Los Alamos National Laboratory: Information on Security of	 
Classified Data, Nuclear Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker	 
Safety, and Project Management Weaknesses (10-JAN-08,		 
GAO-08-173R).							 
                                                                 
The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), which is operated by  
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), is 	 
responsible for, among other things, designing nuclear weapons.  
Over the past decade, we have documented numerous security,	 
safety, and project management weaknesses at NNSA's nuclear	 
weapons complex, including LANL. In particular, LANL has	 
experienced a series of high-profile security incidents that have
drawn attention to the laboratory's inability to account for and 
control classified information and maintain a safe work 	 
environment. In July 2004, LANL's director declared a		 
suspension--or stand-down--of laboratory operations to address	 
immediate concerns, including the loss of classified computer	 
disks. During the stand-down, laboratory teams identified more	 
than 3,400 security and safety issues. As a result of systemic	 
management concerns, and the fact that the laboratory		 
contractor--the University of California--did not adequately	 
address these problems, the Department of Energy (DOE) decided in
2003 to allow other organizations to compete for the management  
contract at LANL. The University of California, which had been	 
the exclusive management and operating contractor since the	 
1940s, was replaced in June 2006 by Los Alamos National Security,
LLC, (LANS). LANS is a consortium of contractors that includes	 
Bechtel National, Inc.; the University of California; BWX	 
Technologies, Inc.; and the Washington Group International, Inc. 
In this context, Congress asked us to provide information	 
detailing recent security, safety, and management problems at	 
LANL. We provided Congressional staffs with information on these 
issues. This report summarizes and formally transmits the	 
information provided to Congressional staffs. As requested, this 
report provides information on (1) security incidents that	 
compromised or potentially compromised classified information,	 
(2) incidents involving the loss of or failure to properly	 
account for special nuclear material (highly enriched uranium or 
plutonium) and radiological material, (3) nuclear safety concerns
at the laboratory, (4) safety accidents involving LANL employees 
or contractor personnel, and (5) project management weaknesses	 
that may have resulted in significant cost overruns.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-173R					        
    ACCNO:   A79552						        
  TITLE:     Los Alamos National Laboratory: Information on Security  
of Classified Data, Nuclear Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker
Safety, and Project Management Weaknesses			 
     DATE:   01/10/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Classified information				 
	     Cost overruns					 
	     Information security				 
	     Laboratory safety					 
	     Nuclear facilities 				 
	     Nuclear facility safety				 
	     Nuclear facility security				 
	     Nuclear materials					 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Nuclear weapons plant safety			 
	     Nuclear weapons plant security			 
	     Nuclear weapons plants				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Radiation safety					 
	     Safety regulation					 
	     Safety standards					 
	     Plutonium						 
	     Uranium						 
	     Occupational safety				 

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GAO-08-173R

   

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January 10, 2008

The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky
Chairman
The Honorable David L. Hobson
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Subject: Los Alamos National Laboratory: Information on Security of
Classified Data, Nuclear Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker Safety, and
Project Management Weaknesses

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),^1 which is operated by the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),^2 is responsible for,
among other things, designing nuclear weapons. Over the past decade, we
have documented numerous security, safety, and project management
weaknesses at NNSA's nuclear weapons complex, including LANL. In
particular, LANL has experienced a series of high-profile security
incidents that have drawn attention to the laboratory's inability to
account for and control classified information and maintain a safe work
environment.

In July 2004, LANL's director declared a suspension--or stand-down--of
laboratory operations to address immediate concerns, including the loss of
classified computer disks. During the stand-down, laboratory teams
identified more than 3,400 security and safety issues.

As a result of systemic management concerns, and the fact that the
laboratory contractor--the University of California--did not adequately
address these problems, the Department of Energy (DOE) decided in 2003 to
allow other organizations to compete for the management contract at LANL.
The University of California, which had been the exclusive management and
operating contractor since the 1940s, was replaced in June 2006 by Los
Alamos National Security, LLC, (LANS). LANS is a consortium of contractors
that includes Bechtel National, Inc.; the University of California; BWX
Technologies, Inc.; and the Washington Group International, Inc.

^1The laboratory operates and manages numerous nuclear facilities and
operations. Critical activities include plutonium, uranium, and tritium
processing; research and development operations with special nuclear
material; high-energy radiography; radiation measurement; packaging of
nuclear materials; and radioactive and hazardous waste management. The
laboratory covers 40 square miles, including 2,700 buildings covering an
area of 9.4 million square feet, and employs more than 12,000 personnel.
It has an annual operating budget of approximately $2 billion.

^2NNSA was established in 2000 in response to management difficulties with
the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons program. These difficulties
included security problems at the department's national laboratories and
significant cost overruns in the management of projects. NNSA is a
separately organized agency within the department with responsibility for
the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors
programs.

In this context, you asked us to provide information detailing recent
security, safety, and management problems at LANL. We provided your staffs
with information on these issues. This report summarizes and formally
transmits the information provided to your staffs (see enc. I). As
requested, this report provides information on (1) security incidents that
compromised or potentially compromised classified information, (2)
incidents involving the loss of or failure to properly account for special
nuclear material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) and radiological
material, (3) nuclear safety concerns at the laboratory, (4) safety
accidents involving LANL employees or contractor personnel, and (5)
project management weaknesses that may have resulted in significant cost
overruns.

To document security incidents relating to classified information, we
obtained and analyzed data from LANL's Office of Safeguards and Security
and DOE's Incident Tracking and Analysis Capability (ITAC) database. We
relied on security incident data provided by ITAC because it is DOE's
primary repository for tracking security incidents. To assess the
reliability of these data, we interviewed DOE security officials
responsible for compiling these data and performed reasonableness checks
on the data. Regarding incidents involving the loss of or failure to
properly account for special nuclear or radiological material, we met with
departmental program officials, analyzed data from ITAC, and obtained and
analyzed reports on material control and accountability from DOE's Office
of Independent Oversight and the DOE Inspector General. Regarding nuclear
safety concerns, we obtained information from DOE and LANL, and
interviewed Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety Board)
representatives at Los Alamos. Regarding safety accidents, we obtained and
analyzed accident investigation reports from DOE's Office of Health,
Safety and Security and the Los Alamos Site Office,^3 including federal
and contractor-led investigations from October 1, 2002, through June 30,
2007. In addition, we confirmed with DOE officials that we had obtained
the complete list of accident investigations conducted during this period.
To document project management weaknesses that resulted in significant
cost overruns, we reviewed pertinent project information and interviewed
project management officials at DOE headquarters and at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL). We also reviewed contract requirements and LANL's
annual performance appraisals for fiscal years 2003 through 2006. To
ensure consistency and comparability of the data, we obtained and analyzed
information, to the extent possible, from October 1, 2002, through June
30, 2007. We determined that the data we obtained were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted this performance
audit from August 2007 through January 2008 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our
audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.

^3The Los Alamos Site Office is responsible for administering LANL's
contract, providing oversight, and managing federal activities.

In summary, LANL experienced 57 reported security incidents involving the
compromise or potential compromise of classified information from October
1, 2002, through June 30, 2007, according to DOE's ITAC database.
Thirty-seven (or 65 percent) of these reported incidents posed the most
serious threat to U.S. national security interests.^4 Of the remaining 20
incidents, 9 involved the confirmed or suspected unauthorized disclosure
of secret information, which posed a significant threat to U.S. national
security interests. The remaining 11 reported security incidents involved
the confirmed or suspected unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information, which posed threats to DOE security interests. Examples of
the most serious types of security incidents reported by DOE include the
following:

           o LANL could not account for nine classified removable electronic
           media items, including data disks, during the relocation of these
           items to a different on-site facility. DOE concluded that these
           items were likely destroyed prior to their relocation (November
           2003).

           o A law enforcement search of a LANL subcontractor's home in Los
           Alamos, New Mexico, recovered classified information in the form
           of a USB "thumb drive" and documents. The subcontractor, who
           possessed a DOE security clearance, had removed the information
           from a highly classified facility at the laboratory (October
           2006). In response to this incident, in July 2007, enforcement
           actions were taken by DOE, including the issuance of (1) a
           preliminary notice of violation to the University of California
           with a proposed civil penalty in the amount of $3 million, (2) a
           separate preliminary notice of violation to LANS with a proposed
           civil penalty in the amount of $300,000, and (3) a Secretarial
           Compliance Order to LANS. The preliminary notice of violation
           cited both the University of California and LANS for serious
           violations of DOE's classified information and cyber security
           requirements.

In response to security weaknesses in the handling and processing of
classified data, LANL officials told us they have implemented a number of
measures to strengthen controls since June 2006, including the following:

           o destroying an estimated 1.4 million "legacy" classified
           documents,
           o reducing the number of accountable electronic classified items
           from 87,000 to 4,472,
           o reducing the number of vaults and vault-type rooms holding
           classified data from 142 to 114, and
           o consolidating classified material and classified processing
           operations into a "Super Vault Type Room."

^4DOE has established four categories of security incidents on the basis
of the relative severity of the incident. These categories are identified
by an impact measurement index (IMI) number. IMI-1 incidents involve
events that pose the most serious threats to U.S. national security
interests and/or critical DOE assets, create serious security situations,
or could result in deaths in the workforce or general public; IMI-2
incidents involve events that pose threats to U.S. national security
interests and/or critical DOE assets or that potentially create dangerous
situations; IMI-3 incidents involve events that pose threats to DOE
security interests or potentially degrade the overall effectiveness of
DOE's safeguards and security program; and IMI-4 incidents involve events
that could pose threats to DOE by adversely affecting the ability of
organizations to protect DOE safeguards and security interests.

There were no reported incidents involving the loss or diversion of
special nuclear or radiological material from LANL from October 1, 2002,
through June 30, 2007. However, a number of security concerns with the
inventory and accounting of these materials have been documented, most
recently in a DOE Inspector General report issued in September 2007.^5
Although the Inspector General concluded that, in general, LANL provides
timely and accurate information on its inventory of accountable nuclear
material,^6 it highlighted several areas of concern, including the
following:

           o Several inventories of nuclear materials were not completed in a
           timely manner.

           o A storage vault containing over 11,000 individual containers of
           accountable nuclear material had not undergone a 100 percent
           inventory in over a decade.

           o The creation of a new container of accountable nuclear material
           was not documented within the required time frame. This nuclear
           material could have been diverted without any record showing that
           it had ever existed.

Concerns about nuclear safety at LANL are long-standing. Problems include
the following:

           o Criticality concerns. ^7 For example, since 2003, the laboratory
           reported 19 incidents raising nuclear criticality concerns, such
           as storage or transportation of dangerous material in quantities
           that exceeded or potentially exceeded criticality limits. In the
           plutonium facility (TA-55) in July 2007, for example, an area of
           the facility containing spent trichloroethylene exceeded the
           criticality safety limit for such material by 40 percent. As
           recently as September 2007, operations were suspended in the
           plutonium facility over nuclear safety concerns.
           o Noncompliant safety documentation. The laboratory has been out
           of compliance with safety documentation requirements, which
           require developing and annually updating an analysis of hazards
           and mitigating controls. Under a new contract with LANS, which
           went into effect in June 2006, LANL committed to having all but
           one of its nuclear facilities operating under compliant safety
           documentation by the end of 2007. However, only 2 of the
           laboratories' 19 nuclear facilities are currently under compliant
           safety documentation as of November 2007.

           o Inadequate safety systems. The Safety Board and DOE have raised
           concerns about the inadequacies of safety systems at the
           laboratory, including weak or missing drawings for important
           safety system, missing procedures that systems should be operating
           under, and failure to properly maintain these systems to ensure
           they will work in an emergency. The Safety Board stated it lacks
           confidence in the laboratory's efforts to improve the reliability
           of safety systems.
           o Radiological exposures. Since fiscal year 2003, the laboratory
           has reported 21 incidents involving exposure to radiological
           materials, including contamination of face, hands, or other body
           parts from working in situations such as glove boxes; unusually
           high, unexplained dosage reading for workers; and unanticipated
           intake of contaminants, such as plutonium, from inadvertent
           release.
           o Nuclear safety violation enforcement actions. Since fiscal year
           2003, LANL has received four enforcement actions containing civil
           penalties totaling nearly $2.5 million for significant violations
           of nuclear safety requirements. The enforcement actions include a
           June 2004 penalty of $770,000 for violations that resulted in two
           workers being exposed to radiation doses exceeding annual
           allowable limits, and a February 2007 penalty of $1.1 million for
           15 separate violations of nuclear safety rules, reflecting
           continuing safety performance deficiencies over the past several
           years.

^5DOE Inspector General, Material Control and Accountability at Los Alamos
National Laboratory, DOE/IG-0774, Sept. 2007.

^6This refers to nuclear material that LANL is required to account for and
control according to its strategic and monetary importance and the
consequences of its loss.

^7Criticality involves an inadvertent nuclear chain reaction. To prevent
such an occurrence from happening, DOE's regulations and directive require
contractors to evaluate potential accident conditions and put in place
appropriate controls and safety measures.

From October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007, LANL experienced 23 reported
safety accidents serious enough to warrant investigation.^8 Although no
fatalities occurred during this period, workers involved in these
accidents were seriously injured.^9 Examples of safety accidents include
the following:

^8DOE categorizes safety accidents according to their severity. Type A is
the most serious type of incident, involving one or more of the following:
a fatality; three or more injured workers or members of the public;
radiation exposure of 25 rem or more; property damage equal to or
exceeding $2.5 million. Type B is a serious incident which includes at
least one of the following: one or more injured workers or members of the
public; radiation exposure of greater than 10 roentgen equivalent man
(rem)--the absorbed dose of radiation adjusted for the relative biological
effect of the type of radiation--but less than 25 rem; or property damage
of more than $1 million but less than $2.5 million. We included all Type A
and Type B accident investigations conducted by DOE, as well as the most
serious accidents investigated by LANL contractors. We included all
investigations of events resulting in injury or property damage as well as
those considered near misses that were serious enough to warrant an
investigation. If one investigation included more than one incident, we
counted each incident separately.

           o A package in which plutonium-238 residues had been stored since
           1996 degraded and ruptured when being handled, releasing airborne
           plutonium. Two workers were each exposed to about one-half of
           DOE's annual allowable radiation dose for occupationally exposed
           workers (August 2003).

           o A student was partially blinded after receiving a laser flash to
           her eye during an experiment because a LANL researcher in charge
           failed to ensure that the student was wearing required eye
           protection (July 2004).

           o After opening a package of radioactive material contaminated
           during shipping, a LANL employee contaminated himself and his
           clothing. Over the next few days, the worker spread contamination
           to his home, to relatives' homes in Kansas and Colorado, and to
           other sites at LANL. The contamination went undetected for 11 days
           (July 2005).

           o Laboratory workers were exposed to plutonium on two occasions
           while performing routine operations inside protective glove boxes
           that contained sharp tools (January 2007).

Weaknesses in project management have affected or threatened to affect
project cost and schedules at LANL. NNSA and others have expressed concern
for years about the adequacy of project management at the laboratory. In
January 2001, when the contract for the laboratory was extended, new
contract provisions stressed five key areas that needed improvement,
including project management. In response, the University of California
implemented DOE's new project management order and requirements and
standardized formats for monthly reporting on projects. Despite these
changes, LANL has continued to have project management problems. From
fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2005, the laboratory has only achieved a
"satisfactory" rating in overall project management.

Project management weaknesses at LANL have led to problems on projects.^10
We identified one project in particular at LANL --the Dual Axis
Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) program--that has experienced
significant cost overruns, and has been the subject of a DOE Inspector
General report^11 and an NNSA "lessons learned" evaluation.^12 DARHT will
be the nation's first hydrodynamic test facility capable of producing
three-dimensional X-ray photographs of a nuclear weapon and is expected to
play an important role in DOE's Stockpile Stewardship Program. Original
plans for DARHT's construction called for the development of two
single-pulse axes with similar capabilities. The original estimated cost
of the project, in 1998, ranged between $30 million and $54 million.

^9For further information on worker safety at LANL, see GAO, Nuclear and
Worker Safety: Actions Needed to Determine the Effectiveness of Safety
Improvement Efforts at NNSA's Weapons Laboratories, GAO-08-73 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007).

^10In January 2007, we reported on other NNSA-wide project management
weaknesses. See GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional
Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs,
GAO-07-36 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).

^11DOE Inspector General, Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
Facility, DOE/IG-0599, May 2003.

^12National Nuclear Security Administration, DARHT Construction Project
Lessons Learned Report, March 2005.

The first axis was completed following the original design and has been
operational for 5 years. However, with DOE approval, LANL changed the
scope of the second axis, and subsequently, major problems have occurred
with its design and construction. In May 2003, the DOE Inspector General
reported that DARHT's budget estimates were not realistic given the
project's technical complexity. Furthermore, the Inspector General
reported that the project's contingency fund was insufficient and at least
$57.5 million in actual project costs had been transferred to other DOE
programs or projects, which made it appear that DARHT was within budget
when it was not. DOE then estimated that the costs for the Second Axis
Recovery and Commissioning Project to complete the second axis totaled
about $90 million. The project is scheduled to be completed in May 2008.

Project management weaknesses at LANL also threatened schedule delays on a
multilab project led by ORNL, called the Spallation Neutron Source
project. LANL was responsible for two portions of this project,
specifically, the linear accelerator and a low-level radio-frequency
control system. Due to fabrication problems in 2002 with the linear
accelerator, including leaky tubing, rework was required, and resulted in
a cost impact of approximately $8 million (which was funded through $1.8
million in contingency and the remainder in offsets). LANL's design
problems with the radio-frequency control system resulted in potential
schedule delays. As a result, ORNL took over management of this project
and, using a simpler design already in use at one of the other DOE
laboratories, brought the project in within cost and schedule. The former
ORNL Spallation Neutron Source program manager, who is now the laboratory
director, told us that problems with these two projects led by LANL could
have significantly delayed the overall project.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We requested comments on a draft of this report from LANL, DOE, and NNSA.
In response, we received oral comments from LANL officials, including the
Deputy Division Leader, Environment, Safety, Health and Quality; the
Deputy Division Leader, Office of Safeguards and Security; the DARHT
Second Axis Project Director; and the Deputy Division Leader, Technical
Cyber Security. Although LANL officials generally agreed with the facts as
presented in this report, they noted that the new management and
operations contractor--LANS--has taken actions to improve security at the
laboratory since June 2006, including reducing the number of individual
classified items at the site and consolidating classified material and
classified operations. We added this information to our report based on
these comments. In addition, LANL officials noted our report showed that
the number of security incidents that compromised or potentially
compromised classified information had declined from fiscal year 2006
through June 30, 2007, thus demonstrating progress in improving the
security of classified information at the site. In our view, this short
period of time is not sufficient to provide a basis for meaningful trend
analysis. Consequently, it is too soon to tell if this decline in security
incidents is more than temporary. LANL officials also provided technical
comments, which we included as appropriate. We also received oral comments
from DOE's Director, Office of Security Evaluations, and NNSA's Director,
Policy and Internal Control Management. These comments were technical in
nature, and we incorporated them in the report where appropriate.

                                    - - - -

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of
Energy, the Administrator of NNSA, the Director of LANL, appropriate
congressional committees, and other interested parties. We will also make
copies available to others on request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at 202-512-3841 or [8][email protected] . Contact point s for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report include Allison B.
Bawden, Carole J. Blackwell, Nancy L. Crothers, A. Donald Cowan, Janet E.
Frisch, Preston S. Heard, Lisa Nicole Henson, Nancy K. Kintner-Meyer, Glen
Levis, James D. Noel, and Rachael A. Schacherer.

Gene Aloise
Director, Natural Resources and Environment

Enclosure

Enclosure I: Briefing to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives

Enclosure I: Briefing to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water 
Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives: 

Los Alamos National Laboratory: Security of Classified Data, Nuclear 
Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker Safety, and Project Management 
Weaknesses: 

Briefing to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Committee 
on Appropriations U.S. House of Representatives: 

Objectives: 

Provide the following information on problems at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) for October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007: 

security incidents that compromised or potentially compromised 
classified information,

incidents involving the loss or failure to properly account for special 
nuclear material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) or radiological 
material,

nuclear safety concerns at the laboratory, 

safety accidents involving LANL employees or contractor personnel, and

project management weaknesses that may have resulted in significant 
cost overruns.

Scope and Methodology: 

We obtained and analyzed data on security incidents that compromised or 
potentially compromised classified information from LANLï¿½s Office of 
Safeguards and Security. In addition, we obtained data from the 
Department of Energyï¿½s (DOE) Incident Tracking and Analysis Capability 
(ITAC) database. We relied on security incident data provided by ITAC 
because it is DOEï¿½s primary repository for tracking security incidents. 
To assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed DOE security 
officials who were responsible for compiling these data and performed 
reasonableness checks of the data. 

We met with officials from the Los Alamos Site Office, analyzed data 
from ITAC, and obtained and analyzed reports on special nuclear and 
radiological material control and accountability from DOEï¿½s Office of . 
Independent Oversight and the DOE Inspector General. 

We obtained information on nuclear safety issues by reviewing documents 
from DOE and LANL. We also reviewed weekly staff reports and 
correspondence from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety 
Board) and interviewed Safety Board representatives at LANL.

We obtained and analyzed safety accident investigation reports from 
DOEï¿½s Office of Health, Safety and Security and the Los Alamos Site 
Office, including federal and contractor-led investigations. We also 
reviewed the information contained in these reports and confirmed with 
DOE officials that we had obtained all accident investigation reports. 

We interviewed project management officials at DOE headquarters and at 
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and reviewed pertinent project 
management information. We also reviewed contract requirements and 
LANLï¿½s annual performance appraisals for fiscal years 2003 through 
2006. 

We did not analyze trends to determine whether the security and safety 
incidents were increasing or decreasing over time. 

To ensure the consistency and comparability of the data in this report, 
we obtained and analyzed information, to the extent possible, from 
October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007. We determined that the data 
were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted our review 
from August 2007 through January 2008, in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards.

Summary: 

Since fiscal year 2003, LANL has experienced a number of problems: 

Fifty-seven reported security incidents involving the compromise or 
potential compromise of classified information, with 37 (or 65 percent) 
of these incidents posing the most serious threat to U.S. national 
security interests, according to DOE. 

Identification of a number of security concerns involving the inventory 
and accounting of special nuclear or radiological material. 

Nuclear safety concerns, including incidents in which criticality 
safety standards were exceeded, and facilities were operating without 
proper safety documentation. 

Twenty-three reported safety accidents serious enough to warrant 
investigation by DOE or the laboratory contractor. 

Significant cost overruns on at least one major project, the Dual Axis 
Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) program and continued problems 
in project management overall. DARHT will be the nationï¿½s first 
hydrodynamic test facility capable of producing three-dimensional X-ray 
photographs of a nuclear weapon and is expected to play an important 
role in DOEï¿½s Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

LANL is a multidisciplinary national security laboratory whose core 
missions are to:

* ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons 
stockpile, and: 

* reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear 
proliferation, and terrorism worldwide.

LANL manages numerous nuclear facilities and operations. Activities 
include plutonium, uranium, and tritium processing; research and 
development operations with special nuclear material; high-energy 
radiography; radiation measurement; packaging of nuclear materials; and 
radioactive and hazardous waste management.

LANLï¿½s facilities cover over 40 square miles and include 2,700 
buildings covering an area of 9.4 million square feet. LANL has more 
than 12,000 employees and an annual operating budget of approximately 
$2 billion. 

Over the past decade, numerous security, safety, and project management 
weaknesses have occurred throughout DOEï¿½s nuclear weapons complex. 
Among the highest-profile security incidents was the Wen Ho Lee case at 
LANL in 1999. 

In response to these collective problems with DOE management, in 2000, 
the Congress established the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) as a separately organized agency within DOE and made NNSA 
responsible for the management and security of the nationï¿½s nuclear 
weapons programs. 

Subsequent to the creation of NNSA, LANL has experienced a significant 
number of high-profile security incidents as a result of its inability 
to account for and control classified information.

LANL has also had difficulty ensuring the safety of workers, the 
public, and the environment.

Although LANL has made improvements in response to identified 
weaknesses, numerous investigations by GAO, the DOE Inspector General, 
the DOE Office of Independent Oversight, and the Los Alamos Site Office 
have shown that the improvement efforts have not been sustained, 
allowing many of the weaknesses to recur.

In July 2004, LANLï¿½s Director declared a suspensionï¿½or stand-downï¿½of 
laboratory operations to address immediate security and safety 
concerns. All activities associated with laboratory operations were 
approved for full resumption in May 2005. 

The stand-down followed a decline in laboratory security and safety, 
including a security incident in the weeks before the stand-down in 
which two classified computer disks were reported missing.

During the stand-down, laboratory teams identified more than 3,400 
security and safety concerns.

As a result of systemic management concerns, and the fact that the 
laboratory contractorï¿½the University of Californiaï¿½did not adequately 
address these problems, DOE decided in 2003 to allow other 
organizations to compete for the management contract at LANL.

The University of California, which had been the exclusive management 
and operating contractor since the 1940s, was replaced in June 2006 by 
Los Alamos National Security, LLC, (LANS). LANS is a consortium of 
contractors that includes Bechtel National, Inc; the University of 
California; BWX Technologies, Inc; and the Washington Group 
International, Inc. 

Security Incidents Compromising or Potentially Compromising Classified 
Information at LANL: 

According to DOE, there have been 57 reported security incidents 
involving the compromise or potential compromise of classified 
information from October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007. Thirty-seven 
(or 65 percent) of these incidents posed the most serious threat to 
U.S. national security interests.

Security Incidents Compromising or Potentially Compromising Classified 
Information at LANL: 

DOE ranks security incidents according to their potential to cause 
serious damage or to place safeguards and security interests and 
activities at risk. 

DOE has established four categories of security incidents on the basis 
of the relative severity of the incident. These categories are 
identified by an impact measurement index (IMI) number. 

* IMI-1: Events that pose the most serious threats to U.S. national 
security interests and/or critical DOE assets, create serious security 
situations, or could result in deaths in the workforce or general 
public. 

* IMI-2: Events that pose threats to U.S. national security interests 
and/or critical DOE assets or that potentially create dangerous 
situations. 

* IMI-3: Events that pose threats to DOE security interests or 
potentially degrade the overall effectiveness of DOEï¿½s safeguards and 
security program.

* IMI-4: Events that could pose threats to DOE by adversely affecting 
the ability of organizations to protect DOE safeguards and security 
interests. 

Security Incidents Compromising or Potentially Compromising Classified 
Information at LANL:  

LANL experienced 57 reported security incidents involving the 
compromise or potential compromise of classified information from 
October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007. 

Figure: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

This figure is a combination bar chart. The X axis is the fiscal year, 
and the Y axis is the number of incidents. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE security incident data. 

[End of figure] 

Security Incidents Compromising or Potentially Compromising Classified 
Information at LANL: 

Of the 57 reported security incidents, 37 (or 65 percent) involved the 
confirmed or suspected unauthorized disclosure of weapons data, which 
posed the most serious threat to U.S. national security interests (IMI-
1). Of the remaining 20 reported incidents,

* nine involved the confirmed or suspected unauthorized disclosure of 
secret information, which posed a significant threat to U.S. national 
security interests (IMI-2), and: 

* eleven involved the confirmed or suspected unauthorized disclosure of 
confidential information, which posed a moderate threat to DOE security 
interests (IMI-3). 

Examples of security incidents include the following: 

* Nine classified removable electronic media items were unaccounted for 
during the relocation of these items to a different on-site facility. 
DOE concluded that these items were likely destroyed prior to their 
relocation (November 2003).

* LANL determined that it could not account for a single piece of 
classified removable electronic media. DOE determined that the item was 
most likely destroyed without proper disposition documentation (May 
2004).

* A law enforcement search of a LANL subcontractorï¿½s home in Los 
Alamos, New Mexico, recovered classified information in the form of a 
USB ï¿½thumb driveï¿½ and documents. The subcontractor, who possessed a DOE 
security clearance, removed the information from a highly classified 
facility at the laboratory (October 2006). 

In response to the October 2006 event, enforcement actions were taken 
by DOE that cited both the University of California and LANS for 
serious violations of DOEï¿½s classified information and cybersecurity 
requirements and included the issuance of:

* a notice of violation to the University of California with a civil 
penalty in the amount of $3 million (the largest civil penalty assessed 
by DOE since the enforcement program began in 1996); 

* a separate notice of violation to LANS with a civil penalty in the 
amount of $300,000; and: 

* a Secretarial Compliance Order to LANS requiring a comprehensive 
review of deficiencies in the laboratoryï¿½s classified information 
security and cybersecurity programs and an integrated corrective action 
plan. Violation of the compliance order could result in additional 
civil penalties up to $100,000 per violation per day. 

According to LANL officials, in response to security weaknesses 
involving the handling and processing of classified data, LANL has 
implemented a number of measures to strengthen controls. LANL officials 
told us that since June 2006, the laboratory has: 

* destroyed an estimated 1.4 million ï¿½legacyï¿½ classified documents;

* reduced the number of accountable electronic classified items from 
87,000 to 4,472; 

* reduced the number of vaults and vault-type rooms holding classified 
data from 142 to 114; and 

* consolidated classified material and classified processing operations 
into a ï¿½Super Vault Type Room."

Control and Accountability for Special Nuclear and Radiological 
Material at LANL: 

No incidents involving the loss or diversion of special nuclear or 
radiological material were reported from October 1, 2002, through June 
30, 2007. However, a number of security concerns involving the 
inventory and accounting of these materials have been identified. 

The Materials Control and Accountability Program at LANL encompasses 
systems and measures to establish and track nuclear and radiological 
material inventories, control access, and detect the loss or diversion 
of these materials. 

LANLï¿½s activities require the maintenance of inventories of Category I, 
II, III, and IV nuclear material. 

Categories I and II are the most attractive to an adversary intent on 
theft or diversion and generally include weapon components as well as 
other high-grade materials containing significant quantities of 
plutonium and uranium.

Categories III and IV materials contain smaller quantities of 
plutonium, uranium, and other radiological materials and are considered 
less attractive for theft and diversion. 

There have been no incidents involving the loss or diversion of special 
nuclear or radiological material from October 1, 2002, through June 30, 
2007.

In 2006, DOEï¿½s Office of Independent Oversight inspected LANLï¿½s control 
and accountability of special nuclear and radiological material and 
concluded that LANLï¿½s program was effective. 

However, our review of DOEï¿½s Office of Independent Oversight inspection 
reports and Los Alamos Site Office annual survey assessments from 2000 
to 2006 found that LANL has been cited for security concerns related to 
its material control and accountability, including: 

* inconsistent inventory and measurement oversight, 

* deficiencies in identifying incidents of security concern because 
they fall below the reporting threshold established in DOE directives, 
and: 

* inadequate training and documentation.

According to a Los Alamos Site Office official, concerns also exist 
about the adequacy of the Materials Accounting and Safeguards System 
(MASS) that LANL uses to account for material. MASS is: 

* very old, difficult to update, and does not receive adequate funding 
to support needed improvements, and: 

* cannot account for the movement or location of specific items within 
a facility. 

The DOE Inspector General concluded in its September 2007 report on 
LANLï¿½s Material Control and Accountability Program[Footnote 13] that, 
in general, LANL provides timely and accurate information but made the 
following observations: 

* Since December 2005, several inventories were not completed in a 
timely manner because of problems performing verification measurements 
within specified time frames.

* A storage vault containing over 11,000 individual containers of 
accountable nuclear material[Footnotes 14] had not undergone a 100 
percent inventory in over a decade. 

- Although DOE does not require a 100 percent inventory, LANL officials 
recognize its value and plan to complete such an inventory by January 
2008. 

* Multiple items of accountable nuclear material were included in MASS 
as single items, contrary to LANLï¿½s accounting procedures.

* In some cases, LANL did not maintain separation of duties when 
shipping and receiving accountable nuclear material, which violated DOE 
requirements. 

* In one case, the creation of a new container of accountable nuclear 
material was not documented within the required time frame. According 
to the DOE Inspector General, this nuclear material could have been 
diverted without any record showing that it had ever existed. 

According to LANL officials, since June 2006, LANL has consolidated its 
holdings of Category I special nuclear material from nine locations to 
one single facility. 

Nuclear Safety Concerns: 

Concerns about nuclear safety at LANL are long-standing. Problems 
include 19 occasions since 2003 where criticality safety requirements 
were violated, such as storing materials in quantities higher than 
safety limits allow, 17 of 19 of the siteï¿½s nuclear facilities 
operating without proper safety documentation, reported inadequacies in 
safety systems, radiological releases, and four enforcement actions for 
significant violations of nuclear safety rules. 

To ensure safe operation of nuclear facilities, DOE regulations and 
directives require contractors to develop, maintain, and annually 
update documentation, called a documented safety analysis, that 

* describes the work to be performed; 

* evaluates all potential hazards and accident conditions; 

* contains appropriate controls, including technical requirements, to 
eliminate or minimize the risk of hazards; and: 

* delineates procedures and practices for safe operations. 

DOE regulations also require that radiation doses to workers at DOE 
facilities be maintained within prescribed limits. 

Violations of nuclear safety rules are enforced through DOEï¿½s Office of 
Enforcement, which levies civil penalties for serious offenses. 25
Nuclear Safety Concerns

Independent reports have raised concerns about nuclear safety at LANL, 
including reports by DOEï¿½s Office of Independent Oversight and 
Performance Assurance and the Safety Board. Topics of concern include:

* criticality safety (which involves an inadvertent nuclear chain 
reaction),

* safety documentation, and: 

* safety systems.

In addition, DOEï¿½s Office of Enforcement has: 

* raised concerns about radiological contamination and: 

* issued enforcement actions.

Criticality safety:

In 2005 and 2006, respectively, NNSA and the Safety Board reported that 
LANLï¿½s nuclear criticality safety program was out of compliance, and 
the laboratory had not fully put in place interim measures to reduce 
the risk of a criticality event until the program could be brought into 
compliance. 

Since 2003, the laboratory has reported 19 incidents raising nuclear 
criticality concerns, such as storage or transportation of dangerous 
materials in quantities that exceeded or potentially exceeded 
criticality limits. In the plutonium facility (TA-55) in July 2007, for 
example, an area of the facility containing spent trichloroethylene 
exceeded the criticality safety limit for such material by 40 percent.  

Twelve of the 19 reported incidents took place at the laboratoryï¿½s 
plutonium facility.

Criticality concerns have persisted: 

In September 2007, operations were suspended at TA-55 over concerns 
that radiation shielding in the vault containing plutonium and other 
materials might not be sufficient to prevent a criticality event. 
Radiation shielding is important because it prevents inadvertent chain 
reactions in the nuclear material. 

In October 2007, nearly 60 drums containing transuranic waste stored in 
Area G at the laboratory were found to be overloaded beyond criticality 
safety limits acceptable at the repository where the drums will be 
stored. However, because all but 6 of the drums were originally 
certified as being below criticality safety limits, the laboratory 
determined that it needed to address only the 6 drums. 

Documented safety analyses:

The laboratory has been out of compliance with safety documentation 
requirements, which require annually updating analysis of hazards and 
mitigating controls and, since 2001, has not met contract requirements 
to bring safety documentation into compliance. 

In May 2004, the Safety Board noted that many of the laboratoryï¿½s high-
risk facilities were operating with out-of-date safety documentation, 
including four high-risk facilities operating under documentation that 
had not been updated for 5-8 years. Under a new contract with LANS, 
which went into effect in June 2006, the laboratory committed to having 
all but one of its nuclear facilities operating under compliant safety 
documentation by the end of fiscal year 2007. 

Nevertheless, as of November 2007, only 2 of LANLï¿½s 19 nuclear 
facilities were operating under compliant safety documentation. 

Safety systems:

Safety systems, such as for ventilation and fire suppression, are vital 
to ensure that nuclear facilities operate to protect workers and the 
public. 

Concerns have been raised by the Safety Board and DOE about the 
inadequacies of safety systems at the laboratory, including: 

* weak or missing drawings for important safety systems, 

* incomplete or inadequate descriptions of system functions, missing 
procedures under which systems should be operating, and: 

* failure to maintain systems properly to ensure they will work in an 
emergency.

Because of these inadequacies, the Safety Board stated that it lacks 
confidence in LANLï¿½s efforts to improve the reliability of safety 
systems. 

Radiological incidents: 

Since fiscal year 2003, the laboratory has reported 21 incidents 
involving exposure to radiological materials, including: 

* contamination of face, hands, or other body parts from working in 
situations such as glove boxes; 

* unusually high, unexplained dosage readings for workers; and: 

* unanticipated intake of contaminants, such as plutonium, from 
inadvertent releases.

For example, in a November 2006 event, a plutonium-239 sample popped 
from its mount in TA-55, striking and contaminating an employee on the 
L arm and chest before it fell to the floor. 

The laboratory has had a history of significant radiological intakes, 
in which workers have inhaled quantities of airborne radiological 
materials. 

Nuclear safety violation enforcement actions: 

Since fiscal year 2003, LANL has received four enforcement actions 
containing civil penalties totaling nearly $2.5 million.[Footnote 15] 

These enforcement actions describe significant violations of nuclear 
safety requirements, including:

* December 2002: violations leading to operating an unauthorized 
nuclear facility for 5 years and storing radioactive waste without 
proper controls (penalties assessed, $220,000). 

* April 2003: violations including failure to operate nuclear 
facilities in accordance with safety documentation and numerous 
violations of radiological work procedures, resulting in exposure of 
workers to radioactive material (penalties assessed, $385,000). 

* June 2004: work control violations that exposed two workers to 
radiation doses exposures exceeding annual allowable limits (penalties 
assessed, $770,000). 

* February 2007: 15 separate violations of nuclear safety rules, 
reflecting continuing safety performance deficiencies over the past 
several years (penalties assessed, $1,100,000). 

Safety Accidents at LANL: 

From October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007, LANL experienced 23 safety 
accidents serious enough to warrant investigation by DOE or the 
laboratory contractor. Although no fatalities occurred, workers 
involved in these accidents were seriously injured. 

Note: For the purposes of this report, we included all investigations 
of safety accidents resulting in injury or property damage as well as 
those near misses that were serious enough to warrant an investigation. 
If an investigation included more than one incident, we counted each 
incident separately. 

Safety Accidents at LANL: 

DOE categorizes safety accidents according to their severity. 

Type A, most serious: The investigation team is appointed by DOEï¿½s 
Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer and is led by staff from DOE 
headquarters. Threshold criteria for a type A investigation include the 
following:

* occurrence of a fatality;

* three or more injured workers or members of the public requiring 
hospitalization for more than 48 hours and sustaining serious bodily 
damage, such as nerve damage;

* single, individual radiation exposure of 25 rem or more;[Footnote 16] 
or: 

* property damage equal to or exceeding $2.5 million. 

Type B, serious: The investigation is led by Los Alamos Site Office 
staff. Threshold criteria for a type B investigation includes the 
following: 

* one or more injured workers or members of the public requiring 
hospitalization for 5 consecutive days or more; 

* single, individual radiation exposure of greater than 10 rem, but 
less than 25 rem; or: 

* property damage of more than $1 million but less than $2.5 million. 

Other investigations: Investigation of a less serious event is 
initiated by LANLï¿½s management and operations contractor according to 
significance, severity, or risk associated with the occurrence. 

LANL experienced 23 safety accidents resulting in formal investigation 
from October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007, none of which were 
classified as type A.

Figure: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

This figure is a combination bar graph. The X axis is the fiscal year, 
and the Y axis is the number of incidents. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE safety investigation reports. 

[End of figure] 

Examples of safety accidents include the following: 

A package in which plutonium-238 residues had been stored since 1996 
degraded and ruptured when handled, releasing airborne plutonium. Two 
workers were each exposed to about one-half of DOEï¿½s annual allowable 
radiation dose for occupationally exposed workers (August 2003).

Two technicians were exposed to a neutron radiation field of about 
twice the threshold for a high-radiation area while performing 
maintenance in an experimental area where atomic particle beams were 
active (March 2004).

A student was partially blinded after receiving a laser flash to her 
eye during an experiment because the laboratory researcher in charge 
failed to ensure that the student was wearing required eye protection. 
The researcher was reported as having followed poor safety practices 
for a number of years (July 2004). 

Two postdoctoral employees inhaled acid vapors when using a mixture of 
hydrochloric and nitric acids to clean laboratory glassware. One 
employee was later hospitalized for a lung injury attributable to the 
accident (June 2005). 

After opening a package of radioactive material contaminated during 
shipping, a LANL employee contaminated himself and his clothing. Over 
the next few days, the worker spread contamination to his home, to 
relativesï¿½ homes in Kansas and Colorado, and to other sites at LANL. 
The contamination went undetected for 11 days (July 2005). 

A subcontractor employee sustained serious injuries to his leg and 
pelvis when a metal stairway, being hoisted by a crane, slipped from 
its rigging. The workerï¿½s injuries were so serious that he had to be 
airlifted out of the area for treatment (June 2006).

Laboratory workers were exposed to plutonium on two occasions while 
performing routine operations inside protective glove boxes that 
contained sharp tools (January 2007).

Project Management Weaknesses at LANL: 

Weaknesses in project management have affected or threatened to affect 
project cost and schedule. Examples include actual cost overruns on the 
Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Program (DARHT), and potential 
schedule delays on the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) project, led by 
ORNL. 

NNSA and others have expressed concern for years about the adequacy of 
project management at the laboratory. 

In January 2001, when the contract for the laboratory was extended, new 
contract provisions stressed five key areas that needed improvement, 
including project management. 

In response, the University of California implemented DOEï¿½s new project 
management order and requirements and standardized formats for monthly 
reporting on projects to make it easier to identify negative 
performance trends. 

Despite these changes, LANL has continued to have problems with project 
management. Starting in fiscal year 2003, one of the annual performance 
objectives for the laboratory has been to ï¿½achieve successful 
completion of projects and development of user facilities.ï¿½

Contractor performance is evaluated annually against the performance 
objectives in the contract to determine the fee earned. Rating 
adjectives range from a low of ï¿½unsatisfactoryï¿½ to a high of 
ï¿½outstandingï¿½ï¿½ï¿½satisfactoryï¿½ is in the middle of the range. No fee is 
earned for ratings below satisfactory. 

In the fiscal year 2003 performance appraisal, NNSA rated the 
laboratoryï¿½s performance for this objective only as "satisfactory." 

* NNSA reviewed cost, schedule, and scope performance on 16 active line-
item projects. Approximately one-third of the projects performed in the 
marginal rating area. Project management issues included a lack of well-
managed integrated project teams, poor planning early in the project in 
the area of authorization basis integration, and lack of support for 
operational readiness assessments. 

In the fiscal year 2004 performance appraisal, NNSA rated the 
laboratoryï¿½s performance for this objective as "satisfactory." 

The July 2004 stand-down adversely affected project performance. 
Because of the unique nature and inherent hazards associated with 
construction activities, an operations panel conducted an institutional 
evaluation of the laboratoryï¿½s construction portfolio. 

* Individual construction project safety, security, and compliance 
risks were assessed, and the panel provided restart recommendations. 
The only two projects allowed to continue work during the stand-down 
were the National Security Sciences Building and the High Power 
Detonator Facility. 

For fiscal year 2005, NNSA evaluated construction project management 
against three major factors:

* planning projects in accordance with NNSA planning protocols; 

* executing projects in a manner consistent with plans and approved 
baselines; and: 

* tracking performance against the plans and baselines, reporting 
performance, and taking appropriate corrective actions when needed. 

NNSA determined that line-item construction projects made adequate 
progress but nevertheless the rating in this area did not improve 
beyond "satisfactory" for the project management objective. 

Project management weaknesses at LANL have led to problems on projects, 
including: 

* DARHTï¿½Inaccurate budget projections, due in part to inadequate 
contingency planning, which resulted in cost overruns.

* SNSï¿½Design and fabrication problems, which threatened schedule 
milestones.

DARHT will be the nationï¿½s first hydrodynamic test facility capable of 
producing three-dimensional X-ray photographs of a nuclear weapon and 
is expected to play an important role in DOEï¿½s Stockpile Stewardship 
Program.

The original plans for the construction of DARHT called for the 
development of two single-pulse axes with similar capabilities. The 
original cost to complete DARHT was estimated in 1998 to be between $30 
million and $54 million. 

The first axis was completed following the original design and has been 
operational since 1999.

With DOE approval, LANL changed the scope and redesigned the capability 
of the second axis. Subsequently, design and construction of the second 
axis have been plagued by cost overruns.

In May 2003, the DOE Inspector General issued a report on the DARHT 
project,[Footnote 17] finding, among other things, that: 

* Budget estimates were not realistic, given the projectï¿½s technical 
complexity. 

* The contingency fund was insufficient. 

* The project lacked a viable baseline. 

* At least $57.5 million in DARHT project costs had been transferred to 
other programs or projects, which gave the appearance that the total 
project cost was within budget when it was not. 

In December 2004, DOE estimated the total project costs to complete the 
second axis at about $90 million. 

A March 2005 NNSA study[Footnote 18] of the DARHT Construction Project, 
which included the redesigned second axis, found, among other things, 
that:

* Senior LANL officials did not treat DARHT as a priority. 

* DOE did not require clear project definition and performance 
requirements.

* DOE rescoped the project using unproven technology. 

* DOE failed to establish clear completion criteria. 

* DOE used poor design practices for the second axis. 

The Second Axis Recovery and Commissioning project is scheduled to be 
completed in May 2008. 

LANL was responsible for portions of the SNS project led by ORNL. 
Specifically, LANL was responsible for the linear accelerator and a low-
level radio-frequency control system.

Fabrication problems in 2002 with the linear accelerator, including 
leaky tubing, required rework and resulted in a cost impact of 
approximately $8 million (which was funded through $1.8 million in 
contingency funds and the remainder in offsets). 

Design problems with the radio-frequency control system resulted in 
potential schedule delays; as a result, ORNL took over management of 
this project, and completed it within cost and schedule estimates. As 
part of the corrective action, according to the ORNL laboratory 
director, ORNL decided to use a less complex radio-frequency control 
system already developed by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

The former SNS program manager at ORNL, who is now the laboratory 
director, told us that these two problems could have significantly 
delayed the overall project. 

Related GAO Products: 

Nuclear and Worker Safety: Actions Needed to Determine the 
Effectiveness of Safety Improvement Efforts at NNSAï¿½s Weapons 
Laboratories, GAO-08-73 (Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007). 

Department of Energy: Consistent Application of Requirements Needed to 
Improve Project Management, GAO-07-518 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2007).

National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to 
Improve Management of the Nationï¿½s Nuclear Programs, GAO-07-36 
(Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007). 

Stand-down of Los Alamos National Laboratory: Total Costs Uncertain; 
Almost Al Mission-Critical Programs Were Affected but Have Recovered, 
GAO-06-83 (Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2005). 

Department of Energy: Mission Support Challenges Remain at Los Alamos 
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, GAO-04-370 (Washington, 
D.C.: February 27, 2004).

Contract Reform: DOEï¿½s Policies and Practices in Competing Research 
Laboratory Contracts, GAO-03-932 (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2003). 

Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safe guards and 
Security Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003). 

Nuclear Security: Lessons to Be Learned from Implementing NNSAï¿½s 
Security Enhancements, GAO-02-358 (Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2002). 

Department of Energy: Fundamental Reassessment Needed to Address Major 
Mission, Structure, and Accountability Problems, GAO-02-51 (Washington, 
D.C.: December 21, 2001). 

National Laboratories: Better Performance Reporting Could Aid Oversight 
of Laboratory-Directed R&D Program, GAO-01-927 (Washington, D.C.: 
September 28, 2001).

Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Improve Control over Classified 
Information, GAO-01-806 (Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2001). 

National Laboratories: DOE Needs to Assess the Impact of Using 
Performance-Based Contracts, GAO/RCED-99-141 (Washington, D.C.: May 7, 
1999).

Department of Energy: Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE 
Facilities, GAO/T-RC-ED-99-159 (Washington, D.C.: April 20, 1999).

Footnotes: 

[13] DOE Inspector General, Material Control and Accountability at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, DOE/IG-0774, Sept. 2007. 

[14] This refers to nuclear material that LANL is required to account 
for and control according to its strategic and monetary importance and
the consequence of its loss. 

[15] Because of an exemption under section 234A(d) of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2282a, under the contractor at the 
time, the laboratory did not pay the penalties associated with the 
enforcement actions levied against it. 

[16] Rem = Roentgen equivalent man, which is the absorbed dose of 
radiation adjusted for the relative biological effect of the type of 
radiation. 

[17] DOE Inspector General, Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test 
Facility, DOE/IG-0599, May 2003.

[18] National Nuclear Security Administration, DARHT Construction 
Project Lessons Learned Report, March 2005. 

(360878)

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