Embassy Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site	 
Conditions Prevent Full Adherence to Standards (18-JAN-08,	 
GAO-08-162).							 
                                                                 
Following the 1998 embassy bombings, the Department of State	 
(State) determined that more than 85 percent of diplomatic	 
facilities did not meet security standards and were vulnerable to
terrorist attacks. State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings 	 
Operations (OBO) has undertaken a program to replace or upgrade  
the security of these facilities. As of 2007, OBO had constructed
more than 50 new embassies and moved nearly 15,000 staff to safer
facilities. However, most remaining facilities will not be	 
replaced in the near term. To address these facilities, OBO has  
obligated about $140 million per year for its Compound Security  
Upgrade Program (CSUP). GAO was asked to (1) describe the process
that OBO follows to prioritize and plan CSUP projects, including 
stakeholder involvement; (2) determine the extent to which CSUP  
projects met contracted cost and time frames and whether OBO has 
procedures to ensure security upgrades are installed; and (3)	 
assess whether State's CSUP efforts have enhanced posts'	 
abilities to comply with State's physical security standards. To 
address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent State documents,
met with State officials in Washington, D.C., and overseas, and  
traveled to 11 posts in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle	 
East. State provided written comments on a draft of this report  
and agreed with our findings.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-162 					        
    ACCNO:   A79930						        
  TITLE:     Embassy Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but   
Site Conditions Prevent Full Adherence to Standards		 
     DATE:   01/18/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Embassies						 
	     Entry security					 
	     Facility management				 
	     Facility security					 
	     Safety standards					 
	     Security assessments				 
	     Security policies					 
	     Security regulations				 
	     Security threats					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorists 					 
	     Compound Security Upgrade Program			 

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GAO-08-162

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background
     * [3]CSUP Planning Process Balances Security Needs of Posts and I

          * [4]OBO Planning Reflects DS Security Analysis and Input from Po
          * [5]DS Priority Assessments Focus on Main Compounds, but Efforts
          * [6]OBO Has Taken Steps to Conduct More Comprehensive Needs Asse

     * [7]CSUP Projects Generally Completed within Contractual Time Fr
     * [8]CSUP Has Enhanced Physical Security, but Site Conditions at
     * [9]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [10]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
     * [11]Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State
     * [12]Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

          * [13]GAO Contact
          * [14]Staff Acknowledgments

     * [15]Related GAO Products

          * [16]Order by Mail or Phone

Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

January 2008

EMBASSY SECURITY

Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions Prevent Full
Adherence to Standards

GAO-08-162

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2
Background 4
CSUP Planning Process Balances Security Needs of Posts and Includes Input
from Stakeholders 8
CSUP Projects Generally Completed within Contractual Time Frames and
Costs, and OBO Has Project Management Procedures to Help Ensure Completion
11
CSUP Has Enhanced Physical Security, but Site Conditions at Many Posts
Limit Ability to Adhere to All Security Standards 14
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 20
Appendix II Comments from the Department of State 22
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 24
Related GAO Products 25

Figures

Figure 1: Key Security Measures at a Notional Embassy Compound 7
Figure 2: CSUP Project Timeliness, Cost, and Contract Modifications 12
Figure 3: A New CAC Facility 15
Figure 4: A New Fence, Bollards, and Concrete Planters 16
Figure 5: A Post with Insufficient Setback 18

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Abbreviations

CAC: compound access control: 
CSUP: Compound Security Upgrades Program: 
DS: State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security: 
NEC: New Embassy Compound: 
OBO: State Department's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations: 

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

January 18, 2008

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Davis:

Following the 1998 embassy attacks in East Africa, the Department of State
(State) determined that more than 85 percent of diplomatic facilities
overseas did not meet security standards at that time and were vulnerable
to terrorist attacks. Since then, State has worked with other agencies
that operate overseas to enhance security standards and State's Bureau of
Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has undertaken a major program to
replace or upgrade these facilities to comply with security standards. As
of the end of fiscal year 2007, OBO constructed more than 50 new
facilities and moved nearly 15,000 staff to safer work facilities at a
cost of more than $5.9 billion.^1 However, most remaining overseas
diplomatic office facilities will not be replaced in the near term. To
address security deficiencies at these facilities, OBO has obligated
approximately $140 million per year for its Compound Security Upgrade
Program (CSUP), which aims to enhance physical security protection for
vulnerable facilities until they are replaced by improving perimeter
security measures and installing forced entry/ballistic resistant doors
and windows, among other security upgrades.^212 At posts where OBO does
not plan to replace the embassy facility, CSUP aims to enhance physical
security protection to the extent possible given the nature of the
facility and the risks identified. Following the 1998 embassy attacks in
East Africa, the Department of State (State) determined that more than 85
percent of diplomatic facilities overseas did not meet security standards
at that time and were vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Since then, State
has worked with other agencies that operate overseas to enhance security
standards and State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has
undertaken a major program to replace or upgrade these facilities to
comply with security standards. As of the end of fiscal year 2007, OBO
constructed more than 50 new facilities and moved nearly 15,000 staff to
safer work facilities at a cost of more than $5.9 billion. However, most
remaining overseas diplomatic office facilities will not be replaced in
the near term. To address security deficiencies at these facilities, OBO
has obligated approximately $140 million per year for its Compound
Security Upgrade Program (CSUP), which aims to enhance physical security
protection for vulnerable facilities until they are replaced by improving
perimeter security measures and installing forced entry/ballistic
resistant doors and windows, among other security upgrades. At posts where
OBO does not plan to replace the embassy facility, CSUP aims to enhance
physical security protection to the extent possible given the nature of
the facility and the risks identified.

In this report, we (1) describe the process that OBO follows to prioritize
and plan CSUP projects, including stakeholder involvement; (2) determine
the extent to which CSUP projects met contracted cost and time frames and
whether OBO has procedures to ensure security upgrades are In this report,
we (1) describe the process that OBO follows to prioritize and plan CSUP
projects, including stakeholder involvement; (2) determine the extent to
which CSUP projects met contracted cost and time frames and whether OBO
has procedures to ensure security upgrades are installed; and (3) assess
whether State's CSUP efforts have enhanced posts' ability to comply with
State's physical security standards.

^1We reviewed OBO's progress with new embassy construction and other
efforts to enhance the security of U.S. personnel overseas in earlier
reports. See Related GAO Products.

^2State incorporates physical security standards in its "Foreign Affairs
Handbook" and "Foreign Affairs Manual."

To address these objectives, we reviewed State prioritization and planning
documents concerning the assignment of post threat levels, assessments of
the security vulnerabilities of posts, and project planning procedures. We
also reviewed contracting documentation for select CSUP projects to assess
their timeliness and cost. Our scope included all 47 projects contracted
since fiscal year 2004, completed by the end of fiscal year 2007, and
valued at $1 million or more and, therefore, excluded smaller projects
such as those designed to enhance the security of schools and other
non-U.S. government properties frequented by U.S. personnel and their
dependents.^3 We assessed the impact of these projects on physical
security conditions at posts based on the security standards set forth in
State's "Foreign Affairs Handbook" and "Foreign Affairs Manual." We
discussed CSUP with officials from OBO and State's Bureau of Diplomatic
Security (DS) in Washington, D.C., and with post officials and contractors
overseas. We traveled to 11 posts in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle
East. We selected these countries to ensure regional coverage, a range of
project types, and a mix of ongoing and completed projects. We are not
naming the specific countries we visited for this review due to security
concerns.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2006 through January
2008, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit
objectives. (See app. I for a more complete description of our scope and
methodology.)

Results in Brief

OBO has a threat- and vulnerability-based process for determining which
posts receive a CSUP project each year and a project planning process to
develop each CSUP project, utilizing input from DS and post personnel. OBO
prioritizes which posts will receive upgrades based in part on assessments
from DS of the threat levels and physical security conditions at each
post. However, the DS physical security assessment is currently based on
the physical security needs of the post's main compound, even though there
are hundreds of post facilities located outside the main embassy or
consulate compound. DS is developing a risk-based prioritization process
that will factor in the number of personnel, threat levels, and
vulnerabilities at each facility, including off-compound facilities. After
State receives its budget appropriation, OBO decides where it will install
CSUP upgrades based on its priority list. As OBO moves into the design and
construction phase of individual projects, it consults with security and
facilities management officials at the posts. In recent years, OBO has
improved its project planning processes by conducting a comprehensive
survey of the physical security needs of posts, including off-compound
facilities, early in the planning phase.

^3We reviewed State's efforts to protect U.S. officials and citizens
outside of embassies in earlier reports, including: GAO, Overseas
Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to
Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies,
[17]GAO-05-642 (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005).

Most CSUP projects have been completed within 30 days of their contractual
completion date and for the contracted cost, and OBO has project
management procedures to help ensure that contractors complete the work
called for in the contracts. However, OBO found it necessary to modify all
but one of the contracts to extend project completion dates, adjust costs,
or both. In reviewing schedule performance data for 47 projects undertaken
since 2004, we found that 96 percent of projects were completed within 30
days of their contractual completion date. However, OBO modified 81
percent of the 47 contracts to extend their completion dates by an average
of almost 4 months. In reviewing cost data, we found that while OBO paid
the contractors the amount specified in the fixed-price contracts, at an
average project cost of $2.6 million, contract modifications resulted in
cost adjustments to all but two of the contracts. OBO increased the total
cost of three-quarters of the projects an average of 17 percent and
decreased the remaining quarter of the projects an average of 5 percent--a
net increase of $10 million for all 47 projects. Past GAO assessments of
government construction projects found that for renovations of existing
facilities such cost variances were not uncommon. OBO cited factors
outside the contractor's control as the cause of most of the delays and
cost increases, such as unusually lengthy local permitting processes and
design changes made during construction work. For example, when OBO
increased the scope of work of a CSUP project to include a new compound
access control (CAC) facility, it modified the contract to compensate the
contractor an additional $874,000. To help ensure that security upgrades
contracted for are completed and enhance posts' compliance with physical
security standards, OBO assigns a project manager who is responsible for
the effective completion of the project and relies on a mix of regional
and post officials to provide additional on-site monitoring. At the 11
posts we visited, the upgrades contracted for had been or were being
installed.

Completed CSUP projects have generally enhanced posts' compliance with
physical security standards at 47 embassies and consulates, but many of
these posts continue to face physical security deficiencies that cannot be
addressed without building a new facility. CSUP security enhancements at
these posts have encompassed constructing compound access control
facilities at the perimeter of the compounds at 25 posts; building safe
areas for post officials in case of attack at 25 posts; and improving
compound walls, fencing, and barriers at 22 posts. At the 11 posts we
visited, we found the CSUP projects had enhanced posts' compliance with
State's physical security standards as detailed in the "Foreign Affairs
Handbook" and "Foreign Affairs Manual." Specifically, the projects
replaced perimeter fencing to meet anti-climb requirements, installed
bollards^4 and barriers at key points to meet anti-ram requirements, built
safe areas for post officials in case of attack, and replaced or enhanced
pedestrian and vehicle access points to the posts. However, because of
site conditions that were outside the scope of the physical security
upgrade projects, we found that none of the posts we visited were in full
compliance with all of State's physical security standards.^5 For example,
more than one post's location in a dense urban area prevented it from
achieving a 100-foot setback from the street, a key security standard,
while older structures at some posts were not able to support forced
entry/ballistic resistant windows. As a result, many buildings and their
occupants may remain vulnerable to attack.

The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this
report, which are reproduced in appendix II. State agreed with our
findings, noting that the report accurately describes State's CSUP
efforts. State also provided us with technical suggestions and
clarifications that we have addressed in this report, as appropriate.

Background

In response to various attacks, State has continually assessed and updated
its security standards and physical security measures at posts around the
world. After the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania, State initiated the Capital Security Construction
program (also referred to as the New Embassy Compound [NEC] program), a
multiyear effort to replace approximately 200 facilities with new
facilities that meet State's updated security standards. As of the end of
fiscal year 2007, State had obligated more than $5.9 billion for this
program, awarded contracts for the construction of 78 new embassy and
consulate compounds, and completed more than 50 new facilities. State
currently plans to contract for 80 more new facilities through 2014.

^4A bollard is one of a series of short posts for excluding or diverting
motor vehicles from entering an area.

^5State's "Foreign Affairs Handbook" and "Foreign Affairs Manual"
recognize that the standards apply to existing office buildings only to
the maximum extent feasible or practicable.

To complement its efforts to move overseas U.S. government employees into
more secure facilities, State initiated efforts to enhance physical
security at existing facilities. After the 1998 embassy bombings, State
initiated a new physical security upgrades program called the World-Wide
Security Upgrade Program, which focused on enhancing perimeter security
measures. In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, State focused
on ensuring that embassies and consulates had adequate safe areas for
staff in case of an attack on the facilities. Since 2004, State has taken
a more comprehensive approach to physical security upgrades by reviewing
the entire range of physical security needs at posts through CSUP. State
has identified the following four goals for CSUP:

           o to provide physical security protection to the extent practical
           for existing facilities;
           o to provide physical security upgrades to meet current security
           standards for those facilities that will not be replaced by a NEC
           in the near-term;
           o to initiate physical security upgrades at facilities that are
           not part of the chancery compound, including annexes, public
           diplomacy facilities, and warehouses; and
           o to provide security upgrades to nongovernmental facilities
           ("soft targets") frequented by U.S. citizens.

           From fiscal year 1999 through 2007, State had obligated more than
           $1.2 billion for security upgrades. Since fiscal year 2004 and the
           initiation of CSUP, OBO has undertaken approximately 55 major
           projects costing over $1 million that enhance physical security at
           posts that are not going to be replaced with a new facility in the
           near future, if at all. OBO's Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan
           calls for it to undertake an average of 13 major CSUP projects per
           year through 2012. CSUP provides several categories of security
           upgrades to help posts meet physical security standards, such as
           perimeter security measures (including anti-climb walls, fences,
           compound access control facilities, bollards, cameras, and
           security lighting); forced entry/ballistic resistant doors and
           windows; safe areas for U.S. personnel in case of emergency; and
           stand-alone mail screening facilities. In addition, OBO has
           obligated approximately $58 million per year of CSUP funds for
           minor post-managed security upgrade projects, such as minor
           residential security upgrades, maintenance, repair, and
           replacement of existing forced entry/ballistic resistant doors and
           windows, and modular mail screening facilities.

           The Overseas Security Policy Board, which includes representatives
           from more than 20 U.S. intelligence, foreign affairs, and other
           agencies, is responsible for considering, developing, and
           promoting security policies and standards that affect U.S.
           government agencies under the authority of the Chief of Mission at
           a post. This responsibility includes reviewing and issuing uniform
           guidance on physical security standards for embassies, consulates,
           and other overseas office space. State incorporates the board's
           physical security standards in its "Foreign Affairs Handbook" and
           "Foreign Affairs Manual." With respect to existing office
           buildings, the standards apply to the maximum extent feasible or
           practicable.^6

           State has identified five key Overseas Security Policy Board
           standards to protect overseas diplomatic office facilities against
           terrorism and other dangers (see fig. 1).

^612 F.A.M. 311.2.

Figure 1: Key Security Measures at a Notional Embassy Compound

First, the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999^7
requires that office facilities be at least 100 feet from uncontrolled
areas, such as a street where vehicles can pass without being checked by
security officials. This distance is meant to help protect the buildings
and occupants against threats such as bomb blasts. Second, State requires
high perimeter walls or fences that are difficult to climb, thereby
deterring those who might attack the compound on foot. Third, State
requires anti-ram barriers to ensure that vehicles cannot breach the
facility perimeter to get close to the building and detonate a bomb. The
fourth standard requires blast-resistant construction techniques and
materials. These materials include reinforced concrete and steel
construction and blast-resistant windows. Coupled with a 100-foot setback,
blast-resistant construction provides the best possible protection against
vehicle bomb attack, according to DS officials. State's fifth security
standard is controlled access of pedestrians and vehicles at the perimeter
of a compound. Compound access control facilities allow guards to screen
personnel and visitors before they enter the compound to verify that they
have legitimate business at the embassy or consulate and that they bring
nothing onto the compound that could be potentially harmful or used to
surreptitiously gather intelligence. Similarly, the facilities allow
guards to search vehicles before they are permitted to enter the compound.

^722 U.S.C. 4865(a)(3)(A).

CSUP Planning Process Balances Security Needs of Posts and Includes Input from
Stakeholders

OBO has a threat- and vulnerability-based planning process for its CSUP
projects that includes input from DS's analysis of security threats and
vulnerabilities and from post officials. The DS analysis currently focuses
on embassy and consulate compounds, though DS is developing a risk-based
prioritization process that considers the number of personnel, threats,
and vulnerabilities at each facility, including off-compound facilities.
OBO has improved its process for developing projects by conducting more
comprehensive needs assessments of posts, including off-compound
facilities, early in the design phase.

OBO Planning Reflects DS Security Analysis and Input from Post

OBO prioritizes which posts will receive upgrades based in part on
assessments from DS of the physical security conditions and threat levels
at each post. Each year, DS ranks all 262 posts based on their threat
levels and vulnerabilities. With input from posts' security officers and
the intelligence community, DS determines the threat level for terrorism
and political violence. DS also determines the vulnerabilities of each
post in several categories, including protection from chemical and
biological attack, seismic and blast resistance, the strength of the
construction and fac,ade, and the amount of setback. Once these
determinations are made, DS ranks the posts.^8 The resulting list of
rankings is used by OBO and other stakeholders to plan NEC projects.

For CSUP planning, posts that are scheduled for an NEC project within the
next 2 to 3 years are removed from the list, and DS and OBO reevaluate the
list, factoring in the number of people at post, to create a priority list
for CSUP projects. OBO then modifies the list to balance various factors.
First, OBO removes facilities that cannot be further upgraded, such as
many leased facilities. Second, OBO adds facilities that may have been
removed, such as vulnerable off-compound facilities at posts where NEC
projects are planned. Third, OBO has security engineers conduct a thorough
assessment of each post's needs. Fourth, OBO alters the list to account
for external factors, such as difficulty getting a host government's
approval on a project, which would move a project down the list. Finally,
OBO develops its 6-year list of CSUP projects based on expected funds and
places these projects in the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan. If OBO
experiences budget constraints, it will delay projects--moving future
projects to subsequent fiscal years--rather than reduce their scope,
according to State officials.

Once a project is placed on the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan, an OBO
team undertakes an assessment visit to the post to determine what the
project should include. OBO consults with DS and the post and reviews
Office of Inspector General security inspections in order to determine the
scope of the project. One year prior to a project's start date, OBO then
develops an initial planning survey in which OBO seeks agreement between
its engineers and the post's Regional Security Officer. The initial
planning survey is then sent in draft form for approval by OBO and post
officials, including the Regional Security Officer, administrative
officer, and facilities manager. Once this process is completed, OBO works
with its contract design firm to develop conceptual design plans. State's
contracting offices use these plans to advertise for bids to complete the
design and construct the improvements using a design-build contract.^9
After a firm has been awarded the contract, it will develop and submit
interim and then final plans for OBO's review. OBO consults with post
officials, including the Regional Security Officer, in reviewing the
designs to help ensure that proposed upgrades meet each post's security
needs before giving the firm authorization to proceed with construction.

^8We did not assess State's methodology for determining posts' threat
levels and vulnerabilities or the formula it uses to determine actual post
rankings, as this was beyond the scope of our assignment.

^9The design-build contract delivery method reduces project cycle time by
combining design and construction in a single contract award and may allow
contractors to begin construction before the building design is complete.

DS Priority Assessments Focus on Main Compounds, but Efforts Are Being Made to
Address All Post Facilities

According to OBO and DS officials, the DS physical security assessment is
currently based on the physical security needs of each post's main
compound but does not factor in the security of facilities located outside
the main embassy or consulate compound, even though hundreds of such
facilities exist. We noted that, in several cases, these off-compound
facilities lacked required physical security measures. For example, we
found that one post compound, following the conclusion of its CSUP
project, met most security standards, but a nearby off-compound office
facility did not have setback, blast-resistant walls and windows, a
controlled access facility for pedestrians and vehicles, a safe area, and
other security features.

OBO and DS are currently working to better address the needs of all
facilities, including the hundreds of annexes located off compound, and
improve CSUP project prioritization. OBO officials commented that newer
projects take into account the needs of all facilities at a post, whether
they are on compound or not. For example, at one post we visited, we saw a
CSUP project for an off-compound office facility. Moreover, DS is
developing a new risk-based process to prioritize CSUP projects that will
rate the vulnerabilities of each overseas building with office space,
including annexes, and factor in the number of personnel and threat levels
to better set priorities. According to a DS official, the formula needs to
be validated and, if successful, staff needs to be trained on its use
before beginning implementation. State expects to complete these steps by
March 2008.

OBO Has Taken Steps to Conduct More Comprehensive Needs Assessments during
Project Design

OBO is taking additional steps to more comprehensively address post
security needs and improve CSUP planning processes. According to OBO, CSUP
initially focused on perimeter security, but as new standards have been
put in place and perimeter projects completed, the program has broadened
its focus to ensure that posts meet all physical security standards to the
extent feasible. For example, in 2004, terrorists rushed on foot past the
barriers blocking a car being inspected at the vehicular gate of the
consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In response, State began to install
additional fencing and a secondary gate, called a man trap, at vehicle
entry points at posts to prevent attackers on foot from accessing the
compounds. Moreover, the Overseas Security Policy Board is currently
considering the addition of a new security standard requiring man traps.
In addition, OBO officials noted that they meet monthly to improve
processes for project planning and execution, including those involving
CSUP. One result of these meetings has been a decision to conduct OBO's
initial planning surveys earlier in the design process to gain a better
understanding of post's security needs. Another result of these meetings
is that OBO created a more comprehensive survey instrument to better
identify all vulnerabilities at the post for consideration in the CSUP
project.

CSUP Projects Generally Completed within Contractual Time Frames and Costs, and
OBO Has Project Management Procedures to Help Ensure Completion

While most CSUP projects we reviewed have been completed within their
contractual time frames and costs, OBO found it necessary to modify all
but one of the contracts to extend project time frames, adjust costs, or
both. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2004, OBO has contracted for 47
projects valued at $1 million or more that were subsequently completed by
September 30, 2007. In reviewing schedule performance data, we found that
96 percent of projects were completed within 30 days of their contractual
completion date (see fig. 2). However, we found that OBO modified the
contracts to extend their completion dates for 81 percent of the projects.
On average, OBO extended the contracts by 4 months--an average increase of
26 percent.^10 Many of these extensions did not result in increased costs
to the government.

^10For one project, the modification documents are awaiting final
approval; therefore, the completion date and cost modifications are not
factored into this calculation.

Figure 2: CSUP Project Timeliness, Cost, and Contract Modifications

^aTimeliness was measured against contractual obligations, including
modifications. Total does not equal 100 due to rounding.

^bTotal does not equal 100 due to rounding.

^cThis project has a pending modification for both completion date and
cost.

For each of the 47 projects, OBO paid the contractor the amount specified
in the fixed-price contracts--an average project cost of $2.6 million. In
reviewing cost data, we found that OBO increased the contract cost for 34
projects, at an average increase of 17 percent, and decreased the contract
cost for 11 projects, at an average decrease of 5 percent (see fig. 2).
The net change in the cost of the 47 projects was an increase of $10
million. Cost increases were generally due to changes in the scope of the
projects, while cost decreases were generally due to a reduction in
expected local tax costs. Our past assessments of domestic government
renovation projects found that work on existing facilities presented a
number of difficulties and challenges, making renovations especially
susceptible to cost increases stemming from unexpected conditions.^11 We
found that, for such projects, government agencies generally budget 5 to
15 percent of project cost for unexpected changes.

OBO cited factors outside the contractor's control as the cause of most of
the delays and cost increases, such as unusually lengthy local permitting
processes, previously unidentified underground utilities that needed to be
moved, design changes that OBO made during construction work, and project
changes requested by the post. For example, OBO extended the deadline 10
months for completion of perimeter fencing upgrades and a new CAC facility
at a U.S. consulate in Asia because of delays in receiving approval from
local authorities to proceed with the work. In addition, in response to a
request from officials at a U.S. embassy in Europe, OBO added to the scope
of the planned CSUP project, including a new CAC facility, and modified
the contract to pay the contractor an additional $874,000 for the added
work. However, in cases where OBO found that contractor error was the
cause of a delay or cost increase, OBO held the contractor accountable.
For example, at a U.S. mission in Europe, OBO found instances where the
contractor's work did not conform to contract specifications and required
the contractor to redo the work. OBO did not compensate the contractor for
the additional costs associated with replacing the substandard work.
Similarly, at a U.S. consulate in Europe, the contractor was more than 6
months late in completing the security upgrades; OBO, therefore, assessed
the contractor a penalty of almost $60,000.

^11GAO, Kennedy Center: Stronger Oversight of Fire Safety Issues,
Construction Projects, and Financial Management Needed, [18]GAO-05-334
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22, 2005).

OBO has project management procedures to help ensure the security upgrades
it contracted for are completed and have enhanced posts' compliance with
physical security standards. For each CSUP project, OBO assigns a project
manager who is responsible for the effective completion of the project.
However, because CSUP projects are generally small and OBO has limited
resources, project managers are not usually able to be on site full time
during the project. Project managers visit posts to ensure the work
contracted for is being done and, in many cases, rely on post officials,
including the Regional Security Officers and facility managers, to provide
additional monitoring of the work. In our visits to 11 posts, we found
that, in most cases, the work called for in the projects had been done or
was under way. However, at one location, we found that one component of
the project--strengthening the room where the post's emergency generator
is located--was removed from the scope of the project because, according
to post officials, it would have unexpectedly required creating new office
space to relocate people during the work, adding costs that could not be
covered by the CSUP budget. OBO decided to remove this work from the scope
of the project and initiate a new project in the future to address this
physical security need.

CSUP Has Enhanced Physical Security, but Site Conditions at Many Posts Limit
Ability to Adhere to All Security Standards

Completed CSUP projects have achieved their objective of enhancing the
security at posts by bringing posts in better compliance with security
standards. Major CSUP projects have enhanced physical security at 47
embassies and consulates since fiscal year 2004, and OBO currently expects
to complete all major CSUP projects, barring extensive changes to current
security standards or expected funding, by 2018. CSUP security
enhancements have encompassed constructing compound access control
facilities at the perimeter of the compounds at 25 posts (see fig. 3 for
an example); building safe areas for post officials in case of attack at
25 posts; improving compound walls, fencing, and barriers at 22 posts (see
fig. 4 for examples); and strengthening the interior walls and doors that
create a "hard line" that separates American staff from visitors at 8
posts.

Figure 3: A New CAC Facility

Figure 4: A New Fence, Bollards, and Concrete Planters

At the 11 posts we visited with ongoing or completed CSUP projects, we
found that the projects had enhanced posts' compliance with State's
physical security standards as detailed in the "Foreign Affairs Handbook"
and "Foreign Affairs Manual." The projects we viewed added or enhanced
pedestrian and vehicle access points, replaced perimeter fencing to meet
anti-climb requirements, installed bollards and barriers at key points to
meet anti-ram requirements, built safe areas for post officials in case of
attack, enhanced the hard line separating post employees from visitors,
and installed forced entry/ballistic-resistant windows and doors.

Nevertheless, without building a new facility, many posts are unable to
meet all security standards for a variety of reasons beyond the scope of
CSUP. We found that none of the posts we visited adhered fully with
current security standards because of conditions that were outside the
scope of CSUP projects.^12 For example, most of the posts we visited were
located in dense urban areas that prevented them from achieving a 100-foot
setback from the street, one of the key security standards (see fig. 5 for
an example). OBO and DS officials acknowledged that, at many locations, it
is not feasible to increase the setback by acquiring land and closing off
nearby streets. In other cases, officials stated the buildings themselves
were not structurally capable of handling heavy forced
entry/ballistic-resistant windows or other upgrades. And in other cases,
officials commented that host nations or cities would not allow certain
upgrades to be implemented, such as removing trees to create a clear zone
around the embassy or changing the facade of historic buildings. Finally,
current plans for the NEC program do not include the replacement of 61 of
262 embassies and consulates. Several of these facilities were built after
physical security standards were strengthened in response to terrorist
attacks against U.S. facilities in Beirut, Lebanon, in the 1980s. State
officials acknowledged that other facilities may not be replaced due to
cost and political concerns. As a result, many buildings and their
occupants may remain vulnerable to attack.

^12When an upgrade project cannot meet security standards due to site
location and other factors, OBO and DS seeks the appropriate waivers and
exceptions to ensure that the process has been fully vetted by
stakeholders.

Figure 5: A Post with Insufficient Setback

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this
report, which are reproduced in appendix II. State agreed with our
findings, noting that the report accurately describes State's CSUP
efforts. State also provided us with technical suggestions and
clarifications that we have addressed in this report, as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
interested Members of Congress and the Secretary of State. We also will
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [19]http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or [20][email protected] .
Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made
major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Acting Director, International Affairs and
Trade

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To discuss the factors that the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
(OBO) considers as it plans and prioritizes Compound Security Upgrades
Program (CSUP) projects, we reviewed Department of State (State)
prioritization and planning documents concerning the assignment of post
threat levels, assessments of the security vulnerabilities of posts, and
CSUP. We discussed CSUP prioritization and planning, as well as changes to
those processes in response to recent attacks, with officials from OBO and
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) in Washington, D.C, and
overseas, including post officials, including Deputy Chiefs of Mission,
Regional Security Officers, facilities managers, and General Services
Officers, and with contractors overseas. In addition, we reviewed past GAO
audit work on related issues. (See Related GAO Products at the end of this
report.) To help confirm the accuracy of our analysis, we discussed our
findings with State personnel involved in CSUP.

To assess the extent to which CSUP projects met cost and schedule
projections, we analyzed data that OBO provided specifically for the
purposes of our review. Our scope included all 47 projects contracted
since fiscal year 2004, completed by the end of fiscal year 2007, and
valued at $1 million or more and, therefore, excluded smaller projects
such as those designed to enhance the security of schools and other
non-U.S. government properties frequented by U.S. personnel and their
dependents. For each CSUP project, OBO provided data on the originally
contracted completion date and cost, the modifications to the contracted
completion date and cost, and the actual date of substantial completion
and final contract cost for completed projects. We reviewed contracting
documents to verify that the data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report. To assess the extent to which CSUP projects
included the security upgrades called for in the contract, we reviewed
OBO's project management procedures. We interviewed project managers in
Washington, D.C., and facilities managers, administrative officers, and
regional security officers at 11 posts to verify the role and
responsibilities of the project managers. We also inspected the ongoing or
completed CSUP work at these posts to verify that the projects encompassed
all of the security upgrades called for under the contract.

To review the extent to which State's CSUP efforts have enhanced posts'
ability to comply with State's physical security standards, we reviewed
the project authorization memoranda, contract modifications, and OBO
summary document on each of the 47 CSUP projects. These documents allowed
us to identify the type of physical security upgrades that were installed
at all 47 facilities. We discussed over 50 completed, ongoing, and planned
projects with OBO officials. To confirm our initial findings, we traveled
to 11 posts in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East that had
recently completed or ongoing CSUP projects. We selected these countries
to ensure regional coverage, a range of project types, and a mix of
ongoing and completed projects; however, as this was not a generalizeable
sample, our findings do not necessarily apply to all posts. We are not
naming the specific countries we visited for this review due to security
concerns. We developed a physical security needs checklist based upon
State's "Foreign Affairs Handbook," "Foreign Affairs Manual," and OBO's
own needs assessment documentation. We applied our checklist consistently
at all 11 posts. Our checklist did not, however, attempt to assess State's
procedures for utilizing physical security upgrades. For example, the
checklist did not assess whether posts use new CACs properly to screen
vehicles or people. At each post, we conducted a review of the security
needs and received briefings on the recently completed, ongoing, or
planned CSUP projects. We met with relevant post personnel, including
Deputy Chiefs of Mission, Regional Security Officers, facilities managers,
and General Services Officers, as well as contractors to discuss the
physical security needs at post, CSUP project management and
implementation, and post-specific limitations to receiving certain
physical security upgrades.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2006 through January
2008, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit
objectives.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial 
Officer: 
Washington, D, C. 20520: 

December 19, 2007: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Embassy 
Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions Prevent 
Full Adherence to Standards," GAO Job Code 320456. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Paula Harrison, Program Analyst, Bureau of Overseas Building 
Operations, at (703) 875-5128.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Bradford R. Higgins: 
cc: GAO ï¿½ Michael Courts: 
OBO ï¿½ Gen. Charles Williams State/OIG ï¿½ Mark Duda: 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft: 

Embassy Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions 
Prevent Full Adherence to Standards (GAO-08-162, GAO Code 320456): 

Thank you for giving the Department the opportunity to comment on GAO's 
report concerning the Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP). We 
appreciate your interest in the Department's planning and 
implementation of CSUP projects. 

We agree with the GAO's observations and conclusions in this review. 
The report accurately describes the Department's significant efforts to 
prioritize, plan, and execute CSUP projects. 

The Department, through the Capital Security Construction program (also 
known as the New Embassy Construction (NEC) program), continues to 
aggressively replace vulnerable, deficient, and functionally obsolete 
overseas facilities with new, safe, and secure compounds. Since 2001, 
the Department ï¿½ with excellent support from the Congress -- has moved 
nearly 15,000 U.S. Government (USG) employees into new buildings. 

However, as noted in this report, the large number of remaining 
deficient facilities ï¿½ in conjunction with the time and cost to 
construct new facilities ï¿½ necessitates interim measures to protect 
overseas personnel. Security upgrades since 1998 have prevented or 
limited deaths, injuries, and damage caused by terrorist attacks on 
U.S. diplomatic facilities in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, and Austria, and have deterred planned attacks at numerous other 
posts. The Compound Security Upgrade Program remains a vital component 
of the Department's ongoing, high priority efforts to provide safe and 
secure facilities. 

The Department agrees with the GAO's conclusion that CSUP projects are 
limited by existing site conditions and other host nation restrictions. 
As stated in one of the report's examples, the Department typically 
cannot meet the 100-foot setback requirement at posts located in dense 
urban areas. In many cases, the only way to meet all security standards 
is to consolidate all post functions within a safe and secure New 
Embassy Compound through the Capital Security Construction program.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Acting Director, International Affairs and
Trade, (202) 512-7331, or [21][email protected]

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition the individual named above, David C. Maurer, Assistant
Director; Michael J. Courts, Assistant Director; Valerie L. Nowak; Thomas
M. Costa; Martin H. de Alteriis; Michael W. Armes; Leslie K. Locke; Ramon
J. Rodriguez; Joseph P. Carney; Ian A. Ferguson; Etana Finkler; and Jason
L. Bair made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Embassy Construction: State Has Made Progress Constructing New Embassies,
but Better Planning Is Needed for Operations and Maintenance Requirements.
[22]GAO-06-641 . Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.

Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures
to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies.
[23]GAO-05-688T . Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2005.

Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures
to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies.
[24]GAO-05-642 . Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005.

Embassy Construction: Achieving Concurrent Construction Would Help Reduce
Costs and Meet Security Goals. [25]GAO-04-952 . Washington, D.C.:
September 28, 2004.

Embassy Construction: State Department Has Implemented Management Reforms,
but Challenges Remain. [26]GAO-04-100 . Washington, D.C.: November 4,
2003.

Overseas Presence: Conditions of Overseas Diplomatic Facilities.
[27]GAO-03-557T . Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2003.

Embassy Construction: Better Long-Term Planning Will Enhance Program
Decision-making. [28]GAO-01-11 . Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2001.

State Department: Overseas Emergency Security Program Progressing, but
Costs Are Increasing. [29]GAO/NSIAD-00-83 . Washington, D.C.: March 8,
2000.

(320456)

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Highlights of [37]GAO-08-162 , a report to the Ranking Member, Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives

January 2008

EMBASSY SECURITY

Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions Prevent Full
Adherence to Standards

Following the 1998 embassy bombings, the Department of State (State)
determined that more than 85 percent of diplomatic facilities did not meet
security standards and were vulnerable to terrorist attacks. State's
Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has undertaken a program to
replace or upgrade the security of these facilities. As of 2007, OBO had
constructed more than 50 new embassies and moved nearly 15,000 staff to
safer facilities. However, most remaining facilities will not be replaced
in the near term. To address these facilities, OBO has obligated about
$140 million per year for its Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP).

GAO was asked to (1) describe the process that OBO follows to prioritize
and plan CSUP projects, including stakeholder involvement; (2) determine
the extent to which CSUP projects met contracted cost and time frames and
whether OBO has procedures to ensure security upgrades are installed; and
(3) assess whether State's CSUP efforts have enhanced posts' abilities to
comply with State's physical security standards. To address these
objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent State documents, met with State
officials in Washington, D.C., and overseas, and traveled to 11 posts in
Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East.

State provided written comments on a draft of this report and agreed with
our findings.

OBO has a threat- and vulnerability-based process for prioritizing which
posts receive CSUP projects and a planning process that utilizes input
from State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and post officials. DS
assessments are currently based on physical security of each post's main
compound, although many posts have facilities located outside the
compound. DS is developing a prioritization process that will factor in
the number of personnel, threat levels, and vulnerabilities at each
facility, including those off compound. OBO has improved its planning
processes by conducting a comprehensive survey of posts' physical security
needs, including off-compound facilities.

GAO found that 96 percent of 47 projects undertaken since fiscal year 2004
were completed within 30 days of their contractual completion date.
However, OBO modified 81 percent of the contracts to extend their
completion dates. GAO also found that while OBO paid the contractors the
amount specified in the contracts, contract modifications resulted in cost
adjustments to all but two contracts, which GAO found in prior work is not
uncommon in government renovation projects. OBO cited factors outside the
contractors' control as the cause of most delays and cost increases, such
as lengthy local permitting issues. To help ensure security upgrades
contracted for are completed, OBO assigns a project manager who is
responsible for the project's completion and relies on regional and post
officials to provide additional monitoring.

CSUP projects have enhanced posts' compliance with physical security
standards by constructing compound access control facilities, safe areas
for post personnel, and compound walls and barriers. However, at the 11
posts GAO visited, site conditions prevented them from adhering fully with
standards. For example, more than one post's urban location prevented it
from achieving a 100-foot setback from the street, a key security
standard. As a result, many buildings and their occupants may remain
vulnerable to attack.

Key Security Measures at a Notional Embassy

References

Visible links
  17. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-642
  18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-334
  19. http://www.gao.gov/
  20. mailto:[email protected]
  21. mailto:[email protected]
  22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-641
  23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-688T
  24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-642
  25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-952
  26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-100
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-557T
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-11
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-83
  30. http://www.gao.gov/
  31. http://www.gao.gov/
  32. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  33. mailto:[email protected]
  34. mailto:[email protected]
  35. mailto:[email protected]
  36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-162
  37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-162
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