Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler	 
Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry (05-NOV-07,	 
GAO-08-219).							 
                                                                 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for	 
keeping terrorists and other dangerous people from entering the  
country while also facilitating the cross-border movement of	 
millions of travelers. CBP carries out this responsibility at 326
air, sea, and land ports of entry. In response to a congressional
request, GAO examined CBP traveler inspection efforts, the	 
progress made and the challenges that remain in staffing and	 
training at ports of entry, and the progress CBP has made in	 
developing strategic plans and performance measures for its	 
traveler inspection program. This is a public version of a For	 
Official Use Only report GAO issued on October 5, 2007. To	 
conduct its work, GAO reviewed and analyzed CBP data and	 
documents related to inspections, staffing, and training,	 
interviewed managers and officers, observed inspections at eight 
major air and land ports of entry, and tested inspection controls
at eight small land ports of entry. Information the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) deemed sensitive has been redacted.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-219 					        
    ACCNO:   A77928						        
  TITLE:     Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler
Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry		 
     DATE:   11/05/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Airports						 
	     Border security					 
	     Employee training					 
	     Harbors						 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Inspection 					 
	     Internal controls					 
	     On-the-job training				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Port security					 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Standards						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Terrorists 					 
	     Travel						 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-08-219

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background

          * [3]Process for Inspecting Travelers Differs between Air and Lan
          * [4]Traveler Inspection Policies and Procedures Call for Establi
          * [5]Transforming the Role of CBP Officers Is a Work in Progress

     * [6]CBP Has Had Some Success in Interdicting Inadmissible Aliens

          * [7]CBP Has Had Some Success Identifying Inadmissible Aliens and
          * [8]Improvements Notwithstanding, CBP Acknowledges that It Did N
          * [9]Weaknesses in How Well Inspection Procedures Were Followed I

               * [10]CBP Is Taking Action to Address Inspection Weaknesses,
                 but C

          * [11]Problems with Physical Infrastructure Increase the Risk That

               * [12]Making Changes to Address Physical Infrastructure
                 Weaknesses

     * [13]Progress Being Made, but Challenges Still Exist in CBP Offic

          * [14]Staffing Shortfalls and Retention Problems Exist at Ports of

               * [15]CBP Cites Insufficient Staffing as an Impediment to
                 Traveler
               * [16]CBP Faces Challenges in Retaining Officers

          * [17]Major Cross-Training Program Developed, but Ports of Entry W

               * [18]Mission Demands Cited as Reason for Challenges in
                 Delivering
               * [19]Insufficient Cross-Training Creates Vulnerabilities in
                 Trave
               * [20]Data for Measuring Progress in Providing Cross-Training
                 Are

          * [21]On-the-Job Training Program for New CBP Officers Faces Imple

               * [22]Weaknesses in On-the-Job Training Can Reduce the
                 Effectivene
               * [23]Opportunities for Strengthening CBP's On-the-Job
                 Training Pr

          * [24]Results from OPM's 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey Show th

     * [25]CBP Has Developed Strategic Goals for Its Traveler Inspectio

          * [26]Strategic Plan Establishes Goals and Objectives for Traveler
          * [27]Reported Performance Measures for Traveler Inspection Progra

     * [28]Conclusions
     * [29]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [30]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

          * [31]CBP Receives High Marks in Some Areas, but Staff Generally E
          * [32]CBP Results Generally Mirror Those of DHS, but CBP Has Shown
          * [33]Quality of CBP's Work Environment for Nonsupervisory Employe

     * [34]GAO Contact
     * [35]Staff Acknowledgments

          * [36]Border Security

     * [37]GAO's Mission
     * [38]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [39]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [40]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [41]Congressional Relations
     * [42]Public Affairs
     * [43]PDF6-Ordering Information-Young-10-25-07.pdf

          * [44]GAO's Mission
          * [45]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

               * [46]Order by Mail or Phone

          * [47]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
          * [48]Congressional Relations
          * [49]Public Affairs

Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

November 2007

BORDER SECURITY

Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's
Ports of Entry

GAO-08-219

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5
Background 10
CBP Has Had Some Success in Interdicting Inadmissible Aliens and Other
Violators, but It Still Needs to Overcome Weaknesses in Its Traveler
Inspections and Physical Infrastructure 17
Progress Being Made, but Challenges Still Exist in CBP Officer Staffing
and Training 29
CBP Has Developed Strategic Goals for Its Traveler Inspection Program, but
Challenges Remain in Formalizing Related Performance Measures 41
Conclusions 43
Recommendations for Executive Action 44
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 44
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 47
Appendix II CBP's Strengths and Challenges, According to OPM Surveys 51
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 57
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 61
Related GAO Products 62

Tables

Table 1: Top 10 Items--Strengths in CBP 52
Table 2: Bottom 10 Items--Weaknesses in CBP 53
Table 3: Selected Items in Which CBP Scored Lower than Elsewhere in the
Federal Government (in percentages) 55

Figures

Figure 1: Vehicle Lanes at the San Ysidro Port of Entry 11
Figure 2: Border Crossings at Ports of Entry in Fiscal Year 2005 12
Figure 3: Arriving International Passengers Awaiting CBP Inspection at JFK
International Airport 13
Figure 4: CBP Technology Used to Screen Commercial Trucks 19
Figure 5: NEXUS Lane at a Port of Entry 21
Figure 6: License Plate Reader at a Port of Entry 22
Figure 7: Canine Team Inspecting Vehicular Traffic at a Land Port of Entry
33

Abbreviations

CBP Customs and Border Protection
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FAST Free and Secure Trade
FMFIA Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act
FTE full-time equivalent
GSA General Services Administration
JFK John F. Kennedy
OPM Office of Personnel Management
SENTRI Secure Electronic Network for Travelers' Rapid Inspection
US-VISIT U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

November 5, 2007

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Bob Etheridge: 
House of Representatives: 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--a major component within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is the lead federal agency in
charge of inspecting travelers seeking to enter the United States at air,
land, and sea ports of entry.^1  CBP officers, who number about 17,600 at
these ports of entry, play a critical role in carrying out this
responsibility. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, their
role has involved increased emphasis on countering threats posed by
terrorists and others attempting to enter the country with fraudulent or
altered travel documents. Intelligence officials believe that the United
States will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat and that the
terrorist group al Qaeda will intensify its efforts to put operatives
here. There is also a growing concern that terrorists with no criminal
record may use legitimate travel documents when they attempt to enter the
country through ports of entry.

^1 Ports of entry are government-designated locations where CBP inspects
persons and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully admitted into
the country. A land port of entry may have more than one border crossing
point where CBP inspects travelers for admissibility into the United
States.

In addition to its homeland security responsibilities, CBP is responsible
for preventing inadmissible aliens, criminals, and inadmissible goods from
entering the country. Doing so is a difficult task given the high volume
of travelers and goods that enter the country. For example, officers
frequently carry out their responsibilities with little time to make
decisions about admitting individuals into the country because they also
face pressure to facilitate the cross-border movement of millions of
legitimate travelers and billions of dollars in international trade.

When CBP was created in March 2003, it represented a merger of components
from three departments--the U.S. Customs Service,^2 the U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service,^3 and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service.^4 As part of the merger, CBP moved forward with an approach that
was to allow a CBP officer, with the proper cross-training, to carry out
homeland security as well as traditional customs and immigration
responsibilities. For example, former customs inspectors would be trained
and work on tasks traditionally done by immigration inspectors and vice
versa. The CBP officer would also be capable of referring agricultural
violations to agricultural specialists. By training officers from legacy
agencies to perform both the customs and immigration functions, CBP aimed
to have a well-trained and well-integrated workforce to carry out the
range of the agency's missions.

In July 2003, we reported on vulnerabilities and inefficiencies in
traveler inspections.^5 Given the critical role that CBP plays in homeland
security, you asked us to review the progress CBP has made in
strengthening its ability to inspect travelers arriving at the nation's
international airports and land borders. In response, on October 5, 2007,
we issued a For Official Use Only^6 report that addressed the following
questions:

^2 U.S Customs Service was in the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Customs
inspectors were primarily responsible for inspecting cargo and goods.

^3 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service was in the Department of
Justice. Immigration inspectors were responsible for processing people
traveling across the border.

^4 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service was in the Department of
Agriculture. Unlike the Customs Service and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, which were moved to DHS in its entirety, Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service continues to exist within the
Department of Agriculture and retains responsibility for conducting, among
other things, veterinary inspections of live imported animals,
establishing policy for inspections and quarantines, and providing risk
analysis.

^5 See GAO, Land Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the
Inspections Process, [50]GAO-03-782 (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).

           o What success and challenges has CBP had in interdicting
           inadmissible aliens and other violators^7 at its ports of entry?

           o What progress has CBP made in improving staffing and training at
           its ports of entry and how successful has it been in carrying out
           these workforce programs?

           o What progress and problems has CBP encountered in setting goals
           and performance measures for its traveler inspection program?

As our October 2007 report contained information that DHS considered law
enforcement sensitive, this version of the report omits sensitive
information about CBP's traveler inspection efforts, including information
on the techniques used to carry out inspections, data on the number of
inadmissible aliens and other violators that enter the country each year,
and data on staffing at ports of entry. In addition, at DHS's request, we
have redacted the specific locations that we visited.

The overall methodology used for our initial report is relevant to this
version of the report since the information in this product is derived
from our first report. To address the questions above, we analyzed
information and data on CBP's traveler inspections, staffing, and training
at ports of entry. We reviewed CBP policies and procedures for the
traveler inspection program as well as other documents related to traveler
inspection efforts. We interviewed CBP officials on the status of CBP
efforts to develop a staffing model, train staff, carry out traveler
inspections, and develop performance measures.^8 For information that
would provide an overall picture of CBP's efforts, we reviewed and
analyzed several nationwide databases, including data on staffing,
training, attrition, resource requests from CBP's 20 field offices^9 and
one pre-clearance headquarters office, and apprehension of inadmissible
aliens and other violators at major airp and land ports of entry. We
assessed the reliability of CBP's data from CBP's random selection program
of travelers and staffing and training data by, among other things,
meeting with knowledgeable officials about these data, reviewing relevant
documentation, and performing electronic testing. We concluded that data
from CBP databases, with the exception of the data on training as we
discuss later in our report, were sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of our review. Although we discussed the staffing model and its results
with CBP officials responsible for the model, validating the model and its
results was outside the scope of our review.

^6 See GAO, Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler
Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry, [51]GAO-08-123SU
(Washington D.C.: Oct. 5, 2007).

^7 Other violators include individuals seeking to enter the country who
are not in compliance with the laws and regulations for entry, including
immigration, customs, and agricultural requirements.

^8 Our work on training focused on the training provided at ports of entry
and did not include basic training given to CBP officers at the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center. We also did not examine the role of
agricultural specialists in CBP because we issued a report on agricultural
inspections at ports of entry last year. See GAO, Homeland Security:
Management and Coordination Problems Increase the Vulnerability of U.S.
Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease, [52]GAO-06-644 (Washington D.C.:
May 19, 2006).

To supplement our analyses of CBP's nationwide data, we visited eight
ports of entry. While we cannot generalize our work from our visits to all
ports of entry, we chose these ports of entry to provide examples of
operations at air and land ports of entry. At each site, we held
discussion groups with CBP officers and met with management to discuss,
among other things, staffing and training programs. In addition, GAO
investigators visited other ports of entry to test the traveler inspection
process. Although we cannot generalize our investigator's work at these
locations to all ports of entry, we selected these ports of entry to
provide examples of traveler inspections. Our investigators did their work
in accordance with quality standards for investigations as set forth by
the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. Unless we specify
that the work was done by our investigators, all referrals to our visits
to ports of entry pertain to the eight ports of entry cited above. In
addition, we analyzed the 2004 and 2006 Office of Personnel Management
Federal Human Capital Surveys of staff at 36 federal agencies, including
the results from CBP, that dealt with the views of federal employees on
training and staffing in the workplace. We reviewed standards for internal
control in the federal government^10 and compared the standards for
information and communications and monitoring with CBP's policies and
procedures for traveler inspections. Finally, we reviewed prior GAO
reports on best practices for developing strategic plans and performance
measures and compared the best practices with CBP's plans and measures for
its operations at its ports of entry. See appendix I for further
explanation of our scope and methodology. We did our work in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards from August 2006
through September 2007.

^9 CBP's 20 field offices are responsible for managing more than 300 ports
of entry.

^10 GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[53]GAO/AIMD-00-21 .3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

Results in Brief

CBP has had some success in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other
violators, but weaknesses in its traveler inspection procedures and
related physical infrastructure increase the potential that dangerous
people and illegal goods could enter the country. In 2006, CBP officers
turned away over 200,000 aliens who attempted to enter the country
illegally, and seized over 600,000 pounds of illegal drugs and more than
40,000 fraudulent documents, according to CBP. To help officers identify
potential violators, CBP has installed additional technology to inspect
vehicles for smuggled aliens and illicit cargo and to check traveler
documents against law enforcement databases. While CBP has had some
success in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators, its
analyses indicate that several thousand inadmissible aliens and other
violators entered the country at land and air ports of entry in fiscal
year 2006.^11 When CBP does not apprehend a potentially dangerous person,
this increases the potential that national security may be compromised.
Weaknesses that contributed to failed inspections relate both to
procedures and to infrastructure:

           o Weaknesses in traveler inspection procedures. In mid-2006, CBP
           reviewed videotapes from about 150 large and small ports of entry
           and, according to CBP officials, determined that while CBP
           officers carried out thorough traveler inspections in many
           instances, they also identified numerous instances where traveler
           inspections at land ports of entry were weak in that they did not
           determine the citizenship and admissibility of travelers entering
           the country as required by law. Such weaknesses included officers
           not stopping vehicles for inspection and pedestrians crossing the
           border without any visual or verbal contact from a CBP officer
           despite operating procedures that required officers to do so. In
           the summer of 2006, CBP management took actions to place greater
           management emphasis on traveler inspections by holding meetings
           with senior management to reinforce the importance of carrying out
           effective inspections and by providing training to all supervisors
           and officers on the importance of interviewing travelers, checking
           travel documents, and having adequate supervisory presence.
           However, tests our investigators conducted in October 2006 and
           January 2007--as many as 5 months after CBP issued guidance and
           conducted the training--showed similar weaknesses as those on the
           videotape were still occurring in traveler inspections at ports of
           entry. At two ports, our investigators were not asked to provide a
           travel document to verify their identity--a procedure that
           management had called on officers to carry out--as part of the
           inspection. The extent of continued noncompliance is unknown, but
           these results point to the challenge CBP management faces in
           ensuring its directives are carried out. Standards for internal
           control in the federal government require that information should
           be communicated to agency management to enable it to carry out its
           program responsibilities. In July 2007, CBP issued new internal
           policies and procedures for agency officials responsible for its
           traveler inspection program at land ports of entry. The new
           policies and procedures require field office managers to conduct
           periodic audits and assessments to ensure compliance with the new
           inspection procedures. However, they do not call on managers to
           share the results of their assessments with headquarters
           management. Without this communication, CBP management may be
           hindering its ability to efficiently use the information to
           overcome weaknesses in traveler inspections.

           o Weaknesses in physical infrastructure. While we cannot
           generalize our findings, at several ports of entry of entry that
           we examined, barriers designed to ensure that vehicles pass
           through a CBP inspection booth were not in place, increasing the
           risk that vehicles could enter the country without inspection. CBP
           recognizes that it has infrastructure weaknesses and has estimated
           it needs about $4 billion to make the needed capital improvements
           needed at all 163 land crossings. CBP has prioritized the ports
           with the greatest need. Each year, depending upon funding
           availability, CBP submits its proposed capital improvement
           projects based upon the prioritized list it has developed. Several
           factors affect CBP's ability to make improvements, including the
           fact that some ports of entry are owned by other governmental or
           private entities, potentially adding to the time needed to agree
           on infrastructure changes and put them in place. As of September
           2007, CBP had infrastructure projects related to 20 different
           ports of entry in various stages of development.

^11 We redacted data on the rate at which CBP apprehends inadmissible
aliens and other violators who seek to enter the country because the data
are considered sensitive.

CBP has taken action to improve staffing and training at ports of entry by
assessing staffing needs, adding more officers since 2005 in response to
higher budgeted staffing levels, and developing an extensive training
program, but it lacks (1) data to measure progress on providing required
training and (2) certain elements in its on-the-job training program for
new CBP officers, which limits its ability to effectively train and
evaluate the performance of new officers. According to managers at ports
of entry, staffing shortages can result in, among other things, officer
fatigue that can affect the quality of traveler inspections. Untrained or
poorly trained officers can increase the probability that terrorists,
inadmissible aliens, and illicit goods will enter the country. Progress
and problems with staffing and training involved the following:

           o Progress and problems with staffing. Responding to language in a
           conference report for its fiscal year 2007 appropriation, CBP has
           developed a staffing model to estimate staffing needs. The model
           is based on several assumptions, such as whether overtime is
           considered as part of CBP's staffing at ports of entry, CBP's
           model estimates that CBP may need up to several thousand more
           officers and agricultural specialists to operate its ports of
           entry. According to field officials, lack of staff is affecting
           their ability to carry out border security responsibilities. For
           example, we examined requests for resources from CBP's 20 field
           offices and its pre-clearance headquarters office for January 2007
           and found that managers at 19 of the 21 offices cited examples of
           anti-terrorism activities not being carried out, new or expanded
           facilities that were not fully operational, and radiation monitors
           and other inspection technologies not being fully used because of
           staff shortages. At seven of the eight major ports we visited,
           officers and managers told us that not having sufficient staff
           contributes to morale problems, fatigue, lack of backup support,
           and safety issues when officers inspect travelers--increasing the
           potential that terrorists, inadmissible travelers, and illicit
           goods could enter the country. Reported staffing shortages are
           exacerbated by challenges in retaining staff, contributing to an
           increasing number of vacant positions nationwide. CBP officials
           attribute attrition to retirements, officers receiving better law
           enforcement benefits at other DHS components and other federal
           agencies, and new officers being unable to afford high
           cost-of-living locations. Low job satisfaction, as reflected in
           the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Federal Human Capital
           Survey, is also a contributing factor to attrition, according to
           CBP. CBP recognized that it has a problem with retaining staff and
           plans to develop ways to stem its problems in this area. For
           example, CBP plans to analyze attrition data and data from OPM's
           Human Capital Survey and employee satisfaction and exit surveys in
           order to help identify what actions are needed to curb attrition.
           CBP plans to develop some initial retention strategies by December
           2008 and by September 2009 develop approaches to retain staff
           based on areas of concern identified in the employee exit survey.

           o Progress and problems with training. CBP has developed 37
           courses on such topics as how to carry out inspections and detect
           fraudulent documents and has instituted national guidelines for a
           12-week on-the-job training program that new officers should
           receive at land ports of entry. However, CBP faces challenges in
           providing the required training. Managers at seven of the eight
           ports of entry we visited said that they were challenged in
           putting staff through training because staffing shortfalls force
           the ports to choose between performing port operations and
           providing training. For example, at one land port of entry we
           visited, managers stated that courses are scheduled, but then
           canceled because of staffing concerns. CBP managers at
           headquarters recognize that untrained officers increase the
           potential of failed inspections. Standards for internal control in
           the federal government provide a framework for agencies to achieve
           effective and efficient operations and ultimately to improve
           accountability. One of the standards calls on agencies to compare
           actual performance to planned or expected results throughout the
           organization and to analyze significant differences. However, CBP
           lacks data that show whether the individuals who require training
           are receiving it. Having reliable data to measure the degree to
           which training has been delivered would put CBP management in a
           position to better gauge the results of its training program. In
           regards to on-the-job training, while CBP guidance states that new
           officers at land ports of entry should receive 12 weeks of
           on-the-job training, new officers at the ports we visited did not
           receive 12 weeks of training. For example, at one port of entry,
           new officers told us they received between 2 weeks and 6 weeks of
           on-the-job training. In addition, internal control standards
           related to management of human capital state that management
           should ensure that the organization has a workforce that has the
           required skills necessary to achieve organizational goals. CBP's
           guidance for its on-the-job training program does not require that
           new CBP officers perform certain tasks in order to develop needed
           skills or that the officers demonstrate proficiency in specific
           tasks. In contrast, the U.S. Border Patrol, another office within
           CBP, has developed a field training program where officers are
           required to demonstrate proficiency in 32 different skills. We
           discussed the utility of the Border Patrol's on-the-job training
           standards with CBP officials who told us that they might examine
           the Border Patrol's program to identify best practices that they
           could incorporate into the on-the-job training program for new CBP
           officers. When staff do not receive required training or are not
           trained consistent with program guidance, it limits knowledge
           building and increases the risk that needed expertise is not
           developed.

CBP has developed strategic goals that call for, among other things,
establishing ports of entry where threats are deterred and inadmissible
people and goods are intercepted--a key goal related to traveler
inspections--but it faces challenges in developing a performance measure
that tracks progress in achieving this goal. Linking performance to
strategic goals and objectives and publicly reporting this information is
important so that Congress and the public have better information about
agency performance and to help to ensure accountability. While CBP's 2006
Performance and Accountability Report included some performance measures
related to CBP's goal of intercepting inadmissible people and goods, the
report did not include a performance measure regarding how effective CBP
is at achieving this goal at ports of entry. As discussed above, CBP has
data on the degree to which it interdicts travelers who seek to enter the
country illegally or who violate other laws at major air and land ports of
entry. During the course of our review, we discussed with CBP officials
the potential of using these data as one way of measuring the
effectiveness of CBP inspection efforts. In June 2007, CBP officials told
us that CBP was in the process of selecting performance measures for
fiscal year 2008 and a decision had not yet been made on whether to
include these data or other similar outcome-based measures in its
performance report.

We made a number of recommendations to the Secretary of DHS to help
address weaknesses in traveler inspections, challenges in training, and
problems with using performance data. These recommendations cover such
matters as improving internal controls for its traveler inspections at
ports of entry, developing data that measure whether officers who require
training are receiving it and establishing procedures for its on-the job
training program that call on officers to perform specific tasks and
measure officer proficiency in performing those tasks, and formalizing a
performance measure that shows how effective CBP is in intercepting
inadmissible people and goods at ports of entry.

In commenting on a draft of the For Official Use Only version of this
report, DHS said it agreed with our recommendations and discussed actions
CBP has underway or has taken to address our recommendations. Written
comments from DHS are in Appendix III.

Background

CBP is the lead federal agency charged with keeping terrorists, criminals,
and inadmissible aliens out of the country while facilitating the flow of
legitimate travel and commerce at the nation's borders. CBP has three main
components that have border security responsibilities. First, CBP's Office
of Field Operations is responsible for processing the flow of people and
goods that enter the country through air, land, and sea ports of entry
where CBP officers inspect travelers and goods to determine whether they
may be legally admitted into the country. Second, CBP's Border Patrol
works to prevent the illegal entry of persons and contraband into the
United States between the ports of entry. The Border Patrol is responsible
for controlling nearly 7,000 miles of the nation's land borders between
ports of entry and 95,000 miles of maritime border in partnership with the
United States Coast Guard. Third, CBP's Office of Air and Marine helps to
protect the nation's critical infrastructure through the coordinated use
of an integrated force of air and marine resources and provides mission
support to the other CBP components. For fiscal year 2007, CBP had a $9.3
billion budget, of which $2.5 billion was for border security and trade
facilitation at ports of entry.^12

In carrying out its responsibilities, CBP operates 326 official ports of
entry, composed of airports, seaports, and designated land ports of entry
along the northern and southern borders.^13 Ports of entry vary
considerably in size and volume, including diverse locations such as major
airports like New York's John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport, and
the busiest land crossing in the United States at San Ysidro, California,
which processes over 17 million vehicles a year (see fig. 1); small ports
in remote rural locations along the Canadian border that process only a
few thousand vehicles every year; and seaports like the Port of Miami
where cruise ships transport more than 3 million travelers into and out of
the country each year. Most ports of entry are land border crossings
located along the northern border with Canada or the southern border with
Mexico.^14 The four largest land border ports of entry by traveler volume
are at San Ysidro, Calexico, and Otay Mesa in California, and the Bridge
of Americas in El Paso, Texas. In total, these four ports process about 27
percent of all travelers who enter the country by land.

^12CBP's budget includes $1.3 billion in revenue from other sources,
including user fees, which include fees collected by CBP for processing
air and sea passengers, commercial trucks, railcars, private vessels,
dutiable mail packages, and customs broker permits.

^13 CBP also has preclearance operations at 15 international ports in
Aruba, Bahamas, Bermuda, Canada, and Ireland, where travelers are
processed for advance approval to enter the United States prior to
departure from the respective airport.

^14Land borders are unique because traffic at these crossings consists of
varying combinations of pedestrians, bicycles, cars, trucks, buses, and
rail.

Figure 1: Vehicle Lanes at the San Ysidro Port of Entry

CBP annually processes over 400 million passenger and pedestrian
entries,^15 20 million containers, and 130 million conveyances^16 through
ports of entry. In fiscal year 2005, the most recent year for which
traveler data are available by mode of entry, land border crossings were
by far the busiest for processing people, with about three out of four
entries into the country occurring through a land port of entry (see fig.
2).^17

15 These statistics represent the total number of crossings, but do not
reflect the number of unique individuals that entered the country. For
example, a person may enter the country on multiple occasions throughout
the year, and CBP counts each separate entry by the same person as an
additional traveler processed.

^16 "Conveyance" refers to the means of transport by which persons or
goods enter the country, such as by vehicle, aircraft, truck, or vessel.

Figure 2: Border Crossings at Ports of Entry in Fiscal Year 2005

Process for Inspecting Travelers Differs between Air and Land Ports of Entry

The process for inspecting travelers at airports is significantly
different than the process at land ports of entry. Prior to departure from
foreign airports, airline carriers electronically submit passenger
manifest information to CBP. CBP officers cross-check passengers against a
wide range of law enforcement databases before travelers enter the
country. Upon arrival in the United States, international airline
passengers are first subject to immigration inspections that check visas,
passports, and biometric data (see fig. 3). Generally, international
passengers arriving by air must present a U.S. passport, permanent
resident card, foreign passport, or a foreign passport containing a visa
issued by the Department of State. CBP officers may also inspect the
luggage of travelers.

^17 The majority of persons processed at land ports of entry arrive either
as automobile drivers or passengers (82 percent) or pedestrians (15
percent), with the remaining travelers arriving by bus (2 percent) or
train (about 1 percent.).

Figure 3: Arriving International Passengers Awaiting CBP Inspection at JFK
International Airport

CBP faces a much greater challenge to identify and screen individuals at
land ports of entry, in part because of the lack of advance traveler
information and the high volume of traffic at many locations. Unlike
travelers who enter the country at airports, travelers entering through
land ports of entry can arrive at virtually any time and may present
thousands of different forms of documentation, ranging from oral
declarations of U.S. or Canadian citizenship, driver's licenses, birth
certificates,^18 passports, visas, permanent resident cards, or U.S.
military identity cards. Travelers entering the country by bus or rail
must provide documentation and may be subject to further inspection. CBP
has implemented measures to help provide advance information on passengers
arriving at land ports of entry, including trusted traveler programs that
register frequent, low-risk travelers for expedited entry, and license
plate readers that match license plate numbers against law enforcement
databases.

^18 Pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, DHS is in the process of developing and implementing a plan, called
the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, to require these travelers to
present a passport or other documents DHS deems sufficient to denote
identity and citizenship. In particular, DHS has announced that it intends
to end the routine practice of accepting oral declarations of citizenship
alone starting January 31, 2008.

Traveler Inspection Policies and Procedures Call for Establishing Citizenship
and Admissibility

The Immigration and Nationality Act,^19 implementing regulations,^20 and
CBP policies and procedures for traveler inspection at all ports of entry
require officers to establish, at a minimum, the nationality of
individuals and whether they are eligible to enter the country. The first
requirement is for the CBP officer to determine if the person is a U.S.
citizen or an alien, and if an alien, establish whether the person meets
the criteria for admission into the country. Current documentation
requirements for entry into the country vary depending on the nationality
of the traveler and the mode of entry. For example, U.S. citizens arriving
at land ports of entry currently may seek to establish citizenship to a
CBP officer through an oral declaration of citizenship. In general,
nonimmigrant aliens^21 arriving at land and air ports of entry must
present a valid, unexpired passport as well as, depending on country of
origin and intended length of stay in the United States, a valid,
unexpired visa issued by a U.S. embassy or consulate for entry into the
country. As most travelers attempting to enter the country through ports
of entry have a legal basis for doing so, a streamlined screening
procedure referred to as a primary inspection is used to process those
individuals who can be readily identified as admissible. Persons whose
admissibility cannot be readily determined and persons selected as part of
a random selection process are subjected to a more detailed review called
a secondary inspection. This involves a closer inspection of travel
documents and possessions, additional questioning by CBP officers, and
cross references through multiple law enforcement databases to verify the
traveler's identity, background, purpose for entering the country, and
other corroborating information. At the end of this process, the
individual may be admitted, refused entry and returned to the country of
origin, or detained while admissibility is subject to further review.

^19 See 8 U.S.C. S 1225(a).

^20 See 8 C.F.R. S 235.1(a), (b), (f)(1).

^21 A non-immigrant alien is an international traveler that wishes to
enter the United States on a temporary basis for tourism, medical
treatment, business, temporary work, study, or other similar reasons.

Transforming the Role of CBP Officers Is a Work in Progress

As part of the original reorganization plan for border security, DHS found
that having border security and inspections performed by three separate
legacy agencies with different priorities, conflicting policies, and
varying leadership structures had led to inconsistent inspections and gaps
in the sharing of information between these agencies. As part of its
actions to address these concerns, in March 2003, DHS created CBP by
merging employees from the three legacy agencies previously responsible
for border security.^22 Among other considerations, DHS formed CBP to
establish a unified command structure that was intended to reduce
duplication of efforts while improving the sharing of information. For
operations at ports of entry, in September 2003 CBP issued its plan for
consolidating the inspection functions formerly performed by separate
inspectors from the three legacy agencies. The plan, referred to as "One
Face at the Border," called for unifying and integrating the legacy
inspectors into two new positions--a CBP officer and a CBP agricultural
specialist.^23 The new CBP officer would serve as the frontline officer
responsible for carrying out the priority anti-terrorism mission as well
as the traditional customs and immigration inspection functions, while
also identifying and referring goods in need of a more extensive
agricultural inspection to the agricultural specialist. CBP anticipated
that having a well-trained and well-integrated workforce that could carry
out the complete range of inspection functions involving the processing of
individuals and goods would allow it to utilize its inspection resources
more effectively and enable it to better target potentially high-risk
travelers.^24 Together, CBP envisioned the result to be more effective
inspections and enhanced security at ports of entry while also
accelerating the processing of legitimate trade and travel.

^22 As noted earlier, the merger consolidated inspectors from: (1) the U.
S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (Department of Justice); (2) the
U. S. Customs Service (Department of the Treasury); and (3) the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (Department of Agriculture).

^23 The agricultural specialist is a technical, scientific position rather
than a law enforcement position with an emphasis on detecting and
preventing the importation of harmful agricultural pests and diseases.
Candidates for these positions are required to have majored in biological
sciences, agricultural sciences, natural resource management, chemistry,
or a closely related field. The agricultural specialist is responsible for
conducting agriculture inspection of passengers and cargo as well as
analysis of agriculture imports. Additionally, agricultural specialists
are not authorized to carry firearms, and therefore they cannot staff
primary inspection lanes. However, they may provide backup support to CBP
officers during secondary screening.

^24 Prior to the creation of CBP, legacy customs officers were
cross-trained to carry out primary inspections at land ports of entry.

While it has been about 4 years since the formation of DHS and CBP, our
prior work on mergers and acquisitions found that it generally takes 5 to
7 years to successfully complete such a transformation. For example, GAO
designated DHS's overall transformation as a high-risk area in 2003 based
on three factors. First, DHS faced a formidable task in implementing a
transformation process that would effectively combine 22 disparate
agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees into one department. Second,
many of these agencies were facing their own challenges in management
areas such as strategic human capital, information technology, and
financial management; thus, DHS inherited a host of operational and
management challenges from the beginning. Third, DHS's national security
mission is critically important and failure to effectively address its
management challenges and program risks could have serious consequences
for national security as well as have major economic impacts.^25 CBP, as
part of DHS, faces many similar challenges in its efforts to unify three
agencies into one and in transforming the role of its officers. For
example, with over 40,000 employees, CBP represented the largest merger of
people and functions within DHS. Additionally, our prior work on the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Customs Service, two
of the primary agencies involved in the merger, showed that these agencies
experienced many management challenges before their merger into CBP.
Finally, like DHS, CBP' has a primary mission of preventing terrorist
attacks that is critical to national security.

^25 To be removed from GAO's high-risk list, agencies must do three
things. First, they have to produce a corrective action plan that defines
the root causes of identified problems, identifies effective solutions to
those problems, and provides for substantially completing corrective
measures in the near term. Second, agencies must demonstrate significant
progress in addressing the problems identified in their corrective action
plan. Finally, agencies, in particular top leadership, must demonstrate a
commitment to achieve any remaining key objectives and sustain various
improvements in their performance over the long term.

CBP Has Had Some Success in Interdicting Inadmissible Aliens and Other
Violators, but It Still Needs to Overcome Weaknesses in Its Traveler Inspections
and Physical Infrastructure

CBP has had some success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other
violators. In fiscal year 2006, CBP successfully caught tens of thousands
of violators and it made security improvements at its ports of entry, such
as installing new cargo inspection technology. Nevertheless, the agency
faces major challenges in overcoming weaknesses in both traveler
inspections and physical infrastructure. In regards to traveler
inspections, at our request, CBP officials showed us a videotape that
identified numerous examples of officers not establishing the nationality
of individuals and their eligibility for entering the country as required
by law. CBP took action in the summer of 2006 to address the problems by
holding high-level management meetings and delivering training on traveler
inspections to its officers. However, we later found that CBP's initial
set of corrective actions did not always address the problems and we found
similar problems as those on the videotape. CBP issued new policies and
procedures to overcome these inspection weaknesses at its land ports of
entry including requiring field office directors to conduct assessments to
ensure compliance with these new inspection procedures. However, the
policies and procedures do not require that field office directors share
their assessment results with CBP headquarters management, which may
hinder its ability to use the information to overcome weaknesses in
traveler inspections and to identify best practices that may occur during
implementation of its new policies and procedures. CBP faces a challenge
in addressing physical infrastructure weaknesses at land ports of entry in
a timely way because some ports are owned by other governmental or private
entities, potentially adding to the time needed to agree on infrastructure
changes and put them in place.

CBP Has Had Some Success Identifying Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators

CBP has identified and interdicted thousands of potentially dangerous
people and significant amounts of illegal goods at ports of entry.
According to CBP, in fiscal year 2006, CBP officers arrested more than
23,000 suspected criminals, denied entry to over 200,000 inadmissible
aliens, seized more than 644,000 pounds of illegal drugs,^26 intercepted
nearly 1.7 million prohibited agricultural items, and seized over $155
million in illegal commercial merchandise, such as counterfeit footwear
and handbags. CBP officers also intercepted 40,362 fraudulent documents
used in attempts to enter the country illegally in fiscal year 2006. Over
half (21,292) of the fraudulent documents intercepted by CBP involved the
alteration or improper use of travel documents issued by the U.S
Department of State. About 80 percent of these documents involved
impostors--that is, people using authentic, unaltered documents that had
been validly issued to another person. The remaining 20 percent attempted
to enter with fraudulent documents that were altered in some way, such as
a fake or altered U.S. visa, or were entirely counterfeit.^27

^26 In total, when seizures by other CBP offices, such as Border Patrol,
are considered, CBP seized about 2 million pounds of illegal drugs in
fiscal year 2006.

CBP's success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other violators has
been enhanced by several new initiatives and programs that aim to further
improve security at ports of entry. They include the following:

           o New cargo inspection technology. According to CBP, it has
           installed nonintrusive inspection technologies at ports of entry
           that enable officers to rapidly inspect vehicles and truck
           containers for inadmissible aliens and other violators, nuclear or
           radiological weapons, or other contraband (see fig. 4). Other
           nonintrusive technologies, such as radiation detectors, allow CBP
           to inspect containerized truck and sea cargo without having to
           perform a time-intensive manual search or other intrusive
           examinations of the contents.

^27 GAO, Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced,
but More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use, [54]GAO-07-1006
(Washington D.C.: July 31, 2007).

Figure 4: CBP Technology Used to Screen Commercial Trucks

           o Additional requirements for screening passengers. To improve its
           ability to target high-risk individuals that are on international
           flights bound for the United States, CBP in fiscal year 2007,
           issued a ruling that requires airlines provide passenger manifest
           information prior to departure. These data are critical in
           screening passengers against watch lists and other databases and
           identifying potentially dangerous individuals attempting to enter
           the United States.

           CBP also expanded the entry capability of the U.S. Visitor and
           Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to a
           total of 116 airports, 15 seaports, and 154 land ports of entry.
           Through this program, CBP is able to collect, maintain, and share
           data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints,
           on selected foreign nationals entering the United States to verify
           their identities as they arrive at air, sea, and land ports of
           entry.^28 CBP also uses these data to screen persons against watch
           lists and other law enforcement databases to determine their
           eligibility to enter the country.

           o Prescreening programs for low-risk travelers. As part of CBP
           efforts to facilitate legitimate trade and travel, CBP has
           implemented several initiatives to increase enrollment in its
           trusted traveler programs, such as the Secure Electronic Network
           for Travelers' Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) program on the southern
           border and the NEXUS program on the northern border. These
           programs allow registered border residents and frequent
           cross-border travelers identified as low-risk individuals access
           to dedicated lanes and expedited processing with minimal
           inspection (see fig. 5). Participants undergo a thorough
           background check, a fingerprint law enforcement check, and a
           personal interview with a CBP officer. Enrollment in these two
           programs totaled nearly 260,000 members in fiscal year 2007. In
           addition, as part of an initiative among the United States,
           Canada, and Mexico, CBP operates a trusted traveler program called
           the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program, for truck companies
           involved in transporting cargo through land ports of entry.
           Participants in FAST have access to dedicated lanes as well as
           reduced number of examinations. In 2006, CBP certified 124 new
           commercial partners and approved over 8,000 new drivers to
           participate in the program, bringing total FAST enrollment to
           84,000 participants.

^28 For additional information on the inspection process for U.S.
passports and visas, see [55]GAO-07-1006 . When fully implemented,
US-VISIT is also intended to capture the same information from foreign
nationals as they exit the country. For more information on the program,
see GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational,
and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. [56]GAO-07-248
(Washington D.C.: Dec. 6, 2006).

Figure 5: NEXUS Lane at a Port of Entry

           o Automated license plate and document readers. CBP has also
           increased deployment of automated license plate and document
           readers at land ports of entry. License plate readers
           automatically read front and rear license plates of vehicles as
           they enter the primary inspection area, with the data
           simultaneously queried against CBP and law enforcement databases
           (see fig. 6). In addition, CBP has installed document readers that
           electronically read documents, such as passports or border
           crossing cards, that allow CBP officers to automatically query law
           enforcement databases. With these readers in place, CBP officers
           spend less time manually inputting information, thereby reducing
           inspection times, improving the accuracy of the collected
           information, and affording the officers the ability to interact
           more with vehicle occupants.

Figure 6: License Plate Reader at a Port of Entry

Improvements Notwithstanding, CBP Acknowledges that It Did Not Apprehend All
Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators

While CBP has had some success in interdicting inadmissible aliens and
other violators, CBP acknowledges that it did not apprehend all
inadmissible aliens and other violators who sought to enter the country at
air and land ports of entry. CBP's estimates of how many inadmissible
aliens and other violators evade detection are based on a sample of
travelers who arrive at land and air ports of entry. This program, called
Compliance Examination (COMPEX), randomly selects travelers entering the
country for more detailed inspections.^29 CBP carries out this program at
air and land ports of entry. At land ports, CBP randomly selects vehicles
and conducts more detailed inspections of the vehicles and possessions of
the traveler. At airports, CBP supervisors randomly select travelers. In
both cases, the program is designed to select travelers who would not
normally be referred to a secondary inspection and would therefore be
allowed to enter the country. On the basis of the extent to which
violations are found in the in-depth inspections, CBP estimates the total
number of inadmissible aliens and other violators who seek to enter the
country at locations where COMPEX is carried out.^30 CBP then calculates
an apprehension rate by comparing the number of violators it actually
apprehends with the estimated number of violators that attempted entry.^31
Using COMPEX, CBP estimates that several thousand inadmissible aliens and
other violators entered the country through air and land ports of entry in
fiscal year 2006.^32

^29 COMPEX was created in 1995 by U.S. Customs and was implemented at
selected land crossings and airports on June 1, 1999. COMPEX allowed
Customs to validate its deterrent efforts as well as meet the reporting
requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act.

Weaknesses in How Well Inspection Procedures Were Followed Increased the
Potential of Illegal Entry

Weaknesses in how well inspection procedures were followed increased the
potential that inadmissible aliens and other violators successfully
entered the country. In the summer of 2006, CBP reviewed hundreds of hours
of video from 150 large and small land ports of entry and determined that
while CBP officers carried out thorough traveler inspections in many
instances, they also identified numerous examples where officers did not
comply with inspection requirements, according to CBP officials. At our
request, CBP officials showed us a 15-minute video that CBP had prepared
that documented noncompliance with inspection requirements. The following
were examples of weaknesses that were on the video:

           o In one instance, officers waved vehicles into the United States
           without stopping the vehicle or interviewing the driver or its
           passengers as required. In another instance, motorcycles passed
           through inspection lanes without stopping and making any contact
           with an officer. In a third instance, during "lane switches" when
           CBP officers were relieved of their duty and replaced by other
           officers, officers waved traffic through the lane while the
           officer logged into the computer. The proper procedure is for
           traffic to be stopped until the officer is logged into the system
           and is available to perform proper inspections.

           o In another instance, while the CBP officer was reviewing
           information on his computer screen, he waved pedestrians through
           the lane without looking at them, making verbal contact, or
           inspecting travel documents. In another instance, travelers would
           simply hold up their identification cards and officers would view
           them without stepping out of the booth before waving the vehicle
           through. In these cases, the officers did not appear to make
           verbal contact with the passengers and did not interview any
           passengers sitting in the back seat of the vehicle. As a final
           example, officers did not board recreational vehicles to determine
           whether additional traveler inspections should be carried out.

^30 CBP breaks out violators into two main categories. The first category
deals with serious violations (called category 1 violations) that include
violations such as drug seizures and prohibited weapons. The second
category involves minor violations (called category 2 violations) that
include violations such as nonroutine prohibited foodstuffs, such as
certain types of candy. The apprehension rate measures only category 1
violators.

^31 The apprehension rate is considered sensitive information and is not
included in this report.

^32 CBP's estimate of the number of inadmissible aliens and other
violators who entered the country in fiscal year 2006 is considered to be
sensitive and therefore could not be included in this report.

Without checking the identity, citizenship, and admissibility of
travelers, there is an increased potential that dangerous people and
inadmissible goods may enter the country and cause harm to American
citizens and the economy. According to CBP interviews with apprehended
alien smugglers, alien smuggling organizations have been aware of
weaknesses in CBP's inspection procedures and they have trained operatives
to take advantage of these weaknesses. This awareness heightens the
potential that failed inspections will occur at ports of entry when such
procedural weaknesses exist.

According to CBP senior management, the factors that may have contributed
to these weaknesses included the following:

           o Failure to engage, lack of focus, and complacency. According to
           CBP senior management, emphasis is not being placed on all
           missions, and there is a failure by some of its officers to
           recognize the threat associated with dangerous people and goods
           entering the country.

           o Insufficient staffing. According to CBP senior management, they
           are unable to staff ports of entry to sufficiently accommodate the
           workload. Lack of sufficient staff contributes to officers working
           double shifts, sometimes resulting in fatigue that can affect
           decisions.^33

           o Lack of supervisory presence in primary inspections. CBP senior
           management noted that lack of supervisory presence at primary
           inspection booths can contribute to less than optimal inspections.

           o Lack of training. CBP senior management acknowledged that, in
           some cases, periodic and on-the-job training is not being
           delivered.

^33 Staffing and training issues are discussed in more detail later in
this report, under the heading, "Progress Being Made, but Challenges Still
Exist in CBP Officer Staffing and Training."

  CBP Is Taking Action to Address Inspection Weaknesses, but Challenges Remain

CBP has taken action to address weaknesses in its inspection procedures by
renewing its emphasis on the need to improve inspections at ports of entry
and by revising traveler inspection policies and procedures. In July 2006,
CBP headquarters showed field office directors the 15-minute videotape
that documented the type of noncompliant inspections that were taking
place at land ports of entry. CBP management emphasized the importance of
thorough inspection procedures at all ports of entry, including airports
and seaports, by requesting field office directors to review current
procedures and identify best practices for more thorough inspections. As
requested by the Assistant Commissioner of Field Operations, the field
office directors conducted a series of meetings with senior port
management to review and evaluate their ports' performance, make
corrections where necessary, and identify best practices when inspecting
travelers. Through efforts such as these, CBP managers identified best
practices that included (1) increased supervisory presence in primary
inspection areas; (2) detailing specific steps that should be conducted
during primary inspections, such as interviewing travelers and conducting
thorough document review (e.g., handling and inspecting documents); and
(3) personal visits to ports of entry by directors and managers.

CBP also revised its policies and procedures for traveler inspections at
land ports of entry to deal with weaknesses that were identified.^34 In
July 2007, CBP issued new policies and procedures for inspecting travelers
at land ports of entry, including pedestrians and those who enter by
vehicle. Among other things, the policies and procedures call on officers
to obtain photo identification for all travelers in a vehicle and match
the traveler with the photograph.^35 In doing so, the CBP officer is
required to obtain a declaration of citizenship, either in the form of
travel documents, such as passports, or in the case of a U.S. citizen or
Canadian citizen, an oral statement. To the extent possible, officers are
required to query law enforcement databases for all travelers in a
vehicle. The new policies identify roles and responsibilities of CBP
officials at ports of entry, including directors of field offices, port
directors, supervisory CBP officers, as well as CBP officers. In the near
future, CBP officials are also planning to issue new policies and
procedures for processing cargo at land borders and for inspecting
travelers who enter the country at airports and seaports.

^34 The Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations (OFO)
created a steering committee whose primary responsibility was to develop
draft directives for traveler inspections at land, air, and sea ports and
associated performance measures. The committee consists of all OFO
Executive Directors and the Deputy Assistant Commissioner for OFO.

However, issuing new policies and procedures alone does not ensure they
will be carried out. For example, after CBP headquarters issued
directives, held musters, and issued memorandums to field office and port
managers that emphasized the importance of carrying out improved traveler
inspections in July 2006, many of the same weaknesses they attempted to
deal with continued to exist at ports of entry we visited. In October 2006
and January 2007, or as much as 5 months after managers informed officers
of the need to carry out traveler inspections in a more rigorous way by
interviewing travelers and examining their travel documents, our
investigators identified weaknesses in traveler inspections that were
similar to those identified in CBP's 15-minute video. At several ports of
entry, our investigators found that a CBP officer was not staffing the
booth when they arrived for inspection. At other locations, CBP officers
did not ask for travel documents from our investigators. For example, at
one port, when our investigators arrived at the port of entry, one of them
called over to three officers who were seated at desks behind a counter
about ten feet away. One of the officers asked our investigator if he was
a U.S. citizen and the investigator said "yes." The CBP officers did not
get up from their desks to ask for any identification, asked no other
question, and allowed our investigator to enter the country.^36 At another
port of entry, a CBP officer was not present at the primary inspection
booth when our investigator arrived for inspection and he had to wait
approximately 3 to 4 minutes before an officer arrived.

^35 CBP's policy recognizes that U.S. or Canadian citizens under the age
of 16 may not have identification.

^36 DHS stated that by law a CBP officer is not required to ask for an
identity document if the officer is satisfied that the person is a United
States citizen.

While CBP's new policies and procedures are a step in the right direction,
ensuring their proper implementation will be key to overcoming weaknesses
in traveler inspections. An effective internal control environment is a
key method to help agency managers achieve program objectives and enhance
their ability to address identified weaknesses. CBP is taking positive
steps to implement some control requirements. For example, one of the
standards for internal control in the federal government involves
monitoring to assess the quality of performance over time. To monitor how
traveler inspections are conducted at ports of entry, CBP headquarters has
developed a program to covertly test the integrity of existing security
measures at ports of entry, including the work carried out by CBP
officers. In addition, CBP headquarters officials are called on to conduct
compliance reviews. Last, CBP's new policies and procedures on traveler
inspections call on field office directors to ensure compliance with the
new inspection procedures at all ports of entry by conducting audits and
assessments. Internal control standards state that information should be
communicated to management to enable it to carry out its program
responsibilities. However, CBP does not require that field offices share
the results of their audits and assessments with CBP headquarters
management. Without obtaining and receiving the results of field office
audits and assessments, CBP management may be hindered in its ability to
efficiently use the information to overcome weaknesses in traveler
inspections and identify best practices that may occur during
implementation of its new policies and procedures.

Querying all travelers arriving at land ports of entry against CBP law
enforcement databases represents a major challenge for CBP. As discussed
earlier in this report, CBP's new policies and procedures require
officers, to the extent feasible, to query travel documents of all
travelers who arrive at primary inspection at land ports of entry. In
contrast, CBP officers at airports generally handle and query documents of
all travelers. Taking the time to enter information into CBP's law
enforcement database for the several hundred million travelers arriving at
primary inspection could hinder CBP's ability to facilitate the movement
of legitimate travel and commerce.

DHS's planned Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, when implemented at
land ports of entry, may allow CBP to query more travelers against law
enforcement databases and could improve CBP's ability to identify
inadmissible aliens and other violators without harming commerce and
travel. The initiative generally requires travelers to have a passport or
passport-like document to enter the United States from Canada, Mexico, and
other countries in the western hemisphere that is machine-readable and
therefore can be more quickly and accurately checked against CBP's law
enforcement database than currently acceptable documents. CBP has already
implemented the initiative at air ports of entry, but has yet to do so at
land ports of entry. When the initiative is implemented at land ports of
entry, CBP officers may be able to query more documents because DHS
estimates that processing a traveler at primary inspection will be reduced
by 15 to 25 seconds because all travelers will have documents that will be
machine readable.

Problems with Physical Infrastructure Increase the Risk That Vehicles Could
Bypass Land Ports of Entry

CBP's effectiveness at securing the nation's borders depends not only on
the quality of traveler inspections, but also on the degree to which
physical infrastructure is in place to reduce the risk that inadmissible
aliens and other violators could bypass inspection points and enter the
country. During our site visits, we identified weaknesses in physical
infrastructure at some land ports of entry.^37

  Making Changes to Address Physical Infrastructure Weaknesses at Land Ports of
  Entry Can Be Challenging

CBP has developed a process to identify and prioritize capital
infrastructure needs at land ports of entry. One component of this
planning process is called the Strategic Resource Assessment--an
assessment that identifies capital needs at ports of entry by evaluating
existing facility conditions, predicting future workload trends,
performing space capacity analyses, and estimating costs for the
recommended options. CBP's Office of Finance has compiled resource
assessments for 163 land crossings and has prioritized the ports with the
greatest need. On the basis of the assessments, CBP estimates that the
cost of making capital improvements at land crossings totals about $4
billion. In addition, the assessments identify a planning process to
ensure that funding is allocated in a systematic and objective manner.

While CBP has made progress in identifying its capital needs, making
infrastructure changes to address the problems is not always easy,
according to CBP officials responsible for infrastructure improvements.
For example, these senior CBP officials noted that they do not have the
discretion to make infrastructure improvements on their own, such as
installing barriers and bollards, when they do not own the property and
therefore need to coordinate their efforts with other entities, such as
private bridge commissions or state highway departments. For capital
improvements at ports of entry, such as building new vehicle lanes or
secondary inspection facilities, the CBP officials said the lead time for
making such improvements was long. For example, according to these CBP
officials, for the 96 ports of entry that are owned by the General
Services Administration (GSA), GSA approves and prioritizes capital
improvement projects. The process of submitting a request for an
infrastructure improvement and completion of the project is approximately
7 years from start to finish, according to a GSA official. For the 23
ports of entry that are privately owned and leased by GSA,^38 CBP
officials noted that coordinating with privately owned companies on
infrastructure improvements is a difficult process because the private
owner's interest in facilitating commerce must be balanced with CBP's
interest in national security. According to CBP officials, the degree to
which improvements will be made at land ports of entry and how long it
will take depend on available funding and the results of discussions with
various stakeholders, such as GSA and private port owners. Each year,
depending upon funding availability, CBP submits its proposed capital
improvement projects based upon the prioritized list it has developed. As
of September 2007, CBP had infrastructure projects related to 20 different
ports of entry in various stages of development, according to a CBP
official.

^37 The locations and a description of the weaknesses in physical
infrastructure are considered sensitive information and therefore are not
included in this report.

Progress Being Made, but Challenges Still Exist in CBP Officer Staffing and
Training

CBP has taken action to improve staffing and training at ports of entry by
assessing staffing needs, adding staff, and developing an extensive
training program, but it faces challenges in hiring and retaining staff
and providing required training. To address staffing, CBP developed a
staffing model to identify the resources needed at the nation's ports of
entry. While CBP has had a net increase of about 1,000 more staff since
2005, the results of the staffing model indicate that CBP may need
additional officers at ports. Not having sufficient staff contributes to
morale problems, fatigue, and safety issues for officers. It also makes it
difficult for ports of entry to fully carry out anti-terrorism and other
traveler inspection programs. The problems are exacerbated by difficulties
in retaining experienced staff. Regarding training, CBP has made progress
in developing 37 training modules for CBP officers and a national
on-the-job training program for new officers. While it has delivered
training to thousands of CBP officers, CBP faces challenges in (1)
delivering the required training modules to those who need it and (2)
providing on-the-job training to new CBP officers consistent with national
program guidance. When staff do not receive required training or are not
trained consistently with program guidance, it limits knowledge building
and increases the risk that needed expertise is not developed. Senior CBP
headquarters officials also stated that the lack of training and training
that is inconsistently delivered may increase the risk that terrorists,
inadmissible travelers, and illicit goods could be admitted into the
country.

^38 Examples of privately owned ports of entry that are leased to GSA
include the Rainbow Bridge in Niagara Falls, New York and the Windsor
Tunnel in Detroit, Michigan.

Staffing Shortfalls and Retention Problems Exist at Ports of Entry

Congressional concern about CBP's ability to link resources to its mission
led Congress to call on CBP to develop resource allocation models. In
responding to language in the conference report for the fiscal year 2007
DHS appropriations^39 and the SAFE Port Act of 2006,^40 CBP developed a
staffing model for its land, air, and sea ports of entry. The conference
report directed CBP to develop the staffing model in a way that would
align officer resources with threats, vulnerabilities, and workload. This
directive stemmed, in part, from concern about CBP's ability to
effectively manage its growing workload, minimize wait times, and ensure
that CBP officers receive adequate training in all relevant inspection
functions. The staffing model is designed to determine the optimum number
of CBP officers that each port of entry needs in order to accomplish its
mission responsibilities. According to CBP staff involved in developing
the staffing model, it is primarily driven by traveler volume and
inspection processing times. The staffing model also incorporates
assumptions for training, anti-terrorism activities, and staffing for
special equipment, such as radiation portal monitors.^41 According to CBP
officials, the model's assumptions will be recalculated each fiscal year
in order to account for changes caused by new requirements, procedures, or
changes in workload. For example, when the new inspection requirements
come into effect under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, CBP can
adjust the processing times in the staffing model, which may result in
changes in the number of staff needed,^42 according to CBP officials. CBP
plans to use the staffing model to help management decide on the number of
staff needed and where they should be deployed.

^39 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-699, at 126 (2006).

^40 Pub. L. No. 109-347, S403, 120 Stat. 1884, 1926-28.

^41 A radiation portal monitor is a detection device that provides CBP
with a passive, non-intrusive means to screen trucks and other conveyances
for the presence of nuclear and radiological materials.

In July 2007, CBP provided us with the results for the staffing model.^43
The model's results showed that CBP would need up to several thousand
additional CBP officers and agricultural specialists at its ports of
entry. In addition, the staffing model showed the relative need among
different CBP locations. CBP has determined that data from the staffing
model are law enforcement sensitive. Therefore, we are not providing more
detailed data and information from the model in this report.

The staffing model was not finalized in time to prepare CBP's fiscal year
2008 budget request. CBP officials told us that they plan to use the
results of the staffing model to determine which locations are to receive
additional staffing in fiscal year 2008, should Congress approve their
request for additional positions.

  CBP Cites Insufficient Staffing as an Impediment to Traveler Inspection
  Efforts

Before the staffing model was finalized, CBP used other data to determine
staffing needs and provide an indication of the degree to which
insufficient staffing affects operations at ports of entry. CBP's 20 field
offices and its pre-clearance headquarters office requested additional
officers through quarterly resource assessment reports that quantified
perceived staffing needs and provided justifications for the request. CBP
used the quarterly resource assessment reports to help determine the
number of officers to allocate to each office, but the majority of the
requests went unfilled due, in part, to budget constraints. In January
2007, 19 of CBP's 21 offices identified a need for additional officers to
accomplish their anti-terrorism responsibilities through special
operations and anti-terrorism teams; operate new equipment, such as
radiation portal monitors and non-intrusive inspection technologies, both
of which are relatively new additions to CBP's mission responsibilities;
and to deal with increased workload from increased traveler volume and the
expansion of primary inspection lanes and other facilities.

^42 For example, the DHS estimates that when the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative is implemented--the initiative that generally requires U.S.
citizens and citizens of Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico when entering the
United States from certain countries in North, Central, or South America
to have a passport or other document or combination of documents that the
Secretary of DHS deems sufficient to show identity and citizenship--it
will reduce inspection times by 15 to 25 seconds.

^43 In a prior report, GAO recommended that CBP implement a staffing model
to ensure that agricultural staffing levels at each port of entry are
sufficient. See GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Coordination
Problems Increase the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests
and Disease, [57]GAO-06-644 (Washington D.C.: May 19, 2006).

Managers, supervisors, and officers at seven of the eight ports of entry
that we visited provided examples of how insufficient staffing affects
their ability to carry out primary and secondary inspections:

Anti-terrorism and other traveler inspection programs are not fully
carried out. CBP uses a "layered" enforcement approach when it inspects
travelers.^44 In implementing this approach, port officials told us that
when possible, they perform enforcement operations that include
anti-terrorism teams and canine inspections (see fig. 7). While considered
discretionary, according to CBP officials, these inspections can result in
significant numbers of seizures and adverse actions and, thus, are a key
tool in traveler inspection efforts. For example, one port conducted a
30-day pilot project during which it focused its efforts on such
operations. During this time, CBP officers said they apprehended 96
criminals, inadmissible aliens, and other violators who were in line for
primary inspection.

^44 The specific techniques used by CBP in its "layered" enforcement
approach are not included in this report because the information is
considered sensitive. In addition, specific information on how staffing
shortages affect CBP's ability to carry out primary and secondary
inspections are also viewed as sensitive information and therefore are not
included in this report.

Figure 7: Canine Team Inspecting Vehicular Traffic at a Land Port of Entry

Double shifts can result in officer fatigue. Due to staffing shortages,
ports of entry rely on overtime to accomplish their inspection
responsibilities. Officers at six of the eight ports of entry we visited
indicated that officer fatigue caused by excessive overtime negatively
affected inspections at their ports of entry. On occasion, officers said
they are called upon to work 16-hour shifts, spending long stints in the
primary passenger processing lanes in order to keep lanes open, in part to
minimize traveler wait times.^45 Further evidence of fatigue came from
officers who said that CBP officers call in sick due to exhaustion, in
part to avoid mandatory overtime, which in turn exacerbates the staffing
challenges faced by the ports.

^45 Specific concerns from CBP officials of how officer fatigue affects
primary inspections are not included in this report because the
information is considered sensitive.

  CBP Faces Challenges in Retaining Officers

CBP's onboard staffing level is below its budgeted level, partly due to
attrition.^46 According to CBP officials at headquarters and the ports of
entry we visited, the gap between the budgeted staffing level and the
number of officers onboard is attributable in part to high attrition, with
ports of entry losing officers faster than they can hire replacements.
Through March 2007, CBP data show that, on average, 52 CBP officers left
the agency each 2-week pay period in fiscal year 2007, up from 34 officers
in fiscal year 2005. Port managers at five locations indicated that the
rising attrition consistently keeps their ports of entry below the
budgeted staffing level because of the lengthy amount of time--up to a
year--that it can take to hire and train a new officer. On a case-by-case
basis, CBP has allowed five field offices to hire above their budgeted
staffing levels in order to account for the expected attrition before the
next hiring cycle. For example, one field office was allowed to hire over
its budgeted staffing level by 100 staff in anticipation of expected
officer attrition. However, the use of this option is limited and port
managers stated that attrition still outpaces hiring at such locations.

Numerous reasons exist for officer attrition. As with other federal
agencies, officer retirements are taking a toll on the agency's workforce.
In the next 4 years, over 3,700 CBP officers, or about 20 percent of CBP's
authorized level of 18,530 officers, will become eligible for retirement.
In addition, according to CBP officials, CBP officers are leaving the
agency to take positions at other DHS components and other federal
agencies to obtain law enforcement officer benefits not authorized to them
at CBP. In fiscal year 2006, about 24 percent of the officers leaving CBP,
or about 339 officers, left for a position in another DHS component.
Further, extensive overtime, poor officer morale, and the high cost of
living in certain areas were frequently cited by employees who left as
reasons for attrition. Our analysis of responses by nonsupervisory CBP
staff^47 to the 2006 OPM Federal Human Capital Survey^48 corroborated that
they have concerns about efforts to develop staff and agency leadership
that could contribute to low morale and attrition. See appendix II for a
more complete analysis of responses by nonsupervisory employees to OPM's
Federal Human Capital Survey.

^46 Specific data on CBP's budgeted staffing level and the number of
officers onboard are not included in this report because the data are
considered sensitive.

^47CBP staff refers to all nonsupervisory employees within CBP, including
CBP officers, Border Patrol agents, and other mission support staff. CBP
officers constitute 42 percent of CBP's nonsupervisory workforce and they
represent the largest nonsupervisory group in CBP.

^48OPM conducts the Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS) as part of its
efforts to measure federal employees' perceptions about how effectively
agencies manage their workforce.

CBP recognizes that attrition of officers is adversely affecting its
operations and that it must reassess aspects of its human capital approach
if it is to hire and retain a high-performing, motivated workforce. CBP
officials told us that CBP is considering a number actions including
establishing personnel incentive programs, such as a tuition reimbursement
program. In addition, the Office of Field Operations plans to work with
CBP's Office of Human Resources Management to develop and distribute a
personnel satisfaction survey to obtain employee feedback so that
leadership can better address the needs of its workforce. CBP has also
revised the exit survey it gives to employees prior to their leaving the
agency to better assess their reasons for leaving and to help CBP identify
where it is losing employees. CBP plans to analyze data from OPM's Human
Capital Survey, the employee satisfaction and exit surveys, and attrition
data to help identify what specific actions CBP may need to take to curb
attrition. CBP plans to develop some initial retention strategies by
December 2008 and by September 2009 develop approaches to retain staff
based on areas of concern identified in the employee exit survey.

Major Cross-Training Program Developed, but Ports of Entry We Visited Faced
Challenges in Delivering Required Training

Starting in 2003, CBP began developing a series of 37 training modules
aimed at improving the skills of and to cross-train CBP officers in
carrying out inspections at ports of entry.^49 CBP recognized the
importance of training in transforming the role of its officers, and has
made officer training a focus of the agency. CBP initiated a multiyear
cross-training program effort to equip new and legacy officers with the
tools necessary to perform primary immigration and customs inspections,
and sufficient knowledge to identify agricultural threats in need of
further examination by the agricultural specialists. For example, through
a combination of computer-based "fundamentals" courses followed by
classroom and on-the-job training, a former customs inspector would take
training that prepared him or her to conduct secondary inspections related
to possible immigration violations.^50 At airports, former customs
officers might receive instruction so that they could better conduct
traveler inspections. Legacy immigration officers in air and land ports of
entry would be trained so that they could work in inspecting baggage or
vehicles, respectively.^51 The program involved developing training
modules on such topics as anti-terrorism and detecting fraudulent
documents. Through its efforts, CBP has cross-trained thousands of
officers since 2004. For example, CBP has trained about 12,000 staff in
the anti-terrorism module.

^49 According to CBP officials, it developed the 37 modules by
prioritizing courses in the following sequence: (1) anti-terrorism
programs, (2) primary inspection policies and procedures, (3) agricultural
inspection programs, and (4) customs secondary inspection for those
officers with expertise in immigration issues.

In August 2007, CBP officials involved in developing the training program
at ports of entry told us that CBP is in the process of changing its
cross-training program. The officials told us that they hope to update
existing cross-training materials and align them with recent changes in
policies and procedures. Further, the officials said that the new program
will be geared toward delivering training that provides specific expertise
in immigration or customs-related inspection activities to new officers or
CBP officers transferring to a different job function. According to these
officials, they will begin implementing the program in January 2008.

  Mission Demands Cited as Reason for Challenges in Delivering Cross-Training

While CBP has made progress in developing training modules and in training
its officers, CBP managers at seven of the eight ports of entry we visited
said they had experienced difficulty in providing their officers with
required training in a timely manner because staffing challenges force the
ports to choose between performing port operations and providing training.
In these instances, port of entry managers told us that training is often
sacrificed. One port of entry director stated, "the port is thinking out
of the box just to do basic functions [and] cannot even begin to focus on
training." Managers at this port of entry also indicated that training
courses are scheduled and then canceled because of staffing concerns. At
two other ports of entry we visited, managers indicated that staffing
challenges cause the ports of entry to use overtime to fill positions
temporarily vacated by officers who participate in training. For example,
to provide its officers with four basic cross-training courses, including
a course in processing immigration cases, management at one port estimated
they would need nearly $4 million in overtime--a condition that would make
the port go over its budget for overtime and add to the problems we
discussed earlier caused by excessive overtime.

^50 This example applies to land ports of entry.

^51 CBP has developed a specialty position in the immigration secondary
area called the CBP Admissibility Officer. CBP officers designated for
this position take a 21-day course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center followed by on-the-job training at the port of entry.

We also identified examples where ports of entry we visited did not
consistently provide cross-training courses in the manner expected by CBP
headquarters. For example, headquarters informed field offices that course
content may not be shortened. However, according to a CBP official at one
location, his port of entry trained officers to work in the immigration
secondary area by pushing officers through a compressed 5-day version of
the course rather than the 9-day version developed by headquarters. At
another port, new officers we spoke with had not taken the immigration
course after working for 3 years, even though CBP guidance states that new
officers should take the course during their second year at the port.
Challenges in providing training are not new. We have previously reported
that staffing shortages have affected training efforts at ports of entry
even before CBP was created in March 2003.^52

  Insufficient Cross-Training Creates Vulnerabilities in Traveler Inspections

Managers and supervisors at six of eight ports of entry we visited told us
that vulnerabilities in traveler inspections occurred when officers did
not receive cross-training before rotating to new inspection areas.
Although CBP's training policy calls for no officer to be placed in an
area without receiving the proper cross-training module, officers and
supervisors at ports of entry we visited told us that officers are placed
in situations for which they had not been trained. While we cannot
determine the degree to which this is happening in other ports of entry
cross the country, we identified several examples where this policy is not
being followed at the ports of entry we visited. For example, legacy
customs officers at one port of entry reported feeling ill prepared when
called upon to inspect passengers because they had not received the
requisite training. One supervisor at this port of entry stated that he
had "no confidence" that the officers he supervised could process the
casework for a marijuana seizure correctly in order to successfully
prosecute the violator because they had not received training. Supervisors
at another port of entry told us that they were rotated to areas in which
they had not received training. With responsibility over admissibility
decisions, these supervisors were concerned that they could not answer
questions from their subordinates or make necessary determinations beyond
their area of expertise. As a result of not being trained, officers at
this port stated that they relied heavily on senior officers from legacy
agencies. The officers also told us that these senior officers have been
leaving the agency. CBP managers in headquarters recognize that
insufficient training can lead to a higher risk of failed inspections. In
a presentation that was given to all field office directors, CBP
headquarters officials stated that untrained officers increase the risk
that terrorists, inadmissible travelers, and illicit goods could enter the
country.

^52 GAO, Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in
the Inspections Process, [58]GAO-03-782 (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).
GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training
Important for Successful Transformation, [59]GAO-05-888 (Washington, D.C.:
September 2005).

  Data for Measuring Progress in Providing Cross-Training Are Not Available

CBP is attempting to capture information that better reflects whether
training requirements are being met. In November 2006, CBP's field offices
submitted their revised training plans indicating how many additional
officers needed to be cross-trained over the next several years. However,
CBP officials told us that they do not track specifically which officers
need to take a particular training module, nor do they track whether those
officers have received the needed training. Without data on which CBP
officers need which particular cross-training modules and whether they
have received the training, CBP does not know the extent that its officers
have received the necessary cross-training and are not in a position to
measure progress toward achieving its cross-training program goals.

Standards for internal control in the federal government provide a
framework for agencies to achieve effective and efficient operations and
ultimately to improve accountability. One of the standards involves having
good controls in place to ensure that management's directives are carried
out. To do so, the standards call on agencies to compare actual
performance to planned or expected results throughout the organization and
to analyze significant differences. Having reliable data to measure the
degree to which training has been delivered to those who are required to
receive it would help meet this standard and put CBP management in a
position to better gauge the results of its cross-training program.

On-the-Job Training Program for New CBP Officers Faces Implementation Challenges
at Ports of Entry We Visited

In addition to developing cross-training modules for its officers, CBP
also has an on-the-job training program for new officers once they arrive
at a port of entry.^53 In a July 2003 report on inspections at land border
ports of entry, we recommended that CBP develop and implement a field
training program for new officers before they independently conduct
inspections.^54 In response to this recommendation, CBP issued guidance
for on-the-job training of new CBP officers. According to the guidance,
new officers should receive up to 12 and 14 weeks of on-the-job training
at land and air ports of entry, respectively. The guidance provides an
outline of the type of experiences that a port of entry needs to provide
to an officer as part of the on-the-job training program, such as
reviewing emergency port of entry procedures and computer systems used in
primary inspections.

However, at seven of the eight ports of entry we visited officials told us
that they had difficulty in providing on-the-job training in compliance
with the guidance. For example:

           o Management at one land port of entry stated that it could not
           provide 12 weeks of on-the-job training to its new officers
           because of workload, budget, and staffing challenges, but
           indicated that it tried to provide 6 weeks of on-the-job training.
           CBP officers at another port of entry told us that the length of
           their on-the-job training varied from 2 weeks to 6 weeks and they
           told us that they needed more on-the-job training before
           inspecting travelers on their own.

           o CBP's on-the-job training guidance recommends, but does not
           require, new officers receive 3 weeks of the training under close
           supervision of a coach or field training officer in order to
           receive direct guidance and feedback in their performance.
           However, officials at seven of the ports of entry we visited said
           that their port of entry had difficulty providing new officers
           with field training officers. For example, at two ports of entry,
           experienced officers were unwilling to take on the extra
           responsibility of training new officers, according to CBP
           officials at these locations.

^53 New officers are sent to a port of entry after receiving roughly 14
weeks of training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center,
according to a CBP officer.

^54 See [60]GAO-03-782 .

  Weaknesses in On-the-Job Training Can Reduce the Effectiveness of Traveler
  Inspections

Vulnerabilities in traveler inspections are created when new officers do
not receive required training. For example, new officers who received as
little as 2 weeks of on-the-job training rather than the recommended 12
weeks told us that they needed more training before inspecting travelers.
In our July 2003 report, we reported that discrepancies in on-the-job
training decrease the effectiveness of traveler inspections at ports of
entry when little or no on-the-job training is given to new officers.^55
For example, we found that the ports that graded their officers as being
the least prepared to carry out traveler inspections were among the ports
that provided the least amount of on-the-job training.

  Opportunities for Strengthening CBP's On-the-Job Training Program for New CBP
  Officers

In addition to new CBP officers not receiving on-the-job training
consistent with CBP's national program guidance, the training program
lacks certain elements that may be limiting CBP's ability to effectively
train new officers. Internal control standards related to management of
human capital state that management should ensure that the organization
has a workforce that has the required skills necessary to achieve
organizational goals. While CBP's on-the-job training guidance requires
supervisors to document the tasks officers have performed while in the
on-the-job training program, the guidance does not require that officers
perform certain tasks to develop needed skills nor does it call on
officers to demonstrate proficiency in specific job tasks.

The U.S. Border Patrol, an office within CBP, developed a field training
program that contains mechanisms to help ensure new Border Patrol agents
obtain the needed skills to do their job and demonstrate proficiency in
those skills. For example, the Border Patrol identified 32 different
specific skills, knowledge, and behavior traits intrinsic to Border Patrol
operations, such as processing an expedited removal case, that agents must
perform over the 12-week training period. If the new agent cannot gain
experience in a specific task, the training officer must arrange for the
new agent to conduct a practical exercise. The program requires that
agents be evaluated in all 32 areas and be provided weekly feedback on
those areas covered in training during the week. Agents are required to
demonstrate competency in performing the 32 skills. In addition, training
officers are required to write specific comments on performance that is
rated as significantly deficient or exceptional.

^55 See [61]GAO-03-782 .

We discussed the utility of the Border Patrol's on-the-job training
program with CBP officials. CBP officials told us that they are planning
to revise CBP's on-the-job field training program for new CBP officers to
make it a more robust program. They stated that they would review the
Border Patrol's field training program to identify best practices that
they might incorporate into CBP's on-the-job training program for new CBP
officers.

Results from OPM's 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey Show that NonSupervisory
CBP Staff Are Concerned about Training

Similar to the issues discussed above, our analysis of OPM's 2006 Federal
Human Capital Survey shows that CBP staff expressed concern about
training. Our analysis shows that less than half of nonsupervisory CBP
staff were satisfied with how CBP assesses their training needs (43
percent), the extent to which supervisors support employee development (43
percent), and the degree to which supervisors provide constructive
feedback on how to improve (42 percent). In responding to these three
questions, a significantly lower percentage of nonsupervisory staff at CBP
was satisfied with their training experiences than nonsupervisory staff in
other federal agencies.

CBP Has Developed Strategic Goals for Its Traveler Inspection Program, but
Challenges Remain in Formalizing Related Performance Measures

Strategic Plan Establishes Goals and Objectives for Traveler Inspection Program

CBP has developed strategic goals for its traveler inspection program, but
it faces challenges in formalizing a set of performance measures that
track what progress it is making toward achieving these goals. In
September 2006, CBP's Office of Field Operations issued its 5-year
strategic plan called Securing America's Borders at Ports of Entry, which
defines CBP's national strategy for securing America's borders,
specifically at ports of entry for fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year
2011. Building on the key themes in DHS's and other CBP strategic plans^56
and applying them specifically to ports of entry, the plan outlines the
Office of Field Operation's vision on establishing secure ports of entry
where potential threats are deterred; threats and inadmissible people,
goods, and conveyances are intercepted; legitimate trade and travel are
facilitated; and operations and outcomes are consistent across locations
and modes of transportation. The plan outlines five strategic goals. They
are (1) expanding advance knowledge--increasing and improving the
information and analysis CBP has about people, goods, and conveyances
before they arrive at the ports of entry; (2) modernizing the inspection
process to ensure that all people and goods are inspected appropriately;
(3) ensuring a flexible enforcement focus to improve CBP's effectiveness
in assessing, detecting, and predicting threats; (4) strengthening
physical security at the ports of entry to maintain a secure environment
for officers to perform inspections; and (5) building organizational
partnerships, maintaining a skilled workforce, and utilizing emerging
technologies to achieve CBP's mission.

Reported Performance Measures for Traveler Inspection Program Do Not Assess
CBP's Effectiveness at Apprehending Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators

Although one of CBP's main goals is to intercept inadmissible aliens and
other violators, CBP's reported performance measure does not address this
goal. In its fiscal year 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, CBP
reported on the degree to which travelers who arrive at the port of entry
are in compliance with immigration, agricultural, and other laws, rules,
and regulations as a way to gauge the success of its traveler inspection
efforts. Using data from its COMPEX program, CBP uses a measure--called
the compliance rate--which showed that in fiscal year 2006 about 99
percent of travelers who seek to enter the United States through 19 major
airports and by vehicle at 25 major land ports were in compliance with
laws, rules, and regulations.

We have reported that linking performance to strategic goals and
objectives and publicly reporting this information are important so that
Congress and agency management have better information about agency
performance and help to ensure accountability. CBP's current performance
measure, the compliance rate, shows the extent to which travelers arriving
at ports of entry meet the legal requirements for entering the country.
CBP does not use data that measure the extent to which it is intercepting
inadmissible aliens and other violators, one of CBP's key strategic
objectives. As discussed earlier in our report, CBP calculates a measure
known as the apprehension rate as part of its COMPEX program, which
provides an estimate of the agency's effectiveness in apprehending
travelers seeking to enter the country illegally or in violation of other
laws. The COMPEX program was originally developed by the former U.S.
Customs Service to comply with the Government Performance and Results Act,
which requires federal agencies to develop outcome-based performance goals
and measures, when possible, as a way to assess the effectiveness and
efficiency of their programs.

^56 DHS plan:Securing Our Homeland, 2004. CBP's 5-year strategic plan for
fiscal years 2005-2010 is called Protecting America, issued in May 2005,
and sets goals and objectives for securing the border at and between ports
of entry. CBP has also developed a national strategy for the Border Patrol
for reaching operational control of the border between ports of entry.

During the course of our review, we discussed with CBP officials the
potential of using the apprehension rate as one way of measuring the
effectiveness of CBP interdiction efforts. In June 2007, CBP officials
told us that CBP was in the process of selecting performance measures for
fiscal year 2008 and a decision had not yet been made on whether to
include the apprehension rate or some other similar outcome-based measure.

Conclusions

Effective inspection of the millions of travelers entering the country
each year is critical to the security of the United States. As CBP matures
as an organization, having effective inspection procedures, retaining its
officer corps, and developing the necessary skills in its officer corps
are essential given the critical role that CBP plays in national security.
Although CBP developed new inspection procedures that require CBP field
office directors to monitor and assess compliance with the new procedures,
a key internal control requiring field office directors to communicate
with CBP management the results of their monitoring and assessment efforts
is not in place. As a result, CBP management may not get information that
would identify weaknesses in the traveler inspections process that need to
be addressed. The initial set of actions that CBP has taken for dealing
with challenges in training at ports of entry is a positive start, but it
has not established a mechanism to know whether officers who need specific
cross-training have received it and whether new CBP officers have
experience in the necessary job tasks and are proficient in them. This
means that some officers may be called on to perform certain inspection
tasks without having the knowledge and skills to do them.

It is also important to have performance measures in place to permit
agency management to gauge progress in achieving program goals and, if
not, to take corrective action. In regard to traveler inspections, CBP is
missing an important performance measure that shows what results are
achieved in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators. CBP has
apprehension rate data that could be used to develop such a performance
measure. Having performance measures related to the effectiveness of CBP
interdiction efforts would help inform Congress and agency management of
improvements resulting from changes in CBP's traveler inspection program
and what gaps in coverage, if any, remain.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To mitigate the risk of failed traveler inspections at ports of entry, we
recommended in our October 5, 2007 report^57 that the Secretary of
Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection
to take the following four actions:

           o implement internal controls to help ensure that field office
           directors communicate to agency management the results of their
           monitoring and assessment efforts so that agencywide results can
           be analyzed and necessary actions taken to ensure that new
           traveler inspection procedures are carried out in a consistent way
           across all ports of entry;

           o develop data on cross-training programs that measure whether the
           individuals who require training are receiving it so that agency
           management is in a better position to measure progress toward
           achieving training goals;

           o incorporate into CBP's procedures for its on-the-job training
           program (1) specific tasks that CBP officers must experience
           during on-the-job training and (2) requirements for measuring
           officer proficiency in performing those tasks; and

           o formalize a performance measure for the traveler inspection
           program that identifies CBP's effectiveness in apprehending
           inadmissible aliens and other violators.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of the For Official Use Only version of this report to
DHS for comment. In commenting on our draft report, DHS, including CBP,
agreed with our recommendations. Specifically, DHS stated that CBP is
taking action or has taken action to address each recommendation. For
example, DHS stated that CBP will develop a measurement validation tool to
help confirm that officers have received the necessary cross-training
courses before they are assigned to a different work environment. In
addition, CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) will evaluate how the
Border Patrol is implementing its on-the-job training program and analyze
its compatibility to OFO. If effectively implemented, these actions should
help address the intent of our recommendations.

^57 See [62]GAO-08-123SU .

CBP took issue with an example we used in our draft report describing a
situation where two GAO investigators who tested the traveler inspection
process at land port of entry were not asked for any identification. We
stated that as our investigators attempted to enter at the port, the CBP
officer--who was seated behind a desk about 10 feet away--only asked our
investigators if they were U.S. citizens and the investigators said "yes."
DHS stated that under current statute and regulation, a person claiming to
be a United States citizen arriving at a port of entry is not required to
provide identity documents as long as the subject can establish, to the
satisfaction of the inspecting officer, citizenship. DHS stated that
because CBP officers were satisfied with the citizenship of the two
investigators at the time of inspection, identity documents were not
required.

We agree that an identity document is not required for U.S. citizens at
land ports of entry. However, this example is meant to convey that some
inspections were not meeting the intent of CBP's July 2006 management
guidance calling for more thorough inspections through traveler interviews
and document review. Asking a traveler one question about citizenship when
seated at a desk about 10 feet away does not seem to be consistent with
the more thorough inspections called for in CBP's management guidance. We
modified our report to include additional information on this episode.

DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the For
Official Use Only version of this report as appropriate. Appendix III
contains written comments from DHS.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to
others on request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge
on the GAO Web site at [63]http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at [64][email protected] . Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.

Richard M. Stana
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report addresses the progress the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) has made and the remaining challenges it faces in conducting
traveler inspections, staffing, and training at ports of entry.
Specifically, we answered the following questions: (1) What success and
challenges has CBP had in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other
violators at its ports of entry? (2) What progress has CBP made in
improving staffing and training at its ports of entry and how successful
has it been in carrying out these workforce programs? (3) What progress
and problems CBP has encountered in setting goals and performance measures
for its traveler inspection program?

On October 5, 2007, we issued a report that answered the above questions,
but it contained information that DHS considered law enforcement
sensitive.^1 This version of the report omits sensitive information about
CBP's traveler inspection efforts, including information on the techniques
used to carry out inspections, data on the number of inadmissible aliens
and other violators that enter the country each year, and data on staffing
at ports of entry. In addition, at DHS's request, we have redacted the
specific locations that we visited.

The overall methodology used for our initial report is relevant to this
version of the report since the information in this product is derived
from our first report. Specifically, we, performed our work at the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) CBP offices, based in Washington,
D.C. We also conducted work at 8 ports of entry--three airports and five
land crossings. While we cannot generalize our work from our visits to all
ports of entry, we chose these ports of entry to provide examples of
operations at ports of entry. At each location, we held group sessions
with CBP officers and supervisors. We also interviewed port management and
staff involved in training. In addition, our investigators conducted
vulnerability assessments of inspection procedures at 8 additional ports
of entry. Our investigators conducted covert operations to evaluate
screening procedures at small ports of entry. Although we cannot
generalize our investigators` work at these locations to all ports of
entry, we selected these ports of entry to provide examples of traveler
inspections at small ports of entry. Our investigators did their work in
accordance with quality standards for investigations as set forth by the
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. In assessing the adequacy
of internal controls, we used the criteria in GAO's Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD 00-21.3.1, dated November
1999. These standards, issued pursuant to the requirements of the Federal
Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA), provide the overall
framework for establishing and maintaining internal control in the federal
government. Also pursuant to FMFIA, the Office of Management and Budget
issued Circular A-123, revised December 21, 2004, to provide the specific
requirements for assessing the reporting on internal controls. Internal
control standards and the definition of internal control in Circular A-123
are based on the GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government.

^1 See [65]GAO-08-123SU .

To determine what success and challenges CBP has had in interdicting
inadmissible aliens and other violators at its ports of entry, we
interviewed CBP headquarters officials, such as officials from the Offices
of Field Operations, Policy and Planning, Finance, and Training and
Development. We obtained and analyzed available DHS documents on traveler
inspections, more specifically on COMPEX data (a compliance measurement to
determine an overall estimated rate of compliance for travelers), and port
infrastructure assessments. For example, we examined COMPEX data that
estimate the total number of inadmissible aliens and other violators that
seek to enter the country, and compared their compliance and apprehension
rates. We assessed the reliability of the COMPEX data by (1) talking with
knowledgeable officials about how COMPEX inspections are conducted,
documented, and how the apprehension rate estimates are generated; (2)
reviewing relevant documentation; and (3) replicating the calculations for
the apprehension rates that were provided in the COMPEX reports. We
determined the COMPEX estimates were sufficiently reliable for
illustrating apprehension rates for the ports of entry the COMPEX program
covers. Additionally, we also analyzed CBP's Strategic Resource
Assessment, an evaluation and planning tool designed to identify a port's
infrastructure needs and operational impact on traveler inspections. We
also evaluated the CBP Inspector's Field Manual to determine
inspections-related requirements. During our eight site visits, we met
with and interviewed field office directors and senior port management
staff. During our interviews, we (1) discussed CBP's success in
interdicting inadmissible aliens and other violators and the
vulnerabilities in the inspections procedures and concerns related to
physical infrastructure and (2) obtained available documentation regarding
traveler-related inspections policies and procedures. At each port of
entry we visited, we observed both primary and secondary screening
procedures and conducted discussion group sessions with officers and
supervisors. At each port of entry we visited, we obtained a list of CBP
officers scheduled to work during our site visit and from that list we
randomly selected officers and supervisors to participate in our sessions
at six of the eight ports we visited. We organized the discussion groups
by whether they were from legacy organizations or became CBP officers
after the merger. At two ports of entry, local management selected
officers who would attend the discussion groups and interviews. The group
discussions covered a variety of discussion topics, particularly officers'
perceptions and experiences with the "One Face at the Border" initiative
and associated challenges in conducting inspections at ports of entry.
Over 200 CBP officers participated in our discussion group sessions. In
addition to the discussion groups, we also conducted meetings (usually
groups of two to four) with CBP chiefs, line supervisors, and specialists
(e.g., officers assigned to the intelligence or canine units). These
meetings were designed to collect perceptions from CBP middle management
and specialists. Additionally, we reviewed a videotape prepared by CBP
that documented noncompliance with inspection requirements. Finally, we
reviewed CBP's new policies and procedures for traveler inspections at
land ports of entry.

To examine what progress CBP has made in improving staffing and training
at its ports of entry and how successful has it been in carrying out these
workforce programs, we interviewed CBP headquarters officials, including
those from the Offices of Field Operations, Policy and Planning, Human
Resource Management, and Training and Development. We obtained and
analyzed available CBP reports on staffing and training data. For example,
we analyzed staffing data from CBP's Quarterly Resource Assessment, an
allocation tool used by field offices to identify the port's need for
additional resources (e.g., request for additional officers). We also
collected and analyzed data from CBP's National Training Plan, a
comprehensive guide that documents recommended training guidelines for CBP
officers. At each major port we visited, we met with field office
directors and senior port management. During our meetings we discussed
staffing and training challenges that affected port operations. Follow-up
meetings with CBP headquarters officials resulted in receiving staffing
numbers from the Quarterly Resource Assessment--an assessment tool used by
CBP to identify field office needs and resources--that documented field
offices' request for additional officers. We reviewed headquarters
guidance on the on-the-job training program, then met with field office
directors and training coordinators. We assessed the reliability of the
staffing data by (1) talking with knowledgeable officials about staffing
resources, (2) reviewing relevant documentation, and (3) comparing
budgeted staffing numbers to officers currently onboard. Although CBP
provided us with the results of the staffing model and not the model
itself, we reviewed the model with knowledgeable officials, including the
assumptions that were used to produce the estimated staffing needs. We
understand that the staffing requirements the model produces will vary
depending on the assumptions used and we present the key assumptions in
the text of our report. Although we discussed the staffing model and its
results with CBP officials responsible for the model, validating the model
and its results was outside the scope of our review. During the course of
our review, we analyzed November 2006 training data from ports of entry
that showed the number of officers that had taken cross-training modules
as well as the number of officers that local port management had
identified as still needing to take a certain module. However, when we
compared July 2007 training data with the November 2006 data from ports of
entry, we identified inconsistencies with the data. For example, the July
2007 data showed that 120 fewer officers had taken training in a module
when compared with the November 2006 data. Because of inconsistencies such
as these, we did not use these data in our report. We also reviewed the
Border Patrol's on-the-job training program to identify best practices.
Finally, we assessed nonsupervisory CBP employees' perceptions of the
effectiveness of CBP's workforce management in areas such as job
satisfaction, performance evaluation, providing employees sufficient
resources to do their jobs, and meeting training needs by analyzing
results from the 2004 and 2006 Office of Personnel Management's (OPM)
Federal Human Capital Survey. In addition, we discussed CBP's training
program with officers during discussion groups at the eight ports of entry
we visited. To get a perspective on how these results ranked against other
federal agencies, we compared the results of our analysis for
nonsupervisory CBP employees with responses from nonsupervisory staff in
the other DHS component agencies as well as the responses from the other
36 federal agencies included in the survey.

To examine what progress CBP has made in setting goals and performance
measures for its traveler inspection program, we interviewed and
corresponded with officials in CBP's Offices of Field Operations, Policy
and Planning, and Human Resources Management. In addition, to identify
CBP's strategic goals and performance measures for inspecting travelers,
we reviewed agency documents such as CBP's Strategic Plan for 2005 to
2010, CBP Performance and Accountability Reports for fiscal years 2005 and
2006, and OFO's strategic plan, Securing America's Borders at Ports of
Entry (FY 2007- 2011).

We conducted our work from August 2006 through September 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: CBP's Strengths and Challenges, According to OPM Surveys

To gain a broader view of CBP nonsupervisory staff perspectives on
workforce issues, we analyzed results from the 2004 and 2006 OPM Federal
Human Capital Survey of 36 federal departments or agencies. OPM's survey
represents responses from over 220,000 federal employees, including staff
from DHS and CBP. ^1 The survey has 73 questions designed to gauge
employees' perceptions about how effectively agencies manage their
workforce in the following categories: Personal Work Experiences;
Recruitment, Development and Retention; Performance Culture; Leadership;
Learning (Knowledge Management); Job Satisfaction; and Satisfaction with
Benefits. The following presents our analysis of responses from
nonsupervisory CBP staff to questions from OPM's 2004 and 2006 surveys.

CBP Receives High Marks in Some Areas, but Staff Generally Expressed Low
Satisfaction with Their Work Environment

Estimates based on responses by CBP nonsupervisory staff to OPM's 2006
survey show that weaknesses in the work environment generally outweighed
the strengths. Our analysis of the survey data showed that CBP
nonsupervisory staff identified strengths in 12 of the 73 survey
questions.^2 For example, we estimate that a high percentage of CBP staff
(1) view their work as important, (2) use information technology to
perform work, (3) like the kind of work they do, and (4) understand how
their work relates to the agency's mission. (See table 1 for the top 10
items.)

^1 The sample design for the OPM survey of federal employees allows
reporting results at the DHS component level, and the data may be further
broken out by employee, supervisory, or management status. It does not
provide for developing estimates by job series, or for CBP officers alone.
Here, "CBP staff" refers to all nonsupervisory employees within CBP,
including CBP officers, Border Patrol agents, and other mission support
staff. CBP officers constitute 42 percent of all CBP's nonsupervisory
workforce and about 36 percent of CBP's workforce overall; therefore,
these estimates can be considered a closer reflection of CBP officers than
estimates for all of CBP.

^2 OPM suggests an area is a management strength when 65 percent or more
of the respondents give a positive response to a question.

Table 1: Top 10 Items--Strengths in CBP

                                      Percent estimates for nonsupervisoryCBP 
                                     staff who responded "agree" or "strongly 
Items                              agree, "satisfied," or "very satisfied" 
The work I do is important                                            87.5 
Employees use information                                             86.1 
technology to perform work                                                 
I like the kind of work I do                                          83.0 
Satisfaction with paid                                                81.9 
vacation time                                                              
Satisfaction with paid leave                                          77.0 
for illness                                                                
Electronic access to learning                                         74.9 
and training at desk                                                       
The people I work with                                                74.7 
cooperate to get the job done                                              
Employees in my work unit                                             73.4 
share job knowledge with each                                              
other                                                                      
I know how my work relates to                                         73.1 
the agency's goals and                                                     
priorities                                                                 
Rate the overall quality of                                           67.7 
work done by work group                                                    

Source: GAO analysis of OPM survey.

Our analysis also showed that CBP nonsupervisory staff identified
weaknesses^3 in 22 of 73 areas.^4 (See table 2 for the bottom 10 items.)

^3 OPM indicates that an area is a management weakness when 35 percent or
less of respondents give a positive response to a question.

^4 We estimate that 50 percent or more of CBP nonsupervisory staff gave
positive responses to 27 of 73 questions. For the remaining 46 questions,
less than half of CBP's staff responded in a positive way.

Table 2: Bottom 10 Items--Weaknesses in CBP

                                                        Percent estimates for 
                                                 non-supervisoryCBP staff who 
                                        responded "agree" or"strongly agree," 
Item                                      "satisfied," or "very satisfied" 
Employees are rewarded for                                            20.8 
high-quality products and services                                         
Awards depend on how well employees                                   19.8 
perform their jobs                                                         
Satisfaction with work/life programs                                  19.3 
Creativity and innovation are                                         18.4 
rewarded                                                                   
Steps taken to deal with a poor                                       17.8 
performer                                                                  
Promotions in my work unit are based                                  17.7 
on merit                                                                   
Differences in performance are                                        16.7 
recognized in a meaningful way                                             
Satisfaction with                                                     15.8 
telework/telecommuting                                                     
Satisfaction with child care                                           9.4 
subsidies                                                                  
Pay raises depend on how well                                          9.1 
employees perform their jobs                                               

Source: GAO analysis of OPM survey.

When compared with the 2004 survey results, the survey results for 2006
showed that the only area where CBP demonstrated significant progress for
non-supervisory staff was increasing employees' electronic access to
learning materials at their desks (an estimated 24 percent improvement
from 2004 to 2006). For 19 of 71 items,^5 we estimate that scores for
nonsupervisory CBP staff declined by a statistically significant degree.
Some of the items where CBP faces greater challenges today than it did in
2004 include (1) having worthwhile discussions with supervisors about
performance (an estimated 9.4 percent fewer positive responses in 2006
compared with 2004); (2) rating the overall quality of work done by their
unit (6.9 percent fewer); and (3) people I work with cooperate to get the
job done (6.2 percent fewer).

CBP Results Generally Mirror Those of DHS, but CBP Has Shown Little or No
Improvement in Its Work Environment Since 2004

The estimates for nonsupervisory staff within CBP generally mirror those
for the rest of DHS employees. Estimates based on responses from
nonsupervisory CBP staff were about the same as those based on the rest of
DHS on 47 of the 73 survey items. CBP scored higher on four items,
including having a reasonable workload and electronic access to training.
CBP was below DHS on the remaining 22 items, including work environment
issues such as the quality of work done by the workgroup, feedback from
supervisors, and having enough information to do the job well.

^5 The 2004 and 2006 Federal Human Capital Surveys had 71 questions in
common.

Placing the results of our analysis in context with how DHS compared with
the other 36 departments or agencies involved in OPM's survey provides a
baseline along which to examine a department or agency's results. For
2006, DHS ranked at or near the bottom of four main categories measured by
the survey. DHS ranked 35th on leadership and knowledge management, 36th
on having a results-oriented performance culture, 33rd on talent
management, and 36th on job satisfaction. To put the situation at CBP in
this context, CBP's survey results rank the agency 10th out of the 13 DHS
subcomponents, which would suggest that CBP similarly ranks at or near the
bottom in these categories when compared to other federal agencies.

Quality of CBP's Work Environment for Nonsupervisory Employees Is Generally
Lower than at Other Federal Agencies

For 2006, nonsupervisory CBP staff scored the work environment as lower
than elsewhere in the federal government on 61 of the survey's 73
questions.^6 For example, when we compared CBP with other federal
agencies, we estimated that a significantly smaller percentage of CBP
nonsupervisory staff said (1) supervisors or team leaders in their work
unit support employee development, (2) their work unit recruits people
with the right skills, and (3) they are given an opportunity to improve
their skills. In contrast, there were no items where CBP staff scored the
work environment as significantly better.

When viewed in more detail, our analysis of OPM's survey data shows that
CBP faces challenges in staffing and training its personnel, especially
when CBP is compared to other federal agencies. For staffing, we estimate
that CBP staff gave low marks to CBP for (1) the adequacy of sufficient
resources to get the job done and (2) their work unit being able to
recruit people with the right skills. With respect to training, less than
half of CBP's staff were reportedly satisfied with (1) the quality of the
training received, (2) CBP's assessment of their training needs, and (3)
supervisory support for employee development (see table 3).

^6 OPM suggests using 5 percent as a "rule of thumb" approach when
reviewing and interpreting the survey results to identify notable or
meaningful differences in responses to survey questions. Using this
standard, CBP staff scores were 5 percent or more below the governmentwide
average in responses to 61 of the 73 survey questions.

Table 3: Selected Items in Which CBP Scored Lower than Elsewhere in the
Federal Government (in percentages)

                                                           Rest of            
            Item                                    CBP government Difference 
Staffing                                                                   
            I have sufficient resources to get my  33.2       47.8      -14.7 
            job done                                                          
            My talents are used well in the        48.1       61.7      -13.6 
            workplace                                                         
            My work unit is able to recruit people 30.3       43.7      -13.5 
            with the right skills                                             
Training                                                                   
            Supervisor/team leader in my work unit 43.0       64.5      -21.5 
            supports employee development                                     
            Supervisor/team leader provides        42.1       57.9      -15.7 
            constructive feedback on how to                                   
            improve                                                           
            My training needs are assessed         43.3       51.2       -7.8 
Other work environment issues                                              
            I have enough information to do my job 58.2       72.6      -14.4 
            well                                                              
            My work gives me a feeling of personal 60.9       73.1      -12.3 
            accomplishment                                                    
            I have trust and confidence in my      55.1       63.9       -8.8 
            supervisor                                                        

Source: GAO analysis of OPM survey.

CBP acknowledges that it needs to improve its workforce management,
particularly focusing on raising employees' perceptions of CBP leadership,
enhancing training and career development, and attitudes toward the
performance culture at CBP. CBP has formulated a business plan that
outlines a variety of corrective actions and initiatives it will take to
achieve results in each of these areas. From a strategic standpoint, CBP
will establish a Human Capital Advisory Board, composed of senior field
leadership from the major CBP offices, that will serve as the central
contact point for all program offices, advise and assist with implementing
the initiatives outlined in the business plan, and asses the potential for
forming an Employee Action Team Advisory Board. To facilitate
communication with CBP employees about management actions, the plan sets
forth a variety of potential actions, such as creating a Web site on the
CBP intranet where CBP supervisors and employees can review the current
workforce issues being addressed or results from actions taken, adding a
link to CBP's Web site where the public can access information to learn
how CBP is addressing the survey results, and holding town hall meetings
at key locations with the Commissioner and other high-level management. To
better define the scope of the workforce issues and problems identified
through the Federal Human Capital Survey, CBP also plans to conduct
employee focus groups as well as administer the survey internally to a
larger, more representative sample of CBP employees. Following an in-depth
analysis of the results of these actions, CBP will update the business
plan in the first quarter of 2008.

As part of its leadership initiative, CBP is exploring options to improve
employee perceptions of managers' job performance, establish better
communication of management's goals and priorities, and encourage managers
to build more trust and confidence with their employees. To accomplish
these goals, CBP plans to create a leadership development checklist to
make sure supervisors are addressing critical areas identified through the
employee focus groups, and intends to increase the marketing of its
recently implemented training course for incumbent supervisors as well as
continue the development of training for supervisors newly promoted into
management positions. These courses cover integrity, communication,
conflict management, and holding effective roundtable discussions. Within
the performance culture initiative, CBP wants to find better ways of
recognizing employees' performance that will improve their perceptions
about the fairness of CBP's performance recognition while also supporting
a balance between work and family life, which employees also rated poorly.
CBP's plan includes, among other things, a call for improving the channels
of communication used to inform supervisors and managers about the type
and scope of discretionary performance awards they have at their disposal
to issue throughout the year. It also suggests encouraging management at
all levels of CBP to have more frequent employee recognition events, to
publish award recipients and best practices, and to make awards management
a component of performance standards for supervisory personnel. Finally,
within the talent management initiative, the plan calls for Human
Resources to complete its competency, skills, and needs assessment by the
third quarter of fiscal year 2007, and for the Office of Training and
Development to implement an automated development and career path system
that will guide employees in their career development by providing
occupational "road maps" and recommending training based on the
occupations they intend to pursue.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777 or [66][email protected] .

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact listed above, Michael Dino, Assistant Director;
Neil Asaba; Frances Cook; Josh Diosomito; Kasea Hamar; Michael Meleady;
Christopher Leach; Ron La Due Lake; and Stan Stenersen made key
contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Border Security

Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced, but More
Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use. [67]GAO-07-1006 .
Washington D.C.: July 31, 2007.

Homeland Security: Prospects for Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability Remain
Unclear. [68]GAO-07-1044T . Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2007.

Border Patrol: Costs and Challenges Related to Training New Agents.
[69]GAO-07-997T . Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2007.

Homeland Security: Information on Training New Border Patrol Agents.
[70]GAO-07-540R . Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.

Homeland Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Operational, Technological, and
Management Challenges. [71]GAO-07-632T . Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2007.

Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Planning and Management Improvements
Needed to Control Risks. [72]GAO-07-504T . Washington, D.C.: February 27,
2007.

Homeland Security: US-VISIT Has Not Fully Met Expectations and
Longstanding Program Management Challenges Need to Be Addressed.
[73]GAO-07-499T . Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2007.

Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better Support
Oversight and Accountability. [74]GAO-07-309 . Washington, D.C.: February
15, 2007.

Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and Justified. [75]GAO-07-278
. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.

Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. [76]GAO-07-378T .
Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007.

Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. [77]GAO-07-248 .
Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.

Department of Homeland Security and Department of State: Documents
Required for Travelers Departing from or Arriving in the United States at
Air Ports-of-Entry From within the Western Hemisphere. [78]GAO-07-250R .
Washington, DC: December 6, 2006.

Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of
the Visa Waiver Program. [79]GAO-06-1090T . Washington, D.C.: September 7,
2006.

Illegal Immigration: Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995;
Border Patrol's Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated.
[80]GAO-06-770 . Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2006.

Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the
United States. [81]GAO-06-976T . Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2006.

Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of
the Visa Waiver Program. [82]GAO-06-854 . Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.

Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa Waiver Program.
[83]GAO-06-835R . Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.

Intellectual Property: Initial Observations on the STOP Initiative and
U.S. Border Efforts to Reduce Piracy. [84]GAO-06-1004T . Washington, D.C.:
July 26, 2006.

Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources across Our
Nation's Borders at Two Locations. [85]GAO-06-940T . Washington, D.C.:
July 7, 2006.

Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources across Our
Nation's Borders at Two Locations. [86]GAO-06-939T . Washington, D.C.:
July 5, 2006.

Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in the
Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement and
Customs and Border Protection. [87]GAO-06-751R . Washington, D.C.: June
13, 2006.

Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and
Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened. [88]GAO-06-404 .
Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006.

Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative on the U.S. Border with Canada. [89]GAO-06-741R . Washington,
D.C.: May 25, 2006.

Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase the
Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease.
[90]GAO-06-644 . Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006.

Border Security: Reassessment of Consular Resource Requirements Could Help
Address Visa Delays. [91]GAO-06-542T . Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.

Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources across Our
Nation's Borders at Two Locations. [92]GAO-06-583T . Washington, D.C.:
March 28, 2006.

Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported Radioactive
Sources across Our Nation's Borders at Selected Locations. [93]GAO-06-545R
. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.

Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS's Ability
to Allocate Investigative Resources. [94]GAO-06-462T . Washington, D.C.:
March 28, 2006.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation
Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain.
[95]GAO-06-389 . Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination
Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment
to Other Countries. [96]GAO-06-311 . Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.

Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border
Surveillance Technology Program. [97]GAO-06-295 . Washington, D.C.:
February 22, 2006.

Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border
Security Program Need to Be Implemented. [98]GAO-06-296 . Washington,
D.C.: February 14, 2006.

Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating, but
Management Improvements Are Still Needed. [99]GAO-06-318T . Washington,
D.C.: January 25, 2006.

Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training
Important for Successful Transformation. [100]GAO-05-888 . Washington,
D.C.: September 23, 2005.

Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements
in Staffing and Information Sharing. [101]GAO-05-859 . Washington, D.C.:
September 13, 2005.

Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and Marine
Assets. [102]GAO-05-543 . Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2005.

Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of
Homeland Security's Visa Security Program. [103]GAO-05-801 . Washington,
D.C.: July 29, 2005.

Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences
in Sector Performance. [104]GAO-05-435 . Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection
Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. [105]GAO-05-840T .
Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.

Homeland Security: Performance of Foreign Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System Continues to Improve, but Issues Remain.
[106]GAO-05-440T . Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.

Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program. [107]GAO-05-202
. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.

Border Security: Streamlined Visas Mantis Program Has Lowered Burden on
Foreign Science Students and Scholars, but Further Refinements Needed.
[108]GAO-05-198 . Washington, D.C.: February 18, 2005.

Border Security: Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and DHS Needed to
Guide Biometric Visas and Related Programs. [109]GAO-04-1080T .
Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2004.

Border Security: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on Schedule,
but Guidance Is Lagging. [110]GAO-04-1001 . Washington, D.C.: September 9,
2004.

Border Security: Consular Identification Cards Accepted within United
States, but Consistent Federal Guidance Needed. [111]GAO-04-881 .
Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2004.

Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the
Visa Revocation Process. [112]GAO-04-795 . Washington, D.C.: July 13,
2004.

Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the
Visa Revocation Process. [113]GAO-04-899T . Washington, D.C.: July 13,
2004.

Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their Strategies and
Operations on Federal Lands. [114]GAO-04-590 . Washington, D.C.: June 16,
2004.

Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a Layered
Defense. [115]GAO-04-82 . Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004.

Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status Program
Operating, but Improvements Needed. [116]GAO-04-586 . Washington, D.C.:
May 11, 2004.

Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security
Program Need to Be Addressed. [117]GAO-04-569T . Washington, D.C.: March
18, 2004.

Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate
Visas for Science Students and Scholars. [118]GAO-04-443T . Washington,
D.C.: February 25, 2004.

Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate
Visas for Science Students and Scholars. [119]GAO-04-371 . Washington,
D.C.: February 25, 2004.

Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered
Defense. [120]GAO-04-170T . Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2003.

Security: Counterfeit Identification Raises Homeland Security Concerns.
[121]GAO-04-133T . Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2003.

Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security
Program Need to Be Addressed. [122]GAO-03-1083 . Washington, D.C.:
September 19, 2003.

Security: Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud Raise
Security Concerns. [123]GAO-03-1147T . Washington, D.C.: September 9,
2003.

Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the
Inspections Process. [124]GAO-03-1084R . Washington, D.C.: August 18,
2003.

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center: Capacity Planning and Management
Oversight Need Improvement. [125]GAO-03-736 . Washington, D.C.: July 24,
2003.

Border Security: New Policies and Increased Interagency Coordination
Needed to Improve Visa Process. [126]GAO-03-1013T . Washington, D.C.: July
15, 2003.

Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the
Inspections Process, [127]GAO-03-782 . Washington, D.C.: July 2003.

Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in
the Visa Revocation Process. [128]GAO-03-908T . Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2003.

Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in
the Visa Revocation Process. [129]GAO-03-798 . Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2003.

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security
in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation Missions.
[130]GAO-03-902T . Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.

Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States from Certain Western
Hemisphere Countries Not Detected. [131]GAO-03-713T . Washington, D.C.:
May 13, 2003.

Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to
Promote Better Integration and Sharing. [132]GAO-03-322 . Washington,
D.C.: April 15, 2003.

Border Security: Challenges in Implementing Border Technology.
[133]GAO-03-546T . Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003.

(440677)

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on [134]GAO-08-219 .

For more information, contact Richard Stana at (202) 512-8777 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [135]GAO-08-219 , a report to congressional requestors

November 2007

BORDER SECURITY

Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's
Ports of Entry

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for keeping
terrorists and other dangerous people from entering the country while also
facilitating the cross-border movement of millions of travelers. CBP
carries out this responsibility at 326 air, sea, and land ports of entry.
In response to a congressional request, GAO examined CBP traveler
inspection efforts, the progress made and the challenges that remain in
staffing and training at ports of entry, and the progress CBP has made in
developing strategic plans and performance measures for its traveler
inspection program. This is a public version of a For Official Use Only
report GAO issued on October 5, 2007. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed
and analyzed CBP data and documents related to inspections, staffing, and
training, interviewed managers and officers, observed inspections at eight
major air and land ports of entry, and tested inspection controls at eight
small land ports of entry. Information the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) deemed sensitive has been redacted.

[136]What GAO Recommends

GAO made recommendations aimed at enhancing internal controls in the
inspection process, mechanisms for measuring training provided and new
officer proficiency, and implementing a performance measure for
apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators. DHS concurred with
our recommendations and said that CBP is taking steps to address them.

CBP has had some success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other
violators, but weaknesses in its operations increase the potential that
terrorists and inadmissible travelers could enter the country. In fiscal
year 2006, CBP turned away over 200,000 inadmissible aliens and
interdicted other violators. Although CBP's goal is to interdict all
violators, CBP estimated that several thousand inadmissible aliens and
other violators entered the country though ports of entry in fiscal year
2006. Weaknesses in 2006 inspection procedures, such as not verifying the
nationality and admissibility of each traveler, contribute to failed
inspections. Although CBP took actions to address these weaknesses,
subsequent follow up work conducted by GAO months after CBP's actions
found that weaknesses such as those described above still existed. In July
2007, CBP issued detailed procedures for conducting inspections including
requiring field office managers to assess compliance with these
procedures. However, CBP has not established an internal control to ensure
field office managers share their assessments with CBP headquarters to
help ensure that the new procedures are consistently implemented across
all ports of entry and reduce the risk of failed traveler inspections.

CBP developed a staffing model that estimates it needs up to several
thousand more staff. Field office managers said that staffing shortages
affected their ability to carry out anti-terrorism programs and created
other vulnerabilities in the inspections process. CBP recognizes that
officer attrition has impaired its ability to attain budgeted staffing
levels and is in the process of developing a strategy to help curb
attrition. CBP has made progress in developing training programs, yet it
does not measure the extent to which it provides training to all who need
it and whether new officers demonstrate proficiency in required skills.

CPB issued a strategic plan for operations at its ports of entry and has
collected performance data that can be used to measure its progress in
achieving its strategic goals. However, current performance measures do
not gauge CBP effectiveness in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other
violators, a key strategic goal.

GAO's Mission

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site ( [137]www.gao.gov ). Each weekday, GAO posts
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To
have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
[138]www.gao.gov and select "E-mail Updates."

Order by Mail or Phone

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
DC 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000
TDD: (202) 512-2537
Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: [139]www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: [140][email protected]
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [141][email protected] , (202) 512-4400
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
Washington, DC 20548

Public Affairs

Chuck Young, Managing Director, [142][email protected] , (202) 512-4800 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington,
DC 20548

References

Visible links

  50. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-782
  51. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-123SU
  52. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-644
  53. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
  54. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1006
  55. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1006
  56. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-248
  57. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-644
  58. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-782
  59. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-888
  60. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-782
  61. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-782
  62. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-123SU
  63. http://www.gao.gov/
  64. mailto:[email protected]
  65. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-123SU
  66. mailto:[email protected]
  67. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1006
  68. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1044T
  69. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-997T
  70. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-540R
  71. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-632T
  72. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-504T
  73. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-499T
  74. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-309
  75. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-278
  76. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-378T
  77. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-248
  78. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-250R
  79. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1090T
  80. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-770
  81. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-976T
  82. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-854
  83. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-835R
  84. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1004T
  85. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-940T
  86. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-939T
  87. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-751R
  88. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-404
  89. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-741R
  90. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-644
  91. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-542T
  92. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-583T
  93. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-545R
  94. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-462T
  95. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-389
  96. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-311
  97. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-295
  98. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-296
  99. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-318T
 100. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-888
 101. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-859
 102. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-543
 103. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-801
 104. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-435
 105. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-840T
 106. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-440T
 107. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-202
 108. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-198
 109. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1080T
 110. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1001
 111. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-881
 112. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-795
 113. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-899T
 114. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-590
 115. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-82
 116. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-586
 117. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-569T
 118. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-443T
 119. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-371
 120. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-170T
 121. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-133T
 122. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1083
 123. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1147T
 124. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1084R
 125. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-736
 126. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1013T
 127. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-782
 128. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-908T
 129. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-798
 130. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-902T
 131. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-713T
 132. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-322
 133. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-546T
 134. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-219
 135. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-219
 137. http://www.gao.gov/
 138. http://www.gao.gov/
 139. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
 140. mailto:[email protected]
 141. mailto:[email protected]
 142. mailto:[email protected]
*** End of document. ***