    Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler
    Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry (05-NOV-07,
    GAO-08-219).

    U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for
    keeping terrorists and other dangerous people from entering the
    country while also facilitating the cross-border movement of
    millions of travelers. CBP carries out this responsibility at 326
    air, sea, and land ports of entry. In response to a congressional
    request, GAO examined CBP traveler inspection efforts, the
    progress made and the challenges that remain in staffing and
    training at ports of entry, and the progress CBP has made in
    developing strategic plans and performance measures for its
    traveler inspection program. This is a public version of a For
    Official Use Only report GAO issued on October 5, 2007. To
    conduct its work, GAO reviewed and analyzed CBP data and
    documents related to inspections, staffing, and training,
    interviewed managers and officers, observed inspections at eight
    major air and land ports of entry, and tested inspection controls
    at eight small land ports of entry. Information the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) deemed sensitive has been redacted.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-219
        ACCNO:   A77928
      TITLE:     Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler
    Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry
         DATE:   11/05/2007
      SUBJECT:   Airports
    	     Border security
    	     Employee training
    	     Harbors
    	     Homeland security
    	     Inspection
    	     Internal controls
    	     On-the-job training
    	     Performance measures
    	     Port security
    	     Risk assessment
    	     Risk management
    	     Standards
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Terrorism
    	     Terrorists
    	     Travel
    	     Policies and procedures
    	     Program goals or objectives
    	     Program implementation

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    GAO-08-219

         * [1]Results in Brief
         * [2]Background

              * [3]Process for Inspecting Travelers Differs between Air and Lan
              * [4]Traveler Inspection Policies and Procedures Call for Establi
              * [5]Transforming the Role of CBP Officers Is a Work in Progress

         * [6]CBP Has Had Some Success in Interdicting Inadmissible Aliens

              * [7]CBP Has Had Some Success Identifying Inadmissible Aliens and
              * [8]Improvements Notwithstanding, CBP Acknowledges that It Did N
              * [9]Weaknesses in How Well Inspection Procedures Were Followed I

                   * [10]CBP Is Taking Action to Address Inspection Weaknesses,
                     but C

              * [11]Problems with Physical Infrastructure Increase the Risk That

                   * [12]Making Changes to Address Physical Infrastructure
                     Weaknesses

         * [13]Progress Being Made, but Challenges Still Exist in CBP Offic

              * [14]Staffing Shortfalls and Retention Problems Exist at Ports of

                   * [15]CBP Cites Insufficient Staffing as an Impediment to
                     Traveler
                   * [16]CBP Faces Challenges in Retaining Officers

              * [17]Major Cross-Training Program Developed, but Ports of Entry W

                   * [18]Mission Demands Cited as Reason for Challenges in
                     Delivering
                   * [19]Insufficient Cross-Training Creates Vulnerabilities in
                     Trave
                   * [20]Data for Measuring Progress in Providing Cross-Training
                     Are

              * [21]On-the-Job Training Program for New CBP Officers Faces Imple

                   * [22]Weaknesses in On-the-Job Training Can Reduce the
                     Effectivene
                   * [23]Opportunities for Strengthening CBP's On-the-Job
                     Training Pr

              * [24]Results from OPM's 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey Show th

         * [25]CBP Has Developed Strategic Goals for Its Traveler Inspectio

              * [26]Strategic Plan Establishes Goals and Objectives for Traveler
              * [27]Reported Performance Measures for Traveler Inspection Progra

         * [28]Conclusions
         * [29]Recommendations for Executive Action
         * [30]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

              * [31]CBP Receives High Marks in Some Areas, but Staff Generally E
              * [32]CBP Results Generally Mirror Those of DHS, but CBP Has Shown
              * [33]Quality of CBP's Work Environment for Nonsupervisory Employe

         * [34]GAO Contact
         * [35]Staff Acknowledgments

              * [36]Border Security

         * [37]GAO's Mission
         * [38]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

              * [39]Order by Mail or Phone

         * [40]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
         * [41]Congressional Relations
         * [42]Public Affairs
         * [43]PDF6-Ordering Information-Young-10-25-07.pdf

              * [44]GAO's Mission
              * [45]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

                   * [46]Order by Mail or Phone

              * [47]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
              * [48]Congressional Relations
              * [49]Public Affairs

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    November 2007

    BORDER SECURITY

    Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's
    Ports of Entry

    GAO-08-219

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 5
    Background 10
    CBP Has Had Some Success in Interdicting Inadmissible Aliens and Other
    Violators, but It Still Needs to Overcome Weaknesses in Its Traveler
    Inspections and Physical Infrastructure 17
    Progress Being Made, but Challenges Still Exist in CBP Officer Staffing
    and Training 29
    CBP Has Developed Strategic Goals for Its Traveler Inspection Program, but
    Challenges Remain in Formalizing Related Performance Measures 41
    Conclusions 43
    Recommendations for Executive Action 44
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 44
    Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 47
    Appendix II CBP's Strengths and Challenges, According to OPM Surveys 51
    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 57
    Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 61
    Related GAO Products 62

    Tables

    Table 1: Top 10 Items--Strengths in CBP 52
    Table 2: Bottom 10 Items--Weaknesses in CBP 53
    Table 3: Selected Items in Which CBP Scored Lower than Elsewhere in the
    Federal Government (in percentages) 55

    Figures

    Figure 1: Vehicle Lanes at the San Ysidro Port of Entry 11
    Figure 2: Border Crossings at Ports of Entry in Fiscal Year 2005 12
    Figure 3: Arriving International Passengers Awaiting CBP Inspection at JFK
    International Airport 13
    Figure 4: CBP Technology Used to Screen Commercial Trucks 19
    Figure 5: NEXUS Lane at a Port of Entry 21
    Figure 6: License Plate Reader at a Port of Entry 22
    Figure 7: Canine Team Inspecting Vehicular Traffic at a Land Port of Entry
    33

    Abbreviations

    CBP Customs and Border Protection
    DHS Department of Homeland Security
    FAST Free and Secure Trade
    FMFIA Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act
    FTE full-time equivalent
    GSA General Services Administration
    JFK John F. Kennedy
    OPM Office of Personnel Management
    SENTRI Secure Electronic Network for Travelers' Rapid Inspection
    US-VISIT U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office
    Washington, DC 20548

    November 5, 2007

    The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
    Chairman:
    Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
    Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
    Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
    United States Senate:

    The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
    Chairman:
    Committee on Homeland Security:
    House of Representatives:

    The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee:
    House of Representatives:

    The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek:
    House of Representatives:

    The Honorable Bob Etheridge:
    House of Representatives:

    U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--a major component within the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is the lead federal agency in
    charge of inspecting travelers seeking to enter the United States at air,
    land, and sea ports of entry.^1  CBP officers, who number about 17,600 at
    these ports of entry, play a critical role in carrying out this
    responsibility. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, their
    role has involved increased emphasis on countering threats posed by
    terrorists and others attempting to enter the country with fraudulent or
    altered travel documents. Intelligence officials believe that the United
    States will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat and that the
    terrorist group al Qaeda will intensify its efforts to put operatives
    here. There is also a growing concern that terrorists with no criminal
    record may use legitimate travel documents when they attempt to enter the
    country through ports of entry.

    ^1 Ports of entry are government-designated locations where CBP inspects
    persons and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully admitted into
    the country. A land port of entry may have more than one border crossing
    point where CBP inspects travelers for admissibility into the United
    States.

    In addition to its homeland security responsibilities, CBP is responsible
    for preventing inadmissible aliens, criminals, and inadmissible goods from
    entering the country. Doing so is a difficult task given the high volume
    of travelers and goods that enter the country. For example, officers
    frequently carry out their responsibilities with little time to make
    decisions about admitting individuals into the country because they also
    face pressure to facilitate the cross-border movement of millions of
    legitimate travelers and billions of dollars in international trade.

    When CBP was created in March 2003, it represented a merger of components
    from three departments--the U.S. Customs Service,^2 the U.S. Immigration
    and Naturalization Service,^3 and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
    Service.^4 As part of the merger, CBP moved forward with an approach that
    was to allow a CBP officer, with the proper cross-training, to carry out
    homeland security as well as traditional customs and immigration
    responsibilities. For example, former customs inspectors would be trained
    and work on tasks traditionally done by immigration inspectors and vice
    versa. The CBP officer would also be capable of referring agricultural
    violations to agricultural specialists. By training officers from legacy
    agencies to perform both the customs and immigration functions, CBP aimed
    to have a well-trained and well-integrated workforce to carry out the
    range of the agency's missions.

    In July 2003, we reported on vulnerabilities and inefficiencies in
    traveler inspections.^5 Given the critical role that CBP plays in homeland
    security, you asked us to review the progress CBP has made in
    strengthening its ability to inspect travelers arriving at the nation's
    international airports and land borders. In response, on October 5, 2007,
    we issued a For Official Use Only^6 report that addressed the following
    questions:

    ^2 U.S Customs Service was in the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Customs
    inspectors were primarily responsible for inspecting cargo and goods.

    ^3 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service was in the Department of
    Justice. Immigration inspectors were responsible for processing people
    traveling across the border.

    ^4 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service was in the Department of
    Agriculture. Unlike the Customs Service and the Immigration and
    Naturalization Service, which were moved to DHS in its entirety, Animal
    and Plant Health Inspection Service continues to exist within the
    Department of Agriculture and retains responsibility for conducting, among
    other things, veterinary inspections of live imported animals,
    establishing policy for inspections and quarantines, and providing risk
    analysis.

    ^5 See GAO, Land Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the
    Inspections Process, [50]GAO-03-782 (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).

               o What success and challenges has CBP had in interdicting
               inadmissible aliens and other violators^7 at its ports of entry?

               o What progress has CBP made in improving staffing and training at
               its ports of entry and how successful has it been in carrying out
               these workforce programs?

               o What progress and problems has CBP encountered in setting goals
               and performance measures for its traveler inspection program?

    As our October 2007 report contained information that DHS considered law
    enforcement sensitive, this version of the report omits sensitive
    information about CBP's traveler inspection efforts, including information
    on the techniques used to carry out inspections, data on the number of
    inadmissible aliens and other violators that enter the country each year,
    and data on staffing at ports of entry. In addition, at DHS's request, we
    have redacted the specific locations that we visited.

    The overall methodology used for our initial report is relevant to this
    version of the report since the information in this product is derived
    from our first report. To address the questions above, we analyzed
    information and data on CBP's traveler inspections, staffing, and training
    at ports of entry. We reviewed CBP policies and procedures for the
    traveler inspection program as well as other documents related to traveler
    inspection efforts. We interviewed CBP officials on the status of CBP
    efforts to develop a staffing model, train staff, carry out traveler
    inspections, and develop performance measures.^8 For information that
    would provide an overall picture of CBP's efforts, we reviewed and
    analyzed several nationwide databases, including data on staffing,
    training, attrition, resource requests from CBP's 20 field offices^9 and
    one pre-clearance headquarters office, and apprehension of inadmissible
    aliens and other violators at major airp and land ports of entry. We
    assessed the reliability of CBP's data from CBP's random selection program
    of travelers and staffing and training data by, among other things,
    meeting with knowledgeable officials about these data, reviewing relevant
    documentation, and performing electronic testing. We concluded that data
    from CBP databases, with the exception of the data on training as we
    discuss later in our report, were sufficiently reliable for the purposes
    of our review. Although we discussed the staffing model and its results
    with CBP officials responsible for the model, validating the model and its
    results was outside the scope of our review.

    ^6 See GAO, Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler
    Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry, [51]GAO-08-123SU
    (Washington D.C.: Oct. 5, 2007).

    ^7 Other violators include individuals seeking to enter the country who
    are not in compliance with the laws and regulations for entry, including
    immigration, customs, and agricultural requirements.

    ^8 Our work on training focused on the training provided at ports of entry
    and did not include basic training given to CBP officers at the Federal
    Law Enforcement Training Center. We also did not examine the role of
    agricultural specialists in CBP because we issued a report on agricultural
    inspections at ports of entry last year. See GAO, Homeland Security:
    Management and Coordination Problems Increase the Vulnerability of U.S.
    Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease, [52]GAO-06-644 (Washington D.C.:
    May 19, 2006).

    To supplement our analyses of CBP's nationwide data, we visited eight
    ports of entry. While we cannot generalize our work from our visits to all
    ports of entry, we chose these ports of entry to provide examples of
    operations at air and land ports of entry. At each site, we held
    discussion groups with CBP officers and met with management to discuss,
    among other things, staffing and training programs. In addition, GAO
    investigators visited other ports of entry to test the traveler inspection
    process. Although we cannot generalize our investigator's work at these
    locations to all ports of entry, we selected these ports of entry to
    provide examples of traveler inspections. Our investigators did their work
    in accordance with quality standards for investigations as set forth by
    the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. Unless we specify
    that the work was done by our investigators, all referrals to our visits
    to ports of entry pertain to the eight ports of entry cited above. In
    addition, we analyzed the 2004 and 2006 Office of Personnel Management
    Federal Human Capital Surveys of staff at 36 federal agencies, including
    the results from CBP, that dealt with the views of federal employees on
    training and staffing in the workplace. We reviewed standards for internal
    control in the federal government^10 and compared the standards for
    information and communications and monitoring with CBP's policies and
    procedures for traveler inspections. Finally, we reviewed prior GAO
    reports on best practices for developing strategic plans and performance
    measures and compared the best practices with CBP's plans and measures for
    its operations at its ports of entry. See appendix I for further
    explanation of our scope and methodology. We did our work in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards from August 2006
    through September 2007.

    ^9 CBP's 20 field offices are responsible for managing more than 300 ports
    of entry.

    ^10 GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
    [53]GAO/AIMD-00-21 .3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

    Results in Brief

    CBP has had some success in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other
    violators, but weaknesses in its traveler inspection procedures and
    related physical infrastructure increase the potential that dangerous
    people and illegal goods could enter the country. In 2006, CBP officers
    turned away over 200,000 aliens who attempted to enter the country
    illegally, and seized over 600,000 pounds of illegal drugs and more than
    40,000 fraudulent documents, according to CBP. To help officers identify
    potential violators, CBP has installed additional technology to inspect
    vehicles for smuggled aliens and illicit cargo and to check traveler
    documents against law enforcement databases. While CBP has had some
    success in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators, its
    analyses indicate that several thousand inadmissible aliens and other
    violators entered the country at land and air ports of entry in fiscal
    year 2006.^11 When CBP does not apprehend a potentially dangerous person,
    this increases the potential that national security may be compromised.
    Weaknesses that contributed to failed inspections relate both to
    procedures and to infrastructure:

               o Weaknesses in traveler inspection procedures. In mid-2006, CBP
               reviewed videotapes from about 150 large and small ports of entry
               and, according to CBP officials, determined that while CBP
               officers carried out thorough traveler inspections in many
               instances, they also identified numerous instances where traveler
               inspections at land ports of entry were weak in that they did not
               determine the citizenship and admissibility of travelers entering
               the country as required by law. Such weaknesses included officers
               not stopping vehicles for inspection and pedestrians crossing the
               border without any visual or verbal contact from a CBP officer
               despite operating procedures that required officers to do so. In
               the summer of 2006, CBP management took actions to place greater
               management emphasis on traveler inspections by holding meetings
               with senior management to reinforce the importance of carrying out
               effective inspections and by providing training to all supervisors
               and officers on the importance of interviewing travelers, checking
               travel documents, and having adequate supervisory presence.
               However, tests our investigators conducted in October 2006 and
               January 2007--as many as 5 months after CBP issued guidance and
               conducted the training--showed similar weaknesses as those on the
               videotape were still occurring in traveler inspections at ports of
               entry. At two ports, our investigators were not asked to provide a
               travel document to verify their identity--a procedure that
               management had called on officers to carry out--as part of the
               inspection. The extent of continued noncompliance is unknown, but
               these results point to the challenge CBP management faces in
               ensuring its directives are carried out. Standards for internal
               control in the federal government require that information should
               be communicated to agency management to enable it to carry out its
               program responsibilities. In July 2007, CBP issued new internal
               policies and procedures for agency officials responsible for its
               traveler inspection program at land ports of entry. The new
               policies and procedures require field office managers to conduct
               periodic audits and assessments to ensure compliance with the new
               inspection procedures. However, they do not call on managers to
               share the results of their assessments with headquarters
               management. Without this communication, CBP management may be
               hindering its ability to efficiently use the information to
               overcome weaknesses in traveler inspections.

               o Weaknesses in physical infrastructure. While we cannot
               generalize our findings, at several ports of entry of entry that
               we examined, barriers designed to ensure that vehicles pass
               through a CBP inspection booth were not in place, increasing the
               risk that vehicles could enter the country without inspection. CBP
               recognizes that it has infrastructure weaknesses and has estimated
               it needs about $4 billion to make the needed capital improvements
               needed at all 163 land crossings. CBP has prioritized the ports
               with the greatest need. Each year, depending upon funding
               availability, CBP submits its proposed capital improvement
               projects based upon the prioritized list it has developed. Several
               factors affect CBP's ability to make improvements, including the
               fact that some ports of entry are owned by other governmental or
               private entities, potentially adding to the time needed to agree
               on infrastructure changes and put them in place. As of September
               2007, CBP had infrastructure projects related to 20 different
               ports of entry in various stages of development.

    ^11 We redacted data on the rate at which CBP apprehends inadmissible
    aliens and other violators who seek to enter the country because the data
    are considered sensitive.

    CBP has taken action to improve staffing and training at ports of entry by
    assessing staffing needs, adding more officers since 2005 in response to
    higher budgeted staffing levels, and developing an extensive training
    program, but it lacks (1) data to measure progress on providing required
    training and (2) certain elements in its on-the-job training program for
    new CBP officers, which limits its ability to effectively train and
    evaluate the performance of new officers. According to managers at ports
    of entry, staffing shortages can result in, among other things, officer
    fatigue that can affect the quality of traveler inspections. Untrained or
    poorly trained officers can increase the probability that terrorists,
    inadmissible aliens, and illicit goods will enter the country. Progress
    and problems with staffing and training involved the following:

               o Progress and problems with staffing. Responding to language in a
               conference report for its fiscal year 2007 appropriation, CBP has
               developed a staffing model to estimate staffing needs. The model
               is based on several assumptions, such as whether overtime is
               considered as part of CBP's staffing at ports of entry, CBP's
               model estimates that CBP may need up to several thousand more
               officers and agricultural specialists to operate its ports of
               entry. According to field officials, lack of staff is affecting
               their ability to carry out border security responsibilities. For
               example, we examined requests for resources from CBP's 20 field
               offices and its pre-clearance headquarters office for January 2007
               and found that managers at 19 of the 21 offices cited examples of
               anti-terrorism activities not being carried out, new or expanded
               facilities that were not fully operational, and radiation monitors
               and other inspection technologies not being fully used because of
               staff shortages. At seven of the eight major ports we visited,
               officers and managers told us that not having sufficient staff
               contributes to morale problems, fatigue, lack of backup support,
               and safety issues when officers inspect travelers--increasing the
               potential that terrorists, inadmissible travelers, and illicit
               goods could enter the country. Reported staffing shortages are
               exacerbated by challenges in retaining staff, contributing to an
               increasing number of vacant positions nationwide. CBP officials
               attribute attrition to retirements, officers receiving better law
               enforcement benefits at other DHS components and other federal
               agencies, and new officers being unable to afford high
               cost-of-living locations. Low job satisfaction, as reflected in
               the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Federal Human Capital
               Survey, is also a contributing factor to attrition, according to
               CBP. CBP recognized that it has a problem with retaining staff and
               plans to develop ways to stem its problems in this area. For
               example, CBP plans to analyze attrition data and data from OPM's
               Human Capital Survey and employee satisfaction and exit surveys in
               order to help identify what actions are needed to curb attrition.
               CBP plans to develop some initial retention strategies by December
               2008 and by September 2009 develop approaches to retain staff
               based on areas of concern identified in the employee exit survey.

               o Progress and problems with training. CBP has developed 37
               courses on such topics as how to carry out inspections and detect
               fraudulent documents and has instituted national guidelines for a
               12-week on-the-job training program that new officers should
               receive at land ports of entry. However, CBP faces challenges in
               providing the required training. Managers at seven of the eight
               ports of entry we visited said that they were challenged in
               putting staff through training because staffing shortfalls force
               the ports to choose between performing port operations and
               providing training. For example, at one land port of entry we
               visited, managers stated that courses are scheduled, but then
               canceled because of staffing concerns. CBP managers at
               headquarters recognize that untrained officers increase the
               potential of failed inspections. Standards for internal control in
               the federal government provide a framework for agencies to achieve
               effective and efficient operations and ultimately to improve
               accountability. One of the standards calls on agencies to compare
               actual performance to planned or expected results throughout the
               organization and to analyze significant differences. However, CBP
               lacks data that show whether the individuals who require training
               are receiving it. Having reliable data to measure the degree to
               which training has been delivered would put CBP management in a
               position to better gauge the results of its training program. In
               regards to on-the-job training, while CBP guidance states that new
               officers at land ports of entry should receive 12 weeks of
               on-the-job training, new officers at the ports we visited did not
               receive 12 weeks of training. For example, at one port of entry,
               new officers told us they received between 2 weeks and 6 weeks of
               on-the-job training. In addition, internal control standards
               related to management of human capital state that management
               should ensure that the organization has a workforce that has the
               required skills necessary to achieve organizational goals. CBP's
               guidance for its on-the-job training program does not require that
               new CBP officers perform certain tasks in order to develop needed
               skills or that the officers demonstrate proficiency in specific
               tasks. In contrast, the U.S. Border Patrol, another office within
               CBP, has developed a field training program where officers are
               required to demonstrate proficiency in 32 different skills. We
               discussed the utility of the Border Patrol's on-the-job training
               standards with CBP officials who told us that they might examine
               the Border Patrol's program to identify best practices that they
               could incorporate into the on-the-job training program for new CBP
               officers. When staff do not receive required training or are not
               trained consistent with program guidance, it limits knowledge
               building and increases the risk that needed expertise is not
               developed.

    CBP has developed strategic goals that call for, among other things,
    establishing ports of entry where threats are deterred and inadmissible
    people and goods are intercepted--a key goal related to traveler
    inspections--but it faces challenges in developing a performance measure
    that tracks progress in achieving this goal. Linking performance to
    strategic goals and objectives and publicly reporting this information is
    important so that Congress and the public have better information about
    agency performance and to help to ensure accountability. While CBP's 2006
    Performance and Accountability Report included some performance measures
    related to CBP's goal of intercepting inadmissible people and goods, the
    report did not include a performance measure regarding how effective CBP
    is at achieving this goal at ports of entry. As discussed above, CBP has
    data on the degree to which it interdicts travelers who seek to enter the
    country illegally or who violate other laws at major air and land ports of
    entry. During the course of our review, we discussed with CBP officials
    the potential of using these data as one way of measuring the
    effectiveness of CBP inspection efforts. In June 2007, CBP officials told
    us that CBP was in the process of selecting performance measures for
    fiscal year 2008 and a decision had not yet been made on whether to
    include these data or other similar outcome-based measures in its
    performance report.

    We made a number of recommendations to the Secretary of DHS to help
    address weaknesses in traveler inspections, challenges in training, and
    problems with using performance data. These recommendations cover such
    matters as improving internal controls for its traveler inspections at
    ports of entry, developing data that measure whether officers who require
    training are receiving it and establishing procedures for its on-the job
    training program that call on officers to perform specific tasks and
    measure officer proficiency in performing those tasks, and formalizing a
    performance measure that shows how effective CBP is in intercepting
    inadmissible people and goods at ports of entry.

    In commenting on a draft of the For Official Use Only version of this
    report, DHS said it agreed with our recommendations and discussed actions
    CBP has underway or has taken to address our recommendations. Written
    comments from DHS are in Appendix III.

    Background

    CBP is the lead federal agency charged with keeping terrorists, criminals,
    and inadmissible aliens out of the country while facilitating the flow of
    legitimate travel and commerce at the nation's borders. CBP has three main
    components that have border security responsibilities. First, CBP's Office
    of Field Operations is responsible for processing the flow of people and
    goods that enter the country through air, land, and sea ports of entry
    where CBP officers inspect travelers and goods to determine whether they
    may be legally admitted into the country. Second, CBP's Border Patrol
    works to prevent the illegal entry of persons and contraband into the
    United States between the ports of entry. The Border Patrol is responsible
    for controlling nearly 7,000 miles of the nation's land borders between
    ports of entry and 95,000 miles of maritime border in partnership with the
    United States Coast Guard. Third, CBP's Office of Air and Marine helps to
    protect the nation's critical infrastructure through the coordinated use
    of an integrated force of air and marine resources and provides mission
    support to the other CBP components. For fiscal year 2007, CBP had a $9.3
    billion budget, of which $2.5 billion was for border security and trade
    facilitation at ports of entry.^12

    In carrying out its responsibilities, CBP operates 326 official ports of
    entry, composed of airports, seaports, and designated land ports of entry
    along the northern and southern borders.^13 Ports of entry vary
    considerably in size and volume, including diverse locations such as major
    airports like New York's John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport, and
    the busiest land crossing in the United States at San Ysidro, California,
    which processes over 17 million vehicles a year (see fig. 1); small ports
    in remote rural locations along the Canadian border that process only a
    few thousand vehicles every year; and seaports like the Port of Miami
    where cruise ships transport more than 3 million travelers into and out of
    the country each year. Most ports of entry are land border crossings
    located along the northern border with Canada or the southern border with
    Mexico.^14 The four largest land border ports of entry by traveler volume
    are at San Ysidro, Calexico, and Otay Mesa in California, and the Bridge
    of Americas in El Paso, Texas. In total, these four ports process about 27
    percent of all travelers who enter the country by land.

    ^12CBP's budget includes $1.3 billion in revenue from other sources,
    including user fees, which include fees collected by CBP for processing
    air and sea passengers, commercial trucks, railcars, private vessels,
    dutiable mail packages, and customs broker permits.

    ^13 CBP also has preclearance operations at 15 international ports in
    Aruba, Bahamas, Bermuda, Canada, and Ireland, where travelers are
    processed for advance approval to enter the United States prior to
    departure from the respective airport.

    ^14Land borders are unique because traffic at these crossings consists of
    varying combinations of pedestrians, bicycles, cars, trucks, buses, and
    rail.

    Figure 1: Vehicle Lanes at the San Ysidro Port of Entry

    CBP annually processes over 400 million passenger and pedestrian
    entries,^15 20 million containers, and 130 million conveyances^16 through
    ports of entry. In fiscal year 2005, the most recent year for which
    traveler data are available by mode of entry, land border crossings were
    by far the busiest for processing people, with about three out of four
    entries into the country occurring through a land port of entry (see fig.
    2).^17

    15 These statistics represent the total number of crossings, but do not
    reflect the number of unique individuals that entered the country. For
    example, a person may enter the country on multiple occasions throughout
    the year, and CBP counts each separate entry by the same person as an
    additional traveler processed.

    ^16 "Conveyance" refers to the means of transport by which persons or
    goods enter the country, such as by vehicle, aircraft, truck, or vessel.

    Figure 2: Border Crossings at Ports of Entry in Fiscal Year 2005

    Process for Inspecting Travelers Differs between Air and Land Ports of Entry

    The process for inspecting travelers at airports is significantly
    different than the process at land ports of entry. Prior to departure from
    foreign airports, airline carriers electronically submit passenger
    manifest information to CBP. CBP officers cross-check passengers against a
    wide range of law enforcement databases before travelers enter the
    country. Upon arrival in the United States, international airline
    passengers are first subject to immigration inspections that check visas,
    passports, and biometric data (see fig. 3). Generally, international
    passengers arriving by air must present a U.S. passport, permanent
    resident card, foreign passport, or a foreign passport containing a visa
    issued by the Department of State. CBP officers may also inspect the
    luggage of travelers.

    ^17 The majority of persons processed at land ports of entry arrive either
    as automobile drivers or passengers (82 percent) or pedestrians (15
    percent), with the remaining travelers arriving by bus (2 percent) or
    train (about 1 percent.).

    Figure 3: Arriving International Passengers Awaiting CBP Inspection at JFK
    International Airport

    CBP faces a much greater challenge to identify and screen individuals at
    land ports of entry, in part because of the lack of advance traveler
    information and the high volume of traffic at many locations. Unlike
    travelers who enter the country at airports, travelers entering through
    land ports of entry can arrive at virtually any time and may present
    thousands of different forms of documentation, ranging from oral
    declarations of U.S. or Canadian citizenship, driver's licenses, birth
    certificates,^18 passports, visas, permanent resident cards, or U.S.
    military identity cards. Travelers entering the country by bus or rail
    must provide documentation and may be subject to further inspection. CBP
    has implemented measures to help provide advance information on passengers
    arriving at land ports of entry, including trusted traveler programs that
    register frequent, low-risk travelers for expedited entry, and license
    plate readers that match license plate numbers against law enforcement
    databases.

    ^18 Pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
    2004, DHS is in the process of developing and implementing a plan, called
    the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, to require these travelers to
    present a passport or other documents DHS deems sufficient to denote
    identity and citizenship. In particular, DHS has announced that it intends
    to end the routine practice of accepting oral declarations of citizenship
    alone starting January 31, 2008.

    Traveler Inspection Policies and Procedures Call for Establishing Citizenship
    and Admissibility

    The Immigration and Nationality Act,^19 implementing regulations,^20 and
    CBP policies and procedures for traveler inspection at all ports of entry
    require officers to establish, at a minimum, the nationality of
    individuals and whether they are eligible to enter the country. The first
    requirement is for the CBP officer to determine if the person is a U.S.
    citizen or an alien, and if an alien, establish whether the person meets
    the criteria for admission into the country. Current documentation
    requirements for entry into the country vary depending on the nationality
    of the traveler and the mode of entry. For example, U.S. citizens arriving
    at land ports of entry currently may seek to establish citizenship to a
    CBP officer through an oral declaration of citizenship. In general,
    nonimmigrant aliens^21 arriving at land and air ports of entry must
    present a valid, unexpired passport as well as, depending on country of
    origin and intended length of stay in the United States, a valid,
    unexpired visa issued by a U.S. embassy or consulate for entry into the
    country. As most travelers attempting to enter the country through ports
    of entry have a legal basis for doing so, a streamlined screening
    procedure referred to as a primary inspection is used to process those
    individuals who can be readily identified as admissible. Persons whose
    admissibility cannot be readily determined and persons selected as part of
    a random selection process are subjected to a more detailed review called
    a secondary inspection. This involves a closer inspection of travel
    documents and possessions, additional questioning by CBP officers, and
    cross references through multiple law enforcement databases to verify the
    traveler's identity, background, purpose for entering the country, and
    other corroborating information. At the end of this process, the
    individual may be admitted, refused entry and returned to the country of
    origin, or detained while admissibility is subject to further review.

    ^19 See 8 U.S.C. S 1225(a).

    ^20 See 8 C.F.R. S 235.1(a), (b), (f)(1).

    ^21 A non-immigrant alien is an international traveler that wishes to
    enter the United States on a temporary basis for tourism, medical
    treatment, business, temporary work, study, or other similar reasons.

    Transforming the Role of CBP Officers Is a Work in Progress

    As part of the original reorganization plan for border security, DHS found
    that having border security and inspections performed by three separate
    legacy agencies with different priorities, conflicting policies, and
    varying leadership structures had led to inconsistent inspections and gaps
    in the sharing of information between these agencies. As part of its
    actions to address these concerns, in March 2003, DHS created CBP by
    merging employees from the three legacy agencies previously responsible
    for border security.^22 Among other considerations, DHS formed CBP to
    establish a unified command structure that was intended to reduce
    duplication of efforts while improving the sharing of information. For
    operations at ports of entry, in September 2003 CBP issued its plan for
    consolidating the inspection functions formerly performed by separate
    inspectors from the three legacy agencies. The plan, referred to as "One
    Face at the Border," called for unifying and integrating the legacy
    inspectors into two new positions--a CBP officer and a CBP agricultural
    specialist.^23 The new CBP officer would serve as the frontline officer
    responsible for carrying out the priority anti-terrorism mission as well
    as the traditional customs and immigration inspection functions, while
    also identifying and referring goods in need of a more extensive
    agricultural inspection to the agricultural specialist. CBP anticipated
    that having a well-trained and well-integrated workforce that could carry
    out the complete range of inspection functions involving the processing of
    individuals and goods would allow it to utilize its inspection resources
    more effectively and enable it to better target potentially high-risk
    travelers.^24 Together, CBP envisioned the result to be more effective
    inspections and enhanced security at ports of entry while also
    accelerating the processing of legitimate trade and travel.

    ^22 As noted earlier, the merger consolidated inspectors from: (1) the U.
    S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (Department of Justice); (2) the
    U. S. Customs Service (Department of the Treasury); and (3) the Animal and
    Plant Health Inspection Service (Department of Agriculture).

    ^23 The agricultural specialist is a technical, scientific position rather
    than a law enforcement position with an emphasis on detecting and
    preventing the importation of harmful agricultural pests and diseases.
    Candidates for these positions are required to have majored in biological
    sciences, agricultural sciences, natural resource management, chemistry,
    or a closely related field. The agricultural specialist is responsible for
    conducting agriculture inspection of passengers and cargo as well as
    analysis of agriculture imports. Additionally, agricultural specialists
    are not authorized to carry firearms, and therefore they cannot staff
    primary inspection lanes. However, they may provide backup support to CBP
    officers during secondary screening.

    ^24 Prior to the creation of CBP, legacy customs officers were
    cross-trained to carry out primary inspections at land ports of entry.

    While it has been about 4 years since the formation of DHS and CBP, our
    prior work on mergers and acquisitions found that it generally takes 5 to
    7 years to successfully complete such a transformation. For example, GAO
    designated DHS's overall transformation as a high-risk area in 2003 based
    on three factors. First, DHS faced a formidable task in implementing a
    transformation process that would effectively combine 22 disparate
    agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees into one department. Second,
    many of these agencies were facing their own challenges in management
    areas such as strategic human capital, information technology, and
    financial management; thus, DHS inherited a host of operational and
    management challenges from the beginning. Third, DHS's national security
    mission is critically important and failure to effectively address its
    management challenges and program risks could have serious consequences
    for national security as well as have major economic impacts.^25 CBP, as
    part of DHS, faces many similar challenges in its efforts to unify three
    agencies into one and in transforming the role of its officers. For
    example, with over 40,000 employees, CBP represented the largest merger of
    people and functions within DHS. Additionally, our prior work on the
    Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Customs Service, two
    of the primary agencies involved in the merger, showed that these agencies
    experienced many management challenges before their merger into CBP.
    Finally, like DHS, CBP' has a primary mission of preventing terrorist
    attacks that is critical to national security.

    ^25 To be removed from GAO's high-risk list, agencies must do three
    things. First, they have to produce a corrective action plan that defines
    the root causes of identified problems, identifies effective solutions to
    those problems, and provides for substantially completing corrective
    measures in the near term. Second, agencies must demonstrate significant
    progress in addressing the problems identified in their corrective action
    plan. Finally, agencies, in particular top leadership, must demonstrate a
    commitment to achieve any remaining key objectives and sustain various
    improvements in their performance over the long term.

    CBP Has Had Some Success in Interdicting Inadmissible Aliens and Other
    Violators, but It Still Needs to Overcome Weaknesses in Its Traveler Inspections
    and Physical Infrastructure

    CBP has had some success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other
    violators. In fiscal year 2006, CBP successfully caught tens of thousands
    of violators and it made security improvements at its ports of entry, such
    as installing new cargo inspection technology. Nevertheless, the agency
    faces major challenges in overcoming weaknesses in both traveler
    inspections and physical infrastructure. In regards to traveler
    inspections, at our request, CBP officials showed us a videotape that
    identified numerous examples of officers not establishing the nationality
    of individuals and their eligibility for entering the country as required
    by law. CBP took action in the summer of 2006 to address the problems by
    holding high-level management meetings and delivering training on traveler
    inspections to its officers. However, we later found that CBP's initial
    set of corrective actions did not always address the problems and we found
    similar problems as those on the videotape. CBP issued new policies and
    procedures to overcome these inspection weaknesses at its land ports of
    entry including requiring field office directors to conduct assessments to
    ensure compliance with these new inspection procedures. However, the
    policies and procedures do not require that field office directors share
    their assessment results with CBP headquarters management, which may
    hinder its ability to use the information to overcome weaknesses in
    traveler inspections and to identify best practices that may occur during
    implementation of its new policies and procedures. CBP faces a challenge
    in addressing physical infrastructure weaknesses at land ports of entry in
    a timely way because some ports are owned by other governmental or private
    entities, potentially adding to the time needed to agree on infrastructure
    changes and put them in place.

    CBP Has Had Some Success Identifying Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators

    CBP has identified and interdicted thousands of potentially dangerous
    people and significant amounts of illegal goods at ports of entry.
    According to CBP, in fiscal year 2006, CBP officers arrested more than
    23,000 suspected criminals, denied entry to over 200,000 inadmissible
    aliens, seized more than 644,000 pounds of illegal drugs,^26 intercepted
    nearly 1.7 million prohibited agricultural items, and seized over $155
    million in illegal commercial merchandise, such as counterfeit footwear
    and handbags. CBP officers also intercepted 40,362 fraudulent documents
    used in attempts to enter the country illegally in fiscal year 2006. Over
    half (21,292) of the fraudulent documents intercepted by CBP involved the
    alteration or improper use of travel documents issued by the U.S
    Department of State. About 80 percent of these documents involved
    impostors--that is, people using authentic, unaltered documents that had
    been validly issued to another person. The remaining 20 percent attempted
    to enter with fraudulent documents that were altered in some way, such as
    a fake or altered U.S. visa, or were entirely counterfeit.^27

    ^26 In total, when seizures by other CBP offices, such as Border Patrol,
    are considered, CBP seized about 2 million pounds of illegal drugs in
    fiscal year 2006.

    CBP's success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other violators has
    been enhanced by several new initiatives and programs that aim to further
    improve security at ports of entry. They include the following:

               o New cargo inspection technology. According to CBP, it has
               installed nonintrusive inspection technologies at ports of entry
               that enable officers to rapidly inspect vehicles and truck
               containers for inadmissible aliens and other violators, nuclear or
               radiological weapons, or other contraband (see fig. 4). Other
               nonintrusive technologies, such as radiation detectors, allow CBP
               to inspect containerized truck and sea cargo without having to
               perform a time-intensive manual search or other intrusive
               examinations of the contents.

    ^27 GAO, Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced,
    but More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use, [54]GAO-07-1006
    (Washington D.C.: July 31, 2007).

    Figure 4: CBP Technology Used to Screen Commercial Trucks

               o Additional requirements for screening passengers. To improve its
               ability to target high-risk individuals that are on international
               flights bound for the United States, CBP in fiscal year 2007,
               issued a ruling that requires airlines provide passenger manifest
               information prior to departure. These data are critical in
               screening passengers against watch lists and other databases and
               identifying potentially dangerous individuals attempting to enter
               the United States.

               CBP also expanded the entry capability of the U.S. Visitor and
               Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to a
               total of 116 airports, 15 seaports, and 154 land ports of entry.
               Through this program, CBP is able to collect, maintain, and share
               data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints,
               on selected foreign nationals entering the United States to verify
               their identities as they arrive at air, sea, and land ports of
               entry.^28 CBP also uses these data to screen persons against watch
               lists and other law enforcement databases to determine their
               eligibility to enter the country.

               o Prescreening programs for low-risk travelers. As part of CBP
               efforts to facilitate legitimate trade and travel, CBP has
               implemented several initiatives to increase enrollment in its
               trusted traveler programs, such as the Secure Electronic Network
               for Travelers' Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) program on the southern
               border and the NEXUS program on the northern border. These
               programs allow registered border residents and frequent
               cross-border travelers identified as low-risk individuals access
               to dedicated lanes and expedited processing with minimal
               inspection (see fig. 5). Participants undergo a thorough
               background check, a fingerprint law enforcement check, and a
               personal interview with a CBP officer. Enrollment in these two
               programs totaled nearly 260,000 members in fiscal year 2007. In
               addition, as part of an initiative among the United States,
               Canada, and Mexico, CBP operates a trusted traveler program called
               the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program, for truck companies
               involved in transporting cargo through land ports of entry.
               Participants in FAST have access to dedicated lanes as well as
               reduced number of examinations. In 2006, CBP certified 124 new
               commercial partners and approved over 8,000 new drivers to
               participate in the program, bringing total FAST enrollment to
               84,000 participants.

    ^28 For additional information on the inspection process for U.S.
    passports and visas, see [55]GAO-07-1006 . When fully implemented,
    US-VISIT is also intended to capture the same information from foreign
    nationals as they exit the country. For more information on the program,
    see GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational,
    and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. [56]GAO-07-248
    (Washington D.C.: Dec. 6, 2006).

    Figure 5: NEXUS Lane at a Port of Entry

               o Automated license plate and document readers. CBP has also
               increased deployment of automated license plate and document
               readers at land ports of entry. License plate readers
               automatically read front and rear license plates of vehicles as
               they enter the primary inspection area, with the data
               simultaneously queried against CBP and law enforcement databases
               (see fig. 6). In addition, CBP has installed document readers that
               electronically read documents, such as passports or border
               crossing cards, that allow CBP officers to automatically query law
               enforcement databases. With these readers in place, CBP officers
               spend less time manually inputting information, thereby reducing
               inspection times, improving the accuracy of the collected
               information, and affording the officers the ability to interact
               more with vehicle occupants.

    Figure 6: License Plate Reader at a Port of Entry

    Improvements Notwithstanding, CBP Acknowledges that It Did Not Apprehend All
    Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators

    While CBP has had some success in interdicting inadmissible aliens and
    other violators, CBP acknowledges that it did not apprehend all
    inadmissible aliens and other violators who sought to enter the country at
    air and land ports of entry. CBP's estimates of how many inadmissible
    aliens and other violators evade detection are based on a sample of
    travelers who arrive at land and air ports of entry. This program, called
    Compliance Examination (COMPEX), randomly selects travelers entering the
    country for more detailed inspections.^29 CBP carries out this program at
    air and land ports of entry. At land ports, CBP randomly selects vehicles
    and conducts more detailed inspections of the vehicles and possessions of
    the traveler. At airports, CBP supervisors randomly select travelers. In
    both cases, the program is designed to select travelers who would not
    normally be referred to a secondary inspection and would therefore be
    allowed to enter the country. On the basis of the extent to which
    violations are found in the in-depth inspections, CBP estimates the total
    number of inadmissible aliens and other violators who seek to enter the
    country at locations where COMPEX is carried out.^30 CBP then calculates
    an apprehension rate by comparing the number of violators it actually
    apprehends with the estimated number of violators that attempted entry.^31
    Using COMPEX, CBP estimates that several thousand inadmissible aliens and
    other violators entered the country through air and land ports of entry in
    fiscal year 2006.^32

    ^29 COMPEX was created in 1995 by U.S. Customs and was implemented at
    selected land crossings and airports on June 1, 1999. COMPEX allowed
    Customs to validate its deterrent efforts as well as meet the reporting
    requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act.

    Weaknesses in How Well Inspection Procedures Were Followed Increased the
    Potential of Illegal Entry

    Weaknesses in how well inspection procedures were followed increased the
    potential that inadmissible aliens and other violators successfully
    entered the country. In the summer of 2006, CBP reviewed hundreds of hours
    of video from 150 large and small land ports of entry and determined that
    while CBP officers carried out thorough traveler inspections in many
    instances, they also identified numerous examples where officers did not
    comply with inspection requirements, according to CBP officials. At our
    request, CBP officials showed us a 15-minute video that CBP had prepared
    that documented noncompliance with inspection requirements. The following
    were examples of weaknesses that were on the video:

               o In one instance, officers waved vehicles into the United States
               without stopping the vehicle or interviewing the driver or its
               passengers as required. In another instance, motorcycles passed
               through inspection lanes without stopping and making any contact
               with an officer. In a third instance, during "lane switches" when
               CBP officers were relieved of their duty and replaced by other
               officers, officers waved traffic through the lane while the
               officer logged into the computer. The proper procedure is for
               traffic to be stopped until the officer is logged into the system
               and is available to perform proper inspections.

               o In another instance, while the CBP officer was reviewing
               information on his computer screen, he waved pedestrians through
               the lane without looking at them, making verbal contact, or
               inspecting travel documents. In another instance, travelers would
               simply hold up their identification cards and officers would view
               them without stepping out of the booth before waving the vehicle
               through. In these cases, the officers did not appear to make
               verbal contact with the passengers and did not interview any
               passengers sitting in the back seat of the vehicle. As a final
               example, officers did not board recreational vehicles to determine
               whether additional traveler inspections should be carried out.

    ^30 CBP breaks out violators into two main categories. The first category
    deals with serious violations (called category 1 violations) that include
    violations such as drug seizures and prohibited weapons. The second
    category involves minor violations (called category 2 violations) that
    include violations such as nonroutine prohibited foodstuffs, such as
    certain types of candy. The apprehension rate measures only category 1
    violators.

    ^31 The apprehension rate is considered sensitive information and is not
    included in this report.

    ^32 CBP's estimate of the number of inadmissible aliens and other
    violators who entered the country in fiscal year 2006 is considered to be
    sensitive and therefore could not be included in this report.

    Without checking the identity, citizenship, and admissibility of
    travelers, there is an increased potential that dangerous people and
    inadmissible goods may enter the country and cause harm to American
    citizens and the economy. According to CBP interviews with apprehended
    alien smugglers, alien smuggling organizations have been aware of
    weaknesses in CBP's inspection procedures and they have trained operatives
    to take advantage of these weaknesses. This awareness heightens the
    potential that failed inspections will occur at ports of entry when such
    procedural weaknesses exist.

    According to CBP senior management, the factors that may have contributed
    to these weaknesses included the following:

               o Failure to engage, lack of focus, and complacency. According to
               CBP senior management, emphasis is not being placed on all
               missions, and there is a failure by some of its officers to
               recognize the threat associated with dangerous people and goods
               entering the country.

               o Insufficient staffing. According to CBP senior management, they
               are unable to staff ports of entry to sufficiently accommodate the
               workload. Lack of sufficient staff contributes to officers working
               double shifts, sometimes resulting in fatigue that can affect
               decisions.^33

               o Lack of supervisory presence in primary inspections. CBP senior
               management noted that lack of supervisory presence at primary
               inspection booths can contribute to less than optimal inspections.

               o Lack of training. CBP senior management acknowledged that, in
               some cases, periodic and on-the-job training is not being
               delivered.

    ^33 Staffing and training issues are discussed in more detail later in
    this report, under the heading, "Progress Being Made, but Challenges Still
    Exist in CBP Officer Staffing and Training."

      CBP Is Taking Action to Address Inspection Weaknesses, but Challenges Remain

    CBP has taken action to address weaknesses in its inspection procedures by
    renewing its emphasis on the need to improve inspections at ports of entry
    and by revising traveler inspection policies and procedures. In July 2006,
    CBP headquarters showed field office directors the 15-minute videotape
    that documented the type of noncompliant inspections that were taking
    place at land ports of entry. CBP management emphasized the importance of
    thorough inspection procedures at all ports of entry, including airports
    and seaports, by requesting field office directors to review current
    procedures and identify best practices for more thorough inspections. As
    requested by the Assistant Commissioner of Field Operations, the field
    office directors conducted a series of meetings with senior port
    management to review and evaluate their ports' performance, make
    corrections where necessary, and identify best practices when inspecting
    travelers. Through efforts such as these, CBP managers identified best
    practices that included (1) increased supervisory presence in primary
    inspection areas; (2) detailing specific steps that should be conducted
    during primary inspections, such as interviewing travelers and conducting
    thorough document review (e.g., handling and inspecting documents); and
    (3) personal visits to ports of entry by directors and managers.

    CBP also revised its policies and procedures for traveler inspections at
    land ports of entry to deal with weaknesses that were identified.^34 In
    July 2007, CBP issued new policies and procedures for inspecting travelers
    at land ports of entry, including pedestrians and those who enter by
    vehicle. Among other things, the policies and procedures call on officers
    to obtain photo identification for all travelers in a vehicle and match
    the traveler with the photograph.^35 In doing so, the CBP officer is
    required to obtain a declaration of citizenship, either in the form of
    travel documents, such as passports, or in the case of a U.S. citizen or
    Canadian citizen, an oral statement. To the extent possible, officers are
    required to query law enforcement databases for all travelers in a
    vehicle. The new policies identify roles and responsibilities of CBP
    officials at ports of entry, including directors of field offices, port
    directors, supervisory CBP officers, as well as CBP officers. In the near
    future, CBP officials are also planning to issue new policies and
    procedures for processing cargo at land borders and for inspecting
    travelers who enter the country at airports and seaports.

    ^34 The Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations (OFO)
    created a steering committee whose primary responsibility was to develop
    draft directives for traveler inspections at land, air, and sea ports and
    associated performance measures. The committee consists of all OFO
    Executive Directors and the Deputy Assistant Commissioner for OFO.

    However, issuing new policies and procedures alone does not ensure they
    will be carried out. For example, after CBP headquarters issued
    directives, held musters, and issued memorandums to field office and port
    managers that emphasized the importance of carrying out improved traveler
    inspections in July 2006, many of the same weaknesses they attempted to
    deal with continued to exist at ports of entry we visited. In October 2006
    and January 2007, or as much as 5 months after managers informed officers
    of the need to carry out traveler inspections in a more rigorous way by
    interviewing travelers and examining their travel documents, our
    investigators identified weaknesses in traveler inspections that were
    similar to those identified in CBP's 15-minute video. At several ports of
    entry, our investigators found that a CBP officer was not staffing the
    booth when they arrived for inspection. At other locations, CBP officers
    did not ask for travel documents from our investigators. For example, at
    one port, when our investigators arrived at the port of entry, one of them
    called over to three officers who were seated at desks behind a counter
    about ten feet away. One of the officers asked our investigator if he was
    a U.S. citizen and the investigator said "yes." The CBP officers did not
    get up from their desks to ask for any identification, asked no other
    question, and allowed our investigator to enter the country.^36 At another
    port of entry, a CBP officer was not present at the primary inspection
    booth when our investigator arrived for inspection and he had to wait
    approximately 3 to 4 minutes before an officer arrived.

    ^35 CBP's policy recognizes that U.S. or Canadian citizens under the age
    of 16 may not have identification.

    ^36 DHS stated that by law a CBP officer is not required to ask for an
    identity document if the officer is satisfied that the person is a United
    States citizen.

    While CBP's new policies and procedures are a step in the right direction,
    ensuring their proper implementation will be key to overcoming weaknesses
    in traveler inspections. An effective internal control environment is a
    key method to help agency managers achieve program objectives and enhance
    their ability to address identified weaknesses. CBP is taking positive
    steps to implement some control requirements. For example, one of the
    standards for internal control in the federal government involves
    monitoring to assess the quality of performance over time. To monitor how
    traveler inspections are conducted at ports of entry, CBP headquarters has
    developed a program to covertly test the integrity of existing security
    measures at ports of entry, including the work carried out by CBP
    officers. In addition, CBP headquarters officials are called on to conduct
    compliance reviews. Last, CBP's new policies and procedures on traveler
    inspections call on field office directors to ensure compliance with the
    new inspection procedures at all ports of entry by conducting audits and
    assessments. Internal control standards state that information should be
    communicated to management to enable it to carry out its program
    responsibilities. However, CBP does not require that field offices share
    the results of their audits and assessments with CBP headquarters
    management. Without obtaining and receiving the results of field office
    audits and assessments, CBP management may be hindered in its ability to
    efficiently use the information to overcome weaknesses in traveler
    inspections and identify best practices that may occur during
    implementation of its new policies and procedures.

    Querying all travelers arriving at land ports of entry against CBP law
    enforcement databases represents a major challenge for CBP. As discussed
    earlier in this report, CBP's new policies and procedures require
    officers, to the extent feasible, to query travel documents of all
    travelers who arrive at primary inspection at land ports of entry. In
    contrast, CBP officers at airports generally handle and query documents of
    all travelers. Taking the time to enter information into CBP's law
    enforcement database for the several hundred million travelers arriving at
    primary inspection could hinder CBP's ability to facilitate the movement
    of legitimate travel and commerce.

    DHS's planned Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, when implemented at
    land ports of entry, may allow CBP to query more travelers against law
    enforcement databases and could improve CBP's ability to identify
    inadmissible aliens and other violators without harming commerce and
    travel. The initiative generally requires travelers to have a passport or
    passport-like document to enter the United States from Canada, Mexico, and
    other countries in the western hemisphere that is machine-readable and
    therefore can be more quickly and accurately checked against CBP's law
    enforcement database than currently acceptable documents. CBP has already
    implemented the initiative at air ports of entry, but has yet to do so at
    land ports of entry. When the initiative is implemented at land ports of
    entry, CBP officers may be able to query more documents because DHS
    estimates that processing a traveler at primary inspection will be reduced
    by 15 to 25 seconds because all travelers will have documents that will be
    machine readable.

    Problems with Physical Infrastructure Increase the Risk That Vehicles Could
    Bypass Land Ports of Entry

    CBP's effectiveness at securing the nation's borders depends not only on
    the quality of traveler inspections, but also on the degree to which
    physical infrastructure is in place to reduce the risk that inadmissible
    aliens and other violators could bypass inspection points and enter the
    country. During our site visits, we identified weaknesses in physical
    infrastructure at some land ports of entry.^37

      Making Changes to Address Physical Infrastructure Weaknesses at Land Ports of
      Entry Can Be Challenging

    CBP has developed a process to identify and prioritize capital
    infrastructure needs at land ports of entry. One component of this
    planning process is called the Strategic Resource Assessment--an
    assessment that identifies capital needs at ports of entry by evaluating
    existing facility conditions, predicting future workload trends,
    performing space capacity analyses, and estimating costs for the
    recommended options. CBP's Office of Finance has compiled resource
    assessments for 163 land crossings and has prioritized the ports with the
    greatest need. On the basis of the assessments, CBP estimates that the
    cost of making capital improvements at land crossings totals about $4
    billion. In addition, the assessments identify a planning process to
    ensure that funding is allocated in a systematic and objective manner.

    While CBP has made progress in identifying its capital needs, making
    infrastructure changes to address the problems is not always easy,
    according to CBP officials responsible for infrastructure improvements.
    For example, these senior CBP officials noted that they do not have the
    discretion to make infrastructure improvements on their own, such as
    installing barriers and bollards, when they do not own the property and
    therefore need to coordinate their efforts with other entities, such as
    private bridge commissions or state highway departments. For capital
    improvements at ports of entry, such as building new vehicle lanes or
    secondary inspection facilities, the CBP officials said the lead time for
    making such improvements was long. For example, according to these CBP
    officials, for the 96 ports of entry that are owned by the General
    Services Administration (GSA), GSA approves and prioritizes capital
    improvement projects. The process of submitting a request for an
    infrastructure improvement and completion of the project is approximately
    7 years from start to finish, according to a GSA official. For the 23
    ports of entry that are privately owned and leased by GSA,^38 CBP
    officials noted that coordinating with privately owned companies on
    infrastructure improvements is a difficult process because the private
    owner's interest in facilitating commerce must be balanced with CBP's
    interest in national security. According to CBP officials, the degree to
    which improvements will be made at land ports of entry and how long it
    will take depend on available funding and the results of discussions with
    various stakeholders, such as GSA and private port owners. Each year,
    depending upon funding availability, CBP submits its proposed capital
    improvement projects based upon the prioritized list it has developed. As
    of September 2007, CBP had infrastructure projects related to 20 different
    ports of entry in various stages of development, according to a CBP
    official.

    ^37 The locations and a description of the weaknesses in physical
    infrastructure are considered sensitive information and therefore are not
    included in this report.

    Progress Being Made, but Challenges Still Exist in CBP Officer Staffing and
    Training

    CBP has taken action to improve staffing and training at ports of entry by
    assessing staffing needs, adding staff, and developing an extensive
    training program, but it faces challenges in hiring and retaining staff
    and providing required training. To address staffing, CBP developed a
    staffing model to identify the resources needed at the nation's ports of
    entry. While CBP has had a net increase of about 1,000 more staff since
    2005, the results of the staffing model indicate that CBP may need
    additional officers at ports. Not having sufficient staff contributes to
    morale problems, fatigue, and safety issues for officers. It also makes it
    difficult for ports of entry to fully carry out anti-terrorism and other
    traveler inspection programs. The problems are exacerbated by difficulties
    in retaining experienced staff. Regarding training, CBP has made progress
    in developing 37 training modules for CBP officers and a national
    on-the-job training program for new officers. While it has delivered
    training to thousands of CBP officers, CBP faces challenges in (1)
    delivering the required training modules to those who need it and (2)
    providing on-the-job training to new CBP officers consistent with national
    program guidance. When staff do not receive required training or are not
    trained consistently with program guidance, it limits knowledge building
    and increases the risk that needed expertise is not developed. Senior CBP
    headquarters officials also stated that the lack of training and training
    that is inconsistently delivered may increase the risk that terrorists,
    inadmissible travelers, and illicit goods could be admitted into the
    country.

    ^38 Examples of privately owned ports of entry that are leased to GSA
    include the Rainbow Bridge in Niagara Falls, New York and the Windsor
    Tunnel in Detroit, Michigan.

    Staffing Shortfalls and Retention Problems Exist at Ports of Entry

    Congressional concern about CBP's ability to link resources to its mission
    led Congress to call on CBP to develop resource allocation models. In
    responding to language in the conference report for the fiscal year 2007
    DHS appropriations^39 and the SAFE Port Act of 2006,^40 CBP developed a
    staffing model for its land, air, and sea ports of entry. The conference
    report directed CBP to develop the staffing model in a way that would
    align officer resources with threats, vulnerabilities, and workload. This
    directive stemmed, in part, from concern about CBP's ability to
    effectively manage its growing workload, minimize wait times, and ensure
    that CBP officers receive adequate training in all relevant inspection
    functions. The staffing model is designed to determine the optimum number
    of CBP officers that each port of entry needs in order to accomplish its
    mission responsibilities. According to CBP staff involved in developing
    the staffing model, it is primarily driven by traveler volume and
    inspection processing times. The staffing model also incorporates
    assumptions for training, anti-terrorism activities, and staffing for
    special equipment, such as radiation portal monitors.^41 According to CBP
    officials, the model's assumptions will be recalculated each fiscal year
    in order to account for changes caused by new requirements, procedures, or
    changes in workload. For example, when the new inspection requirements
    come into effect under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, CBP can
    adjust the processing times in the staffing model, which may result in
    changes in the number of staff needed,^42 according to CBP officials. CBP
    plans to use the staffing model to help management decide on the number of
    staff needed and where they should be deployed.

    ^39 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-699, at 126 (2006).

    ^40 Pub. L. No. 109-347, S403, 120 Stat. 1884, 1926-28.

    ^41 A radiation portal monitor is a detection device that provides CBP
    with a passive, non-intrusive means to screen trucks and other conveyances
    for the presence of nuclear and radiological materials.

    In July 2007, CBP provided us with the results for the staffing model.^43
    The model's results showed that CBP would need up to several thousand
    additional CBP officers and agricultural specialists at its ports of
    entry. In addition, the staffing model showed the relative need among
    different CBP locations. CBP has determined that data from the staffing
    model are law enforcement sensitive. Therefore, we are not providing more
    detailed data and information from the model in this report.

    The staffing model was not finalized in time to prepare CBP's fiscal year
    2008 budget request. CBP officials told us that they plan to use the
    results of the staffing model to determine which locations are to receive
    additional staffing in fiscal year 2008, should Congress approve their
    request for additional positions.

      CBP Cites Insufficient Staffing as an Impediment to Traveler Inspection
      Efforts

    Before the staffing model was finalized, CBP used other data to determine
    staffing needs and provide an indication of the degree to which
    insufficient staffing affects operations at ports of entry. CBP's 20 field
    offices and its pre-clearance headquarters office requested additional
    officers through quarterly resource assessment reports that quantified
    perceived staffing needs and provided justifications for the request. CBP
    used the quarterly resource assessment reports to help determine the
    number of officers to allocate to each office, but the majority of the
    requests went unfilled due, in part, to budget constraints. In January
    2007, 19 of CBP's 21 offices identified a need for additional officers to
    accomplish their anti-terrorism responsibilities through special
    operations and anti-terrorism teams; operate new equipment, such as
    radiation portal monitors and non-intrusive inspection technologies, both
    of which are relatively new additions to CBP's mission responsibilities;
    and to deal with increased workload from increased traveler volume and the
    expansion of primary inspection lanes and other facilities.

    ^42 For example, the DHS estimates that when the Western Hemisphere Travel
    Initiative is implemented--the initiative that generally requires U.S.
    citizens and citizens of Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico when entering the
    United States from certain countries in North, Central, or South America
    to have a passport or other document or combination of documents that the
    Secretary of DHS deems sufficient to show identity and citizenship--it
    will reduce inspection times by 15 to 25 seconds.

    ^43 In a prior report, GAO recommended that CBP implement a staffing model
    to ensure that agricultural staffing levels at each port of entry are
    sufficient. See GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Coordination
    Problems Increase the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests
    and Disease, [57]GAO-06-644 (Washington D.C.: May 19, 2006).

    Managers, supervisors, and officers at seven of the eight ports of entry
    that we visited provided examples of how insufficient staffing affects
    their ability to carry out primary and secondary inspections:

    Anti-terrorism and other traveler inspection programs are not fully
    carried out. CBP uses a "layered" enforcement approach when it inspects
    travelers.^44 In implementing this approach, port officials told us that
    when possible, they perform enforcement operations that include
    anti-terrorism teams and canine inspections (see fig. 7). While considered
    discretionary, according to CBP officials, these inspections can result in
    significant numbers of seizures and adverse actions and, thus, are a key
    tool in traveler inspection efforts. For example, one port conducted a
    30-day pilot project during which it focused its efforts on such
    operations. During this time, CBP officers said they apprehended 96
    criminals, inadmissible aliens, and other violators who were in line for
    primary inspection.

    ^44 The specific techniques used by CBP in its "layered" enforcement
    approach are not included in this report because the information is
    considered sensitive. In addition, specific information on how staffing
    shortages affect CBP's ability to carry out primary and secondary
    inspections are also viewed as sensitive information and therefore are not
    included in this report.

    Figure 7: Canine Team Inspecting Vehicular Traffic at a Land Port of Entry

    Double shifts can result in officer fatigue. Due to staffing shortages,
    ports of entry rely on overtime to accomplish their inspection
    responsibilities. Officers at six of the eight ports of entry we visited
    indicated that officer fatigue caused by excessive overtime negatively
    affected inspections at their ports of entry. On occasion, officers said
    they are called upon to work 16-hour shifts, spending long stints in the
    primary passenger processing lanes in order to keep lanes open, in part to
    minimize traveler wait times.^45 Further evidence of fatigue came from
    officers who said that CBP officers call in sick due to exhaustion, in
    part to avoid mandatory overtime, which in turn exacerbates the staffing
    challenges faced by the ports.

    ^45 Specific concerns from CBP officials of how officer fatigue affects
    primary inspections are not included in this report because the
    information is considered sensitive.

      CBP Faces Challenges in Retaining Officers

    CBP's onboard staffing level is below its budgeted level, partly due to
    attrition.^46 According to CBP officials at headquarters and the ports of
    entry we visited, the gap between the budgeted staffing level and the
    number of officers onboard is attributable in part to high attrition, with
    ports of entry losing officers faster than they can hire replacements.
    Through March 2007, CBP data show that, on average, 52 CBP officers left
    the agency each 2-week pay period in fiscal year 2007, up from 34 officers
    in fiscal year 2005. Port managers at five locations indicated that the
    rising attrition consistently keeps their ports of entry below the
    budgeted staffing level because of the lengthy amount of time--up to a
    year--that it can take to hire and train a new officer. On a case-by-case
    basis, CBP has allowed five field offices to hire above their budgeted
    staffing levels in order to account for the expected attrition before the
    next hiring cycle. For example, one field office was allowed to hire over
    its budgeted staffing level by 100 staff in anticipation of expected
    officer attrition. However, the use of this option is limited and port
    managers stated that attrition still outpaces hiring at such locations.

    Numerous reasons exist for officer attrition. As with other federal
    agencies, officer retirements are taking a toll on the agency's workforce.
    In the next 4 years, over 3,700 CBP officers, or about 20 percent of CBP's
    authorized level of 18,530 officers, will become eligible for retirement.
    In addition, according to CBP officials, CBP officers are leaving the
    agency to take positions at other DHS components and other federal
    agencies to obtain law enforcement officer benefits not authorized to them
    at CBP. In fiscal year 2006, about 24 percent of the officers leaving CBP,
    or about 339 officers, left for a position in another DHS component.
    Further, extensive overtime, poor officer morale, and the high cost of
    living in certain areas were frequently cited by employees who left as
    reasons for attrition. Our analysis of responses by nonsupervisory CBP
    staff^47 to the 2006 OPM Federal Human Capital Survey^48 corroborated that
    they have concerns about efforts to develop staff and agency leadership
    that could contribute to low morale and attrition. See appendix II for a
    more complete analysis of responses by nonsupervisory employees to OPM's
    Federal Human Capital Survey.

    ^46 Specific data on CBP's budgeted staffing level and the number of
    officers onboard are not included in this report because the data are
    considered sensitive.

    ^47CBP staff refers to all nonsupervisory employees within CBP, including
    CBP officers, Border Patrol agents, and other mission support staff. CBP
    officers constitute 42 percent of CBP's nonsupervisory workforce and they
    represent the largest nonsupervisory group in CBP.

    ^48OPM conducts the Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS) as part of its
    efforts to measure federal employees' perceptions about how effectively
    agencies manage their workforce.

    CBP recognizes that attrition of officers is adversely affecting its
    operations and that it must reassess aspects of its human capital approach
    if it is to hire and retain a high-performing, motivated workforce. CBP
    officials told us that CBP is considering a number actions including
    establishing personnel incentive programs, such as a tuition reimbursement
    program. In addition, the Office of Field Operations plans to work with
    CBP's Office of Human Resources Management to develop and distribute a
    personnel satisfaction survey to obtain employee feedback so that
    leadership can better address the needs of its workforce. CBP has also
    revised the exit survey it gives to employees prior to their leaving the
    agency to better assess their reasons for leaving and to help CBP identify
    where it is losing employees. CBP plans to analyze data from OPM's Human
    Capital Survey, the employee satisfaction and exit surveys, and attrition
    data to help identify what specific actions CBP may need to take to curb
    attrition. CBP plans to develop some initial retention strategies by
    December 2008 and by September 2009 develop approaches to retain staff
    based on areas of concern identified in the employee exit survey.

    Major Cross-Training Program Developed, but Ports of Entry We Visited Faced
    Challenges in Delivering Required Training

    Starting in 2003, CBP began developing a series of 37 training modules
    aimed at improving the skills of and to cross-train CBP officers in
    carrying out inspections at ports of entry.^49 CBP recognized the
    importance of training in transforming the role of its officers, and has
    made officer training a focus of the agency. CBP initiated a multiyear
    cross-training program effort to equip new and legacy officers with the
    tools necessary to perform primary immigration and customs inspections,
    and sufficient knowledge to identify agricultural threats in need of
    further examination by the agricultural specialists. For example, through
    a combination of computer-based "fundamentals" courses followed by
    classroom and on-the-job training, a former customs inspector would take
    training that prepared him or her to conduct secondary inspections related
    to possible immigration violations.^50 At airports, former customs
    officers might receive instruction so that they could better conduct
    traveler inspections. Legacy immigration officers in air and land ports of
    entry would be trained so that they could work in inspecting baggage or
    vehicles, respectively.^51 The program involved developing training
    modules on such topics as anti-terrorism and detecting fraudulent
    documents. Through its efforts, CBP has cross-trained thousands of
    officers since 2004. For example, CBP has trained about 12,000 staff in
    the anti-terrorism module.

    ^49 According to CBP officials, it developed the 37 modules by
    prioritizing courses in the following sequence: (1) anti-terrorism
    programs, (2) primary inspection policies and procedures, (3) agricultural
    inspection programs, and (4) customs secondary inspection for those
    officers with expertise in immigration issues.

    In August 2007, CBP officials involved in developing the training program
    at ports of entry told us that CBP is in the process of changing its
    cross-training program. The officials told us that they hope to update
    existing cross-training materials and align them with recent changes in
    policies and procedures. Further, the officials said that the new program
    will be geared toward delivering training that provides specific expertise
    in immigration or customs-related inspection activities to new officers or
    CBP officers transferring to a different job function. According to these
    officials, they will begin implementing the program in January 2008.

      Mission Demands Cited as Reason for Challenges in Delivering Cross-Training

    While CBP has made progress in developing training modules and in training
    its officers, CBP managers at seven of the eight ports of entry we visited
    said they had experienced difficulty in providing their officers with
    required training in a timely manner because staffing challenges force the
    ports to choose between performing port operations and providing training.
    In these instances, port of entry managers told us that training is often
    sacrificed. One port of entry director stated, "the port is thinking out
    of the box just to do basic functions [and] cannot even begin to focus on
    training." Managers at this port of entry also indicated that training
    courses are scheduled and then canceled because of staffing concerns. At
    two other ports of entry we visited, managers indicated that staffing
    challenges cause the ports of entry to use overtime to fill positions
    temporarily vacated by officers who participate in training. For example,
    to provide its officers with four basic cross-training courses, including
    a course in processing immigration cases, management at one port estimated
    they would need nearly $4 million in overtime--a condition that would make
    the port go over its budget for overtime and add to the problems we
    discussed earlier caused by excessive overtime.

    ^50 This example applies to land ports of entry.

    ^51 CBP has developed a specialty position in the immigration secondary
    area called the CBP Admissibility Officer. CBP officers designated for
    this position take a 21-day course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Center followed by on-the-job training at the port of entry.

    We also identified examples where ports of entry we visited did not
    consistently provide cross-training courses in the manner expected by CBP
    headquarters. For example, headquarters informed field offices that course
    content may not be shortened. However, according to a CBP official at one
    location, his port of entry trained officers to work in the immigration
    secondary area by pushing officers through a compressed 5-day version of
    the course rather than the 9-day version developed by headquarters. At
    another port, new officers we spoke with had not taken the immigration
    course after working for 3 years, even though CBP guidance states that new
    officers should take the course during their second year at the port.
    Challenges in providing training are not new. We have previously reported
    that staffing shortages have affected training efforts at ports of entry
    even before CBP was created in March 2003.^52

      Insufficient Cross-Training Creates Vulnerabilities in Traveler Inspections

    Managers and supervisors at six of eight ports of entry we visited told us
    that vulnerabilities in traveler inspections occurred when officers did
    not receive cross-training before rotating to new inspection areas.
    Although CBP's training policy calls for no officer to be placed in an
    area without receiving the proper cross-training module, officers and
    supervisors at ports of entry we visited told us that officers are placed
    in situations for which they had not been trained. While we cannot
    determine the degree to which this is happening in other ports of entry
    cross the country, we identified several examples where this policy is not
    being followed at the ports of entry we visited. For example, legacy
    customs officers at one port of entry reported feeling ill prepared when
    called upon to inspect passengers because they had not received the
    requisite training. One supervisor at this port of entry stated that he
    had "no confidence" that the officers he supervised could process the
    casework for a marijuana seizure correctly in order to successfully
    prosecute the violator because they had not received training. Supervisors
    at another port of entry told us that they were rotated to areas in which
    they had not received training. With responsibility over admissibility
    decisions, these supervisors were concerned that they could not answer
    questions from their subordinates or make necessary determinations beyond
    their area of expertise. As a result of not being trained, officers at
    this port stated that they relied heavily on senior officers from legacy
    agencies. The officers also told us that these senior officers have been
    leaving the agency. CBP managers in headquarters recognize that
    insufficient training can lead to a higher risk of failed inspections. In
    a presentation that was given to all field office directors, CBP
    headquarters officials stated that untrained officers increase the risk
    that terrorists, inadmissible travelers, and illicit goods could enter the
    country.

    ^52 GAO, Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in
    the Inspections Process, [58]GAO-03-782 (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).
    GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training
    Important for Successful Transformation, [59]GAO-05-888 (Washington, D.C.:
    September 2005).

      Data for Measuring Progress in Providing Cross-Training Are Not Available

    CBP is attempting to capture information that better reflects whether
    training requirements are being met. In November 2006, CBP's field offices
    submitted their revised training plans indicating how many additional
    officers needed to be cross-trained over the next several years. However,
    CBP officials told us that they do not track specifically which officers
    need to take a particular training module, nor do they track whether those
    officers have received the needed training. Without data on which CBP
    officers need which particular cross-training modules and whether they
    have received the training, CBP does not know the extent that its officers
    have received the necessary cross-training and are not in a position to
    measure progress toward achieving its cross-training program goals.

    Standards for internal control in the federal government provide a
    framework for agencies to achieve effective and efficient operations and
    ultimately to improve accountability. One of the standards involves having
    good controls in place to ensure that management's directives are carried
    out. To do so, the standards call on agencies to compare actual
    performance to planned or expected results throughout the organization and
    to analyze significant differences. Having reliable data to measure the
    degree to which training has been delivered to those who are required to
    receive it would help meet this standard and put CBP management in a
    position to better gauge the results of its cross-training program.

    On-the-Job Training Program for New CBP Officers Faces Implementation Challenges
    at Ports of Entry We Visited

    In addition to developing cross-training modules for its officers, CBP
    also has an on-the-job training program for new officers once they arrive
    at a port of entry.^53 In a July 2003 report on inspections at land border
    ports of entry, we recommended that CBP develop and implement a field
    training program for new officers before they independently conduct
    inspections.^54 In response to this recommendation, CBP issued guidance
    for on-the-job training of new CBP officers. According to the guidance,
    new officers should receive up to 12 and 14 weeks of on-the-job training
    at land and air ports of entry, respectively. The guidance provides an
    outline of the type of experiences that a port of entry needs to provide
    to an officer as part of the on-the-job training program, such as
    reviewing emergency port of entry procedures and computer systems used in
    primary inspections.

    However, at seven of the eight ports of entry we visited officials told us
    that they had difficulty in providing on-the-job training in compliance
    with the guidance. For example:

               o Management at one land port of entry stated that it could not
               provide 12 weeks of on-the-job training to its new officers
               because of workload, budget, and staffing challenges, but
               indicated that it tried to provide 6 weeks of on-the-job training.
               CBP officers at another port of entry told us that the length of
               their on-the-job training varied from 2 weeks to 6 weeks and they
               told us that they needed more on-the-job training before
               inspecting travelers on their own.

               o CBP's on-the-job training guidance recommends, but does not
               require, new officers receive 3 weeks of the training under close
               supervision of a coach or field training officer in order to
               receive direct guidance and feedback in their performance.
               However, officials at seven of the ports of entry we visited said
               that their port of entry had difficulty providing new officers
               with field training officers. For example, at two ports of entry,
               experienced officers were unwilling to take on the extra
               responsibility of training new officers, according to CBP
               officials at these locations.

    ^53 New officers are sent to a port of entry after receiving roughly 14
    weeks of training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center,
    according to a CBP officer.

    ^54 See [60]GAO-03-782 .

      Weaknesses in On-the-Job Training Can Reduce the Effectiveness of Traveler
      Inspections

    Vulnerabilities in traveler inspections are created when new officers do
    not receive required training. For example, new officers who received as
    little as 2 weeks of on-the-job training rather than the recommended 12
    weeks told us that they needed more training before inspecting travelers.
    In our July 2003 report, we reported that discrepancies in on-the-job
    training decrease the effectiveness of traveler inspections at ports of
    entry when little or no on-the-job training is given to new officers.^55
    For example, we found that the ports that graded their officers as being
    the least prepared to carry out traveler inspections were among the ports
    that provided the least amount of on-the-job training.

      Opportunities for Strengthening CBP's On-the-Job Training Program for New CBP
      Officers

    In addition to new CBP officers not receiving on-the-job training
    consistent with CBP's national program guidance, the training program
    lacks certain elements that may be limiting CBP's ability to effectively
    train new officers. Internal control standards related to management of
    human capital state that management should ensure that the organization
    has a workforce that has the required skills necessary to achieve
    organizational goals. While CBP's on-the-job training guidance requires
    supervisors to document the tasks officers have performed while in the
    on-the-job training program, the guidance does not require that officers
    perform certain tasks to develop needed skills nor does it call on
    officers to demonstrate proficiency in specific job tasks.

    The U.S. Border Patrol, an office within CBP, developed a field training
    program that contains mechanisms to help ensure new Border Patrol agents
    obtain the needed skills to do their job and demonstrate proficiency in
    those skills. For example, the Border Patrol identified 32 different
    specific skills, knowledge, and behavior traits intrinsic to Border Patrol
    operations, such as processing an expedited removal case, that agents must
    perform over the 12-week training period. If the new agent cannot gain
    experience in a specific task, the training officer must arrange for the
    new agent to conduct a practical exercise. The program requires that
    agents be evaluated in all 32 areas and be provided weekly feedback on
    those areas covered in training during the week. Agents are required to
    demonstrate competency in performing the 32 skills. In addition, training
    officers are required to write specific comments on performance that is
    rated as significantly deficient or exceptional.

    ^55 See [61]GAO-03-782 .

    We discussed the utility of the Border Patrol's on-the-job training
    program with CBP officials. CBP officials told us that they are planning
    to revise CBP's on-the-job field training program for new CBP officers to
    make it a more robust program. They stated that they would review the
    Border Patrol's field training program to identify best practices that
    they might incorporate into CBP's on-the-job training program for new CBP
    officers.

    Results from OPM's 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey Show that NonSupervisory
    CBP Staff Are Concerned about Training

    Similar to the issues discussed above, our analysis of OPM's 2006 Federal
    Human Capital Survey shows that CBP staff expressed concern about
    training. Our analysis shows that less than half of nonsupervisory CBP
    staff were satisfied with how CBP assesses their training needs (43
    percent), the extent to which supervisors support employee development (43
    percent), and the degree to which supervisors provide constructive
    feedback on how to improve (42 percent). In responding to these three
    questions, a significantly lower percentage of nonsupervisory staff at CBP
    was satisfied with their training experiences than nonsupervisory staff in
    other federal agencies.

    CBP Has Developed Strategic Goals for Its Traveler Inspection Program, but
    Challenges Remain in Formalizing Related Performance Measures

    Strategic Plan Establishes Goals and Objectives for Traveler Inspection Program

    CBP has developed strategic goals for its traveler inspection program, but
    it faces challenges in formalizing a set of performance measures that
    track what progress it is making toward achieving these goals. In
    September 2006, CBP's Office of Field Operations issued its 5-year
    strategic plan called Securing America's Borders at Ports of Entry, which
    defines CBP's national strategy for securing America's borders,
    specifically at ports of entry for fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year
    2011. Building on the key themes in DHS's and other CBP strategic plans^56
    and applying them specifically to ports of entry, the plan outlines the
    Office of Field Operation's vision on establishing secure ports of entry
    where potential threats are deterred; threats and inadmissible people,
    goods, and conveyances are intercepted; legitimate trade and travel are
    facilitated; and operations and outcomes are consistent across locations
    and modes of transportation. The plan outlines five strategic goals. They
    are (1) expanding advance knowledge--increasing and improving the
    information and analysis CBP has about people, goods, and conveyances
    before they arrive at the ports of entry; (2) modernizing the inspection
    process to ensure that all people and goods are inspected appropriately;
    (3) ensuring a flexible enforcement focus to improve CBP's effectiveness
    in assessing, detecting, and predicting threats; (4) strengthening
    physical security at the ports of entry to maintain a secure environment
    for officers to perform inspections; and (5) building organizational
    partnerships, maintaining a skilled workforce, and utilizing emerging
    technologies to achieve CBP's mission.

    Reported Performance Measures for Traveler Inspection Program Do Not Assess
    CBP's Effectiveness at Apprehending Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators

    Although one of CBP's main goals is to intercept inadmissible aliens and
    other violators, CBP's reported performance measure does not address this
    goal. In its fiscal year 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, CBP
    reported on the degree to which travelers who arrive at the port of entry
    are in compliance with immigration, agricultural, and other laws, rules,
    and regulations as a way to gauge the success of its traveler inspection
    efforts. Using data from its COMPEX program, CBP uses a measure--called
    the compliance rate--which showed that in fiscal year 2006 about 99
    percent of travelers who seek to enter the United States through 19 major
    airports and by vehicle at 25 major land ports were in compliance with
    laws, rules, and regulations.

    We have reported that linking performance to strategic goals and
    objectives and publicly reporting this information are important so that
    Congress and agency management have better information about agency
    performance and help to ensure accountability. CBP's current performance
    measure, the compliance rate, shows the extent to which travelers arriving
    at ports of entry meet the legal requirements for entering the country.
    CBP does not use data that measure the extent to which it is intercepting
    inadmissible aliens and other violators, one of CBP's key strategic
    objectives. As discussed earlier in our report, CBP calculates a measure
    known as the apprehension rate as part of its COMPEX program, which
    provides an estimate of the agency's effectiveness in apprehending
    travelers seeking to enter the country illegally or in violation of other
    laws. The COMPEX program was originally developed by the former U.S.
    Customs Service to comply with the Government Performance and Results Act,
    which requires federal agencies to develop outcome-based performance goals
    and measures, when possible, as a way to assess the effectiveness and
    efficiency of their programs.

    ^56 DHS plan:Securing Our Homeland, 2004. CBP's 5-year strategic plan for
    fiscal years 2005-2010 is called Protecting America, issued in May 2005,
    and sets goals and objectives for securing the border at and between ports
    of entry. CBP has also developed a national strategy for the Border Patrol
    for reaching operational control of the border between ports of entry.

    During the course of our review, we discussed with CBP officials the
    potential of using the apprehension rate as one way of measuring the
    effectiveness of CBP interdiction efforts. In June 2007, CBP officials
    told us that CBP was in the process of selecting performance measures for
    fiscal year 2008 and a decision had not yet been made on whether to
    include the apprehension rate or some other similar outcome-based measure.

    Conclusions

    Effective inspection of the millions of travelers entering the country
    each year is critical to the security of the United States. As CBP matures
    as an organization, having effective inspection procedures, retaining its
    officer corps, and developing the necessary skills in its officer corps
    are essential given the critical role that CBP plays in national security.
    Although CBP developed new inspection procedures that require CBP field
    office directors to monitor and assess compliance with the new procedures,
    a key internal control requiring field office directors to communicate
    with CBP management the results of their monitoring and assessment efforts
    is not in place. As a result, CBP management may not get information that
    would identify weaknesses in the traveler inspections process that need to
    be addressed. The initial set of actions that CBP has taken for dealing
    with challenges in training at ports of entry is a positive start, but it
    has not established a mechanism to know whether officers who need specific
    cross-training have received it and whether new CBP officers have
    experience in the necessary job tasks and are proficient in them. This
    means that some officers may be called on to perform certain inspection
    tasks without having the knowledge and skills to do them.

    It is also important to have performance measures in place to permit
    agency management to gauge progress in achieving program goals and, if
    not, to take corrective action. In regard to traveler inspections, CBP is
    missing an important performance measure that shows what results are
    achieved in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators. CBP has
    apprehension rate data that could be used to develop such a performance
    measure. Having performance measures related to the effectiveness of CBP
    interdiction efforts would help inform Congress and agency management of
    improvements resulting from changes in CBP's traveler inspection program
    and what gaps in coverage, if any, remain.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    To mitigate the risk of failed traveler inspections at ports of entry, we
    recommended in our October 5, 2007 report^57 that the Secretary of
    Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection
    to take the following four actions:

               o implement internal controls to help ensure that field office
               directors communicate to agency management the results of their
               monitoring and assessment efforts so that agencywide results can
               be analyzed and necessary actions taken to ensure that new
               traveler inspection procedures are carried out in a consistent way
               across all ports of entry;

               o develop data on cross-training programs that measure whether the
               individuals who require training are receiving it so that agency
               management is in a better position to measure progress toward
               achieving training goals;

               o incorporate into CBP's procedures for its on-the-job training
               program (1) specific tasks that CBP officers must experience
               during on-the-job training and (2) requirements for measuring
               officer proficiency in performing those tasks; and

               o formalize a performance measure for the traveler inspection
               program that identifies CBP's effectiveness in apprehending
               inadmissible aliens and other violators.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    We provided a draft of the For Official Use Only version of this report to
    DHS for comment. In commenting on our draft report, DHS, including CBP,
    agreed with our recommendations. Specifically, DHS stated that CBP is
    taking action or has taken action to address each recommendation. For
    example, DHS stated that CBP will develop a measurement validation tool to
    help confirm that officers have received the necessary cross-training
    courses before they are assigned to a different work environment. In
    addition, CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) will evaluate how the
    Border Patrol is implementing its on-the-job training program and analyze
    its compatibility to OFO. If effectively implemented, these actions should
    help address the intent of our recommendations.

    ^57 See [62]GAO-08-123SU .

    CBP took issue with an example we used in our draft report describing a
    situation where two GAO investigators who tested the traveler inspection
    process at land port of entry were not asked for any identification. We
    stated that as our investigators attempted to enter at the port, the CBP
    officer--who was seated behind a desk about 10 feet away--only asked our
    investigators if they were U.S. citizens and the investigators said "yes."
    DHS stated that under current statute and regulation, a person claiming to
    be a United States citizen arriving at a port of entry is not required to
    provide identity documents as long as the subject can establish, to the
    satisfaction of the inspecting officer, citizenship. DHS stated that
    because CBP officers were satisfied with the citizenship of the two
    investigators at the time of inspection, identity documents were not
    required.

    We agree that an identity document is not required for U.S. citizens at
    land ports of entry. However, this example is meant to convey that some
    inspections were not meeting the intent of CBP's July 2006 management
    guidance calling for more thorough inspections through traveler interviews
    and document review. Asking a traveler one question about citizenship when
    seated at a desk about 10 feet away does not seem to be consistent with
    the more thorough inspections called for in CBP's management guidance. We
    modified our report to include additional information on this episode.

    DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the For
    Official Use Only version of this report as appropriate. Appendix III
    contains written comments from DHS.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
    Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and
    interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to
    others on request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge
    on the GAO Web site at [63]http://www.gao.gov .

    If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at [64]stanar@gao.gov . Contact
    points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
    be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
    are listed in appendix IV.

    Richard M. Stana
    Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    This report addresses the progress the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    (CBP) has made and the remaining challenges it faces in conducting
    traveler inspections, staffing, and training at ports of entry.
    Specifically, we answered the following questions: (1) What success and
    challenges has CBP had in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other
    violators at its ports of entry? (2) What progress has CBP made in
    improving staffing and training at its ports of entry and how successful
    has it been in carrying out these workforce programs? (3) What progress
    and problems CBP has encountered in setting goals and performance measures
    for its traveler inspection program?

    On October 5, 2007, we issued a report that answered the above questions,
    but it contained information that DHS considered law enforcement
    sensitive.^1 This version of the report omits sensitive information about
    CBP's traveler inspection efforts, including information on the techniques
    used to carry out inspections, data on the number of inadmissible aliens
    and other violators that enter the country each year, and data on staffing
    at ports of entry. In addition, at DHS's request, we have redacted the
    specific locations that we visited.

    The overall methodology used for our initial report is relevant to this
    version of the report since the information in this product is derived
    from our first report. Specifically, we, performed our work at the
    Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) CBP offices, based in Washington,
    D.C. We also conducted work at 8 ports of entry--three airports and five
    land crossings. While we cannot generalize our work from our visits to all
    ports of entry, we chose these ports of entry to provide examples of
    operations at ports of entry. At each location, we held group sessions
    with CBP officers and supervisors. We also interviewed port management and
    staff involved in training. In addition, our investigators conducted
    vulnerability assessments of inspection procedures at 8 additional ports
    of entry. Our investigators conducted covert operations to evaluate
    screening procedures at small ports of entry. Although we cannot
    generalize our investigators` work at these locations to all ports of
    entry, we selected these ports of entry to provide examples of traveler
    inspections at small ports of entry. Our investigators did their work in
    accordance with quality standards for investigations as set forth by the
    President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. In assessing the adequacy
    of internal controls, we used the criteria in GAO's Standards for Internal
    Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD 00-21.3.1, dated November
    1999. These standards, issued pursuant to the requirements of the Federal
    Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA), provide the overall
    framework for establishing and maintaining internal control in the federal
    government. Also pursuant to FMFIA, the Office of Management and Budget
    issued Circular A-123, revised December 21, 2004, to provide the specific
    requirements for assessing the reporting on internal controls. Internal
    control standards and the definition of internal control in Circular A-123
    are based on the GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
    Government.

    ^1 See [65]GAO-08-123SU .

    To determine what success and challenges CBP has had in interdicting
    inadmissible aliens and other violators at its ports of entry, we
    interviewed CBP headquarters officials, such as officials from the Offices
    of Field Operations, Policy and Planning, Finance, and Training and
    Development. We obtained and analyzed available DHS documents on traveler
    inspections, more specifically on COMPEX data (a compliance measurement to
    determine an overall estimated rate of compliance for travelers), and port
    infrastructure assessments. For example, we examined COMPEX data that
    estimate the total number of inadmissible aliens and other violators that
    seek to enter the country, and compared their compliance and apprehension
    rates. We assessed the reliability of the COMPEX data by (1) talking with
    knowledgeable officials about how COMPEX inspections are conducted,
    documented, and how the apprehension rate estimates are generated; (2)
    reviewing relevant documentation; and (3) replicating the calculations for
    the apprehension rates that were provided in the COMPEX reports. We
    determined the COMPEX estimates were sufficiently reliable for
    illustrating apprehension rates for the ports of entry the COMPEX program
    covers. Additionally, we also analyzed CBP's Strategic Resource
    Assessment, an evaluation and planning tool designed to identify a port's
    infrastructure needs and operational impact on traveler inspections. We
    also evaluated the CBP Inspector's Field Manual to determine
    inspections-related requirements. During our eight site visits, we met
    with and interviewed field office directors and senior port management
    staff. During our interviews, we (1) discussed CBP's success in
    interdicting inadmissible aliens and other violators and the
    vulnerabilities in the inspections procedures and concerns related to
    physical infrastructure and (2) obtained available documentation regarding
    traveler-related inspections policies and procedures. At each port of
    entry we visited, we observed both primary and secondary screening
    procedures and conducted discussion group sessions with officers and
    supervisors. At each port of entry we visited, we obtained a list of CBP
    officers scheduled to work during our site visit and from that list we
    randomly selected officers and supervisors to participate in our sessions
    at six of the eight ports we visited. We organized the discussion groups
    by whether they were from legacy organizations or became CBP officers
    after the merger. At two ports of entry, local management selected
    officers who would attend the discussion groups and interviews. The group
    discussions covered a variety of discussion topics, particularly officers'
    perceptions and experiences with the "One Face at the Border" initiative
    and associated challenges in conducting inspections at ports of entry.
    Over 200 CBP officers participated in our discussion group sessions. In
    addition to the discussion groups, we also conducted meetings (usually
    groups of two to four) with CBP chiefs, line supervisors, and specialists
    (e.g., officers assigned to the intelligence or canine units). These
    meetings were designed to collect perceptions from CBP middle management
    and specialists. Additionally, we reviewed a videotape prepared by CBP
    that documented noncompliance with inspection requirements. Finally, we
    reviewed CBP's new policies and procedures for traveler inspections at
    land ports of entry.

    To examine what progress CBP has made in improving staffing and training
    at its ports of entry and how successful has it been in carrying out these
    workforce programs, we interviewed CBP headquarters officials, including
    those from the Offices of Field Operations, Policy and Planning, Human
    Resource Management, and Training and Development. We obtained and
    analyzed available CBP reports on staffing and training data. For example,
    we analyzed staffing data from CBP's Quarterly Resource Assessment, an
    allocation tool used by field offices to identify the port's need for
    additional resources (e.g., request for additional officers). We also
    collected and analyzed data from CBP's National Training Plan, a
    comprehensive guide that documents recommended training guidelines for CBP
    officers. At each major port we visited, we met with field office
    directors and senior port management. During our meetings we discussed
    staffing and training challenges that affected port operations. Follow-up
    meetings with CBP headquarters officials resulted in receiving staffing
    numbers from the Quarterly Resource Assessment--an assessment tool used by
    CBP to identify field office needs and resources--that documented field
    offices' request for additional officers. We reviewed headquarters
    guidance on the on-the-job training program, then met with field office
    directors and training coordinators. We assessed the reliability of the
    staffing data by (1) talking with knowledgeable officials about staffing
    resources, (2) reviewing relevant documentation, and (3) comparing
    budgeted staffing numbers to officers currently onboard. Although CBP
    provided us with the results of the staffing model and not the model
    itself, we reviewed the model with knowledgeable officials, including the
    assumptions that were used to produce the estimated staffing needs. We
    understand that the staffing requirements the model produces will vary
    depending on the assumptions used and we present the key assumptions in
    the text of our report. Although we discussed the staffing model and its
    results with CBP officials responsible for the model, validating the model
    and its results was outside the scope of our review. During the course of
    our review, we analyzed November 2006 training data from ports of entry
    that showed the number of officers that had taken cross-training modules
    as well as the number of officers that local port management had
    identified as still needing to take a certain module. However, when we
    compared July 2007 training data with the November 2006 data from ports of
    entry, we identified inconsistencies with the data. For example, the July
    2007 data showed that 120 fewer officers had taken training in a module
    when compared with the November 2006 data. Because of inconsistencies such
    as these, we did not use these data in our report. We also reviewed the
    Border Patrol's on-the-job training program to identify best practices.
    Finally, we assessed nonsupervisory CBP employees' perceptions of the
    effectiveness of CBP's workforce management in areas such as job
    satisfaction, performance evaluation, providing employees sufficient
    resources to do their jobs, and meeting training needs by analyzing
    results from the 2004 and 2006 Office of Personnel Management's (OPM)
    Federal Human Capital Survey. In addition, we discussed CBP's training
    program with officers during discussion groups at the eight ports of entry
    we visited. To get a perspective on how these results ranked against other
    federal agencies, we compared the results of our analysis for
    nonsupervisory CBP employees with responses from nonsupervisory staff in
    the other DHS component agencies as well as the responses from the other
    36 federal agencies included in the survey.

    To examine what progress CBP has made in setting goals and performance
    measures for its traveler inspection program, we interviewed and
    corresponded with officials in CBP's Offices of Field Operations, Policy
    and Planning, and Human Resources Management. In addition, to identify
    CBP's strategic goals and performance measures for inspecting travelers,
    we reviewed agency documents such as CBP's Strategic Plan for 2005 to
    2010, CBP Performance and Accountability Reports for fiscal years 2005 and
    2006, and OFO's strategic plan, Securing America's Borders at Ports of
    Entry (FY 2007- 2011).

    We conducted our work from August 2006 through September 2007 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II: CBP's Strengths and Challenges, According to OPM Surveys

    To gain a broader view of CBP nonsupervisory staff perspectives on
    workforce issues, we analyzed results from the 2004 and 2006 OPM Federal
    Human Capital Survey of 36 federal departments or agencies. OPM's survey
    represents responses from over 220,000 federal employees, including staff
    from DHS and CBP. ^1 The survey has 73 questions designed to gauge
    employees' perceptions about how effectively agencies manage their
    workforce in the following categories: Personal Work Experiences;
    Recruitment, Development and Retention; Performance Culture; Leadership;
    Learning (Knowledge Management); Job Satisfaction; and Satisfaction with
    Benefits. The following presents our analysis of responses from
    nonsupervisory CBP staff to questions from OPM's 2004 and 2006 surveys.

    CBP Receives High Marks in Some Areas, but Staff Generally Expressed Low
    Satisfaction with Their Work Environment

    Estimates based on responses by CBP nonsupervisory staff to OPM's 2006
    survey show that weaknesses in the work environment generally outweighed
    the strengths. Our analysis of the survey data showed that CBP
    nonsupervisory staff identified strengths in 12 of the 73 survey
    questions.^2 For example, we estimate that a high percentage of CBP staff
    (1) view their work as important, (2) use information technology to
    perform work, (3) like the kind of work they do, and (4) understand how
    their work relates to the agency's mission. (See table 1 for the top 10
    items.)

    ^1 The sample design for the OPM survey of federal employees allows
    reporting results at the DHS component level, and the data may be further
    broken out by employee, supervisory, or management status. It does not
    provide for developing estimates by job series, or for CBP officers alone.
    Here, "CBP staff" refers to all nonsupervisory employees within CBP,
    including CBP officers, Border Patrol agents, and other mission support
    staff. CBP officers constitute 42 percent of all CBP's nonsupervisory
    workforce and about 36 percent of CBP's workforce overall; therefore,
    these estimates can be considered a closer reflection of CBP officers than
    estimates for all of CBP.

    ^2 OPM suggests an area is a management strength when 65 percent or more
    of the respondents give a positive response to a question.

    Table 1: Top 10 Items--Strengths in CBP

                                          Percent estimates for nonsupervisoryCBP
                                         staff who responded "agree" or "strongly
    Items                              agree, "satisfied," or "very satisfied"
    The work I do is important                                            87.5
    Employees use information                                             86.1
    technology to perform work
    I like the kind of work I do                                          83.0
    Satisfaction with paid                                                81.9
    vacation time
    Satisfaction with paid leave                                          77.0
    for illness
    Electronic access to learning                                         74.9
    and training at desk
    The people I work with                                                74.7
    cooperate to get the job done
    Employees in my work unit                                             73.4
    share job knowledge with each
    other
    I know how my work relates to                                         73.1
    the agency's goals and
    priorities
    Rate the overall quality of                                           67.7
    work done by work group

    Source: GAO analysis of OPM survey.

    Our analysis also showed that CBP nonsupervisory staff identified
    weaknesses^3 in 22 of 73 areas.^4 (See table 2 for the bottom 10 items.)

    ^3 OPM indicates that an area is a management weakness when 35 percent or
    less of respondents give a positive response to a question.

    ^4 We estimate that 50 percent or more of CBP nonsupervisory staff gave
    positive responses to 27 of 73 questions. For the remaining 46 questions,
    less than half of CBP's staff responded in a positive way.

    Table 2: Bottom 10 Items--Weaknesses in CBP

                                                            Percent estimates for
                                                     non-supervisoryCBP staff who
                                            responded "agree" or"strongly agree,"
    Item                                      "satisfied," or "very satisfied"
    Employees are rewarded for                                            20.8
    high-quality products and services
    Awards depend on how well employees                                   19.8
    perform their jobs
    Satisfaction with work/life programs                                  19.3
    Creativity and innovation are                                         18.4
    rewarded
    Steps taken to deal with a poor                                       17.8
    performer
    Promotions in my work unit are based                                  17.7
    on merit
    Differences in performance are                                        16.7
    recognized in a meaningful way
    Satisfaction with                                                     15.8
    telework/telecommuting
    Satisfaction with child care                                           9.4
    subsidies
    Pay raises depend on how well                                          9.1
    employees perform their jobs

    Source: GAO analysis of OPM survey.

    When compared with the 2004 survey results, the survey results for 2006
    showed that the only area where CBP demonstrated significant progress for
    non-supervisory staff was increasing employees' electronic access to
    learning materials at their desks (an estimated 24 percent improvement
    from 2004 to 2006). For 19 of 71 items,^5 we estimate that scores for
    nonsupervisory CBP staff declined by a statistically significant degree.
    Some of the items where CBP faces greater challenges today than it did in
    2004 include (1) having worthwhile discussions with supervisors about
    performance (an estimated 9.4 percent fewer positive responses in 2006
    compared with 2004); (2) rating the overall quality of work done by their
    unit (6.9 percent fewer); and (3) people I work with cooperate to get the
    job done (6.2 percent fewer).

    CBP Results Generally Mirror Those of DHS, but CBP Has Shown Little or No
    Improvement in Its Work Environment Since 2004

    The estimates for nonsupervisory staff within CBP generally mirror those
    for the rest of DHS employees. Estimates based on responses from
    nonsupervisory CBP staff were about the same as those based on the rest of
    DHS on 47 of the 73 survey items. CBP scored higher on four items,
    including having a reasonable workload and electronic access to training.
    CBP was below DHS on the remaining 22 items, including work environment
    issues such as the quality of work done by the workgroup, feedback from
    supervisors, and having enough information to do the job well.

    ^5 The 2004 and 2006 Federal Human Capital Surveys had 71 questions in
    common.

    Placing the results of our analysis in context with how DHS compared with
    the other 36 departments or agencies involved in OPM's survey provides a
    baseline along which to examine a department or agency's results. For
    2006, DHS ranked at or near the bottom of four main categories measured by
    the survey. DHS ranked 35th on leadership and knowledge management, 36th
    on having a results-oriented performance culture, 33rd on talent
    management, and 36th on job satisfaction. To put the situation at CBP in
    this context, CBP's survey results rank the agency 10th out of the 13 DHS
    subcomponents, which would suggest that CBP similarly ranks at or near the
    bottom in these categories when compared to other federal agencies.

    Quality of CBP's Work Environment for Nonsupervisory Employees Is Generally
    Lower than at Other Federal Agencies

    For 2006, nonsupervisory CBP staff scored the work environment as lower
    than elsewhere in the federal government on 61 of the survey's 73
    questions.^6 For example, when we compared CBP with other federal
    agencies, we estimated that a significantly smaller percentage of CBP
    nonsupervisory staff said (1) supervisors or team leaders in their work
    unit support employee development, (2) their work unit recruits people
    with the right skills, and (3) they are given an opportunity to improve
    their skills. In contrast, there were no items where CBP staff scored the
    work environment as significantly better.

    When viewed in more detail, our analysis of OPM's survey data shows that
    CBP faces challenges in staffing and training its personnel, especially
    when CBP is compared to other federal agencies. For staffing, we estimate
    that CBP staff gave low marks to CBP for (1) the adequacy of sufficient
    resources to get the job done and (2) their work unit being able to
    recruit people with the right skills. With respect to training, less than
    half of CBP's staff were reportedly satisfied with (1) the quality of the
    training received, (2) CBP's assessment of their training needs, and (3)
    supervisory support for employee development (see table 3).

    ^6 OPM suggests using 5 percent as a "rule of thumb" approach when
    reviewing and interpreting the survey results to identify notable or
    meaningful differences in responses to survey questions. Using this
    standard, CBP staff scores were 5 percent or more below the governmentwide
    average in responses to 61 of the 73 survey questions.

    Table 3: Selected Items in Which CBP Scored Lower than Elsewhere in the
    Federal Government (in percentages)

                                                               Rest of
                Item                                    CBP government Difference
    Staffing
                I have sufficient resources to get my  33.2       47.8      -14.7
                job done
                My talents are used well in the        48.1       61.7      -13.6
                workplace
                My work unit is able to recruit people 30.3       43.7      -13.5
                with the right skills
    Training
                Supervisor/team leader in my work unit 43.0       64.5      -21.5
                supports employee development
                Supervisor/team leader provides        42.1       57.9      -15.7
                constructive feedback on how to
                improve
                My training needs are assessed         43.3       51.2       -7.8
    Other work environment issues
                I have enough information to do my job 58.2       72.6      -14.4
                well
                My work gives me a feeling of personal 60.9       73.1      -12.3
                accomplishment
                I have trust and confidence in my      55.1       63.9       -8.8
                supervisor

    Source: GAO analysis of OPM survey.

    CBP acknowledges that it needs to improve its workforce management,
    particularly focusing on raising employees' perceptions of CBP leadership,
    enhancing training and career development, and attitudes toward the
    performance culture at CBP. CBP has formulated a business plan that
    outlines a variety of corrective actions and initiatives it will take to
    achieve results in each of these areas. From a strategic standpoint, CBP
    will establish a Human Capital Advisory Board, composed of senior field
    leadership from the major CBP offices, that will serve as the central
    contact point for all program offices, advise and assist with implementing
    the initiatives outlined in the business plan, and asses the potential for
    forming an Employee Action Team Advisory Board. To facilitate
    communication with CBP employees about management actions, the plan sets
    forth a variety of potential actions, such as creating a Web site on the
    CBP intranet where CBP supervisors and employees can review the current
    workforce issues being addressed or results from actions taken, adding a
    link to CBP's Web site where the public can access information to learn
    how CBP is addressing the survey results, and holding town hall meetings
    at key locations with the Commissioner and other high-level management. To
    better define the scope of the workforce issues and problems identified
    through the Federal Human Capital Survey, CBP also plans to conduct
    employee focus groups as well as administer the survey internally to a
    larger, more representative sample of CBP employees. Following an in-depth
    analysis of the results of these actions, CBP will update the business
    plan in the first quarter of 2008.

    As part of its leadership initiative, CBP is exploring options to improve
    employee perceptions of managers' job performance, establish better
    communication of management's goals and priorities, and encourage managers
    to build more trust and confidence with their employees. To accomplish
    these goals, CBP plans to create a leadership development checklist to
    make sure supervisors are addressing critical areas identified through the
    employee focus groups, and intends to increase the marketing of its
    recently implemented training course for incumbent supervisors as well as
    continue the development of training for supervisors newly promoted into
    management positions. These courses cover integrity, communication,
    conflict management, and holding effective roundtable discussions. Within
    the performance culture initiative, CBP wants to find better ways of
    recognizing employees' performance that will improve their perceptions
    about the fairness of CBP's performance recognition while also supporting
    a balance between work and family life, which employees also rated poorly.
    CBP's plan includes, among other things, a call for improving the channels
    of communication used to inform supervisors and managers about the type
    and scope of discretionary performance awards they have at their disposal
    to issue throughout the year. It also suggests encouraging management at
    all levels of CBP to have more frequent employee recognition events, to
    publish award recipients and best practices, and to make awards management
    a component of performance standards for supervisory personnel. Finally,
    within the talent management initiative, the plan calls for Human
    Resources to complete its competency, skills, and needs assessment by the
    third quarter of fiscal year 2007, and for the Office of Training and
    Development to implement an automated development and career path system
    that will guide employees in their career development by providing
    occupational "road maps" and recommending training based on the
    occupations they intend to pursue.

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

    Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact

    Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777 or [66]StanaR@gao.gov .

    Staff Acknowledgments

    In addition to the contact listed above, Michael Dino, Assistant Director;
    Neil Asaba; Frances Cook; Josh Diosomito; Kasea Hamar; Michael Meleady;
    Christopher Leach; Ron La Due Lake; and Stan Stenersen made key
    contributions to this report.

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    (440677)

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    Highlights of [135]GAO-08-219 , a report to congressional requestors

    November 2007

    BORDER SECURITY

    Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's
    Ports of Entry

    U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for keeping
    terrorists and other dangerous people from entering the country while also
    facilitating the cross-border movement of millions of travelers. CBP
    carries out this responsibility at 326 air, sea, and land ports of entry.
    In response to a congressional request, GAO examined CBP traveler
    inspection efforts, the progress made and the challenges that remain in
    staffing and training at ports of entry, and the progress CBP has made in
    developing strategic plans and performance measures for its traveler
    inspection program. This is a public version of a For Official Use Only
    report GAO issued on October 5, 2007. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed
    and analyzed CBP data and documents related to inspections, staffing, and
    training, interviewed managers and officers, observed inspections at eight
    major air and land ports of entry, and tested inspection controls at eight
    small land ports of entry. Information the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) deemed sensitive has been redacted.

    [136]What GAO Recommends

    GAO made recommendations aimed at enhancing internal controls in the
    inspection process, mechanisms for measuring training provided and new
    officer proficiency, and implementing a performance measure for
    apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators. DHS concurred with
    our recommendations and said that CBP is taking steps to address them.

    CBP has had some success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other
    violators, but weaknesses in its operations increase the potential that
    terrorists and inadmissible travelers could enter the country. In fiscal
    year 2006, CBP turned away over 200,000 inadmissible aliens and
    interdicted other violators. Although CBP's goal is to interdict all
    violators, CBP estimated that several thousand inadmissible aliens and
    other violators entered the country though ports of entry in fiscal year
    2006. Weaknesses in 2006 inspection procedures, such as not verifying the
    nationality and admissibility of each traveler, contribute to failed
    inspections. Although CBP took actions to address these weaknesses,
    subsequent follow up work conducted by GAO months after CBP's actions
    found that weaknesses such as those described above still existed. In July
    2007, CBP issued detailed procedures for conducting inspections including
    requiring field office managers to assess compliance with these
    procedures. However, CBP has not established an internal control to ensure
    field office managers share their assessments with CBP headquarters to
    help ensure that the new procedures are consistently implemented across
    all ports of entry and reduce the risk of failed traveler inspections.

    CBP developed a staffing model that estimates it needs up to several
    thousand more staff. Field office managers said that staffing shortages
    affected their ability to carry out anti-terrorism programs and created
    other vulnerabilities in the inspections process. CBP recognizes that
    officer attrition has impaired its ability to attain budgeted staffing
    levels and is in the process of developing a strategy to help curb
    attrition. CBP has made progress in developing training programs, yet it
    does not measure the extent to which it provides training to all who need
    it and whether new officers demonstrate proficiency in required skills.

    CPB issued a strategic plan for operations at its ports of entry and has
    collected performance data that can be used to measure its progress in
    achieving its strategic goals. However, current performance measures do
    not gauge CBP effectiveness in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other
    violators, a key strategic goal.

    GAO's Mission

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     127. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-782
     128. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-908T
     129. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-798
     130. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-902T
     131. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-713T
     132. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-322
     133. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-546T
     134. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-219
     135. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-219
     137. http://www.gao.gov/
     138. http://www.gao.gov/
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     140. mailto:fraudnet@gao.gov
     141. mailto:jarmonG@gao.gov
     142. mailto:youngc1@gao.gov
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