    State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for
    Overseas Posts Can Be Improved (19-OCT-07, GAO-08-23).

    Since 1988, the Department of State (State) has ordered over 270
    evacuations from overseas posts due to civil strife, terrorist
    incidents, natural disasters, conventional war threats, and
    disease outbreaks. To prepare for evacuation, overseas posts rely
    on a variety of guidance, plans, and training, such as Emergency
    Action Plans (EAP). GAO was asked to assess State's (1) guidance
    and plans to prepare for evacuation, (2) training and exercises
    to prepare post staff for crisis, and (3) efforts to collect,
    analyze, and incorporate evacuation lessons learned into guidance
    and training. GAO examined State and Department of Defense (DOD)
    documents, spoke with State and DOD officials, conducted a survey
    of 243 overseas posts, and completed 22 structured interviews
    with State personnel.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-23
        ACCNO:   A77448
      TITLE:     State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations
    for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved
         DATE:   10/19/2007
      SUBJECT:   Americans abroad
    	     Emergency management
    	     Emergency preparedness
    	     Emergency response
    	     Emergency response personnel
    	     Emergency response plans
    	     Emergency response procedures
    	     Employee training
    	     Evacuation
    	     Foreign governments
    	     Interagency relations
    	     International cooperation
    	     Lessons learned
    	     Policy evaluation
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Evacuation of civilians
    	     Policies and procedures
    	     Program coordination
    	     Program implementation

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    GAO-08-23

         * [1]Results in Brief
         * [2]Background

              * [3]Evacuations Occur in Response to Diverse Crises and Differ C
              * [4]State Has Tools for Warning American Citizens and Provides V
              * [5]A Number of State Units Are Involved in Planning for and Imp

         * [6]Deficiencies in State's Guidance and Plans Can Hinder Post E

              * [7]State's Emergency Planning Handbook Has Limited Usefulness i
              * [8]State Is Not Comprehensively Reviewing and Updating Emergenc
              * [9]Estimates of American Citizens in Countries Abroad Are Frequ
              * [10]State and DOD's Memorandum of Agreement to Prepare for Large

         * [11]There Are Gaps in the Crisis Management Training State Provi

              * [12]Insufficient EAC Training and Drills Can Hurt Posts' Readine
              * [13]Crisis Management Exercises Considered Useful but Could Be M
              * [14]Regular Input from Staff with Evacuation Experience Could Im
              * [15]State Beginning to Implement New Training Tools

         * [16]State's Lack of a Systematic Process to Collect, Analyze, an

              * [17]Most Posts Did Not Complete an After Action Report Following
              * [18]Evacuation After Action Reports Lack a Standard Format
              * [19]After Action Reports Could Include Staffing and Morale Lesso
              * [20]State Has No Systematic Mechanism to Analyze and Incorporate
              * [21]Post Staff Have Limited Institutional Knowledge of Earlier E

         * [22]Conclusions
         * [23]Recommendations for Executive Action
         * [24]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * [25]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
         * [26]Appendix II: Number of Overseas Posts Evacuated Since 1988 u
         * [27]Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

              * [28]GAO Comments

         * [29]Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

              * [30]GAO Comments

         * [31]Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

              * [32]GAO Contact
              * [33]Staff Acknowledgments

                   * [34]Order by Mail or Phone

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    October 2007

    STATE DEPARTMENT

    Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved

    GAO-08-23

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 3
    Background 6
    Deficiencies in State's Guidance and Plans Can Hinder Post Efforts to
    Prepare for a Possible Evacuation 14
    There Are Gaps in the Crisis Management Training State Provides to Post
    Staff 20
    State's Lack of a Systematic Process to Collect, Analyze, and Incorporate
    Lessons Learned Constrains Preparation for Evacuation 27
    Conclusions 32
    Recommendations for Executive Action 32
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33
    Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36
    Appendix II Number of Overseas Posts Evacuated Since 1988 under Authorized
    and Ordered Departure Authority 40
    Appendix III Comments from the Department of State 41
    Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 53
    Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 57

    Figures

    Figure 1: State Overseas Posts Evacuated by Country from March 2002 to
    August 2007 7
    Figure 2: State Department Units Involved in Implementing the Authorized
    or Ordered Departure of Staff and Dependents 11
    Figure 3: Most Likely Threats to Occur at Post Identified in Survey
    Results 16

    Abbreviations

    CLO Community Liaison officer
    CME crisis management exercise
    DOD Department of Defense
    DVD digital video disc
    EAC Emergency Action Committee
    EAP Emergency Action Plan
    EPH Emergency Planning Handbook
    FAQ frequently asked question
    FSI Foreign Service Institute
    MOA memorandum of agreement
    SARS severe acute respiratory syndrome
    State Department of State

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced
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    However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other
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    wish to reproduce this material separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Washington, DC 20548
    October 19, 2007

    The Honorable Tom Lantos
    Chairman
    The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
    Ranking Member
    Committee on Foreign Affairs
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable Thelma Drake
    House of Representatives

    The Department of State (State) operates overseas posts^1 all over the
    world, some in unstable, dangerous, or crisis-prone regions where threats
    against post staff, dependents, or private American citizens can result in
    State-ordered evacuations. Evacuations can occur in response to various
    types of crises, including civil strife, terrorist incidents, natural
    disasters, conventional war threats, and disease outbreaks. They can range
    from the more common and relatively simple departures of post staff and
    dependents on regularly scheduled commercial flights to the more rare,
    complex, and massive sea and air lift of thousands of American citizens on
    U.S. government-chartered and U.S. military ships and planes. According to
    State officials, since 1988, State has ordered more than 270 evacuations
    from overseas posts. Based on a survey we conducted, 1 in 5 overseas posts
    reported they had experienced some type of evacuation of post staff and
    dependents in the past 5 years.

    To plan and prepare for possible evacuation, overseas posts rely on a
    variety of guidance, plans, and training. Emergency Action Committees
    (EAC) at overseas posts are responsible for assisting the ambassador in
    planning and preparing for crises, including the possible evacuation of
    post staff, dependents, and American citizens, with support from State
    offices in Washington, D.C. State's primary guidance is the Emergency
    Planning Handbook (EPH), which contains policies and procedures for crisis
    management, including planning, preparing for, and conducting evacuations.
    In addition, all posts are required to create and annually update an
    Emergency Action Plan (EAP) that includes planning for potential,
    post-specific emergencies, using the EPH as a guide. State's Foreign
    Service Institute (FSI) trains overseas-bound staff in crisis management
    and conducts crisis management exercises (CME) at all overseas posts every
    1 to 2-1/2 years to improve crisis preparedness.

    ^1Overseas posts are State-operated U.S. embassies and consulates in other
    countries.

    Due to your concerns regarding threats against overseas posts that have
    resulted in evacuations, we reviewed State's efforts to plan, prepare for,
    and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens.
    In this report, we (1) assess State's guidance and plans to prepare for
    possible evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens; (2)
    assess the training, drills, and exercises used to prepare staff at
    overseas posts for crises, including possible evacuation; and (3) evaluate
    State's efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate lessons learned from
    previous evacuations into modifications of guidance and training. As part
    of this review, we collected information on State's and the Department of
    Defense's (DOD) efforts to evacuate American citizens from Lebanon in July
    2006. To address questions specifically about the Lebanon evacuation, we
    briefed members of your staff on April 30, 2007, and issued a separate
    report on the Lebanon evacuation in June 2007.^2

    To meet these three objectives, we examined State and DOD documents
    related to evacuation planning, preparations, training, and execution. We
    spoke with State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and traveled to
    Cyprus, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, where we met with State and DOD
    officials responsible for planning and implementing evacuations, including
    the July 2006 evacuation from Lebanon. In addition, we conducted a survey
    of all 243 EACs at State's overseas posts; 86 percent of these committees
    responded to our survey.^3 We requested that the post's EAC members
    collectively complete the survey.^4 We also conducted 22 structured
    interviews with State employees who had experienced a variety of
    evacuation-related events over the last 5 years. We performed our work
    from June 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards. Appendix I provides a more detailed
    description of our scope and methodology.

    ^2GAO, State Department: The July 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens
    from Lebanon, [35]GAO-07-893R (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2007).

    ^3Survey questions, results, and number of respondents per question are
    presented in an electronic-supplement to this report, which may be
    accessed at [36]GAO-08-24sp . Survey percentages reported do not include
    nonresponses to each question in our survey.

    ^4Survey responses collectively completed by State overseas posts' EAC
    members will hereafter be presented as "Posts reported that... ."

    Results in Brief

    In recent years, State has conducted numerous evacuations--most notably
    the safe evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens and family members
    from Lebanon. State provides a variety of guidance and training to prepare
    overseas staff for managing evacuations of post staff, dependents, and
    American citizens. However, we found that State guidance and plans to
    prepare for possible evacuation of post staff, dependents, and American
    citizens could be improved. First, although the EPH is State's primary
    guidance, posts reported it was too generic, voluminous, and not
    particularly useful in preparing for the possibility of evacuation. For
    example, one post reported that the EPH had too much generic boilerplate
    language and another indicated the EPH was large and not user-friendly.
    Second, while all posts are required to review and update their EAPs once
    a year, we found almost 40 percent of posts surveyed had not updated their
    EAP in 18 months or longer. Without EAPs that are reviewed and updated on
    a timely basis, posts' planning and preparedness for crisis situations,
    including evacuations, can be impaired. Third, State requires posts to
    produce estimates of the number of private American citizens in country;
    however, more than three-quarters of posts said their last estimate was,
    at best, only somewhat accurate. State officials told us these estimates,
    called F-77 reports, were best guesses and not based on a particular
    methodology. Lastly, when State requires DOD assistance with a large-scale
    evacuation, the two departments rely on a memorandum of agreement (MOA);
    but we found weaknesses in the agreement that could limit State's and
    DOD's ability to quickly and effectively work together during a crisis,
    such as not addressing the logistical capabilities and limitations of each
    department, and not referencing contact lists to expedite practical
    communications between State and DOD personnel in a crisis.

    State provides crisis management training to post staff--including
    instruction for EAC members, CMEs conducted at each post, and classroom
    training for overseas-bound staff at FSI's U.S. campus. However, we found
    gaps in this training as it relates to preparing for evacuations. For
    example, while the EPH states that a "robust training program" for
    overseas staff "is essential for emergency preparedness," over one-quarter
    of posts reported that EAC members have not received training necessary to
    meet their assigned emergency responsibilities. As a result, EAC members
    may not be fully prepared to make decisions in a crisis. Specifically,
    officials from several posts reported that newer staff have not received
    training for their roles on the EAC. For example, one post noted that the
    frequent turnover at unaccompanied posts, where staff serve for only 1
    year, means that EAC members at these posts need training to make them
    better equipped to work as a team. Although CMEs are widely recognized as
    an important tool, post staff told us that the exercises should be more
    practical and reflect scenarios that are more likely to occur at the post.
    Finally, FSI's crisis management training for overseas-bound staff covers
    a variety of topics, including evacuation, through various training
    methods. However, regular input from staff with evacuation experience
    could improve this training. State is beginning to implement new training
    tools, such as recent workshops on hurricane-related evacuations, that
    feature colleagues with evacuation experience and allow for more relevant,
    frequent, and inclusive training.

    State's preparations for evacuation are constrained by the lack of a
    systematic process to collect, analyze, and incorporate lessons learned
    from previous evacuations. Most posts did not complete a required after
    action report following an evacuation, and there is no State entity to
    ensure their production. Almost 60 percent of posts that have had an
    evacuation in the past 5 years reported that they did not produce such a
    report. State has no standardized format for after action reports, and
    these reports could include staffing and morale lessons learned. When
    posts do submit after action reports, State has no formal review process
    to analyze and incorporate lessons learned from these reports into
    guidance and training. Although State has distributed some cables and
    other documents on lessons learned from evacuations on an ad hoc basis,
    these documents are sometimes vague and can be overlooked by posts. We
    also found post staff have limited institutional memory of prior
    evacuations, particularly at unaccompanied posts, which reinforces the
    need for a process that captures, analyzes, and disseminates lessons
    learned from prior evacuations to all post staff.

    To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management of
    evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens from overseas
    posts, we recommend the Secretary of State

               o designate an entity within State to (1) ensure that EAPs are
               prepared annually, (2) ensure that posts generate standardized
               evacuation after action reports with lessons learned, and (3)
               systematically collect and analyze these reports to assess State's
               performance and recommend modifications to State guidance, plans,
               training, and exercises, if necessary;
               o direct posts to complete narrative sections in the F-77 report
               documenting the processes and data sources used to produce their
               estimates, as well as lessons learned on generating estimates for
               that particular country;
               o review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members
               to meet assigned emergency responsibilities, including planning
               and preparing for possible evacuation, and identify areas for
               improving training, particularly for less experienced EAC members;
               and
               o strengthen CMEs by having posts play a greater role in designing
               them and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at the
               post into exercise scenarios.

               To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management
               of large-scale evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American
               citizens from overseas posts when State requires DOD assistance,
               we recommend the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense

               o review the MOA between State and DOD (and its amendments) to
               ensure it expedites practical communication and coordination
               between the two departments before and during a large-scale
               evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
               capabilities and limitations of each department (such as
               capabilities to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).

               We received written comments on a draft of this report from State
               and DOD, which are reprinted in appendixes III and IV. State
               concurred with our recommendations that the Secretary of State
               improve the F-77 process, review training for EAC members, and
               strengthen CMEs.

               State partially concurred with our recommendation that the
               Secretary of State designate an entity within State to ensure that
               EAPs are prepared annually. In its response, State said that it
               was already taking actions to address this part of the
               recommendation. State concurred with the rest of the
               recommendation.

               DOD and State partially concurred with the recommendation in our
               draft report that State and DOD review their MOA. While DOD and
               State agreed on the need to review the MOA, both departments said
               that the current coordination structure was working well. In
               addition, DOD expressed concern that our recommendation could
               hinder DOD's ability to conduct military operations. In response,
               we modified the recommendation to clarify that the Secretary of
               State and the Secretary of Defense review the MOA (and its
               amendments) to ensure it expedites practical communication and
               coordination between the two departments before and during a
               large-scale evacuation.

               We also received technical comments from State, which we have
               incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.

    	 		  Background

               Evacuations occur in response to diverse crises and differ
               considerably in scope, size, and complexity; large-scale
               evacuations of American citizens are rare. To pre-empt the need
               for or, if necessary, facilitate, evacuations of American
               citizens, State has tools for warning American citizens about
               potential crises. It also provides varying degrees of assistance
               to Americans wishing to leave a country. A number of State units,
               including the affected post, are involved in planning for and
               implementing an evacuation, which typically takes the form of an
               authorized or ordered departure of staff and dependents; State
               ends a departure of post staff and dependents by terminating the
               authorization or order.

    			  Evacuations Occur in Response to Diverse Crises and Differ
    			  Considerably in Scope, Size, and Complexity

               State evacuates staff, dependents, or private American citizens in
               response to various crises, including civil strife, terrorist
               incidents, natural disasters, conventional war threats, and
               disease outbreaks. For example, according to information compiled
               by State,^5 of the 89 evacuations over the past 5 years, almost
               half were clustered in the Middle East, Turkey, and Pakistan (see
               fig. 1). Twenty-three of these evacuations were due to the
               impending U.S. invasion of Iraq in early 2003; the remaining
               evacuations in the Middle East, Turkey, and Pakistan were due
               primarily to terrorist threats or attacks. Ten other evacuations
               in Southeast Asia resulted from the outbreak of severe acute
               respiratory syndrome (SARS) in the spring of 2003, and nine in the
               Caribbean were due to hurricanes. During 2006 and 2007, State
               evacuated 11 posts for various reasons, including civil unrest,
               elections that could lead to civil unrest, a coup attempt, a U.S.
               embassy bombing, a hurricane, and war.^6

    ^5State's FSI compiled these records on an informal basis to provide
    context for its crisis management training.

    ^6See app. II for a timeline showing authorized and ordered departures by
    year since 1988.

    Figure 1: State Overseas Posts Evacuated by Country from March 2002 to
    August 2007

    ^aNumber of times one or more posts in the same country were evacuated
    simultaneously (e.g., State evacuated all posts in Turkey in March 2003).

    Evacuations differ considerably in scope, size, and complexity and can
    involve (1) authorized departure of post staff and dependents, (2) ordered
    departure of post staff and dependents, or (3) assisted departure of
    American citizens.^7 When authorizing departure, State grants permission
    to nonemergency post staff and all dependents to voluntarily depart the
    country at U.S. government expense. In contrast, when State orders
    departure, State directs nonemergency post staff and all dependents to
    leave the country. The number and type of post staff and dependents
    actually departing a country can vary greatly depending on the size of the
    post, the nature of the crisis, and the type of departure. For example,
    evacuations can range from massive, complex events like the safe
    extraction of almost 15,000 Americans and family members from Lebanon in
    the summer of 2006, to the relatively small-scale evacuation from Conakry,
    Guinea, in February 2007 during a period of civil strife. The latter
    involved flying a few dozen people (dependents of embassy staff, State
    employees temporarily deployed to the embassy, and private American
    citizens) to a nearby city in another West African country, where U.S.
    embassy personnel assisted the evacuees in obtaining commercial flights
    back to the United States or an alternate approved safe haven.

    While authorized departures and ordered departures of post staff and
    dependents typically occur several times a year, according to State and
    DOD officials large-scale evacuations of private American citizens are
    rare.^8 Based on the information State compiled, the department has
    implemented 271 authorized and ordered departures from overseas posts
    since 1988. According to the results of our survey, approximately 20
    percent of posts reported that they had experienced an authorized
    departure within the past 5 years, and about 10 percent reported
    experiencing an ordered departure within this period.

    State Has Tools for Warning American Citizens and Provides Varying Degrees of
    Assistance to Americans Wishing to Leave a Country

    State has several tools for helping American citizens during crises
    overseas, including evacuation. These tools include (1) travel warnings,
    (2) registration and warden systems, and (3) varying degrees of assistance
    to Americans wishing to leave a country. State issues travel warnings to
    urge Americans considering trips abroad to stay away from potentially
    dangerous areas. For example, as of July 2007, State had current travel
    warnings for 27 countries. The reasons for these warnings include the
    threat of terrorism, civil strife, violent crime, and targeted attacks
    against U.S. citizens. Almost 45 percent of posts reported that State has
    issued a travel warning for their country within the past 5 years.^9

    7"Evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens" will be
    used interchangeably with "authorized or ordered departure of post staff
    and dependents, and assisted departure of American citizens."

    ^8Even less frequently, State will close a post after evacuating all staff
    and dependents. The last time this occurred was Embassy Bangui, Central
    African Republic, in November 2002.

    State also encourages, but cannot require, U.S. citizens to register with
    the department when traveling abroad.^10 According to State officials,
    this allows State to have better information on the number and location of
    American citizens in a country should a crisis arise. In the event of a
    crisis, wardens--which consist of business contacts, hotel
    representatives, nongovernmental organization officials, or other
    individuals connected to communities of Americans in the country who have
    agreed to serve as a liaison between the post and the parties they have
    agreed to contact--forward messages from the post to these parties. These
    messages, often conveyed via phone trees in the past but now typically
    sent via mass e-mails, text messages, or faxes, contain information about
    potential security threats or urgent directives such as where and when to
    gather in the event of an evacuation. Almost three-quarters of posts
    reported issuing a threat or security warning within the past 5 years.

    Although State cannot order American citizens to leave a country due to a
    crisis, State officials said they provide varying degrees of assistance to
    Americans wishing to leave. State officials told us American citizens
    typically leave on commercially available flights; the U.S. government
    does not generally arrange transportation for departing American citizens.
    State sometimes assists by creating greater availability of commercial
    transport, such as by requesting U.S. flag carriers to schedule more
    flights. Infrequently, when commercial transportation is not available,
    State officials contract transportation for American citizens.^11 More
    serious crises may require the assistance of DOD; according to data
    compiled by State, DOD has provided assistance on only four occasions in
    the past 5 years. For example, during a period of civil unrest in a
    Caribbean country in 2004, DOD provided military assistance to help
    embassy personnel and their families depart the country. On very rare
    occasions, large numbers of American citizens depart the country on U.S.
    government-contracted and U.S. military transportation.^12

    ^9A list of current travel warnings issued by State can be found at State's
    Web site, [37]http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html .

    ^10According to statistics compiled by the Commerce Department's Bureau of
    Travel and Tourism, U.S. citizen overseas air travel is increasing. U.S.
    citizen overseas air travel rose over 50 percent from 1996 to 2006, from
    19,786,300 to 29,947,055 U.S. citizen departures, excluding travel to
    Canada and Mexico.

    ^11Pursuant to statutory requirement, State has a mechanism for seeking
    reimbursement from American citizens for commercial transportation costs
    associated with an evacuation. State evacuates U.S. citizens from overseas
    locations according to 22 U.S.C. 2671(b)(2)(A), which authorizes
    expenditures from the department's appropriation for Emergencies in the
    Diplomatic or Consular Service (the "K Fund") for "the evacuation when
    their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster of
    (i) United States Government employees and their dependents; and (ii)
    private United States citizens or third-country nationals, on a
    reimbursable basis to the maximum extent practicable... ."

    A Number of State Units Are Involved in Planning for and Implementing
    Evacuations

    A number of State units are involved in planning for and implementing the
    authorized or ordered departure of staff and dependents and assisting
    American citizens who wish to leave (see fig. 2). In Washington, D.C.,
    State headquarters provides guidance and training to prepare for
    evacuations. A Crisis Management Support unit coordinates crisis response
    with other State units and U.S. government agencies, supports taskforces
    that assist posts in handling crises, and trains headquarters staff in
    evacuation procedures and policy. Several State bureaus also are involved
    in preparations for possible evacuations and implementing evacuations.
    These include the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which generates emergency
    guidance and oversees planning for crises; the Bureau of Human Resources,
    which includes a Family Liaison Office that assists evacuated spouses and
    dependents; the Consular Affairs Bureau, which responds to the needs of
    American citizens abroad; and the Bureau of Administration, which is
    responsible for chartering flights or other transportation out of the
    country, if needed. In addition, FSI in Arlington, Virginia, provides
    training for staff before they leave for their first overseas post or
    rotate to a new post, and conducts periodic CME training at each post.^13

    ^12During the summer of 2006 evacuation from Lebanon, State suspended its
    policy of collecting promissory notes from evacuees regarding
    reimbursement for evacuation-related costs; State officials said they
    viewed this policy as a potential hurdle in the evacuation process due to
    the significant potential danger associated with the situation on the
    ground in Lebanon.

    ^13According to State guidance, CMEs are to be conducted annually at
    1-year tour of duty posts, and every 2 to 2-1/2 years at other posts.

    Figure 2: State Department Units Involved in Implementing the Authorized
    or Ordered Departure of Staff and Dependents

    Overseas, posts also are responsible for preparing for crises, including a
    potential evacuation of staff, dependents, and private American citizens
    in the country. For example, the post's EAC develops an EAP to prepare for
    crises; the plan includes trip wires that can be used to determine when to
    authorize or order the departure of staff and dependents. Each post also
    prepares an estimate of the number and location of private American
    citizens present in the country and practices responding to crises that
    could lead to an evacuation through CMEs and other drills.

    During a crisis, the ambassador can request that State headquarters
    approve a departure of post staff and their families and is expected to
    recommend post evacuations on a timely basis when circumstances warrant
    it.^14 These evacuations may be approved "when it is of national interest
    to require the departure of some or all employees and/or their eligible
    family members, or if there is imminent danger to the life of the employee
    or the lives of the immediate family of the employee." The formal decision
    on evacuating post staff and dependents is made by the Under Secretary for
    Management in an Action Memorandum. The decision is communicated to the
    relevant overseas post via an approval cable, or if necessary, by other
    means. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which is responsible for
    providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign
    policy, also plays a role in this decision.

    Beyond security concerns, other factors such as staff morale or political
    considerations can affect an ambassador's decision regarding whether to
    request evacuation of post staff and dependents. For example, according to
    State officials, an ambassador may be reluctant to disrupt the lives of
    staff and their families, particularly those staff who would have to
    remove their children from school. The officials also said an ambassador
    may be hesitant to authorize or order people to leave due to concern that
    a drawdown of staff and dependents could send a signal to the host country
    that the United States no longer considers the country safe for its
    employees and their families. Former and current State officials noted
    that these factors can sometimes create tension between State headquarters
    in Washington, D.C., which often is focused primarily on security concerns
    and therefore in favor of evacuation, and leadership at post, which may be
    more reluctant to initiate an evacuation.

    While a post is in evacuation status, there is generally a change in the
    composition of staff and an increased workload, both of which can affect
    staff morale. Some staff, whom the ambassador^15 considers critical for
    addressing the crisis, assisting American citizens in the crisis, or
    keeping the post up and running, remain at the post. In addition, non-U.S.
    staff also generally remain at the post. These staff, referred to as
    locally employed staff, are typically from the country in which the post
    is located, although they can also be from third countries.^16 Locally
    employed staff range from professional office staff to drivers,
    groundskeepers, and others. These remaining U.S. and local staff are often
    joined by U.S. government officials from State and other agencies who are
    sent to the post temporarily to help manage the crisis. The changed work
    environment, including the absence of family members, the crisis-related
    workload that can involve long hours, and the addition of new co-workers
    can affect staff morale both positively and negatively. According to State
    officials, the crisis atmosphere can create a special bond among the
    remaining post staff. In addition, these staff may feel freer to dedicate
    more time to their work knowing they will not be neglecting their
    families, who also are safely removed. On the other hand, State officials
    said that staff remaining at the post can experience extreme stress and
    feel isolated without the support of their families.

    ^14Pursuant to the President's Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission,
    the ambassador is responsible for protecting all U.S. government personnel
    on official duty abroad, other than those under the protection of a
    U.S.-area military commander or on the staff of an international
    organization, and their accompanying dependents.

    ^15Decisions regarding staff drawdowns at individual posts are made by the
    chief of mission at the post. The chief of mission at an embassy is the
    ambassador; the chief of mission at a consulate is the charge d'affairs or
    the principal officer.

    When the ambassador, in consultation with State officials at headquarters,
    determines that it is safe for departed staff and families to return to a
    post, the Under Secretary for Management concludes an authorized or
    ordered departure by terminating the authorization or order. If an
    authorized or ordered departure is not terminated within 6 months, the
    post switches to "unaccompanied" status. Since such posts have experienced
    prolonged crises, State deems them more dangerous and Foreign Service
    officers rotate there for just 1 year instead of the more typical 2 to 4
    years. Unaccompanied status means that there are restrictions on whether
    spouses, children, or any other dependents can stay at the post. There can
    be several gradations of unaccompanied status. For example, Abidjan, Cote
    D'Ivoire, is currently a partially unaccompanied post, where spouses and
    preschool-aged children are allowed; however, State does not consider the
    post safe enough for school-aged children who generally travel to and from
    school and other activities on their own. A post can continue on
    unaccompanied status for some time. Three posts in one Persian Gulf
    country were placed on ordered departure in April 2004 and switched to
    unaccompanied status in August 2004; all three remain unaccompanied as of
    April 2007.

    ^16For example, many locally employed staff at U.S. posts in Saudi Arabia
    are not Saudi nationals.

    Deficiencies in State's Guidance and Plans Can Hinder Post Efforts to Prepare
    for a Possible Evacuation

    Deficiencies in State's guidance and plans can hinder post efforts to
    prepare for a possible evacuation of post staff, dependents, and American
    citizens. State's primary crisis management guidance, the EPH, has limited
    usefulness in preparing overseas posts for evacuation. In addition, posts
    are not comprehensively reviewing and updating their EAPs in order to plan
    and prepare for potential evacuation. Post-produced estimates of American
    citizens in country are frequently inaccurate best guesses, and weaknesses
    in a State and DOD MOA need to be corrected to prepare for large-scale
    evacuations.

    State's Emergency Planning Handbook Has Limited Usefulness in Preparing Overseas
    Posts for Possible Evacuation

    The EPH contains State's emergency policies and procedures and is State's
    primary crisis management guidance. State officials said the EPH was
    revised in November 2005 to minimize boilerplate language and simplify its
    presentation. However, we found in our survey conducted from January 2007
    to April 2007 that posts do not consider the EPH particularly useful in
    preparing for the possibility of evacuation. In our survey to posts' EACs,
    we asked respondents to rate the usefulness of eight resources a post
    could use to prepare for the possibility of evacuation.^17 Among these
    eight resources, posts rated the EPH last in terms of being "very useful"
    in preparing for the possibility of evacuation. Almost 60 percent of
    respondents rated the EPH, at best, only "somewhat useful" in preparing
    for the possibility of evacuation.^18

    In addition, a number of State officials reported that the EPH, which is
    hundreds of pages long, was too generic, formulaic, and voluminous, all of
    which inhibits its usefulness in preparing for possible evacuation. For
    example, one post reported that the EPH had too much boilerplate language,
    which concealed important information, and another reported that the EPH
    was a large, unwieldy document with no easy index and information that was
    not easy to access. One senior State official told us that the EPH was not
    helpful during a major evacuation because it was quickly rendered
    irrelevant by fast-moving events.

    ^17We asked posts to rate the usefulness (very, somewhat, not very, not at
    all) of the following resources in preparing for the possibility of
    evacuation: (1) Emergency Planning Handbook; (2) Emergency Action Plan;
    (3) Emergency Action Plan checklists; (4) crisis management exercises; (5)
    other crisis management training; (6) F-77 Report of Potential Evacuees;
    (7) advice from colleagues who have experienced evacuations; (8) input
    from local staff on situations in country, including previous evacuations;
    (9) the Transfer and Evacuation Management System; (10) the Crisis
    Management Support "Heads Up" package, and (11) Other. The last three
    options were removed from the analysis because these three options
    received a large number of "no basis to judge" or non-responses in our
    survey.

    ^18In rating the usefulness of the EPH in preparing for the possibility of
    evacuation, 31 percent of respondents said it was "very useful," 50
    percent said it was "somewhat useful," 7 percent said it was "not very
    useful," 2 percent said it was "not at all useful," and 10 percent said
    they had "no basis to judge."

    Moreover, the EPH is missing some elements that could be useful to prepare
    for the possibility of large-scale evacuation of American citizens. For
    example, while the EPH provides guidance on communicating with the media
    in various crisis situations, we found it has no specific guidance for
    addressing the public through the media during a mass evacuation of
    American citizens from a war zone. In addition, it does not contain
    guidance, such as lessons learned, best practices, or tips from
    experienced consular officers, on producing accurate estimates of the
    number of American citizens in country for F-77 reports.

    The handbook is also a post's principal reference for preparing and
    revising its EAP. However, over half of posts reported that the EPH was,
    at best, only "somewhat useful" in developing the post's EAP. For example,
    some posts reported that the EPH is too general and cumbersome to use to
    develop an EAP.

    State Is Not Comprehensively Reviewing and Updating Emergency Action Plans

    Posts are required to create and periodically update an EAP that includes
    planning for crises and "trip wires" used to determine when to authorize
    post staff and dependants to leave, order them to leave, close down the
    post, or initiate the evacuation of American citizens.^19 According to
    State guidance, all posts are required to conduct a comprehensive review
    and update of their EAPs once a year. However, we found almost 40 percent
    of posts who gave a date reported that it has been 18 months or longer
    since they most recently updated their EAP. When EAPs are not
    comprehensively reviewed and updated on a timely basis, important
    logistical information that is critical during an evacuation may not be
    available to post. For example, State officials told us that updated
    contact lists of local government officials in an EAP are particularly
    important for the Consular Section at post in the event that American
    citizens need assistance to evacuate from a country.

    ^19State has recently instituted an electronic system to facilitate the
    drafting of EAPs, and many posts are currently using the system.

    Moreover, some posts have not updated trip wires in their EAPs to cover
    likely threats. According to State officials, each post is required to
    develop trip wires (an event such as the closure of the main road from an
    embassy to a country's only airport) that can trigger a post response
    (such as evacuation of post staff and dependents). Posts reported that (1)
    protest and demonstrations, (2) natural disasters, and (3) terrorism are
    the top three most likely threats at their posts. Figure 3 illustrates
    posts' responses to the survey question, "Which three of the following
    threats are the most likely to occur at your post?"

    Figure 3: Most Likely Threats to Occur at Post Identified in Survey
    Results

    However, almost 25 percent of posts reported that they do not know whether
    their trip wires cover likely threats or, at best, their trip wires leave
    some likely threats unaddressed. Trip wires in a post's EAP need to be
    reviewed and updated to ensure that likely threats at post are covered.

    In addition, State guidance encourages posts to plan and coordinate with
    other foreign missions during crises, such as evacuations. However, almost
    60 percent of posts reported that they do not have standing arrangements
    with foreign missions on evacuation planning and coordination or do not
    know if such arrangements are in place.^20 The importance of working with
    other foreign missions in planning, preparing, and coordinating an
    evacuation was highlighted by the July 2006 evacuation from Lebanon. State
    officials said that good coordination with other foreign missions was an
    important contributor to the success of the evacuation. Close coordination
    and communication with other foreign missions can also be important for
    smaller evacuations. For example, a State official reported that during an
    evacuation of about 400 American citizens from West Africa in 2004, the
    post extensively coordinated and communicated with foreign missions
    because all American citizens were evacuated on foreign
    government-arranged aircraft.

    Estimates of American Citizens in Countries Abroad Are Frequently Inaccurate and
    Not Based on a Particular Methodology

    State's estimates of the number of American citizens in countries abroad
    are frequently inaccurate. Posts are supposed to provide an estimation of
    the number of private American citizens in a country in F-77 reports,
    based in part on traveler registration. These reports play a central role
    in State and DOD's planning for and conducting evacuations of American
    citizens. However, we found that more than three-quarters of posts
    reported that the last F-77 at post was, at best, only somewhat accurate
    in its estimation of the American citizen population. In addition, of
    those posts able to provide an estimate of the nature of the inaccuracies,
    over two-thirds reported that the F-77 report tends to underestimate the
    American citizen population.

    Several factors may complicate the estimation of American citizens in
    country. First, according to State officials, countries can experience
    wide fluctuations in their American citizen populations at certain times
    of the year (such as the summer tourist season, religious festivals, or
    pilgrimages) and it can be challenging to estimate the location of
    American citizens in country. Second, State encourages American citizens
    to register with the department whenever they travel internationally, and
    State relies on registration numbers to generate estimates of American
    citizens in country. However, State officials said that American citizens
    often do not register and cannot be compelled to register. Third, State
    officials also said it is difficult to estimate the number of dual
    nationals. For example, according to a State official, there are a number
    of Saudis in Saudi Arabia who were born in the United States when their
    parents were studying or traveling abroad. These Saudis are eligible for
    U.S. citizenship and may choose to obtain U.S. passports at any time,
    depending on the situation in their country.

    ^20In commenting on a draft of this report, State said standing
    arrangements with other foreign missions are impractical in many
    situations because State's first priority is assisting U.S. citizens.
    According to our survey, 26 percent of posts reported that, during the
    last 2 years, they had discussions with other foreign missions on at least
    a quarterly basis regarding emergency evacuation planning and
    coordination.

    In addition, State officials said sometimes dual nationals with passports
    are not captured in any U.S. citizen entry data received from the host
    government. Dual nationals may use their non-American passports to enter
    foreign countries to avoid host country-imposed fees or to maintain a
    non-American profile in country. Even when a post can make estimates of
    the number of dual nationals in country, it can be difficult to predict
    when and if they would evacuate from a country. Dual nationals often have
    close ties with friends and relatives in country, which can influence
    their decision on when to evacuate.

    According to State officials, the estimates posts produce in the F-77 are
    best guesses and not based on a particular methodology. Based on our
    review of F-77 reports, the reports typically do not contain the source
    data used to generate estimates or explanations from consular officers on
    how they used these data to generate estimates. Considering the
    complications of producing accurate estimates of American citizens in
    country, consular officers need to document the processes and data sources
    used to produce their estimates. If processes and data sources used were
    documented, consular officers would have an understanding of how prior
    estimates were generated using available information. According to a State
    official, State is in the process of updating the instructions for
    producing F-77 reports to include frequently asked questions (FAQ) on
    preparing estimates of American citizens. However, in our review of the
    FAQs, we found only basic guidance with little detail on how to produce
    estimates or how to address the complexities of estimating a diverse and
    changing American citizen population overseas.

    In addition to the above challenges to producing an accurate estimate,
    some posts are not updating their F-77 reports on a timely basis.
    According to State guidance, posts are to submit F-77 reports annually.
    However, over one-quarter of posts reported that their F-77 was updated 18
    months or longer ago or that they do not know when the F-77 was updated.
    The F-77 plays a central role in evacuation and other crisis management
    planning and provides the figures that State and DOD rely on when planning
    for and conducting evacuations of American citizens. If the F-77 reports
    are not updated on a timely basis, State and DOD risk planning and
    preparing for evacuations with out-of-date information.

    State and DOD's Memorandum of Agreement to Prepare for Large-scale Evacuation
    Has Weaknesses

    When State requires assistance with a large-scale evacuation (e.g., during
    the 2006 evacuation from Lebanon), it may request help from DOD. Guidance
    for coordination between State and DOD is included in an MOA^21 meant to
    define the roles and responsibilities of each agency in implementing such
    large-scale evacuations. According to the MOA, State is responsible for
    the protection and evacuation of all U.S. citizens abroad and is generally
    responsible for evacuating U.S. citizens. However, State may request
    assistance from DOD to support an evacuation. Once DOD assistance has been
    requested, DOD is responsible for conducting military operations to
    support the evacuation in consultation with the U.S. ambassador. During an
    evacuation, the MOA calls for coordination between State and DOD through a
    liaison group responsible for evacuation planning and implementation.

    However, we found weaknesses in the MOA (and its amendments) that could
    reduce State and DOD's ability to quickly and effectively work together
    during a crisis. The MOA does not address the logistical capabilities and
    limitations of each department, such as DOD's substantial capability to
    contract and track large volumes of aircraft and ships. In addition,
    unlike EAPs at post, the MOA does not reference contact lists (which could
    be updated on a regular basis) that could expedite practical
    communications between State and DOD personnel in a crisis. Moreover, a
    majority of posts reported that they have had little or no training or
    preparations for a potential large-scale evacuation with DOD.^22 Since
    large-scale DOD-assisted evacuations occur infrequently and posts have
    minimal training with DOD for such evacuations, explicit guidance between
    State and DOD is needed to speed communication and coordination between
    the departments. The lack of readily available, hands-on information
    needed to quickly arrange logistics could limit State and DOD's ability to
    quickly coordinate and collaborate during a large-scale evacuation.

    ^21"Memorandum of Agreement Between The Departments of State and Defense
    on the Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Nationals and
    Designated Other Persons From Threatened Areas Overseas," last updated
    July 1998.

    ^22According to State officials, DOD conducts its own mock embassy
    evacuation training exercises. On an ad hoc basis, DOD asks State staff
    from Washington, D.C., to role play as embassy staff during the exercises.
    However, this U.S.-based training is for DOD units tasked to carry out
    such operations and is not typically conducted with overseas posts.

    For example, as we reported previously,^23 weaknesses in the MOA and other
    factors, such as State and DOD having different institutional cultures and
    systems, resulted in miscommunication between State and DOD and possible
    delays in chartering ships and planes to evacuate American citizens from
    Lebanon in July 2006.^24 A State official in charge of logistics said
    State personnel did not know DOD's chain of command, and it took time to
    determine whom to contact at DOD for transportation logistics. State
    officials found a DOD organization chart online, but it did not have names
    and contact information. Consequently, State may have lost time during the
    evacuation trying to determine whom to contact within DOD.

    There Are Gaps in the Crisis Management Training State Provides to Post Staff

    While State provides general crisis management training to overseas-bound
    staff, there are gaps in this training as it relates to preparing for and
    implementing evacuations. For example, insufficient EAC training and
    infrequent drills can hurt posts' readiness to act in the event of an
    evacuation. In addition, while CMEs are recognized as useful, posts
    reported that they could be more relevant and practical. Further, FSI
    crisis management training at its campus in Arlington, Virginia, for new
    and returning Foreign Service officers covers a variety of topics,
    including evacuation, and uses a variety of tools; however, it does not
    regularly include input from colleagues with evacuation experience. State
    is beginning to implement new training tools that allow for more relevant,
    frequent, and inclusive training.

    Insufficient EAC Training and Drills Can Hurt Posts' Readiness for Evacuations

    As mentioned earlier, EAC members at overseas posts are responsible for
    assisting the ambassador in planning and preparing for crises, including
    possible evacuation. Almost 90 percent of posts reported that the EAC has
    enough staff to meet its assigned emergency responsibilities. According to
    the EPH, a "robust training program" for staff manning overseas posts "is
    essential for emergency preparedness," including possible evacuation.^25
    Despite this guidance, we found that insufficient training of EAC members,
    coupled with infrequent drills for post staff, can hurt posts' readiness
    to act in the event of an evacuation. The EAC is required to conduct at
    least one tabletop exercise^26 per year to ensure that all members
    understand their roles and responsibilities, are familiar with the EAP,
    and to identify out-of-date or flawed information in it. However, we found
    that EAC members at several posts are not receiving the training needed to
    be prepared to assist the ambassador in the event of an evacuation or
    other crisis.

    ^23 [38]GAO-07-893R .

    ^24For example, officials at both agencies noted that State and DOD speak
    different "languages," which made it difficult for State to communicate
    its needs and the urgency of the crisis to DOD. In addition, State
    consular and DOD officials in Lebanon and Cyprus used data systems with
    different classification levels, which inhibited the exchange of important
    logistical information.

    ^25EPH, 12 FAH-1 H-761.

    About 24 percent of posts reported that EAC members are only somewhat
    aware or not aware of their responsibilities and need to make more
    preparations for evacuation under the EAP. For example, officials from
    several posts reported that newer staff have not received training
    necessary to meet their assigned emergency responsibilities. EAC members
    at one post reported that their newer EAC colleagues are not familiar with
    retrieving and using evacuation-related information in the EAP and could
    use more training in this area. Over 75 percent of posts reported that EAC
    members receive training or rehearse their assigned emergency action
    functions on the EAC at most once a year, if at all. One post reported
    that no formal training of EAC members or tabletop exercises have been
    conducted at the post since April 2003. Even when exercises are conducted,
    not all EAC members are fully engaged. For example, a Regional Security
    Officer who has led several training exercises stated that there is little
    participation from other EAC members and as a result, they are not
    prepared to make decisions in a crisis. He added that other EAC members
    should be prepared to make such decisions because the regional security
    officer often is engaged in specific tasks during crises and does not make
    all the decisions related to addressing them.

    In addition, over one-quarter of posts reported that EAC members have not
    received training necessary to meet their assigned emergency
    responsibilities. For example, one post noted that the frequent turnover
    at unaccompanied posts, where staff serve for only 1 year, means that EAC
    members at these posts need training to make them better equipped to work
    as a team. Another post suggested that EAC members should be better
    trained on how to coordinate crisis response with U.S. government agencies
    other than State. A third post, which had received a large influx of
    temporary duty staff to assist with the evacuation of American citizens
    from Lebanon in the summer of 2006, commented that its human resource
    officer needs training in coordinating temporary duty staffing. Without
    such training, posts trying to address the needs of temporary staff and
    deploy them where they would be most useful risk diverting resources from
    the evacuation effort itself.

    ^26A tabletop exercise is a simulation in which an event, like a crisis
    that could lead to an evacuation, is discussed along with possible
    reactions to the event.

    The EAC also is tasked with preparing and conducting briefings, drills,
    exercises, and other crisis preparedness functions for the post as a
    whole.^27 For example, the EAC is supposed to conduct drills that test the
    post's emergency notification system and the consular warden system, which
    is used to notify American citizens in the country in the event of a
    crisis. However, over 40 percent of posts reported that they had never
    used drills or exercises to test parts of their EAP related to drawing
    down post staff and dependents, and almost half of posts reported that
    they had never used drills or exercises to test parts of their EAP related
    to evacuation of private American citizens. In addition, even though the
    EPH recommends that posts consider involving host country response
    services in the training and drills conducted, less than a third of posts
    reported that host government officials have participated in evacuation
    drills or exercises to test the post's EAP.^28

    Crisis Management Exercises Considered Useful but Could Be More Relevant to
    Posts

    While CMEs are widely recognized as an important tool, they could be made
    more relevant to posts. CMEs are simulations meant to prepare staff at
    overseas posts for handling crises, including evacuations. According to
    the EPH, these exercises are supposed to be conducted at each post every 2
    to 2-1/2 years, and every year at 1-year (unaccompanied) posts. FSI
    designs the exercise scenarios and hires contractors to conduct them at
    the posts. FSI officials said the training typically lasts 2 days,
    starting with an overview of the EPH and EAP followed by several crisis
    simulations for all post staff on the first day and continuing on the
    second day with longer and more involved simulations for EAC members. Over
    70 percent of posts reported that they have used these exercises to refine
    their EAP, and more than three-quarters of this group reported that the
    exercise was very or extremely useful in doing so. Staff from a few posts
    characterized the exercises as realistic and timely, and FSI officials
    cited several instances in which the exercises improved crisis
    preparedness in a concrete manner, such as by prompting post staff to
    identify a location for their alternate command center.

    ^27According to the EPH (12 FAH-1 H-231), "Responsibilities of the EAC
    include ... drills, exercises and other crisis preparedness functions (see
    12 FAH-1 H-244 and 12 FAH-1 H-700) and ... ensuring mission-wide
    familiarity with the EAP and representative participation in its
    preparation process."

    ^28Almost three-quarters of posts have identified and contacted local
    government officials, such as airport and seaport officials, who might
    help facilitate the evacuation of large numbers of American citizens.
    Further, 65 posts, or 31 percent of posts responding to our survey,
    indicated that such officials would be both "extremely" or "very" willing
    and "extremely" or "very" able to help facilitate the evacuation of large
    numbers of American citizens. However, a majority of these posts reported
    that they did not include local government officials in evacuation drills
    or exercises to test the post's EAP.

    State guidance directs that scenarios in CMEs be post-specific and drafted
    with post input. However, staff from some posts described the exercises
    either as not practical or relevant, too long, tying up too many
    resources, or "too far-fetched." For example, staff at one post said the
    exercises focused on a catastrophic but unlikely scenario, such as a
    weapons of mass destruction attack, rather than smaller-scale, more likely
    events, such as an ordinary bomb blast. Staff at another post pointed out
    that such catastrophic scenarios are inappropriate because they involve
    post staff making decisions that would normally be made at a much higher
    level in Washington, D.C. The Defense Attache at this post said it would
    be helpful if after action reports were collected on crises that have
    actually occurred, and if CMEs could be designed to simulate those
    scenarios. The post's management counselor added that FSI should do a
    better job of gathering ideas on how to improve CMEs, and that one way to
    make the exercises more realistic would be to have the post's more
    experienced staff develop them and the more junior staff run through them.
    This would allow the junior staff to prepare for possible crises, during
    which they may have to fill in for more senior colleagues who may be
    absent. Some post staff reported that more practical, frequent, and less
    formal, hands-on exercises would be helpful, for example, "so people can
    learn who does what, and when."

    Staff at one post cited examples of shorter, more practical exercises, or
    "mini CMEs," lasting only a few hours each that they had found useful. For
    example, these included an exercise focused on bird flu, which preceded an
    actual case of bird flu in the country, and one in which they practiced
    text messaging their colleagues to warn of a car bomb at the embassy so
    people would know not to go back to the building after returning from
    lunch. Staff at this post also have used their crisis management training
    time to discuss lessons learned after an event. The event in this case was
    a large-scale evacuation of American citizens, during which this post
    served as a temporary safe haven for the evacuees. In a cable describing
    this CME, the ambassador wrote that it "enabled us to `Monday-morning
    quarterback' our recent experiences while they were still fresh in our
    collective minds, and before transfer season robbed us of considerable
    institutional knowledge." He also said that the exercise allowed EAC
    members to consider lessons learned and "allowed the crisis management
    trainer to hear firsthand many of the difficulties overcome, which are
    details that often slip through the cracks in the final wrap-up versions
    of after action reports."

    According to a State document on evacuations, locally employed staff
    should be involved in all stages of emergency planning. The EPH also
    encourages posts to include locally employed staff in crisis management
    training. Further, a majority of posts reported that input from local
    staff is "very useful" in preparing for the possibility of an evacuation.
    A number of State officials with evacuation-related experience said that
    these staff, who generally remain at the post during a crisis, often at
    great risk to themselves, have played critical roles during evacuations
    because of their contacts with the host government and fluency in the
    local language. According to FSI, local staff are included in the first
    day of crisis management training.

    Regular Input from Staff with Evacuation Experience Could Improve FSI Crisis
    Management Training

    Crisis management training at FSI in Arlington, Virginia, for new and
    returning overseas staff covers a variety of topics. However, those
    portions of the training we attended,^29 which covered evacuation-related
    information, were limited to tabletop exercises and ad hoc input from
    participants who happen to have experienced evacuations or other crises.
    FSI trains State and other U.S.-government staff for their postings
    overseas. It provides courses for new Foreign Service officers about to be
    sent to their first post and for more experienced staff rotating to new
    posts. It also provides courses targeted to specific positions, such as
    ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission, or Community Liaison officers
    (CLO).^30 All these courses have crisis management segments, which last
    anywhere from a few hours to a few days, and cover evacuation-related
    information, including a brief description of the EPH, EAP, EAC, the
    warden system, and the post's obligations to private American citizens,
    among other evacuation-related information. As a result, all staff receive
    some training to prepare for possible evacuation before being sent
    overseas. The training we attended included lectures accompanied by
    PowerPoint presentations. Two of the three course segments we attended
    also included tabletop exercises with hypothetical crisis scenarios
    involving escalating trip wires and role playing as part of a mock EAC.

    ^29We attended crisis management segments for three courses: the general
    course for experienced State and other U.S. government staff about to
    rotate to new posts, one for new Foreign Service officers, and one for
    CLOs.

    ^30CLOs who work in conjunction with State's Family Liaison Office
    typically are employee spouses who are paid to address the needs of family
    members at an overseas post and ensure the cohesiveness and morale of the
    post community, such as by planning social events. CLOs are responsible
    for addressing families' practical and emotional needs during an
    authorized or ordered departure and typically leave the post with
    families.

    While the material presented in the courses provided some useful
    information, such as descriptions of the EPH, EAP, and EAC, some of the
    most practical, as well as engaging, parts of these course
    segments--comments from participants who happened to have been through
    evacuations--were included by chance rather than being formally
    incorporated into the program. For example, a participant in one class who
    had been evacuated twice from Jakarta, Indonesia provided much more
    specific information than the instructor was able to provide regarding the
    importance of contact information for evacuating family members. Fifty
    percent more posts rated advice from experienced colleagues as "very
    useful" in preparing for the possibility of evacuations compared to the
    number that rated crisis management training at FSI "very useful." Given
    this finding, FSI crisis management training could be improved by
    incorporating guest speakers who have been through evacuations (either as
    evacuees, critical staff remaining at post, or temporary staff sent to
    help with the crisis). A consular official at the embassy in Beirut who
    worked through the 2006 evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon told
    us such training would be valuable and she would like to contribute to it.

    State Beginning to Implement New Training Tools

    State is beginning to implement training tools through which staff with
    evacuation experience can share their insights with colleagues, and it is
    experimenting with new mechanisms to allow more frequent and inclusive
    training. For example, the Consular Affairs Bureau recently conducted two
    workshops in the aftermath of Hurricanes Wilma and Katrina that featured
    staff with experience evacuating American citizens from hurricanes. In
    addition to State employees, the first hurricane workshop included
    officials from other U.S. government agencies, the private sector, and
    other entities, so participants could learn what the roles of these
    entities were in the evacuations and discuss any challenges in
    coordination.^31 The second workshop primarily included State employees
    but was conducted via videoconference, which allowed local staff from
    affected posts to participate. According to the Director of Consular
    Affairs' Office of American Citizen Services, these staff are especially
    valuable because they tend to remain at a post much longer than rotating
    U.S. staff and therefore have long institutional memories and a wealth of
    experience. The Consular Affairs Bureau also is in the process of
    developing training based on lessons learned from staff involved in the
    2006 evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon.^32

    FSI is beginning to use new tools as well, including conducting some
    exercises via videoconference. For example, it has used videoconferencing
    to conduct exercises tailored to specific upcoming, potentially
    crisis-prone events, such as major sporting events held in overseas
    cities. It also has conducted videoconference-based exercises from hubs in
    several countries that have allowed staff from outlying posts to
    participate without having to travel to the training location. While posts
    in some developing countries may lack the needed infrastructure to
    participate in videoconferencing and differing time zones can create
    scheduling problems, this technology can allow for more frequent,
    on-demand exercises with greater participation from staff at all posts as
    well as locally employed staff. In addition, a State official involved in
    training said FSI would consider other options for improving CMEs,
    including possibly reevaluating their 2-day structure and introducing
    online training.

    ^31In addition to Consular Affairs staff, participants included staff from
    affected posts in Mexico and the Caribbean, and related State regional and
    functional units such as the Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau and Crisis
    Management Support; officials from other U.S. government agencies such as
    DOD, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Federal
    Aviation Administration; private industry representatives from the travel,
    airline, cruise, and other industries; international organizations (the
    Pan American Health Organization); and foreign government officials whose
    citizens had also been stranded by the hurricanes.

    ^32State previously produced a digital video disc (DVD) ("Crisis
    Response") and a video ("Lives on Hold") that share lessons learned by
    former Ambassador Prudence Bushnell and other State officials in the
    aftermath of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings and crises, including
    evacuations, at other posts.

    State's Lack of a Systematic Process to Collect, Analyze, and Incorporate
    Lessons Learned Constrains Preparation for Evacuation

    State lacks a systematic process to collect, analyze, and incorporate
    lessons learned from previous evacuations, which constrains posts' efforts
    to prepare and plan for future evacuations. The majority of posts do not
    complete after action reports detailing lessons learned following an
    evacuation, and there is no State entity responsible for ensuring their
    production. Evacuation-related after action reports do not have a
    standardized format, and these reports could include lessons learned on
    recurring staff and morale issues. State has no systematic mechanism to
    ensure lessons learned included in after action reports are analyzed and
    incorporated into modifications of training and guidance. Although State
    headquarters has disseminated some ad hoc guidance based on lessons
    learned from prior evacuations, the guidance is sometimes vague and may be
    overlooked by posts due to the high volume of material they receive. Post
    staff have limited institutional knowledge of earlier evacuations, which
    points to a need for a more comprehensive process that captures and
    disseminates lessons learned from prior evacuations to all post staff.

    Most Posts Did Not Complete an After Action Report Following an Evacuation, and
    There Is No State Entity to Ensure Its Production

    Following an authorized or ordered departure, posts are required to
    complete an after action report that includes lessons learned.
    Furthermore, State guidance for cables terminating authorized or ordered
    departure directs that posts submit an after action report within 15 days.
    Despite this explicit guidance, almost 60 percent of posts that have
    experienced an authorized or ordered departure in the past 5 years
    reported that they have not produced an after action report. As a result,
    State does not have the opportunity to assess most posts' evacuation
    experiences. It is therefore difficult for State to determine common
    themes or trends among evacuations. There may also be similarities among
    posts that do produce after action reports that would not be truly
    representative of post evacuations as a whole.

    According to State officials, there is no single entity at State
    responsible for ensuring that posts produce after action reports following
    an evacuation. We were told of specific cases where valuable lessons were
    learned during a recent post evacuation, but this information remained
    generally unknown because State has not systematically collected after
    action reports. For example, one evacuation was due to civil unrest where
    several hundred Americans were evacuated from an African country. The
    official told us the warden system collapsed during the crisis; wardens
    either fled the violence, could not get to their phone lists, or could not
    charge their cell phones and make calls. The post had purchased a computer
    program that allowed it to send text messages over cell phones en masse.
    The official said this capability was critical to getting messages out to
    American citizens, and the system undoubtedly saved lives. The official
    further stated that the ability to text message is crucial in a crisis and
    should be a standard tool for assisting American citizens. While some
    posts also are implementing this communication tool, the lessons learned
    from using this technology during an actual crisis may have been lost
    because the official did not report the lessons learned to State
    headquarters. In another example, a post in Asia went to authorized
    departure during the SARS epidemic. An official who served at the post
    during the epidemic said that before the event, there had not been much
    thought on how posts would deal with a worldwide epidemic, but the
    experience increased the post's preparedness for such an event. However,
    the official said the post did not produce an after action report
    detailing lessons learned during this event.

    Evacuation After Action Reports Lack a Standard Format

    Though required after action reports are to include lessons learned,
    policies to be clarified, resource needs, training needs, and an
    assessment of host government actions, their lack of a standard template
    may cause key information to be missed and make the information hard to
    use and assess. We reviewed about a dozen after action reports and found
    that while they were well-organized and presented information in a logical
    manner, they generally varied in style and presentation. For example, some
    after action reports we reviewed presented information as a narrative, in
    which the author described the event and reported observations. Other
    after action reports we reviewed presented information on what went well,
    followed by what could be improved or recommendations for action. A single
    post also may produce multiple reports from different State entities at
    that post, such as one report for lessons learned by Consular Affairs and
    another report from the management officer. The lack of a standard
    template that highlights key information to guide posts in their reporting
    makes it possible that posts may omit important information. For example,
    an ambassador at a post involved in a recent evacuation noted that many
    challenges posts encounter during evacuation are not included in after
    action reports.

    After Action Reports Could Include Staffing and Morale Lessons Learned

    State's guidance to posts does not include providing lessons learned in
    response to recurring staffing and morale issues, such as the process of
    deciding whom to evacuate and what happens at a post after nonemergency
    staff and family members have left. Problems involving staff and morale
    can occur at posts during evacuations and may affect the ability of posts
    to effectively carry out operations during and after a crisis.

    According to State officials, a challenge during evacuations is
    determining which personnel will be designated as "emergency" and required
    to stay at post and which staff will be designated "nonemergency" and told
    to leave.^33 There often are tensions over who leaves and who stays. For
    example, some post staff have appealed their designation as "nonemergency"
    in the hope of staying. While certain senior and security-related
    positions would likely be designated "emergency" positions in any
    situation, one State official said that decisions regarding emergency
    personnel are often made based on individual employees' ability to handle
    crises or their family situation rather than their position.^34 As a
    result, making these decisions and communicating them to employees often
    requires considerable skill and tact. State officials said that decisions
    regarding the reasons for evacuations are sometimes not transparent, and a
    State official said post staff can be suspicious of why certain personnel
    were designated to leave. The State official said staff may be concerned
    that an evacuation is really an attempt to "right size" a post. After
    action reports could provide lessons learned on how to improve personnel
    decisions in order to minimize damage to staff morale and allow the post
    to function smoothly both during the crisis and when the departing staff
    return.

    Locally employed staff at two posts and one State official said another
    concern is that local staff, who are generally from the host country or a
    third country and typically remain at a post during an evacuation, may be
    nervous over job security, since their supervisors are leaving the post.
    They also may be unprepared for carrying out their duties in the absence
    of a familiar supervisor. A State document to posts recommends posts
    address local staff supervision issues before departure and establish a
    clear chain of command for remaining personnel. However, a State official
    said post staff who are evacuated often do not explain to local staff who
    they will report to or what their new responsibilities will be. In
    addition, State officials said that local staff may fear for their
    personal safety during a crisis, after nonemergency staff and dependents
    depart. A State official and a State document emphasized that it is
    important to keep local staff as informed as possible about an unfolding
    crisis, what actions the post is taking and why, and what their roles
    should be. After action reports could provide lessons learned on how to
    best keep local staff informed about an unfolding crisis and what their
    new roles will be when nonemergency staff and dependents leave.

    ^33The EPH provides no specific definition of "emergency" or
    "nonemergency" staff or positions, but states that "if an authorized or
    ordered departure is necessary, post must plan to keep a sufficient amount
    of staff available at post to maintain certain operating functions...."
    (12 FAH-1 H-222 Drawdown Staffing). These functions include security and
    logistics; communications with State personnel in Washington, D.C.; U.S.
    citizen and other consular services; communication of U.S. foreign policy;
    and public affairs.

    ^34For example, single parents in a key role will likely need to leave
    with their children.

    Further, two State officials with extensive overseas experience told us
    that after nonemergency staff and dependents leave the post, the role of
    the CLO, who is responsible for addressing staff morale and related
    issues, remains important. However, the CLO typically departs the post
    with family members. These officials said post morale can drop
    substantially when family members depart and staff can suffer burnout,
    working exceedingly long hours. A State document to posts recommends that
    posts retain as many CLO functions as possible after nonemergency staff
    and dependents have left. After action reports could provide lessons
    learned on the role of the CLO in maintaining staff morale and could
    include best practices, such as the designation of a temporary or backup
    CLO after the CLO departs.

    State Has No Systematic Mechanism to Analyze and Incorporate Evacuation Lessons
    Learned

    State has no systematic mechanism to ensure lessons learned from after
    action reports are analyzed and incorporated into modifications of State
    training and guidance. According to State officials, there is no entity at
    State responsible for systematically reviewing and analyzing the
    evacuation lessons learned contained in after action reports, and no
    entity responsible for determining whether modifications to State
    evacuation guidance and training are necessary. As a result, lessons
    learned from evacuation-related events are not being comprehensively
    analyzed, and lessons learned are not systematically incorporated into
    guidance and training. Under the current system, the majority of posts
    reported they have not received, or do not know if they received, written
    guidance from State headquarters on earlier evacuations.

    Although State headquarters has disseminated some ad hoc guidance based on
    lessons learned from evacuated posts, the guidance can be overlooked and
    is sometimes vague. State headquarters issued two lessons-learned cables
    to all posts following the evacuation of almost 15,000 American citizens
    from Lebanon in the summer of 2006.^35 State also has issued cables on
    lessons learned from evacuations related to hurricanes and avian flu.
    However, the current system involves distributing cables on lessons
    learned together with numerous cables on other subjects, and posts easily
    can overlook these important lessons due to the volume of cables received.
    In addition, cables do not always include actions posts should take to
    prepare for evacuation. As a result, the lessons from these sources can be
    inconsistent and vague.

    ^35These two cables also were posted to the State Crisis Management Web
    site.

    Post Staff Have Limited Institutional Knowledge of Earlier Evacuations

    Posts reported that advice from colleagues experienced in evacuations is
    one of the most useful tools in preparing for evacuations. However,
    State's policy of changing staff assignments at overseas posts every 1 to
    3 years limits the knowledge gained from evacuations, since staff who
    experienced an evacuation at a post soon move on. The most frequent
    rotations occur at unaccompanied posts, which are often in dangerous and
    unstable areas. According to State officials, staff at unaccompanied posts
    often are less experienced than other posts, and staff generally change
    every year. Additionally, midlevel positions at many hardship posts^36
    continue to be staffed by junior officers who lack experience and have
    minimal guidance.

    According to State officials, the number of positions at unaccompanied
    posts is at its highest level in history. State officials said less
    experienced staff can be stationed at unaccompanied posts for several
    reasons; they have less seniority in State's posting process, they often
    do not have families and are less affected by unaccompanied status, or
    they may seek out placements at unaccompanied posts because such postings
    may enhance their career development. For example, State recently made
    service in a hardship post a prerequisite for promotion to the senior
    Foreign Service. This may result in a trend toward less experienced
    personnel serving shorter terms at unaccompanied posts that could be
    vulnerable to future crises and potential evacuations. Since post staff
    have limited institutional memory of prior evacuations, particularly at
    unaccompanied posts, it is important to have a process that captures and
    disseminates lessons learned from prior evacuations to all post staff.

    ^36State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S.
    government provides differential pay incentives of an additional 5 percent
    to 35 percent of base salary, depending on the severity or difficulty of
    the conditions, to encourage employees to bid on assignments to these
    posts and compensate them for the hardships they encounter.

    Conclusions

    State's diplomatic mission requires its staff and dependents to work in
    posts all over the world, including in unstable, dangerous, or
    crisis-prone regions from which staff and dependents might have to be
    evacuated. In recent years, evacuations have occurred on a regular
    basis--over the past 5 years, State has authorized or ordered the
    evacuation of an average of one overseas post every 3 weeks. Private
    American citizens also are present in increasing numbers all over the
    world, sometimes in unstable, dangerous, or crisis-prone regions where
    they might need evacuation assistance. To meet these challenges, State has
    made a concerted effort to prepare staff to manage the wide variety of
    crises they might face. For example, State has developed crisis management
    guidance, plans, and training such as the EPH, EAP, and instruction in
    Washington, D.C., and at post. State also has been proactive in seeking to
    improve its ability to prepare for and implement evacuations.

    However, while we found no major adverse impacts, we did find deficiencies
    in State's guidance and plans and gaps in its training to plan, prepare
    for, and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American
    citizens. In addition, State lacks a systematic process to collect,
    analyze, and incorporate lessons learned from previous evacuations. As a
    result, State misses opportunities to assess its performance and make
    modifications to improve its evacuation guidance and training. Further,
    the memorandum of agreement governing State and DOD's division of
    responsibility has weaknesses that could hamper communication and
    cooperation between the two departments. State should improve its
    planning, preparations for, and management of evacuations through updating
    its guidance and plans and improving the training for overseas staff with
    emergency responsibilities. With thousands of U.S. government personnel
    and their families working at U.S. posts and ever-increasing air travel of
    private American citizens living and traveling overseas, evacuations will
    continue, and large-scale operations such as the evacuation of American
    citizens from Lebanon could happen again.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management of
    evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens from overseas
    posts, we recommend the Secretary of State

               o designate an entity within State to (1) ensure that EAPs are
               prepared annually, (2) ensure that posts generate standardized
               evacuation after action reports with lessons learned, and (3)
               systematically collect and analyze these reports to assess State's
               performance and recommend modifications to State guidance, plans,
               training, and exercises, if necessary;
               o direct posts to complete narrative sections in the F-77 report
               documenting the processes and data sources used to produce their
               estimates, as well as lessons learned on generating estimates for
               that particular country;
               o review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members
               to meet assigned emergency responsibilities, including planning
               and preparing for possible evacuation, and identify areas for
               improving training, particularly for less experienced EAC members;
               and
               o strengthen CMEs by having posts play a greater role in designing
               them and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at the
               post into exercise scenarios.

               To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management
               of large-scale evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American
               citizens from overseas posts when State requires DOD assistance,
               we recommend the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense

               o review the MOA between State and DOD (and its amendments) to
               ensure it expedites practical communication and coordination
               between the two departments before and during a large-scale
               evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
               capabilities and limitations of each department (such as
               capabilities to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).

    			  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

               We provided a draft of this report and our survey results to the
               Secretaries of State and Defense for their review and comment. We
               received written comments from the Departments of State and
               Defense that are reprinted in appendixes III and IV. State
               concurred with three of our five recommendations and partially
               concurred with two. State also provided us with technical
               comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD partially
               concurred with the recommendation regarding the MOA between State
               and DOD (and its amendments), which was the only recommendation
               relevant to DOD, and did not comment on any other aspect of the
               report.

               Specifically, State concurred with our recommendations that the
               Secretary of State

               o direct posts to complete narrative sections in the F-77 report
               documenting the processes and data sources used to produce their
               estimates, as well as lessons learned on generating estimates for
               that particular country;
               o review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members
               to meet assigned emergency responsibilities, including planning
               and preparing for possible evacuation, and identify areas for
               improving training, particularly for less experienced EAC members;
               and
               o strengthen CMEs by having posts play a greater role in designing
               them and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at the
               post into exercise scenarios.

               State partially concurred with our recommendation that the
               Secretary of State designate an entity within State to ensure that
               EAPs are prepared annually. In its response, State said that this
               task is already covered under existing State regulations and added
               that the department is currently deploying a new software
               application that should facilitate keeping EAPs up to date. While
               we welcome these efforts, it is not clear that they are adequate
               to ensure that EAPs are updated on an annual basis. State
               concurred with the rest of this recommendation, which asks the
               Secretary of State to designate a central entity to ensure that
               posts generate standardized evacuation after action reports with
               lessons learned and systematically collect and analyze these
               reports to assess State's performance and recommend modifications
               to State guidance, plans, training, and exercises, if necessary.

               Both State and DOD partially concurred with our recommendation
               regarding the MOA between State and DOD (and its amendments).
               While both agencies agreed to review the document, they
               misunderstood part of our recommendation. We did not recommend
               that a contact list be added to the MOA. Furthermore, State and
               DOD said they believed existing interagency communication channels
               are adequate for managing and implementing large-scale
               evacuations. In addition, DOD expressed concern that explicitly
               specifying general capabilities and limitations in the MOA could
               adversely affect ongoing military operations. In response, we have
               modified the recommendation to clarify that the Secretary of State
               and the Secretary of Defense review the MOA (and its amendments)
               to ensure it expedites practical communication and coordination
               between the two departments before and during a large-scale
               evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
               capabilities and limitations of each department (such as
               capabilities to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).

               State also questioned whether the survey results, as we presented
               them in our report, accurately reflect posts' assessment of the
               usefulness of existing crisis planning resources and whether
               survey results contradict anecdotal comments/criticisms regarding
               FSI training. We obtained a high response rate to our survey of
               overseas posts; the survey results are a statistically valid
               reflection of posts' views on the guidance and training available
               to plan and prepare for potential evacuation. The survey results
               and findings derived from them are both factually correct and
               methodologically valid. The survey was developed based on a review
               of State documentation and interviews with State officials and was
               reviewed with State officials from Crisis Management Support,
               Consular Affairs, Diplomatic Security, and the regional bureaus.
               Survey methodology experts at GAO were directly involved in the
               collection, analysis, and review of survey results, as well as the
               findings and conclusions derived from those results.

               We are sending copies of this report to interested Congressional
               Committees and to the Secretaries of State and Defense. We will
               also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
               the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
               http://www.gao.gov.

               If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please
               contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or [39]fordj@gao.gov .
               Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
               Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO
               staff who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix
               V.

               Jess T. Ford
    			  Director, International Affairs and Trade

    			  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

               To examine the Department of State's (State) efforts to plan,
               prepare for, and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and
               American citizens from overseas posts, we (1) assessed State's
               guidance and plans to prepare for possible evacuations of post
               staff, dependents, and American citizens; (2) assessed the
               training, drills, and exercises used to prepare staff at overseas
               posts for crises, including possible evacuation; and (3) evaluated
               State's efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate lessons
               learned from previous evacuations into modifications of guidance
               and training. We employed several methodologies to address these
               three objectives. We conducted a survey of all Emergency Action
               Committees (EAC) at State embassies and consulates worldwide. In
               addition, we conducted structured interviews with State employees
               who had experienced a variety of evacuation-related events over
               the last 5 years.^1 We also examined State and Department of
               Defense (DOD) documents regarding efforts to plan, prepare for,
               and manage evacuations. We met with State and DOD officials
               overseas in Cyprus, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia; in Washington,
               D.C.; and at U.S. Transportation Command headquarters at Scott Air
               Force Base in Illinois.

               As part of our efforts to collect information on all three
               objectives, we conducted a survey of all 243 EACs at State
               embassies and consulates (posts) worldwide.^2 EACs are responsible
               for crisis management at post and therefore are best qualified to
               discuss crisis management activities, including preparing for and
               implementing evacuations. The survey consisted of 49 questions
               covering a range of topics on how posts plan, prepare for, and
               implement evacuations, as well as how lessons learned are
               reported. The survey was sent to the principal officer at each
               post (typically the deputy chief of mission or consul general). We
               requested that the survey be completed collectively by members of
               the post's EAC, and completed surveys were intended to reflect the
               views of the EAC as a whole. We received 210 completed surveys,
               for an overall response rate of 86 percent. State posts are
               divided into six different geographical bureaus. The Bureau of
               East Asian and Pacific Affairs had the highest response rate for
               any geographical bureau at 92 percent, and the Bureau of Near
               Eastern Affairs had the lowest response rate at 73 percent.^3 The
               survey was distributed by the heads of the State regional bureaus
               to posts under their supervision via e-mail as a Word attachment
               on January 30, 2007, and recipients were requested to complete the
               survey within 2 weeks. On February 15, 2007, the regional bureaus
               sent targeted e-mail reminders to posts that had not yet
               responded. We contacted all remaining posts that had not yet
               responded by telephone, starting on February 28, 2007. Completed
               surveys were accepted until April 4, 2007.

    ^1These events included authorized departure, authorized departure that became
    an ordered departure, ordered departure only, evacuation of American citizens,
    or serving at a post that was a transit point for one of the above events.

    ^2The survey was not sent to small posts that do not have an EAC.

               The survey was developed based on a review of State documentation
               and interviews with State officials. We conducted face-to-face
               pretests with two former State regional security officers as well
               as two current State officials who had recently served on an EAC.
               We also reviewed the survey in a meeting with State officials from
               Crisis Management Support, Consular Affairs, Resource Management,
               Human Resources, Diplomatic Security, and the regional bureaus. We
               conducted the review and pretests to make sure that (1) the
               questions were clear and unambiguous, (2) terminology was used
               correctly, (3) the survey did not place an undue burden on agency
               officials, (4) the information could feasibly be obtained, and (5)
               the survey was comprehensive and unbiased. We made changes to the
               content and format of the survey after the meeting with State
               officials and after each of the four pretests, based on comments
               received.

               The majority of questions in the survey were close ended, which
               allowed us to develop statistics that are representative of the
               entire universe of Emergency Action Committees. The survey also
               allowed for some open-ended responses. Commentary from open-ended
               questions is reflected in the body of the report, but is not
               summarized statistically. Survey percentages reported do not
               include nonresponses to each question in our survey. Of responses
               analyzed in this report, there were relatively few nonresponses to
               individual questions. Survey questions, results, and number of
               respondents per question are presented in an electronic
               supplement, which may be accessed at GAO-08-24SP.

               We conducted 22 structured interviews, via e-mail and in person,
               with State personnel who had served on an EAC and experienced a
               draw down or evacuation within the last 5 years. Eighteen
               responded to our e-mail with the structured interview questions.
               We also conducted four structured interviews in person. The
               purpose of the structured interview was to collect detailed
               qualitative information related to evacuations through open-ended
               questions, such as training, guidance, policies, implementation,
               morale, and lessons learned. We pretested the structured interview
               in-person with two State officials currently serving on an EAC who
               had experienced at least one evacuation. We made changes to the
               content and format of the structured interview based on comments
               from the pretests.

    ^3Posts in Iraq and Afghanistan did not respond to our survey. Given the ongoing
    political and security situations in both countries, State officials told us it
    would not be feasible for these posts to complete our survey.

               To identify candidates for structured interviews, we sent a brief
               questionnaire, along with the survey, to all 243 EACs. The
               questionnaire and survey were pretested at the same time to check
               for clarity and usefulness. We made changes to the content and
               format of the questionnaire based on comments we received. We
               received approximately 100 completed questionnaires with
               respondents indicating a willingness to participate in a
               structured interview via e-mail. We reviewed the completed
               questionnaires and selected interview candidates in order to
               obtain a wide variety of experiences. All six State geographical
               bureaus were represented in the structured interviews. Structured
               interview respondents had experienced many different crisis
               situations, including natural disasters, disease epidemics, war
               threats, and civil unrest. The respondents had experienced
               authorized departure, ordered departure, assisting private
               American citizens in evacuations, serving as a transit point for
               evacuees, departing posts during evacuations, and traveling to
               posts to serve as temporary employees while the post was in
               evacuation status. The respondents held different positions at
               posts; such as ambassador, deputy chief of mission, regional
               security officer, management officer, Consular Affairs chief,
               public affairs officer, general services officer, U.S. Agency for
               International Aid country director, and Peace Corps country
               director.

               To review State and DOD's planning, preparation for, and managing
               of evacuations, we examined State and DOD documents, including
               State's Emergency Planning Handbook, numerous post Emergency
               Action Plans, several post-produced F-77 reports of potential
               evacuees, the Memorandum of Agreement between State and DOD on the
               Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Nationals and
               Designated other Persons from Threatened Areas Overseas, and
               various other State cables and documents related to evacuations,
               including situation reports, lessons-learned cables, and other
               documents discussing lessons learned.

               In the United States, we met with numerous State and DOD officials
               to assess how State and DOD plan, prepare for, and manage
               evacuations. In Washington, we met with the Under Secretary of
               State for Management; the Assistant Secretary of State for
               Consular Affairs and other officials from the Consular Affairs
               Bureau; officials from State's regional bureaus; and from State's
               bureaus of diplomatic security, administration, resource
               management, and political military affairs. We also met with
               Crisis Management Support officials, who support State taskforces
               during a crisis and train staff in evacuation policy and
               procedures, and toured State's Operations Center, where taskforces
               are located. In addition, we met with officials from State's
               Foreign Service Institute, which conducts crisis management
               training.

               To review how State and DOD implement staff draw downs and
               evacuations of American citizens, and make observations on these
               agencies' successes and challenges in doing so, we traveled to
               Lebanon, Cyprus, and Saudi Arabia, where we met with U.S. embassy
               and host country officials involved in staff draw downs and
               evacuations. State officials in Lebanon and Cyprus implemented one
               of the largest evacuations of American citizens in U.S. history.
               The consulate in Jeddah and the embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
               have each experienced three evacuations in the past 5 years.

               To assess how State interacts with DOD during DOD-assisted
               evacuations or draw downs, we met with DOD officials in the Office
               of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and
               the U.S. Transportation Command's Military Sealift Command. We
               also traveled to Scott Air Force Base in Illinois to meet with
               officials at U.S. Transportation Command headquarters and its Air
               Mobility Command. In addition, we spoke by telephone with Central
               Command officials in Tampa, Florida.

               We performed our work from June 2006 to July 2007 in accordance
               with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    			  Appendix II: Number of Overseas Posts Evacuated Since 1988 under
    			  Authorized and Ordered Departure Authority^a

               ^aIn 1991, 1998, and 2003, the most frequent reasons for posts
               evacuated under authorized and ordered departure authority are
               listed.

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:

    Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
    end of this appendix.

    United States Department of State:
    Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
    Officer:
    Washington, D.C. 20520:

    October 2, 2007:

    Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
    Managing Director:
    International Affairs and Trade:
    Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street, NW:
    Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:

    Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:

    We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "State
    Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can
    Be Improved," GAO Job Code 320428.

    The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
    incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.

    If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Mark
    Libby, Crisis Management Coordinator, Office of the Executive
    Secretariat, Crisis Management Support at (202) 647-7640.

    Sincerely,

    Signed by: Bradford R. Higgins:

    cc: GAO � David Maurer:
    S/ES � Dan Smith:
    State/OIG � Mark Duda:

    Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:

    Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved
    (GAO-08-23; GAO Code 320428):

    Summary and Comment:

    Thank you for allowing the Department of State the opportunity to
    comment on GAO's draft report "Evacuation Planning and Preparations for
    Overseas Posts Can Be Improved. "

    The Department of State has built a strong record over many years in
    managing crises overseas that threaten U.S. embassies, personnel,
    citizens and interests. The GAO report notes that State has organized
    temporary reductions in staff (often accomplished through voluntary
    departures) or evacuations of U.S. personnel, dependents and private
    American citizens over 260 times in the past twenty years alone. The
    vast majority of those operations involved countries with limited
    infrastructure beset by instability or violence, or suffering from a
    natural disaster. Statistics alone cannot capture the enormous variety
    in conditions experienced by official and private Americans overseas or
    the wide range of possible scenarios to which the Department must be
    prepared to respond. Advance planning and preparation, central subjects
    of this report, are hallmarks of the Department's approach to crisis
    management. So are flexibility and innovation needed to deal with
    circumstances that do not fit the plan.

    The Department's success in this regard reflects its determination to
    improve continuously its crisis management performance and training. It
    is strongly committed to learning from actual experience in order to
    better prepare for future crises. Toward this end, the Department
    welcomes the GAO review of crisis planning and preparation, and notes
    that the Department has already undertaken many of the measures that
    the GAO endorses. These include strengthened and sustained crisis
    management training, efforts to develop and disseminate more
    systematically lessons learned from crisis response and evacuations,
    including better use of after-action reports, and development of best
    practices that can be shared widely among posts.

    Much of GAO's report focuses on basic planning and resources available
    to all embassies, and the Department appreciates GAO's efforts to
    review these planning efforts. This focus, while valid, perhaps
    overlooked key components of the Department's overall preparedness for
    crises and evacuations, including the process through which the
    Department and specific posts collaborate intensively in:

    * evaluating possible risks;
    * refining a mission's generic planning;
    * identifying mission crisis managers' key duties specific to that
    crisis; and
    * prioritizing required actions to respond safely and efficiently.

    The Department is committed to supporting, including through
    evacuations, U.S. personnel and private citizens in every country. It
    believes every mission must have a base level of preparedness. But it
    also understands that U.S. embassies and personnel operate in wildly
    divergent threat environments. The most intense focus of its crisis
    management planning and preparation is therefore on those missions
    facing the greatest threats.

    In handling these high-threat situations, moreover, the ongoing
    dialogue between the Department and posts is critical to our success in
    responding to situations that often escalate quickly and take
    unexpected turns. Preparation and planning are vitally important, but
    so is the ability to monitor conditions and adapt appropriately to ever-
    changing circumstances.

    Planning and Preparation

    With regard to the basic crisis-management guidance that State provides
    to overseas posts, the Department appreciates the GAO report's
    observations and recommendations, but notes an apparent contradiction
    between the report's suggestion, incorrect in our view, that Department
    guidance to posts is too long, laden with "boilerplate" language, and
    the report's recommendation that State provide additional, more
    comprehensive guidance on specific aspects of crisis management to the
    field. The Department notes that there is a fine balance between giving
    our overseas missions the support they need and overburdening them with
    additional guidance or reporting requirements. The wide range of
    geographical, political, and other factors with which each post must
    contend, moreover, means that no "one-size-fits-all" approach to crisis
    preparation is appropriate. Instead, Department training and
    contingency planning resources are designed to provide missions with a
    toolbox from which they can develop plans that realistically reflect
    their particular operating environments. The Department is nonetheless
    committed to ensuring that crisis management training and other tools
    used by posts for emergency planning (such as the Emergency Planning
    Handbook and Emergency Action Plans) are as useful, relevant, and fresh
    as possible. (See comment 1)

    The Department partially concurs with the recommendation that it
    designate an entity within State to ensure Emergency Action Plans
    (EAPs) are prepared annually. Chiefs of Mission are already Charged
    under 12 FAH 1 to "oversee the efforts of post personnel to prepare for
    crises." The Department is currently deploying a new software
    application (the Crisis and Emergency Planning Application - CEPA),
    which will ensure wider participation and further familiarize employees
    with Post's Emergency Action Plans. It will also help Emergency Action
    Committee members at post better understand their roles in a crisis
    situation -- and allow experienced staff at post to record useful
    evacuation-related information and tips for their successors'
    consideration. The Department believes this will largely address the
    concerns behind the GAO's recommendation regarding preparation of EAPs.
    The Department notes, however, that the conclusions drawn in some
    sections of the GAO draft report regarding these basic planning tools
    are at variance with the actual survey data collected by GAO about the
    usefulness of existing crisis planning resources. On page 15, for
    example, the report states that most posts feel the Emergency Planning
    Handbook (EPH) is of only limited usefulness in preparing for an
    evacuation. Yet the raw survey data shows that a solid 81% of
    respondents view the EPH as either "somewhat" or "very" useful �
    perhaps because the EPH includes guidance (such as checklists for
    planning evacuation routes, establishing helicopter landing zones, and
    identifying evacuation assembly areas) crucial to posts as they draw up
    the EAPs that will guide them in an actual crisis. EAP checklists, EAPs
    themselves, and crisis management exercises received even higher marks
    for usefulness in preparing for an evacuation (90%, 87%, and 87%,
    respectively). GAO's raw survey data indicates that nearly three-
    quarters of posts reported using Crisis Management Exercises (CMEs) to
    refine their EAPs, elements of which over 85% of respondents report
    rehearsing at least once yearly. Most respondents report that their
    EAPs address the likeliest threats at their post, including terrorism,
    natural disaster, and civil unrest. (See comments 2, 3, and 4)

    In addition, the Department's EPH and individual posts' EAPs address
    contingencies (such as building fires, bomb threats, and certain health
    emergencies) that might involve responses other than evacuation. Much
    of the additional "volume" and "boilerplate language" identified by
    survey respondents provides guidance to posts on how to plan for these
    sorts of emergencies � and, while less useful for evacuation planning
    per se, the Department believes that this guidance is still important
    to include in the EPH.

    The Department also notes that the draft report's discussion of F-77
    reports on American citizens in consular districts overseas (pages 18-
    20) incorrectly implies it would be possible for posts to generate a
    definitive number of Americans in any given country at any given
    moment. The draft states that the Department "encourages but does not
    require" U.S. citizens to register while overseas, implying that this
    might be a policy decision or a question of resource allocation. In
    fact, the Department cannot require or compel American citizens to
    register while overseas. Because of this, consular officials must rely
    on a range of other indicators to arrive at their F-77 estimates. These
    indicators vary from country to country, depending on the unique
    circumstances of each consular district, and therefore do not lend
    themselves to the sort of standardized methodology the draft report
    seems to recommend. The Department nonetheless feels that the
    statistics in these F-77 reports, which are based on consular officers'
    first-hand knowledge of the situations in their host countries,
    represent the best possible estimates given the reality of overseas
    operations. (See comments 5 and 6)

    The Department concurs with the recommendation that it direct Posts to
    complete the narrative sections in the F-77 report and is investigating
    ways to implement the report's recommendation.

    The GAO report criticized the lack of a "particular methodology" in
    estimating the number of Americans in country. While it did not offer
    suggestions on how the Department can reach more definitive estimates,
    the report did recommend that posts document processes and data sources
    in the F-77 report. When generating the F-77, many posts already use
    the "comments" field to describe how they have estimated the number of
    Americans present in their consular districts. These comments are
    accessible to any reader on the Department's sensitive-but-unclassified
    intranet website. The Department will explore modification of this
    software application to make data entry in the comments field mandatory
    � and require posts to use this field to identify their particular data
    sources and methodology as they update their F-77s.

    Crisis Management Exercises and Training:

    The Department concurs with the recommendations that the Department
    review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members, and
    that posts play a greater role in planning CMEs, but notes that this is
    an existing and ongoing process carried out by FSI, in conjunction with
    posts.

    The overwhelmingly positive response and high marks given to FSI in the
    GAO's comprehensive survey often contradict anecdotal
    comments/criticisms regarding FSI training contained in the report.
    These positive survey results reflect the views of the Department: that
    our training is effectively preparing our people for the challenges
    that they will face throughout their careers. (See comment 7)

    While the Department is never "satisfied" with it training efforts � as
    evidenced by our continual review and updating of the FSI curriculum,
    including examining the possibility of distance learning programs for
    EAC members � we would note GAO's survey reported 74% of the
    respondents answered "Yes" to the question of whether EAC members have
    received training necessary to meet their assigned emergency
    responsibilities (question 11). (See comment 8)

    The FSI role is to prepare Department and other US Government employees
    for the full range of potential contingencies. In some countries the
    stability of the society, economy, and political situation weighs
    heavily against the possibility of a mass evacuation of American
    citizens or a drawdown of our posts. Posts in these countries face a
    far greater likelihood of other contingencies: terrorism, mass casualty
    events (e.g., a plane crash), demonstrations near the embassy, etc.
    Including evacuation training in all of our exercises�including posts
    where evacuation is improbable�would not be the best use of training
    time and resources. Conversely, in selected major transportation hubs,
    an exercise that includes the receipt of evacuees from other posts is
    certainly a viable scenario to include in crisis management exercises.
    Our mission in Germany is not a likely candidate for evacuation, but
    the Consulate General in Frankfurt, located at a major transit point
    for international air travel, has received evacuees in the past from
    other countries and posts. FSI has included such scenarios in its
    training of many of those posts.

    With regard to the design of CMEs, FSI trainers always coordinate post-
    specific scenario development, working with each individual post
    through the designated point of contact. The FSI trainer also requests
    that members of the Emergency Action Committee be contacted for their
    input. FSI seeks to incorporate post-preferred scenarios to the extent
    possible into the actual crisis management exercise.

    Regarding GAO's finding that crisis management exercises could be more
    relevant to posts, the statistics provided in the report indicate that
    the overwhelming majority of posts (72%) found they have used exercises
    to refine their EAP and 76% of this group reported the exercise was
    very or extremely useful in doing so (results of question 26 of the GAO
    survey). (See comment 9)

    Integrating Lessons Learned with Training and Planning Mechanisms:

    The Department concurs with the recommendation that the Department
    establish additional procedures to ensure that EAPs are updated, after
    action reports are collected and that lessons learned are applied.
    State has begun to implement procedures that will address GAO's
    recommendation that the Department systematically capture and integrate
    lessons learned in future crisis planning. The Department is already
    implementing GAO's two recommendations regarding crisis management
    training and crisis management exercises by constantly reviewing the
    content and presentation of training modules and CMEs to ensure that
    they are relevant and that they incorporate lessons learned from
    previous evacuations. (See comment 10)

    After-action reports are currently requested by the Executive Secretary
    in the same memo that authorizes the establishment of a crisis
    management task force. They are also requested by the Under Secretary
    for Management in the cable s/he issues to terminate a post's
    authorized or ordered departure status. In the future, the Executive
    Secretariat will follow up these requests by tasking the lead regional
    bureau to draft an after-action report that will incorporate lessons
    learned by domestic players and the overseas post(s) involved. The
    Executive Secretariat will work with the bureaus concerned to ensure
    the after-action report is comprehensive, useful, and prepared on a
    reasonable deadline -- and will archive the report for easy on-line
    access in the future.

    Once an after-action report is received, the Executive Secretariat's
    Crisis Management Staff will follow up with the relevant bureaus and
    offices within State (including the Bureau of Consular Affairs,
    Diplomatic Security, the concerned regional bureau[s], the Foreign
    Service Institute, representatives from the Under Secretary for
    Management's office, the Family Liaison Office, and other regional and
    functional bureaus as appropriate) to ensure consideration and
    implementation, both domestically and at posts overseas, of crisis-
    management and training lessons learned. As appropriate, the Executive
    Secretariat will disseminate lessons learned to counterparts in other
    agencies.

    Coordination with the Department of Defense:

    The Department partially concurs with the recommendation regarding
    review of the State DOD Memorandum of Agreement and will continue to
    review the MOA with DOD, but does not believe that it requires revision
    at the present time.

    The Department notes that although the GAO's draft report suggests
    there may be a need to strengthen the State-Defense Memorandum of
    Agreement (MOA), there is little specific information about how the MOA
    could be improved. With decades of experience managing successful
    evacuations with DoD, the State Department feels that the two agencies
    in fact have a clear idea of each other's capabilities and
    organizational cultures. The standing contact list recommended by GAO
    would not be a useful addition to the MOA since personnel in both
    Departments regularly rotate duty stations and such a list would
    quickly become obsolete. (See comment 11)

    The Department notes there are already several more useful channels of
    communication between State and DOD, including: consultation through
    the interagency Washington Liaison Group; the Military Advisor
    permanently stationed in State's 24-hour Operations Center; eighteen
    military officers currently serving in the Department's Bureau of
    Political-Military Affairs; and the State Department Political Advisors
    detailed to the military's various combatant commands. These personnel
    are experts who are in frequent contact with each other, and who
    regularly play key roles in State-Defense coordination of evacuation-
    related issues. Frequent contacts continue at other levels, as well.
    For example, following the summer 2006 Lebanon evacuation,
    representatives of State's Office of Logistics Management
    traveled to USTRANSCOM headquarters to meet with their counterparts.
    The Department of State plans future such visits to TRANSCOM to
    maintain a positive working relationship and open communication
    channels. Furthermore, both Departments have 24-hour watches � such as
    State's Operations Center and Political Military Action Team (PMAT) and
    DOD's National Military Command Center � that are also in frequent and
    regular contact with each other, especially during crises.

    The Department will ensure, through our ongoing training, that
    personnel involved in crisis response understand the highly-effective
    channels of interagency communication already available � and are aware
    of the central coordination role the Executive Secretariat plays in
    State's communications with DOD and other agencies.

    The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State letter
    dated October 2, 2007.

    GAO Comments:

    1. State notes an "apparent contradiction" between our reference to
    lengthy and cumbersome State guidance and a recommendation that State
    "provide additional, more comprehensive guidance on specific aspects of
    crisis management to the field." Our report contains no such
    recommendation. According to the audit work we conducted, as detailed
    in appendix I, we found the Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH) to be
    both "too generic" and "voluminous," as well as lacking in information
    useful in preparing for and implementing a large-scale evacuation of
    American citizens.

    2. We disagree with State's assertion that some of the conclusions in
    this report are at variance with the actual survey data collected by
    GAO about the usefulness of existing crisis planning resources. The
    survey results and findings derived from them are both factually
    correct and methodologically valid. Survey methodology experts at GAO
    were directly involved in the collection, analysis, and review of
    survey results, as well as the findings and conclusions derived from
    those results.

    3. State has mischaracterized our statement. In our report, we stated
    that, based on survey results, posts do not consider the EPH
    particularly useful in preparing for the possibility of evacuation.
    Half of overseas posts rated the EPH as "somewhat useful" in preparing
    for an evacuation. This, along with the 9 percent who said the EPH was
    "not very useful" or "not at all useful," as well as comments by a
    number of State officials that it was too generic, formulaic, and
    voluminous, indicate that while the EPH is of some utility, there is a
    definite opportunity to improve the EPH when it comes to helping posts
    prepare for an evacuation.

    4. State has attempted to reinterpret our survey results by combining
    the responses for "somewhat useful" and "very useful" for various
    tools; this obscures the point that the EPH could be improved. Please
    see the analysis as detailed in comment 3 above.

    5. We did not imply that it would be possible for posts to generate a
    definitive number of Americans in any given country at any given
    moment; we understand that the F-77 is an estimate of American citizens
    and estimates vary in terms of accuracy. We reported that more than
    three-quarters of posts said their last estimate was, at best, only
    somewhat accurate in its estimation of the American citizen population.

    6. We have modified the text in the report to reflect that State cannot
    require American citizens to register with the department.

    7. We disagree with State's assertion that our survey data contradict
    anecdotal comments/criticisms regarding FSI training and that the
    survey results are "positive." In our report, the survey results and
    findings derived from them are both factually correct and
    methodologically valid. We obtained a high response rate to our survey
    of Emergency Action Committees (EAC) at overseas posts; the survey
    results are a statistically valid reflection of posts' views on the
    guidance and training available to plan and prepare for potential
    evacuation.

    8. We agree that 74 percent of the respondents answered "yes" to the
    question of whether EAC members have received training necessary to
    meet their assigned emergency responsibilities. However, the responses
    to our survey came from EACs, whose members are responsible for
    assisting the ambassador in planning and preparing for crisis,
    including possible evacuation. We are concerned that more than a
    quarter of EACs have reported that their members have not received
    training necessary to meet their emergency responsibilities;
    insufficient training for EAC members can hurt posts' readiness to act
    in the event of evacuation.

    9. We agree that crisis management exercises (CME) are generally
    considered useful; in our report we have identified areas where CMEs
    can be improved, such as by having posts play a greater role in
    designing them and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at
    the post into exercise scenarios.

    10. While we appreciate State's concurrence with establishing
    additional procedures to ensure that Emergency Action Plans (EAP) are
    updated, we did not make a separate recommendation to this effect. This
    is a misstatement of the first part of our first recommendation, which
    asks the Secretary of State to designate an entity within State to
    ensure EAPs are prepared annually.

    11. We did not recommend that a standing contact list be added to the
    memorandum of agreement (MOA) between State and DOD. In addition, we
    have modified our recommendation to clarify that State and DOD should
    review the MOA (and its amendments) to ensure it expedites practical
    communication and coordination between the two departments before and
    during a large-scale evacuation, particularly in areas regarding
    logistical capabilities and limitations of each department (such as
    capabilities to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).

    [End of section]

    Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:

    Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
    end of this appendix.

    Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
    Global Security Affairs:
    2900 Defense Pentagon:
    Washington, D.C. 20301-2900:

    October 2, 2007:

    Mr. Jess T. Ford:
    Director, International Affairs and Trade:
    U.S. Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street, NW:
    Washington, D.C. 20548:

    Dear Mr. Ford:

    This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
    report GAO-08-23, 'State Department: Evacuation Planning and
    Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved,' dated August 30, 2007
    (GAO Code 320428).

    The draft report contains several recommendations, one of which is
    addressed to the Department of Defense and the Department of State. The
    GAO recommends the two departments review the memorandum of agreement
    on overseas noncombatant evacuations and focus that review on two
    areas. DoD partially concurs in that recommendation with explicatory
    comments enclosed with this letter.

    The Department has no comment on the draft report, which assesses
    Department of State programs, planning, and preparations for overseas
    evacuations.

    Signed by:

    Joseph A. Benkert:
    Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:

    Enclosure:

    As stated:

    GAO Draft Report Dated August 30, 2007:
    GAO-08-23 (GAO CODE 320428):

    "State Department: Evacuation Planning And Preparations For Overseas
    Posts Can Be Improved:"

    Department Of Defense Comments To The Gao Recommendations:

    Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of State and
    the Secretary of Defense: review the Memorandum of Agreement between
    State and DoD (and its amendments) to ensure it addresses the general
    capabilities and limitations of each department, as well as ways to
    expedite practical communication and coordination between the two
    departments before and during a large-scale evacuation. (Page 36/GAO
    Draft Report)

    DOD Response: Partially concur.

    GAO report 08-23 assesses Department of State programs, planning, and
    preparations for overseas evacuations. Noncombatant evacuation
    operations (NEO) are included among the types of evacuations the report
    addresses. As the report notes, DoD does not participate in the large
    majority of State-ordered or authorized evacuations, but it does
    participate in NEOs at the request of the State Department.

    DoD and State signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) on NEOs several
    years ago. Because the MOA is almost 10 years old, DoD agrees it would
    be useful to review it. We will approach State to initiate a review by
    November 2007. However, DoD does not agree that the MOA should include
    a list of general capabilities or a contact list for the following
    reasons. (See comment 1)

    The MOA's procedures are designed to facilitate communication between
    the agencies. It established the Washington Liaison Group (WLG),
    regional liaison groups, and other interagency working groups as the
    mechanisms to coordinate DoD's and State's NEO activities, logistics,
    and information sharing. Those groups work very well responding to
    requirements and including appropriate DoD support elements as needed.
    The WLG is the point of contact for DoD on all NEO matters. The WLG
    itself is augmented by the crisis management staffs of the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. OSD recently established
    a focal point for global crisis management activities within the office
    of the ASD-Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs. This office
    serves as the entry point into DoD for the interagency during crisis
    operations, such as NEOs. It collaborates closely with the Joint Staff
    and shares information with State Department's operations center,
    facilitating contact among the required subject matter experts. OSD's
    crisis management staff maintains contact and responsibilities lists
    across the organization. Thus, the required experts within the
    organization can be identified according to the circumstances and
    contacted rapidly, while minimizing confusion and duplication of tasks.
    This approach is more enduring, more responsive, and less confusing
    during a crisis.

    The MOA covers DoD's roles, responsibilities and authorities for
    noncombatant evacuations. It also contains a "Checklist for Increased
    Interagency Coordination in Crisis/Evacuation Situations" as appendix
    one, which sets up interagency processes that are used by the NEO-
    related interagency working groups. Those procedures in tandem with the
    WLG and other groups are well-established and work very well responding
    to requirements. DoD makes every effort to respond quickly to identify
    support requirements. Support capabilities will depend on the
    operational environment in which the NEO will be conducted.
    Capabilities and limitations should be identified during "Mission
    Analysis" by the operational commander when a NEO is imminent.
    Including a list of general capabilities and limitations has a high
    risk of unwitting, adverse affects on ongoing operations and
    operational planning if there are attempts to secure listed DoD
    capabilities independent of military operations. Section E
    "Responsibility for Military Operations" of the MOA further elucidates
    and addresses that concern. Finally, DoD is willing to consider
    participating in NEO training at State's Foreign Service Institute.
    (See comment 2)

    The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense letter
    dated October 2, 2007.

    GAO Comments:

    1. We did not recommend that a contact list be added to the memorandum
    of agreement (MOA) between State and DOD. In addition, we have modified
    our recommendation to clarify that State and DOD should review the MOA
    (and its amendments) to ensure it expedites practical communication and
    coordination between the two departments before and during a large-
    scale evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
    capabilities and limitations of each department (such as capabilities
    to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).

    1. We have modified our recommendation to address DOD's concern that
    explicitly specifying general capabilities and limitations in the MOA
    could adversely affect ongoing military operations. The intent of the
    recommendation is to have State and DOD review the MOA (and its
    amendments) to ensure it expedites practical communication and
    coordination between the two departments before and during a large-
    scale evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
    capabilities and limitations of each department.

    [End of section]

    References

    Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

    GAO Contact:

    Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov:

    Staff Acknowledgments:

    In addition to the contact named above, Dave Maurer, Assistant
    Director; Ian Ferguson; Jonathan Fremont; Kay Halpern; Catherine
    Hurley; Monica Wolford; and Joe Carney made key contributions to this
    report.

    [End of section]

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      35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-893R
      36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-24SP
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