Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audits and Key	 
Oversight Issues (30-OCT-07, GAO-08-231T).			 
                                                                 
Since 2003, the Congress has obligated nearly $400 billion for	 
U.S. efforts in Iraq, of which about $40 billion has supported	 
reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Congressional oversight
of this substantial investment is crucial as the Administration  
requests additional military and economic funds for Iraq. This	 
testimony summarizes the results of recent GAO audit work and	 
proposes three areas for which continued oversight is needed: (1)
progress in improving security and national reconciliation, (2)  
efforts to develop clear U.S. strategies, and (3) Iraqi and	 
international contributions to economic development. We reviewed 
U.S. agency documents and interviewed agency officials, including
the departments of State, Defense, and Treasury; and the U.S.	 
Agency for International Development; the UN; and the Iraqi	 
government. We also made multiple trips to Iraq as part of this  
work.								 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-231T					        
    ACCNO:   A77793						        
  TITLE:     Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audits   
and Key Oversight Issues					 
     DATE:   10/30/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Audits						 
	     Benchmark testing					 
	     Economic stabilization				 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     International relations				 
	     Iraq War and reconstruction			 
	     Legislation					 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Security assessments				 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Iraq						 

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GAO-08-231T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background
     * [3]Limited Progress Has Been Made in National Reconciliation
     * [4]United States and Iraq Lack Clear Strategies for Key Efforts

          * [5]Developing a National Strategy for Iraq
          * [6]Building Capacity in Iraq's Ministries
          * [7]Reconstructing Iraq's Energy Sectors

     * [8]Iraqi and International Contributions Have Played a Limited

          * [9]Iraqi Government Has Spent a Small Portion of Its Funds on R
          * [10]International Donor Contributions

     * [11]Conclusion
     * [12]Appendix I: Donor Pledges for Iraq Reconstruction (in thousa
     * [13]Appendix II: U.S. and Coalition Troops in Iraq (in thousands

          * [14]Order by Mail or Phone

Testimony

Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, U.S. House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Tuesday, October 30, 2007

SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ

GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director
International Affairs and Trade

GAO-08-231T

Chairwoman Lowey, Ranking Member Wolf, and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's recent work on U.S. efforts
to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq.

Over the last 4 years, the United States has provided thousands of troops
and obligated nearly $400 billion to help achieve the strategic goal of
creating a democratic Iraq that can defend itself and be an ally in the
war on terror. Of this amount, about $40 billion has been used for
reconstruction and stabilization purposes. Congressional oversight of
these substantial investments is crucial particularly since the
Administration is requesting additional military and economic funds for
U.S. efforts in Iraq.

This testimony summarizes the results of recent GAO audit work and
proposes three areas in which continued oversight is needed: (1) progress
in improving security and enacting Iraqi legislation that promotes
national reconciliation, (2) efforts to develop clear strategies for
programs to rebuild and stabilize Iraq, and (3) Iraqi and international
contributions to economic development in Iraq.

As part of this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed
officials with the departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), and the
Treasury (Treasury); the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID); the Multinational Force-Iraq and its subordinate commands; the
Embassy Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO); the United Nations; the
World Bank; and the Iraqi government. As part of this work, we made
multiple visits to Iraq in 2006 and 2007, most recently in August 2007.
Because of broad congressional interest in this issue, we performed our
work under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States
to conduct reviews on his own initiative. We conducted our review in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary

In summary, we found that

           o Since GAO last reported on the status of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks
           in September 2007, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has
           declined. While political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has
           not yet advanced key legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues
           and holding provincial elections. In addition, sectarian
           influences within the Iraqi ministries

           continue while militia influences divide the loyalties of Iraqi
           security forces.

           o Key U.S. efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq lack strategies
           with clear purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, and
           performance measures. The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning
           are compounded by the Iraqi government's lack of integrated
           strategic planning in its critical energy sector.
           o The U.S. strategy assumed that the Iraqi government and
           international community funds would help finance Iraq's
           development needs. However, the Iraqi government has limited
           capacity to spend reconstruction funds. In addition, the
           international community has provided funds for Iraq's
           reconstruction, but most of the funding offered has been in the
           form of loans that the Iraqis have not accessed.
			  
			  Background

           Iraq's national government was established after a constitutional
           referendum in October 2005, followed by election of the first
           Council of Representatives (Parliament) in December 2005, and the
           selection of the first Prime Minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, in
           May 2006. By mid-2006, the cabinet was approved; the government
           now has 34 ministries responsible for providing security and
           essential services--including electricity, water, and
           education--for the Iraqi people. The Ministry of Finance is
           responsible for tracking and reporting government expenditures.
           The Iraqi government uses single-year budgeting, which generally
           requires that funds be used by December 31, the end of Iraq's
           fiscal year.

           In March 2003, the United States--along with the United Kingdom,
           Australia, and other members of the coalition--began combat
           operations in Iraq. The original "coalition of the willing"
           consisted of 49 countries (including the United States) that
           publicly committed to the war effort and also provided a variety
           of support, such as direct military participation, logistical and
           intelligence support, over-flight rights, or humanitarian and
           reconstruction aid. Many nations and various international
           organizations are supporting the efforts to rebuild Iraq through
           multilateral or bilateral assistance. U.N. Security Council
           Resolution 1511 of October 16, 2003, urged member states and
           international and regional organizations to support the Iraq
           reconstruction effort. On October 23-24, 2003, an international
           donors conference was held in Madrid, with 76 countries, 20
           international organizations, and 13 nongovernmental organizations
           participating.
			  
			  Limited Progress Has Been Made in National Reconciliation

           Since GAO last reported on the status of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks
           in September 2007, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has
           declined. While political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has
           not yet advanced key legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues
           and holding provincial elections. In addition, sectarian
           influences within the Iraqi ministries continue while militia
           influences divide the loyalties of Iraqi security forces.

           The January 2007 U.S. strategy, New Way Forward in Iraq, is
           designed to support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence and
           foster conditions for national reconciliation by providing the
           Iraqi government with the time and space needed to help address
           differences among the various segments of Iraqi society. The
           number of enemy-initiated attacks on civilians, Iraqi Security
           Forces, and coalition forces increased dramatically after the
           February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. The
           increase in the number of monthly attacks generally continued
           through June 2007. To help quell the violence, the United States
           deployed about 30,000 additional troops to Iraq during the spring
           of 2007, bringing the total number of U.S. military personnel to
           about 164,700 as of September 2007.

           As depicted in figure 1, enemy-initiated attacks declined from a
           total of about 5,300 in June 2007 to about 3,000 in September
           2007. However, the recent decrease in monthly attacks was
           primarily due to a decrease in the number of attacks against
           coalition forces. Attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and
           civilians have declined less than attacks against coalition
           forces.

Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks against the Coalition, Iraqi Security
Forces, and Civilians, May 2003 through September 2007

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the incidents captured
in military reporting do not account for all violence throughout Iraq. For
example, they may underreport incidents of Shi'a militias fighting each
other and attacks against Iraqi security forces in southern Iraq and other
areas with few or no coalition forces.

In addition, according to a UN report released October 15, 2007, the Iraqi
people and government continue to confront major challenges resulting from
the devastating effects of violence. The UN reported that widespread
insecurity continues to make national dialogue challenging, and increasing
levels of displacement are adding to an alarming humanitarian crisis.

The Iraqi government continues to make limited progress in meeting eight
legislative benchmarks intended to promote national reconciliation.^1 As
of October 25, 2007, the Iraqi government had met one legislative
benchmark and partially met another. Specifically, the rights of minority
political parties in the Iraqi legislature were protected through existing
provisions in the Iraqi Constitution and Council of Representatives'
by-laws. In addition, the Iraqi government partially met the benchmark to
enact and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was
enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008.

The benchmark requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not yet
been met. Fundamental issues remain unresolved as part of the
constitutional review process, such as expanded powers for the presidency,
the resolution of disputed areas (such as Kirkuk), and power sharing
between federal and regional governments over issues such as the
distribution of oil revenue. In addition, five other legislative
benchmarks requiring parliamentary action have not yet been met. Figure 2
highlights the status of the benchmarks requiring legislative enactment
and implementation.

^1Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met
Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, [15]GAO-07-1195
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007).

Figure 2: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative
Benchmarks, as of October 25, 2007

^aThe Iraqi legislature is considering several competing drafts.

^bAccording to State, the Iraqi legislature has received competing drafts
from the Council of Ministers and is awaiting clarification from the
Council.

^cThe Iraqi constitution exempts the law on formation of regions from
following the Presidency Council's ratification process, which is set out
in Article 138 of the Constitution.

^dAccording to State, it is unclear if the Iraqi government needs
legislation to set an election date.

Although State and Multinational Force-Iraq report progress in promoting
reconciliation at local levels such as Anbar province, at the national
level, sectarian factions within the Iraqi government ministries continue
to undermine reconciliation efforts. For example, ministries within the
Iraqi government continued to be controlled by sectarian factions and are
used to maintain power and provide patronage to individuals and groups.
According to an August 2007 U.S. interagency report, the withdrawal of
members of the Iraqi cabinet ended the Shi'a-dominated coalition's claim
to be a government of national unity and further undermined Iraq's already
faltering program of national reconciliation. In late August 2007, Iraq's
senior Shi'a and Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders signed a unity
accord signaling efforts to foster greater national reconciliation. The
accord covered draft legislation on de-Ba'athification reform and
provincial powers laws, and established a mechanism to release some Sunni
detainees being held without charges. However, these laws have not been
passed as of October 25, 2007.

The Iraqi government has made limited progress in developing effective and
non-sectarian forces. Since 2003, the United States has provided about
$19.2 billion to train and equip about 360,000 Iraqi soldiers and police
officers, in an effort to develop Iraqi security forces, transfer security
responsibilities to them and to the Iraqi government, and ultimately
withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq. Iraqi security forces have grown in size
and are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations. However, only
about 10 of 140 Iraqi army, national police, and special operations forces
are operating independently as of September 2007.

Several factors have complicated the development of effective and loyal
Iraqi security forces. First, the Iraqi security forces are not a single
unified force with a primary mission of countering the insurgency in Iraq.
Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in an
overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces present for duty.
Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of
Iraqi security forces. According to the Independent Commission on the
Security Forces of Iraq, the Iraqi National Police is not viable and
should be disbanded. Fourth, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the
coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities.^2

^2For more information, see Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the
Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces, [16]GAO-07-612T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 13, 2007).

United States and Iraq Lack Clear Strategies for Key Efforts

Three GAO reports illustrate a recurring problem with U.S. efforts in
Iraq--the lack of strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles and
responsibilities, and performance measures. Our reports assessing (1) the
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI), (2) U.S. efforts to develop
planning and budget capacity in Iraq's ministries, and (3) U.S. and Iraqi
efforts to rebuild Iraq's energy sector show that clear strategies are
needed to guide U.S. efforts, manage risk, and identify needed resources.

Developing a National Strategy for Iraq

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq was intended to clarify the
President's strategy for achieving overall U.S. political, security, and
economic goals in Iraq. In our 2006 report, we found that the strategy was
incomplete. ^3 First, it only partially identified the agencies
responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy. Second, it did
not fully address how the United States would integrate its goals with
those of the Iraqis and the international community, and it did not detail
Iraq's anticipated contribution to its future needs. Third, it only
partially identified the current and future costs of U.S. involvement in
Iraq, including maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi
government capacity, and rebuilding critical infrastructure. Without a
complete strategy, U.S. efforts are less likely to be effective. We
recommended that the National Security Council (NSC), along with DOD and
State, complete the strategy by addressing all six characteristics of an
effective national strategy, including detailed information on costs and
roles and responsibilities. NSC, State, and DOD did not comment on GAO's
recommendations. In commenting on the report, State asserted that GAO
misrepresented the NSVI's purpose--to provide the public a broad overview
of the U.S. strategy in Iraq, not to set forth details readily available
elsewhere. However, without detailed information on costs and roles and
responsibilities, the strategy does not provide Congress with a clear road
map for achieving victory in Iraq.

In addition, we have provided the Congress classified reports and
briefings on the Joint U.S. Embassy - Multinational Force-Iraq's
classified campaign plan for Iraq.

^3Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help
Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO-06-788 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006).

Building Capacity in Iraq's Ministries

The development of competent and loyal Iraqi ministries is critical to
stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq.^4 To help Iraq develop the capability of
its ministries, the United States has provided about $300 million between
fiscal years 2005 to 2007. The Administration has requested an additional
$255 million for fiscal year 2008 to continue these efforts. However, U.S.
efforts lack an overall strategy, no lead agency provides overall
direction, and U.S. priorities have been subject to numerous changes. U.S.
efforts also face four challenges that pose risks to their success and
long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi government institutions have
significant shortages of personnel with the skills to perform the vital
tasks necessary to provide security and deliver essential services to the
Iraqi people. Second, Iraq's government confronts significant challenges
in staffing a nonpartisan civil service and addressing militia
infiltration of key ministries. Third, widespread corruption undermines
efforts to develop the government's capacity by robbing it of needed
resources. Fourth, violence in Iraq hinders U.S. advisors' access to Iraqi
ministries, increases absenteeism among ministry employees, and
contributes to the growing number of professional Iraqis leaving the
country.

Without a unified U.S. strategy that clearly articulates agency roles and
responsibilities and addresses the risks cited above, U.S. efforts are
less likely to succeed. We recommended that the State Department complete
an overall integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development efforts.
Congress should also consider conditioning future appropriations on the
completion of the strategy. State recognized the value of such a strategy
but expressed concern about conditioning further capacity development
investment on completion of such a strategy.

Reconstructing Iraq's Energy Sectors

The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the Iraqis'
lack of strategic planning in its critical energy sector. As we reported
in May 2007, it is difficult to identify the most pressing future funding
needs, key rebuilding priorities, and existing vulnerabilities and risks
given the absence of an overarching strategic plan that comprehensively
assesses the requirements of the energy sector as a whole.^5 While the
Iraqi government has crafted a multiyear strategic plan for Iraq's
electricity sector, no such plan exists for the oil sector. Given the
highly interdependent nature of the oil and electricity sectors, such a
plan would help identify the most pressing needs for the entire energy
sector and help overcome the daunting challenges affecting future
development prospects. For fiscal years 2003 to 2006, the United States
made available about $7.4 billion and spent about $5.1 billion to rebuild
Iraq's oil and electricity sectors. However, production in both sectors
has consistently fallen below U.S. program goals of 3 million barrels per
day and 6,000 megawatts of electrical peak generation capacity.

^4Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development
Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage
Risk, [17]GAO-08-117 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007).

^5Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq's
Oil and Electricity Sectors, [18]GAO-07-677 (Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2007).

Billions of dollars are still needed to rebuild, maintain, and secure
Iraq's oil and electricity infrastructure, underscoring the need for sound
strategic planning. The Ministry of Electricity's 2006-2015 Electricity
Master Plan estimates that $27 billion will be needed to reach its goal of
providing reliable electricity across Iraq by 2015. According to DOD,
investment in Iraq's oil sector is "woefully short" of the absolute
minimum required to sustain current production, and additional foreign and
private investment is needed. Moreover, U.S. officials and industry
experts estimate that Iraq would need $20 billion to $30 billion over the
next several years to reach and sustain a crude oil production capacity of
5 million barrels per day. We recommended that the Secretary of State, in
conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies and international donors, work
with Iraqi ministries to develop an integrated energy strategy. State
commented that the Iraqi government, not the U.S. government, is
responsible for taking action on GAO's recommendations. We believe that
the recommendations are still valid given the billions made available for
Iraq's energy sector and the U.S. government's influence in overseeing
Iraq's rebuilding efforts.

Iraqi and International Contributions Have Played a Limited Role in Rebuilding
Iraq

From the onset of the reconstruction and stabilization effort, the U.S.
strategy assumed that the Iraqis and the international community would
help finance Iraq's development needs. However, the Iraqi government has a
limited capacity to spend reconstruction funds, which hinders its ability
to assume a more prominent role in rebuilding Iraq's crumbling
infrastructure. The international community has provided funds for Iraq's
reconstruction, but most of the funding offered has been in the form of
loans that the Iraqis have not accessed.

Iraqi Government Has Spent a Small Portion of Its Funds on Reconstruction

The government of Iraq allocated $10 billion of its 2007 revenues for
capital projects and reconstruction, including capital funds for the
provinces based on their populations. However, available data from the
government of Iraq and analysis from U.S. and coalition officials show
that, while 2007 spending has increased compared with 2006, a large
portion of Iraq's $10 billion in capital projects and reconstruction
budget will likely go unspent through the end of this year.^6 Iraq's
ministries, for example, spent only 24 percent of their 2007 capital
budgets through mid-July 2007.

U.S. government, coalition, and international agencies have identified a
number of factors that affect the Iraqi government's ability to spend
capital budgets. In addition to the poor security environment and "brain
drain" issues, U.S. and foreign officials also noted that weaknesses in
Iraqi procurement and budgeting procedures impede completion of capital
projects. For example, according to the State Department, Iraq's
Contracting Committee requires about a dozen signatures to approve
projects exceeding $10 million, which slows the process.

As a possible reflection of Iraq's difficulty in spending its capital
budgets, Iraq's proposed 2008 capital budget declines substantially (57
percent) from 2007 (see table 1).

Table 1: Government of Iraq 2007 Budget and Proposed 2008 Budget

Dollars in millions                                                        
                                              Proposed 2008                   
                              2007 Budget            Budget Percentage change 
Operating expenditures         $31,002           $31,040               0.1 
Capital projects                                                           
expenditures                    10,052             4,286               -57 
Total                          $41,054           $35,326               -14 

Source: GAO analysis of Iraqi government data provided by U.S. Treasury.

Note: Budget figures in Iraq dinars are converted to dollars using a
constant exchange rate of ID 1260 per dollar. This preserves the growth
rates in Iraq dinars. For budget purposes, U.S. Treasury assumes that the
dinar will appreciate by 5 percent and uses an exchange rate of ID 1200
per dollar for the 2008 budget. This will add between 2 to 5 percentage
points to the growth rates.

^6Iraq's fiscal year is January 1 to December 31.

As a percentage of its overall budget, Iraq's capital expenditures will
decline from 24 percent in 2007 to 12 percent in 2008. We are conducting a
review of U.S. efforts to help Iraq spend its budget and will issue a
separate report at a later date.

International Donor Contributions

As of April 2007, international donors have pledged about $14.9 billion in
support of Iraq reconstruction.^7 In addition, some countries exceeded
their pledges by providing an additional $744 million for a total of about
$15.6 billion, according to the State Department. Of this amount, about
$11 billion is in the form of loans. As of April 2007, Iraq had accessed
about $436 million in loans from the International Monetary Fund. The
remaining $4.6 billion is in the form of grants, to be provided
multilaterally or bilaterally; $3 billion of that amount has been
disbursed to Iraq. See appendix I for pledges made at Madrid and
thereafter for Iraq reconstruction. In addition, 16 of the 41 countries
that pledged funding for Iraq reconstruction also provided troops to the
multinational force in Iraq.

In addition to funds, some countries also contribute troops to the
U.S.-led coalition. As of September 2007, 26 countries were contributing
12,300 troops to multinational forces in Iraq. Compared with the 164,700
forces from the United States, other coalition countries represent about 7
percent of Multinational Forces in Iraq. From December 2003 through
September 2007, the number of non-U.S. coalition troops decreased from
24,000 to 12,300 and the number of coalition nations contributing troops
to military operations decreased from 33 to 26.^8 See appendix II for a
comparison of U.S and coalition troops from December 2003 through
September 2007.

Conclusion

As this committee is called upon to provide more resources to help
stabilize and rebuild Iraq, continued oversight is needed of the key
issues highlighted in today's testimony. While U.S. troops have performed
courageously under difficult and dangerous circumstances, the continued
violence and polarization of Iraqi society as well as the Iraqi
government's continued difficulties in funding its reconstruction needs
diminishes the prospects for achieving current U.S. security, political,
and economic goals in Iraq.

^7Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and International
Donor Commitments, [19]GAO-07-827T (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007).

^8In addition to multinational force contributions, six countries
contribute troops to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, which supports
training of Iraqi security forces. As of September 2007, these countries
were Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Turkey.

Of particular concern is the lack of strategic plans to guide U.S. and
Iraqi efforts to rebuild and stabilize the country. Our assessment of the
U.S. strategy for Iraq and recent efforts to build central ministry
capacity show that U.S. planning efforts have been plagued by unclear
goals and objectives, changing priorities, inadequate risk assessments,
and uncertain costs. Weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded
by the lack of strategic planning in Iraq's energy sector, the sector that
provides the most government revenues.

Madam Chair this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any
questions that you or other Members may have.

For questions regarding this testimony, please contact me on (202)
512-8979 or [email protected]. Other key contributors to this statement
were Stephen Lord, David Bruno, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern, Mattias
Fenton, Muriel Forster, Lisa Helmer, Dorian Herring, Patrick Hickey, Bruce
Kutnicky, Tetsuo Miyabara, Judith McCloskey, and Mary Moutsos.

Appendix I: Donor Pledges for Iraq Reconstruction (in thousands)

                                           Post-Madrid Pledges and            
                                            Donations in Excess of            
Donor                Madrid Pledges              Madrid Pledges      Total 
Australia                    45,590                      28,680     74,270 
Austria                       5,480                           0      5,480 
Belgium                       5,890                           0      5,890 
Bulgaria                        640                           0        640 
Canada                      187,470                           0    187,470 
China                        25,000                       6,500     31,500 
Croatia                           0                         333        333 
Cyprus                          120                           0        120 
Czech Republic               14,660                           0     14,660 
Denmark                      26,950                      35,000     61,950 
European Commission         235,620                     685,685    921,305 
Estonia                          80                           0         80 
Finland                       5,890                       2,944      8,834 
Germany                           0                       4,150      4,150 
Greece                        3,530                       3,618      7,148 
Hungary                       1,240                         430      1,670 
Iceland                       2,500                         500      3,000 
India                        10,000                           0     10,000 
Iran                          5,000                   1,000,000  1,005,000 
Ireland                       3,530                           0      3,530 
Italy                       235,620                           0    235,620 
Japan                     4,914,000                           0  4,914,000 
Republic of Korea           200,000                           0    200,000 
Kuwait                      500,000                           0    500,000 
Lithuania                         0                          30         30 
Luxembourg                    2,360                         199      2,559 
Malta                            27                           0         27 
Netherlands                   9,420                       3,465     12,885 
New Zealand                   3,350                       2,760      6,110 
Norway                       12,870                      10,840     23,710 
Oman                          3,000                           0      3,000 
Pakistan                      2,500                           0      2,500 
Portugal                          0                         600        600 
Qatar                       100,000                           0    100,000 
Saudi Arabia                500,000                           0    500,000 
Slovenia                        420                           0        420 
Spain                       220,000                      28,000    248,000 
Sweden                       33,000                           0     33,000 
Turkey                       50,000                           0     50,000 
United Arab Emirates        215,000                           0    215,000 
United Kingdom              452,330                     198,000    650,330 
Vietnam                           0                         700        700 
Lower end of planned                                                       
World Bank lending        3,000,000                           0  3,000,000 
Lower end of planned                                                       
IMF lending               2,550,000                           0  2,550,000 
Total non-US pledges                                                       
and donations            13,583,087                   2,012,434 15,595,521 

Appendix II: U.S. and Coalition Troops in Iraq (in thousands)

(320562)

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To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on [26]GAO-08-231T .

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Highlights of [27]GAO-08-231T , testimony before the Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs, House of Representatives

October 30, 2007

SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ

GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues

Since 2003, the Congress has obligated nearly $400 billion for U.S.
efforts in Iraq, of which about $40 billion has supported reconstruction
and stabilization efforts. Congressional oversight of this substantial
investment is crucial as the Administration requests additional military
and economic funds for Iraq.

This testimony summarizes the results of recent GAO audit work and
proposes three areas for which continued oversight is needed: (1) progress
in improving security and national reconciliation, (2) efforts to develop
clear U.S. strategies, and (3) Iraqi and international contributions to
economic development.

We reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed agency officials,
including the departments of State, Defense, and Treasury; and the U.S.
Agency for International Development; the UN; and the Iraqi government. We
also made multiple trips to Iraq as part of this work.

[28]What GAO Recommends

GAO reports have recommended that the Administration, in conjunction with
the Iraqi government, develop clear and complete strategic plans for
overall and sector specific efforts in Iraq. The agencies generally agreed
on the importance of having clear strategies but provided various comments
on how best to implement these strategies.

Since GAO last reported in September 2007, on the status of the 18 Iraqi
benchmarks, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has declined. While
political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has not yet advanced key
legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues and holding provincial
elections. In addition, sectarian influences within Iraqi ministries
continue while militia influences divide the loyalties of Iraqi security
forces.

U.S. efforts lack strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles, and
performance measures. The U.S. strategy for victory in Iraq partially
identifies the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the
strategy and does not fully address how the United States would integrate
its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community. U.S.
efforts to develop Iraqi ministry capability lack an overall strategy, no
lead agency provides overall direction, and U.S. priorities have been
subject to numerous changes. The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are
compounded by the Iraqi government's lack of integrated strategic planning
in its critical energy sector.

The U.S. strategy assumed that the Iraqis and international community
would help finance Iraq's reconstruction. However, the Iraqi government
has limited capacity to spend reconstruction funds. For example, Iraq
allocated $10 billion of its revenues for capital projects and
reconstruction in 2007. However, a large portion of this amount is
unlikely to be spent, as ministries had spent only 24 percent of their
capital budgets through mid-July 2007. Iraq has proposed spending only $4
billion for capital projects in 2008, a significant reduction from 2007.
The international community has pledged $15.6 billion for reconstruction
efforts in Iraq, but about $11 billion of this is in the form of loans.

Enemy-Initiated Attacks May 2003 through September 2007

References

Visible links
  15. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1195
  16. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-612T
  17. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-117
  18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-677
  19. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-827T
  20. http://www.gao.gov/
  21. http://www.gao.gov/
  22. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  23. mailto:[email protected]
  24. mailto:[email protected]
  25. mailto:[email protected]
  26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-231T
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-231T
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