DOD's domestic mission throughout the force. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that clear guidance be developed for 
interagency planning efforts. DOD stated that it had begun to 
incorporate such direction in its major planning documents and would 
continue to expand on this guidance in the future. We believe DOD's 
efforts as part of the Integrated Planning System and on its own, if 
pursued consistently, should help better focus interagency planning to 
meet the range of natural and man-made threats. 

DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix III. 

DHS also reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical 
comments, which we have incorporated where appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and 
other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others 
on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or [email protected]. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key staff members who contributed to 
this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Member: Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of 
Representatives: 

The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Kit Bond: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Gene Taylor: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has 
prepared plans to execute its homeland defense and civil support 
missions, we reviewed NORTHCOM's available major plans and supporting 
plans, comparing them to established Department of Defense (DOD) joint 
operational planning criteria for completeness and adequacy. We also 
met with knowledgeable NORTHCOM officials to discuss the status of each 
of the plans NORTHCOM is required to prepare and the process whereby 
the plans were developed and assessed. We did not independently 
validate the planning elements, such as the assumptions NORTHCOM used. 
We therefore did not attempt to state the extent to which the plans are 
executable. We compared the 15 national planning scenarios with 
NORTHCOM's plans and discussed the incorporation of the scenarios 
within those plans with NORTHCOM officials. To assess the challenges 
NORTHCOM faces in planning for and conducting homeland defense and 
civil support, we developed a methodology based on DOD's standards for 
joint operational planning. Although we included all of NORTHCOM's 
plans in our review, we concentrated on the two primary homeland 
defense and civil support plans as well as the Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Consequence Management 
plan. The methodology involved a series of questions and topics to 
determine the extent to which NORTHCOM and DOD have considered the 
following as part of their planning for homeland defense and civil 
support: 

* Identification of required capabilities: 

* Allocation of military capabilities to meet identified capability 
requirements: 

* Readiness of forces (trained personnel and equipment) to meet the 
missions for which they are assigned: 

* Conduct of exercises and evaluation of lessons learned that can be 
fed back into the planning process: 

We discussed this methodology with officials from the National Defense 
University, NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, and the Joint Forces Staff 
College to ensure that it was a reasonable approach to evaluating joint 
operational planning. 

We used the results of this analysis and our discussions with a broad 
range of DOD officials to determine what gaps, if any, exist in 
NORTHCOM's planning efforts stemming from these challenges. We also 
reviewed the structure of NORTHCOM's lessons learned process and 
collected information on the origin, analysis, and disposition of 
homeland defense and civil support lessons. As part of this effort, we 
observed a major exercise (Ardent Sentry/Northern Edge) in the 
Indianapolis area in May 2007. During our review, the NORTHCOM 
Inspector General's Office was conducting an assessment of the 
command's lessons learned process, including oversight mechanisms and 
internal controls. Therefore, we did not conduct a deeper analysis of 
those elements. 

To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has adequate planning 
personnel with the relevant experience and training to perform the 
planning function for the command, we discussed personnel staffing and 
training with officials from NORTHCOM headquarters, NORTHCOM 
subordinate commands, and Joint Forces Staff College who were 
knowledgeable of training courses available to planning personnel. We 
discussed the extent to which NORTHCOM addresses planning challenges 
unique to the command in its planning staff structure. In addition, we 
compared basic information on planning personnel at NORTHCOM with that 
of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. European Command, 
and U.S. Pacific Command in such areas as overall staffing levels; 
numbers of military, civilian, and contractor personnel on staff; and 
number of planning personnel who had received Joint Professional 
Military Education credit. Since our intention was to look at all the 
staff who have a direct relation to planning at the commands, and not 
just the staff of the plans directorates, we left it up to the commands 
to define who should be included. We did not validate the commands' 
requirements for specific numbers of planning personnel, and we did not 
independently validate the personnel data we received from the 
combatant commands. However, we assessed the data reliability measures 
the commands took to gather and maintain the data and determined that 
the information originated with the commands themselves and represented 
the best available source. We did not obtain the data from other 
sources, such as databases maintained by the military services' 
personnel centers. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of this report. 

To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates with federal 
agencies and other organizations in planning for and conducting its 
missions, we met with officials from NORTHCOM's Interagency 
Coordination Directorate; reviewed the documentation and mechanisms for 
coordination with organizations outside NORTHCOM; and interviewed 
officials from NORTHCOM's subordinate commands, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). We also surveyed the 
adjutants general from the 48 contiguous states, Alaska, and the 
District of Columbia and obtained information from NORTHCOM, DHS, and 
NGB on NORTHCOM's coordination with the states. We are reporting 
separately on the results of that work. 

In addressing our objectives, we reviewed plans and related documents, 
obtained information, and interviewed officials at the following 
locations: 

* NORTHCOM Headquarters, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, 
Colorado: 

* Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia: 

* The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 

* The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 

* Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Fort Monroe, Virginia: 

* U.S. Army North, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas: 

* U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia: 

* U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia: 

* Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region, Fort McNair, 
Washington, D.C. 

* Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia: 

* NGB, Arlington, Virginia: 

* DHS, Washington, D.C. 

* U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

* FEMA, Washington, D.C. 

We conducted our review from May 2006 to April 2008 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: NORHTCOM's 25 Prescripted Mission Assignments: 

Table 6 shows the 25 prescripted mission assignments that NORTHCOM and 
FEMA officials coordinated in order to facilitate the process for 
requesting DOD capabilities in the event of an emergency. 

Table 6: Prescripted Mission Assignments: 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Defense coordinating 
officer/defense coordinating element; 
Capability providers: Army Forces North coordinated colonel and nine-
person emergency preparedness liaison officer staff. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Rotary wing lift (heavy); 
Capability providers: Marine Corps CH-53E helicopter squadron, Navy MH- 
53 helicopter squadron, or Army CH-47 helicopter detachment. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Rotary wing lift (medium); 
Capability providers: Marine Corps CH-46 helicopter squadron, Army UH- 
60 helicopter detachment, or Navy MH-60 helicopter detachment. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Tactical transportation; 
Capability providers: Army transportation company or light-medium truck 
company. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Strategic transportation; 
Capability providers: U.S. Transportation Command provides strategic 
airlift and the Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution Command 
provides ground transportation (commercial trucks). 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Communications - first 
responders; 
Capability providers: NORTHCOM or Army Forces North communications van. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Communications - 25 user 
package; 
Capability providers: Army communications company (detachment) or 
Marine Corps communications battalion (detachment); 
and a satellite communications ground station (four-person team). 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Communications - 75 user 
package; 
Capability providers: Army communications company (detachment) or 
Marine Corps communications battalion (detachment); 
and a satellite communications ground station (four-person team). 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Emergency route clearance; 
Capability providers: Army or Marine Corps heavy equipment engineer 
battalion/company with infantry battalion/company in direct support or 
Air Force civil engineering squadron[A]. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Aerial damage assessment; 
Capability providers: Marine Corps CH-46 squadron, Army CH-47/UH-60 
helicopter detachment, Navy MH-60 helicopter detachment, or Air Force 
Global Hawk (unmanned aerial vehicle). 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Prepare temporary housing 
sites; 
Capability providers: Air Force civil engineering squadron or Navy 
naval mobile construction battalion[A]. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Mobilization centers; 
Capability providers: Army personnel support detachment[A]. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Operational staging areas; 
Capability providers: U.S. Transportation Command Joint Task Force for 
port opening[A]. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Fuel distribution points 
(ground); 
Capability providers: Army bulk fuel unit or Marine Corps bulk fuel 
detachment[A]. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Rotary wing medical 
evacuation; 
Capability providers: Army air ambulance squadron[A]. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Temporary medical facilities; 
Capability providers: Air Force medical rapid response force[A]. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Air component coordination 
element; 
Capability providers: Air Force/AFNORTH-coordinated eight- person 
detachment. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Air fuel distribution points; 
Capability providers: Air Force air expeditionary force fuel detachment 
or Marine Corps forward arming and refueling point detachment[A]. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Strategic patient movement 
(formerly contingency aeromedical staging facility); 
Capability providers: U.S. Transportation Command coordinated joint 
patient movement team. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Airborne command and control 
in support of emergency management authorities; 
Capability providers: U.S. Strategic Command command and control 
aircraft[A]. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Mortuary affairs; 
Capability providers: Army mortuary affairs company. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Full Motion video capability; 
Capability providers: Air Force Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Public affairs support; 
Capability providers: Military public affairs detachment-joint. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Regional/state emergency 
preparedness liaison officer; 
Capability providers: Military-provided liaison officer. 

NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Air space control (ground); 
Capability providers: U.S. Transportation Command coordinated Joint 
Task Force for port opening. 

Source: NORTHCOM. 

[A] These are recommended units only and are not sourced, because 
NORTHCOM has never executed this mission assignment. 

[End of table]  

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Homeland Defense: 

Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
2600 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-2600: 

March 26, 2008: 

Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. D'Agostino: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, "Homeland Defense: U.S. 
Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force 
Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues," dated February 
27, 2008 (GAO Code 350863/GAO- 08-251). 

Our responses to GAO's recommendations are attached. The DoD partially 
concurs with GAO's first three recommendations and fully concurs with 
the fourth recommendation. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the 
report. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Paul McHale:

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated March 2008 GAO 08-251/(350863): 

"Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to 
Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends, in conjunction with the new 
national planning requirements of the National Response Framework and 
the national planning annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
8, that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of NORTHCOM to 
complete the process to track the status of all supporting plans, 
coordinate the completion of those plans by other commands and 
agencies, and assess the suitability of those plans to meet the intent 
and objectives of NORTHCOM's major plans. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. DoD agrees with GAO's assessment that 
NORTHCOM's tracking, coordination, and suitability assessment of 
supporting plans is desirable. However, this direction is reflected in 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff standing guidance in the 
Joint Operation Execution and Planning System (JOPES), referenced by 
GAO, that commanders review their supporting plans. 

During the period of GAO's report, NORTHCOM has been focused on writing 
its tasked plans for homeland defense and civil support missions. As 
noted in the draft report (page 6), NORTHCOM has already begun the 
effort to track, coordinate, and assess supporting plans. These efforts 
will continue, making additional direction from the Secretary of 
Defense unnecessary to complete this process or satisfy GAO's 
recommendation. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends, in conjunction with the new 
national planning requirements of the National Response Framework and 
the national planning annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
8, that the Secretary of Defense, assign forces to NORTHCOMï¿½as is done 
for other combatant commandsï¿½as well as require NORTHCOM to develop 
dedicated time-phased force deployment data lists for each of its major 
plans. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. To clarify DoD's response to GAO's 
recommendations, please see the term appendix at the end of our 
responses. The statement "as is done for other combatant commands," 
does not accurately reflect the process to assign, apportion, allocate, 
and/or attach forces for operational planning and execution. Forces are 
apportioned, not assigned, to Combatant Commands for contingency plans 
and are allocated during crisis action planning and attached by a 
Secretary of Defense-approved deployment order. GAO's recommendation 
lacks this definitional clarity. DoD concurs that NORTHCOM needs the 
ability to assess unit readiness for civil support missions. This 
requirement is especially critical for highly specialized forces 
trained and equipped for specific technical missions involving domestic 
consequence management in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 
and high explosive (CBRNE) environments. Those forces ought to be 
allocated or assigned to NORTHCOM. On the other hand, some civil 
support contingencies for which NORTHCOM plans, like a 10 kiloton 
nuclear detonation in a metropolitan area, could conceivably require 
several hundred thousand general utility forces. Such a vast number of 
forces cannot be assigned to NORTHCOM without dramatically increasing 
DoD's end strength or deviating from DoD's historical force structure. 
To keep NORTHCOM in a supporting rather than a leading role in the 
homeland, DoD will work to develop readiness metrics for civil support 
for those general utility forces but will wait to allocate and attach 
general utility forces to NORTHCOM until support operations are 
directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. 

DoD does not concur with the recommendation that the Secretary produce 
additional guidance regarding development of time-phased force 
deployment data (TPFDDs). The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 
already provides NORTHCOM detailed guidance to develop TPFDDs for 
specified plans. And since TPFDDs usually identify units by type rather 
than by Unit Identification Codes (UICs) (e.g. "TICONDEROGA-class 
Cruiser instead of "USS LAKE ERIE" a specific Cruiser), TPFDDs would 
not provide the level of unit readiness tracking that GAO recommends. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends, in conjunction with the new 
national planning requirements of the National Response Framework and 
the national planning annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
8, that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of NORTHCOM, in 
consultation and coordination with the Services, to develop mission 
essential tasks for its civil support plans. Individual units required 
for these missions should be identified and these mission essential 
tasks should be included as part of DoD's readiness assessment systems 
in order to permit consistent tracking of readiness for specific 
elements of NORTHCOM's plans. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. To properly respond, we must break the 
recommendation into its component parts: 1) that NORTHCOM develop 
mission essential tasks for its civil support plans; 2) that units be 
identified to complete these mission essential tasks; and 3) that the 
mission essential tasks be included in units' readiness assessment 
metrics. 

NORTHCOM has developed mission essential tasks for its civil support 
plans and will continue to do so as supported entities identify other 
gaps and seams that NORTHCOM must augment. 

Having NORTHCOM identify individual units for all of its civil support 
mission essential tasks is neither possible nor desirable. The tasks 
are not limited to specialized domestic consequence management tasks in 
CBRNE environments. The mission essential tasks for NORTHCOM's civil 
support plans could require anywhere from several hundred to several 
hundred thousand general utility forces. Thus DoD cannot predict the 
individual units that would be allocated to NORTHCOM for civil support 
missions. Assigning or apportioning a vast complement of forces to 
NORTHCOM is not the solution for the problem that GAO identifiesï¿½that 
NORTHCOM may not be ready when directed to accomplish civil support 
missions. 

Instead, the solution centers on defining and instituting civil support 
readiness metrics across DoD's general utility forces. DoD concurs with 
GAO's assessment that NORTHCOM needs to track units' readiness to 
complete civil support missionsï¿½even "dual-use" general purpose forces. 
Rather than identifying general utility forces by UIC for civil support 
readiness tracking, all general purpose forces should have civil 
support-specific readiness metrics. DoD could then produce a single 
readiness report for each dual-use unit that includes overseas combat 
and domestic civil support readiness. That information should be 
available to NORTHCOM for use in determining how ready forces are to 
carry out possible tasks. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Commander of NORTHCOM and other appropriate 
federal agencies develop clear guidance for interagency planning 
efforts, including appropriate memoranda of understanding and charters 
for interagency planning groups. This should be done in conjunction 
with the integrated planning system required in the national planning 
annex to the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. DOD RESPONSE: 
Concur. Better integration of DoD Components with interagency groups 
requires continuing clarification of roles and responsibilities. These 
are particularly critical for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
the Joint Staff, the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, and NORTHCOM under the Integrated Planning System (IPS) and 
the National Response Framework (NRF). DoD has begun to incorporate 
such direction in its major planning documents, such as the Guidance 
for the Employment of the Force (GEF), and will continue to expand and 
clarify that guidance in the future. 

GAO Draft Report - Dated March 2008 GAO 08-251/(350863): 

"Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to 
Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues" 

Terms Appendix: 

The following terms are from "Forces For Unified Commands FY 2006." 

COCOM: Nontransferable command authority that cannot be delegated and 
normally is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and 
Service and/or functional component commanders. It includes 
budget/PPBES input and assignment of subordinate commanders. 

Assigned Forces: Those forces and resources that have been placed under 
COCOM of a unified commander. [they] are available for normal peacetime 
operations of that command. 

Apportioned Forces: Those forces and resources assumed to be available 
for adaptive planning as of a specified date. They may include those 
assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed. 

Allocated Forces: Those forces and resources provided by the President 
or Secretary of Defense for crisis action planning or execution. The 
allocation of forces is accomplished through procedures established for 
crisis action planning. 

Attach: The placement of units or personnel in an organization where 
such placement is relatively temporary. 

Note: A force is assigned in accordance with the guidance contained 
with the "Forces For" document. Forces are allocated for crisis action 
planning or execution through JOPES. Forces become attached when 
deployed via a Secretary of Defense-approved deployment order.

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements: 

GAO Contact: 

Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St. James, Assistant 
Director; Steven D. Boyles; Yecenia C. Camarillo; Angela S. Jacobs; 
David F. Keefer; Joseph W. Kirschbaum; Joanne Landesman; Robert D. 
Malpass; Lonnie J. McAllister; Erin S. Noel; Pamela Valentine; and Jena 
R. Whitley made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern 
Command's Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, But 
Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008. 

Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs' 
Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs' Impact on 
National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. GAO-08-488T. Washington, 
D.C.: March 11, 2008. 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made in Implementation of 
Management and Mission Functions, but More Work Remains. GAO-08-457T. 
Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008. 

Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Challenges That Require Federal and Private 
Sector Coordination. GAO-08-36. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to 
Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. 
GAO-07-1241T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007. 

Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Clarify Federal Leadership 
Roles and Improve Pandemic Planning. GAO-07-1257T. Washington, D.C.: 
September 26, 2007. 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of 
Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-1240T. Washington, D.C.: 
September 18, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for 
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related 
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington, D.C.: July 
31, 2007. 

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness Efforts Could 
Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk 
Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007. 

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic 
Equipment Requirements and Readiness. GAO-07-60. Washington, D.C.: 
January 26, 2007. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to Close 
the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National 
Priorities. GAO-07-143. Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st 
Century Challenges. GAO-06-1109T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2006. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, 
D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery 
Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.: 
July 31, 2006. 

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support 
Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges. GAO-06-498. 
Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the 
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-808T. 
Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643. 
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington, 
D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment 
Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005. 

Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All- 
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.: 
July 11, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for 
Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington, D.C.: 
November 10, 2004. 

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas 
and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. Washington, 
D.C.: April 29, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally 
Chartered Commissions. GAO-04-591. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004. 

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for 
Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2003. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. 
GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The command is combined with the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD). DOD often refers to this command as NORAD-NORTHCOM. 

[2] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support (Washington, D.C.: June 2005). 

[3] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support, 5. 

[4] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support (Sep. 14, 
2007), vii. 

[5] The National Response Framework--formerly called the National 
Response Plan--is a national level guide to how local, state, and 
federal governments respond to incidents resulting from all kinds of 
hazards. The framework is based on the principal of tiered response, 
starting from local communities and working up to include support from 
the other levels of government and the private sector. Department of 
Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2008). 

[6] The command was created in April 2002 as part of a revised Unified 
Command Plan, which outlines the areas of responsibility for the 
combatant commands. It became officially operational on October 1, 
2002. 

[7] GAO, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. 
Forces for Domestic Military Missions, GAO-03-670 (Washington, D.C.: 
July 11, 2003). 

[8] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness 
Efforts Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and 
Risk Mitigation, GAO-07-696 (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007); Reserve 
Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment 
Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 
2007); Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed 
to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated 
National Priorities, GAO-07-143 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007); 
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006); and Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises 
Needed to Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural 
Disasters, GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 

[9] DOD refers to civil support operations conducted in accordance with 
the National Response Framework as Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support 
, GL-7. 

[10] This does not include U.S. Coast Guard forces, which are under 
DHS. 

[11] See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support , vii. 

[12] A number of DOD doctrine publications and other guidance govern 
the conduct of joint operational planning. The principal guidance is 
published in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation 
Planning (Dec. 26, 2006). 

[13] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Ongoing Efforts 
to Improve Coordination with the States and National Guard Bureau but 
Additional Efforts Are Needed, GAO-08-252 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4, 
2008). 

[14] As part of DOD's new adaptive planning process, plans are being 
reviewed and revised more often in order to keep them relevant. 

[15] DOD refers to these tasks as mission essential tasks. Monitoring 
the readiness of military forces is ultimately the responsibility of 
the military services that train and equip the units in question. 
Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of 
Defense and Its Major Components, ï¿½ 6.4 (Aug. 1, 2002) (certified 
current as of Nov. 21, 2003). Nonetheless, monitoring unit readiness is 
also a means by which joint commanders assure themselves that the 
military units that will respond to their mission are indeed prepared. 

[16] See White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, 
National Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003); White House, 
HSPD-8 Annex 1, National Planning (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007); and 
Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework. 

[17] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

[18] White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned (Feb. 23, 2006); House of Representatives, A Failure of 
Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Feb. 
15, 2006); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (May 2006); and 
GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-808T 
(Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006). 

[19] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support, 8. 

[20] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support, 5. Homeland defense is considered DOD's portion of the broader 
area of homeland security. DHS is the lead federal agency responsible 
for homeland security, which is a concerted national effort to prevent 
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's 
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from 
attacks that do occur. Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007), 3 and Department of 
Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 5. 

[21] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, vii and 
Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework. 

[22] See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, vii. 

[23] See Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework. 

[24] See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support and 
Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework for a full 
description of these mechanisms and authorities. 

[25] Among the DOD guidance for joint operation planning is Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Pub. 5-0 and Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Manual 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning 
and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures 
(Sept. 29, 2006); Manual 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and 
Execution System (JOPES)Volume II, Planning Formats (Feb. 28, 2006); 
and Manual 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 
(JOPES) Volume III, Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data 
Development and Deployment Execution (Mar. 22, 2004) (current as of 
July 19, 2006). 

[26] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

[27] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3141.01C, 
Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Contingency Plans 
(Sept. 12, 2006). 

[28] U.S. Strategic Command is a unified command with worldwide 
responsibilities for such functions as space operations; strategic 
deterrence; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and global 
command and control. 

[29] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Manual 3122.01A, Joint 
Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning 
Policies and Procedures, C-3 and Manual 3122.03B, Joint Operation 
Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats, and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, I-25. 

[30] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Manual 3122.01A, Joint 
Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning 
Policies and Procedures, C-25, D-9; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 
Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, I-25. 

[31] Component commands are generally the military service commands 
that directly support the combatant commands. 

[32] NGB forwarded these plans to NORTHCOM but received no indication 
that they had been reviewed and assessed. See GAO-08-252. 

[33] As mentioned in the background section of this report, the Joint 
Planning and Execution Community is composed of the DOD stakeholders 
for reviewing and contributing to joint operation plans. 

[34] U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations (June 13, 2005), 3- 
11. 

[35] Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review: Phase 2 
Report (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). 

[36] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard 
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, 
D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007). 

[37] Emergency support functions are how the federal government and 
many state governments organize much of their resources and 
capabilities. The 15 emergency support functions are transportation; 
communications; public works and engineering; firefighting; emergency 
management; mass care, emergency assistance, housing, and human 
services; logistics management and resource support; public health and 
medical services; search and rescue; oil and hazardous materials 
response; agriculture and natural resources; energy; public safety; 
long-term community recovery; and external affairs. Each function has a 
federal agency coordinator. See Department of Homeland Security, 
National Response Framework. 

[38] Pub. L. No. 109-364, ï¿½ 1406 (2006). 

[39] Pub. L. No. 109-364, ï¿½ 1406(2) (2006). 

[40] Pub. L. No. 109-295, ï¿½ 651 (2006). 

[41] Pub. L. No. 110-181, ï¿½ 1815 (2008). 

[42] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2004). 

[43] GAO-07-143. 

[44] The CCMRF was designed to provide federal military assistance to a 
lead federal agency in the event of a CBRNE attack. The National Guard 
units that would fulfill this mission may be in a nonfederalized state 
active duty status, which means they remain under the command of their 
respective governors. Because of the state of negotiations, there 
remains the issue of whether the units would be federalized and placed 
under NORTHCOM if needed. 

[45] Joint Forces Command is the force provider for NORTHCOM and the 
other combatant commands. The commands transmit their force 
requirements (forces needed to execute their planned operations) to 
Joint Forces Command (through the Joint Staff), and it determines which 
mix of trained military service units (Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Marines) will provide the requested forces. See White House, Unified 
Command Plan (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2006), and Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, p. I-10. In addition, 
any other combatant command to which forces have been assigned by DOD, 
such as U.S. Pacific Command, could also be directed to provide forces 
to NORTHCOM. 

[46] Joint Forces Command officials explained to us that sourced units 
are those that Joint Forces Command has actually identified as specific 
units for meeting specific requirements. Unsourced units are units for 
which Joint Forces Command has not identified a specific unit in 
advance but will attempt to do so when the order or plan is executed. 

[47] GAO has reported in the past on DOD's focus on units' wartime 
combat missions as opposed to domestic civil support missions. See GAO, 
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for 
Domestic Military Missions, GAO-03-670 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2003), and Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are 
Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and 
Stated National Priorities, GAO-07-143 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 
2007). 

[48] White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National 
Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003), and White House, HSPD- 
8 Annex 1, National Planning (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007). The January 
2008 National Response Framework also incorporates the recent national 
planning requirements. 

[49] White House, HSPD-8 Annex 1, National Planning, 2. 

[50] Pub. L. No. 110-181, ï¿½ 1821 (2008). 

[51] The federal government uses prescripted mission assignments to 
assist in planning and to reduce the time it takes to deploy response 
resources. Prescripted mission assignments identify resources or 
capabilities of government organizations that are commonly called upon 
during response to an incident. Department of Homeland Security, 
National Response Framework, 29. 

[52] EMAC provides a means for states affected by disasters to access 
resources from other states, including emergency managers, National 
Guard assets, and first responders. 

[53] GAO-06-15. 

[54] The IMPT includes a core group of 15 full-time senior-level 
planners from 8 different agencies: DHS, DOD, the Department of 
Justice, the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, 
the Department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, and the American Red Cross. In addition, the IMPT 
has an on-call group that is assembled during training or emergencies 
consisting of 33 officials representing 20 agencies. 

[55] See White House, HSPD-8 Annex 1, National Planning and National 
Response Framework. 

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