The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Systematic Assessment Is	 
Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward U.S. Policy	 
Objectives (14-DEC-07, GAO-08-188).				 
                                                                 
In enacting the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Relief,	 
Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), Congress
established 15 U.S. policy objectives to address the DRC's	 
humanitarian, development, economic and natural resource,	 
governance, and security issues and mandated that GAO review	 
actions taken by U.S. agencies to achieve these objectives. In	 
this report, GAO identifies (1) U.S. programs and activities that
support the Act's objectives, (2) major challenges hindering the 
accomplishment of the objectives, and (3) U.S. efforts to assess 
progress toward the objectives. GAO obtained and analyzed	 
agencies' program documents and met with officials of agencies	 
and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) active in the DRC.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-188 					        
    ACCNO:   A78911						        
  TITLE:     The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Systematic	      
Assessment Is Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward U.S. 
Policy Objectives						 
     DATE:   12/14/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Development systems				 
	     Economic development				 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign aid programs				 
	     Foreign economic assistance			 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International economic relations			 
	     International law					 
	     International organizations			 
	     International relations				 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Democratic Republic of the Congo			 

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GAO-08-188

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background
     * [3]U.S. Programs and Activities Support the Act's Policy Object

          * [4]U.S. Funding for the DRC
          * [5]Humanitarian Assistance
          * [6]Social Development Assistance
          * [7]Economic and Natural Resource Management Assistance
          * [8]Governance Assistance
          * [9]Security Assistance

     * [10]Major Challenges in the DRC Impede Efforts to Achieve the Ac

          * [11]Unstable Security Situation
          * [12]Weak Governance and Corruption
          * [13]Mismanagement of Natural Resources
          * [14]Lack of Basic Infrastructure

     * [15]U.S. Government Has Not Assessed Its Overall Progress toward
     * [16]Conclusions
     * [17]Recommendation for Executive Action
     * [18]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [19]GAO Contact
     * [20]Staff Acknowledgments

          * [21]Order by Mail or Phone

Report to Congress

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

December 2007

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Systematic Assessment Is Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward
U.S. Policy Objectives

GAO-08-188

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 5
U.S. Programs and Activities Support the Act's Policy Objectives 11
Major Challenges in the DRC Impede Efforts to Achieve the Act's Policy
Objectives 19
U.S. Government Has Not Assessed Its Overall Progress toward Achieving the
Act's Policy Objectives 28
Conclusions 29
Recommendation for Executive Action 30
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30
Appendix I Objectives, Scope and Methodology 32
Appendix II Examples of Programs by Policy Objective Category 34
Appendix III Comments from the Department of State 35
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 40

Tables

Table 1: Policy Objectives in the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy
Promotion Act of 2006, by Category 9
Table 2: U.S. Agencies' Funding Allocations for the DRC by Category 12

Figures

Figure 1: Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 6
Figure 2: Allocation of U.S. Funding for the DRC by Agency, Fiscal Years
2006-2007 13
Figure 3: Allocation of U.S. Funding for the DRC by Category, Fiscal Years
2006-2007 14

Abbreviations

Act: DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DFA: Director of Foreign Assistance: 

DOL: Department of Labor: 

DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo: 

EITI: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: 

HHS: Department of Health and Human Services: 

HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Country: 

IMF: International Monetary Fund: 

NGO: nongovernmental organization: 

NSC: National Security Council: 

OFDA: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance: 

OPIC: Overseas Private Investment Corporation: 

UN: United Nations: 

USAID: United States Agency for International Development: 

USDA: Department of Agriculture: 

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United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

December 14, 2007


The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tom Lantos: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

Because of its large size, central location in sub-Saharan Africa, and
abundant natural resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is
important to the stability of central Africa and is of long-term interest
to the United States. However, since achieving independence in 1960, the
DRC--one of the world's poorest countries--has suffered from despotic
rule, underdevelopment, economic problems, and conflicts with neighboring
countries that resulted in the deaths of an estimated 3.9 million
Congolese within the past decade. Government and other armed forces also
committed abuses against thousands of Congolese women and girls. According
to the U.S. Department of State, Western nations provided the DRC with
considerable aid during the Cold War era, but support for the DRC fell in
the early 1990s owing to concerns about human rights abuses and the need
for internal reforms. Because of its large size, central location in
sub-Saharan Africa, and abundant natural resources, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) is important to the stability of central
Africa and is of long-term interest to the United States. However, since
achieving independence in 1960, the DRC--one of the world's poorest
countries--has suffered from despotic rule, underdevelopment, economic
problems, and conflicts with neighboring countries that resulted in the
deaths of an estimated 3.9 million Congolese within the past decade.
Government and other armed forces also committed abuses against thousands
of Congolese women and girls. According to the U.S. Department of State,
Western nations provided the DRC with considerable aid during the Cold War
era, but support for the DRC fell in the early 1990s owing to concerns
about human rights abuses and the need for internal reforms.

U.S. aid to the DRC began to increase again in 2001, following the
initiation of peace talks that led first to the withdrawal of foreign
armies and then to the installation of a transitional DRC government in
2003. Subsequently, the U.S. President stated that the United States would
work closely with the transitional government to promote "peace,
prosperity and democracy" for all Congolese people. The transition process
culminated in the December 6, 2006, inauguration of the DRC's first
democratically elected president in more than 40 years. Following the U.S.
aid to the DRC began to increase again in 2001, following the initiation
of peace talks that led first to the withdrawal of foreign armies and then
to the installation of a transitional DRC government in 2003.
Subsequently, the U.S. President stated that the United States would work
closely with the transitional government to promote "peace, prosperity and
democracy" for all Congolese people. The transition process culminated in
the December 6, 2006, inauguration of the DRC's first democratically
elected president in more than 40 years. Following the DRC elections, on
December 22, 2006, Congress enacted the DRC Relief, Security, and
Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act).^1 The Act established 15 policy
objectives aimed at addressing a range of concerns regarding humanitarian,
social development, economic and natural resource, governance, and
security issues in the DRC.^2 Also, it stated the Secretary of State
should withhold certain assistance to the DRC if the Secretary determined
that the DRC was not making sufficient progress toward accomplishing these
policy objectives. The Act mandated that GAO review actions taken by U.S.
agencies to achieve the Act's policy objectives.

In this report, we identify (1) U.S. programs and activities that support
the Act's objectives, (2) major impediments hindering accomplishment of
these objectives, and (3) U.S. efforts to assess progress toward
accomplishing the objectives. Because the Act directed us to review
actions taken by U.S. agencies to achieve its objectives, we focused on
the fiscal year in which the Act was enacted, and also considered the
fiscal year before its enactment to provide context. In conducting our
work, we analyzed policy, planning, budget, and programming documents
describing U.S. policies and programs in the DRC provided by key U.S.
agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Labor
(DOL), Health and Human Services (HHS), State, and the Treasury; the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). We identified the amount of funding
each agency allocated for its DRC programs in fiscal years 2006 and 2007;
we did not determine the extent to which each agency obligated or expended
its allocated funds. We also met with representatives from each of these
agencies, the National Security Council (NSC), nongovernmental
organizations (NGO), and other organizations with expertise on DRC-related
issues. To identify key challenges hindering the accomplishment of the
Act's policy objectives, we analyzed relevant policy and program
documents; interviewed U.S. agency officials; conducted a round-table
session with a nonprobability sample of 11 NGOs with a broad range of
experience and expertise implementing programs and projects in the DRC;
and interviewed representatives from other organizations with experience
in the DRC. To examine U.S. efforts to assess progress toward
accomplishing the Act's policy objectives and to make decisions regarding
additional actions, we reviewed U.S. agency assessments and implementation
documents. Although we did not travel to the DRC, we conducted several
telephone interviews with U.S. embassy and USAID mission staff located in
the DRC. We performed our work from May 2007 to December 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See
app. I for a more detailed description of our scope and methodology.)

^1Pub. L. No. 109-456, 120 Stat. 3384.

^2We have grouped the Act's 15 objectives in five categories--emergency
humanitarian assistance, social development, economic and natural
resources, governance, and security.

Results in Brief

U.S. programs and activities support the Act's policy objectives. In
fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, U.S. agencies--USDA, DOD, HHS,
DOL, State, the Treasury, and USAID--allocated a total of about $217.9
million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About 70 percent of the funds were
allocated for programs that support the Act's humanitarian and social
development objectives, while the remainder was allocated for programs and
activities that support the Act's economic, governance, and security
objectives. For example, USAID is providing humanitarian assistance that
includes emergency supplies, food, and water and sanitation improvements
to vulnerable populations. Treasury has worked to provide the DRC with
interim debt relief. State is working to provide training and other
assistance aimed at professionalizing members of the DRC's military.
Although the agencies have not acted on the Act's policy objective of
working bilaterally to urge nations contributing peacekeeping troops to
prosecute abusive troops, U.S. multilateral actions address this issue.

U.S., NGO, and other officials and experts identified several major
challenges that are impeding U.S. efforts to achieve the Act's policy
objectives, including (1) an unstable security situation, (2) weak
governance and widespread corruption, (3) mismanagement of natural
resources, and (4) lack of basic infrastructure. These challenges are
interrelated and can negatively impact progress in multiple areas. For
example, the unstable security situation in the eastern DRC has worsened
humanitarian and social problems, while forcing U.S. and NGO staff to
curtail some efforts. The lack of roads has prevented deliveries of
critically needed humanitarian assistance. Similarly, corruption and other
governance problems have hindered efforts to provide roads and other
needed infrastructure, which impedes the efficient delivery of
humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the DRC's weak governance structures
prevent the country from meeting the requirements for badly needed debt
relief, as well as discourage private-sector investment, thus hindering
economic growth.

The U.S. government has not established a process for systematically
assessing its progress toward achieving the Act's policy objectives. Some
of the agencies we reviewed collect information about their respective
activities in the DRC; for example, two USAID Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance program officers regularly visit project sites in the DRC and
publish quarterly reports of the office's activities. However, although we
identified two executive branch mechanisms for coordinating some of the
agencies' activities in the DRC, no mechanism exists for assessing overall
U.S. progress. State and USAID have begun to develop a joint planning and
budgeting process that, according to State officials, may eventually
assess all U.S. foreign assistance. However, State's Director of Foreign
Assistance (DFA) has yet to finalize the DFA plan for operations in the
DRC during fiscal year 2007, which ended on September 30, 2007. As of
February 2007, the draft plan was incomplete, consisting of a listing of
individual programs that did not include a systematic assessment of the
collective impact of State and USAID efforts during fiscal year 2007. In
addition, the DFA draft plan did not address activities funded by other
agencies, including DOD, the Treasury, and HHS, although the DFA plan may
eventually include other agencies to some degree. The NSC has established
an interagency group, including State, Defense, and the Treasury, to help
discuss policies and approaches to addressing the challenges in the DRC
and coordinate certain agencies' activities. However, the group does not
include several relevant agencies, such as DOL, HHS, or USDA, in its
discussions of policies and approaches and, according to NSC and State
officials, does not systematically assess U.S. progress in the DRC.

To provide a basis for informed decisions regarding U.S. allocations for
assistance in the DRC as well as any needed bilateral or multilateral
actions, we are recommending that the Secretary of State, through the
Director of Foreign Assistance, work with the heads of the other U.S.
agencies implementing programs in the DRC to develop a plan for
systematically assessing the extent to which the U.S. government as a
whole is making progress in achieving the Act's policy objectives.

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretaries of
Agriculture, Defense, Labor, Health and Human Services, State, and the
Treasury; from the Administrator of USAID; and from the Director of
Congressional Relations of OPIC. We received written comments from State,
which are reprinted in appendix III. State commented that it endorsed our
recommendation and noted that our recommendation would likely be met as
DFA's joint planning and budgeting processes are extended to include all
U.S. agencies engaged in the DRC. In addition, State provided specific
comments which we have incorporated as appropriate in this report. We also
received technical comments on our draft report from Defense, HHS, Labor,
the Treasury, and USAID, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

Background

The DRC's size, location, and wealth of natural resources contribute to
its importance to U.S. interests in the region. With an area of more than
900,000 square miles, the DRC is roughly the size of the United States
east of the Mississippi River. Located in the center of Africa, the DRC
borders nine nations (see fig. 1). Its abundant natural resources, which
constitute its primary export products, include 34 percent of world cobalt
reserves; 10 percent of world copper reserves; 64 percent of world coltan
reserves; and significant amounts of wood, oil, coffee, diamonds, gold,
cassiterite, and other minerals.^3 In addition, rain forests in the DRC
provide 8 percent of world carbon reserves.^4 The DRC has a population of
58 million to 65 million people, including members of more than 200 ethnic
groups.

^3Coltan and cassiterite are metals used in the electronics industry.

^4According to a recent report by Greenpeace--Carving Up the Congo (Apr.
1, 2007)--forests play a critical role in keeping the planet's climate
stable by storing carbon. Central African forests constitute the second
largest area of rain forest in the world.

Figure 1: Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The DRC has had a turbulent history. In 1965, fewer than 5 years after the
nation achieved its independence from Belgium, a military regime seized
control of the DRC and ruled, often brutally, for more than three decades.
It was toppled in 1997 by a coalition of internal groups and neighboring
countries to the east, including Rwanda and Uganda, after dissident
Rwandan groups began operating in the DRC. Subsequent efforts by a new DRC
government to secure the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops prompted
a second war in 1998 that eventually drew the armies of three more African
nations into the DRC. According to the International Rescue Committee,
this second war resulted in an estimated 3.9 million deaths. Beginning in
1999, a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force was deployed to the DRC.
After a series of peace talks, the other nations withdrew all or most of
their troops and an interim government was established. Elections held in
2006 with logistical support provided by UN peacekeepers culminated in the
December 6, 2006, inauguration of the DRC's first democratically elected
president in more than 40 years.

Partially as a result of this turbulent history, the DRC suffers from a
wide range of problems, including acute poverty. The DRC is one of the
poorest and least developed countries in the world. It was ranked 167th of
177 nations surveyed by the UN Development Program in terms of life
expectancy, education, and standard of living, and its ranking on these
measures has declined more than 10 percent over the past decade. The
current life expectancy is 43 years, in part because the DRC suffers from
high rates of tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and malaria. According to USAID,
more than 2 of every 10 children born in the DRC die before their fifth
birthday (owing in part to chronic malnutrition and low vaccination
rates), and the maternal death rate is the world's highest. Congolese
women also suffer from the effects of rampant sexual attacks and other
forms of gender-based violence against women, particularly in the eastern
regions of the country. A UN expert reported in July 2007 that widespread
atrocities against women in one eastern DRC province constituted the worst
crisis of sexual violence that the expert had yet encountered. An
international group of donor nations recently concluded that the DRC's
educational system is failing and in a state of crisis. Most rural
children do not attend school at all, in part because their parents cannot
afford to pay school fees. As a result of such problems, the Fund for
Peace ranked the DRC second on its "failed states" scale, after Sudan.

The DRC's economic prospects are uncertain. It once derived about 75
percent of its export revenues and 25 percent of its gross domestic
product from its natural resources, but wars and turmoil have reduced its
economy to dependence on subsistence agriculture and informal activities.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that as of 2001, the DRC's
per capita gross domestic product had contracted to $100 from a
preindependence level of $400, in constant dollars. Although the DRC's
gross domestic product grew at an average rate of 5.5 percent from 2002
through 2005, growth has recently slowed. Also, the DRC's prospects are
encumbered by an external debt load of around $8 billion.^5 The value of
this debt--which represents more than 90 percent of the DRC's gross
domestic product, 300 percent of its exports, and 700 percent of its
government's revenues--is three times greater than the level of debt that
the World Bank and the IMF consider sustainable. The DRC has not fully
qualified for debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Country
(HIPC) initiative.^6

The DRC receives assistance from an array of donor nations and
organizations. During 2004 and 2005, the 10 largest donors to the DRC were
the World Bank's International Development Association, the European
Commission, Japan, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United States, France,
Germany, the IMF, and the Netherlands. The World Bank is preparing a
country assistance strategy to support the DRC's 2007-2010
poverty-reduction goals. The United States and 16 other donor nations and
organizations are contributing to the World Bank's effort by preparing a
country assistance framework document that assesses the major challenges
facing the DRC and identifies major areas for donor focus. Some donor
nations and organizations have also begun an effort to coordinate
assistance for reforming the DRC's troubled army, police, and judiciary.

According to the Department of State, the United States' goal for its
assistance to the DRC is to strengthen the process of internal
reconciliation and democratization to promote a stable, developing, and
democratic DRC. The Department of State has also reported that the United
States is seeking to ensure that the DRC professionalizes its security
forces and is at peace; develops democratic institutions; supports
private-sector economic growth and achieves macroeconomic stability; meets
the basic needs of its people; and, with its international partners,
provides relief in humanitarian crises. As described by the Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, U.S. policy is to support--but not
lead--the efforts of the DRC to address its problems.

^5We state external debt in present value terms, which take into account
the sum of all future debt-service obligations (interest and principal) on
existing debt, discounted at the market interest rate.

^6The DRC did not service its external debt during the war. At the end of
2001, the DRC's arrears on publicly guaranteed debt was about $10.6
billion. Donors cleared about $2 billion in arrears, and the DRC qualified
for debt relief in 2003 through HIPC, a joint bilateral and multilateral
effort to relieve poor countries of debt to promote long-term economic
growth and debt sustainability. In qualifying for HIPC, the DRC has been
able to receive interim debt relief, primarily in terms of lower
debt-service payments. The DRC must meet certain additional criteria
before its debt is fully reduced through HIPC.

In October 2006, continued violence and armed conflict in the eastern DRC
led the President of the United States to issue an executive order
blocking the property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in
the DRC.^7 In October 2006, the President reiterated the United States'
commitment to the goal of creating a prosperous Congolese democracy. In
October 2007, the President, meeting with the newly elected president of
the DRC, again cited the importance of democracy and economic growth in
the DRC and noted the need for progress on security and health issues.

Section 102 of the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of
2006 includes 15 U.S. policy objectives for the DRC. Table 1 presents
these objectives in five categories of assistance--emergency humanitarian,
social development, economic and natural resources, governance, and
security.

Table 1: Policy Objectives in the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy
Promotion Act of 2006, by Category

Policy objective                                 Category                  
Help promote, reinvigorate, and support the      Governance                
political process in the DRC to press all                                  
parties in the Transitional National Government                            
and the succeeding government to implement                                 
fully and to institutionalize mechanisms,                                  
including national and international election                              
observers, fair and transparent voter                                      
registration procedures, and a significant                                 
civic awareness and public education campaign                              
created for the July 30, 2006, elections and                               
future elections in the DRC to ensure that                                 
elections are carried out in a fair and                                    
democratic manner.                                                         
Urge the DRC to recognize and act upon its       Governance and security   
responsibilities to immediately bring                                      
discipline to its security forces, hold those                              
individuals responsible for atrocities and                                 
other human rights violations, particularly the                            
rape of women and girls as an act of war,                                  
accountable and bring such individuals to                                  
justice.                                                                   
Help ensure that, once a stable national         Governance and            
government is established in the DRC, it is      economic/natural          
committed to multiparty democracy, open and      resources                 
transparent governance, respect for human                                  
rights and religious freedom, ending the                                   
violence throughout the country, promoting                                 
peace and stability with its neighbors,                                    
rehabilitating the national judicial system and                            
enhancing the rule of law, combating                                       
corruption, instituting economic reforms to                                
promote development, and creating an                                       
environment to promote private investment.                                 
Assist the DRC as it seeks to meet the basic     Humanitarian, social      
needs of its citizens, including security,       development, and security 
safety, and access to health care, education,                              
food, shelter, and clean drinking water.                                   
Support security sector reform by assisting the  Security                  
DRC to establish a viable and professional                                 
national army and police force that respects                               
human rights and the rule of law, is under                                 
effective civilian control, and possesses a                                
viable presence throughout the entire country,                             
provided the DRC meets all requirements for US                             
military assistance under existing law.                                    
Help expedite planning and implementation of     Security                  
programs associated with the disarmament,                                  
demobilization, repatriation, reintegration,                               
and rehabilitation process in the DRC.                                     
Support efforts of the DRC, the UN peacekeeping  Security                  
force, and other entities, as appropriate, to                              
disarm, demobilize, and repatriate the                                     
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda                             
and other illegally armed groups.                                          
Make all efforts to ensure that the DRC (a) is   Economic/natural          
committed to responsible and transparent         resources                 
management of natural resources across the                                 
country; and (b) takes active measures to (i)                              
promote economic development; (ii) hold                                    
accountable individuals who illegally exploit                              
the country's natural resources; and (iii)                                 
implement the Extractive Industries                                        
Transparency Initiative by enacting laws                                   
requiring disclosure and independent auditing                              
of company payments and government receipts for                            
natural resource extraction.                                               
Promote a viable civil society and enhance NGOs  Governance                
and institutions, including religious                                      
organizations, the media, political parties,                               
trade unions, and trade and business                                       
associations, that can act as a stabilizing                                
force and effective check on the government.                               
Help rebuild and enhance infrastructure,         Humanitarian and social   
communications, and other mechanisms that will   development               
increase the ability of the central government                             
to manage internal affairs, encourage economic                             
development, and facilitate relief efforts of                              
humanitarian organizations.                                                
Help halt high prevalence of sexual abuse and    Social development        
violence perpetrated against women and children                            
in the DRC and mitigate the detrimental effects                            
from acts of this type of violence by                                      
undertaking health, education, and psychosocial                            
support programs.                                                          
Work aggressively on a bilateral basis to urge   Security                  
governments of countries contributing troops to                            
the UN peacekeeping force to enact and enforce                             
laws on trafficking in persons and sexual abuse                            
that meet international standards, promote                                 
codes of conduct for troops serving as part of                             
UN peacekeeping missions, and immediately                                  
investigate and punish citizens who are                                    
responsible for abuses in the DRC.                                         
Assist the DRC as it undertakes steps to (a)     Security, social          
protect internally displaced persons and         development, and          
refugees in the DRC and border regions from all  humanitarian              
forms of violence, including gender-based                                  
violence and other human rights abuses; (b)                                
address other basic needs of vulnerable                                    
populations with the goal of allowing these                                
conflict-affected individuals to ultimately                                
return to their homes; and (c) assess the                                  
magnitude of the problem of orphans from                                   
conflict and HIV/AIDS in the DRC, and work to                              
establish a program of national support.                                   
Engage with governments working to promote       Security                  
peace and security throughout the DRC and hold                             
accountable individuals, entities, and                                     
countries working to destabilize the country.                              
Promote appropriate use of the forests of the    Economic/natural resource 
DRC in a manner that benefits the rural          management                
population in that country that depends on the                             
forests for their livelihoods and protects                                 
national and environmental interests.                                      

^7Exec. Order No. 13413, 71 Fed. Reg. 64105 (Oct. 27, 2006).

Source: GAO analysis of the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion
Act of 2006.

The National Security Council has established an interagency working group
to focus attention on issues affecting the Great Lakes region of central
Africa, which encompasses the DRC. The group meets bimonthly and includes
officials from DOD, State, USAID, and Treasury. Its mission is to
establish a coordinated approach, policies, and actions to address issues
(such as security) in the DRC and other countries in the region.

To ensure that foreign assistance, including assistance provided to the
DRC, is used as effectively as possible to meet broad foreign policy
objectives, the Secretary of State in 2006 appointed a Director of Foreign
Assistance (DFA), who also serves as the Administrator of USAID. The DFA
is charged with

           o developing a coordinated U.S. government foreign assistance
           strategy, including multiyear country-specific assistance
           strategies and annual country-specific assistance operational
           plans;

           o creating and directing consolidated policy, planning, budget,
           and implementation mechanisms and staff functions required to
           provide umbrella leadership to foreign assistance; and

           o providing guidance to foreign assistance delivered through other
           agencies and entities of the U.S. government, including the
           Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Office of the Global AIDS
           Coordinator.
			  
			  U.S. Programs and Activities Support the Act's Policy Objectives

           U.S. programs and activities provide support to the Act's policy
           objectives. Most recently, in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, U.S.
           agencies allocated the largest share of their funds for the DRC to
           programs that supported the Act's humanitarian and social
           development goals. Although the U.S. government has not acted on
           the Act's policy objective that it bilaterally urge nations
           contributing UN peacekeepers to prosecute abusive peacekeeping
           troops, it has taken other steps to address this objective.
			  
			  U.S. Funding for the DRC

           Recent U.S. funding for the DRC has focused primarily on the Act's
           humanitarian and development goals.^8 Seven U.S. agencies
           allocated about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for aid to the
           DRC in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, as shown in table
           2.^9

^8See appendix II for further details.

Table 2: U.S. Agencies' Funding Allocations for the DRC by Category

Dollars in millions                                                        
Fiscal                                                                     
year   Humanitarian Social development Economic Governance Security  Total 
2006          $85.3              $51.9  $66.4^a       $7.5     $6.9 $217.9 
2007           88.4               58.2      9.6       14.5     10.8 $181.5 
Total        $173.7             $110.1    $76.0      $22.1    $17.7 $399.4 

Source: GAO analysis of executive branch data.

Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding.

aIncludes $44.6 million allocated by the Treasury to help address costs of
DRC debt relief. The DRC has received interim debt relief but must meet
additional criteria before its debt is fully reduced.

As shown in figure 2, most of these funds were allocated by State and
USAID.

^9We did not determine the extent to which the agencies have obligated and
expended the funds they allocated. In addition to providing the funding
shown, the United States also contributed funds to international
organizations that conducted activities in the DRC during 2006 and 2007.
For example, it contributed about $236 million and $300 million in fiscal
years 2006 and 2007, respectively, for the support of UN peacekeeping
activities in the DRC. As one of the largest donors to the DRC, the World
Bank has funded a wide range of programs--including macroeconomic
management, infrastructure, and disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration of militia fighters--that have totaled around $366 million
in fiscal year 2006 and $180 million in fiscal year 2007. The United
States provides around 14 percent of donor funds to the World Bank for
such operations. It is also the largest contributor to the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which is active in the DRC.

Figure 2: Allocation of U.S. Funding for the DRC by Agency, Fiscal Years
2006-2007

The agencies allocated about 70 percent of these funds for programs that
would support the Act's emergency humanitarian and social development
objectives (see fig. 3).^10 They allocated about 30 percent of the funds
for programs and activities that would support the Act's economic,
governance, and security objectives.^11

^10According to HHS, its Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
obligates funds for projects that are part of research that can be
conducted in different countries, rather than allocating funds by country.
Our summary figures incorporate total Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention funding for the DRC for the 2 years depicted.

Figure 3: Allocation of U.S. Funding for the DRC by Category, Fiscal Years
2006-2007

Humanitarian Assistance

USAID and State have provided humanitarian assistance to help the DRC meet
the basic needs of its citizens and vulnerable populations. The following
examples illustrate these efforts.

           o USAID has provided emergency food assistance to the DRC,
           primarily through the UN World Food Program and Food for the
           Hungry International. USAID-funded emergency food assistance
           included general distribution of food to internally displaced
           persons who need food aid; vulnerable groups such as people
           infected with, and orphans and widows affected by, HIV/AIDS; and
           victims of sexual abuse by soldiers. USAID emergency assistance
           also supported road rehabilitation and bridge reconstruction
           projects; schools; and the socioeconomic reintegration of ex-child
           soldiers, adult combatants, and their families. In addition, USAID
           provided emergency supplies, health care, nutrition programs,
           water and sanitation improvements, food, and agriculture
           assistance to vulnerable populations in the DRC--including
           malnourished children, war-affected populations, internally
           displaced people, and formerly displaced households--primarily
           through NGOs. Recent program activities have focused on road
           rehabilitation; primary health care and specialized care services
           to malnourished children in certain eastern regions; medical care,
           treatment, and confidential counseling to victims of sexual and
           gender-based violence; and access to water and sanitation at
           health facilities.
			  
^11For fiscal year 2008, State and USAID requested $80.2 million for the
DRC, including $39.8 million for social development assistance, $20.9
million for governance assistance, $11 million for economic development
assistance, and $8.6 million for peace and security assistance. The
agencies have not yet allocated 2008 funding for emergency humanitarian
assistance. The Treasury requested $178.3 million in fiscal year 2008
funds in the event that the DRC qualifies for debt relief. OPIC has
approved $400 million in financing and insurance for a U.S. company to
invest in the DRC's mining sector and will seek fiscal year 2008 funding
to support this project.

           Social Development Assistance

           o State has provided humanitarian assistance to help repatriate,
           integrate, and resettle refugees in the DRC. It has also helped
           fund refugees' food needs and supported mental health assistance
           and market access programs in areas of high refugee return. In
           fiscal year 2007, State supported refugee assistance activities in
           the DRC, which were implemented primarily by the UN High
           Commissioner on Refugees, other international organizations, and
           NGOs. In addition, State contributed to overall Africa assistance
           programs implemented by the UN High Commissioner on Refugees and
           the International Committee of the Red Cross, which help support
           refugees and conflict victims in central Africa.

           USAID, HHS, and DOL allocated funds to support the Act's social
           development and rehabilitation objectives. The following examples
           illustrate these efforts.

           o USAID has worked through NGOs to improve education, health care,
           and family planning. It has implemented activities to reduce
           abandonment of children; provide psychosocial support, medical
           assistance, and reintegration support to survivors of sexual and
           gender-based violence in the eastern DRC; train teachers; and
           increase access to education for vulnerable children. USAID also
           funds efforts to train medical staff and nurses in the management
           of primary health care, distribute bed nets to prevent the spread
           of malaria and polio, provide family planning services, and
           support voluntary counseling and testing centers for HIV/AIDS.

           o HHS has allocated funds for immunization against, and the
           surveillance and control of, infectious diseases such as polio,
           measles, and HIV/AIDS. HHS's Centers for Disease Control and
           Prevention has also sought to strengthen the capacity of public
           health personnel, promote infrastructure development and improve
           the quality of clinical laboratories through grants and
           cooperative agreements. The Centers for Disease Control and
           Prevention have also (1) provided ongoing technical, programmatic,
           and funding support through the World Health Organization and the
           UN Children's Fund for the DRC immunization program with an
           emphasis on polio eradication and measles mortality reduction, and
           (2) assisted the World Health Organization with a recent outbreak
           of Ebola virus. In addition, HHS's National Institutes of Health
           has granted funds to U.S. academic institutions to conduct basic
           and clinical biomedical research, which involves collaboration
           with research partners in the DRC.

           o DOL has allocated funds to address children's involvement in
           mining and related services, small-scale commerce, child
           soldiering, and other forms of child labor in the DRC. This effort
           would build on a recently completed project that assisted a small
           number of former child soldiers by fostering their withdrawal from
           militias and discouraging their reenlistment.
			  
			  Economic and Natural Resource Management Assistance

           The Treasury, USAID, State, and USDA have provided support for the
           Act's economic objectives. The following examples illustrate these
           efforts.

           o The Treasury has worked with the World Bank and the IMF to
           relieve the DRC of some of its foreign debt. The United States
           provided the DRC with interim debt relief (primarily through
           reduced interest payments) in fiscal years 2005 through 2007,
           following the DRC's admittance into the HIPC debt relief program.
           Once the DRC qualifies for the completion of its HIPC debt relief,
           Treasury plans to pay the budgetary costs of full U.S. bilateral
           debt relief to the DRC ($1.3 billion) with $44.6 million allocated
           in fiscal year 2006, about $80 million in previously appropriated
           funds, and about $178 million in fiscal year 2008 funds.^12

           o USAID has allocated funds to support sustainable natural
           resource management, forest protection, and biodiversity in the
           DRC through the Central African Regional Program for the
           Environment. The program is a 20-year regional initiative that
           aims to reduce deforestation and loss of biological diversity in
           the DRC and its eastern neighbors. A component of the
           U.S.-sponsored Congo Basin Forest Partnership, the program also
           promotes forest-based livelihoods in the DRC. USAID has also
           allocated funds to encourage productivity in the agricultural,
           private, and small enterprise sectors and to support agriculture
           development. In addition, USAID's Global Development Alliance
           program works with private companies to promote transparent mining
           practices and reinvestment into DRC mining communities.
			  
^12When the DRC reaches its HIPC completion point, debt relief from all
donors is expected to lower current levels of DRC external debt by about
$6.3 billion. The Treasury estimates that the budgetary cost of reducing
the $1.3 billion of DRC bilateral debt owed to the United States is about
$300 million, based on the Office of Management and Budget's Circular
Number A-11. This estimate includes factors such as the likelihood of
default, the interest rate, and the maturity period. An interagency
country risk assessment is used to calculate the DRC's probability of loan
default.

           o State has supported efforts to promote transparency in the
           natural resource sector by serving as the U.S. representative to
           the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme which deals with rough
           diamond trade,^13 and the Extractive Industries Transparency
           Initiative (EITI).^14

           o USDA has allocated funds to improve agricultural productivity,
           increase rural market development, provide credit for agribusiness
           and rural infrastructure, and increase access to potable water and
           water for irrigation in the DRC.
			  
			  Governance Assistance

           USAID and State have allocated funds for programs that support the
           Act's governance objectives. The following examples illustrate
           such assistance.

           o USAID has allocated funds to organize itinerant court sessions
           in relatively inaccessible parts of the DRC. These sessions are
           intended to bring justice institutions closer to citizens,
           facilitate greater access to justice for vulnerable people, and
           provide quality legal assistance to the population. It has also
           supported an NGO's establishment of democracy resource centers to
           assist political party leaders, civic activists, elected local and
           national officials, and government institutions in consolidating
           good governance and democracy. To promote judicial independence,
           USAID has supported an NGO's efforts to (1) foster the adoption
           and implementation of priority improvements to the DRC's legal
           framework, including laws on sexual violence and the rights of
           women, and (2) provide legal assistance activities for victims of
           sexual and gender-based violence.

^13The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme aims to control the
international rough diamond trade and assure customers that diamonds
purchased have not helped to finance violent conflicts.

^14Under EITI, countries publish and verify payments and government
revenues in the natural resource sector.

           o State allocated funds for more than 30 programs by the National
           Endowment for Democracy during 2006. Several of these programs
           were aimed at informing women of their rights, addressing issues
           of abuse and corruption, and promoting political participation.
           For example, the endowment used State funds to support the
           political role of women in one eastern province before and after
           the elections, to call attention to the continued victimization of
           women in eastern Congo, and to visit detention centers throughout
           the DRC to facilitate release of illegally detained men and women.
			  
			  Security Assistance

           State, USAID, and DOD programs and activities have provided
           support for most of the Act's security-related policy objectives.
           The following examples illustrate these efforts.

           o State has facilitated a multinational forum, the Tripartite Plus
           Commission, to encourage other nations to play a constructive role
           in the DRC's security affairs. The commission provides a forum for
           the DRC and the nations on its troubled eastern border--Uganda,
           Rwanda, and Burundi--to discuss regional security issues,
           including militias operating illegally in the eastern DRC. State
           has also supported a center where these nations can share
           intelligence regarding militias.

           o USAID has launched programs to promote the reintegration of some
           former fighters into Congolese society. The programs are intended
           to provide the former fighters incentives to remain in civilian
           society.

           o State is refurbishing the DRC's military officer training school
           and training multiple levels of the military, including brigade-
           and battalion-staff level officers, on military justice reform,
           civil-military relations, and other issues of concern. According
           to State officials, State funds will be used for an initial DOD
           assessment of the military justice sector to identify needs to be
           addressed with future funds. State may also use these funds to
           help train DRC personnel to combat armed fighters in the eastern
           regions of the DRC.

           o Key State senior-level and program officials informed us that
           they were unaware of any U.S. efforts to bilaterally urge nations
           contributing UN peacekeeping troops to take steps to help those
           nations prosecute any of their peacekeeping troops who may commit
           abuses in the DRC.^15 State officials informed us that the United
           States has encouraged the UN to take actions to guard against
           further abuses of DRC citizens by UN peacekeepers. The United
           States also supports the Global Peace Operations Initiative, a
           5-year program to train and, as appropriate, equip at least 75,000
           peacekeepers worldwide with a focus on African nations.
			  
			  Major Challenges in the DRC Impede Efforts to Achieve the Act's
			  Policy Objectives

           U.S., NGO, and other officials and experts identified several
           major challenges that impede U.S. efforts to achieve the Act's
           policy objectives. These challenges include (1) the unstable
           security situation, (2) weak governance and widespread corruption,
           (3) mismanagement of natural resources, and (4) lack of basic
           infrastructure.^16 Because these challenges are interrelated, they
           negatively impact progress in multiple areas.
			  
			  Unstable Security Situation

           The DRC's weak and abusive security forces have been unable to
           quell continuing militia activities in the DRC's eastern regions,
           where security grew worse during 2007. During 2006 and 2007,
           reports by several organizations described the security challenge
           in the DRC.

           o According to a report by the International Crisis Group,^17
           militias control large portions of the eastern regions of the DRC.
           The report concludes that the DRC's security forces are poorly
           disciplined, ill equipped, and the worst abusers of human rights
           in the DRC.
			  
^15Section 102(12) of the Act states that U.S. policy is to work
aggressively on a bilateral basis to urge governments of countries
contributing troops to the United Nations peacekeeping force in the DRC to
enact and enforce laws on trafficking in persons and sexual abuse that
meet international standards, promote codes of conduct for troops serving
as part of UN peacekeeping missions, and immediately investigate and
punish citizens responsible for abuses in the DRC.

^16In addition to the challenges in the DRC described in this section of
our report, the NGO round table also identified challenges outside of the
DRC relating to the level of U.S. engagement and commitment in the DRC, as
well as the prioritization of U.S. resources and the lack of demonstrated
results.

^17International Crisis Group, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa
Report 128 (Kinshasa and Brussels, July 5, 2007).
			  
           o According to a UN report,^18 the DRC army is responsible for 40
           percent of recently reported human rights violations--including
           rapes, mass killings of civilians, and summary executions--and DRC
           police and other security forces have killed and tortured
           civilians with total impunity. The report states that the DRC has
           generally promoted, rather than investigated and prosecuted, army
           officers suspected of such abuses.

           o According to a report by Amnesty International,^19 women have
           been raped in large numbers by government and other armed forces
           throughout the DRC.

           o According to State, government and other armed forces in the DRC
           have committed a wide range of human rights abuses, including
           forcing children into the security forces.^20

           The DRC's unstable security situation has worsened the DRC's
           humanitarian and social problems and impeded efforts to address
           these problems, according to NGO representatives, agency
           officials, and other sources.

           o The renewed conflict has prompted increased NGO and UN
           assistance programs, including those aimed at addressing basic
           needs and psychosocial, legal, and socioeconomic support for
           victims of sexual and gender-based violence. NGOs have noted that
           active combatants typically commit crimes of sexual violence
           against women, with 4,500 sexual violence cases reported in the
           first 6 months of 2007 alone.^21

           o The lack of security in the DRC has impeded efforts to address
           humanitarian needs as well as efforts aimed at promoting social
           development. U.S. agency officials informed us that the conflict
           has forced them to curtail some emergency assistance programs, and
           NGOs implementing development and humanitarian assistance
           activities in the DRC have reported that the lack of security has
           resulted in attacks on their staff or led them to suspend site
           visits and cancel and reschedule work. The UN has also stated that
           although access to displaced populations has improved somewhat in
           a few areas, in general it remains difficult because of the lack
           of security.
			  
^18Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, MONUC Human Rights
Division, The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) during the period of July to December 2006 (Feb. 8, 2007).

^19Amnesty International, Report 2007--The State of The World's Human
Rights (see [29]http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/download-the-report ).

^20State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, D.C., March 6, 2007).

^21One UN representative noted that the real number of sexual violence
cases is many times higher, as most victims live in inaccessible areas,
are afraid to report the attacks, or did not survive them.			  

           o The DRC's unstable security situation has negatively affected
           the country's economic potential by discouraging investment, which
           in turn could worsen security through renewed conflict. DRC donors
           and the IMF agree that improved security in the DRC is necessary
           to strengthen the economy. Research on the security of property
           rights confirms this view. World Bank research has also found that
           a lack of economic growth increases a postconflict nation's
           likelihood of falling back into conflict.^22 Other researchers
           have estimated that a democratic nation is roughly 10 times more
           likely to be overthrown if its economy experiences negative growth
           2 years in a row.^23
			  
			  Weak Governance and Corruption

           By many accounts, corruption in the DRC is widespread, civil
           liberties are limited, and the DRC's governance institutions have
           been severely damaged.

           o State has described corruption in the DRC as "pervasive." In
           2007, an international donor study concluded that corruption in
           the DRC "remains widespread and is taking a heavy toll on public
           service capacity to deliver key services." Transparency
           International's 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index identifies the
           DRC as one of the 10th most corrupt countries in the world.^24

^22The DRC country assistance framework document notes that an additional
2 percent of economic growth sustained over 10 years could reduce the risk
of renewed civil war by about one-third. See also Paul Collier and Anke
Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, vol.
56 (2004).

^23Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando
Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being
in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University
Press, 2000).

^24The DRC, with three other countries, has a score of 1.9 on the
corruption index's 10-point scale, in which a score of zero would be given
for a highly corrupt state and 10 would be given for a "clean" state. The
index includes 179 nations (see
[30]http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007
).

           o Freedom House in 2007 continued to rate the DRC as "Not Free"
           and scored it near the bottom of its scales for civil liberties
           and political freedom.^25 USAID has pointed to limited
           opportunities for Congolese women to participate in the DRC's
           governance.

           o The World Bank has reported that the DRC's judicial system is
           one of the world's six weakest in terms of enforcing commercial
           contracts.

           o The State Department has described significant failures in the
           criminal justice system, as well as "harsh and life-threatening"
           prison conditions.

           Historically weak governance and corruption in the DRC have
           hindered efforts to reform the security sector and hold human
           rights violators accountable.

           o According to U.S. officials, the lack of a DRC government office
           with clear authority on security issues has impeded efforts to
           promote security sector reform. The officials informed us that the
           absence of clear authority over security sector issues has
           hindered efforts to determine both the DRC government's priorities
           for security sector reform and the most effective role for
           international donors in promoting security sector reform.

           o According to the country assistance framework, the DRC has not
           established a clear and functioning payroll system for its armed
           forces. One NGO reported that much of the $8 million the DRC paid
           in 2005 for its soldiers' salaries was "diverted" and the
           remainder rarely reached soldiers in a timely manner. NGOs and
           media sources have reported that soldiers have committed human
           rights abuses as a result. The country assistance framework states
           that the DRC Ministry of Defense controls only a small number of
           budget items and is not accountable for the defense budget's use.

           o According to one NGO report,^26 efforts to reform the command
           structure, size, and control of the security forces have been
           frustrated by political manipulation, pervasive corruption, and a
           failure to hold officials accountable. A U.S. State Department
           official told us that efforts to reform the DRC's police may be
           impeded by lack of support from DRC institutions that suffer from
           corruption and have no interest in reform.

^25This index may be viewed at
[31]http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=365&year=2007 .

^26International Crisis Group, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa
Report 128 (Kinshasa and Brussels, July 5, 2007).

           o According to NGO representatives, the lack of an effective
           judiciary impedes efforts to hold human rights violators
           accountable for their actions, which in turn promotes a "culture
           of impunity." One NGO reported that a severe shortage of DRC
           judicial personnel--particularly in the eastern portion of the
           nation--prevents courts from hearing cases, public prosecutor
           offices from conducting investigations, and prisons from
           operating. Another NGO stated that the judiciary is subject to
           corruption and manipulation by both official and unofficial
           actors. As a result, courts have recently failed to hold
           individuals accountable for human rights violations, including a
           massacre of more than 70 people and the reported rape by police of
           37 women and girls in a village in a western province. A
           representative of one NGO told us that local government officials
           had tortured his organization's grantees in an effort to stop
           their democracy and governance training programs.

           Governance problems have also hindered efforts to implement
           economic reforms required for debt relief and promote economic
           growth.

           o According to Treasury officials and IMF documents, the
           government's lack of commitment to meet certain requirements has
           jeopardized the DRC's ability to receive some interim debt relief,
           qualify for full debt relief, and improve the country's overall
           economic prospects. To receive the estimated $6.3 billion in debt
           relief for which it may qualify under HIPC, the DRC must meet
           various conditions that include satisfactory macroeconomic
           performance under an IMF-supported program, improved public sector
           management, and implementation of structural reforms. Although
           donors had expected the DRC to qualify for full debt relief in
           2006, the government instead has fallen back into arrears and has
           failed to implement needed policies; as a result, IMF has
           suspended its program assistance to the DRC.^27 Although IMF has
           determined that the DRC cannot sustain its current debt levels,
           donors do not expect the DRC to qualify for full debt relief until
           mid-2008.

           o The judiciary's ineffective enforcement of commercial contracts
           in the DRC has likely discouraged private sector investment and
           hence economic growth. The enforcement of contracts, typically a
           responsibility of the judicial system, is important to
           establishing incentives for economic activity. According to the
           World Bank, the DRC's enforcement of contracts is among the
           weakest in the world, such that a company might need to expend
           roughly 150 percent of a typical contract's value to ensure
           enforcement through court proceedings.

^27For example, IMF reports that the DRC made little progress in reforming
the mining sector, public enterprises, the civil service, and the central
bank. The government incurred large budgetary overruns that were monetized
and resulted in a depreciation of the currency. In 2006, the DRC's
currency depreciated 15 percent against the U.S. dollar and inflation rose
above 18 percent.

           Mismanagement of Natural Resources

           International donors, NGOs, and the DRC government have focused on
           improving natural resource management through increased
           transparency and international instruments of enforcement.
           However, owing in part to governance and capacity challenges,
           these efforts have made only limited progress.

           o Until recently, the DRC had not met EITI implementation
           requirements or followed EITI guidelines, according to U.S.
           officials. These officials informed us that the DRC had excluded
           civil society representatives and replaced EITI's Permanent
           Secretary with a new representative. As a result, EITI was
           reviewing the DRC's signatory status, and key donors were
           withdrawing technical assistance. U.S. officials informed us that
           in September 2007, EITI granted the DRC additional time to meet
           threshold criteria to continue participation in the initiative and
           that the DRC subsequently made progress in meeting those criteria.

           o The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has criticized the
           DRC for weak internal controls, customs capacity, and ability to
           track diamonds extracted by large number of self-employed
           miners.^28 State and USAID officials reported that the DRC's
           certification process is failing to capture as much as 50 percent
           of diamonds mined in the DRC.

           o U.S. and NGO officials have expressed concern that the DRC is
           not enforcing a moratorium on forestry concessions instituted in
           May 2002. An NGO reported that after the moratorium took effect,
           the DRC signed 107 of 156 forestry contracts now under review and
           that a third of the contracts involve areas identified for
           conservation. Although the DRC government is reviewing mining and
           forestry concessions signed during the war,^29 U.S. officials told
           us that the DRC is conducting the mining contract review with
           limited transparency. U.S. and NGO officials expressed concern
           that the DRC has not published its terms of reference or all of
           the contracts or clearly defined the role of representatives of
           civil society.
			  
^28These challenges are common to many developing country members. For
further discussion of such challenges, see GAO, International Trade:
Critical Issues Remain in Deterring Conflict Diamond Trade, [32]GAO-02-678
(Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002).

			  Mismanagement of the DRC's natural resources has fueled continued
           conflict and corruption, according to U.S. officials, the UN,
           international donors, and NGOs.

           o The DRC's abundant natural resources are serving as an incentive
           for conflict between neighboring countries' militias and armed
           domestic factions. These groups seek to control specific mining
           sites and illegal trade networks to finance operations and buy
           arms. For example, the UN has reported that profits from Congolese
           coltan have financed a large part of Rwanda's military budget and
           that gold smuggled into Uganda continues to finance militias. Such
           reports are consistent with World Bank research, which commonly
           finds that countries with valuable natural resources have more
           conflict than countries without such resources.^30

           o In addition to fueling conflict, the DRC's abundance of natural
           resources continues to foster corruption as government officials
           use bribery to share in resource profits. For example, NGOs have
           reported that through extensive bribery and corruption in the
           mining sector, exports of large quantities of DRC copper and
           cobalt have been undeclared and that 60 to 80 percent of the DRC's
           2005-2006 customs revenue was embezzled. USAID has also reported
           on the postconflict proliferation of natural resource contracts
           based on joint ventures between the DRC government and private
           partners, who are receiving a disproportionate share of profits.

^29During wartime, the DRC and rebels alike sold advance mineral
extraction rights and forestry concessions to raise money. In June 2005, a
parliamentary commission investigating economic and financial contracts
signed during the war reported to the National Assembly that many mining
contracts signed between 1996 and 2003 were illegal or of limited value to
the DRC's development. Although the commission recommended that some
contracts be rescinded or renegotiated, the DRC government has not fully
acted on this recommendation, and U.S. officials we spoke with were
uncertain about the recommendation's likely impact on reviews of current
contracts.

^30The World Bank's Development Research Group identified the percentage
of a country's gross domestic product that is derived from natural
resource exports as the single most important structural factor associated
with conflict. Specifically, a country's risk of conflict increases to
about 22 percent from about 1 percent if natural resource exports
constitute as much as 33 percent of its gross domestic product. See
Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance"  (2004).

           Lack of Basic Infrastructure

           The DRC lacks many key elements of basic infrastructure, such as
           buildings, equipment, and transportation.

           o The transportation sector is "broken," according to one recent
           international assessment. The DRC has fewer than 1,740 miles of
           paved roads to connect 58 million to 65 million people distributed
           over more than 900,000 square miles.^31 According to a recent
           study prepared by 17 donor nations, no roads link 9 of the DRC's
           10 provincial capitals to the national capital, and no roads link
           the DRC's northern and southern regions or its eastern and western
           regions.

           o About 90 percent of DRC airfields lack paved runways. More air
           crashes have occurred in the DRC since 1945 than in any other
           African state.

           o International observers have reported that the DRC's educational
           and penal infrastructures are dilapidated.

           o An international group of donor nations recently identified
           major deficiencies in electrification, communications, supplies of
           clean water, and credit.

           The DRC's lack of basic infrastructure has hindered progress in
           humanitarian, developmental, and governance programs.

           o U.S. officials told us that the lack of an adequate in-country
           transportation system increases the time required to get supplies
           to those in need. Such problems limit access to vulnerable groups
           and cause delays in providing humanitarian assistance such as food
           aid.^32 NGO and U.S. officials implementing emergency food aid and
           nonemergency food security programs in the DRC have reported that
           excessive delays in delivering assistance are common because of
           the lack of roads linking the DRC's regions and several of its
           major cities and ports. One NGO has reported that it must compete
           with commercial contracts for the limited space on the DRC's
           troubled rail system and that its commodities and equipment are
           often given lower priority.

^31In contrast, neighboring Uganda, with less than 1/11th of the DRC's
land area and about half of its population, has nearly six times as many
miles of paved roads.

^32See GAO, Foreign Assistance: Various Challenges Impede the Efficiency
and Effectiveness of U.S. Food Aid, [33]GAO-07-560 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
13, 2007).

           o U.S. and NGO officials also pointed out that the lack of roads
           in the DRC has increased the expense or difficulty associated with
           their programs, in part because they must increase their reliance
           on air transport.^33 The dearth of accessible roads in the DRC has
           prompted USAID's emergency assistance programs to use some of
           their funds for road rehabilitation programs, to ensure safe and
           reliable routes to reach those in need. The lack of roads and
           other adequate infrastructure also affects private companies
           trying to import and export goods. According to the World Bank's
           Cost of Doing Business survey, DRC's average export costs in 2006,
           at more than $3,100 per container, were the world's third highest.

           o State officials told us that the DRC government needs
           "everything from bricks to paper." A USAID official told us that
           any effort to establish new provincial legislatures would be
           hindered by the lack of buildings to house the legislators or
           "even chairs for them to sit in."

           o An NGO has reported that the DRC judicial system is being
           undermined by destroyed infrastructure, equipment shortages, lack
           of reference texts, and the dearth of roads, which makes some
           areas inaccessible to legal authorities.

           o A 2007 UN report noted that at least 429 detainees (including
           some convicted of human rights violations) had escaped from
           dilapidated prisons over the last 6 months of 2006.^34

           o International donor nations and organizations concluded in their
           assistance framework document that the lack of infrastructure has
           made economic development almost impossible in many areas and may
           stifle the potential for economic growth and private sector
           activity in most DRC provinces.

^33We reported in 2007 that expenditures for food aid
transportation--including in-country delivery and administration--have
been rising throughout the world, in part because of the expensive nature
of logistics in emergency situations. See [34]GAO-07-560 .

^34See Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, MONUC Human
Rights Division, The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) during the period of July to December 2006 (Feb. 8, 2007).

           U.S. Government Has Not Assessed Its Overall Progress toward
			  Achieving the Act's Policy Objectives

           The U.S. government has not established a process to assess
           agencies' overall progress toward achieving the Act's policy
           objectives in the DRC. Although State and the National Security
           Council (NSC) have developed mechanisms to coordinate some of the
           agencies' activities in the DRC, neither mechanism systematically
           assesses overall progress.

           Some of the key agencies involved in the DRC monitor their
           respective programs. For example, USAID's Office of Foreign
           Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has two program officers in the DRC who
           regularly visit project sites and publish quarterly reports on
           OFDA activities. Their partner organizations, or implementers,
           also provide reports and updates on their projects.^35 Similarly,
           USAID officials told us that USAID's Central African Regional
           Program for the Environment program has an extensive and standard
           set of monitoring and evaluation tools built into all cooperative
           agreements with implementers, such as use of satellite imagery and
           remote sensing to analyze change in forest cover, one of the
           principal "high-level" indicators. DOL informed us that it relies
           on midterm and final evaluations, financial and programmatic
           audits, and biannual technical and financial reports to monitor
           its programs.^36 USDA officials informed us that USDA requires its
           partner organizations to conduct assessments of their projects.

           However, the executive branch has not established a governmentwide
           process to use such information for an assessment of overall U.S.
           progress in the DRC. Although State and NSC have developed
           mechanisms aimed at providing some degree of coordination among
           executive branch agencies active in the DRC, neither mechanism
           currently provides for the systematic assessment of overall U.S.
           progress toward its goals.

           o A new State-USAID joint planning process is not yet fully
           operational and does not include other agencies active in the DRC.
           State's newly established Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA),
           who also serves as USAID's administrator, has been charged with
           ensuring that foreign assistance is being used as effectively as
           possible to meet broad U.S. foreign policy objectives. Under DFA's
           guidance, State and USAID have begun to develop a joint planning
           and budgeting process that, according to State officials, may
           eventually assess all U.S. foreign assistance. However, the Office
           of the DFA has yet to complete its plan for operations in the DRC
           during fiscal year 2007, which ended on September 30, 2007. As of
           February 2007, the draft country operations plan was incomplete
           and consisted of a listing of individual programs that did not
           include a systematic assessment of the collective impact of State
           and USAID efforts during fiscal year 2007. In addition, the DFA
           draft plan did not address activities funded by other agencies,
           including DOD, HHS, and the Treasury, although the DFA joint
           planning process may eventually include other agencies to some
           degree. Under the DFA process, the U.S. mission to the DRC has
           prepared a mission strategic plan. However, the mission strategic
           plan pertains only to currently projected fiscal year 2009
           activities and is therefore subject to change before submission of
           the fiscal year 2009 budget request in 2008.^37
			  
^35For example, in one report, OFDA noted that work conditions are
extremely difficult because many health centers are accessible only by
foot and that the local population is often too fearful of attacks by
armed groups operating in the area to make full use of the centers.

^36One recent report noted that continuing or worsening security problems
were hampering the efficiency of a DOL project in the DRC.

           o The NSC interagency group, intended to help coordinate certain
           agencies' activities, does not systematically assess these
           activities and does not include several relevant agencies. The NSC
           group assembles agencies such the Departments of State, Defense,
           and the Treasury to discuss policies and approaches to addressing
           the challenges in the DRC. For example, according to State and NSC
           officials, these discussions often focus on the eastern DRC's
           unstable security. However, NSC and State officials told us that
           the NSC group has not developed systematic tools for assessing the
           impact of all U.S. agencies' efforts to achieve the objectives of
           the Act. Also, the NSC effort has not included key agencies
           involved in the DRC, such as DOL, HHS, or USDA, in its discussions
           of policies and approaches.
			  
			  Conclusions
			  
           The DRC appears to be at a crucial point in its turbulent history.
           After decades of dictatorship and devastating wars with its
           neighbors and internal groups, it has inaugurated its first
           democratically elected government in more than 40 years. However,
           U.S. and NGO officials agree that several interrelated challenges
           continue to pose major impediments to achievement of the Act's
           policy objectives in the DRC. Failure to make near-term progress
           in addressing the DRC's unstable security, rampant corruption,
           economic mismanagement, and lack of needed infrastructure could
           result in further war and instability in a region of importance to
           U.S. national interests.
			  
^37A DFA official informed us in early December 2007 that the draft fiscal
year 2007 operations plan had yet to be finalized. DFA staff provided us
with summary fiscal year 2007 funding data in September 2007 for the
purposes of this report.

           U.S. agencies have initiated a wide range of efforts to help the
           DRC establish and maintain peace and stability. However, because
           the U.S. government has not established a process to
           systematically assess its overall progress in the DRC, it cannot
           be fully assured that it has allocated these resources in the most
           effective manner. For example, a systematic process for assessing
           governmentwide progress would allow the United States to determine
           whether its allocations, which currently emphasize humanitarian
           aid, should focus more on the DRC's unstable security, which
           worsens the country's other problems and impedes the delivery of
           U.S. assistance. Similarly, such a process could give the U.S.
           government greater assurance that it has identified additional
           bilateral or multilateral measures that may be needed to achieve
           the Act's objectives. Given the DRC's significance to the
           stability of Africa, the scope, complexity, and interrelated
           nature of its urgent problems warrant an effective governmentwide
           response.
			  
			  Recommendation for Executive Action

           To provide a basis for informed decisions regarding U.S.
           allocations for assistance in the DRC as well as any needed
           bilateral or multilateral actions, we recommend that the Secretary
           of State, through the Director of Foreign Assistance, work with
           the heads of the other U.S. agencies implementing programs in the
           DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the U.S.
           government's overall progress toward achieving the Act's
           objectives.
			  
			  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

           We requested comments on a draft of this report from the
           Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Labor, Health and Human
           Services, State, and the Treasury. We also requested comments from
           the Administrator of USAID and from the Director of Congressional
           Relations of OPIC.

           We received written comments from State, which are reprinted in
           appendix III. In its comments, State endorsed our recommendation.
           It further noted that it believed that the recommendation would be
           met as DFA's joint planning and budgeting processes are extended
           to include all U.S. agencies engaged in the DRC. State also
           provided several other comments, for example, expressing concerns
           regarding the span of years addressed in our report and what it
           characterized as a lack of historical context. We addressed
           State's comments as appropriate in this report.

           We also received technical comments on our draft report from DOD,
           HHS, DOL, the Treasury, and USAID. We have incorporated these
           comments into our report, as appropriate.

           We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
           committees, the Secretary of State, and other interested parties.
           We will also make copies available to others on request. In
           addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
           site at [22]http://www.gao.gov .

           If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
           contact me at (202) 512-3149 or [email protected]. Contact points
           for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
           be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors are
           listed in appendix IV.

           David Gootnick
			  Director, International Affairs and Trade
			  
			  Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

           Our objectives were to identify (1) U.S. programs in the
           Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), (2) major impediments
           hindering accomplishment of the policy objectives of the DRC
           Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act),
           and (3) U.S. government efforts to assess progress toward
           accomplishing the Act's policy objectives. Because the Act
           directed us to review actions taken by U.S. agencies to achieve
           its objectives, we focused on the fiscal year in which the Act was
           enacted, and also considered the fiscal year before its enactment
           to provide context.

           To identify U.S. programs in the DRC, we interviewed officials
           from key U.S. agencies who have programs in the DRC. These
           agencies included the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense
           (DOD), Labor (DOL), Health and Human Services (HHS), State, and
           the Treasury (Treasury); the Overseas Private Investment
           Corporation (OPIC); and the U.S. Agency for International
           Development (USAID). We also reviewed program documents, budget
           data, and policy statements. We identified the amount of funding
           each agency had allocated for its DRC programs in fiscal years
           2006 and 2007 by analyzing official agency submissions to Congress
           and related documents. We did not attempt to determine the extent
           to which each agency had obligated or expended the funds it had
           allocated.

           To determine the major impediments hindering accomplishment of the
           Act's policy objectives, we reviewed a range of documents, plans,
           and assessments provided to us by U.S. agencies with programs in
           the DRC. We also interviewed officials from each of these
           agencies. We reviewed economic literature and recent reports,
           program assessments, studies, and papers written by
           nongovernmental organizations, international organizations,
           multilateral banks, and think tanks. To discuss key challenges to
           addressing the Act's policy objectives, we conducted a round-table
           session with a nonprobability sample of 11 nongovernmental
           organizations that offer a broad range of experience and expertise
           implementing programs and projects in the DRC. For example, we
           included panelists from organizations that focus on humanitarian,
           democracy, and economic development issues. Additionally, we
           interviewed representatives from other organizations with
           experience in the DRC. Based on all of these responses, we
           compared and contrasted the challenges identified to determine
           common themes and focused on challenges that were internal to the
           DRC. We considered all of these views as we finalized our analysis
           of these challenges. We defined challenges as factors that are
           internal to the DRC--that is, they represent impediments to the
           United States and other donors that are providing assistance
           intended to improve the situation in that country.

           To examine U.S. efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing
           the Act's policy objectives, we identified U.S. interagency
           assessments, reports, and plans pertaining to programs in the DRC.
           We also interviewed U.S. agency officials and a cognizant official
           of the National Security Council. Although we did not travel to
           the DRC, we conducted several telephone interviews with U.S.
           embassy and USAID mission staff located in the DRC.

           We conducted our work from May 2007 to December 2007 in accordance
           with generally accepted government auditing standards.
			  
			  Appendix II: Examples of Programs by Policy Objective Category

                                                               Total category 
                    Examples of                                funding,fiscal 
                    agencies                                  years 2006-2007 
Policy objective active in     Examples of programs           (millions of 
category         each category pertaining to each category        dollars) 
Humanitarian     USAID,        Provision of the following           $173.7 
                                  to vulnerable populations:                  
                    State                                                     
                                     o emergency supplies                     
                                     o health care                            
                                     o nutrition programs                     
                                     o water and sanitation                   
                                     improvements                             
                                     o food and agriculture                   
                                     assistance                               
Social           USAID,           o Psychosocial support,           $110.1 
development                       medical assistance, and                  
                    HHS,             reintegration support to                 
                                     survivors of sexual and                  
                    DOL,             gender-based violence                    
                                     o Immunization against                   
                    DOD              infectious diseases                      
                                     (e.g., polio and                         
                                     measles)                                 
                                     o Address children's                     
                                     involvement in mining                    
                                     and related services,                    
                                     small-scale commerce,                    
                                     child soldiering, and                    
                                     other forms of child                     
                                     labor                                    
Governance       State,           o Establishment of                 $22.1 
                                     democracy resource                       
                    USAID            centers                                  
                                     o Legal assistance                       
                                     o Support for promoting                  
                                     political participation                  
Economic         Treasury,        o Debt relief                        $76 
/natural                          o Support for the                        
resource         USAID,           Central African Regional                 
management                        Program for the                          
                    USDA             Environment                              
                                     o Agricultural                           
                                     development assistance                   
Security         State,           o Refurbishment of a               $17.7 
                                     military officer                         
                    DOD              training school                          
                                     o Training brigade- and                  
                                     battalion-staff level                    
                                     officers on military                     
                                     justice reform,                          
                                     civil-military                           
                                     relations, and other                     
                                     issues.                                  
                                     o Support for Tripartite                 
                                     Plus Commission   

           Source: GAO analysis of the Act and executive branch data.
			  
			  Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
			  
			  Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  GAO Contact
			  			  
           David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or [email protected]
			  
			  Staff Acknowledgments

           In addition to the contact named above, Zina Merritt (Assistant
           Director), Pierre Toureille, Kristy Kennedy, Kendall Schaefer,
           Martin De Alteriis, Michael Hoffman, Reid Lowe, and Farhanaz
           Kermalli made key contributions to this report. Grace Lui provided
           technical assistance.
			  
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(320490)

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on [35]GAO-08-188 .

For more information, contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [36]GAO-08-188 , a report to Congress

December 2007

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Systematic Assessment Is Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward
U.S. Policy Objectives

In enacting the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Relief, Security,
and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), Congress established 15
U.S. policy objectives to address the DRC's humanitarian, development,
economic and natural resource, governance, and security issues and
mandated that GAO review actions taken by U.S. agencies to achieve these
objectives. In this report, GAO identifies (1) U.S. programs and
activities that support the Act's objectives, (2) major challenges
hindering the accomplishment of the objectives, and (3) U.S. efforts to
assess progress toward the objectives. GAO obtained and analyzed agencies'
program documents and met with officials of agencies and nongovernmental
organizations (NGO) active in the DRC.

[37]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, through the Director of
Foreign Assistance, work with the heads of the other U.S. agencies
implementing programs in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically
assessing the extent to which the U.S. government is making progress in
achieving the Act's policy objectives. The Department of State endorsed
our recommendation. Several U.S. agencies provided technical comments that
were incorporated, as appropriate.

U.S. programs and activities support the Act's policy objectives. In
fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, the Departments of Agriculture,
Defense, Health and Human Services, State, and the Treasury and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated $217.9 million and
$181.5 million for the DRC. About 70 percent of the funds were allocated
for programs that support the Act's humanitarian and social development
objectives, while the remainder was allocated for programs and activities
that support the Act's economic, governance, and security objectives.
Although U.S. agencies have not acted on the Act's objective of
bilaterally urging nations contributing peacekeeping troops to prosecute
abusive peacekeepers, U.S. multilateral actions address this issue.

The DRC's unstable security situation, weak governance, mismanagement of
its vast natural resources, and lack of infrastructure are major
interrelated challenges that impede efforts to achieve the Act's policy
objectives. For example, the unstable security situation in the eastern
DRC has worsened humanitarian and social problems and forced U.S. and NGO
staff to curtail some efforts. The lack of roads has prevented deliveries
of needed aid. DRC's weak governance structures prevent the country from
meeting the requirements for debt relief and discourage private-sector
investment, thus hindering economic growth.

The U.S. government has not established a process for systematically
assessing its progress toward achieving the Act's policy objectives. While
some U.S. agencies collect information about their respective activities
in the DRC, no mechanism exists for assessing overall progress. State and
USAID are developing a joint planning and budgeting process that may
eventually assess all U.S. foreign assistance. However, State's Director
of Foreign Assistance has yet to complete the fiscal year 2007 DRC
operations plan, which does not include a comprehensive assessment of the
collective impact of State and USAID programs and does not address
activities funded by other agencies. While a National Security
Council-sponsored interagency group discusses DRC policies and helps
coordinate some activities, it does not include several relevant agencies
and, according to key officials, does not systematically assess progress
in the DRC.

References

Visible links
  22. http://www.gao.gov/
  23. http://www.gao.gov/
  24. http://www.gao.gov/
  25. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  26.mailto:[email protected]
  27.mailto:[email protected]
  28.mailto:[email protected]
  29. http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/download-the-report
  30. http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007
  31. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=365&year=2007
  32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-678
  33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-560
  34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-560
  35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-188
  36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-188
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