Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have
Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve (11-DEC-07,
GAO-08-159).
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round is the
biggest, most complex, and costliest ever. DOD viewed this round
as a unique opportunity to reshape its installations, realign
forces to meet its needs for the next 20 years, and achieve
savings. To realize savings, DOD must first invest billions of
dollars in facility construction, renovation, and other up-front
expenses to implement the BRAC recommendations. However, recent
increases in estimated cost have become a concern to some members
of Congress. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct
evaluations on his own initiative, GAO (1) compared the BRAC
Commission's cost and savings estimates to DOD's current
estimates, (2) assessed potential for change in DOD's current
estimates, and (3) identified broad implementation challenges.
GAO compared the BRAC Commission's estimates, which were the
closest estimates available associated with final BRAC
recommendations, to DOD's current estimates. GAO also visited 25
installations and major commands, and interviewed DOD officials.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-159
ACCNO: A78790
TITLE: Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates
Have Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve
DATE: 12/11/2007
SUBJECT: Base closures
Base realignments
Cost analysis
Cost control
Defense budgets
Defense cost control
Interagency relations
Military bases
Military budgets
Military cost control
Military facilities
Military facility construction
Military personnel
Program evaluation
Strategic planning
Cost estimates
Program coordination
Program implementation
DOD Base Realignment and Closure Program
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-08-159
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]DOD Plans to Spend More and Save Less Than Originally Estima
* [4]DOD Plans to Spend More and Save Less Than Originally Estima
* [5]Estimated One-time Costs Have Increased
* [6]Savings Estimates Have Decreased
* [7]DOD Will Take Longer to Recoup Up-Front Costs Than the BRAC
* [8]DOD's Estimates to Implement BRAC Recommendations Will Likel
* [9]Details for Several Key Recommendations Are Uncertain and Es
* [10]Military Construction Costs Could Increase
* [11]Environmental Cleanup Costs Are Preliminary and Likely to In
* [12]Annual Recurring Savings Estimates May be Overstated
* [13]DOD Has Made Progress Implementing BRAC, but Several Challen
* [14]DOD Has Made Progress Implementing BRAC
* [15]Challenges in Synchronizing Many BRAC Actions Could Hinder D
* [16]DOD Must Synchronize Personnel Movements with
Construction T
* [17]Some Recommendations Are Dependent on the Completion of
Othe
* [18]Some Installations Affected by Multiple Recommendations
* [19]Force Structure Initiatives Further Complicate DOD's
BRAC Im
* [20]Coordination Among Multiple Services and Agencies Presents A
* [21]Conclusion
* [22]Recommendation for Executive Action
* [23]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [24]GAO Contact
* [25]Acknowledgments
* [26]GAO's Mission
* [27]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [28]Order by Mail or Phone
* [29]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [30]Congressional Relations
* [31]Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Addressees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
December 2007
MILITARY BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES
Cost Estimates Have Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve
GAO-08-159
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 4
Background 7
DOD Plans to Spend More and Save Less Than Originally Estimated and Will
Take Longer Than Expected to Recoup Up-Front Costs 12
DOD's Estimates to Implement BRAC Recommendations Will Likely Continue to
Evolve, and Savings Estimates May be Overstated 21
DOD Has Made Progress Implementing BRAC, but Several Challenges Increase
Risk That All Recommendations Might Not be Completed by the Statutory
Deadline 30
Conclusion 41
Recommendation for Executive Action 41
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 45
Appendix II BRAC Recommendations with the Largest Increases in Estimated
Costs 49
Appendix III BRAC Recommendations with the Largest Decreases in Estimated
Net Annual Recurring Savings 51
Appendix IV BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Cost the Most 52
Appendix V BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Annually 54
Appendix VI BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Over a
20-Year Period 56
Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Defense 58
Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 61
Related GAO Products 62
Tables
Table 1: Comparison of BRAC Cost and Savings Estimates 13
Table 2: Army Installations Expecting Net Gains of at Least 5,000
Personnel for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 Due to BRAC, Overseas
Rebasing, Modularity, and Other Miscellaneous Restationing Actions (as of
March 2007) 38
Table 3: BRAC Recommendations That Increased by More Than $50 Million in
Estimated One-Time Costs (Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011) 49
Table 4: BRAC Recommendations That Have Decreased by More Than $25 Million
in Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings (Projected for Fiscal Year 2012)
51
Table 5: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Cost the Most to Implement
(Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011) 52
Table 6: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Annually After
Implementation (Projected for Fiscal Year 2012) 54
Table 7: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Over a 20-Year
Period (Fiscal Years 2006 through 2025) 56
Figures
Figure 1: DOD's Selection Criteria for the BRAC 2005 Round 7
Figure 2: DOD's Review Process of the BRAC 2005 Business Plans 11
Figure 3: Comparison of Time to Recoup BRAC Costs Using BRAC Commission
and DOD's Data 20
Figure 4: Sequencing of Personnel Movement for Several Interdependent BRAC
Recommendations 35
Abbreviations
BRAC Base Realignment and Closure
COBRA Cost of Base Realignment Actions
DOD Department of Defense
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
December 11, 2007
Congressional Addressees
The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently implementing recommendations
resulting from the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. BRAC
2005 is the fifth round undertaken by DOD since 1988 and, by our
assessment, is the biggest, most complex, and costliest BRAC round ever.
With this BRAC round, DOD plans to execute over 800 BRAC actions, relocate
over 123,000 personnel, and spend over $31 billion--an unprecedented
amount, given that DOD has spent about $24 billion to date to implement
the four previous BRAC rounds combined. DOD viewed the BRAC 2005 round as
not only an opportunity to achieve savings but also as a unique
opportunity to reshape its installations and realign its forces to meet
its needs for the next 20 years. The Secretary of Defense made clear at
the outset that his primary goal for the 2005 BRAC round was military
transformation. As such, many of the BRAC 2005 recommendations involve
complex realignments such as designating where forces returning to the
United States from overseas bases would be located; establishing joint
medical centers; creating joint bases; and reconfiguring the defense
supply, storage, and distribution network. However, anticipated savings
resulting from BRAC implementation remained an important consideration and
was a factor in justifying the need for the 2005 BRAC round.1 The
Department of Defense (DOD) is currently implementing recommendations
resulting from the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. BRAC
2005 is the fifth round undertaken by DOD since 1988 and, by our
assessment, is the biggest, most complex, and costliest BRAC round ever.
With this BRAC round, DOD plans to execute over 800 BRAC actions, relocate
over 123,000 personnel, and spend over $31 billion--an unprecedented
amount, given that DOD has spent about $24 billion to date to implement
the four previous BRAC rounds combined. DOD viewed the BRAC 2005 round as
not only an opportunity to achieve savings but also as a unique
opportunity to reshape its installations and realign its forces to meet
its needs for the next 20 years. The Secretary of Defense made clear at
the outset that his primary goal for the 2005 BRAC round was military
transformation. As such, many of the BRAC 2005 recommendations involve
complex realignments such as designating where forces returning to the
United States from overseas bases would be located; establishing joint
medical centers; creating joint bases; and reconfiguring the defense
supply, storage, and distribution network. However, anticipated savings
resulting from BRAC implementation remained an important consideration and
was a factor in justifying the need for the 2005 BRAC round.1
Unlike prior BRAC rounds, which were implemented during times of declining
defense budgets and where the focus was on eliminating excess capacity and
realizing cost savings, the 2005 BRAC round is being implemented during a
time of conflict when many military capabilities are surging and DOD is
also implementing or planning to implement other extensive worldwide
transformation initiatives. For example, at the same time DOD is to
implement the most recent round of BRAC, it is relocating about 50,000
soldiers2 from primarily Europe and Korea to the United Unlike prior BRAC
rounds, which were implemented during times of declining defense budgets
and where the focus was on eliminating excess capacity and realizing cost
savings, the 2005 BRAC round is being implemented during a time of
conflict when many military capabilities are surging and DOD is also
implementing or planning to implement other extensive worldwide
transformation initiatives. For example, at the same time DOD is to
implement the most recent round of BRAC, it is relocating about 50,000
soldiers2 from primarily Europe and Korea to the United States,
transforming the Army's force structure from an organization based on
divisions to more rapidly deployable, brigade-based units, and seeks to
increase its active end strength by 92,000,3 all of which will affect
DOD's facility infrastructure. Consequently, when evaluating DOD's
candidate BRAC recommendations, the BRAC Commission4 focused not only on
costs and savings but also on DOD's future force structure, the ongoing
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and military transformation. In
addition, both DOD and the BRAC Commission reported that their primary
consideration in making recommendations for the 2005 round was military
value.5 To realize savings from BRAC, DOD must first invest billions of
dollars in facility construction, renovation, and other up-front expenses
to implement the BRAC recommendations. However, some members of Congress
have expressed concerns about DOD's increased up-front cost estimates to
implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations.
1 In a 2001 testimony before Congress, the Secretary of Defense stated
that another BRAC round would generate recurring savings the department
could use for other higher-priority defense programs.
2 About 15,000 of these soldiers are included in the 123,000 personnel
mentioned above. Army plans to relocate the remaining soldiers in
realignment actions not related to BRAC.
This report is one in a series of reports we have undertaken on BRAC 2005
implementation. These reports have identified complex challenges to
implementing recommendations from this BRAC round, including retraining
personnel to new missions, completing many construction projects in a
compressed time frame, and synchronizing personnel movements with planned
infrastructure improvements. We also reported that Congress does not have
full visibility over the total expected cost of DOD's BRAC-related
environmental cleanup efforts, several Air National Guard recommendations
are expected to result in annual costs instead of annual savings, and
DOD's cost estimates for implementing recommendations related to the
Army's reserve components have increased while savings estimates have
decreased. A listing of our related products is at the end of this report.
3 The Army plans to seek an increase in its active-duty end strength by
65,000, and the Marine Corps plan to seek an increase in its active-duty
end strength by 27,000 over the next several years.
4 BRAC legislation (Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX, as amended by Pub. L.
No. 107-107, Title XXX) provided for an independent commission to review
the Secretary of Defense's realignment and closure recommendations and the
commission had the authority to change these recommendations if it
determined that the Secretary deviated substantially from the legally
mandated selection criteria. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission (referred to in this report as the BRAC Commission) presented
its list of final recommendations to the President of the United States,
who approved them in their entirety. The President subsequently forwarded
these BRAC recommendations to Congress, and they became effective on
November 9, 2005.
5 Military value refers to one or more of the first four BRAC selection
criteria (see fig. 1), which includes such considerations as an
installation's current and future mission capabilities, condition, ability
to accommodate future needs, and cost of operations. Whereas in prior
rounds, military value was a priority consideration, along with costs and
savings, economic impact to local communities, and other concerns, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 directed DOD to
consider military value above all other criteria in the BRAC 2005 round.
Pub. L. No. 107-107, S 3002 (2001).
As with most of our BRAC-related work, we initiated this review under the
authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own
initiative6 and are reporting the results of our evaluation to you because
of your oversight role of DOD's infrastructure and the BRAC program. We
are also reporting the results of our work as a result of direction by the
House Armed Services Committee to report annually on DOD's implementation
of BRAC 2005.7 Our objectives are to (1) compare cost and savings
estimates in the BRAC Commission's report to DOD's current cost and
savings estimates, (2) assess the potential for further change in DOD's
estimated costs and savings related to implementing BRAC 2005
recommendations, and (3) identify broad challenges that could affect the
implementation of these recommendations and DOD's ability to meet the
statutory 6-year completion period.8
To address these objectives, we interviewed officials in the Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment and
associated BRAC implementation offices in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
To analyze BRAC cost and savings estimates, we compared the change in
these estimates using mostly information in two publicly available
documents--the BRAC Commission's report to the President dated September
2005 and DOD's latest BRAC budget submission to Congress dated February
2007--because they provided the most authoritative financial information
publicly available. Also, we compared the BRAC Commission's estimates,
which were the closest estimates available associated with final BRAC
recommendations, to DOD's current budgeted estimates. To analyze net
annual recurring savings estimates, we used OSD's savings data for fiscal
year 2012--the fiscal year after DOD expects to complete all BRAC
recommendations--because it more fully captured the expected savings and
allowed us to replicate the same methodology used by the BRAC Commission
in its calculation of this estimate. We generally reported costs and
savings in current dollars and not constant dollars except where noted.
Given the unprecedented number of BRAC 2005 closures and realignments, we
focused our analysis on broad issues affecting DOD's cost and savings
estimates and implementation challenges rather than on specific
implementation issues of individual recommendations. In addition, we
visited 17 installations and 8 major commands affected by some of the more
costly BRAC realignments or closures to obtain the perspective of
officials directly involved in BRAC implementation planning and execution.
Overall, we determined that the data to support our objectives were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of making broad comparisons between
the BRAC Commission and DOD's cost and savings estimates and identifying
implementation challenges.
6 31 U.S.C. S 717.
7 H.R. Rep. No. 110-146, at 514 (2007).
8 Pub. L. No. 101-510, S 2904(a)(5), as amended, provides that the
Secretary shall complete all such closures and realignments no later than
the end of the 6-year period beginning on the date on which the President
transmits the report pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the
recommendations for such closures or realignments.
We conducted our work from November 2005, when the BRAC recommendations
became effective, through October 2007, so we could analyze data in DOD's
BRAC budget submission provided to Congress in February 2007. Our work was
conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Further details on our scope and methodology are described in
appendix I.
Results in Brief
Since the BRAC Commission issued its BRAC cost and savings projections in
2005, DOD plans to spend more and save less to implement the BRAC
Commission's recommendations, and it will take the department longer than
expected to recoup up-front costs. DOD's cost estimates to implement these
recommendations have increased from $21 billion to $31 billion (48
percent) compared to the BRAC Commission's estimates, and net annual
savings estimates have decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 billion (5
percent) compared to the BRAC Commission's estimates.9 Our analysis
further shows that DOD's estimated one-time costs to implement nearly 1/5
of the 2005 BRAC recommendations have increased by more than $50 million
each compared to the BRAC Commission's estimates. Of these, the estimated
costs to implement six recommendations have increased by more than $500
million each. Moreover, our analysis of DOD's current estimates shows that
it will take until 2017 for DOD to recoup its up-front costs to implement
BRAC recommendations--4 years longer than the BRAC Commission's estimate.
Similarly, the BRAC Commission estimated that BRAC 2005 would save DOD
about $36 billion over a 20-year period ending in 2025, whereas our
analysis shows BRAC implementation is now expected to save about $15
billion during this 20-year time period, a decrease of 58 percent, because
BRAC cost estimates have increased and savings estimates have decreased.
OSD BRAC officials told us that, although the 20-year savings estimate is
less than the BRAC Commission expected, the department expects the
implementation of this BRAC round to produce capabilities that will
enhance defense operations and management, despite less than anticipated
savings. In addition, both DOD and the BRAC Commission used an estimation
model, known as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA), to assess
the costs and savings of proposed BRAC recommendations during the
decision-making process. The COBRA model relied to a large extent on
standard factors and averages and was not intended to represent
budget-quality estimates. As a result, neither DOD's nor the BRAC
Commission's cost and savings estimates can be assumed to represent the
actual completion costs that Congress will need to fund through
appropriations or fully reflect the savings to be achieved after
implementation.
9 The BRAC Commission reported its estimates in constant fiscal year 2005
dollars (i.e., excludes projected inflation), while DOD reported BRAC
estimates in the fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission to Congress in
current dollars (i.e., includes projected inflation).
DOD's estimated costs and savings to implement the recommendations from
the latest BRAC round are likely to change further due to uncertainties
surrounding certain implementation details for some recommendations,
potential increases in military construction costs, and likely increases
in the cost of environmental cleanup for some BRAC properties. Moreover,
we believe that DOD may have overstated its net annual savings estimates
by about 46 percent or $1.85 billion. DOD's estimated net annual recurring
savings of about $4 billion includes $2.17 billion in eliminated overhead
expenses, which will free up funds that DOD can then use for other
priorities. However, DOD's net annual recurring savings estimate also
includes $1.85 billion in military personnel entitlements--such as
salaries and housing allowances--for personnel DOD plans to transfer to
other locations rather than eliminate. While DOD disagrees with us, we do
not believe that transferring military personnel produces tangible dollar
savings outside the military personnel accounts since these personnel will
continue to receive salaries and benefits. Because DOD's BRAC budget
submission to Congress does not explain the difference between net annual
recurring savings attributable to military personnel entitlements and net
annual recurring savings that will make funds available for other uses,
DOD is generating a false sense that all of its reported savings could be
used to fund other defense priorities.
DOD has made progress in planning for BRAC 2005 implementation, but
several complex challenges to the implementation of those plans increase
the risk that DOD might not meet the September 2011 statutory deadline. By
statute, DOD must complete the recommendations for closing or realigning
bases made in the BRAC 2005 round within 6 years from the date the
President submitted to Congress his approval of the BRAC Commission's
recommendations. Although DOD has completed several BRAC actions already,
the department faces a number of challenges related to the synchronization
and coordination involved in implementing some key recommendations. For
example, the realignment of over 123,000 military and civilian personnel
must be carefully synchronized with the completion of over $21 billion in
new construction or renovation projects to support them. In addition, some
recommendations are dependent on the completion of other recommendations
before facilities can be renovated for new uses, and some DOD
installations are affected by more than six BRAC recommendations. Delays
in completing some interrelated actions could cause a domino effect that
might jeopardize DOD's ability to meet the statutory 2011 BRAC deadline.10
In addition, our analysis shows that 43 percent of DOD's 240 business
plans for implementing BRAC recommendations involve formal coordination
between at least two military services or defense agencies. Such joint
recommendations involving more than one military component have created
challenges in achieving unity of effort.
This report contains a recommendation that DOD explain its annual
recurring savings attributable to military personnel entitlements in its
budget submission to Congress, thus providing more transparency over these
savings. In commenting on a draft of this report, the department concurred
with our recommendation and agreed to include an explanation of the annual
recurring savings in its BRAC budget justification material that
accompanies the annual President's budget. Also, DOD noted that although
net annual recurring savings have decreased from $4.2 billion to $4
billion, these estimated savings still represent a significant benefit
that will result from the implementation of BRAC recommendations. DOD's
written comments are reprinted in appendix VII. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated into this report as
appropriate.
10 Pub. L. No. 101-510, S 2904, as amended (1990).
Background
DOD has undergone four BRAC rounds since 1988 and is currently
implementing its fifth round.11 For the most recent BRAC round--referred
to in this report as the BRAC 2005 round--DOD applied legally mandated
selection criteria that included four criteria related to military value
as well as other criteria regarding costs and savings, economic impact to
local communities, community support infrastructure, and environmental
impact, as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: DOD's Selection Criteria for the BRAC 2005 Round
Military value criteria.
1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on
operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense,
including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated
airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval,
or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and
staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense
missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future
total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving
locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.
Other criteria.
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the
number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or
realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military
installations.
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential
receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to
potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental
compliance activities.
Source: Pub. L. No. 101-510, S 2913.
In applying these BRAC 2005 selection criteria, priority consideration was
given to military value. In fact, as required by BRAC legislation,
military value was the primary consideration for making BRAC
recommendations, as reported by both DOD and the BRAC Commission. DOD also
incorporated into its analytical process several key considerations
required by BRAC legislation, including the use of certified data and
basing its analysis on its 20-year force structure plan.12 In commenting
on DOD's BRAC process in July 2005, we reported that DOD established and
generally followed a logical and reasoned process for formulating its list
of BRAC recommendations.13 Using this analytical process, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provided over 200 BRAC recommendations to
the BRAC Commission for an independent assessment in May 2005. The BRAC
Commission had the authority to change the Secretary's recommendations if
it determined that the Secretary deviated substantially from the legally
mandated selection criteria and DOD's force structure plan. After
assessing OSD's recommendations, the BRAC Commission stated that it
rejected 13 recommendations in their entirety and significantly modified
another 13. Ultimately, the BRAC Commission forwarded a list of 182
recommendations for base closure or realignment to the President for
approval. The BRAC Commission's recommendations were accepted in their
entirety by the President and Congress and became effective November 9,
2005.14 The BRAC legislation requires DOD to complete recommendations for
closing or realigning bases made in the BRAC 2005 round within a 6-year
time frame ending September 15, 2011, 6 years from the date the President
submitted to Congress his approval of the recommendations.
11 The first round in 1988 was completed under the Defense Authorization
Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Pub. L. No. 100-526,
Title II, as amended (1988)). Subsequently, additional BRAC rounds were
completed in 1991, 1993, and 1995 as authorized in the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Pub .L. No.101-510, Title XXIX, as
amended (1990)). The latest round--BRAC 2005--was authorized in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Pub. L. No.
107-107, Title XXX, (2001)).
To provide a framework for promoting consistency in estimating the costs
and savings associated with various proposed BRAC recommendations, DOD
used an estimation model, known as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions
(COBRA).15 The COBRA model has been used in the base closure process since
1988. It provided important financial information to the selection process
as decision makers weighed the financial implications for various BRAC
actions along with military value and other selection criteria when
arriving at final decisions regarding the suitability of BRAC
recommendations.16 In addition, the department designed the model to
calculate estimated costs and savings associated with actions that are
necessary to implement BRAC recommendations over the 6-year implementation
period and to calculate recurring costs or savings thereafter. As such,
the BRAC Commission continued to use DOD's COBRA model for making its cost
and savings estimates.
12 Specified DOD personnel are required to certify to the best of their
knowledge and belief that information provided to the Secretary of Defense
or the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission concerning the
realignment or closure of a military installation is accurate and
complete. Pub. L. No. 101-510, S 2903(c)(5). The force structure plan is
the numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise U.S. forces,
for example, divisions, air wings, aircraft, tanks, and so forth. Pub. L.
No. 101-510, S 2912(a)(1)(A).
13 GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, [32]GAO-05-785
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).
14 The President was required to approve or disapprove the BRAC
Commission's recommendations in their entirety by September 23, 2005.
After they were approved, the recommendations were forwarded to Congress,
which had 45 days or until adjournment of Congress to disapprove the
recommendations on an all-or-none basis; otherwise, the recommendations
became effective.
The COBRA model relies to a large extent on standard factors and averages
but is not intended to--and consequently does not--represent
budget-quality estimates. As a result, neither DOD's or the BRAC
Commission's COBRA-generated estimates can be assumed to represent the
actual completion costs that Congress will need to fund through
appropriations or fully reflect the savings to be achieved after
implementation. We have examined COBRA in the past and have found it to be
a generally reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings
among candidate alternatives but have not considered it a tool for use in
budgeting.17 In the intervening years, COBRA has been revised to address
certain problems we and others have identified after each round. As with
any model, the quality of the output is dependent on the quality of the
input. For example, a DOD analyst could assume a building could be
renovated to accommodate receiving personnel; however, when BRAC
implementation began, site surveys showed that the building could not be
renovated, thus requiring new construction that increased estimated costs.
The model provides a standard quantitative approach to comparing estimated
costs and savings across various proposed recommendations. In this and
previous BRAC rounds, DOD subsequently developed budget-quality estimates
once BRAC recommendations became effective. Thus, the BRAC Commission's
estimated implementation costs and savings were useful for comparing
candidate recommendations and DOD has subsequently refined these estimates
based on better information after conducting site surveys.
15 The COBRA model provided for several key outputs such as (1) estimated
one-time costs for such factors as military construction, personnel
severance, or moving costs over the implementation period; (2) estimated
savings for such factors as personnel reductions or eliminations, or
reduced operations and maintenance costs; (3) savings that are expected to
occur annually after the implementation period; (4) the payback period for
estimating when total savings will exceed total costs; and (5) the 20-year
savings, also known as net present value, of implementing BRAC actions.
16 Pub. L. No. 101-510, S 2913(c)(1) requires DOD to consider the extent
and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years
until savings exceed costs, in its BRAC selection process.
17 GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, [33]GAO-05-785
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005) and Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's
1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment,
[34]GAO/NSIAD-95-133 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 1995).
BRAC legislation requires DOD to submit an annual schedule containing
revised BRAC cost and savings estimates for each closure and realignment
recommendation to Congress. To meet this legislative requirement, DOD
presents its schedule in its annual BRAC budget submission to Congress.
For BRAC 2005 recommendations, DOD's first presentation of its cost and
savings schedule was in its fiscal year 2007 budget submission to Congress
in March 2006. However, the department stated in its submission that it
did not have enough time to formulate a reasonable BRAC budget and that
the fiscal year 2007 BRAC budget submission contained significant funding
shortfalls. DOD's second presentation of its cost and savings schedule was
its fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission to Congress in February 2007.
For the BRAC 2005 round, the OSD BRAC Office--under the oversight of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics--has
monitored the services' and defense agencies' implementation progress,
analyzed budget justifications for significant differences in cost and
savings estimates, and facilitated the resolution of any challenges that
may impair the successful implementation of the recommendations within the
6-year completion period. To facilitate its oversight role, OSD required
the military departments and certain defense agencies to submit a detailed
business plan for each of their recommendations. These business plans
include information such as a listing of all actions needed to implement
each recommendation, schedules for personnel movements between
installations, updated cost and savings estimates based on better and
updated information, and implementation completion time frames.18 OSD's
general process for reviewing business plans is shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: DOD's Review Process of the BRAC 2005 Business Plans
aOSD BRAC Office oversees the planning and execution of the BRAC 2005
program.
bThe Secretary of Defense established the Infrastructure Steering Group to
oversee the BRAC 2005 process. The group is chaired by the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), and composed of the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Vice Chiefs, the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), and the
Military Department Assistant Secretaries for Installations and
Environment.
OSD BRAC officials consider their business plans to be living documents
that will evolve over the course of the 6-year implementation period.
Additionally, OSD's General Counsel assesses whether the business plans
meet the intent of the BRAC Commission's recommendations.
18 OSD assigned one of the military services or a defense agency to take
the lead in developing business plans for each recommendation or a
distinct part of a recommendation. For recommendations affecting multiple
services or defense agencies, the military service or defense agency with
facility management authority at the gaining site usually prepared the
business plan.
DOD Plans to Spend More and Save Less Than Originally Estimated and Will Take
Longer Than Expected to Recoup Up-Front Costs
Compared to the BRAC Commission's estimates, DOD plans to spend more and
save less to implement BRAC recommendations than the BRAC Commission
originally estimated, and it will take longer than expected for DOD to
recoup its up-front costs. Since the BRAC Commission issued its cost and
savings estimates in 2005, DOD's reported estimates of the costs to
implement about 180 BRAC recommendations have increased by $10 billion to
about $31.2 billion while annual savings estimates have decreased by about
$200 million--$4.2 billion to $4 billion. Moreover, our analysis of DOD's
current estimates shows that it will take until 2017 for the department to
recoup its up-front costs to implement BRAC recommendations--4 years
longer than the BRAC Commission's estimates indicate this would happen.
Similarly, whereas the BRAC Commission estimated that the implementation
of the BRAC 2005 recommendations would save DOD about $36 billion over a
20-year period ending in 2025, BRAC implementation is now expected to save
about $15 billion, a decrease of 58 percent.
DOD Plans to Spend More and Save Less Than Originally Estimated
Since the BRAC Commission issued its cost and savings projections in 2005,
cost estimates to implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations have increased
from $21 billion to $31 billion (48 percent) compared to the BRAC
Commission's reported estimates19 and net annual recurring savings
estimates have decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 billion (5 percent)
compared to the BRAC Commission's reported estimates as shown in table 1.
19 The BRAC Commission forwarded 182 BRAC recommendations to the President
who approved them in their entirety. Our analysis shows DOD requested
funds to implement 175 recommendations because 7 recommendations do not
involve implementation costs for various reasons.
Table 1: Comparison of BRAC Cost and Savings Estimates
Dollars in millions
Difference
BRAC Commission's DOD's
Category reported estimatesa estimatesb Amount Percent
One-time costs during
implementation
(fiscal years 2006 through
2011) $21,025 $31,160 $10,135 48
Net annual recurring
savings after
implementation
(fiscal years 2012 through
2025) 4,225 4,014 (212) (5)
Source: GAO analysis of BRAC Commission and DOD data.
Notes: Amounts may not total due to rounding.
aThe BRAC Commission reported its estimates in constant fiscal year 2005
dollars (i.e., does not include projected inflation). Also, OSD officials
told us they disagreed with the BRAC Commission's reported estimates for
18 recommendations and would increase one-time costs during BRAC
implementation by about $224 million and increase net annual recurring
savings after implementation by about $144 million to the BRAC
Commission's estimates shown in this table.
bDOD reported its BRAC estimates in the fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget
submission to Congress in current dollars (i.e., includes projected
inflation).
A comparison of the BRAC Commission's reported projections with DOD's data
shows that estimated implementation costs have increased by $10.1 billion
or 48 percent and estimated net annual recurring savings have decreased by
$212 million or 5 percent. However, another way to compare expected BRAC
costs and saving is by omitting the effects of inflation. We found that
using the same constant dollar basis as used by the BRAC
Commission--meaning inflation is not considered--DOD's estimated one-time
costs to implement BRAC increased to about $28.6 billion or 36 percent in
constant dollars and estimated net annual recurring savings decreased to
about $3.4 billion or 20 percent in constant dollars compared to the BRAC
Commission's reported estimates.
We found that estimated military construction costs accounted for about 64
percent of the increase in expected BRAC one-time costs. Specifically, the
BRAC Commission estimated that to implement the BRAC recommendations,
military construction costs would be about $13 billion, whereas DOD's
current estimates for military construction, without inflation, were about
$20 billion. We estimated that inflation accounted for about 25 percent,
or about $2.6 billion of the increase in expected one-time costs. This
mostly occurred because the BRAC Commission presented its estimates using
constant fiscal year 2005 dollars, which does not include the effects of
projected inflation, whereas DOD's budgeted estimates were presented in
current (inflated) dollars because budget requests take into consideration
projected inflation. Further, the BRAC Commission estimates did not
include projected environmental cleanup costs for BRAC-affected bases,
which is a consistent practice with past BRAC rounds because DOD is
required to perform needed environmental cleanup on its property whether a
base is closed, realigned, or remains open. Environmental cleanup added
about 6 percent, or about $590 million in expected costs. Finally, other
projected expenses such as operation and maintenance accounted for about 5
percent or about $500 million of the increase in expected costs. Because
the BRAC Commission's data do not include some specific budget categories
that are used in the DOD BRAC budget, we could not make direct comparisons
and precisely identify all estimated cost and savings changes.
Estimated One-time Costs Have Increased
Our analysis shows that estimated one-time costs to implement 33 BRAC
recommendations, representing nearly 1/5 of all the BRAC recommendations
for this round, increased by more than $50 million each compared to the
BRAC Commission's estimates. (See app. II for a listing of these
recommendations.) DOD's expected costs to implement 6 of these
recommendations increased by a total of about $4 billion. Specifically, we
found about:
o $970 million increase in the estimated costs of consolidating
various leased locations and closing other locations of the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to Fort Belvoir, Virginia,
largely because the agency identified the need for additional
supporting facilities, such as a technology center and additional
warehouse space, as well as increased costs for information
technology and furnishings to outfit the new buildings. According
to OSD's business plan, the COBRA analysis of specific costs and
the number of personnel to realign were classified;
o $700 million increase in the estimated costs of realigning
Walter Reed Army Medical Center, D.C., and relocating medical care
functions to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda,
Maryland, and Fort Belvoir, Virginia, largely because planning
officials identified the need for additional space and supporting
facilities at the receiving installations that increased estimated
military construction costs by almost $440 million. Most of these
estimated cost increases are expected to occur at the National
Naval Medical Center, Maryland, because of increased requirements
to renovate existing facilities, such as the medical center.
Additionally, several other facilities, such as a parking
structure and a larger than-initially-expected addition to the
medical center, increased the construction cost estimates as well;
o $680 million increase in the estimated costs of relocating the
Army's armor center and school from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Fort
Benning, Georgia, to support the creation of a new maneuver
school, largely because the Army identified the need for about
$400 million in construction of several facility projects, such as
training ranges, instructional facilities, barracks, medical
facilities, and a child development center that were not in the
initial estimates. Also, the Army identified the need for about
$280 million more in infrastructure support, such as water, sewer,
and gas lines, as well as roads to support the new maneuver school
at Fort Benning;
o $680 million increase in the estimated costs of closing Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey, largely because of increases in expected
military construction costs, such as $375 million at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, which is to receive many of the missions from the
planned closure of Fort Monmouth and for additional facilities,
such as a communications equipment building and an instructional
auditorium. Also, the Army identified the need for additional
infrastructure improvements at Aberdeen such as utilities, roads,
and information technology upgrades. The Army determined that its
military construction estimates would increase because the
existing facilities at Aberdeen could not accommodate an increase
in size of Fort Monmouth's Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance mission
as originally estimated. Moreover, military construction costs to
relocate the U.S. Army Military Academy Preparatory School from
Fort Monmouth to West Point, New York, increased about $175
million largely because the scope of the facility construction
increased from approximately 80,000 square feet to more than
250,000 square feet and planning officials identified the need to
spend about $40 million to prepare the site for construction,
particularly for rock removal, given the terrain at West Point.
Also, DOD's cost estimates for environmental cleanup at Fort
Monmouth have increased by more than $60 million;
o $600 million increase in the estimated costs of co-locating
miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field activity-leased
locations to Fort Belvoir and Fort Lee, Virginia, largely due to
increases in military construction cost due to the identification
of various required facilities at the receiving installations not
included in the original estimate. For example, construction costs
increased because it was determined a structured parking garage
costing about $160 million would be needed to accommodate the
increase in personnel with parking needs compared to the original
nearly $3 million estimate for a flat surface parking lot. An
additional estimated cost increase of nearly $50 million is needed
to cover the costs for a heating and cooling plant and various
safety and antiterrorism protection features. Estimated costs also
increased by more than $160 million to implement this
recommendation for increased information technology needs; and
o $550 million increase in the estimated costs of establishing the
San Antonio Regional Medical Center and realigning enlisted
medical training to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, largely because
planning officials identified additional requirements to move
medical inpatient care functions from Wilford Hall Medical Center
at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas to Fort Sam Houston, including
operating rooms and laboratory facilities not included in the
original estimate. Additionally, requirements for more
instructional and laboratory space increased to accommodate an
increase in the number of students expected to receive medical
training at Fort Sam Houston. Based on the services conducting
additional analysis and using other planning assumptions, the
number of students now expected to arrive at Fort Sam Houston for
medical enlisted training increased by more than 2,700 (44
percent)--from about 6,270 students to approximately 9,000
students.
BRAC implementing officials told us that information gained from
site visits, such as better information on the actual condition
and availability of certain facilities, was a key factor as to why
the department's estimates changed from the BRAC Commission's
estimates. For example, DOD's estimated cost increased over
earlier projections as a result of better data becoming available
on the realignment of the Army Forces Command headquarters due to
the closure of Fort McPherson, Georgia. These data showed the
Command realigned to Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base, North
Carolina would be located in over 20 different buildings. The Army
decided, therefore, to preserve existing operational efficiencies
by keeping the entire Command intact in one location, as it is now
at Fort McPherson, by building a new facility at Fort Bragg
although this plan led to the increase in expected costs to
implement the recommendation.
Moreover, data for some recommendations changed as certain
requirements became better defined over time. For example,
personnel requirements related to the recommendation to activate a
brigade combat team and its associated headquarters unit at Fort
Hood, Texas, and then relocate it to Fort Carson, Colorado, became
better defined after the BRAC Commission made its estimates.
During the BRAC decision-making process in 2005, the Army planned
its facility requirement on about 3,200 soldiers per brigade
combat team but subsequently increased the personnel requirement
to 3,900 soldiers per brigade combat team as it budgeted for
needed facilities in formulating the fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget
submission. Likewise, the personnel requirement in providing
facilities for an associated headquarters unit increased from 300
soldiers in the initial analysis to 900, thus increasing the
expected costs. Thus, the number of personnel to be accommodated
at Fort Carson in order to implement this BRAC recommendation
increased by 37 percent from what was initially expected, which in
turn increased the size of the facilities necessary to house the
additional soldiers expected to arrive at Fort Carson, leading to
an increase in expected cost to implement this recommendation.
As in all previous BRAC rounds, the BRAC Commission used DOD's
COBRA model to generate its estimates. Both we and the BRAC
Commission acknowledged in our respective BRAC 2005 reports that
the COBRA model, while valuable as a comparative tool, does not
provide estimates that DOD is expected to use in formulating the
BRAC budget and against which Congress will appropriate funds. We
have stated that COBRA does not necessarily reflect with a high
degree of precision the actual costs or savings that are
ultimately associated with BRAC implementation. We have also
stated that the services are expected to refine COBRA estimates
following the BRAC decision-making process to better reflect
expected costs and savings using site-specific information. While
COBRA estimates do not reflect the actual costs and savings
ultimately attributable to BRAC, we have recognized in the past
and continue to believe that COBRA is a reasonably effective tool
for the purpose for which it was designed--to aid in BRAC decision
making--and that the BRAC Commission's COBRA-generated estimates
are the only reasonable baseline to use to identify BRAC cost and
savings changes since the recommendations became effective.20
Savings Estimates Have Decreased
Our analysis shows that estimated net annual recurring savings to
implement 13 BRAC recommendations decreased by more than $25
million each compared to the BRAC Commission's estimates. (See
app. III for a listing of these recommendations.) The BRAC
Commission estimated that BRAC 2005 would result in net annual
recurring savings of $4.2 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012;
however, we calculated that the net annual recurring savings have
decreased to $4 billion (5 percent).21 DOD attributed the decrease
in its savings estimate primarily to changes in initial
assumptions or plans. We identified several BRAC recommendations
for which savings estimates decreased compared to the BRAC
Commission's estimates. Specifically, we found about:
o $90 million decrease in the estimated savings of closing various
leased locations of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
and realigning other locations to Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
Initially, officials at the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency and the OSD BRAC Office explained that fewer personnel
eliminations caused some of the decrease in savings. Additionally,
the day before we released this draft for comment, an OSD BRAC
Office official explained to us that they underreported the
estimated savings from expected lease terminations in the fiscal
year 2008 BRAC budget submission. However, time did not permit us
to analyze this information.
o $80 million decrease in the estimated savings of closing three
chemical demilitarization depots (Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah;
Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana; and Umatilla Chemical Depot,
Oregon), largely because the Army expects not to close these
facilities within the BRAC statutory implementation time frame
because DOD must complete the chemical demilitarization mission to
comply with treaty obligations before these facilities can close,
which resulted in less expected savings;
o $70 million decrease in the estimated savings of establishing
joint bases at multiple locations, largely because the Army did
not include its share of the expected savings due to unresolved
issues concerning joint base operations, whereas the other
services included the COBRA-generated savings in DOD's BRAC budget
submission to Congress. OSD had not approved the business plan for
this recommendation; thus additional information on expected
savings was not available for us to review; and
o $50 million savings decrease in realigning the Defense Logistics
Agency's supply, storage, and distribution network, largely
because of the need to retain higher inventory levels than
anticipated and less personnel elimination.
20 In DOD's initial BRAC fiscal year 2007 budget submission to Congress in
March 2006, the department stated that it did not have enough time to
formulate a reasonable BRAC budget and that the budget submission
contained significant funding shortfalls. Based on our analysis of DOD's
initial BRAC budget submission, we agreed and believed it would have been
inappropriate for us to use the data in our analysis.
21 Estimates for net annual recurring savings are based on DOD's annual
recurring costs and savings expected in 2012, the year after DOD expects
to complete BRAC implementation. OSD BRAC officials told us they expect
2012 to be the first year to accrue the full amount of net annual
recurring savings because some recommendations are not expected to be
completed until late 2011. Based on data OSD provided us, DOD expects to
generate about $400 million more in annual recurring savings using its
2012 data, which we have included in our analysis, compared to the data
provided in the department's fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission to
Congress.
DOD Will Take Longer to Recoup Up-Front Costs Than the BRAC Commission
Expected
DOD's current estimates to implement the BRAC recommendations show
that it will take until 2017 for the department to recoup its
up-front costs--4 years longer than the BRAC Commission's
estimates indicated it would take for DOD's up-front investments
to begin to pay back.22 Historically, it has taken DOD about 6 1/2
years to recoup up-front costs for actions such as constructing
new facilities, providing civilian severance pay, or moving
personnel and equipment as a result of implementing BRAC
recommendations. Our analysis of the BRAC Commission's estimates
shows that the time required to recoup such costs would be 8
years, or in 2013. However, using DOD's current estimates, our
analysis shows that the time required to recoup costs would be 12
years, or in 2017, as shown in figure 3.
22 Payback period is a metric used by DOD and the BRAC Commission in
evaluating individual BRAC recommendations and represents the time
required to recoup up-front investment costs to implement BRAC
recommendations. Thus, payback or the break-even point is when cumulative
savings exceed cumulative costs.
Figure 3: Comparison of Time to Recoup BRAC Costs Using BRAC Commission
and DOD's Data
Similarly, because DOD expects to spend more and save less compared to the
BRAC Commission's estimates, projected 20-year savings have decreased by
more than half.23 The BRAC Commission estimated that the implementation of
this BRAC round would save about $36 billion over a 20-year period ending
in 2025. However, based on our analysis of DOD's current estimates,
implementation of this BRAC round will save about $15 billion, a decrease
of $21 billion (58 percent), in fiscal year 2005 constant dollars. OSD
BRAC officials told us that, although the 20-year savings estimate is less
than the BRAC Commission expected, the department expects the
implementation of this BRAC round to produce capabilities that will
enhance defense operations and management, despite less than anticipated
savings.
Moreover, DOD expects a majority of the expected costs and savings to be
related to the implementation of a small percentage of the BRAC
recommendations. For example, we determined that DOD expects the
implementation of about 13 percent of the recommendations to incur 65
percent of the expected one-time costs (see app. IV); 15 percent of the
recommendations to generate 85 percent of the expected annual recurring
savings (see app. V); and 16 percent of the recommendations to generate 85
percent of the expected 20-year savings (see app. VI).
DOD's Estimates to Implement BRAC Recommendations Will Likely Continue to
Evolve, and Savings Estimates May be Overstated
Based on our analysis, we believe DOD's cost and savings estimates to
implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations are likely to continue to evolve
in future BRAC budget submissions. First, DOD's estimates for some key
recommendations are uncertain because they are based on implementation
details that are still evolving, especially for some complex
recommendations such as establishing 12 new joint bases. Second, military
construction costs could increase due to various economic factors and a
possible readjustment of Army construction costs. Third, environmental
cleanup costs for BRAC implementation are preliminary and are likely to
increase. Furthermore, we believe that DOD's annual recurring savings
estimates may be overstated, largely because 46 percent of this savings is
due to questionable military personnel savings.
23 Twenty-year savings, also known as 20-year net present value in the
BRAC Commission's report, is a financial calculation that accounted for
the time value of money by determining the present value of future savings
minus up-front investment costs over a specified period of time.
Determining net present value is important because it illustrates both the
up-front investment costs and long-term savings in a single amount. In the
context of BRAC implementation, net present value is calculated for a
20-year period from 2006 through 2025.
Details for Several Key Recommendations Are Uncertain and Estimates Are Likely
to Change
Many details involved in the implementation of several key BRAC
recommendations were uncertain when the department submitted its fiscal
year 2008 BRAC budget submission to Congress in February 2007; thus, these
estimates are likely to continue to change in succeeding BRAC budget
submissions. OSD officials told us that some estimates could change as
implementation planning progresses and that initial planning for many
recommendations was very difficult but they wanted to provide Congress
with the best budget data available at the time of the budget submission.
However, until DOD resolves implementation details surrounding its BRAC
recommendations, it will continue to have difficulty in more precisely
estimating costs and savings and the resolution of these details could
cause the department's cost and savings estimates to change. For example:
o Realigning Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C.
Multiple groups reviewed current and future medical care for
wounded soldiers, and DOD officials told us that cost estimates in
DOD's next BRAC budget submission to Congress could change pending
the outcomes of these various review groups. OSD officials told us
implementation costs will likely increase from the reported $1.7
billion estimate if the time frame to complete the recommendation
is accelerated, as recommended by OSD's independent panel to
review current rehabilitative care at Walter Reed.24
o Co-locating miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field
activity leased locations to Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The Army had
planned to relocate these agencies and activities to Fort
Belvoir's Engineering Proving Ground, but in August 2007 the Army
announced it is considering a nearby location currently belonging
to the U.S. General Services Administration in Springfield,
Virginia. Then, in October 2007, the Army announced it is also
considering another site in Northern Virginia for relocating about
6,000 personnel. The reported cost estimate of $1.2 billion to
implement this recommendation is likely to change depending on the
Army's site location for relocating these OSD offices, defense
agencies, and defense field activities.
o Establishing Army Centers of Excellence at several locations.
The Army was not certain about the number of personnel it expected
to eliminate as a result of combining several Army schools and
centers at the time of the fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission
to Congress.25 Based on our analysis, once the Army resolves the
implementation details for these recommendations, the combined net
annual savings estimate of $332 million is likely to change in the
next BRAC budget submission.
o Realigning Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The decision as to where
to relocate on Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the Army's 7th
Special Forces Group currently located at Fort Bragg remained
uncertain as of August 2007. According to officials at Eglin, the
planned location of the Special Forces Group could change because
of various space and noise issues associated with the
installation's implementation of another BRAC recommendation to
establish a joint training site for the Joint Strike Fighter
aircraft, also at Eglin Air Force Base. DOD's estimated $343
million in cost in its fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission to
Congress would change depending on the final site location for the
7th Special Forces Group at Eglin.
o Establishing joint basing at multiple locations. The services
have yet to agree on many of the details involved with this
recommendation to create 12 joint bases. According to BRAC
implementing officials and recent testimony before Congress, it is
still uncertain what the organizational and personnel requirements
will be for these joint bases, thus making it difficult to provide
a realistic estimate on the costs or savings from implementing
this recommendation. DOD is currently estimating net savings of
$116 million annually.
o Realigning medical enlisted training at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
Part of this recommendation required the services to co-locate
their medical training to one location with the potential of
transitioning to a joint training effort. Fort Sam Houston
officials told us that the expected savings from this
recommendation were anticipated based on a joint training effort.
However, BRAC implementing officials told us the services had not
yet agreed on the final joint curriculum when the fiscal year 2008
BRAC budget submission was provided to Congress; thus the number
of instructors needed and several other details remained
uncertain. These officials told us that once these details become
final, the amount of expected net savings, which DOD estimated to
be about $91 million annually, could change for this
recommendation.
o Creating a Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments Research,
Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation Center mostly at
Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, California. Navy officials
told us they were uncertain how many personnel associated with a
testing range mission will realign as they plan for the
implementation of this recommendation. Moreover, the DOD Inspector
General recently reported that the Navy did not adequately
document the number of personnel expected to realign in this
recommendation's proposed business plan, citing that the number of
personnel to move has ranged from about 1,660 to nearly 650.26
Until OSD resolves implementation details surrounding this
recommendation, it will continue to have difficulty in more
precisely estimating the associated costs and savings. DOD
estimated it will cost about $427 million to implement this
recommendation as presented in the fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget
submission and OSD estimated it will accrue a net recurring
savings of $68 million annually after 2011.
o Co-locating medical command headquarters. Various BRAC
implementing officials associated with planning the implementation
for this recommendation told us that depending on the still
undecided final site location and the number of personnel to
relocate, the $50 million in estimated costs to implement this
recommendation could likely change.
24 Report by the Independent Review Group on Rehabilitative Care and
Administrative Processes at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the
National Naval Medical Center, April 2007.
25 Combining several existing schools and centers is associated with three
BRAC recommendations. These Army recommendations are (1) realign the Armor
School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, with the Infantry School at Fort Benning,
Georgia, to create the new Maneuver Training Center; (2) realign various
combat service support functions from various installations to Fort Lee,
Virginia, to establish a combined Combat Service Support Center; and (3)
realign the Air Defense Artillery School from Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort
Sill, Oklahoma, to form the new Net Fires Center.
These recommendations illustrate the evolving nature of
implementation planning and the likelihood that the associated
cost and savings estimates could likely change. They are not the
only recommendations which may experience changes in costs or
savings; however, they are some of the recommendations from which
DOD expects to incur the most costs and savings relative to other
BRAC 2005 recommendations. Thus, changes to cost and savings
estimates related to these recommendations will have a larger
effect on the overall BRAC implementation estimates.
Military Construction Costs Could Increase
Military construction costs could increase due to various economic
pressures and if the Army's new initiatives designed to reduce
construction costs do not achieve the planned results. DOD's
current cost estimates of $31 billion to implement the BRAC
recommendations involve about $21 billion in estimated costs for
military construction that could likely increase because of
greater than expected inflation and the market demand for new
construction. Since the majority of expected BRAC costs are for
military construction, systemic increases in the cost of
construction could have a considerable effect on the total cost to
implement BRAC 2005. This change is important because DOD's
estimate of $21 billion in military construction is the single
largest cost item associated with implementing BRAC 2005
recommendations and is unprecedented given that DOD spent less
than $7 billion for military construction in the four previous
BRAC rounds combined. In addition, we recognize that determining
costs in construction programs that span years of effort is
difficult. As such, DOD told us they will continue to monitor
reasons for potential cost growth for BRAC construction contracts.
26 DOD Inspector General, Navy's Proposed Business Plan for Base
Realignment and Closure 2005 Recommendation 184, D-2007-127 (Arlington,
Va.: Sept. 25, 2007).
Additionally, BRAC implementing officials expressed concern that
construction costs have the potential to increase in areas already
experiencing high commercial construction demands such as the
National Capital Region, Washington, D.C. and San Antonio, Texas.
For example, DOD estimated it could cost about $3.4 billion in
construction to implement several recommendations in the National
Capital Region, Washington, D.C. (the realignment of Walter Reed
Medical Center, the relocation of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the realignment to Fort
Belvoir due to numerous terminations of DOD-leased space in the
Washington, D.C. area). Moreover, DOD estimated it could cost
about $1.3 billion in construction to implement the recommendation
to establish a new joint medical enlisted training center and
relocate Lackland Air Force Base's medical inpatient care to Fort
Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) officials told us they are concerned about what effect
construction demand might have on bid proposals given the sizable
amount of construction to take place in a limited amount of time
to meet the BRAC statutory completion time frame. Additionally,
service officials at various installations expressed concern about
the potential for increases in construction costs because of
ongoing reconstruction due to damage caused by Hurricane Katrina,
coupled with the large volume of anticipated BRAC construction
that could also affect bid proposals.
Similar to the current commercial construction market in general,
military construction has been affected by rising costs for
construction labor and materials for the last several years. USACE
officials told us the actual rate of construction inflation for
the last several years has exceeded the federal government's
inflation rate used for budgetary purposes, which is required to
be used in budgeting for construction projects. While this
difference was as high as 6.1 percentage points in 2004, the
difference between the actual rate of construction inflation and
the government's budgetary inflation rate has diminished recently.
USACE officials told us that if the extent to which the actual
rate of inflation continues to exceed the budgeted rate as
implementation proceeds, and if construction material costs are
higher than anticipated, they would either have to redirect
funding from other sources to provide for construction projects or
resort to a reduction in the scope of some construction projects.
However, this trend may not necessarily continue into the future
depending on the economics surrounding the construction industry.
USACE is currently transforming and streamlining its process for
managing and contracting for military construction. USACE
officials told us that these transformation efforts could help in
meeting Army's expected large volume of military construction as
well as costs associated with BRAC and other force structure
initiatives such as overseas rebasing and Army modularity. USACE
has developed a strategy intended to reduce construction costs by
15 percent and reduce construction time by 30 percent. Through its
transformation strategy, USACE intends to change how it executes
construction projects by
o standardizing facility designs and processes,
o expanding the use of premanufactured building where sections or
modules of a building are constructed and transported to a
construction site to be assembled,
o executing military construction as a continuous building program
rather than a collection of individual construction projects, and
o emphasizing commercial rather that government building
standards, which would allow contractors greater flexibility to
use a wider variety of construction materials to meet construction
requirements.
The Army has already incorporated a 15 percent reduction into its
BRAC construction estimates and has budgeted accordingly. Although
USACE officials expressed optimism that these cost savings will be
realized, and preliminary results are encouraging, these results
are based on recent, limited experience using this new process.
Specifically, USACE initiated five construction pilots in 2006,
all of which were awarded under its price limit. However, if the
cost of construction materials escalates or if there is a shortage
of construction labor, especially in locations of high
construction volume such as Washington, D.C, and San Antonio,
Texas, USACE told us that some of the expected military
construction transformation savings could decrease. Given that the
Army is expected to incur almost 60 percent of the estimated BRAC
construction costs ($12 billion), the impact on overall BRAC costs
if the Army is unable to achieve its projected 15 percent savings
could be considerable, especially since USACE officials told us
the majority of the Army's BRAC-related construction projects
incorporated the 15 percent reduction into their estimates.
Environmental Cleanup Costs Are Preliminary and Likely to Increase
We reported in January 2007 that DOD's available data showed that
at least $950 million will be needed to complete environmental
cleanups underway for known hazards on the military bases
scheduled for closure as a result of the BRAC 2005 round.27 Our
prior work has shown that some closures result in more intensive
environmental investigations and the uncovering of additional
hazardous contaminations, thus resulting in higher cleanup costs
than DOD predicted and budgeted. For example, additional hazardous
contaminations were found at the former McClellan Air Force Base,
California, which was recommended for closure in 1995. The
discovery of traces of plutonium during a routine cleanup in 2000
caused cleanup costs to increase by $21 million. However, as
certain bases undergo more complete and in-depth environmental
assessments, a clearer picture of environmental cleanup costs will
likely emerge.
Annual Recurring Savings Estimates May be Overstated
DOD's estimated annual recurring savings resulting from base
closures and realignments may be overstated by about 46 percent.
Currently, DOD calculates total estimated annual recurring savings
of about $4 billion. This amount includes $2.17 billion in
eliminated overhead expenses such as the costs no longer needed to
operate and maintain closed or realigned bases and reductions in
civilian salaries, which will free up funds that DOD can then use
for other defense priorities. However, DOD's annual recurring
savings estimate also includes $1.85 billion in military personnel
entitlements--such as salaries and housing allowances--for
military personnel DOD plans to shift to other positions but does
not plan to eliminate. While DOD disagrees with us, we do not
believe that transferring personnel to other locations produces
tangible dollar savings outside the military personnel accounts
that DOD can use to fund other defense priorities since these
personnel will continue to receive salaries and benefits.
We recognize that DOD is trying to transform its infrastructure
and the Secretary of Defense's primary goal for the BRAC 2005
process was military transformation. We also recognize DOD's
position that military personnel reductions allow the department
to reapply these personnel to support new capabilities and improve
operational efficiencies. Nonetheless, DOD's inclusion of military
personnel entitlements in its estimates of annual recurring
savings could generate a false sense that all of its reported
savings would generate funds that DOD could apply elsewhere.
Because DOD's BRAC budget submission to Congress does not explain
the difference between recurring savings attributable to military
personnel entitlements and recurring savings that will make funds
available for other defense priorities, DOD's overall estimated
annual recurring savings appear almost twice as large as those
which will actually be realized. In addition, our analysis shows
that the current percentage of estimated annual recurring savings
from military personnel entitlements (46 percent) is considerably
higher compared to the last round of BRAC that took place in 1995,
in which DOD derived about 5 percent of BRAC annual recurring
savings from military personnel entitlements. During the previous
four rounds of BRAC that took place between 1988 and 1995, the
military was downsizing in personnel strength, yet the average
percentage of annual recurring savings DOD derived from military
personnel entitlements was 26 percent.
27 GAO, Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve
Environmental Cleanup Cost Reporting and Expedite Transfer of Unneeded
Property, [35]GAO-07-177 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2007).
We reported in July 2005 that military personnel position
eliminations are not a true source of savings since DOD intends to
reassign or shift personnel to other positions without reducing
military end strength associated with the corresponding BRAC
recommendation. Moreover, the BRAC Commission stated in its
September 2005 report that DOD's inclusion of savings from
eliminating military personnel positions distorts the actual
savings attributable to BRAC recommendations. The service
officials we interviewed could not link actual military personnel
eliminations directly to implementing a BRAC recommendation, as
illustrated in the following:
o Army officials said its military end strength will not be
reduced due to any BRAC recommendations. In fact, the Army plans
to increase its active-duty end strength by 65,000 over the next
several years.
o Navy officials said they anticipate reducing the Navy's end
strength by 26,000 active duty military personnel between fiscal
years 2006 and 2011. However, they told us they have not linked
any of these anticipated reductions to BRAC recommendations.
o Air Force officials said they are in the process of reducing the
service's active-duty end strength by about 40,000. However, Air
Force officials said that they cannot link any reductions in
military end strength to implementing their BRAC recommendations
and the personnel drawdown is independent of BRAC.
DOD policy and Office of Management and Budget's guidance28
require that an economic analysis be explicit about the underlying
assumptions used to estimate future costs and benefits, which we
believe includes estimating BRAC savings. If the savings we
question were omitted from DOD's savings estimates, net annual
recurring savings would decrease by about 46 percent. As a result,
DOD's BRAC budget submission does not provide enough information
to allow Congress full oversight of the savings that can be
applied to other programs outside of the military personnel
account. Greater transparency over the assumptions behind DOD's
BRAC savings estimates would help to promote independent analysis
and review and facilitate congressional decision making related to
the multibillion-dollar BRAC implementation program.
In addition to taking issue with how DOD characterizes military
personnel savings, we also disagree with DOD claiming savings for
closing a base that is actually going to stay open. At the time of
DOD's fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission to Congress, DOD
claimed about $260 million in annual recurring savings for closing
Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, which is now going to remain
open. Although DOD recommended closing Cannon in May 2005 as a
proposed recommendation, the BRAC Commission modified the proposed
closure, and stated in its September 2005 report to the President
that Cannon could remain open if the Secretary of Defense
identified a new mission for the base and relocated the base's
fighter wing elsewhere.29 Subsequently, the Air Force announced in
June 2006 that Cannon would remain open and the 16th Special
Operations Wing, currently located at Hurlburt Field, Florida,
would relocate to Cannon. Nevertheless, DOD still claimed about
$200 million in annual savings for military personnel entitlements
and about $60 million in annual savings for categories such as
base operation and maintenance in its fiscal year 2008 BRAC
budget. Officials at the Air Force BRAC office told us that they
claimed these annual savings because they disestablished the
fighter wing at Cannon, although they said most of the military
personnel and aircraft associated with the disestablished fighter
wing were reassigned or relocated and will continue to operate.30
28 DOD Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis for Decisionmaking (Nov. 7,
1995) and Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-94, Guidelines
and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs (Oct. 29,
1992).
29 Although the BRAC Commission language refers to Cannon Air Force Base
as a realignment, this is in reference to establishing an enclave at
Cannon that could remain open until December 31, 2009, during which time
the Secretary of Defense could seek other newly identified missions for
possible assignment to Cannon.
30 In commenting on a draft of this report, the Air Force BRAC Office said
they claimed these savings because the decision to reallocate Air Force
resources and mission to Cannon was made after the BRAC recommendation was
approved and was therefore, a non-BRAC programmatic decision.
Furthermore, we have taken issue with estimated savings for
several Air National Guard BRAC recommendations. As we reported in
May 2007, the implementation of several Air National Guard
recommendations is expected to result in annual recurring costs of
$53 million rather than the annual recurring savings of $26
million estimated by the BRAC Commission--a $79 million per year
difference that occurred primarily due to language in the BRAC
Commission's report that prevents the Air National Guard from
reducing its current end strength in some states.31
DOD Has Made Progress Implementing BRAC, but Several Challenges Increase Risk
That All Recommendations Might Not be Completed by the Statutory Deadline
DOD has made progress implementing BRAC 2005, but faces a number
of synchronization and coordination challenges related to
implementing many BRAC recommendations. These challenges increase
DOD's risk of not meeting the September 2011 statutory deadline.
For example, personnel movements involving tens of thousands of
personnel must be synchronized with the expenditure of billions of
dollars to construct or renovate facilities needed to support them
by 2011. The time frames for completing many BRAC recommendations
are so closely sequenced and scheduled to be completed in 2011
that any significant changes in personnel movement schedules or
construction delays could jeopardize timely completion. Also, some
recommendations are dependent on the completion of others, and
delays in completing some interrelated actions might cause a
domino effect that could jeopardize DOD's ability to meet the
statutory 2011 BRAC deadline. BRAC 2005, unlike prior BRAC rounds,
included more joint recommendations involving more than one
military component, thus creating challenges in achieving unity of
effort among the services and defense agencies.
31 GAO, Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate
Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation
of Air National Guard Recommendations, [36]GAO-07-641 (Washington, D.C.:
May 16, 2007).
DOD Has Made Progress Implementing BRAC
DOD's implementation of BRAC 2005 has progressed since the
recommendations became effective in November 2005. For example,
Navy officials reported that they completed implementing 14 BRAC
actions32 involving the closure of Navy reserve centers and
recruiting districts. To dedicate resources and facilitate
communications to plan for the implementation of hundreds of BRAC
actions, the military services and affected defense agencies have
their own BRAC program management offices. Over the past 2 years,
these offices have begun the planning and design for the $21
billion military construction program necessitated by the most
recent BRAC round, including initiating site surveys and
environmental assessments needed before military construction
projects can begin.
OSD realized that the complexity of the BRAC 2005 round required
it to strategically manage and oversee the entire BRAC 2005
program. During prior BRAC rounds, OSD's oversight of BRAC
implementation was typically limited to adjudicating disagreements
among the services over implementation issues, according to OSD
BRAC officials. However, for this BRAC round, the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics stated in 2005 that the large number of transformational
recommendations, particularly recommendations to promote joint
facility operations, would present OSD with significant
implementation challenges. To meet these challenges, the
department initiated a process to develop business plans that laid
out the requisite actions, timing of those actions, and the costs
and savings associated with implementing each recommendation.
Additionally, OSD recognized that the development of business
plans would serve as the foundation for the complex program
management necessary to implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations.
As such, the primary implementation activity of the military
services, and defense agencies has been to develop about 240
business plans for OSD review and approval. According to OSD,
these business plans have been used as the primary vehicle to
delineate resource requirements and generate military construction
requirements.
32 In the context of BRAC, actions are activities necessary to implement
final and approved recommendations of the BRAC Commission to close or
realign military installations.
As of October 2007, OSD has approved about 220 business plans.
Some business plans remain in draft and have not been approved for
various reasons. According to OSD, these business plans involve
complex issues associated with the services' lines of authority
and sizeable personnel realignments that OSD BRAC officials told
us they intend to resolve soon. However, OSD has deferred the
approval of about 15 business plans pending the development of
broader policies to facilitate the implementation of the
recommendations associated with joint basing and chemical
demilitarization. Finally, officials in OSD's BRAC Office told us
they plan to continue reviewing business plans as part of their
comprehensive, centrally managed oversight of the BRAC program.
Recognizing that business plans provide important implementation
details, in June 2007 OSD directed the services and defense
agencies to update these business plans twice a year in
conjunction with OSD program reviews.
Challenges in Synchronizing Many BRAC Actions Could Hinder DOD's
Ability to Complete Recommendations within the Statutory Time Frame
The department faces a number of challenges related to
synchronizing the completion of many BRAC recommendations in order
to meet the statutory 2011 time frame. For example, personnel
movements involving tens of thousands of military and civilian
personnel must be synchronized with billions of dollars worth of
construction or renovation activities needed to ensure they have
the necessary facilities to support them. Also, the implementation
of some recommendations is dependent on the completion of other
recommendations before facilities can be renovated for new uses,
and some DOD installations are affected by more than six separate
recommendations. Delays in synchronizing and completing these
interrelated actions could cause a domino effect that might
jeopardize DOD's ability to meet the statutory 2011 BRAC deadline.
Also, synchronizing the implementation of several force structure
initiatives could further complicate DOD's BRAC implementation
efforts.
DOD Must Synchronize Personnel Movements with Construction Time Frames
Implementation challenges primarily stem from the complexity of
synchronizing the realignment of over 123,000 personnel with the
completion of over $21 billion in new construction or renovation
projects. According to DOD officials, construction schedules are
often the primary driver in setting BRAC implementation timelines
due to the amount of time needed to design and build new
facilities or renovate existing facilities. The time frames for
completing many BRAC recommendations are closely sequenced and
scheduled to be completed in 2011 but any significant changes in
personnel movement schedules or construction delays could
jeopardize DOD's ability to meet the statutory 2011 BRAC deadline.
According to OSD's approved business plans and DOD officials, the
following are some BRAC recommendations that could experience
synchronization challenges:
o Realigning Army reserve components, constructing 125 new Armed
Forces Reserve Centers, and closing 387 existing reserve component
facilities: Army reserve component officials told us they are
managing the construction of new Armed Forces Reserve Centers in a
compressed time frame. The data in our recently issued report show
that 26 percent of the BRAC actions implementing these
recommendations will begin in fiscal year 2010, according to the
approved business plans.33 This approach compresses the amount of
time available to construct the facilities and respond to any
construction delays that might arise, which increases the risk
that the projects might not be completed in time to meet the BRAC
statutory completion deadline. On the other hand, Army officials
told us that they would assume less risk because many of these
projects are small and can be completed within shorter time frames
compared to larger projects. For example, the Army considered
starting construction on the Armed Forces Reserve Centers toward
the beginning of the implementation period and closing older
reserve facilities. Instead, more complex and costly
recommendations became a higher priority and reserve center
actions were delayed.
o Co-locating miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field
activity leased locations at Fort Belvoir, Virginia: OSD officials
told us that these activities have scheduled the arrival of over
6,000 personnel by September 1, 2011--2 weeks before the BRAC
statutory deadline--to implement over 30 discrete actions
associated with this recommendation. In addition, recent
developments could affect the timing of this realignment to Fort
Belvoir because, at the time of our review, the Army was revising
its implementation planning to accommodate the possibility of
using nearby land owned by the U.S. General Services
Administration or another location in Northern Virginia, which
will require additional studies to determine environmental impacts
and transportation requirements at the new location, according to
Fort Belvoir officials. If the process of identifying alternative
site locations results in delaying the movement of miscellaneous
OSD offices, defense agencies, and field offices, this could
jeopardize meeting the statutory deadline.
o Realigning the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to Fort
Belvoir, Virginia: The fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission
shows that construction is expected to be completed by June 2011,
which allows 3 months before the statutory deadline to move its
missions. To mitigate mission impact and the risk of not
completing these moves if construction is delayed, the agency
plans to begin moving its personnel in phases starting in April
2010.
o Realigning Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., to
the National Naval Medical Center, Maryland, and Fort Belvoir,
Virginia: Completion is scheduled by September 2011 according to
the business plan. The medical joint cross-service group that
developed this recommendation in 2005 stated that delays in
constructing and occupying the buildings could risk the timely
completion of this recommendation and concluded that aggressive
actions would be needed to meet the 6-year deadline. Army and OSD
officials testified before Congress in January 2007 that the time
frame was "very tight" for completing this recommendation.34 Also,
in response to various concerns about the quality of care for
warfighters at Walter Reed, an official with the Army's Surgeon's
General Office told us in September 2007 that certain parts of the
recommendation supporting the construction of intensive medical
care facilities are expected to be completed sooner than
originally planned, while the move to the National Naval Medical
Center, Maryland, and Fort Belvoir, Virginia is still scheduled to
be completed by September 2011. DOD's standard construction
schedules for medical facilities indicate new hospitals, or
additions and renovations to an existing hospital, generally take
longer to complete compared to other facilities.
33 GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor
Challenges for Completing More than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers,
[37]GAO-07-1040 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2007).
Some Recommendations Are Dependent on the Completion of Others
In some cases, DOD's synchronization challenges are exacerbated
when the completion of one recommendation is dependent on the
completion of another. For example, the BRAC recommendation to
close Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, involves relocating personnel
from the Army's Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management
Command currently located at Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland. The new facilities at Aberdeen are expected to be
renovated by February 2011. However, DOD cannot begin those
renovations until the training activity currently occupying the
Aberdeen facilities relocates to Fort Lee, Virginia, an action
associated with the implementation of another BRAC recommendation.
Consequently, the training activity cannot vacate the Aberdeen
space until a new facility is built for them at Fort Lee sometime
in 2009. This interdependence is shown in figure 4.
34 House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense hearing on Military
Medical Readiness and Related Issues, January 19, 2007.
Figure 4: Sequencing of Personnel Movement for Several Interdependent BRAC
Recommendations
Likewise, such interdependence could undermine the Navy's ability to
complete within the statutory deadline the recommendation to consolidate
various Navy-leased locations onto government-owned property. The business
plan that describes the actions and time frames for moving various
Navy-leased locations onto government-owned property stated that it will
begin renovating space for the move to Arlington, Virginia, in September
2008. However, the current occupant of the space--a component of the
Defense Information Systems Agency--is not scheduled to vacate the space
the Navy is to move into until June 2011 because the Defense Information
Systems Agency component needs to wait until it can move into newly
constructed space at Fort Meade, Maryland--an action associated with
another BRAC recommendation. Although both DOD components are working on a
solution, the business plans for these two recommendations stated several
options in order to meet the 2011 BRAC deadline, such as having the Navy
occupy "portable facilities," build a new facility, or explore other
workarounds to meet the statutory time frame.
Some Installations Affected by Multiple Recommendations
Another factor that could threaten the timely completion of some of the
BRAC recommendations is the number of DOD installations that are affected
by more than one recommendation. Based on BRAC Commission data, 27
installations are affected by six or more BRAC recommendations that
include installations such as Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Fort Sam Houston,
Texas; Lackland Air Force Base, Texas; Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio; Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia; Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland;
and Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. In addition to their routine duties for
facility management, installation officials are responsible for
synchronizing and coordinating the movements of personnel with the
availability of facilities. The following are examples of installations
affected by multiple recommendations:
o Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Officials responsible for implementing
the BRAC actions associated with 14 separate recommendations told
us that they need to synchronize the availability of various
facilities to accommodate the increase of nearly 24,000 personnel
expected to arrive, primarily as a result of BRAC recommendations
resulting in the closure or realignment of numerous DOD agencies
and activities. These officials said that they have concerns about
meeting the overall time frame because their plans do not allow
for any delays in construction projects or funding. Fort Belvoir
officials told us they are encountering challenges when planning
the synchronization of the large volume of construction and
personnel movement throughout the implementation period. For
example, the Army initially planned to site the implementation of
2 recommendations (realigning the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency and co-locating miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and
field activity leased locations) at Fort Belvoir that would have
an unfavorable impact on the surrounding community due to
increased traffic congestion. Though Fort Belvoir in October 2007
announced new plans to obtain property near Fort Belvoir that
might lessen traffic congestion for the move of miscellaneous OSD,
defense agency, and field activity leased locations, Fort Belvoir
officials told us that these plans could raise new implementation
challenges to meet the statutory deadline because of additional
time needed for environmental impact studies, planning and design
of new construction, and demolition of existing structures at the
new proposed site.
o Fort Sam Houston, Texas: Installation officials at Fort Sam
Houston told us that they have to synchronize numerous actions
involving eight separate BRAC recommendations and have concerns
about coordinating the availability of facilities--either to be
constructed or renovated--with the planned net increase of over
10,000 personnel. Furthermore, officials told us the lack of
guidance on how installation officials will establish a joint base
with nearby Lackland and Randolph Air Force Bases, Texas, in
accordance with the BRAC recommendation on joint basing
exacerbates the uncertainty in planning for the implementation of
these recommendations.
Force Structure Initiatives Further Complicate DOD's BRAC
Implementation Efforts
Two Army force restructuring initiatives--modularity and overseas
rebasing strategy--could exacerbate the Army's BRAC
synchronization challenges. The Army considers modularity to be
the most extensive reorganization of its force since World War II,
in which it restructures itself from a division-based force to a
more agile and responsive modular brigade-based force. According
to Army estimates, this initiative will require a significant
investment through fiscal year 2011. DOD's Global Defense Posture
Realignment Plan, also known as overseas rebasing, will result in
a global realignment of U.S. forces and installations, including
the planned transfer to American territory of up to 70,000 defense
personnel and about 100,000 family members and civilian employees
currently living overseas. As a result of mostly these force
structure initiatives and BRAC, the Army plans to relocate over
150,000 soldiers and civilian personnel by fiscal year 2012,
representing over 20 percent of the Army's total projected
active-duty and civilian personnel end strength. To illustrate,
Army installations that expect personnel increases of greater than
5,000 over the next 5 years, as of March 2007, are shown in table
2.
Table 2: Army Installations Expecting Net Gains of at Least 5,000
Personnel for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 Due to BRAC, Overseas
Rebasing, Modularity, and Other Miscellaneous Restationing Actions (as of
March 2007)
Estimated Army
Percentage military
FY 2006 Estimated Estimated of construction
beginning FY 2011 net gain in population (dollars in
Installation population population population increase thousands)
Fort Belvoir, 21,437 45,332 23,895 111 $277,700
VA
Fort Bliss, 20,130 38,063 17,933 89 2,076,280
TX
Fort Bragg, 57,352 69,136 11,784 21 1,421,011
NC
Fort Lewis, 36,147 47,110 10,963 30 1,191,249
WA
Fort Sam 24,819 34,980 10,161 41 179,540
Houston, TX
Fort Benning, 40,592 50,487 9,895 24 1,423,461
GA
Fort Riley, 15,188 24,608 9,420 62 905,570
KS
Fort Lee, VA 13,495 20,645 7,150 53 965,500
Fort Meade, 35,504 41,915 6,411 18 104,900
MD
Fort Carson, 24,066 29,756 5,690 24 958,129
CO
Source: GAO analysis of Army headquarters-level data.
Notes: Personnel growth consists of Army military (active and reserve),
military students and trainees, civilians, non-Army military and
civilians, and mission contractors. Figures do not include family members
and nonmission-related contractors and expected increases that may occur
as a result of plans to increase the Army's active end strength by 65,000
personnel.
As shown in table 2, some installations are expecting substantial growth;
Forts Belvoir, Bliss, Riley, and Lee each anticipate net personnel gains
of more than 50 percent. For example, the Army plans to relocate at Fort
Bliss, Texas, about 18,000 personnel as part of BRAC, the transformation
of Army modular brigade units, and DOD's overseas rebasing efforts. The
Army is planning 54 new construction projects over the 6-year BRAC
implementation period to accommodate the increase in base population at
Fort Bliss. Also, some of the installations listed in table 2 may
experience more growth in the next several years depending on whether the
Army's active end strength is increased by 65,000 soldiers.
Coordination Among Multiple Services and Agencies Presents Additional Challenges
BRAC 2005, unlike prior BRAC rounds, included more joint recommendations
involving more than one military component, thus creating challenges in
achieving unity of effort among the services and defense agencies.
According to our analysis, 43 percent of the 240 OSD-required business
plans involved formal coordination between at least two services or
agencies. Service officials said that gaining consensus among military
services and defense agencies has been challenging in the areas of
personnel and facility requirements, implementation schedules, and funding
responsibilities. For example, officials told us it was a challenge due to
the joint nature in planning for the implementation of the recommendation
to realign Fort Bragg, North Carolina, by relocating Army's 7th Special
Forces Group to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Service officials told us
it took time for the Army and Air Force to coordinate how to share base
operations costs given these two services have different standards for
calculating these costs. Similarly, regarding the recommendation to
establish the Joint Strike Fighter initial joint training site at Eglin
Air Force Base, Florida, it took time for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Force to agree on cost-sharing arrangements and a joint training
curriculum designed to achieve savings from consolidated training on the
aircraft. Likewise, other complex joint cross-service recommendations
could be slowed by a similar need to coordinate and negotiate agreements.
The following are some BRAC recommendations with unresolved coordination
challenges.
o Create joint bases involving multiple defense installations: The
26 defense installations involved with creating 12 new joint bases
required DOD to define the governance structure over how these
joint bases should be organized, the associated chain of command
authority, and the operational concepts for managing these joint
bases.35 According to service officials, some of their most
challenging issues to resolve include 1) transferring real
property and budget authority to the lead service, 2) determining
standard levels of base operating support and which base functions
to transfer to the lead service, 3) deciding whether civilian
personnel on a joint base will become employees of the lead
service, 4) agreeing on common terminology and standards, and 5)
funding contributions from each service. These challenges to
establishing joint bases have been problematic since each service
has its own concept of how installations should be managed and
organized. In particular, during recent congressional testimony,
the Air Force expressed views on joint basing concepts contrary to
those of OSD and the other services.36 To overcome these
challenges, OSD formed a special working group to resolve these
issues and OSD officials told us they would approve the joint
basing business plan when more of the planning details have been
resolved.
35 To establish joint bases, DOD plans to transfer various installation
management functions from bases that are contiguous or in close proximity
to each other to a designated lead military service. For example, OSD
plans to transform three bases--McGuire Air Force Base, Fort Dix, and
Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst-New Jersey--into one joint base
with the Air Force providing installation services.
36 Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military
Construction and Veterans Affairs in March 2007.
o Realign supply, storage, and distribution management at multiple
locations: There are several potential issues between the Defense
Logistics Agency and the military services that may affect the
planned implementation of the recommendation. While baseline
agreements have been reached between the Defense Logistics Agency
and the services on the transfer of supply-related personnel
positions and related inventories to the Defense Logistics Agency,
some important aspects of the implementation plans are incomplete
and still need to be resolved. For example, performance-based
agreements that will establish responsibilities, metrics to
measure performance, costs, and business rules between the Defense
Logistics Agency and the services have yet to be negotiated and
agreed upon. Additionally, the funding and decision-making process
for future maintenance, upgrades, usage, and integration of
information technology systems transferring to Defense Logistics
Agency has not been agreed to. Lastly, due to the way the Defense
Logistics Agency plans to implement the recommendation by staging
the personnel transfers over time by each military service, it
plans to apply lessons learned to resolve issues as implementation
proceeds. We also reviewed a separate BRAC action, which is part
of this recommendation, in more detail and issued our report in
October 2007.37
o Co-locate medical command headquarters: The affected agencies
have had challenges in reaching agreement on where to co-locate
these medical commands. Specifically, the Air Force and OSD Health
Affairs have disagreed with the business manager on associated
cost and implementation time frames. As such, OSD has not yet
approved the business plan for this recommendation.
As a result of these coordination challenges, the planning process
has lengthened beyond that which DOD officials initially expected,
which could result in delayed implementation of certain
recommendations. The need for gaining consensus about planning and
implementation details among the services and defense agencies
could continue throughout the BRAC implementation period. At the
same time, DOD believes the review process helps to ensure that
BRAC actions meet the intent of the law, are accurate, and
effectively coordinated. However, if gaining consensus among these
entities continues to be a challenge or if new organizations
established under BRAC continue to lack fully developed
operational concepts and organizational structures, it may become
increasingly difficult to implement these recommendations before
the statutory 2011 deadline.
37 GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply,
Storage, and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense
Logistics Agency, [40]GAO-08-121R (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 2007).
Conclusion
DOD recognizes that its BRAC recommendations and its
implementation are of high public interest. As such, it is
paramount that DOD communicates openly about the expected savings
that could result from the implementation of BRAC actions. As long
as DOD continues to assert that nearly half of its estimated $4
billion in annual recurring BRAC savings come from military
personnel reassignments, which will not free up funds for other
defense priorities, DOD could create a false sense that BRAC 2005
will result in a much higher dollar savings than will actually be
realized to readily fund other priorities. Without explaining the
difference between annual recurring savings attributable to
military personnel reassignments and annual recurring savings that
will make funds available for other defense priorities, DOD could
lessen the credibility of the BRAC program and decrease the
public's trust in the BRAC process. Greater transparency over the
source of expected BRAC savings could help to preserve public
confidence in the integrity of the BRAC program.
Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide more transparency over DOD's estimated annual recurring
savings from BRAC implementation, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, in consultation with the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to explain, in DOD's
BRAC budget submission to Congress, the difference between annual
recurring savings attributable to military personnel entitlements
and annual recurring savings that will readily result in funds
available for other defense priorities.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
our recommendation and agreed to include an explanation of the
annual recurring savings in its BRAC budget justification material
that accompanies the annual President's budget. DOD also noted in
its comments to us that military personnel reductions attributable
to a BRAC recommendation as savings are as real as savings
generated through end strength reductions. DOD also stated that
while it may not reduce overall end strength, its reductions in
military personnel for each recommendation at a specific location
are real and these personnel reductions allow the department to
reapply these military personnel to support new capabilities and
improve operational efficiencies. While we recognize these
benefits from reapplying freed up military personnel to other
locations due to implementing BRAC recommendations, we do question
that nearly half of DOD's annual recurring savings estimate of $4
billion includes military personnel entitlements--such as salaries
and housing allowances--for military personnel DOD plans to shift
to other positions but does not plan to eliminate thus requiring
DOD to continue paying the salaries and benefits. While DOD
disagrees with us, we do not believe that shifting or transferring
personnel to other locations produces tangible dollar savings
outside the military personnel accounts that DOD can use to fund
other defense priorities since these personnel will continue to
receive salaries and benefits. DOD did acknowledge however, that
these savings may not be available to fund other defense
priorities because they have already been spent to fund military
personnel priorities. It is also worth noting that DOD commented
that although its net annual recurring savings estimates have
decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 billion, these savings still
represent a significant benefit that will result from the
implementation of BRAC recommendations. DOD's written comments are
reprinted in appendix VII. DOD also provided technical comments,
which we have incorporated into this report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretaries of Defense; the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force; Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
[38]http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report,
please contact me on (202) 512-4523 or by e-mail at
[39][email protected] . Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs are on the last page of
this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix VIII.
Brian J. Lepore, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
List of Congressional Addressees
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tim Johnson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Susan Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr.:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Chet Edwards:
Chairman:
The Honorable Roger F. Wicker:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We reviewed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's
182 recommendations to realign and close military bases, but
mostly focused our work on the recommendations that changed the
most in expected costs and savings compared to the Commission's
estimates. Recognizing that the Department of Defense (DOD) was in
the process of initial planning for base realignment and closure
(BRAC) implementation, and the associated financial data were
changed frequently during our review, we compared BRAC cost and
savings estimates primarily using two key publicly available
documents--the 2005 BRAC Commission report to the President
released in September 2005 and DOD's latest BRAC budget submission
provided to Congress in February 2007. We used data from the BRAC
Commission report to the President because the estimates contained
in this report were the closest estimates available associated
with the final and approved BRAC recommendations. We used DOD's
most recent BRAC budget submission because it was the most
authoritative information publicly available for making broad
comparisons of BRAC cost and savings estimates. Specifically, we
compared the change in cost estimates as well as the estimates for
net annual recurring savings that DOD expects to incur after BRAC
implementation and noted those recommendations that have increased
the most in expected costs and decreased the most in expected
savings. In addition, we used the BRAC Commission's data generated
from DOD's estimation model, known as the Cost of Base Realignment
Actions, to determine changes in expected one-time costs, to
include military construction cost estimates and inflation. We
generally reported costs and savings in current dollars and not
constant dollars except where noted.
To calculate DOD's estimate of net annual recurring savings, we
used OSD's data provided to us for estimated savings in fiscal
year 2012--the year after OSD expects all recommendations to be
completed--because these data more fully captured these savings
and allowed us to replicate the same methodology used by the BRAC
Commission in its calculation of this estimate. We used OSD's
fiscal year 2012 data and subtracted the estimates for annual
recurring costs from the estimates for annual recurring savings,
which is the same method both DOD and we have used for prior BRAC
rounds. To determine expected 20-year savings--also known as the
20-year net present value--we used the same formulas and
assumptions as DOD and the BRAC Commission used to calculate these
savings.1 Specifically, we used DOD's BRAC fiscal year 2008 budget
data for expected costs and savings to implement each
recommendation for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We also used
data that the BRAC Office in the Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment provided us
for expected net annual recurring savings after the completion of
each recommendation for fiscal years 2012 to 2025. We then
converted these data to fiscal year constant 2005 dollars using
DOD price indexes to distinguish real changes from changes due to
inflation. We used fiscal year 2005 dollars to calculate 20-year
savings because the BRAC Commission also used fiscal year 2005
dollars for this calculation.2 Finally, we calculated how many
years it would take for expected BRAC savings to recoup the
expected initial investment costs to implement the
recommendations, comparing the fiscal years, or break-even points,
when cumulative net savings would exceed cumulative one-time
costs. We did this to be consistent with the way DOD had reported
their break-even points for past BRAC rounds, which is a
methodology we also replicated in our prior reports on BRAC
implementation.
To assess the reliability of DOD's BRAC cost and savings data, we
tested computer-generated data for errors, reviewed relevant
documentation, and discussed data quality control procedures with
officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) BRAC
Office. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of making broad comparisons between DOD's reported
cost and savings estimates and the BRAC Commission's reported
estimates.
To determine why DOD's estimates changed compared to the BRAC
Commission's estimates, we reviewed over 200 OSD-approved business
plans that outlined actions, time frames, and financial estimates
for implementing each BRAC recommendation. We also obtained and
analyzed information from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers about
its recent initiative to transform how it manages military
construction projects and how these new initiatives are expected
to reduce military construction costs during BRAC implementation.
We did not validate the services' or defense agencies' BRAC
military construction requirements because DOD's Office of the
Inspector General, the Army Audit Agency, the Naval Audit Service,
and the Air Force Audit Agency were reviewing BRAC military
construction projects at the time of this report. Their work in
this area is expected to continue over the next several years.
However, we met with staff of these audit services periodically
over the course of our review.
1 DOD reported 20-year savings estimates for each base closure and
realignment recommendation in its report to the BRAC Commission.
Subsequently, the BRAC Commission also reported 20-year savings estimates
for each BRAC recommendation in its report to the President. OSD BRAC
officials told us that DOD does not include 20-year savings estimates in
its BRAC budgets to Congress because this information is not required.
Consequently, we calculated 20-year savings for comparison purposes in a
manner consistent with the BRAC Commission's calculation of these savings.
2 Applying the same formulas and assumptions as used by the BRAC
Commission, we used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate the
accumulated net present value of expected 20-year savings.
Further, we met periodically with officials at the OSD BRAC office
and corresponding BRAC implementation offices in the Army, Navy,
and Air Force to determine why DOD's estimates changed compared to
the BRAC Commission's estimates. We also met with these officials
to discuss their roles and responsibilities as they began BRAC
implementation planning and to obtain their perspectives on any
implementation challenges that they encountered. Given the
unprecedented number of BRAC 2005 closures and realignments, we
focused our analysis on broad issues affecting DOD's cost and
savings estimates and implementation challenges rather than on
specific implementation issues of individual recommendations.
To obtain the perspective of installation and command officials
directly involved in BRAC implementation planning and execution,
we visited 17 bases and 8 major commands affected by BRAC. We
selected these bases and commands because they were among the
closures or realignments that DOD projected to have significant
costs or savings, or because we wanted to obtain more information
about particular implementation issues. Installations we visited
include:
o Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland;
o Brooks City-Base, Texas;
o Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;
o Fort Belvoir, Virginia;
o Fort Benning, Georgia;
o Fort Bliss, Texas;
o Fort Dix, New Jersey;
o Fort McPherson, Georgia;
o Fort Monmouth, New Jersey;
o Fort Monroe, Virginia;
o Fort Sam Houston, Texas;
o Lackland Air Force Base, Texas;
o McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey;
o National Naval Medical Center, Maryland;
o Randolph Air Force Base, Texas;
o Rock Island Army Arsenal, Illinois; and
o Walter Reed Army Medical Center, District of
Columbia.
In addition, we met with officials from eight commands to obtain a
command-level perspective about BRAC implementation and because
these commands were involved in coordinating the business plans or
were responsible for key decisions in implementation planning.
Commands visited include the Air Force's Air Education and
Training Command; Army Communications-Electronics Life Cycle
Management Command; Army Forces Command; Army Information Systems
Engineering Command; Army Medical Command; Army Training and
Doctrine Command; Naval Installations Command; and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. As we obtained information concerning
implementation challenges during interviews, we assessed the
reliability of that information by asking similar questions from
officials at different military services at the installation and
headquarters levels.
We conducted our work from November 2005, when the BRAC
recommendations became effective, through October 2007 so we could
analyze data in DOD's BRAC budget submission provided to Congress
in February 2007. Our work was done in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: BRAC Recommendations with the Largest Increases in
Estimated Costs
Appendix II lists specific base realignment and closure (BRAC)
recommendations that have increased the most in estimated one-time
costs compared to the BRAC Commission estimates reported in
September 2005. Table 3 shows that the Department of Defense's
(DOD) one-time implementation cost estimates have increased by
more than $50 million each for 33 recommendations compared to BRAC
Commission estimates.
Table 3: BRAC Recommendations That Increased by More Than $50 Million in
Estimated One-Time Costs (Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011)
Dollars in millions
Difference
BRAC 2005 DOD's fiscal
Commission year 2008
reported budget
Recommendation estimatesa estimatesb Amount Percent
Close National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
leased locations and realign
others to Fort Belvoir, VA $1,117.30 $2,090.97 $973.67 87
Realign Walter Reed Army Medical
Center to Bethesda National Naval
Medical Center, MD and to Fort
Belvoir, VA 988.76 1,688.38 699.62 71
Realign Maneuver Training to Fort
Benning, GA 773.10 1,454.65 681.55 88
Close Fort Monmouth, NJ 780.43 1,458.11 677.68 87
Co-locate miscellaneous OSD,
defense agency, and field activity
leased locations 601.75 1,200.00 598.25 99
Establish San Antonio Regional
Medical Center and realign
enlisted medical training to Fort
Sam Houston, TX 1,040.90 1,591.02 550.12 53
Realign to establish Combat
Service Support Center at Fort
Lee, VA 754.00 1,145.40 391.40 52
Realign supply, storage, and
distribution management 192.70 577.32 384.62 200
Consolidate Defense Information
Systems Agency at Fort Meade, MD 219.98 572.83 352.85 160
Close Fort McPherson, GA 214.54 550.07 335.53 156
Close Brooks City-Base, TX 325.30 592.30 267.00 82
Consolidate/co-locate active and
reserve personnel and recruiting
centers for Army and Air Force 128.73 370.02 241.29 187
Co-locate military department
investigation agencies with DOD
Counterintelligence and Security
Agency to Marine Corps Base
Quantico, VA 171.99 388.14 216.15 126
Close Fort Monroe, VA 72.40 288.06 215.66 298
Co-locate missile and space
defense agencies to Redstone
Arsenal, AL 178.20 373.53 195.33 110
Close Naval Support Activity New
Orleans, LA 46.15 232.73 186.58 404
Realign Fort Hood, TX 435.80 621.75 185.95 43
Realign to create joint centers
for chemical, biological, and
medical research, development, and
acquisition 55.23 233.92 178.69 324
Close Lone Star Army Ammunition
Plant, TX 29.00 173.43 144.43 498
Consolidate depot level reparable
procurement management
consolidation 124.90 263.89 138.99 111
Reserve Component Transformation,
TX 375.60 500.79 125.19 33
Co-locate miscellaneous Air Force
leased locations and National
Guard Headquarters leased
locations 90.50 212.47 121.97 135
Realign to relocate undergraduate
pilot and navigator training 71.70 193.19 121.49 169
Relocate Army headquarters and
field operating activities 199.90 320.85 120.95 61
Close Fort Gillem, GA 56.80 150.43 93.63 165
Relocate miscellaneous Department
of the Navy leased locations 61.75 155.07 93.32 151
Realign to create a Naval
Integrated Weapons and Armaments
Research, Development, and
Acquisition, Test and Evaluation
Center mostly at Naval Air Weapons
Station China Lake, CA 343.33 426.95 83.62 24
Realign to relocate Air Defense
Artillery Center and School to
Fort Sill, OK 247.00 326.16 79.16 32
Reserve Component Transformation,
OK 168.70 238.89 70.19 42
Consolidate Transportation Command
components at Scott Air Force
Base, IL 101.88 171.60 69.72 68
Realign defense research
service-led laboratories at
multiple locations 136.05 203.39 67.34 49
Reserve Component Transformation,
NY 103.80 162.65 58.85 57
Close Naval Air Station Brunswick,
ME $193.12 $245.97 $52.85 27
Source: GAO analysis of BRAC Commission and DOD data.
aIn constant fiscal year 2005 dollars.
bIn current dollars.
Appendix III: BRAC Recommendations with the Largest Decreases in Estimated
Net Annual Recurring Savings
Appendix III lists specific base realignment and closure (BRAC)
recommendations that have decreased the most in estimated net annual
recurring savings compared to the BRAC Commission estimates. Table 4 shows
that the Department of Defense's (DOD) net annual recurring savings
estimates have decreased by more than $25 million each for 13
recommendations compared to BRAC Commission estimates.
Table 4: BRAC Recommendations That Have Decreased by More Than $25 Million
in Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings (Projected for Fiscal Year 2012)
Dollars in millions
Difference
BRAC 2005
Commission
reported DOD current Percent
Recommendation estimatesa estimatesb Amount decrease
Close National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
leased locations and realign
others at Fort Belvoir, VA $127.70 $35.48 ($92.23) 72
Establish joint bases at multiple
locations 183.76 116.39 (67.37) 37
Realign Fort Hood, TXc (45.27) (105.78) (60.51) 134
Realign supply, storage, and
distribution management 203.21 157.58 (45.63) 22
Realign Grand Forks Air Force
Base, ND 66.69 25.06 (41.63) 62
Close Deseret Chemical Depot, UT 37.95 0 (37.95) 100
Establish San Antonio Regional
Medical Center and realign
enlisted medical training to Fort
Sam Houston, TX 129.04 91.22 (37.82) 29
Close Naval Air Station Willow
Grove, PA and realign Cambria
Regional Airport, Johnstown, PA 73.90 36.32 (37.58) 51
Realign to establish Joint Strike
Fighter initial joint training
site at Eglin Air Force Base, FLc (3.33) (40.69) (37.36) 1122
Close Umatilla Chemical Depot, OR 34.69 0 (34.69) 100
Realign Otis Air National Guard
Base, MA, and Lambert-St. Louis
International Airport Air Guard
Station, MOc 27.88 (6.21) (34.09) 122
Realign Operational Army
(Integrated Global Presence and
Basing Strategy)c (294.68) (324.78) (30.10) 10
Co-locate miscellaneous Air Force
leased locations and National
Guard Headquarters leased
locations 30.84 1.08 (29.76) 97
Source: GAO analysis of BRAC Commission and DOD data.
aIn constant fiscal year 2005 dollars.
bData provided by DOD for fiscal year 2012 expected savings.
cBoth the BRAC Commission and subsequently DOD estimated that this
recommendation would incur a net annual recurring cost (denoted by the
parenthesis) after the BRAC implementation period rather than a net annual
recurring savings. We used the parenthesis to denote an increase in net
annual recurring cost. We included this recommendation because DOD's
current estimate shows net annual recurring cost has increased by more
than $25 million.
Appendix IV: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Cost the Most
Appendix IV lists individual base realignment and closure (BRAC)
recommendations that the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to cost the
most to implement. DOD expects 24 recommendations (13 percent) to generate
65 percent of the one-time costs to implement BRAC recommendations during
fiscal years 2006 through September 15, 2011, as shown in table 5.
Table 5: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Cost the Most to Implement
(Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011)
Dollars in millions
Recommendation One-time costs
Realign Operational Army (Integrated Global Presence and
Basing Strategy) $2,918
Close National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency leased
locations and realign others to Fort Belvoir, VA 2,091
Realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center to Bethesda
National Naval Medical Center, MD and to Fort Belvoir, VA 1,688
Establish San Antonio Regional Medical Center and realign
medical enlisted training to Fort Sam Houston, TX 1,591
Close Fort Monmouth, NJ 1,458
Realign Maneuver Training to Fort Benning, GA 1,455
Co-locate miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field
activity leased locations 1,200
Realign to establish Combat Service Support Center at Fort
Lee, VA 1,145
Realign Fort Hood, TX 622
Close Brooks City-Base, TX 592
Realign supply, storage, and distribution management 577
Consolidate Defense Information Systems Agency to Fort
Meade, MD 573
Close Fort McPherson, GA 550
Army reserve component transformation, TX 501
Realign to create a Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments
Research, Development, and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation
Center mostly at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA 427
Co-locate military department investigation agencies with
DOD Counterintelligence and Security Agency to Marine Corps
Base Quantico, VA 388
Co-locate missile and space defense agencies to Redstone
Arsenal, AL 374
Consolidate/co-locate active and reserve personnel and
recruiting centers for Army and Air Force 370
Realign Fort Bragg, NC 343
Realign to relocate Air Defense Artillery Center and School
to Fort Sill, OK 326
Relocate Army headquarters and field operating activities 321
Close Fort Monroe, VA 288
Consolidate Defense Finance and Accounting Service 280
Close Naval Air Station Willow Grove, PA and realign
Cambria Regional Airport, Johnstown, PA 266
Total one-time estimated costs from the recommendations
listed above $20,344
Total one-time estimated costs from all recommendations $31,160
Percentage of one-time costs from recommendations listed
above of all recommendations 65%
Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data.
Note: Totals may not add because of rounding.
Appendix V: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Annually
Appendix V lists individual base realignment and closure (BRAC)
recommendations that the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to save the
most annually after it has implemented the recommendations. DOD expects 28
recommendations (15 percent) to generate 85 percent of the net annual
recurring savings as shown in table 6.
Table 6: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Annually After
Implementation (Projected for Fiscal Year 2012)
Fiscal year 2012 dollars in millions
Net annual recurring
Recommendation savingsa
Realign to establish fleet readiness centers $304
Consolidate Defense Finance and Accounting Service 284
Realign Cannon Air Force Base, NMb 260
Realign Pope Air Force Base, NC 212
Realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center to Bethesda
National Naval Medical Center, MD and to Fort
Belvoir, VA 172
Consolidate/co-locate active and reserve personnel
and recruiting centers for Army and Air Force 170
Realign supply, storage, and distribution management 158
Close Fort Monmouth, NJ 154
Consolidate depot level reparable procurement
management consolidation 150
Realign to establish Combat Service Support Center at
Fort Lee, VA 148
Realign Maneuver Training to Fort Benning, GA 133
Establish joint bases at multiple locations 116
Close Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME 115
Realign by converting medical inpatient services to
clinics at various installations 106
Consolidate Transportation Command components at
Scott Air Force Base, IL 97
Close Fort McPherson, GA 94
Close Brooks City-Base, TX 92
Establish San Antonio Regional Medical Center and
realign enlisted medical training to Fort Sam
Houston, TX 91
Co-locate miscellaneous OSD, defense agencies, and
field activity leases at Fort Belvoir, VA 72
Close Naval Station Ingleside, TX and realign Naval
Air Station Corpus Christi, TX 69
Realign to create a Naval Integrated Weapons and
Armaments Research, Development, and Acquisition,
Test and Evaluation Center mostly at Naval Air
Weapons Station China Lake, CA 68
Close Fort Monroe, VA 65
Consolidate Defense Information Systems Agency at
Fort Meade, MD 52
Relocate medical command headquarters 51
Realign to relocate Air Defense Artillery Center and
School to Fort Sill, OK 50
Co-locate missile and space defense agencies to
Redstone Arsenal, AL 45
Realign defense research service-led laboratories at
multiple locations 43
Close Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA 42
Total net annual recurring savings from the
recommendations listed above $3,413
Total net annual recurring savings from all
recommendations $4,014
Percentage of net annual recurring savings from
recommendations listed above of all recommendations 85%
Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data.
Note: Totals may not add because of rounding.
aData provided by DOD for fiscal year 2012 expected savings.
bIn May 2005, DOD proposed closing Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. In
September 2005, the BRAC Commission stated that Cannon could remain open
if DOD identified a new mission for the base. Subsequently, the Air Force
announced in June 2006 that Cannon will remain open because they plan to
activate a new mission at the installation.
Appendix VI: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Over a
20-Year Period
Appendix VI lists individual base realignment and closure (BRAC)
recommendations that the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to save the
most over a 20-year period. DOD expects the implementation of 29
recommendations (16 percent) to generate 85 percent of the 20-year savings
as shown in table 7.
Table 7: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Over a 20-Year
Period (Fiscal Years 2006 through 2025)
Constant fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions
20-year net present
Recommendation valuea
Realign to establish fleet readiness centers $3,361
Realign Cannon Air Force Base, NMb 2,837
Consolidate Defense Finance and Accounting Service 2,800
Realign Pope Air Force Base, NC 2,382
Consolidate/co-locate active and reserve personnel and
recruiting centers for Army and Air Force 1,436
Consolidate depot level reparable procurement
management 1,367
Realign supply, storage, and distribution management 1,251
Establish joint bases at multiple locations 1,032
Realign by converting medical inpatient services to
clinics at various installations 1,015
Consolidate Transportation Command components at Scott
Air Force Base, IL 930
Close Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME 905
Close Naval Station Ingleside, TX and realign Naval
Air Station Corpus Christi, TX 488
Relocate medical command headquarters 482
Realign to establish Combat Service Support Center at
Fort Lee, VA 457
Realign commodity management privatization 454
Close Fort McPherson, GA 452
Close Naval Station Pascagoula, MS 446
Close Brooks City-Base, TX 417
Close Fort Monmouth, NJ 381
Close Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA 372
Close Fort Monroe, VA 330
Co-locate miscellaneous Army leased locations 319
Realign to create a Naval Integrated Weapons and
Armaments Research, Development, and Acquisition, Test
and Evaluation Center mostly at Naval Air Weapons
Station China Lake, CA 285
Realign to consolidate maritime command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance, research, development, and
acquisition, test and evaluation functions at multiple
locations 272
Realign defense research service-led laboratories at
multiple locations 268
Realign Army Reserve Command and Control - Northeast 260
Realign Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID 254
Realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center to Bethesda
National Naval Medical Center, MD and to Fort Belvoir,
VA 251
Close Fort Gillem, GA 249
Total savings from the recommendations listed above $25,756
Total savings from only recommendations that accrue a
net savings after 20 years $30,358
Percentage of savings from recommendations listed
above of all recommendations that accrue a net savings
after 20 years 85%
Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data.
Notes: Totals may not add because of rounding.
aNet present value: A financial calculation that takes the time value of
money into account by determining the present value of the up-front
initial investment minus future net savings over a specified period of
time. In the context of BRAC, net present value is the total one-time
costs minus the total net savings that DOD expects to incur from fiscal
year 2006 through fiscal year 2025 to project 20-year savings at 2.8
percent discount rate.
bIn May 2005, DOD proposed closing Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. In
September 2005, the BRAC Commission stated that Cannon could remain open
if DOD identified a new mission for the base. Subsequently, the Air Force
announced in June 2006 that Cannon will remain open because they plan to
activate a new mission at the installation.
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or [email protected]
Acknowledgments
In addition to the individual named above, Barry Holman, Director
(retired); Laura Talbott, Assistant Director; Leigh Caraher; Grace
Coleman; Susan Ditto; Thomas Mahalek; Julia Matta; Charles Perdue;
Benjamin Thompson; and Tristan T. To made key contributions to this
report.
Related GAO Products
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,
Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology. [41]GAO-08-20 . Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage, and
Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics Agency.
[42]GAO-08-121R . Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial
Personnel Growth. [43]GAO-07-1007 . Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor Challenges
for Completing More than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers. [44]GAO-07-1040
. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 2005
Round. [45]GAO-07-1203R . Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers Are
Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and Overcome
Certain Challenges. [46]GAO-07-304 . Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges
and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air
National Guard Recommendations. [47]GAO-07-641 . Washington, D.C.: May 16,
2007.
Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental
Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.
[48]GAO-07-166 . Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.
Military Bases: Observations on DOD's 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
Selection Process and Recommendations. [49]GAO-05-905 . Washington, D.C.:
July 18, 2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. [50]GAO-05-785 .
Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC Rounds.
[51]GAO-05-614 . Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and
Closures. [52]GAO-05-138 . Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD's 2004 Report on the Need for a
Base Realignment and Closure Round. [53]GAO-04-760 . Washington, D.C.: May
17, 2004.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming Base
Realignment and Closure Round. [54]GAO-04-558T . Washington, D.C.: March
25, 2004.
(350840)
GAO's Mission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site ( [55]www.gao.gov ). Each weekday, GAO posts
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To
have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
[56]www.gao.gov and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
DC 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000
TDD: (202) 512-2537
Fax: (202) 512-6061
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Contact:
Web site: [57]www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: [58][email protected]
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Congressional Relations
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [59][email protected] , (202) 512-4400
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
Washington, DC 20548
Public Affairs
Chuck Young, Managing Director [60][email protected] , (202) 512-4800 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington,
DC 20548
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on [61]GAO-08-159 .
For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or
[email protected].
Highlights of [62]GAO-08-159 , a report to congressional addressees
December 2007
MILITARY BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES
Cost Estimates Have Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round is the biggest, most
complex, and costliest ever. DOD viewed this round as a unique opportunity
to reshape its installations, realign forces to meet its needs for the
next 20 years, and achieve savings. To realize savings, DOD must first
invest billions of dollars in facility construction, renovation, and other
up-front expenses to implement the BRAC recommendations. However, recent
increases in estimated cost have become a concern to some members of
Congress.
Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his
own initiative, GAO (1) compared the BRAC Commission's cost and savings
estimates to
DOD's current estimates, (2) assessed potential for change in DOD's
current estimates, and (3) identified broad implementation challenges. GAO
compared the BRAC Commission's estimates, which were the closest estimates
available associated with final BRAC recommendations, to DOD's current
estimates. GAO also visited 25 installations and major commands, and
interviewed DOD officials.
[63]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD explain its estimated BRAC savings from personnel
reductions as compared to other savings to provide more transparency to
Congress. DOD concurred with our recommendation and agreed to explain
savings estimates in its BRAC budget material to Congress.
Since the BRAC Commission issued its cost and savings estimates in 2005,
DOD plans to spend more and save less, and it will take longer than
expected to recoup up-front costs. Compared to the BRAC Commission's
estimates, DOD's cost estimates to implement BRAC recommendations
increased from $21 billion to $31 billion (48 percent), and net annual
recurring savings estimates decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 billion (5
percent). DOD's one-time cost estimates to implement over 30 of the 182
recommendations have increased more than $50 million each over the BRAC
Commission's estimates, and DOD's cost estimates to complete 6 of these
recommendations have increased by more than $500 million each. Moreover,
GAO's analysis of DOD's current estimates shows that it will take until
2017 for DOD to recoup up-front costs to implement BRAC 2005--4 years
longer than the BRAC Commission's estimates show. Similarly, the BRAC
Commission estimated that BRAC 2005 implementation would save DOD about
$36 billion over a 20-year period ending in 2025, whereas our analysis
shows that BRAC implementation is now expected to save about 58 percent
less, or about $15 billion.
DOD's estimates to implement BRAC recommendations are likely to change
further due to uncertainties surrounding implementation details and
potential increases in military construction and environmental cleanup
costs. Moreover, DOD may have overestimated annual recurring savings by
about 46 percent or $1.85 billion. DOD's estimated annual recurring
savings of about $4 billion includes $2.17 billion in eliminated overhead
expenses, which will free up funds that DOD can then use for other
priorities, but it also includes $1.85 billion in military personnel
entitlements, such as salaries, for personnel DOD plans to transfer to
other locations. While DOD disagrees, GAO does not believe transferring
personnel produces tangible dollar savings since these personnel will
continue to receive salaries and benefits. Because DOD's BRAC budget does
not explain the difference between savings attributable to military
personnel entitlements and savings that will make funds available for
other uses, DOD is generating a false sense that all of its reported
savings could be used to fund other defense priorities.
DOD has made progress in planning for BRAC 2005 implementation, but
several complex challenges to the implementation of those plans increase
the risk that DOD might not meet the statutory September 2011 deadline.
DOD faces a number of challenges to synchronize the realignment of over
123,000 personnel with the completion of over $21 billion in new
construction or renovation projects by 2011. For example, the time frames
for completing many BRAC recommendations are so closely sequenced and
scheduled to be completed in 2011 that any significant changes in
personnel movement schedules or construction delays could jeopardize DOD's
ability to meet the statutory 2011 deadline. Additionally, BRAC 2005,
unlike prior BRAC rounds, included more joint recommendations involving
more than one military component, thus creating challenges in achieving
unity of effort among the services and defense agencies.
References
Visible links
1. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_2985
2. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_2996
3. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3022
4. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3023
5. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3042
6. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3556
7. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3547
8. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3055
9. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3062
10. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3510
11. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3499
12. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3500
13. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3485
14. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3488
15. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3491
16. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3492
17. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3476
18. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3092
19. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3425
20. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3101
21. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3757
22. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3759
23. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_3761
24. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_767
25. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_768
26. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_722
27. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_699
28. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_701
29. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_705
30. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_708
31. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#LinkTarget_694
32. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-785
33. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-785
34. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-95-133
35. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-177
36. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-641
37. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1040
38. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/
39. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#mailto:[email protected]
40. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-121R
41. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-20
42. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-121R
43. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1007
44. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1040
45. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1203R
46. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-304
47. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-641
48. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-166
49. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-905
50. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-785
51. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-614
52. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-138
53. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-760
54. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-558T
55. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/
56. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/
57. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
58. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#mailto:[email protected]
59. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#mailto:[email protected]
60. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#mailto:[email protected]
61. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-159
62. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d08159.htm#http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-159
*** End of document. ***