Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special	 
Operations Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico	 
(18-JAN-08, GAO-08-244R).					 
                                                                 
In September 2005, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission	 
(BRAC) recommended closing Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico,	 
unless a new mission for the base could be identified by December
31, 2009. In June 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced
that Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) would establish
a new mission at Cannon Air Force Base and the command would take
ownership of the base on October 1, 2007. As a result, Cannon Air
Force Base will remain open. While DOD has satisfied the intent  
of the recommendation by finding a new mission for the base, this
BRAC recommendation was unusual because it contained a		 
contingency clause. Therefore, we reviewed DOD's implementation  
of this recommendation under the authority of the Comptroller	 
General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. This report
(1) describes the factors underpinning the decision to house	 
AFSOC at Cannon Air Force Base and (2) provides information on	 
the cost estimate and timeline for the movement of personnel to  
establish the AFSOC mission.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-244R					        
    ACCNO:   A79928						        
  TITLE:     Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special 
Operations Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico	 
     DATE:   01/18/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Air Force bases					 
	     Air Force facilities				 
	     Air Force personnel				 
	     Base closures					 
	     Base realignments					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Federal funds					 
	     Funds management					 
	     Military bases					 
	     Military cost control				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     Cannon Air Force Base (NM) 			 
	     DOD Base Realignment and Closure Program		 

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GAO-08-244R

   

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January 18, 2008

Congressional Committees

Subject: Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special
Operations Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico

In September 2005, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC)
recommended closing Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, unless a new
mission for the base could be identified by December 31, 2009. In June
2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced that Air Force Special
Operations Command (AFSOC)^1 would establish a new mission at Cannon Air
Force Base and the command would take ownership of the base on October 1,
2007. As a result, Cannon Air Force Base will remain open. While DOD has
satisfied the intent of the recommendation by finding a new mission for
the base, this BRAC recommendation was unusual because it contained a
contingency clause. Therefore, we reviewed DOD's implementation of this
recommendation under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct
evaluations on his own initiative.^2 This report (1) describes the factors
underpinning the decision to house AFSOC at Cannon Air Force Base and (2)
provides information on the cost estimate and timeline for the movement of
personnel to establish the AFSOC mission.

To determine the factors underpinning the decision to establish an AFSOC
mission at Cannon Air Force Base, we interviewed officials involved in the
decision-making process from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force, Installations, Environment and Logistics; the United States
Special Operations Command; and the Air Force Special Operations Command.
In addition, we reviewed Air Force documents that described efforts to
identify a new mission for Cannon Air Force Base and AFSOC site
evaluations and analyses of potential locations for AFSOC missions. To
provide information on costs, we reviewed the planned military
construction and operations and maintenance funding required for AFSOC
units to operate at Cannon Air Force Base. In addition, we reviewed
Special Operations Command, AFSOC, and Air Combat Command cost estimates
and financial data and interviewed Special Operations Command and AFSOC
officials. Based on these discussions and observations, we believe the DOD
data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To provide
timeline information on moving personnel to Cannon Air Force Base, we
reviewed Special Operations Command personnel information and AFSOC site
survey data and interviewed Special Operations Command and AFSOC
officials. Finally, we met with State of New Mexico and community
officials to obtain information on the state's efforts to assist in the
reuse of Cannon. We conducted this performance audit from June 2007
through January 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the
audit to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

^1AFSOC is the Air Force component of the U.S. Special Operations Command;
it is headquartered at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and it has approximately
12,900 active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard and civilian
personnel. The active duty component is located at Hurlburt Field,
Florida; Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; and at two overseas locations.
The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard components are not affected
by the realignment of units to Cannon.

^231 U.S.C. S 717 (b).

Summary

DOD's decision to establish an AFSOC mission at Cannon was the result of a
confluence of events, chiefly, the BRAC 2005 contingency clause that
provided urgency for finding a new tenant for the base and an AFSOC study
pointing to Cannon Air Force Base as the best location for the AFSOC
mission. According to AFSOC officials, relocating some AFSOC units from
Hurlburt Field, Florida, became a priority as Hurlburt Field was nearing
full capacity of its ramp and hangar space and the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review recommended the growth of the AFSOC mission. In October
2005, AFSOC evaluated three alternatives to address the lack of existing
capacity at Hurlburt Field and rated Cannon as most desirable.
Subsequently, in response to the BRAC 2005 contingency clause, the Air
Force began to look in January 2006 for another mission for Cannon Air
Force Base. The Air Force solicited interest from DOD and other agencies
that would consider selecting Cannon Air Force Base for their missions.
According to Air Force officials, the intent was to identify a tenant that
would make maximum use of the base facilities and the base's associated
range, the Melrose Training Range. AFSOC was the only respondent out of
six that expressed interest in using the entire base and the associated
range. The remaining five planned to use portions of the base. In June
2006, DOD announced that a new AFSOC mission would be established at
Cannon.

Although AFSOC took ownership of Cannon Air Force Base on October 1, 2007,
there is some uncertainty over the total cost and timeline of personnel
growth required to establish the new mission, although AFSOC estimated the
cost at about $517 million over the next 6 years at the time of our
review. First, DOD has programmed about $283 million for military
construction projects from fiscal year 2008 through 2013 to support the
movement of units to Cannon. Approximately $201 million, or 71 percent, of
these funds are for constructing facilities at other Air Force locations,
but these projects were moved to Cannon to support the relocation of the
AFSOC units. For example, $11.2 million was programmed to construct a
special operations squadron and maintenance facility and $15.5 million was
programmed to construct a corrosion control hangar at other locations, but
these projects were moved to Cannon. The remaining $82 million in
programmed funds were to construct or modify existing support facilities
at Cannon. For example, the Air Force had already programmed $8.1 million
in fiscal year 2011 to construct a new dormitory. Second, AFSOC has
identified about $233 million in additional required funding that has yet
to be programmed. These funds would primarily be used to construct or
modify existing mission-related facilities to accommodate aircraft that
are larger and more varied than the ones previously located at the base.
Approximately $19 million of the additional funding would be used to
obtain some temporary facilities until permanent facilities become
available. Moreover, AFSOC originally projected that about 5,700 personnel
would be moved to Cannon by the end of fiscal year 2010. However, because
of funding constraints, the decision to move about 1,400 of these people
is under review by DOD. Further, the expected number and pace of personnel
growth may change further because AFSOC plans to bring fewer aircraft to
Cannon than originally projected.

This report also presents a matter for congressional consideration should
Congress authorize a future base closure round. In a written comment
letter, DOD had no comments on a draft of this report.

Background

On May 13, 2005, the Secretary of Defense made public his recommendations
for the 2005 BRAC round. The BRAC Commission, established by law as an
independent entity to evaluate DOD's recommendations, presented its
findings, along with its own recommendations, to the President on
September 8, 2005. The President approved the commission's recommendations
in their entirety and forwarded them to Congress on September 15, 2005.
When Congress did not pass a joint resolution of disapproval of the
recommendations, they became effective on November 9, 2005. The 2005 BRAC
Commission terminated on April 15, 2006.

DOD recommended the outright closure of Cannon Air Force Base. The BRAC
Commission also recommended closing Cannon Air Force Base but added a
contingent condition that the base could remain open if a new mission
could be found by December 31, 2009. DOD subsequently identified a new
mission for Cannon, and therefore the base will remain open.

Factors That Affected the Decision to Move to Cannon

DOD's decision to establish an AFSOC mission at Cannon Air Force Base was
the result of a confluence of events: chiefly, the BRAC Commission
contingency clause that provided urgency for finding a new tenant to keep
the base open and AFSOC's desire for another location.

Air Force's Response to the BRAC 2005 Contingency Clause

In January 2006, the Air Force began an effort to identify a new use for
Cannon Air Force Base. On the basis of an evaluation of the base's
infrastructure, facilities, and community and regional resources, the Air
Force developed a prospectus of the base that was distributed to federal
organizations both within and outside DOD. The prospectus was to solicit
federal agency interest in using the base. Air Force officials told us
that the ideal candidate would be one that intended to fully utilize the
facilities, including the adjacent Melrose Training Range. The Air Force
received responses from six organizations but only AFSOC expressed
interest in fully using the base and range. The remaining five
organizations expressed a desire to use limited facilities on the base
and, therefore, did not meet the intent of the solicitation. For example,
the Defense Logistics Agency wanted to use some of the facilities at
Cannon Air Force Base to temporarily store equipment. After a second
solicitation did not yield viable responses other than AFSOC's, the Air
Force focused its attention on evaluating AFSOC's proposal, and in June
2006 DOD announced that AFSOC would establish a mission at Cannon Air
Force Base.

AFSOC officials said that at about the same time that the Air Force was
completing its search to identify a new mission for Cannon Air Force Base,
AFSOC was completing its own study comparing basing alternatives.
Information from the Air Force's solicitation results and AFSOC's
comparison study was combined in a series of briefings to DOD.

AFSOC's Desire for Another Location

According to AFSOC officials, in recent years it was becoming increasingly
apparent that Hurlburt Field, Florida, was nearing full capacity of its
ramp and hangar space. In addition, these officials told us that they were
having an increasingly difficult time scheduling training time at the
adjacent training range at Eglin Air Force Base. The officials said that
these constraints were likely to intensify because Eglin was expecting to
have additional demands placed on it as a result of (1) decisions to
locate more aircraft (such as the Joint Strike Fighter) there and (2) the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review call for growth in the AFSOC mission.
Specifically, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review proposed increasing the
Special Operations Forces by 15 percent and establishing an Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle Squadron under U.S. Special Operations Command.

Starting in October 2005, AFSOC examined three alternatives to address the
lack of existing capacity at Hurlburt Field and the anticipated increase
in the AFSOC mission as proposed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.
The three alternatives were (1) increasing capacity at Hurlburt Field; (2)
establishing an AFSOC mission at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona;
and (3) establishing an AFSOC mission at Cannon Air Force Base, New
Mexico. AFSOC evaluated each of these locations based on the 11 criteria
shown in figure 1. As the figure shows, Cannon Air Force Base was rated
the most desirable on 9 of the 11 criteria and tied on 2 criteria. AFSOC
officials said that the installation scored particularly high in the
criteria deemed to be the most important--the availability of ramp space,
lack of encroachment, increased training opportunities, local community
support, and military construction costs.

Figure 1: AFSOC's Comparison of Basing Alternatives

Establishing an AFSOC mission in New Mexico was in line with an interest
AFSOC had expressed in the mid-1990s. According to AFSOC officials, a
western United States location would provide additional training
opportunities for AFSOC and other special operations forces.

Cost and Timeline of AFSOC's Move to Cannon

AFSOC took ownership of Cannon Air Force Base on October 1, 2007, and
plans to spend about $516.6 million to establish the mission over the next
6 years. First, DOD has programmed about $283.3 million in fiscal years
2008 through 2013 for military construction projects. Second, AFSOC has
identified a need for about $233 million in additional funding that has
yet to be programmed. These funds are needed primarily to construct new or
modify existing mission-related facilities to accommodate aircraft that
are larger and more varied than the smaller aircraft previously located at
the base.^3 In addition, AFSOC originally projected that about 5,700
personnel would be located at Cannon by the end of fiscal year 2010.
However, because of funding constraints, the decision to move about 1,400
of them is under review by DOD. Moreover, the expected number and pace of
personnel growth may change further because AFSOC plans to bring fewer
aircraft to Cannon than originally projected.

^3The F-16 fighter has a wingspan of 32 feet and 8 inches and a height of
16 feet. The C-130 has a wingspan of 132 feet and 7 inches and a height of
38 feet and 6 inches and, consequently, requires larger hangars and other
facilities.

Funding Requirements to Establish AFSOC Mission at Cannon

AFSOC anticipates spending about $516.6 million to locate the AFSOC units
but has programmed only about $283.3 million in military construction
funds from fiscal years 2008 through 2013. Our analysis indicates that
about $201 million (71 percent) of these funds were originally programmed
to build facilities at other locations that will now be built at Cannon
based on the decision to move some AFSOC units to the base. For example,
$11.2 million was programmed to construct a special operations squadron
and maintenance facility and $15.5 million was programmed to construct a
corrosion control hangar at other locations, but these projects were moved
to Cannon. The remaining $82 million in programmed funds were to construct
or modify existing support facilities at Cannon. For example, the Air
Force had already programmed $8.1 million in fiscal year 2011 to construct
a new dormitory.

As shown in table 1, $283.3 million of the $516.6 has been programmed, but
additional military construction, operation and maintenance, and
procurement totaling $233.3 million had not been programmed at the time of
our report. This additional funding is to construct new or modify existing
facilities and infrastructure to accommodate AFSOC's mission.

Table 1: Programmed and Unprogammed Funding to Establish AFSOC Mission at
Cannon, Fiscal Years 2008 to 2013

Dollars in millions

Type of Funding                           Fiscal year
                         2008 2009 2010         2011   2012 2013 Total 
Programmed                 $9.2 $18.1  $26.2 $126.4     $40.9 $62.5 $283.3 
Unprogrammed Military                                                      
construction                0.0   0.0   53.0   22.0      48.5   0.0 $123.5 
Operation and                                                              
maintenance                 3.7  24.9   22.9   16.6      17.7  14.8 $100.6 
Procurement                 0.0   6.6    2.2    0.4       0.0   0.0   $9.2 
Subtotal unprogrammed       3.7  31.5   78.1   39.0      66.2  14.8 $233.3 
Total                     $12.9 $49.6 $104.3 $165.4    $107.1 $77.3 $516.6 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

As seen in table 1, AFSOC has identified a need for $123.5 million more in
military construction funds for projects such as an aircraft washing
facility for C-130 aircraft, hangars for the Predator unmanned aerial
system, and squadron operations facilities for an AC-130 squadron. AFSOC
also identified a need for about $100.6 million in additional operation
and maintenance funding. According to AFSOC officials, about $10.3 million
is for minor construction projects, such as enlarging entrance bay doors,
reworking concrete ramps, and adding partition walls and doors to
buildings, and $27.6 million is for upgrading and securing communications
infrastructure. AFSOC officials told us that $19.6 million is needed to
procure temporary hangars for fuel cell maintenance and corrosion control
for C-130 aircraft and to lease facilities for squadron operations until
permanent facilities are built.

Timeline for Moving Personnel to Cannon Air Force Base

Cannon Air Force Base may have lower personnel levels and grow at a slower
rate than initially projected. In July 2007, AFSOC estimated that Cannon
Air Force Base would have about 3,900 personnel by the end of fiscal year
2008 and grow to a peak of about 5,700 by the end of fiscal year 2010.
However, in September 2007, in response to our request, AFSOC provided us
with revised data indicating plans for lower personnel levels and a slower
rate of growth at Cannon. AFSOC's plans as of November 2007 indicated that
a total of about 2,400 personnel would have moved to Cannon by the end of
fiscal year 2008 and grow to a potential peak of about 4,000 personnel by
the end of fiscal year 2009. Figure 2 displays initial and revised
estimates of personnel to be moved to Cannon.

Figure 2: Comparison of Initial and Revised Projected Personnel Growth at
Cannon, Fiscal Years 2008 to 2013

DOD officials told us that funding constraints caused them to reduce the
projected personnel growth at Cannon by about 1,400 personnel and the
decision to move these personnel is under review by DOD.

However, our analysis shows that AFSOC may not achieve even the expected
growth of about 4,000 personnel by 2010. AFSOC's revisions of the planned
personnel growth may be overstated because of the projected decrease in
aircraft to be located at Cannon. AFSOC officials told us that fewer
aircraft are being moved to Cannon than originally planned and at a slower
rate. For example, AFSOC originally projected that 104 aircraft would be
based at Cannon by 2010, but subsequently projected that 68 will be there
by then.

Conclusions

DOD will incur additional costs to establish a new mission at Cannon;
however, these costs were not considered as part of the BRAC process
because the decision to relocate AFSOC was made after the BRAC Commission
was disestablished and the President's report of the BRAC recommendations
was sent to Congress. In addition, because these costs were not part of
the BRAC process, Congress did not have visibility at the time of approval
over the Cannon recommendation and its impact on the total costs and
savings from implementing the BRAC 2005 recommendations.

Matter for Congressional Consideration

If Congress decides to authorize a future base closure round, it may want
to consider whether to allow a future BRAC Commission the authority to add
a contingent element to a recommendation and, if so, under what
conditions.

Agency Comments

In a written comment letter, DOD had no comments on a draft of this
report. DOD's letter is reprinted in enclosure I.

                                     - - -

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Air Force, the Commander of Special Operations Command,
and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will provide
copies of this report to others upon request. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [11]http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions on the information discussed in
this report, please contact me on (202) 512-4523 or [12][email protected] .
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made
key contributions to this report are listed in enclosure II.

Brian J. Lepore
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Enclosures - 2

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
Unites States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
Unites States Senate

The Honorable Tim Johnson
Chairman
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Military Construction,
Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
Unites States Senate

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Chet Edwards
Chairman
Subcommittee on Military Construction,
Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Enclosure I

                    Comments from the Department of Defense

Enclosure II

                     GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or [13][email protected]

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Michael Kennedy,
Assistant Director; Aisha Cabrer; Colin Chambers; Mae Jones; Julia Matta;
and Allen Westheimer made significant contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have Increased
and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T. Washington, D.C.:
December 12, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased and
Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159. Washington, D.C.: December
11, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,
Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage, and
Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics Agency.
GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial
Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor Challenges
for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers. GAO-07-1040.
Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 2005
Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers Are
Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and Overcome
Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges
and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air
National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641. Washington, D.C.: May 16,
2007.

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental
Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.
GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.

Military Bases: Observations on DOD's 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. Washington, D.C.: July
18, 2005.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.
Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC Rounds.
GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and
Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD's 2004 Report on the Need for a
Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2004.

Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming Base
Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.: March 25,
2004.

(351051)

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