Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Improve	 
Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations	 
(30-OCT-07, GAO-08-228T).					 
                                                                 
The United States has become increasingly involved in		 
stabilization and reconstruction operations as evidenced in the  
Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In December 2005,
the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 44,
establishing governmentwide policy for coordinating, planning,	 
and implementing U.S. stabilization and reconstruction assistance
to affected foreign entities. This testimony addresses		 
stabilization and reconstruction issues related to (1) State	 
Department (State) efforts to improve interagency planning and	 
coordination, (2) Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to enhance 
its capabilities and planning, and (3) State efforts to develop  
civilian capabilities. GAO's statement is based on its May 2007  
report on DOD stability operations and preliminary observations  
related to State's interagency planning framework and civilian	 
response capabilities.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-228T					        
    ACCNO:   A77788						        
  TITLE:     Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to      
Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future	 
Operations							 
     DATE:   10/30/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International relations				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Information sharing				 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     Program coordination				 
	     Program implementation				 

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GAO-08-228T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background
     * [3]State's Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clearly

          * [4]S/CRS Is Leading the Development of an Interagency Framework
          * [5]Framework Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities,

     * [6]DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations, Bu

          * [7]DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations
          * [8]Specific Challenges Hinder DOD's Ability to Develop Capabil

     * [9]State Is Establishing Three Civilian Corps but Must Address

          * [10]Agencies Have Partially Staffed Active and Standby Response
          * [11]The Administration Faces Several Challenges in Establishing

     * [12]Conclusions
     * [13]GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
     * [14]GAO's Mission
     * [15]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [16]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [17]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [18]Congressional Relations
     * [19]Public Affairs
     * [20]PDF6-Ordering Information-Young-10-25-07.pdf

          * [21]GAO's Mission
          * [22]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

               * [23]Order by Mail or Phone

          * [24]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
          * [25]Congressional Relations
          * [26]Public Affairs

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Tuesday, October 30, 2007

STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for
Future Operations

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director
International Affairs and Trade, and

Janet A. St. Laurent, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-08-228T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the goals, opportunities, and
challenges to improving an integrated government approach to stability and
reconstruction operations, which is becoming an increasingly important
aspect of our national security. Stabilization and reconstruction
operations may include efforts to reestablish security, strengthen
governance, rebuild infrastructure, and improve social and economic
well-being in foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition
from conflict or civil strife. These operations have increasingly become a
central operational mission for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Department of State (State), highlighted by experiences in the Balkans,
Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The Defense Science Board's 2004
Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities noted that since the
end of the Cold War, the United States has been involved in either a
stability or reconstruction operation every 18 to 24 months, these
operations typically last 5 to 8 years, and they are costly in terms of
human lives and dollars.

In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential
Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which established the overall governmentwide
policy related to interagency efforts for stabilization and reconstruction
efforts. The purpose of NSPD-44 is to promote the security of the United
States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for
stabilization and reconstruction assistance to foreign states and regions.
NSPD-44 assigned the responsibility for coordinating and leading
integrated federal efforts to plan for and conduct stabilization and
reconstruction activities to the Secretary of State. It further stated
that the Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the
Secretary of Defense to ensure harmony with any planned or ongoing U.S.
military operations across the spectrum of conflict. State and DOD have
emphasized that success in stabilization and reconstruction efforts will
depend heavily upon the ability to develop an integrated, interagency
approach, and they have initiated steps to facilitate this shift in focus.

Our testimony today will address (1) Department of State efforts to
improve interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and
reconstruction operations, (2) Department of Defense efforts to enhance
stability operations capabilities and plans, and (3) State efforts to
develop a civilian response capability.

Our testimony is based on recently completed or ongoing work that
addresses DOD and State efforts to enhance and better integrate stability
and reconstruction capabilities. In May 2007, we issued a report to
Representative Christopher Shays, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, on the DOD's approach to stability operations and interagency
planning and made several recommendations for executive action.^1 We are
also completing work for Representative Shays and this subcommittee on
State's interagency planning framework and civilian response capacities,
and we have prepared a draft report summarizing our results. We are
reviewing State's comments on our draft report and are developing
recommendations to address the problems cited in this statement. For both
our prior report and ongoing work, we obtained and analyzed National
Security Presidential Directives; DOD, State, and other relevant agencies'
internal policies; planning guidance; operational plans; budget requests
and funding allocations for stability and reconstruction efforts. We met
with cognizant officials from the Departments of Defense, State,
Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice and the Treasury, the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and private research
centers. We also met with various officials and military planners from the
U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Pacific Command and,
collectively, 14 component commands. While NSPD-44 also charges State with
coordinating U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts with foreign
governments, multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental
organizations, these areas lie outside the scope of our review. Our work
was conducted from October 2005 through September 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary

State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS) is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning
and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations for countries
at risk of, in, or emerging from conflict. The National Security Council
(NSC) has adopted two of three elements of the framework--an Interagency
Management System and procedures for initiating the framework's use.^2
However, the third element--a guide for planning stabilization and
reconstruction operations--has not been approved or completed. While S/CRS
has tested parts of the framework, it has not fully applied it to any
stabilization and reconstruction operation. In completing the framework,
State must address three unresolved issues. First, NSPD-44, the Foreign
Affairs Manual, and the framework provide unclear and inconsistent
guidance on the roles and responsibilities of S/CRS and State's other
bureaus and offices. Second, the lack of a common definition for stability
and reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to interagency
collaboration. Third, some interagency partners expressed concerns over
the importance and utility of the framework, stating that the framework is
cumbersome and time-consuming for the results it has produced.

^1GAO Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Stability
Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning, [27]GAO-07-549
(Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007).

DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct
stability operations but faces challenges in identifying needed
capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions
of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating
lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operations into future
plans. These challenges, if not addressed, may hinder DOD's ability to
fully coordinate and integrate stabilization and reconstruction activities
with other elements of national power, or to develop the full range of
capabilities those operations may require. Since November 2005, the
department issued a new directive focused on stability operations,
expanded its military planning guidance, and developed a joint operating
concept to help guide DOD planning for stability operations.
Notwithstanding these positive and important steps, however, DOD has
encountered challenges in identifying stability operations capabilities
and developing measures of effectiveness--both of which are key tasks
required by DOD's recent directive and important steps in
performance-based management. In addition, DOD is taking steps to develop
more comprehensive military plans related to stability operations, but it
has not established adequate mechanisms at the combatant commands to
facilitate and encourage interagency participation in its planning
efforts. This shortcoming has occurred due to inadequate guidance, DOD
practices that limit the sharing of planning information without the
specific consent of the Secretary of Defense, and differences in the
planning capabilities and capacities of all organizations involved. Also,
although DOD collects lessons learned from past and ongoing operations,
DOD planners are not consistently using these lessons learned as they
develop future contingency plans. We have recommended that DOD take
several actions, such as providing more comprehensive guidance to
combatant commanders and the services on how to identify and prioritize
stability operations capabilities and the mechanisms needed to facilitate
and encourage interagency participation in the development of military
plans. We have also suggested that Congress require DOD to develop an
action plan and report annually on its efforts to address our
recommendations.

^2In this testimony, we use the term "framework" to refer to the key
elements developed to plan and coordinate stabilization and reconstruction
operations under NSPD-44. The first section of our testimony discusses
three elements for planning these operations, while civilian response
mechanisms, which S/CRS considers a fourth element, are discussed later in
this testimony.

Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy
rapidly to international crises but has not addressed key details for
establishing and maintaining these units. State created two units within
the department--an Active Response Corps (ARC) and Standby Response Corps
(SRC) to serve as early responders to an international crisis. State also
has collaborated with other U.S. government agencies to create similar
units. In May 2007, State received funding, subject to further
congressional authorization, to establish a third corps--the Civilian
Reserve Corps (CRC)--which would deploy a cadre of civilian volunteers
such as police officers, judges, public administrators, and civil
engineers. However, State and other agencies face challenges in
establishing their response corps, including difficulties in (1) achieving
planned staffing levels and required training, (2) securing resources for
international operations that some agencies do not view as part of their
domestic missions, and (3) ensuring that home units are not understaffed
as a result of overseas deployments. State faces additional challenges in
creating the Civilian Reserve Corps. State does not yet have congressional
authority to establish the corps and offer personnel an attractive
benefits package. Further, State is moving the civilian reserve concept
forward without a common interagency definition of what constitutes a
stabilization and reconstruction operation. We are reviewing State
Department's comments on our draft report and developing recommendations
to address the problems cited in this statement.

Background

Both State and DOD recognize the need to improve stability and
reconstruction capabilities of the United States, and the importance of
coordinating military activities with those of other U.S. government
agencies and international partners. Following the problems with
reconstruction efforts in Iraq in the Fall of 2003, State noted that the
U.S. government had no standing civilian capacity to plan, implement, or
manage stabilization and reconstruction operations and had relied on ad
hoc processes for planning and executing these efforts. State recommended
that a new office be established to provide a centralized and permanent
structure for planning and coordinating the civilian response to
stabilization and reconstruction operations.

In August 2004, the Secretary of State announced the creation of the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to
coordinate U.S. efforts to prepare, plan, and resource responses to
complex emergencies, failing and failed states, and post conflict
environments. Such efforts could involve establishing security, building
basic public services, and economic development. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2005 granted statutory authorization for S/CRS
within the Office of the Secretary of State.^3

In November 2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,
which established the Department's policy for stability operations. In its
directive, DOD recognizes that stability operations is a core U.S.
military mission, but that many stability operations are best performed by
indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals and that DOD's
participation may be in a supporting role. However, it also states that
U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to
establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.

In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to promote the security of
the United States through improved coordination, planning, and
implementation of stabilization and reconstruction assistance. NSPD-44
assigned the Secretary of State the responsibility to coordinate and lead
U.S. government efforts to plan for, prepare and conduct stabilization and
reconstruction operations in countries and regions at risk of, in, or in
transition from conflict or civil strife. The Secretary, in turn,
delegated implementation of the directive to S/CRS. NSPD-44 identifies
roles, responsibilities, and coordination requirements of U.S. government
agencies that would likely participate in stabilization and reconstruction
operations. It also requires that State lead the development of civilian
response capability, including the capacity to ensure that the United
States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. Finally,
NSPD-44 established the NSC Policy Coordination Committee for
Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations to manage the development,
implementation, and coordination of stabilization and reconstruction
national security policies.

^3Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, S 408
(2004).

State's Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clearly Defined Roles and
Responsibilities, and Interagency Support

S/CRS has led an interagency effort to develop a framework for planning
and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations. The NSC has
adopted two of three elements of the framework--the Interagency Management
System (IMS) and procedures for initiating the framework's use. One
element--a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction
operations--has not been completed. As of October 2007, the framework has
not been fully applied to any operation. In addition, NSPD-44, the Foreign
Affairs Manual, and the framework provide unclear and inconsistent
guidance on roles and responsibilities for S/CRS and other State bureaus
and offices; the lack of a common definition for stability and
reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to interagency
collaboration; and some partners have shown limited support for the
framework and S/CRS.

S/CRS Is Leading the Development of an Interagency Framework for Planning and
Coordinating U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

S/CRS is leading an NSC interagency group of 16 agencies to create a
framework for developing specific stabilization and reconstruction plans
under NSPD-44. The framework is intended to guide the development of U.S.
planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations by facilitating
coordination across federal agencies and aligning interagency efforts at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Key elements of the
framework include an IMS, a guide for planning specific stabilization and
reconstruction operations, and procedures for initiating governmentwide
planning.

The IMS, the first element of the framework, was created to manage
high-priority and highly complex crises and operations. In March 2007, the
NSC approved the IMS, which would guide coordination between Washington,
D.C. policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and civilian and military planners.
If used, IMS would include three new interagency groups for responding to
specific crises: a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group, an
Integration Planning Cell, and an Advance Civilian Team. The Country
Reconstruction and Stabilization Group would be responsible for developing
U.S. government policies that integrate civilian and military plans and
for mobilizing civilian responses to stabilization and reconstruction
operations. The Integration Planning Cell would integrate U.S. civilian
agencies' plans with military operations. The Advance Civilian Team would
be deployed to U.S. embassies to set up, coordinate, and conduct field
operations and provide expertise on implementing civilian operations to
the Chief of Mission and military field commanders. These teams would be
supported by Field Advance Civilian Teams to assist reconstruction efforts
at the local level.

The second element of the framework, which the NSC approved in March 2007,
establishes procedures for initiating the use of the framework for
planning a U.S. response to an actual crisis or in longer-term
scenario-based planning. Factors that may trigger the use of the framework
include the potential for military action, actual or imminent state
failure, the potential for regional instability, displacement of large
numbers of people, and grave human rights violations. The use of the
framework for planning crisis responses may be initiated by the NSC or by
a direct request from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense.
The NSC, Chiefs of Mission, and Regional Assistant Secretaries of State
may request the framework's initiation for longer-term scenario planning
for crises that may occur within 2 to 3 years.

The third element, the planning guide, has not been approved by the NSC
because State is rewriting the draft planning guide to address interagency
concerns.^4 Although NSC approval of the draft planning guide is not
required, S/CRS officials stated that NSC approval would lend authority to
the framework and strengthen its standing among interagency partners. The
draft planning guide divides planning for stabilization and reconstruction
operations into three levels: policy formulation, strategy development,
and implementation planning. The guide states that the goals and
objectives at each level should be achievable, be linked to planned
activities, and include well-defined measures for determining progress.

As of October 2007, the administration had not fully applied the framework
to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. While IMS was approved
by the NSC, the administration has not yet applied it to a current or
potential crisis. The administration also applied earlier versions of one
component of the framework--the planning guide--for efforts in Haiti,
Sudan, and Kosovo. According to State officials, the administration has
been using NSPD-1 processes to manage and plan U.S. operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan in the absence of an approved framework.^5

^4United States Joint Forces Command J7 and Department of State, Pamphlet
Version 1.0, U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction,
Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (December 2005) and State,
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Update to
Draft USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and
Conflict Transformation (Washington, D.C.: August 2006). When S/CRS and
U.S. Joint Forces Command issued the first draft in December 2005, they
distributed it to stakeholder agencies and requested their feedback.

Framework Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities, Common Definitions,
and Interagency Support

In completing the framework, State must resolve three key problems.

First, NSPD-44, the Foreign Affairs Manual, and the framework provide
unclear and inconsistent guidance on the roles and responsibilities of
S/CRS and State's bureaus and offices, resulting in confusion and disputes
about who should lead policy development and control resources for
stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Foreign Affairs Manual
does not define S/CRS's roles and responsibilities, but it does define
responsibilities for State's regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. Each
regional bureau is responsible for providing direction, coordination, and
supervision of U.S. activities in countries within the region,^6 while
each Chief of Mission has authority over all U.S. government staff and
activities in the country.^7 However, according to S/CRS's initial
interpretation of NSPD-44, it was responsible for leading, planning, and
coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations. Staff from one
of State's regional bureaus said that S/CRS had enlarged its role in a way
that conflicted with the Regional Assistant Secretary's responsibility for
leading an operation and coordinating with interagency partners. More
recently, according to S/CRS officials, S/CRS has taken a more
facilitative role in implementing NSPD-44.

Second, the lack of a common definition for stability and reconstruction
operations may pose an obstacle to effective interagency collaboration
under the framework. The framework does not define what constitutes
stabilization or reconstruction operations, including what specific
missions and activities would be involved. In addition, the framework does
not explain how these operations differ from other types of military and
civilian operations, such as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and
development assistance. As a result, it is not clear when, where, or how
the administration would apply the framework. In our October 2005 report,
we found that collaborative efforts require agency staff to define and
articulate a common outcome or purpose.^8 Prior GAO work shows that the
lack of a clear definition can pose an obstacle to improved planning and
coordination of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

^5NSPD-1 organized the NSC and its committees for the current
administration.

^6Foreign Affairs Manual, 1 FAM 112 (a).

^722 U.S.C. 3927.

Third, some interagency partners and State staff expressed concern over
the framework's importance and utility. For example, some interagency
partners and staffs from various State offices said that senior officials
did not communicate strong support for S/CRS or the expectation that State
and interagency partners should use the framework. S/CRS has not been
given key roles for operations that emerged after its creation, such as
the ongoing efforts in Lebanon and Somalia, which several officials and
experts stated are the types of operations S/CRS was created to address.
In addition, USAID staff noted that some aspects of the planning framework
were unrealistic, ineffective, and redundant because interagency teams had
already devised planning processes for ongoing operations in accordance
with NSPD-1. Further, some interagency partners believe the planning
process, as outlined in the draft planning guide, is too cumbersome and
time consuming for the results it produces. Although officials who
participated in planning for Haiti stated that the process provided more
systematic planning, some involved in the operations for Haiti and Sudan
said that the framework was too focused on process. Staff also said that
in some cases, the planning process did not improve outcomes or increase
resources, particularly since S/CRS has few resources to offer. As a
result, officials from some offices and agencies have expressed reluctance
to work with S/CRS on future stabilization and reconstruction plans.

^8GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance an
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies [28]GAO-06-15 , (Washington,
D.C.: October 21, 2005)

DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations, But Faces Significant
Challenges to Improve Capabilities and Planning

DOD has taken several positive steps toward developing a new approach to
stability operations but has encountered challenges in several areas. As
discussed in our May 2007 report, since November 2005, the department
issued a new policy, expanded its military planning guidance, and
developed a joint operating concept to help guide DOD planning for
stability operations.^9 However, because DOD has not yet fully identified
and prioritized stability operations capabilities as required by DOD's new
policy, the services are pursuing initiatives that may not provide the
comprehensive set of capabilities that combatant commanders need to
accomplish stability operations in the future. Also, DOD has made limited
progress in developing measures of effectiveness as required by DOD
Directive 3000.05, which may hinder the department's ability to determine
if its efforts to improve stability operations capabilities are achieving
the desired results. Similarly, the combatant commanders are establishing
working groups and other outreach efforts to include non-DOD organizations
in the development of a wide range of military plans that combatant
commanders routinely develop, but these efforts have had a limited effect
because of inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit sharing of planning
information, and differences in the planning capabilities and capacities
of all organizations involved. Finally, although DOD collects lessons
learned from past operations, DOD does not have a process to ensure that
lessons learned are considered when plans are reviewed. As a result, DOD
heightens its risk of either repeating past mistakes or being unable to
build on its experiences from past operations as it plans for future
operations.

DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations

Among the many improvement efforts under way, DOD has taken three key
steps that frame its approach to stability operations. First, in November
2005, DOD published DOD Directive 3000.05, which formalized a stability
operations policy that elevated stability operations to a core mission,
gave such operations priority comparable to combat operations, and stated
that stability operations will be explicitly addressed and integrated
across all DOD activities, including doctrine, training, education,
exercises, and planning. The directive also states that many stability
operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian
personnel, but that U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all
tasks necessary to maintain order when civilians cannot do so. The
directive assigned approximately 115 specific responsibilities to 18 DOD
organizations. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is
responsible for, among other things, identifying DOD-wide stability
operations capabilities, and recommending priorities to the Secretary of
Defense, and submitting a semiannual stability operations report to the
Secretary of Defense.

^9Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability,
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 28, 2005); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0
(Washington, D.C.: September 2006); and Department of Defense, Military
Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
Operations, Joint Operating Concept (Washington, D.C., December 2006).

A second step taken by DOD to improve stability operations was to broaden
its military planning guidance beyond DOD's traditional emphasis on combat
operations for joint operations to include noncombat activities to
stabilize countries or regions and prevent hostilities and postcombat
activities that emphasize stabilization, reconstruction, and transition
governance to civil authorities.^10 Figure 1 illustrates the change in DOD
planning guidance.

^10Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0.

Figure 1: Prior and Current Phases of Military Operations

As shown in figure 1, military planners in DOD's combatant commands will
now be required to plan for six phases of an operation, which include new
phases focused on (1) shaping efforts to stabilize regions so that
conflicts do not develop and (2) enabling civil authorities. These are
also the phases of an operation that will require significant unity of
effort and close coordination between DOD and other federal agencies.

A third step taken by DOD that frames the approach to stability operations
was the publication, by Joint Forces Command, of the Military Support to
Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint
Operating Concept. This publication will serve as a basis for how the
military will support stabilization, security, transition, and
reconstruction operations in foreign countries in the next 15 to 20 years.

The military services also have taken complementary actions to improve
stability operations capabilities. For example, the Marine Corps has
established a program to improve cultural awareness training, increased
civil affairs planning in its operational headquarters, and established a
Security Cooperation Training Center. Navy officials highlighted service
efforts to (1) align its strategic plan and operations concept to support
stability operations, (2) establish the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command,
and (3) dedicate Foreign Area Officers to specific countries as their key
efforts to improve stability operations capabilities.

Specific Challenges Hinder DOD's Ability to Develop Capabilities and Encourage
Interagency Participation in Combatant Command Planning Efforts

We have identified four specific challenges that if not addressed, may
hinder DOD's ability to develop the full range of capabilities needed for
stability operations, or to facilitate interagency participation in the
routine planning activities at the combatant commands.

           o DOD has not identified and prioritized the full range of
           capabilities needed for stability operations. At the time of our
           review, DOD had made limited progress in fully identifying and
           prioritizing capabilities needed for stability operations, which
           was required by DOD Directive 3000.05. In the absence of DOD-wide
           guidance, a variety of approaches were being used by the combatant
           commands to identify stability operations capabilities and
           requirements.

           We identified two factors that limited DOD's progress in carrying
           out the capability gap assessment process.^11 First, at the time
           of our review, DOD had not issued its 2007 planning guidance to
           the combatant commanders that reflect the new 6-phase approach to
           planning previously discussed in this testimony. This planning
           guidance forms the basis on which combatant commanders develop
           operational plans and identify needed capabilities. Second, there
           was significant confusion over how to define stability operations.
           For example, Air Force officials stated in their May 22, 2006,
           Stability Operations Self-Assessment that the absence of a common
           lexicon for stability operations functions, tasks, and actions
           results in unnecessary confusion and uncertainty when addressing
           stability operations. This lack of a clear and consistent
           definition of stability operations has caused confusion across DOD
           about how to identify stability operations activities and the end
           state for which commanders need to plan.
			  
^11Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials stated they intended
to identify capabilities through an iterative process known as capability
gap assessments. They envisioned that geographic combatant commands would
conduct theater-specific, scenario-driven assessments of forces and
capabilities required for contingencies through routine DOD planning
processes, compare planned requirements for stability operations with
current available forces and military capabilities, and propose remedies
for eliminating any gaps in capability that they identify.			  

           Because of the fragmented efforts being taken by combatant
           commands to identify requirements, and the different approaches
           taken by the services to develop capabilities, the potential
           exists that the department may not be identifying and prioritizing
           the most critical capabilities needed by the combatant commanders,
           and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has not been able to
           recommend capability priorities to the Secretary of Defense. The
           department recognizes the importance of successfully completing
           these capability assessments, and in the August 2006 report on
           stability operations to the Secretary of Defense, the Under
           Secretary stated that the department has not yet defined the
           magnitude of DOD's stability operations capability deficiencies,
           and that clarifying the scope of these capability gaps continues
           to be a priority within the department.

           o DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of
           effectiveness. DOD Directive 3000.05 required numerous
           organizations within DOD to develop measures of effectiveness that
           could be used to evaluate progress in meeting their respective
           goals outlined in the directive. Our past work on DOD
           transformation reported the advantages of using management tools,
           such as performance measures, to gauge performance in helping
           organizations successfully manage major transformation efforts.^12
           Performance measures are an important results-oriented management
           tool that can enable managers to determine the extent to which
           desired outcomes are being achieved. Performance measures should
           include a baseline and target; be objective, measurable, and
           quantifiable; and include specific time frames. Results-oriented
           measures further ensure that it is not the task itself being
           evaluated, but progress in achieving the intended outcome.
			  
^12GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military
Capabilities, [29]GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).

           Despite this emphasis on developing performance measures, however,
           as of March 2007, we found that DOD achieved limited progress in
           developing measures of effectiveness because of significant
           confusion over how this task should be accomplished and minimal
           guidance provided by the Office of Policy. For example, each of
           the services described to us alternative approaches it was taking
           to develop measures of effectiveness, and three services initially
           placed this task on hold pending guidance from DOD. Officials in
           the combatant commands we visited were either waiting for
           additional guidance or stated that that there were no actions
           taken to develop measures of effectiveness. Without clear
           departmentwide guidance on how to develop measures of
           effectiveness and milestones for completing them, confusion may
           continue to exist within the department, and progress on this
           important management tool may be significantly hindered.

           o DOD has not fully established mechanisms that would help it
           achieve consistent interagency participation in the military
           planning process. The combatant commanders routinely develop a
           wide range of military plans for potential contingencies for which
           DOD may need to seek input from other agencies or organizations.
           Within the combatant commands where contingency plans are
           developed, the department is either beginning to establish working
           groups or is reaching out to U.S. embassies on an ad hoc basis to
           obtain interagency perspectives. But this approach to coordinate
           with embassies on an ad-hoc basis can be cumbersome, does not
           facilitate interagency participation in the actual planning
           process, and does not include all organizations that may be able
           to contribute to the operation being planned.

           Three factors hinder interagency participation in DOD's routine
           planning activities at the combatant commands. First, DOD has not
           provided specific guidance to the commands on how to integrate
           planning with non-DOD organizations. Second, DOD does not have a
           process in place to facilitate the sharing of planning information
           with non-DOD agencies because department policy is to not share
           DOD contingency plans with agencies or offices outside of DOD
           unless directed by the Secretary of Defense. Third, DOD and
           non-DOD organizations, such as State and USAID, lack an
           understanding of each other's planning processes and capabilities
           and have different planning cultures and capacities.

           o DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, but planners
           are not consistently using this information as they develop future
           contingency plans. Lessons learned from current and past
           operations are being captured and incorporated into various
           databases, but our analysis shows that DOD planners are not using
           this information on a consistent basis as plans are revised or
           developed. Three factors contribute to this inconsistent use of
           lessons learned in planning: (1) DOD's guidance for incorporating
           lessons learned into plans is outdated and does not specifically
           require planners to include lessons learned in the planning
           process, (2) accessing and searching lessons-learned databases is
           cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process does not evaluate
           the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific
           plans. As a result, DOD is not fully utilizing the results of the
           lessons-learned systems and may repeat past mistakes.

           In our May 2007 report,^13 we recommended that DOD provide
           comprehensive guidance to enhance their efforts to (1) identify
           and address capability gaps, (2) develop measures of
           effectiveness, and (3) facilitate interagency participation in the
           development of military plans. We also recommended that the
           Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of State
           develop a process to share planning information with interagency
           representatives early in the development of military contingency
           plans, and more fully incorporate stability operations-related
           lessons learned into the planning process. DOD partially agreed
           with our recommendations but did not state what specific steps, if
           any, it plans to take to implement them. Therefore, we included a
           matter for congressional consideration suggesting that Congress
           consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop an action
           plan and report annually on the specific steps being taken to
           address our recommendations and the current status of its efforts.
			  
			  State Is Establishing Three Civilian Corps but Must Address Staffing
			  Issues and Seek Additional Congressional Approvals

           Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to
           deploy rapidly to international crises. State has established two
           internal units made up of State employees--the Active Response
           Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC). In May 2007,
           State began an effort to establish the Civilian Reserve Corps
           (CRC), which would be made up of nonfederal civilians who would
           become full-time term federal employees. State and other agencies
           face difficulties in establishing positions and recruiting
           personnel for the ARC and training SRC volunteers; securing
           resources for international operations not viewed as part of the
           agencies' domestic missions; and addressing the possibility that
           deployed volunteers could result in staff shortages for the home
           unit. For the CRC, State needs further congressional authorization
           to establish the Corps and provide compensation packages. Further,
           State is moving the civilian reserve concept forward without a
           common interagency definition of stabilization and reconstruction
           operations.

^13 [30]GAO-07-549 .

           Agencies Have Partially Staffed Active and Standby Response Corps;
			  Civilian Reserve Corps Still a Concept

           To meet NSPD-44 requirements for establishing a strong civilian
           response capability, State and other U.S. agencies are developing
           three corps of civilians to support stabilization and
           reconstruction operations. Table 1 summarizes the three civilian
           corps.
			  
Table 1: Three Civilian Corps under Development

           Composition                                           Government-wide 
           of                                      Personnel, as personnel goal, 
  Unit     volunteers  Deployment Responsibilities of 2007           for FY 2009 
  Active   Current     Within     Deploy to           o 11                   265 
  Response State       24-48      unstable            filled                     
  Corps    employees   hours for  environments to     positions;                 
  (ARC)    serving     3-6 months support a U.S.      o 15                       
           1-year                 mission, engage     approved                   
           rotations              with a host         temporary                  
           as first               country             positions                  
           responders             government, and                                
                                  conduct                                        
                                  assessments in                                 
                                  the field                                      
  Standby  Current and Within     Deploy to           o 91                 2,000 
  Response retired     30-60 days unstable            current                    
  Corps    State       for up to  environments to     State                      
  (SRC)    employees   6 months   assist ARC when     employees                  
           available              additional or       ready to                   
           as second              specialized         deploy;                    
           responders             personnel are       o 209                      
                                  needed              retirees                   
                                                      on roster                  
  Civilian Non-U.S.    Within     Rapidly deploy   None                    2,000 
  Reserve  government  30-60 days to a country in                                
  Corps    employees   for up to  crisis to                                      
  (CRC)    with        1 year     conduct                                        
           expertise              assessments;                                   
           in critical            design,                                        
           areas                  implement and                                  
           serving                evaluate                                       
           4-year                 programs; manage                               
           terms                  contractors,                                   
                                  etc.                                           

Source: GAO analysis of State Department information.

In 2006, State established the ARC within S/CRS, whose members would
deploy during the initial stage of a U.S. stabilization and reconstruction
operation. These first responders would deploy to unstable environments to
assess countries' or regions' needs and help plan, coordinate, and monitor
a U.S. government response. Since 2006, S/CRS has deployed ARC staff to
Sudan, Eastern Chad, Lebanon, Kosovo, Liberia, Iraq, and Haiti. When not
deployed, ARC members engage in training and other planning exercises and
work with other S/CRS offices and State bureaus on related issues to gain
relevant expertise.

Members of the SRC would deploy during the second stage of a stabilization
and reconstruction operation and would supplement ARC staff or provide
specialized skills needed for the stabilization and reconstruction
operation. When not deployed, SRC employees serve in other capacities
throughout State. Through October 2007, S/CRS has deployed SRC members to
Sudan in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement and to Chad to support
Darfur refugees who had migrated into the country.

S/CRS has worked to establish Active and Standby Response Corps in other
U.S. agencies that could be drawn upon during the initial stage of a
stabilization and reconstruction operation. Currently, only USAID and the
Department of the Treasury have established units to respond rapidly to
stability and reconstruction missions and have identified staff available
for immediate deployment to a crisis. In July 2007, the NSC approved S/CRS
plans to establish a governmentwide SRC with 500 volunteers by fiscal year
2008 and 2,000 volunteers by fiscal year 2009.

In 2007, State received authority to make available funds to establish a
CRC. This corps' staff would be deployed to support stabilization and
reconstruction operations for periods of time longer than the Active and
Standby Response Corps. The CRC would be comprised of U.S. civilians from
the private sector, state and local governments, and nongovernmental
organizations who have skills not readily available within the U.S.
government. These reservists would remain in their nonfederal jobs until
called upon for service and, when deployed, would be classified as
full-time term federal employees. They would have the authority to speak
for the U.S. government and manage U.S. government contracts and
employees. These personnel would receive training upon joining CRC and
would be required to complete annual training. In addition, they would
receive training specific and relevant to an operation immediately before
deployment.

The Administration Faces Several Challenges in Establishing the Three Civilian
Corps

Based on our work to date, State and other agencies face the following
challenges in establishing and expanding their Active and Standby Response
Corps.

           o S/CRS has had difficulty establishing positions and recruiting
           personnel for ARC and training SRC volunteers. S/CRS plans to
           increase the number of authorized staff positions for ARC from 15
           temporary positions to 33 permanent positions, which State
           included in its 2008 budget request. However, according to S/CRS
           staff, it is unlikely that State will receive authority to
           establish all 33 positions. Further, S/CRS has had trouble
           recruiting ARC personnel, and as shown in Table 1, S/CRS has only
           been able to recruit 11 of the 15 approved ARC positions. State
           also does not presently have the capacity to train the 1,500 new
           SRC volunteers that S/CRS plans to recruit in 2009. S/CRS is
           studying ways to correct the situation.

           o Many agencies that operate overseas have limited numbers of
           staff available for rapid responses to overseas crises because
           their missions are domestic in nature. Officials from the
           Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, and Justice said that
           their agencies or their appropriators do not view international
           programs as central to their missions. As a result, it is
           difficult for these agencies to secure funding for deployments to
           active stabilization and reconstruction operations, whether as
           part of a cadre of on-call first and second responders or for
           longer-term assistance programs.

           o State and other agencies said that deploying volunteers can
           result in staff shortages in their home units; thus, they must
           weigh the value of deploying volunteers against the needs of these
           units. For example, according to State's Office of the Inspector
           General, S/CRS has had difficulty getting State's other units to
           release the SRC volunteers it wants to deploy in support of
           stabilization and reconstruction operations.^14 Other agencies
           also reported a reluctance to deploy staff overseas or to
           establish on-call units because doing so would leave fewer workers
           available to complete the offices' work requirements.^15

           State also faces several challenges in establishing the CRC. In
           2007, Congress granted State the authority to make available up to
           $50 million of Diplomatic and Consular Programs funds in the
           fiscal year 2007 supplemental to support and maintain the CRC.^16
           However, the legislation specified that no money may be obligated
           without specific authorization for the CRC's establishment in a
           subsequent act of Congress. Legislation that would authorize the
           CRC is pending in both the Senate and the House of
           Representatives, but as of October 2007, neither chamber had taken
           action on the bills.^17

^14Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of
Inspector General, Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization, ISP-l-07-26 (Washington, D.C., May
2007).

^15Some civilian agencies recently agreed to identify, train, and deploy
employees to stabilization and reconstruction operations if State funds
the efforts. According to S/CRS staff, however, the training and
deployment of non-State ARC and SRC would not begin until at least fiscal
year 2009.

^16See U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, S 3810
(2006).

^17See 110th Congress, S. 613 and H.R. 1084.

           In addition, State needs congressional authority to provide key
           elements of a planned compensation package for CRC personnel.^18
           Proposed legislation would allow State to provide the same
           compensation and benefits to deployed CRC personnel as it does to
           members of the Foreign Service, including health, life, and death
           benefits; mission-specific awards and incentive pay; and overtime
           pay and compensatory time. However, the proposed legislation does
           not address whether deployed CRC personnel would have competitive
           hiring status for other positions within State or whether the time
           deployed would count toward government retirement benefits. In
           addition, deployed CRC personnel would not have reemployment
           rights similar to those for military reservists. Currently,
           military reservists who are voluntarily or involuntarily called
           into service have the right to return to their previous places of
           employment upon completion of their military service
           requirements.^19

           Further, S/CRS is moving the CRC concept forward without a common
           interagency definition of stabilization and reconstruction
           operations. According to S/CRS staff and pending legislation that
           would authorize CRC, reservists would deploy to nonhumanitarian
           stabilization and reconstruction missions. However, S/CRS has not
           defined what these missions would be and how they would differ
           from other foreign assistance operations. A common interagency
           definition of what constitutes a stabilization and reconstruction
           operation is needed to determine the corps' structure, the
           missions it would support, and the skills and training its
           volunteers would need.
			  
^18These benefits would include, among other things, salary commensurate
with experience; danger, hardship, and other mission-specific pays,
benefits, and allowances; recruitment bonuses for hard-to-fill positions;
overtime pay and compensatory time; competitive hiring status; federal
health, life, and death benefits, and medical treatment while deployed;
and dual compensation for retired federal workers.

^19See Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act, 38 U.S.C SS
4301-4333.

           Conclusions

           State and DOD have begun to take steps to enhance and better
           coordinate stability and reconstruction activities, but several
           significant challenges may hinder their ability to successfully
           integrate planning for potential future operations and strengthen
           military and civilian capabilities to conduct them. Specifically,
           without an interagency planning framework and clearly defined
           roles and responsibilities, achieving unity of effort in
           stabilization and reconstruction operations, as envisioned by
           NSPD-44, may continue to be difficult to achieve. Also, unless DOD
           develops a better approach for including other agencies in the
           development of combatant commander military contingency plans,
           DOD's plans may continue to reflect a DOD-centric view of how
           potential conflicts may unfold. Moreover, better guidance on how
           DOD should identify and prioritize capability gaps, measure
           progress, and incorporate lessons learned into future planning is
           needed to ensure that DOD is using its available resources to
           address the highest priority gaps in its stability operations
           capabilities. Finally, unless State develops and implements a
           sound plan to bolster civilian capabilities to support stability
           and reconstruction operations and establish a capable civilian
           reserve corps, DOD may continue to be heavily relied upon to
           provide needed stability and reconstruction capabilities, rather
           than leveraging expertise that resides more appropriately in
           civilian agencies.

           Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our
           prepared remarks. We would be happy to answer any questions you
           may have.
			  
			  GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

           For questions regarding this testimony, please call Janet A. St.
           Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or [31][email protected] or Joseph A.
           Christoff at (202) 512-4128 or [32][email protected] . Contact
           points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
           Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other key
           contributors to this statement were Robert L. Repasky, Assistant
           Director; Judith McCloskey, Assistant Director; Sam Bernet; Tim
           Burke; Leigh Caraher; Grace Coleman; Lynn Cothern; Marissa Jones;
           Sona Kalapura; Kate Lenane; and Amber Simco.

(351122)

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Highlights of [40]GAO-08-228T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives

October 30, 2007

STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for
Future Operations

The United States has become increasingly involved in stabilization and
reconstruction operations as evidenced in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia,
Iraq, and Afghanistan. In December 2005, the President issued National
Security Presidential Directive 44, establishing governmentwide policy for
coordinating, planning, and implementing U.S. stabilization and
reconstruction assistance to affected foreign entities. This testimony
addresses stabilization and reconstruction issues related to (1) State
Department (State) efforts to improve interagency planning and
coordination, (2) Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to enhance its
capabilities and planning, and (3) State efforts to develop civilian
capabilities. GAO's statement is based on its May 2007 report on DOD
stability operations and preliminary observations related to State's
interagency planning framework and civilian response capabilities.

[41]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommended that DOD take several actions to improve its capabilities
and interagency planning. DOD partially agreed but did not specify actions
it would take to address them. Therefore GAO suggests Congress require DOD
to do so. GAO has prepared a draft report with recommendations to State to
address the issues cited in this testimony and is reviewing State's
comments on the draft.

State and DOD have begun to take steps to better coordinate stabilization
and reconstruction activities, but several significant challenges may
hinder their ability to integrate planning for potential operations and
strengthen military and civilian capabilities to conduct them. State's
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is
developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning
stabilization and reconstruction operations, but the framework has yet to
be fully applied to any operation. The National Security Council has not
approved the entire framework, guidance related to the framework is
unclear, and some interagency partners have not accepted it. For example,
some interagency partners stated that the framework's planning process is
cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it produces. While steps
have been taken to address concerns and strengthen the framework's
effectiveness, differences in planning capacities and procedures among
U.S. government agencies may pose obstacles to effective coordination.

DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct
stability operations but faces challenges in developing capabilities and
measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD
agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons
learned from past operations into future plans. These challenges, if not
addressed, may hinder DOD's ability to fully coordinate and integrate
stabilization and reconstruction activities with other agencies or to
develop the full range of capabilities those operations may require. Among
its many efforts, DOD has developed a new policy, planning construct and
joint operating concept with a greater focus on stability operations, and
each service is pursuing efforts to improve capabilities. However,
inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit sharing of planning
information with non-DOD organizations, and differences in the planning
capabilities and capacities of DOD and non-DOD organizations hinder the
effectiveness of these improvement efforts.

Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy
rapidly to international crises, but significant challenges must be
addressed before they will be fully capable. State and other agencies face
challenges in establishing two of these units--the Active Response Corps
and Standby Response Corps--because of staffing and resource constraints
and concerns that stabilization and reconstruction operations are not core
missions for each parent organization. Congress has not yet enacted
legislation necessary for State to obligate funds for the third unit, the
Civilian Reserve Corps, staffed solely with non-federal volunteers.
Further, State has not fully defined the types of missions these personnel
would be deployed to support.

References

Visible links
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-549
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-70
  30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-549
  31. mailto:[email protected]
  32. mailto:[email protected]
  33. http://www.gao.gov/
  34. http://www.gao.gov/
  35. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  36. mailto:[email protected]
  37. mailto:[email protected]
  38. mailto:[email protected]
  39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-228T
  40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-228T
*** End of document. ***