Los Alamos National Laboratory: Information on Security of
Classified Data, Nuclear Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker
Safety, and Project Management Weaknesses (10-JAN-08,
GAO-08-173R).
The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), which is operated by
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), is
responsible for, among other things, designing nuclear weapons.
Over the past decade, we have documented numerous security,
safety, and project management weaknesses at NNSA's nuclear
weapons complex, including LANL. In particular, LANL has
experienced a series of high-profile security incidents that have
drawn attention to the laboratory's inability to account for and
control classified information and maintain a safe work
environment. In July 2004, LANL's director declared a
suspension--or stand-down--of laboratory operations to address
immediate concerns, including the loss of classified computer
disks. During the stand-down, laboratory teams identified more
than 3,400 security and safety issues. As a result of systemic
management concerns, and the fact that the laboratory
contractor--the University of California--did not adequately
address these problems, the Department of Energy (DOE) decided in
2003 to allow other organizations to compete for the management
contract at LANL. The University of California, which had been
the exclusive management and operating contractor since the
1940s, was replaced in June 2006 by Los Alamos National Security,
LLC, (LANS). LANS is a consortium of contractors that includes
Bechtel National, Inc.; the University of California; BWX
Technologies, Inc.; and the Washington Group International, Inc.
In this context, Congress asked us to provide information
detailing recent security, safety, and management problems at
LANL. We provided Congressional staffs with information on these
issues. This report summarizes and formally transmits the
information provided to Congressional staffs. As requested, this
report provides information on (1) security incidents that
compromised or potentially compromised classified information,
(2) incidents involving the loss of or failure to properly
account for special nuclear material (highly enriched uranium or
plutonium) and radiological material, (3) nuclear safety concerns
at the laboratory, (4) safety accidents involving LANL employees
or contractor personnel, and (5) project management weaknesses
that may have resulted in significant cost overruns.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-173R
ACCNO: A79552
TITLE: Los Alamos National Laboratory: Information on Security
of Classified Data, Nuclear Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker
Safety, and Project Management Weaknesses
DATE: 01/10/2008
SUBJECT: Classified information
Cost overruns
Information security
Laboratory safety
Nuclear facilities
Nuclear facility safety
Nuclear facility security
Nuclear materials
Nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapons plant safety
Nuclear weapons plant security
Nuclear weapons plants
Program management
Radiation safety
Safety regulation
Safety standards
Plutonium
Uranium
Occupational safety
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-08-173R
* [1]PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf
* [2]GAO's Mission
* [3]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [4]Order by Mail or Phone
* [5]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [6]Congressional Relations
* [7]Public Affairs
January 10, 2008
The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky
Chairman
The Honorable David L. Hobson
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Subject: Los Alamos National Laboratory: Information on Security of
Classified Data, Nuclear Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker Safety, and
Project Management Weaknesses
The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),^1 which is operated by the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),^2 is responsible for,
among other things, designing nuclear weapons. Over the past decade, we
have documented numerous security, safety, and project management
weaknesses at NNSA's nuclear weapons complex, including LANL. In
particular, LANL has experienced a series of high-profile security
incidents that have drawn attention to the laboratory's inability to
account for and control classified information and maintain a safe work
environment.
In July 2004, LANL's director declared a suspension--or stand-down--of
laboratory operations to address immediate concerns, including the loss of
classified computer disks. During the stand-down, laboratory teams
identified more than 3,400 security and safety issues.
As a result of systemic management concerns, and the fact that the
laboratory contractor--the University of California--did not adequately
address these problems, the Department of Energy (DOE) decided in 2003 to
allow other organizations to compete for the management contract at LANL.
The University of California, which had been the exclusive management and
operating contractor since the 1940s, was replaced in June 2006 by Los
Alamos National Security, LLC, (LANS). LANS is a consortium of contractors
that includes Bechtel National, Inc.; the University of California; BWX
Technologies, Inc.; and the Washington Group International, Inc.
^1The laboratory operates and manages numerous nuclear facilities and
operations. Critical activities include plutonium, uranium, and tritium
processing; research and development operations with special nuclear
material; high-energy radiography; radiation measurement; packaging of
nuclear materials; and radioactive and hazardous waste management. The
laboratory covers 40 square miles, including 2,700 buildings covering an
area of 9.4 million square feet, and employs more than 12,000 personnel.
It has an annual operating budget of approximately $2 billion.
^2NNSA was established in 2000 in response to management difficulties with
the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons program. These difficulties
included security problems at the department's national laboratories and
significant cost overruns in the management of projects. NNSA is a
separately organized agency within the department with responsibility for
the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors
programs.
In this context, you asked us to provide information detailing recent
security, safety, and management problems at LANL. We provided your staffs
with information on these issues. This report summarizes and formally
transmits the information provided to your staffs (see enc. I). As
requested, this report provides information on (1) security incidents that
compromised or potentially compromised classified information, (2)
incidents involving the loss of or failure to properly account for special
nuclear material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) and radiological
material, (3) nuclear safety concerns at the laboratory, (4) safety
accidents involving LANL employees or contractor personnel, and (5)
project management weaknesses that may have resulted in significant cost
overruns.
To document security incidents relating to classified information, we
obtained and analyzed data from LANL's Office of Safeguards and Security
and DOE's Incident Tracking and Analysis Capability (ITAC) database. We
relied on security incident data provided by ITAC because it is DOE's
primary repository for tracking security incidents. To assess the
reliability of these data, we interviewed DOE security officials
responsible for compiling these data and performed reasonableness checks
on the data. Regarding incidents involving the loss of or failure to
properly account for special nuclear or radiological material, we met with
departmental program officials, analyzed data from ITAC, and obtained and
analyzed reports on material control and accountability from DOE's Office
of Independent Oversight and the DOE Inspector General. Regarding nuclear
safety concerns, we obtained information from DOE and LANL, and
interviewed Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety Board)
representatives at Los Alamos. Regarding safety accidents, we obtained and
analyzed accident investigation reports from DOE's Office of Health,
Safety and Security and the Los Alamos Site Office,^3 including federal
and contractor-led investigations from October 1, 2002, through June 30,
2007. In addition, we confirmed with DOE officials that we had obtained
the complete list of accident investigations conducted during this period.
To document project management weaknesses that resulted in significant
cost overruns, we reviewed pertinent project information and interviewed
project management officials at DOE headquarters and at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL). We also reviewed contract requirements and LANL's
annual performance appraisals for fiscal years 2003 through 2006. To
ensure consistency and comparability of the data, we obtained and analyzed
information, to the extent possible, from October 1, 2002, through June
30, 2007. We determined that the data we obtained were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted this performance
audit from August 2007 through January 2008 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our
audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
^3The Los Alamos Site Office is responsible for administering LANL's
contract, providing oversight, and managing federal activities.
In summary, LANL experienced 57 reported security incidents involving the
compromise or potential compromise of classified information from October
1, 2002, through June 30, 2007, according to DOE's ITAC database.
Thirty-seven (or 65 percent) of these reported incidents posed the most
serious threat to U.S. national security interests.^4 Of the remaining 20
incidents, 9 involved the confirmed or suspected unauthorized disclosure
of secret information, which posed a significant threat to U.S. national
security interests. The remaining 11 reported security incidents involved
the confirmed or suspected unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information, which posed threats to DOE security interests. Examples of
the most serious types of security incidents reported by DOE include the
following:
o LANL could not account for nine classified removable electronic
media items, including data disks, during the relocation of these
items to a different on-site facility. DOE concluded that these
items were likely destroyed prior to their relocation (November
2003).
o A law enforcement search of a LANL subcontractor's home in Los
Alamos, New Mexico, recovered classified information in the form
of a USB "thumb drive" and documents. The subcontractor, who
possessed a DOE security clearance, had removed the information
from a highly classified facility at the laboratory (October
2006). In response to this incident, in July 2007, enforcement
actions were taken by DOE, including the issuance of (1) a
preliminary notice of violation to the University of California
with a proposed civil penalty in the amount of $3 million, (2) a
separate preliminary notice of violation to LANS with a proposed
civil penalty in the amount of $300,000, and (3) a Secretarial
Compliance Order to LANS. The preliminary notice of violation
cited both the University of California and LANS for serious
violations of DOE's classified information and cyber security
requirements.
In response to security weaknesses in the handling and processing of
classified data, LANL officials told us they have implemented a number of
measures to strengthen controls since June 2006, including the following:
o destroying an estimated 1.4 million "legacy" classified
documents,
o reducing the number of accountable electronic classified items
from 87,000 to 4,472,
o reducing the number of vaults and vault-type rooms holding
classified data from 142 to 114, and
o consolidating classified material and classified processing
operations into a "Super Vault Type Room."
^4DOE has established four categories of security incidents on the basis
of the relative severity of the incident. These categories are identified
by an impact measurement index (IMI) number. IMI-1 incidents involve
events that pose the most serious threats to U.S. national security
interests and/or critical DOE assets, create serious security situations,
or could result in deaths in the workforce or general public; IMI-2
incidents involve events that pose threats to U.S. national security
interests and/or critical DOE assets or that potentially create dangerous
situations; IMI-3 incidents involve events that pose threats to DOE
security interests or potentially degrade the overall effectiveness of
DOE's safeguards and security program; and IMI-4 incidents involve events
that could pose threats to DOE by adversely affecting the ability of
organizations to protect DOE safeguards and security interests.
There were no reported incidents involving the loss or diversion of
special nuclear or radiological material from LANL from October 1, 2002,
through June 30, 2007. However, a number of security concerns with the
inventory and accounting of these materials have been documented, most
recently in a DOE Inspector General report issued in September 2007.^5
Although the Inspector General concluded that, in general, LANL provides
timely and accurate information on its inventory of accountable nuclear
material,^6 it highlighted several areas of concern, including the
following:
o Several inventories of nuclear materials were not completed in a
timely manner.
o A storage vault containing over 11,000 individual containers of
accountable nuclear material had not undergone a 100 percent
inventory in over a decade.
o The creation of a new container of accountable nuclear material
was not documented within the required time frame. This nuclear
material could have been diverted without any record showing that
it had ever existed.
Concerns about nuclear safety at LANL are long-standing. Problems include
the following:
o Criticality concerns. ^7 For example, since 2003, the laboratory
reported 19 incidents raising nuclear criticality concerns, such
as storage or transportation of dangerous material in quantities
that exceeded or potentially exceeded criticality limits. In the
plutonium facility (TA-55) in July 2007, for example, an area of
the facility containing spent trichloroethylene exceeded the
criticality safety limit for such material by 40 percent. As
recently as September 2007, operations were suspended in the
plutonium facility over nuclear safety concerns.
o Noncompliant safety documentation. The laboratory has been out
of compliance with safety documentation requirements, which
require developing and annually updating an analysis of hazards
and mitigating controls. Under a new contract with LANS, which
went into effect in June 2006, LANL committed to having all but
one of its nuclear facilities operating under compliant safety
documentation by the end of 2007. However, only 2 of the
laboratories' 19 nuclear facilities are currently under compliant
safety documentation as of November 2007.
o Inadequate safety systems. The Safety Board and DOE have raised
concerns about the inadequacies of safety systems at the
laboratory, including weak or missing drawings for important
safety system, missing procedures that systems should be operating
under, and failure to properly maintain these systems to ensure
they will work in an emergency. The Safety Board stated it lacks
confidence in the laboratory's efforts to improve the reliability
of safety systems.
o Radiological exposures. Since fiscal year 2003, the laboratory
has reported 21 incidents involving exposure to radiological
materials, including contamination of face, hands, or other body
parts from working in situations such as glove boxes; unusually
high, unexplained dosage reading for workers; and unanticipated
intake of contaminants, such as plutonium, from inadvertent
release.
o Nuclear safety violation enforcement actions. Since fiscal year
2003, LANL has received four enforcement actions containing civil
penalties totaling nearly $2.5 million for significant violations
of nuclear safety requirements. The enforcement actions include a
June 2004 penalty of $770,000 for violations that resulted in two
workers being exposed to radiation doses exceeding annual
allowable limits, and a February 2007 penalty of $1.1 million for
15 separate violations of nuclear safety rules, reflecting
continuing safety performance deficiencies over the past several
years.
^5DOE Inspector General, Material Control and Accountability at Los Alamos
National Laboratory, DOE/IG-0774, Sept. 2007.
^6This refers to nuclear material that LANL is required to account for and
control according to its strategic and monetary importance and the
consequences of its loss.
^7Criticality involves an inadvertent nuclear chain reaction. To prevent
such an occurrence from happening, DOE's regulations and directive require
contractors to evaluate potential accident conditions and put in place
appropriate controls and safety measures.
From October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007, LANL experienced 23 reported
safety accidents serious enough to warrant investigation.^8 Although no
fatalities occurred during this period, workers involved in these
accidents were seriously injured.^9 Examples of safety accidents include
the following:
^8DOE categorizes safety accidents according to their severity. Type A is
the most serious type of incident, involving one or more of the following:
a fatality; three or more injured workers or members of the public;
radiation exposure of 25 rem or more; property damage equal to or
exceeding $2.5 million. Type B is a serious incident which includes at
least one of the following: one or more injured workers or members of the
public; radiation exposure of greater than 10 roentgen equivalent man
(rem)--the absorbed dose of radiation adjusted for the relative biological
effect of the type of radiation--but less than 25 rem; or property damage
of more than $1 million but less than $2.5 million. We included all Type A
and Type B accident investigations conducted by DOE, as well as the most
serious accidents investigated by LANL contractors. We included all
investigations of events resulting in injury or property damage as well as
those considered near misses that were serious enough to warrant an
investigation. If one investigation included more than one incident, we
counted each incident separately.
o A package in which plutonium-238 residues had been stored since
1996 degraded and ruptured when being handled, releasing airborne
plutonium. Two workers were each exposed to about one-half of
DOE's annual allowable radiation dose for occupationally exposed
workers (August 2003).
o A student was partially blinded after receiving a laser flash to
her eye during an experiment because a LANL researcher in charge
failed to ensure that the student was wearing required eye
protection (July 2004).
o After opening a package of radioactive material contaminated
during shipping, a LANL employee contaminated himself and his
clothing. Over the next few days, the worker spread contamination
to his home, to relatives' homes in Kansas and Colorado, and to
other sites at LANL. The contamination went undetected for 11 days
(July 2005).
o Laboratory workers were exposed to plutonium on two occasions
while performing routine operations inside protective glove boxes
that contained sharp tools (January 2007).
Weaknesses in project management have affected or threatened to affect
project cost and schedules at LANL. NNSA and others have expressed concern
for years about the adequacy of project management at the laboratory. In
January 2001, when the contract for the laboratory was extended, new
contract provisions stressed five key areas that needed improvement,
including project management. In response, the University of California
implemented DOE's new project management order and requirements and
standardized formats for monthly reporting on projects. Despite these
changes, LANL has continued to have project management problems. From
fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2005, the laboratory has only achieved a
"satisfactory" rating in overall project management.
Project management weaknesses at LANL have led to problems on projects.^10
We identified one project in particular at LANL --the Dual Axis
Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) program--that has experienced
significant cost overruns, and has been the subject of a DOE Inspector
General report^11 and an NNSA "lessons learned" evaluation.^12 DARHT will
be the nation's first hydrodynamic test facility capable of producing
three-dimensional X-ray photographs of a nuclear weapon and is expected to
play an important role in DOE's Stockpile Stewardship Program. Original
plans for DARHT's construction called for the development of two
single-pulse axes with similar capabilities. The original estimated cost
of the project, in 1998, ranged between $30 million and $54 million.
^9For further information on worker safety at LANL, see GAO, Nuclear and
Worker Safety: Actions Needed to Determine the Effectiveness of Safety
Improvement Efforts at NNSA's Weapons Laboratories, GAO-08-73 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007).
^10In January 2007, we reported on other NNSA-wide project management
weaknesses. See GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional
Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs,
GAO-07-36 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).
^11DOE Inspector General, Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
Facility, DOE/IG-0599, May 2003.
^12National Nuclear Security Administration, DARHT Construction Project
Lessons Learned Report, March 2005.
The first axis was completed following the original design and has been
operational for 5 years. However, with DOE approval, LANL changed the
scope of the second axis, and subsequently, major problems have occurred
with its design and construction. In May 2003, the DOE Inspector General
reported that DARHT's budget estimates were not realistic given the
project's technical complexity. Furthermore, the Inspector General
reported that the project's contingency fund was insufficient and at least
$57.5 million in actual project costs had been transferred to other DOE
programs or projects, which made it appear that DARHT was within budget
when it was not. DOE then estimated that the costs for the Second Axis
Recovery and Commissioning Project to complete the second axis totaled
about $90 million. The project is scheduled to be completed in May 2008.
Project management weaknesses at LANL also threatened schedule delays on a
multilab project led by ORNL, called the Spallation Neutron Source
project. LANL was responsible for two portions of this project,
specifically, the linear accelerator and a low-level radio-frequency
control system. Due to fabrication problems in 2002 with the linear
accelerator, including leaky tubing, rework was required, and resulted in
a cost impact of approximately $8 million (which was funded through $1.8
million in contingency and the remainder in offsets). LANL's design
problems with the radio-frequency control system resulted in potential
schedule delays. As a result, ORNL took over management of this project
and, using a simpler design already in use at one of the other DOE
laboratories, brought the project in within cost and schedule. The former
ORNL Spallation Neutron Source program manager, who is now the laboratory
director, told us that problems with these two projects led by LANL could
have significantly delayed the overall project.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We requested comments on a draft of this report from LANL, DOE, and NNSA.
In response, we received oral comments from LANL officials, including the
Deputy Division Leader, Environment, Safety, Health and Quality; the
Deputy Division Leader, Office of Safeguards and Security; the DARHT
Second Axis Project Director; and the Deputy Division Leader, Technical
Cyber Security. Although LANL officials generally agreed with the facts as
presented in this report, they noted that the new management and
operations contractor--LANS--has taken actions to improve security at the
laboratory since June 2006, including reducing the number of individual
classified items at the site and consolidating classified material and
classified operations. We added this information to our report based on
these comments. In addition, LANL officials noted our report showed that
the number of security incidents that compromised or potentially
compromised classified information had declined from fiscal year 2006
through June 30, 2007, thus demonstrating progress in improving the
security of classified information at the site. In our view, this short
period of time is not sufficient to provide a basis for meaningful trend
analysis. Consequently, it is too soon to tell if this decline in security
incidents is more than temporary. LANL officials also provided technical
comments, which we included as appropriate. We also received oral comments
from DOE's Director, Office of Security Evaluations, and NNSA's Director,
Policy and Internal Control Management. These comments were technical in
nature, and we incorporated them in the report where appropriate.
- - - -
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of
Energy, the Administrator of NNSA, the Director of LANL, appropriate
congressional committees, and other interested parties. We will also make
copies available to others on request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at 202-512-3841 or [8][email protected] . Contact point s for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report include Allison B.
Bawden, Carole J. Blackwell, Nancy L. Crothers, A. Donald Cowan, Janet E.
Frisch, Preston S. Heard, Lisa Nicole Henson, Nancy K. Kintner-Meyer, Glen
Levis, James D. Noel, and Rachael A. Schacherer.
Gene Aloise
Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Enclosure
Enclosure I: Briefing to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
Enclosure I: Briefing to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water
Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives:
Los Alamos National Laboratory: Security of Classified Data, Nuclear
Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker Safety, and Project Management
Weaknesses:
Briefing to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Committee
on Appropriations U.S. House of Representatives:
Objectives:
Provide the following information on problems at Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) for October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007:
security incidents that compromised or potentially compromised
classified information,
incidents involving the loss or failure to properly account for special
nuclear material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) or radiological
material,
nuclear safety concerns at the laboratory,
safety accidents involving LANL employees or contractor personnel, and
project management weaknesses that may have resulted in significant
cost overruns.
Scope and Methodology:
We obtained and analyzed data on security incidents that compromised or
potentially compromised classified information from LANL�s Office of
Safeguards and Security. In addition, we obtained data from the
Department of Energy�s (DOE) Incident Tracking and Analysis Capability
(ITAC) database. We relied on security incident data provided by ITAC
because it is DOE�s primary repository for tracking security incidents.
To assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed DOE security
officials who were responsible for compiling these data and performed
reasonableness checks of the data.
We met with officials from the Los Alamos Site Office, analyzed data
from ITAC, and obtained and analyzed reports on special nuclear and
radiological material control and accountability from DOE�s Office of .
Independent Oversight and the DOE Inspector General.
We obtained information on nuclear safety issues by reviewing documents
from DOE and LANL. We also reviewed weekly staff reports and
correspondence from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety
Board) and interviewed Safety Board representatives at LANL.
We obtained and analyzed safety accident investigation reports from
DOE�s Office of Health, Safety and Security and the Los Alamos Site
Office, including federal and contractor-led investigations. We also
reviewed the information contained in these reports and confirmed with
DOE officials that we had obtained all accident investigation reports.
We interviewed project management officials at DOE headquarters and at
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and reviewed pertinent project
management information. We also reviewed contract requirements and
LANL�s annual performance appraisals for fiscal years 2003 through
2006.
We did not analyze trends to determine whether the security and safety
incidents were increasing or decreasing over time.
To ensure the consistency and comparability of the data in this report,
we obtained and analyzed information, to the extent possible, from
October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007. We determined that the data
were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted our review
from August 2007 through January 2008, in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
Since fiscal year 2003, LANL has experienced a number of problems:
Fifty-seven reported security incidents involving the compromise or
potential compromise of classified information, with 37 (or 65 percent)
of these incidents posing the most serious threat to U.S. national
security interests, according to DOE.
Identification of a number of security concerns involving the inventory
and accounting of special nuclear or radiological material.
Nuclear safety concerns, including incidents in which criticality
safety standards were exceeded, and facilities were operating without
proper safety documentation.
Twenty-three reported safety accidents serious enough to warrant
investigation by DOE or the laboratory contractor.
Significant cost overruns on at least one major project, the Dual Axis
Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) program and continued problems
in project management overall. DARHT will be the nation�s first
hydrodynamic test facility capable of producing three-dimensional X-ray
photographs of a nuclear weapon and is expected to play an important
role in DOE�s Stockpile Stewardship Program.
LANL is a multidisciplinary national security laboratory whose core
missions are to:
* ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons
stockpile, and:
* reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear
proliferation, and terrorism worldwide.
LANL manages numerous nuclear facilities and operations. Activities
include plutonium, uranium, and tritium processing; research and
development operations with special nuclear material; high-energy
radiography; radiation measurement; packaging of nuclear materials; and
radioactive and hazardous waste management.
LANL�s facilities cover over 40 square miles and include 2,700
buildings covering an area of 9.4 million square feet. LANL has more
than 12,000 employees and an annual operating budget of approximately
$2 billion.
Over the past decade, numerous security, safety, and project management
weaknesses have occurred throughout DOE�s nuclear weapons complex.
Among the highest-profile security incidents was the Wen Ho Lee case at
LANL in 1999.
In response to these collective problems with DOE management, in 2000,
the Congress established the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) as a separately organized agency within DOE and made NNSA
responsible for the management and security of the nation�s nuclear
weapons programs.
Subsequent to the creation of NNSA, LANL has experienced a significant
number of high-profile security incidents as a result of its inability
to account for and control classified information.
LANL has also had difficulty ensuring the safety of workers, the
public, and the environment.
Although LANL has made improvements in response to identified
weaknesses, numerous investigations by GAO, the DOE Inspector General,
the DOE Office of Independent Oversight, and the Los Alamos Site Office
have shown that the improvement efforts have not been sustained,
allowing many of the weaknesses to recur.
In July 2004, LANL�s Director declared a suspension�or stand-down�of
laboratory operations to address immediate security and safety
concerns. All activities associated with laboratory operations were
approved for full resumption in May 2005.
The stand-down followed a decline in laboratory security and safety,
including a security incident in the weeks before the stand-down in
which two classified computer disks were reported missing.
During the stand-down, laboratory teams identified more than 3,400
security and safety concerns.
As a result of systemic management concerns, and the fact that the
laboratory contractor�the University of California�did not adequately
address these problems, DOE decided in 2003 to allow other
organizations to compete for the management contract at LANL.
The University of California, which had been the exclusive management
and operating contractor since the 1940s, was replaced in June 2006 by
Los Alamos National Security, LLC, (LANS). LANS is a consortium of
contractors that includes Bechtel National, Inc; the University of
California; BWX Technologies, Inc; and the Washington Group
International, Inc.
Security Incidents Compromising or Potentially Compromising Classified
Information at LANL:
According to DOE, there have been 57 reported security incidents
involving the compromise or potential compromise of classified
information from October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007. Thirty-seven
(or 65 percent) of these incidents posed the most serious threat to
U.S. national security interests.
Security Incidents Compromising or Potentially Compromising Classified
Information at LANL:
DOE ranks security incidents according to their potential to cause
serious damage or to place safeguards and security interests and
activities at risk.
DOE has established four categories of security incidents on the basis
of the relative severity of the incident. These categories are
identified by an impact measurement index (IMI) number.
* IMI-1: Events that pose the most serious threats to U.S. national
security interests and/or critical DOE assets, create serious security
situations, or could result in deaths in the workforce or general
public.
* IMI-2: Events that pose threats to U.S. national security interests
and/or critical DOE assets or that potentially create dangerous
situations.
* IMI-3: Events that pose threats to DOE security interests or
potentially degrade the overall effectiveness of DOE�s safeguards and
security program.
* IMI-4: Events that could pose threats to DOE by adversely affecting
the ability of organizations to protect DOE safeguards and security
interests.
Security Incidents Compromising or Potentially Compromising Classified
Information at LANL:
LANL experienced 57 reported security incidents involving the
compromise or potential compromise of classified information from
October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007.
Figure:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
This figure is a combination bar chart. The X axis is the fiscal year,
and the Y axis is the number of incidents.
Source: GAO analysis of DOE security incident data.
[End of figure]
Security Incidents Compromising or Potentially Compromising Classified
Information at LANL:
Of the 57 reported security incidents, 37 (or 65 percent) involved the
confirmed or suspected unauthorized disclosure of weapons data, which
posed the most serious threat to U.S. national security interests (IMI-
1). Of the remaining 20 reported incidents,
* nine involved the confirmed or suspected unauthorized disclosure of
secret information, which posed a significant threat to U.S. national
security interests (IMI-2), and:
* eleven involved the confirmed or suspected unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information, which posed a moderate threat to DOE security
interests (IMI-3).
Examples of security incidents include the following:
* Nine classified removable electronic media items were unaccounted for
during the relocation of these items to a different on-site facility.
DOE concluded that these items were likely destroyed prior to their
relocation (November 2003).
* LANL determined that it could not account for a single piece of
classified removable electronic media. DOE determined that the item was
most likely destroyed without proper disposition documentation (May
2004).
* A law enforcement search of a LANL subcontractor�s home in Los
Alamos, New Mexico, recovered classified information in the form of a
USB �thumb drive� and documents. The subcontractor, who possessed a DOE
security clearance, removed the information from a highly classified
facility at the laboratory (October 2006).
In response to the October 2006 event, enforcement actions were taken
by DOE that cited both the University of California and LANS for
serious violations of DOE�s classified information and cybersecurity
requirements and included the issuance of:
* a notice of violation to the University of California with a civil
penalty in the amount of $3 million (the largest civil penalty assessed
by DOE since the enforcement program began in 1996);
* a separate notice of violation to LANS with a civil penalty in the
amount of $300,000; and:
* a Secretarial Compliance Order to LANS requiring a comprehensive
review of deficiencies in the laboratory�s classified information
security and cybersecurity programs and an integrated corrective action
plan. Violation of the compliance order could result in additional
civil penalties up to $100,000 per violation per day.
According to LANL officials, in response to security weaknesses
involving the handling and processing of classified data, LANL has
implemented a number of measures to strengthen controls. LANL officials
told us that since June 2006, the laboratory has:
* destroyed an estimated 1.4 million �legacy� classified documents;
* reduced the number of accountable electronic classified items from
87,000 to 4,472;
* reduced the number of vaults and vault-type rooms holding classified
data from 142 to 114; and
* consolidated classified material and classified processing operations
into a �Super Vault Type Room."
Control and Accountability for Special Nuclear and Radiological
Material at LANL:
No incidents involving the loss or diversion of special nuclear or
radiological material were reported from October 1, 2002, through June
30, 2007. However, a number of security concerns involving the
inventory and accounting of these materials have been identified.
The Materials Control and Accountability Program at LANL encompasses
systems and measures to establish and track nuclear and radiological
material inventories, control access, and detect the loss or diversion
of these materials.
LANL�s activities require the maintenance of inventories of Category I,
II, III, and IV nuclear material.
Categories I and II are the most attractive to an adversary intent on
theft or diversion and generally include weapon components as well as
other high-grade materials containing significant quantities of
plutonium and uranium.
Categories III and IV materials contain smaller quantities of
plutonium, uranium, and other radiological materials and are considered
less attractive for theft and diversion.
There have been no incidents involving the loss or diversion of special
nuclear or radiological material from October 1, 2002, through June 30,
2007.
In 2006, DOE�s Office of Independent Oversight inspected LANL�s control
and accountability of special nuclear and radiological material and
concluded that LANL�s program was effective.
However, our review of DOE�s Office of Independent Oversight inspection
reports and Los Alamos Site Office annual survey assessments from 2000
to 2006 found that LANL has been cited for security concerns related to
its material control and accountability, including:
* inconsistent inventory and measurement oversight,
* deficiencies in identifying incidents of security concern because
they fall below the reporting threshold established in DOE directives,
and:
* inadequate training and documentation.
According to a Los Alamos Site Office official, concerns also exist
about the adequacy of the Materials Accounting and Safeguards System
(MASS) that LANL uses to account for material. MASS is:
* very old, difficult to update, and does not receive adequate funding
to support needed improvements, and:
* cannot account for the movement or location of specific items within
a facility.
The DOE Inspector General concluded in its September 2007 report on
LANL�s Material Control and Accountability Program[Footnote 13] that,
in general, LANL provides timely and accurate information but made the
following observations:
* Since December 2005, several inventories were not completed in a
timely manner because of problems performing verification measurements
within specified time frames.
* A storage vault containing over 11,000 individual containers of
accountable nuclear material[Footnotes 14] had not undergone a 100
percent inventory in over a decade.
- Although DOE does not require a 100 percent inventory, LANL officials
recognize its value and plan to complete such an inventory by January
2008.
* Multiple items of accountable nuclear material were included in MASS
as single items, contrary to LANL�s accounting procedures.
* In some cases, LANL did not maintain separation of duties when
shipping and receiving accountable nuclear material, which violated DOE
requirements.
* In one case, the creation of a new container of accountable nuclear
material was not documented within the required time frame. According
to the DOE Inspector General, this nuclear material could have been
diverted without any record showing that it had ever existed.
According to LANL officials, since June 2006, LANL has consolidated its
holdings of Category I special nuclear material from nine locations to
one single facility.
Nuclear Safety Concerns:
Concerns about nuclear safety at LANL are long-standing. Problems
include 19 occasions since 2003 where criticality safety requirements
were violated, such as storing materials in quantities higher than
safety limits allow, 17 of 19 of the site�s nuclear facilities
operating without proper safety documentation, reported inadequacies in
safety systems, radiological releases, and four enforcement actions for
significant violations of nuclear safety rules.
To ensure safe operation of nuclear facilities, DOE regulations and
directives require contractors to develop, maintain, and annually
update documentation, called a documented safety analysis, that
* describes the work to be performed;
* evaluates all potential hazards and accident conditions;
* contains appropriate controls, including technical requirements, to
eliminate or minimize the risk of hazards; and:
* delineates procedures and practices for safe operations.
DOE regulations also require that radiation doses to workers at DOE
facilities be maintained within prescribed limits.
Violations of nuclear safety rules are enforced through DOE�s Office of
Enforcement, which levies civil penalties for serious offenses. 25
Nuclear Safety Concerns
Independent reports have raised concerns about nuclear safety at LANL,
including reports by DOE�s Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance and the Safety Board. Topics of concern include:
* criticality safety (which involves an inadvertent nuclear chain
reaction),
* safety documentation, and:
* safety systems.
In addition, DOE�s Office of Enforcement has:
* raised concerns about radiological contamination and:
* issued enforcement actions.
Criticality safety:
In 2005 and 2006, respectively, NNSA and the Safety Board reported that
LANL�s nuclear criticality safety program was out of compliance, and
the laboratory had not fully put in place interim measures to reduce
the risk of a criticality event until the program could be brought into
compliance.
Since 2003, the laboratory has reported 19 incidents raising nuclear
criticality concerns, such as storage or transportation of dangerous
materials in quantities that exceeded or potentially exceeded
criticality limits. In the plutonium facility (TA-55) in July 2007, for
example, an area of the facility containing spent trichloroethylene
exceeded the criticality safety limit for such material by 40 percent.
Twelve of the 19 reported incidents took place at the laboratory�s
plutonium facility.
Criticality concerns have persisted:
In September 2007, operations were suspended at TA-55 over concerns
that radiation shielding in the vault containing plutonium and other
materials might not be sufficient to prevent a criticality event.
Radiation shielding is important because it prevents inadvertent chain
reactions in the nuclear material.
In October 2007, nearly 60 drums containing transuranic waste stored in
Area G at the laboratory were found to be overloaded beyond criticality
safety limits acceptable at the repository where the drums will be
stored. However, because all but 6 of the drums were originally
certified as being below criticality safety limits, the laboratory
determined that it needed to address only the 6 drums.
Documented safety analyses:
The laboratory has been out of compliance with safety documentation
requirements, which require annually updating analysis of hazards and
mitigating controls and, since 2001, has not met contract requirements
to bring safety documentation into compliance.
In May 2004, the Safety Board noted that many of the laboratory�s high-
risk facilities were operating with out-of-date safety documentation,
including four high-risk facilities operating under documentation that
had not been updated for 5-8 years. Under a new contract with LANS,
which went into effect in June 2006, the laboratory committed to having
all but one of its nuclear facilities operating under compliant safety
documentation by the end of fiscal year 2007.
Nevertheless, as of November 2007, only 2 of LANL�s 19 nuclear
facilities were operating under compliant safety documentation.
Safety systems:
Safety systems, such as for ventilation and fire suppression, are vital
to ensure that nuclear facilities operate to protect workers and the
public.
Concerns have been raised by the Safety Board and DOE about the
inadequacies of safety systems at the laboratory, including:
* weak or missing drawings for important safety systems,
* incomplete or inadequate descriptions of system functions, missing
procedures under which systems should be operating, and:
* failure to maintain systems properly to ensure they will work in an
emergency.
Because of these inadequacies, the Safety Board stated that it lacks
confidence in LANL�s efforts to improve the reliability of safety
systems.
Radiological incidents:
Since fiscal year 2003, the laboratory has reported 21 incidents
involving exposure to radiological materials, including:
* contamination of face, hands, or other body parts from working in
situations such as glove boxes;
* unusually high, unexplained dosage readings for workers; and:
* unanticipated intake of contaminants, such as plutonium, from
inadvertent releases.
For example, in a November 2006 event, a plutonium-239 sample popped
from its mount in TA-55, striking and contaminating an employee on the
L arm and chest before it fell to the floor.
The laboratory has had a history of significant radiological intakes,
in which workers have inhaled quantities of airborne radiological
materials.
Nuclear safety violation enforcement actions:
Since fiscal year 2003, LANL has received four enforcement actions
containing civil penalties totaling nearly $2.5 million.[Footnote 15]
These enforcement actions describe significant violations of nuclear
safety requirements, including:
* December 2002: violations leading to operating an unauthorized
nuclear facility for 5 years and storing radioactive waste without
proper controls (penalties assessed, $220,000).
* April 2003: violations including failure to operate nuclear
facilities in accordance with safety documentation and numerous
violations of radiological work procedures, resulting in exposure of
workers to radioactive material (penalties assessed, $385,000).
* June 2004: work control violations that exposed two workers to
radiation doses exposures exceeding annual allowable limits (penalties
assessed, $770,000).
* February 2007: 15 separate violations of nuclear safety rules,
reflecting continuing safety performance deficiencies over the past
several years (penalties assessed, $1,100,000).
Safety Accidents at LANL:
From October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007, LANL experienced 23 safety
accidents serious enough to warrant investigation by DOE or the
laboratory contractor. Although no fatalities occurred, workers
involved in these accidents were seriously injured.
Note: For the purposes of this report, we included all investigations
of safety accidents resulting in injury or property damage as well as
those near misses that were serious enough to warrant an investigation.
If an investigation included more than one incident, we counted each
incident separately.
Safety Accidents at LANL:
DOE categorizes safety accidents according to their severity.
Type A, most serious: The investigation team is appointed by DOE�s
Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer and is led by staff from DOE
headquarters. Threshold criteria for a type A investigation include the
following:
* occurrence of a fatality;
* three or more injured workers or members of the public requiring
hospitalization for more than 48 hours and sustaining serious bodily
damage, such as nerve damage;
* single, individual radiation exposure of 25 rem or more;[Footnote 16]
or:
* property damage equal to or exceeding $2.5 million.
Type B, serious: The investigation is led by Los Alamos Site Office
staff. Threshold criteria for a type B investigation includes the
following:
* one or more injured workers or members of the public requiring
hospitalization for 5 consecutive days or more;
* single, individual radiation exposure of greater than 10 rem, but
less than 25 rem; or:
* property damage of more than $1 million but less than $2.5 million.
Other investigations: Investigation of a less serious event is
initiated by LANL�s management and operations contractor according to
significance, severity, or risk associated with the occurrence.
LANL experienced 23 safety accidents resulting in formal investigation
from October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007, none of which were
classified as type A.
Figure:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
This figure is a combination bar graph. The X axis is the fiscal year,
and the Y axis is the number of incidents.
Source: GAO analysis of DOE safety investigation reports.
[End of figure]
Examples of safety accidents include the following:
A package in which plutonium-238 residues had been stored since 1996
degraded and ruptured when handled, releasing airborne plutonium. Two
workers were each exposed to about one-half of DOE�s annual allowable
radiation dose for occupationally exposed workers (August 2003).
Two technicians were exposed to a neutron radiation field of about
twice the threshold for a high-radiation area while performing
maintenance in an experimental area where atomic particle beams were
active (March 2004).
A student was partially blinded after receiving a laser flash to her
eye during an experiment because the laboratory researcher in charge
failed to ensure that the student was wearing required eye protection.
The researcher was reported as having followed poor safety practices
for a number of years (July 2004).
Two postdoctoral employees inhaled acid vapors when using a mixture of
hydrochloric and nitric acids to clean laboratory glassware. One
employee was later hospitalized for a lung injury attributable to the
accident (June 2005).
After opening a package of radioactive material contaminated during
shipping, a LANL employee contaminated himself and his clothing. Over
the next few days, the worker spread contamination to his home, to
relatives� homes in Kansas and Colorado, and to other sites at LANL.
The contamination went undetected for 11 days (July 2005).
A subcontractor employee sustained serious injuries to his leg and
pelvis when a metal stairway, being hoisted by a crane, slipped from
its rigging. The worker�s injuries were so serious that he had to be
airlifted out of the area for treatment (June 2006).
Laboratory workers were exposed to plutonium on two occasions while
performing routine operations inside protective glove boxes that
contained sharp tools (January 2007).
Project Management Weaknesses at LANL:
Weaknesses in project management have affected or threatened to affect
project cost and schedule. Examples include actual cost overruns on the
Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Program (DARHT), and potential
schedule delays on the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) project, led by
ORNL.
NNSA and others have expressed concern for years about the adequacy of
project management at the laboratory.
In January 2001, when the contract for the laboratory was extended, new
contract provisions stressed five key areas that needed improvement,
including project management.
In response, the University of California implemented DOE�s new project
management order and requirements and standardized formats for monthly
reporting on projects to make it easier to identify negative
performance trends.
Despite these changes, LANL has continued to have problems with project
management. Starting in fiscal year 2003, one of the annual performance
objectives for the laboratory has been to �achieve successful
completion of projects and development of user facilities.�
Contractor performance is evaluated annually against the performance
objectives in the contract to determine the fee earned. Rating
adjectives range from a low of �unsatisfactory� to a high of
�outstanding���satisfactory� is in the middle of the range. No fee is
earned for ratings below satisfactory.
In the fiscal year 2003 performance appraisal, NNSA rated the
laboratory�s performance for this objective only as "satisfactory."
* NNSA reviewed cost, schedule, and scope performance on 16 active line-
item projects. Approximately one-third of the projects performed in the
marginal rating area. Project management issues included a lack of well-
managed integrated project teams, poor planning early in the project in
the area of authorization basis integration, and lack of support for
operational readiness assessments.
In the fiscal year 2004 performance appraisal, NNSA rated the
laboratory�s performance for this objective as "satisfactory."
The July 2004 stand-down adversely affected project performance.
Because of the unique nature and inherent hazards associated with
construction activities, an operations panel conducted an institutional
evaluation of the laboratory�s construction portfolio.
* Individual construction project safety, security, and compliance
risks were assessed, and the panel provided restart recommendations.
The only two projects allowed to continue work during the stand-down
were the National Security Sciences Building and the High Power
Detonator Facility.
For fiscal year 2005, NNSA evaluated construction project management
against three major factors:
* planning projects in accordance with NNSA planning protocols;
* executing projects in a manner consistent with plans and approved
baselines; and:
* tracking performance against the plans and baselines, reporting
performance, and taking appropriate corrective actions when needed.
NNSA determined that line-item construction projects made adequate
progress but nevertheless the rating in this area did not improve
beyond "satisfactory" for the project management objective.
Project management weaknesses at LANL have led to problems on projects,
including:
* DARHT�Inaccurate budget projections, due in part to inadequate
contingency planning, which resulted in cost overruns.
* SNS�Design and fabrication problems, which threatened schedule
milestones.
DARHT will be the nation�s first hydrodynamic test facility capable of
producing three-dimensional X-ray photographs of a nuclear weapon and
is expected to play an important role in DOE�s Stockpile Stewardship
Program.
The original plans for the construction of DARHT called for the
development of two single-pulse axes with similar capabilities. The
original cost to complete DARHT was estimated in 1998 to be between $30
million and $54 million.
The first axis was completed following the original design and has been
operational since 1999.
With DOE approval, LANL changed the scope and redesigned the capability
of the second axis. Subsequently, design and construction of the second
axis have been plagued by cost overruns.
In May 2003, the DOE Inspector General issued a report on the DARHT
project,[Footnote 17] finding, among other things, that:
* Budget estimates were not realistic, given the project�s technical
complexity.
* The contingency fund was insufficient.
* The project lacked a viable baseline.
* At least $57.5 million in DARHT project costs had been transferred to
other programs or projects, which gave the appearance that the total
project cost was within budget when it was not.
In December 2004, DOE estimated the total project costs to complete the
second axis at about $90 million.
A March 2005 NNSA study[Footnote 18] of the DARHT Construction Project,
which included the redesigned second axis, found, among other things,
that:
* Senior LANL officials did not treat DARHT as a priority.
* DOE did not require clear project definition and performance
requirements.
* DOE rescoped the project using unproven technology.
* DOE failed to establish clear completion criteria.
* DOE used poor design practices for the second axis.
The Second Axis Recovery and Commissioning project is scheduled to be
completed in May 2008.
LANL was responsible for portions of the SNS project led by ORNL.
Specifically, LANL was responsible for the linear accelerator and a low-
level radio-frequency control system.
Fabrication problems in 2002 with the linear accelerator, including
leaky tubing, required rework and resulted in a cost impact of
approximately $8 million (which was funded through $1.8 million in
contingency funds and the remainder in offsets).
Design problems with the radio-frequency control system resulted in
potential schedule delays; as a result, ORNL took over management of
this project, and completed it within cost and schedule estimates. As
part of the corrective action, according to the ORNL laboratory
director, ORNL decided to use a less complex radio-frequency control
system already developed by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
The former SNS program manager at ORNL, who is now the laboratory
director, told us that these two problems could have significantly
delayed the overall project.
Related GAO Products:
Nuclear and Worker Safety: Actions Needed to Determine the
Effectiveness of Safety Improvement Efforts at NNSA�s Weapons
Laboratories, GAO-08-73 (Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007).
Department of Energy: Consistent Application of Requirements Needed to
Improve Project Management, GAO-07-518 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2007).
National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to
Improve Management of the Nation�s Nuclear Programs, GAO-07-36
(Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007).
Stand-down of Los Alamos National Laboratory: Total Costs Uncertain;
Almost Al Mission-Critical Programs Were Affected but Have Recovered,
GAO-06-83 (Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2005).
Department of Energy: Mission Support Challenges Remain at Los Alamos
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, GAO-04-370 (Washington,
D.C.: February 27, 2004).
Contract Reform: DOE�s Policies and Practices in Competing Research
Laboratory Contracts, GAO-03-932 (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2003).
Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safe guards and
Security Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003).
Nuclear Security: Lessons to Be Learned from Implementing NNSA�s
Security Enhancements, GAO-02-358 (Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2002).
Department of Energy: Fundamental Reassessment Needed to Address Major
Mission, Structure, and Accountability Problems, GAO-02-51 (Washington,
D.C.: December 21, 2001).
National Laboratories: Better Performance Reporting Could Aid Oversight
of Laboratory-Directed R&D Program, GAO-01-927 (Washington, D.C.:
September 28, 2001).
Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Improve Control over Classified
Information, GAO-01-806 (Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2001).
National Laboratories: DOE Needs to Assess the Impact of Using
Performance-Based Contracts, GAO/RCED-99-141 (Washington, D.C.: May 7,
1999).
Department of Energy: Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE
Facilities, GAO/T-RC-ED-99-159 (Washington, D.C.: April 20, 1999).
Footnotes:
[13] DOE Inspector General, Material Control and Accountability at Los
Alamos National Laboratory, DOE/IG-0774, Sept. 2007.
[14] This refers to nuclear material that LANL is required to account
for and control according to its strategic and monetary importance and
the consequence of its loss.
[15] Because of an exemption under section 234A(d) of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2282a, under the contractor at the
time, the laboratory did not pay the penalties associated with the
enforcement actions levied against it.
[16] Rem = Roentgen equivalent man, which is the absorbed dose of
radiation adjusted for the relative biological effect of the type of
radiation.
[17] DOE Inspector General, Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
Facility, DOE/IG-0599, May 2003.
[18] National Nuclear Security Administration, DARHT Construction
Project Lessons Learned Report, March 2005.
(360878)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced
and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO.
However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other
material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you
wish to reproduce this material separately.
GAO's Mission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site ( [9]www.gao.gov ). Each weekday, GAO posts
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To
have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
[10]www.gao.gov and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
DC 20548
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000
TDD: (202) 512-2537
Fax: (202) 512-6061
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Contact:
Web site: [11]www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: [12][email protected]
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Congressional Relations
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [13][email protected] , (202) 512-4400
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
Washington, DC 20548
Public Affairs
Chuck Young, Managing Director, [14][email protected] , (202) 512-4800 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington,
DC 20548
References
Visible links
8. mailto:[email protected]
9. http://www.gao.gov/
10. http://www.gao.gov/
11. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
12. mailto:[email protected]
13. mailto:[email protected]
14. mailto:[email protected]
*** End of document. ***