Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics
Efforts, but the Flow of Illicit Drugs into the United States	 
Remains High (25-OCT-07, GAO-08-215T).				 
                                                                 
The overall goal of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy,	 
which is prepared by the White House Office of National Drug	 
Control Policy (ONDCP), is to reduce illicit drug use in the	 
United States. One of the strategy's priorities is to disrupt the
illicit drug marketplace. To this end, since fiscal year 2000,	 
the United States has provided about $397 million to support	 
Mexican counternarcotics efforts. According to the Department of 
State (State), much of the illicit drugs consumed in the United  
States flows through or is produced in Mexico. GAO examined (1)  
trends in Mexican drug production and trafficking since calendar 
year 2000 and (2) U.S. counternarcotics support for Mexico since 
fiscal year 2000. This testimony is based on a recently issued	 
report (GAO-07-1018) that addresses these issues.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-215T					        
    ACCNO:   A77627						        
  TITLE:     Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican	      
Counternarcotics Efforts, but the Flow of Illicit Drugs into the 
United States Remains High					 
     DATE:   10/25/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Controlled substances				 
	     Drug trafficking					 
	     Drugs						 
	     Extradition					 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Narcotics						 
	     Search and seizure 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Imported drugs					 
	     Mexico						 
	     National Drug Control Strategy			 
	     ONDCP National Drug Control Program		 

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GAO-08-215T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background
     * [3]Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking by Mexican Drug Orga

          * [4]Corruption Persists within the Mexican Government
          * [5]Mexican DTOs Control Drug Trafficking in Mexico and Have Ext

     * [6]U.S. Assistance Helped Mexico Improve Its Counternarcotics E

          * [7]Extraditions of Mexican Drug Traffickers Have Increased
          * [8]Efforts to Counter Money Laundering Are Progressing
          * [9]USAID, DEA, INL, and Other U.S. Agencies Support Mexico's Ru
          * [10]U.S. Support for Mexican Interdiction Efforts Has Helped, bu

               * [11]Infrastructure Upgrades and Equipment
               * [12]Law Enforcement and Judicial Personnel Training
               * [13]Interdiction Cooperation and Coordination Can Be
                 Improved
               * [14]U.S. Aviation Support for Interdiction Can Be Better
                 Coordin

          * [15]Southwest Border Strategy's Implementation Plan

     * [16]Conclusions
     * [17]Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
     * [18]Appendix I: Estimated Amounts of Illicit Drugs Transiting or

          * [19]Order by Mail or Phone

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign
Affairs House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Thursday, October 25, 2007

DRUG CONTROL

U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but the Flow
of Illicit Drugs into the United States Remains High

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director
International Affairs and Trade

GAO-08-215T

October 25, 2007

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here to discuss GAO's recent report on U.S. drug
control assistance to Mexico since 2000.^1 Today, I will discuss (1) the
illicit drug threat posed by Mexican drug production and trafficking to
the United States since 2000 and (2) U.S. agencies' programs to support
Mexico's counternarcotics efforts since fiscal year 2000.

The overall goal of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy is to reduce
illicit drug use in the United States. One of the strategy's priorities is
to disrupt the illicit drug marketplace. According to the U.S. interagency
counternarcotics community,^2 most of the cocaine destined for the United
States comes through Mexico, and Mexico is a major supplier of heroin as
well as the principal foreign source of marijuana and methamphetamine.
Over the years, U.S. counternarcotics policy has sought to support and
strengthen the institutional capability of the Mexican government to
combat the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Since fiscal year
2000, the United States has provided about $397 million to support Mexican
counternarcotics efforts. In October 2007, the Director of the White House
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) released a summary of a
Southwest Border Strategy aimed at disrupting the flow of illegal drugs
into the United States, and cited recent cooperation with the government
of Mexico as leading to a substantial disruption of illegal drug flow into
the United States.

^1GAO, Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics
Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the United
States, [20]GAO-07-1018 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 2007).

^2The U.S. interagency counternarcotics community includes the Central
Intelligence Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center; the Department of
Defense Intelligence Agency's Counternarcotics Trafficking Office,
Defense's Joint Staff, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics; various Department of Homeland Security entities,
including Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Coast Guard, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, Office of Counternarcotics and Enforcement, and
the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator; the Department of Justice's Drug
Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Narcotic and
Dangerous Drug Section, National Drug Intelligence Center, and the
Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force; the National Security
Agency; the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy; the
Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs; and the Department of Treasury's Internal Revenue
Service and Office of Foreign Assets Control.

My statement today is based on our August 2007 report on U.S.
counternarcotics assistance to Mexico. Over the course of that work, we
reviewed and analyzed congressional budget presentations, and other
reports and related information, and met with officials from the
Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury,
as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and
ONDCP. In addition, we traveled to Mexico to meet with U.S. embassy
officials responsible for implementing U.S. programs and activities in
Mexico and with government of Mexico officials at the federal, state, and
local levels. To address trends in the drug threat, we reviewed various
estimates of illicit drug production and seizures and disruptions prepared
by the interagency counternarcotics community.^3 We determined that,
despite shortcomings outlined in prior work,^4 the data were sufficiently
reliable to provide an overall indication of the illicit drug trade. We
conducted our work for the Mexico report from May 2006 through July 2007,
and for purposes of this statement, we updated certain data in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary

The U.S. interagency counternarcotics community reports that each year
hundreds of tons of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine flow
into the United States from Mexico, while seizures in Mexico and along the
U.S.-Mexico border have been relatively small in recent years. The
following illustrates some trends since 2000:

           o The interagency counternarcotics community estimated that about
           two-thirds of the cocaine that departed South America toward the
           United States was destined for transshipment through Mexico in
           2000; this estimate rose to 90 percent in 2006. Accounting for
           seizures along the way, an estimated 220 metric tons of cocaine
           arrived in Mexico in 2000, and between about 300 and 460 metric
           tons arrived in 2006. The estimated amount of cocaine arriving in
           Mexico for transshipment to the United States averaged about 290
           metric tons per year.^5 Reported seizures in Mexico and along the
           U.S.-Mexico border averaged about 36 metric tons a year--with a
           low of 28 metric tons in 2003, and a high of 44 metric tons in
           2005.
           o The estimated amount of export quality heroin produced in Mexico
           ranged from a low of 9 metric tons in 2000 to a high of 30 metric
           tons in 2003--averaging almost 19 metric tons a year. Reported
           seizures in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico border averaged less
           than 1 metric ton a year, or less than 5 percent of the export
           quality heroin produced in Mexico since 2000.
           o The estimated amount of marijuana produced in Mexico ranged from
           a low of 7,000 metric tons in 2000 to a high of 13,500 metric tons
           in 2003--averaging about 9,400 metric tons a year. Reported
           seizures averaged less than 2,900 metric tons, or about 30 percent
           a year.
           o Reported seizures of methamphetamine produced in Mexico and
           along the U.S.-Mexican border rose from a low of 500 kilograms in
           2000 to highs of almost 2,900 kilograms in 2005 and about 2,700
           kilograms in 2006. Although the U.S. interagency counternarcotics
           community has not estimated the amount of methamphetamine
           manufactured in Mexico, it noted that the more than fivefold
           increase in seizures indicated a dramatic rise in supply.
			  
^3Seizures are defined as taking physical possession of the illicit drug.
Disruptions are defined as forcing individuals suspected of transporting
the drugs to jettison or abandon their cargo. For purposes of this
testimony, we refer to both events as seizures.

^4GAO, Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug
Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit
Zone Operations, [21]GAO-06-200 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2005).

           In addition, although Mexico has undertaken various initiatives to
           deal with corruption, including reorganizing its federal police
           and conducting aggressive investigations, according to State,
           corruption persists within the Mexican government and challenges
           Mexico's efforts to fight organized crime and curb drug
           trafficking. Moreover, according to the U.S. interagency
           counternarcotics community, Mexican drug trafficking organizations
           (DTO) operate with relative impunity in certain regions of Mexico,
           including areas along the U.S.-Mexican border; expanded their
           illicit drug business to almost every region of the United States;
           and become increasingly sophisticated and violent in their
           activities.
			  
^5In response to certain methodological issues, the interagency
counternarcotics community reported low and high ranges of cocaine flowing
toward the United States for 2004, 2005, and 2006. To calculate the
average for the period 2000-2006, we used the midpoints of the ranges.

           Although the United States did not accomplish its goal of stemming
           the flow and production of illicit drugs destined for the United
           States, assistance to Mexico since fiscal year 2000 has produced
           some positive results. For instance,

           o The United States and Mexico are collaborating more to extradite
           drug traffickers. In 2006, Mexico extradited 63 criminals to the
           United States and, as of mid-October 2007, has extradited 68,
           including several major drug traffickers.
           o The two countries are also cooperating more to counter money
           laundering, although Justice officials report that Mexico lacks a
           legal framework to allow aggressive seizure of drug traffickers'
           assets.
           o With U.S. technical support, Mexican states are implementing
           more transparent and open criminal trial systems to strengthen the
           rule of law, and Mexico has strengthened controls over imports and
           marketing of chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine.
           o U.S. infrastructure support and training are strengthening the
           capacity of Mexican law enforcement entities to interdict illicit
           drugs.

           While U.S.-supported programs have strengthened some Mexican
           counternarcotics efforts, cooperation and coordination between the
           two countries can be improved. For example,

           o Although the Mexican Navy has acted on U.S.-provided information
           regarding maritime vessels suspected of carrying illicit drugs, it
           is limited in its ability to act on some suspected vessels because
           it cannot go more than 200 nautical miles from shore without
           special authorization. In many cases, the United States cannot
           take action before evidence is destroyed or the vessel is scuttled
           because the existing requirement that Mexico authorize boarding on
           a case-by-case basis is too time consuming.
           o An aerial surveillance program along the U.S.-Mexico border was
           suspended because the United States and Mexico could not reach
           agreement on certain personnel status issues. In the absence of
           this program, U.S. law enforcement officials have reported
           indications of increased drug trafficking.
           o Vietnam-era helicopters provided to the Mexican Attorney
           General's Office have proved expensive and difficult to
           maintain.^6 Furthermore, Defense is phasing out support for this
           aircraft. As a result, the Attorney General's Office will
           increasingly have difficulty transporting law enforcement officers
           to interdiction sites.
           o A helicopter border surveillance program apparently did not meet
           the needs of the Mexican Attorney General's Office. State halted
           the program after the delivery of 12 out of 28 planned aircraft.

           In March 2006, ONDCP and the interagency counternarcotics
           community developed a Southwest Border Strategy,^7 which we
           reviewed in June 2007. In July 2007, we also reviewed a classified
           implementation plan, which was being revised to respond to recent
           Mexican government initiatives. Our review highlighted a number of
           initiatives requiring Mexican government cooperation, but ONDCP
           told us that the strategy and plan had not yet been addressed with
           Mexican authorities at the time of our review. Therefore, we
           recommended that the Director of ONDCP, as the lead agency for
           U.S. drug policy, and the departments and agencies in the U.S.
           counternarcotics interagency community, coordinate with the
           appropriate Mexican officials before completing the strategy's
           implementation plan to (1) help ensure Mexico's cooperation with
           any efforts that require it and (2) address the cooperation issues
           we identified. ONDCP assures us that these efforts have begun.
			  
			  Background

           According to ONDCP and other officials in the interagency
           counternarcotics community, the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico land border
           presents numerous challenges to preventing illicit drugs from
           reaching the United States. With 43 legitimate crossing points,
           the rest of the border consists of hundreds of miles of open
           desert, rugged mountains, the Rio Grande, and other physical
           impediments to surveillance, making it easy to smuggle illegal
           drugs into the United States.^8
			  
^6We note that this is not a new issue. In 1998, we reported that similar
helicopters provided to the Mexican Army were not being properly
maintained, and they eventually were returned to the United States. See
GAO, Drug Control: U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face Difficult
Challenges, [22]GAO/NSIAD-98-154 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 1998).

^7The Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006,
enacted in December 2006, states that not later than 120 days after the
act's enactment and every 2 years thereafter, ONDCP will submit to the
Congress a Southwest Border Strategy that, among other things, identifies
specific resources required to implement the strategy. According to ONDCP,
the strategy--although not its implementation plan--was completed in March
2006, 9 months prior to the enactment of this legislation.

^8GAO, Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and
Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations, GAO-07-884T (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
27, 2007).

           Since the 1970s, the United States has collaborated with and
           provided assistance to Mexico for counternarcotics programs and
           activities. The goal over the years has been to disrupt the market
           for illegal drugs, making it more difficult for traffickers to
           produce and transport illicit drugs to the United States.
           Specifically, the United States has provided Mexico with
           assistance for a range of projects, including interdicting cocaine
           shipments from South America; stemming the production and
           trafficking of opium poppy,^9 as well as marijuana; and, more
           recently, controlling precursor chemicals used to manufacture
           methamphetamine.

           In the past, Mexico has chosen to combat drug trafficking with
           reduced assistance from the United States, and Mexican sensitivity
           about its national sovereignty has made it difficult for the two
           countries to coordinate counternarcotics activities. However,
           beginning in the mid-1990s, cooperation began to improve,
           culminating in 1998 in the signing of a Bi-National Drug Control
           Strategy. Since then, the two countries have continued to
           cooperate through meetings of a U.S.-Mexico Senior Law Enforcement
           Plenary, among other contacts.
			  
			  Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking by Mexican Drug Organizations
			  Have Continued Virtually Unabated

           Mexico is the conduit for most of the cocaine reaching the United
           States, the source for much of the heroin consumed in the United
           States, and the largest foreign supplier of marijuana and
           methamphetamine to the U.S. market. According to U.S. and Mexican
           estimates, which vary from year to year, more cocaine flowed
           toward the United States through Mexico during 2006 than in 2000,
           and more heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine were produced in
           Mexico during 2005 than in 2000. In addition, although reported
           seizures of these drugs within Mexico and along the U.S. southwest
           border generally increased, according to the U.S. interagency
           counternarcotics community, seizures have been a relatively small
           percentage of the estimated supply.

           As we have reported previously, acknowledged shortcomings in the
           illicit drug production and seizure data collected and reported by
           various U.S. government agencies mean that the data cannot be
           considered precise.^10 However, they can provide an overall
           indication of the magnitude and nature of the illicit drug trade.
           Based on the available data, the following describes the trends
           since 2000 on the amount of cocaine arriving in Mexico for
           transshipment to the United States; the amounts of heroin and
           marijuana produced in Mexico; and reported seizures of these
           illicit drugs and methamphetamine in Mexico and along the
           U.S.-Mexico border. (See app. I for a more detailed table of the
           data.)
			  
^9Opium poppy is used to make heroin.

           Cocaine: Virtually all the cocaine consumed in the United States
           is produced along the South American Andean ridge--primarily, in
           Colombia. The U.S. interagency counternarcotics community prepares
           an annual assessment (the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine
           Movement [IACM]) that, among other things, estimates the amount of
           cocaine departing South America toward the United States. From
           2000 to 2006, the IACM reported an increase in the estimated
           amount of cocaine flowing through Mexico to the United
           States--from 66 percent in 2000 to 77 percent in 2003 and 90
           percent in 2006.

           o Between 2000 and 2002, the cocaine estimated arriving in Mexico
           rose about 23 percent--from 220 to 270 metric tons. In 2003, it
           declined over 60 metric tons, or about 22 percent. For 2004-2006,
           the IACM did not provide "point" estimates for cocaine flow
           because of certain methodological concerns; rather, a range was
           provided for each year. The midpoint of the IACM range of cocaine
           estimated arriving in Mexico during 2006 (about 380 metric tons)
           was about 160 metric tons more than the estimate for 2000. Using
           the midpoint of the IACM ranges, the amount of cocaine estimated
           arriving in Mexico during 2000-2006 averaged about 290 metric tons
           per year.
           o Despite the apparent increases in cocaine arriving in Mexico,
           the amount of cocaine reported seized in Mexico and along the
           U.S.-Mexico border for 2000-2006 did not increase proportionately,
           with 43 metric tons reported seized in 2000, a low of 28 metric
           tons seized in 2003, and a high of 44 metric tons in 2005.
           Reported seizures for 2000-2006 averaged about 36 metric tons a
           year, or about 13 percent of the estimated amount of cocaine
           arriving in Mexico.^11
			  
^10See [23]GAO-06-200 .

^11The 13 percent figure is based on using the midpoint of the IACM ranges
for the years 2004-2006.

           Heroin: During 2000-2005, the estimated amount of heroin produced
           for export in Mexico averaged almost 19 metric tons a
           year--ranging from a low of 9 metric tons in 2000 to a high of 30
           metric tons in 2003. Although the estimated amount of heroin
           produced declined in 2004 and 2005, the 2005 estimate (17 metric
           tons) was nearly double the estimated amount produced in 2000.
           Reported heroin seizures in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico
           border averaged less than 1 metric ton or less than 5 percent a
           year of the estimated export quality heroin produced in Mexico
           between 2000 and 2005.

           Marijuana: During 2000-2005, the estimated amount of marijuana
           produced in Mexico each year averaged about 9,400 metric
           tons--ranging from a low of 7,000 metric tons in 2000 to a high of
           13,500 metric tons in 2003. Although estimated production declined
           to 10,100 metric tons in 2005, this was over 3,000 metric tons
           more than the estimated production in 2000. Reported seizures of
           marijuana in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico border ranged from
           about 2,150 metric tons in 2000 to nearly 3,500 in 2003--averaging
           less than 2,900 metric tons a year, or about 30 percent of the
           annual production estimates.

           Methamphetamine: Neither the United States nor the government of
           Mexico prepares estimates of the amount of methamphetamine
           produced in Mexico. However, U.S. officials told us that the large
           increases in reported methamphetamine seizures from 2000 through
           2006 point to significantly greater amounts being manufactured. On
           the basis of the reported data, seizures along the U.S.-Mexico
           border rose more than five times--from an estimated 500 kilograms
           in 2000 to almost 2,900 metric tons in 2004 and over 2,700
           kilograms in 2006.
			  
			  Corruption Persists within the Mexican Government

           In 2001, State reported that pervasive corruption within the
           government of Mexico was the greatest challenge facing Mexico's
           efforts to curb drug trafficking. Since then State has reported on
           the Mexican government's efforts to reduce corruption.
           Nevertheless, increasing illicit drug proceeds from the United
           States--estimated by the National Drug Intelligence Center at
           between $8 billion and $23 billion in 2005^12--has afforded
           Mexican DTOs considerable resources to subvert government
           institutions, particularly at the state and local level. U.S. and
           Mexican government officials and various other observers,
           including academics, investigative journalists, and
           nongovernmental organizations that study drug trafficking trends
           in Mexico, told us that profits of such magnitude enable drug
           traffickers to bribe law enforcement and judicial officials.
			  
^12According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, drug proceeds in
Mexico in 2005 ranged from: $2.9 billion to $6.2 billion for cocaine
(including Central America), $324 million to $736 million for heroin, $3.9
billion to $14.3 billion for marijuana, and $794 million to $1.9 billion
for methamphetamine. Mexican drug traffickers also grow marijuana in the
United States; therefore, the amount of proceeds returned to Mexico is
likely greater than the reported estimates.

           Since 2000, Mexico has undertaken several initiatives to address
           corruption. For instance, in 2001, when Mexican authorities
           created the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI)^13 in the Mexican
           Attorney General's Office, they disbanded the Federal Judicial
           Police, which was widely considered corrupt. Mexico also conducted
           aggressive investigations into public corruption, resulting in the
           arrest and prosecution of officials, as well as the dismissal and
           suspension of others.

           Despite these actions, corruption remains a major factor
           complicating efforts to fight organized crime and combat drug
           trafficking. U.S. and some Mexican law enforcement agents told us
           that in certain parts of the country, they do not have vetted
           counterparts to work with. Moreover, AFI represents only about
           one-third of Mexico's estimated 24,000 federal law enforcement
           officials. According to U.S. officials, the majority--about
           17,000--belong to the Federal Preventive Police,^14 whose
           personnel are not subject to the same requirements as those of AFI
           for professional selection, polygraph and drug testing, and
           training.

           Partly to address the problem of corruption, Mexican President
           Felipe Calderon's government has begun to consolidate various
           federal civilian law enforcement entities into one agency and
           triple the number of trained, professional federal law enforcement
           officers subject to drug, polygraph, and other testing.^15 This
           initiative will combine AFI and the Federal Preventive Police,
           along with officers from other agencies, into one agency known as
           the Federal Police Corps, which would operate in cities and towns
           of more than 15,000 people.^16 However, this initiative will not
           affect the vast majority of Mexico's law enforcement officials,
           most of whom are state and local employees and who, according to
           one source, number approximately 425,000.

^13AFI is the Spanish acronym for Agencia Federal de Investigacion.

^14The Federal Preventive Police itself was the result of a reorganization
to reduce, prevent, and combat crime in 1999.

^15Felipe Calderon was elected President of Mexico in July 2006 and
inaugurated in December 2006.

           Mexican DTOs Control Drug Trafficking in Mexico and Have Extended
			  Their Reach into the United States

           According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), four main
           DTOs control the illicit drug production and trafficking in Mexico
           and operate with relative impunity in certain parts of the
           country:

           o The Federation, which operates from the Mexican state of
           Sinaloa, is an alliance of drug traffickers that U.S. and Mexican
           officials told us may have the most extensive geographic reach in
           Mexico.
           o The Tijuana Cartel, also known as the Arellano Felix
           Organization after its founder, operates from the border city of
           Tijuana in the Mexican state of Baja California. Its activities
           center in the northwestern part of Mexico, where, according to
           local investigative journalists and U.S. officials, it exerts
           considerable influence over local law enforcement and municipal
           officials.
           o The Juarez Cartel is based in Ciudad Juarez, in the border state
           of Chihuahua. According to DEA officials, the Juarez Cartel has
           extensive ties to state and local law enforcement officials.
           o The Gulf Cartel operates out of Matamoros on the Gulf of Mexico,
           in the border state of Tamaulipas. According to DEA officials, the
           Gulf Cartel has infiltrated the law enforcement community
           throughout Tamaulipas, including the border city of Nuevo Laredo,
           which is a principal transit point for commercial traffic to the
           United States. The Gulf Cartel has also employed a criminal gang
           referred to as the Zetas, which is primarily composed of rogue
           former Mexican military commandos that are known for their violent
           methods.

           According to DEA and other U.S. officials, in recent years Mexican
           DTOs have taken over the transportation of cocaine shipments from
           South America previously managed by Colombians. In addition,
           according to the National Drug Threat Assessment, Mexican DTOs
           have expanded their presence in drug markets throughout the United
           States, moving into cities east of the Mississippi River
           previously dominated by Colombian and Dominican drug traffickers.
           According to National Drug Intelligence Center officials, Mexican
           DTOs tend to be less structured in the United States than in
           Mexico, but have regional managers throughout the country, relying
           on Mexican gangs to distribute illicit drugs. Further, DTOs are
           becoming more sophisticated and violent.
			  
^16The plan would also create two other police forces: one consisting
principally of former military police, whose role would be one of policing
rural communities with less than 15,000 people, and a Coast Guard.

           o With significant resources at their disposal, Mexican DTOs are
           developing more sophisticated drug trafficking methods and to
           evade U.S. maritime detection and interdiction efforts, such as
           using elaborate networks of go-fast boats and refueling
           vessels.^17 According to Justice officials and documents, Mexican
           drug traffickers are also taking advantage of advances in cell
           phone and satellite communications technology, which have allowed
           them to quickly communicate and change routes once they suspect
           their plans have been compromised. In addition, the traffickers
           have also begun making more use of tunnels under the U.S.-Mexico
           border--another indication of the increasing sophistication of DTO
           operations. From 2000 to 2006, U.S. border officials found 45
           tunnels--several built primarily for narcotics smuggling.
           According to U.S. officials, tunnels found in the last 6 years are
           longer and deeper than in prior years.
           o Drug-related violence in Mexico has continued to increase in
           recent years. President Calderon highlighted the importance of
           improving public security by punishing crime, and the
           administration of former President Vicente Fox (2000-2006)
           actively targeted major drug kingpins. While this strategy does
           not appear to have significantly reduced drug trafficking in
           Mexico, it disrupted the cartels' organizational structure,
           presenting opportunities to gain control of important transit
           corridors leading to the United States, such as Nuevo Laredo. Such
           struggles led to increased violence throughout Mexico, with
           drug-related deaths estimated at over 2,000 in 2006. This trend
           has continued in 2007, with drug-related deaths estimated at over
           1,100 as of June 2007. In addition, an increasing number of
           drug-related incidents targeting law enforcement officers and
           government officials have been documented in Mexico. For example,
           in May 2007, the newly appointed head of Mexico's drug
           intelligence unit in the Attorney General's office was shot and
           killed in a street ambush in Mexico City.

^17Go-fast boats are capable of traveling over 40 knots and are difficult
to detect in open water. Even when detected, go-fast boats can often
outrun conventional ships. Some go-fast boats are capable of carrying up
to 8 metric tons of cocaine or other cargo.

           Journalists have also been targeted as a result of investigative
           articles written about DTO activities. Due to the risks associated
           with reporting on narco-trafficking, Mexico was recently ranked as
           the second most dangerous country in the world for journalists,
           after Iraq.
			  
			  U.S. Assistance Helped Mexico Improve Its Counternarcotics Efforts,
			  but Coordination Can Be Improved

           Table 1 depicts U.S. assistance to support
           counternarcotics-related programs and activities in Mexico during
           fiscal years 2000 through 2006. Other U.S. agencies also supported
           Mexican counternarcotics activities, but did not provide funding.

           Table 1: U.S. Agencies' Support for Mexican Counternarcotics
           Activities, Fiscal Years 2000-2006
			  
Dollars in millions
State        $168.9 
Justice       140.0 
Defense^a      57.8 
USAID          29.9 
Total        $396.6 

           Source: GAO analysis of Defense, Justice, State, and USAID data.

           aDefense does not track obligations by country; thus these figures
           reflect estimated expenditures in Mexico from fiscal years 2000 to
           2006.

           State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
           Affairs (INL) funds supported the purchase of a wide range of
           items and activities, including scanning machinery for security
           purposes at ports and border crossings; vehicles, computers,
           software, and other equipment used to improve Mexico's law
           enforcement infrastructure; interdiction and eradication
           initiatives; aircraft and related equipment and maintenance;
           training for Mexican law enforcement and judicial officials; and
           other programs designed to promote U.S. counternarcotics goals.
           DEA's funding primarily supported field offices throughout Mexico,
           from which DEA agents coordinated bilateral cooperation with
           Mexican federal, state, and local law enforcement officials,
           allowing both countries to collect drug intelligence, conduct
           investigations, prosecute drug traffickers, and seize assets.
           Defense supported programs designed to detect, track, and
           interdict aircraft and maritime vessels suspected of transporting
           illicit drugs--primarily cocaine from South America. Last, USAID's
           funding for Mexico promoted reform of Mexico's judicial system at
           the state level, as well as government transparency, which broadly
           supports U.S. counternarcotics objectives.

           According to the U.S. embassy in Mexico, one of its primary goals
           is to help the Mexican government combat transnational crimes,
           particularly drug trafficking. Over the years, U.S. assistance has
           supported four key strategies: (1) to apprehend and extradite drug
           traffickers, (2) to counter money laundering by seizing the assets
           of DTOs, (3) to strengthen the application of the rule of law, and
           (4) to interdict or disrupt the production and trafficking of
           illicit drugs. Since 2000, U.S. assistance has made some progress
           in each of these areas but has not significantly cut into drug
           trafficking, and Mexico and the United States can improve
           cooperation and coordination in some areas.

           Extraditions of Mexican Drug Traffickers Have Increased
			  
           In January 2007, the administration of President Calderon
           extradited several high-level drug kingpins, such as Osiel
           Cardenas, the head of the Gulf Cartel, whose extradition long had
           been sought by U.S. authorities. U.S. officials cited Mexico's
           decision to extradite Cardenas and other drug kingpins as a major
           step forward in cooperation between the two countries and
           expressed optimism about the prospects for future extraditions. As
           shown in table 2, U.S. extradition efforts have progressed
           gradually through 2005, but increased more than 50 percent in 2006
           and through mid-October, 2007.

Table 2: Number of Individuals Extradited from Mexico to the United
States, 2000 through mid-October, 2007

Year         2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (through mid-Oct.) 
Extraditions   12   17   25   31   34   41   63                      68 

Source: State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,,
2000-2006, and State, 2007.

Efforts to Counter Money Laundering Are Progressing

In 2002, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and DEA supported
Mexican authorities who established a vetted unit within AFI for
investigating money laundering, consisting of about 40 investigators and
prosecutors. These AFI officials collaborated with ICE on money laundering
and other financial crime investigations and developed leads. With funding
provided by the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS),^18 ICE developed several
training initiatives for Mexican law enforcement personnel targeting bulk
cash smuggling via commercial flights to other Latin American countries.
From 2002 to 2006, in collaboration with ICE, Mexican Customs and AFI's
money laundering unit seized close to $56 million in illicit cash,
primarily at Mexico City's international airport.

18NAS is in the U.S. embassy in Mexico City and supports State/INL
counternarcotics initiatives in Mexico and funds several programs and
activities.

In 2004, the Mexican Congress passed financial reform legislation as part
of a comprehensive strategy to prevent and combat money laundering and
terrorist financing. In May of that year, the Financial Intelligence Unit
under Mexico's Treasury Secretariat brought together various functions
previously undertaken by different Treasury Secretariat divisions with the
goal of detecting and preventing money laundering and terrorist financing.
To support these efforts, NAS provided over $876,000 for equipment and to
refurbish office space for the Financial Intelligence Unit. Since 2004,
the Financial Intelligence Unit has established closer monitoring of money
service businesses and financial transactions. According to Financial
Intelligence Unit officials, this resulted in the seizure of millions of
dollars.

U.S. Treasury officials noted improvements in the level of cooperation
with Mexican authorities under the Fox administration. For example, they
highlighted how the Financial Intelligence Unit began issuing accusations
against individuals named on Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control's
(OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list of drug
kingpins and suspected money launderers.^19 These accusations were
forwarded to the Mexican Attorney General's Office for possible legal
action. Treasury officials also expressed optimism that continued
collaboration with Mexican authorities under the Calderon administration
would lead to more aggressive action on asset forfeitures.

DEA also works closely with AFI to identify the assets of Mexican DTOs. In
March and April 2007, DEA conducted asset forfeiture and financial
investigative training to the newly formed Ad Hoc Financial Investigative
Task Force in Mexico's Attorney General's Office. In March 2007, DEA
efforts in an investigation of chemical control violations resulted in the
seizure of $207 million in currency at a residence in Mexico City.^20 In
another investigation, DEA assistance led Mexican authorities to seize in
excess of $30 million in assets from a designated kingpin and his DTO. DEA
officials share Treasury's optimism that continued collaboration with
Mexican authorities will lead to significant seizures of drug trafficking
assets.

^19The Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list is
maintained by OFAC. It lists individuals and organizations whose assets
are blocked by various sanctions programs administered by OFAC, primarily
for suspected involvement in terrorist or criminal activities, such as
drug trafficking. Pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation
Act, as of June 2007, 25 of the 54 individuals designated as drug kingpins
were Mexican nationals.

USAID, DEA, INL, and Other U.S. Agencies Support Mexico's Rule-of-Law Efforts

As part of its rule-of-law portfolio in Mexico, USAID has promoted
criminal justice reforms at the state level since 2003. The criminal
procedures system that prevails in Mexico today is based on the Napoleonic
inquisitorial written model, with judges working independently using
evidence submitted in writing by the prosecution and defense to arrive at
a ruling. According to U.S. officials, this system has been vulnerable to
the corrupting influence of powerful interests, particularly criminal
organizations. To promote greater transparency in judicial proceedings,
USAID has supported initiatives to introduce adversarial trials in Mexico.
Such trials entail oral presentation of prosecution and defense arguments
before a judge in a public courtroom. Since this system is open to public
scrutiny, USAID officials explained that it should be less vulnerable to
corruption. To date, USAID has provided technical assistance to 14 Mexican
states to implement criminal justice reforms, including oral trials.

U.S. agencies have also pursued legal and regulatory reforms related to
precursor chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine in Mexico.
Specifically, the United States has encouraged the government of Mexico to
implement import restrictions on methamphetamine precursor chemicals and
impose stricter controls on the way these substances are marketed and sold
once in Mexico. In 2004, the Mexican Federal Commission for the Protection
against Sanitary Risk (COFEPRIS)^21 conducted a study that revealed an
excess of imports of pseudoephedrine products into Mexico. Subsequently,
Mexico implemented several controls on pseudoephedrine. In 2005, COFEPRIS
officials reduced legal imports of pseudoephedrine by over 40
percent--from 216 metric tons in 2004 to about 132. In 2006,
pseudoephedrine imports were further reduced to 70 metric tons. According
to ONDCP, as of mid-October, 2007 Mexico had reduced its imports of
pseudoephedrine to 12 metric tons.

^20DEA also noted that during 2006 and 2007, besides the record high drug
cash seizure, Mexican law enforcement authorities seized over 30
clandestine laboratories, over 20 tons of chemicals, and approximately 6.4
million dosage units of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine used in the
manufacture of methamphetamine.

^21COFEPRIS is the Spanish acronym for Comision Federal para la Proteccion
contra Riesgos Sanitarios.

U.S. Support for Mexican Interdiction Efforts Has Helped, but Improvements Are
Needed

The fourth strategy under the embassy's counternarcotics goal is to
support Mexican efforts to interdict illicit drugs. U.S. assistance has
provided for (1) infrastructure upgrades for law enforcement entities; (2)
professional training for law enforcement and judicial personnel; (3)
military coordination, particularly for maritime interdiction and
surveillance; and (4) aviation support for interdiction and surveillance.
Overall, these U.S.-supported programs have strengthened Mexican
counternarcotics efforts, but areas for improvement remain, particularly
regarding cooperation and coordination with Mexican counternarcotics
agencies and the provision of U.S. aviation support.

  Infrastructure Upgrades and Equipment

From 2000 to 2006, a significant share of INL's assistance to
Mexico--about $101 million of nearly $169 million--supported the embassy's
interdiction strategy for Mexico through the purchase of equipment to
enhance border security measures and upgrade the infrastructure of various
Mexican law enforcement entities. In October 2001, when the Fox
administration created AFI under the jurisdiction of the Attorney
General's Office, NAS provided infrastructure and equipment for
counternarcotics operations, including computer servers,
telecommunications data processing hardware and software, systems for
encrypting telecommunications, telephone systems, motorcycles, and a
decontamination vehicle for dismantling methamphetamine processing labs.
In addition, NAS funded the renovation of a building where AFI staff were
located, as well as the construction of a state-of-the-art network for
tracking and interdicting drug trafficking aircraft. According to State
reports, since 2001, AFI has figured prominently in investigations,
resulting in the arrests of numerous drug traffickers and corrupt
officials, becoming the centerpiece of Fox administration efforts to
transform Mexican federal law enforcement entities into effective
institutions.

In July 2003, the Mexican Attorney General's Office reorganized its drug
control planning capacity under the National Center for Analysis, Planning
and Intelligence (CENAPI).^22 According to INL, NAS also equipped CENAPI
with a state-of-the-art computer network for collecting, storing, and
analyzing crime-related information. CENAPI analysts noted that software
provided by NAS allowed them to process large volumes of data--including
background files on more than 30,000 criminals--and make considerable
progress in investigations of unsolved crimes.

In 2005, NAS provided computer equipment for COFEPRIS to monitor imports
of methamphetamine precursor chemicals at major international points of
entry into Mexico. This complemented efforts by the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime to enhance COFEPRIS's capabilities to track shipments
and imports of precursor chemicals and controlled medicines through a
National Drug Control System database.

NAS also funded the procurement of nonintrusive inspection equipment for
Mexican customs officials to scan container trucks, railroad cars, and
other cargo containers for illicit contraband at Mexican ports and the
border. Such border security measures also support counternarcotics
efforts, since drug traffickers are known to exploit opportunities
provided by legitimate U.S.-Mexico cross-border trade to smuggle illicit
drugs. Border security funding was also used to enhance "secure rapid
inspection lanes" at six U.S.-Mexico border crossings.

In addition to support provided by NAS, Justice's DEA provided specialized
equipment to the Attorney General's Office and other Mexican law
enforcement entities to allow them to detect and properly handle hazardous
materials at clandestine methamphetamine laboratories. This included
safety suits required for clandestine lab cleanups, evidence containers,
and drug-testing chemical kits. DEA also donated eight specially designed
vehicles to handle toxic chemicals typically found at facilities where
methamphetamine is produced. These trucks were recently refurbished and
will be based at locations throughout Mexico where a large number of
methamphetamine labs are suspected of operating.

  Law Enforcement and Judicial Personnel Training

U.S. agencies have sought to strengthen Mexico's interdiction capabilities
through training for Mexican law enforcement, judicial, and military
personnel. According to State, the overall purpose of this training is to
help Mexican police personnel and prosecutors combat more effectively all
transnational crimes affecting U.S. interests, including drug trafficking
and money laundering. NAS has taken the lead in funding such training, and
courses are typically taught by U.S. law enforcement agencies and various
contractors in Mexico and the United States. From 2000 through 2006, NAS
provided approximately $15 million for such training. DEA has also funded
some training for members of its vetted units, and Defense has provided
training for Mexican military officials.

^22This unit assumed a broad mandate to gather and analyze strategic
intelligence on organized criminal organizations in Mexico, including drug
trafficking and money laundering. CENAPI is the Spanish acronym for Centro
Nacional de Planeacion, Analisis e Informacion para el Combate a la
Delincuencia.

According to U.S. and Mexican officials, this training was an integral
part of the Mexican Attorney General's efforts to develop a professional
cadre of investigative agents within AFI, and it also supported more
general efforts by the Fox administration to upgrade the capabilities and
ethical awareness of Mexican law enforcement officials at the federal,
state, and local levels. By 2006, the United States had supported training
for over 2,000 federal, state, and local law enforcement officials, with a
goal of training 2,000 more in 2007.

  Interdiction Cooperation and Coordination Can Be Improved

From 2000 to 2006, Defense has spent a total of about $58 million for
equipment and training for the Mexican military, particularly to help the
Mexican Navy interdict aircraft and vessels suspected of transporting
illicit drugs. From 2000 to 2006, Defense provided training for about
2,500 Mexican military personnel in the use of certain kinds of equipment,
as well as training to enable them to coordinate with U.S. aircraft and
vessels. The training provided was designed to strengthen the Mexican
military's ability to detect, monitor, and interdict suspected drug
trafficking aircraft and vessels, as well as help professionalize Mexico's
military and improve relations between the U.S. and Mexican militaries.

Defense initiatives have facilitated coincidental maritime operations
between the United States and Mexico that have resulted in greater
cooperation between the two countries, particularly with respect to
boarding, searching, and seizing suspected vessels transiting Mexican
waters. In recent years, the Mexican Navy has regularly responded to U.S.
information on suspect vessels transiting Mexican waters--46 times in
2006, for example. In addition, the Mexican Navy agreed on several
occasions to temporarily place Mexican liaison officers aboard U.S. Coast
Guard vessels, as well as placing U.S. Coast Guard officers aboard Mexican
vessels. The Mexican Navy also permitted U.S. law enforcement personnel to
participate in some dockside searches and post-seizure analyses.

However, the United States and Mexico have not agreed to a bilateral
maritime cooperation agreement that would allow U.S. law enforcement
personnel to board and search Mexican-flagged vessels on the high seas
suspected of trafficking illicit drugs without asking the government of
Mexico for authority to board on a case-by-case basis.^23 According to
Defense officials, a request to board and search a suspicious
Mexican-flagged vessel--or one whose captain reports it as
Mexican-registered--can be complex and time-consuming, involving, at a
minimum, the Foreign Affairs Secretariat as well as the Mexican Navy.
Waiting for approval or the arrival of the Mexican Navy typically creates
delays, which can result in the loss of evidence as the illicit drugs are
thrown overboard or the vessel is scuttled or escapes. In addition, while
the Mexican Navy has proved willing to respond to U.S. information on
suspicious vessels transiting Mexican waters, according to Defense
officials, the Mexican Navy does not normally conduct patrols more than
200 nautical miles from shore.^24

In addition, according to embassy and Defense officials, Defense has
little contact with Mexico's Defense Secretariat (SEDENA),^25 which
oversees the Mexican Army and Air Force. According to these officials, the
Mexican Army has conducted counternarcotics operations throughout Mexico,
including in Acapulco, Nuevo Laredo, and Tijuana, to reduce the violence
caused by drug trafficking, and it manually eradicates opium poppy and
marijuana. But, according to Defense officials, none of these efforts took
advantage of U.S. expertise or intelligence. In the past, some eradication
efforts were also done by the Mexican Attorney General's Office, which
worked with its U.S. counterparts. Now, however, the Calderon
administration plans to consolidate all eradication efforts under SEDENA,
which makes greater cooperation with SEDENA all the more important.

^23The United States has bilateral maritime cooperation agreements with
more than 20 other countries in the Caribbean Sea and Central and South
America.

^24The Mexican constitution prohibits the deployment of forces more than
200 nautical miles from Mexican territory during peacetime unless the
deployment is requested by the President and authorized by Congress.

^25SEDENA is the Spanish acronym for Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional.

In addition, from 2001 until late 2006, Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) provided eight Citation jets for detection and monitoring of
suspected drug trafficking aircraft along the U.S.-Mexican border under a
program known as Operation Halcon in cooperation with AFI.^26 According to
CBP officials, in recent years Operation Halcon was a successful
interdiction effort that helped prevent drug traffickers from flying
aircraft near the U.S.-Mexico border, which made it more difficult to
transport illicit drugs to the United States. They also noted that CBP and
AFI personnel worked very closely and one CBP official worked full time at
the AFI Command Center. Moreover, CBP officials maintained that the
embassy infrastructure, operational staffing, and relationships developed
under Halcon provided critical daily interface with the Mexican
authorities, facilitating quick responses to operational needs along the
border and the sharing of intelligence. Overall, in 2005, between 15 and
25 percent of the 294 suspect aircraft identified by Operation Halcon
resulted in seizures of aircraft and other vehicles or arrests.

In March 2006, the United States sought to formalize Operation Halcon to
limit liability for U.S. pilots involved in the patrols in the event of an
accident. However, the Mexican government did not respond with terms
acceptable to CBP, and in November 2006, the government of Mexico
suspended the program. As a result, U.S. embassy officials said that fewer
suspect flights are being identified and interdicted. According to CBP
officials, since the suspension, seizures of illicit drugs along the
U.S.-Mexico border have increased, and this, according to DEA, CBP, and
other officials, is an indication that more drugs are finding their way to
northern Mexico.

  U.S. Aviation Support for Interdiction Can Be Better Coordinated

From 2000 to 2006, NAS provided about $22 million, or 13 percent of INL's
obligations for Mexico, to support aviation programs for counternarcotics
efforts by the Attorney General's Office and one program for the Mexican
Air Force. Since 1990, NAS has provided 41 Vietnam-era UH-1H helicopters,
of which 28 remain in service, to the Mexican Attorney General's Office to
transport law enforcement personnel interdicting drug trafficking aircraft
landing in Mexico.^27 Since 2000, NAS has expended $4.5 million to
refurbish 8 of the aircraft.^28 According to State, the aircraft have
served as the transportation workhorse for the Attorney General's air
services section, flying a total of approximately 14,000 hours from 2001
to 2006. However, according to the embassy, the UH-1H program did not meet
its target of interdicting 15 percent of all aircraft detected in the
transport of illicit drugs and crops--in 2005, 4 percent were interdicted.
In addition, the helicopters' readiness rates have progressively declined
from about 90 percent in January 2000 to 33 percent in January 2007. NAS
and Mexican officials attributed the reduced readiness rates to a lack of
funding and a lack of spare parts for these aging aircraft, which Defense
will stop supporting in 2008. In January 2007, NAS officials told us that
State/INL does not intend to provide any further support for the UH-1Hs.

^26When in Mexico, all activity was coordinated with the Air Interception
Director of AFI and an AFI pilot was aboard the aircraft. The Citations
would track the suspect aircraft, and U.S.-provided transport would
transport law enforcement officers to the landing site.

^27In addition, prior to 2000, NAS provided 39 other aircraft, including
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, to the Attorney General's Office.

^28The remaining UH-1H helicopters were refurbished before 2000.

Beginning in 2004, NAS provided the Attorney General's Office 12 Schweizer
333 helicopters, of which 11 remain operational.^29 The total expended for
these helicopters was $14.2 million, which included a 2-year support
package. Equipped with forward-looking infrared sensors for nighttime
operations as well as television cameras, the Schweizers are designed to
provide the Attorney General's Office with a reconnaissance, surveillance,
and command and control platform. According to State officials, the
Schweizers were used in Nuevo Laredo and other locations, providing
support for surveillance operations, flying a total of approximately 1,750
hours from September 2004 to February 2007.

Originally, NAS had planned to provide 28 Schweizers, deploying them to
various points throughout Mexico. However, according to State officials,
due to funding limitations and changed priorities, NAS capped the number
at 12. In addition, Mexican Attorney General officials told us that they
would have preferred a helicopter with both a surveillance capability and
troop transport capacity.^30

From 2000 to 2006, NAS also expended about $4.2 million to repair,
maintain, and operate four C-26 aircraft provided by the United States to
Mexico in 1997. The aircraft did not originally come equipped with a
surveillance capability, and the Mexican Air Force had indicated it had no
plans to invest in the necessary equipment. In 1998, we reported that the
Mexican Air Force was not using the aircraft for any purpose.^31 After
Mexico upgraded these aircraft with forward-looking infrared radar in
2002, NAS funded maintenance of the aircraft and sensors, as well as
training for sensor operators and imagery analysts. Part of the NAS
funding was also used to provide contractor logistical support, including
spare parts.

^29One Schweizer crashed in June 2006.

^30The Schweizer 333 normally carries a three-person crew--a pilot, a
copilot, and an observer to operate the forward-looking infrared sensor
and television camera and communicate to commanders on the ground.

^31 [24]GAO/NSIAD-98-154 .

Southwest Border Strategy's Implementation Plan

In March 2006, ONDCP, in conjunction with the National Security Council
and other agencies involved in the U.S. interagency counternarcotics
community, developed a Southwest Border Strategy to help reduce the flow
of illicit drugs entering the United States across the southwest border
with Mexico. The stated objectives of the strategy, which we reviewed in
June 2007, were to

           o enhance and better coordinate the collection of intelligence;
           o effectively share information, when appropriate, with Mexican
           officials;
           o investigate, disrupt, and dismantle Mexican DTOs;
           o interdict drugs and other illicit cargo by denying entry by
           land, air, and sea routes;
           o deny drug traffickers their profits by interdicting bulk
           currency movements and electronic currency transfers;
           o enhance Mexico's counterdrug capabilities; and
           o reduce the corruption that facilitates illicit activity along
           and across the border.

           In addition, a plan was developed to implement the strategy. As of
           August 2007, ONDCP officials told us that the implementation plan
           was being revised to respond to the Calderon administration's new
           initiatives. On October 2, 2007, the Director of ONDCP released a
           summary of the strategy that referred to the implementation plan.
           According to the summary, the implementation plan lays out the
           desired end state, estimated resource requirements, action plan,
           and metrics for each of the seven objectives in the strategy.
			  
			  Conclusions

           U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Mexico since 2000 has helped
           Mexico strengthen its law enforcement institutions and capacity to
           combat illicit drug production and trafficking. However, overall,
           the flow of illicit drugs to the United States has not abated, and
           U.S. and Mexican authorities have seized only a relatively small
           percentage of the illicit drugs estimated transiting through or
           produced in Mexico. Moreover, reducing drug-related corruption
           remains a challenge for the Mexican government, and Mexican DTOs
           have increasingly become a threat in both Mexico and the United
           States. Mexican officials have recognized the increasing threat
           and indicated that combating the illicit drug threat in
           cooperation with the United States is a priority.

           As we noted in our recent report, the Calderon administration has
           signaled an interest in working with the United States to reduce
           drug production and trafficking.^32 At the time, to respond to the
           Calderon administration's initiatives, ONDCP and the U.S.
           counternarcotics community was revising the Southwest Border
           Strategy's implementation plan to emphasize greater cooperation
           with Mexico. We recommended that the Director of ONDCP, as the
           lead agency for U.S. drug policy, in conjunction with the
           cognizant departments and agencies in the U.S. counternarcotics
           interagency community, coordinate with the appropriate Mexican
           officials before completing the Southwest Border Strategy's
           implementation plan to help ensure Mexico's cooperation with any
           efforts that require it and address the cooperation issues we
           identified.

           ONDCP concurred with the recommendation and it has since assured
           us that the interagency counternarcotics community is actively
           engaged with their Mexican counterparts. In commenting on our
           report, ONDCP emphasized that the Southwest Border Strategy's
           implementation plan must be a living document with the flexibility
           to adjust as resources become available.

           Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
           prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you
           may have.
			  
32 [32]GAO-07-1018 .			

           Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

           For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T.
           Ford at (202) 512-4268 or [25][email protected] . Albert H.
           Huntington, III, Assistant Director; Joe Carney; and Jose M. Pena,
           III made key contributions in preparing this statement.
			  
Appendix I: Estimated Amounts of Illicit Drugs Transiting or Produced in
Mexico and Seized, Calendar Years 2000-2006

                                                Calendar year
Illicit drugs                 2000  2001  2002   2003   2004   2005   2006 
Cocaine (metric tons)                                                      
Arriving in Mexico for                                                     
transshipment to the United                           220 to 260 to 300 to 
States^a                       220   270   270    210  440^b  460^b  460^b 
Seized in Mexico                20    10     8     12     19     21     10 
U.S. border seizures^c          23    20    23     16     22     23     27 
Heroin (metric tons)                                                       
Produced^d                       9    21    13     30     23     17    N/A 
Seized in Mexico               .27   .27   .28    .31    .30    .46    .40 
U.S. border seizures^c         .07   .35   .30    .35    .29    .32    .47 
Marijuana (metric tons)                                                    
Produced                     7,000 7,400 7,900 13,500 10,400 10,100    N/A 
Seized in Mexico             1,619 1,839 1,633  2,248  2,208  1,786  1,849 
U.S. border seizures^c         533 1,083 1,072  1,221  1,173    974  1,015 
Methamphetamine (kilograms)                                                
Seized in Mexico               560   400   460    750    950    980    600 
U.S. border seizures^c         500 1,150 1,320  1,750  2,210  2,870  2,710 

           Sources: The Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement, the
           International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, National Drug
           Intelligence Center, the Central Intelligence Agency's Crime and
           Narcotics Center, ONDCP, and the El Paso Intelligence Center.

           aThe Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM) estimates
           the metric tons of cocaine departing South America and flowing
           toward the United States. It also estimates what percentage of
           this amount is flowing towards Mexico for transshipment to the
           United States and reports seizures of cocaine. To estimate the
           amount of cocaine available in Mexico for transshipment to the
           United States, we multiplied the IACM's total estimate of cocaine
           flowing toward the United States by the IACM's estimated
           percentage of what was flowing toward Mexico (which ranged from 66
           percent in 2000 to 91 percent in 2006). We then subtracted the
           IACM's reported cocaine seizures and disruptions in the eastern
           Pacific Ocean, western Caribbean Sea, and Central America for each
           year to estimate how much cocaine was available to transit Mexico.
           Because of the uncertain nature of the estimates involved, we
           rounded the figures we derived to the nearest ten.

           bFor 2000 through 2003, the IACM reported "point" estimates of the
           cocaine flow. In 2004, the IACM began reporting low and high
           estimates of the metric tons of cocaine flowing through the
           transit zone due to certain methodological concerns over providing
           point estimates.

           cThe Drug Enforcement Administration's El Paso Intelligence Center
           (and the IACM) defines drug seizures at the U.S. southwest border
           to include seizures at the U.S.-Mexico border or within 150 miles
           on the U.S. side of the border, including 88 border counties in
           Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas.

           dThis estimate does not include heroin that is produced in
           Colombia and may transit Mexico on the way to the United States.
			  
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[33]GAO-08-215T . For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202)
512-4268 or [email protected].

Highlights of [34]GAO-08-215T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives

October 2007

DRUG CONTROL

U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but the Flow
of Illicit Drugs into the United States Remains High

The overall goal of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, which is
prepared by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP), is to reduce illicit drug use in the United States. One of the
strategy's priorities is to disrupt the illicit drug marketplace. To this
end, since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided about $397
million to support Mexican counternarcotics efforts. According to the
Department of State (State), much of the illicit drugs consumed in the
United States flows through or is produced in Mexico. GAO examined (1)
trends in Mexican drug production and trafficking since calendar year 2000
and (2) U.S. counternarcotics support for Mexico since fiscal year 2000.
This testimony is based on a recently issued report (GAO-07-1018) that
addresses these issues.

[35]What GAO Recommends

In the recent report, GAO recommended that ONDCP and the U.S.
counternarcotics community coordinate with Mexico before completing the
Southwest Border Strategy's implementation plan to (1) help ensure
Mexico's cooperation with any initiatives that require it and (2) address
the cooperation issues GAO identified. ONDCP concurred with the
recommendation and has since assured GAO that the interagency community is
engaged with its Mexican counterparts.

According to the U.S. interagency counternarcotics community, hundreds of
tons of illicit drugs flow from Mexico into the United States each year,
and seizures in Mexico and along the U.S. border have been relatively
small in recent years. The following illustrates some trends since 2000:

           o The estimated amount of cocaine arriving in Mexico for
           transshipment to the United States averaged about 290 metric tons
           per year. Reported seizures averaged about 36 metric tons a year.
           o The estimated amount of export quality heroin and marijuana
           produced in Mexico averaged almost 19 metric tons and 9,400 metric
           tons per year, respectively. Reported heroin seizures averaged
           less than 1 metric ton and reported marijuana seizures averaged
           about 2,900 metric tons a year.
           o Although an estimate of the amount of methamphetamine
           manufactured in Mexico is not prepared, reported seizures along
           the U.S. border rose from about 500 kilograms in 2000 to highs of
           about 2,800 kilograms in 2005 and about 2,700 kilograms in 2006.
           According to U.S. officials, this more than fivefold increase
           indicated a dramatic rise in supply.

In addition, according to State, corruption persists within the Mexican
government and challenges Mexico's efforts to curb drug production and
trafficking. Moreover, Mexican drug trafficking organizations operate with
relative impunity along the U.S. border and in other parts of Mexico, and
have expanded their illicit business to almost every region of the United
States.

U.S. assistance since fiscal year 2000 has helped Mexico strengthen its
capacity to combat illicit drug production and trafficking. Among other
things, extraditions of criminals to the United States increased;
thousands of Mexican law enforcement personnel were trained; and controls
over chemicals to produce methamphetamine were strengthened. Nevertheless,
cooperation with Mexico can be improved. The two countries do not have an
agreement permitting U.S. law enforcement officers to board
Mexican-flagged vessels suspected of transporting illicit drugs on the
high seas; an aerial monitoring program along the U.S. border was
suspended because certain personnel status issues could not be agreed on;
State-provided Vietnam-era helicopters have proved expensive and difficult
to maintain and many are not available for operations; and a
State-supported border surveillance program was cut short due to limited
funding and changed priorities.

In 2006, in response to a congressional mandate, ONDCP and other agencies
involved in U.S. counternarcotics efforts developed a strategy to help
reduce the illicit drugs entering the United States from Mexico. An
implementation plan was prepared but is being revised to address certain
initiatives recently undertaken by Mexico. Based on our review of the
plan, some proposals require the cooperation of Mexico; but, according to
ONDCP, they had not been addressed with Mexican authorities at the time of
our review.

References

Visible links
  20. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1018
  21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-200
  22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-154
  23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-200
  24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-154
  25. mailto:[email protected]
  26. http://www.gao.gov/
  27. http://www.gao.gov/
  28. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  29. mailto:[email protected]
  30. mailto:[email protected]
  31. mailto:[email protected]
  32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1018
  33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-215T
  34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-215T
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