Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to
Assist Foreign Nations (04-OCT-07, GAO-08-144T).
Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11
attacks, directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on
the prevention of terrorist attacks. The strategies called for
LEAs to intensify their efforts to help foreign nations identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. This testimony addresses (1)
the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which
LEAs have implemented this guidance.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-144T
ACCNO: A77055
TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack
Directives to Assist Foreign Nations
DATE: 10/04/2007
SUBJECT: Combating terrorism
Counterterrorism
Federal aid to foreign countries
International relations
Law enforcement
Law enforcement agencies
Law enforcement personnel
Police training
Strategic planning
Terrorism
Training utilization
Program implementation
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-08-144T
* [1]Summary
* [2]Background
* [3]National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance, but Lack Key Ele
* [4]National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance for LEAs to Assis
* [5]The National Strategies Lack Key Elements for a Strategic Pl
* [6]NCTC Has Drafted Plan for Combating Terrorism, but Implement
* [7]Several Factors Limit LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations
* [8]Some LEAs Have Taken Steps to Assist Foreign Nations to Comb
* [9]LEAs Lack Clear Roles and Responsibilities
* [10]LEAs Lack Guidance on Prioritizing Funds
* [11]LEAs Lack Performance Monitoring Systems
* [12]LEAs Lack Mechanisms to Foster Joint Collaboration
* [13]LEAs Lack Comprehensive Country Needs Assessments
* [14]Conclusion
* [15]Recommendations to Improve U.S. LEA Efforts to Assist Foreig
* [16]Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [17]Order by Mail or Phone
* [18]PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf
* [19]Order by Mail or Phone
Statement for the Record
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, Committee
on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
To accompany the Committee hearing record of Thursday, October 4, 2007
COMBATING TERRORISM
Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations
Statement for the Record by Jess T. Ford, Director
International Affairs and Trade
GAO-08-144T
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to submit this statement for the record on U.S. law
enforcement efforts to help foreign nations to combat terrorism abroad.^1
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, combating terrorism has become
the nation's top national security goal and the highest strategic
objective of U.S. embassies worldwide. Law enforcement agencies (LEA) from
the departments of State (State), Justice (Justice), and Homeland Security
(DHS)--including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(DS)--operate from U.S. embassies overseas and assist foreign nation
governments on a broad array of law enforcement issues, such as
investigating crime, reducing illegal drug activity, controlling borders
and immigration, and protecting U.S. embassies and diplomats from attack.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of national
strategies that have called for using all elements of national power to
combat terrorism, including changing the role of LEAs. In particular,
these strategies have directed that law enforcement activities be
increasingly focused on the prevention of further terrorist attacks,
including helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. This includes technical assistance, such as antiterrorism
training and the provision of technologies used to identify terrorist
threats, and operational assistance, such as joint U.S.-foreign nation
investigations and operations against terrorists.
This statement discusses the findings from our recent report regarding (1)
the guidance for LEAs to help foreign nations combat terrorism, and (2)
the extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance. I should point
out that our review was limited to U.S. law enforcement efforts overseas.
It did not focus on U.S. domestic law enforcement efforts or other
instruments of national power--including military, intelligence,
diplomatic, and financial--currently being used to combat terrorism.
During the course of our review, we analyzed the National Security
Strategy of the United States of America, the National Strategy for
Homeland Security, and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. We
discussed this and other guidance with representatives from State,
Justice, and DHS, along with embassy and LEA officials involved with
working with foreign nation counterparts. We also reviewed State, Justice,
and DHS strategic plans and annual performance reports and conducted
detailed work in four countries with key roles in combating terrorism
where we met with LEA, embassy, and foreign nation officials. We also met
with officials from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)^2 to brief
them on our observations and to determine the status of ongoing efforts to
develop a plan to use all elements of national power, including LEAs, to
combat terrorism. NCTC officials would not discuss the plan, its contents,
or any issues raised in our report. During the course of our work we
experienced considerable delays obtaining information from Justice and
State, which resulted in our report being issued several months later than
initially planned. We were eventually able to obtain information
sufficient for answering our objectives. The work used to support this
statement was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
^1GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to
Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists,
[20]GAO-07-697 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007).
Summary
The national strategies issued after the 9/11 attacks collectively called
for reorienting U.S. LEAs to proactively work to prevent terrorist attacks
at home and abroad. However, they lacked key components, such as clearly
defined objectives, roles, and responsibilities necessary for a strategic
plan and for facilitating interagency collaboration. Further, they did not
articulate which LEAs should implement the general guidance provided in
the strategies or how they should do so. For example, of the seven LEAs in
our review, only the FBI received and has issued some implementing
guidance--for example, stating that it planned to increase its presence
abroad and increase joint operations with foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In December 2004, Congress passed the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (the 2004 Intelligence
Reform Act),^3 which charged the NCTC with developing a plan to use all
elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC
officials told us they had drafted a general plan, which was approved by
the President in June 2006. According to NCTC officials, the implementing
guidance for the plan was still under development as of May 2007, and they
would not discuss the plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance.
^2The NCTC was created by Congress as part of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). NCTC's mission includes
developing plans that coordinate the use of all elements of national
power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks.
As detailed in the background section of this report, the NCTC reports
directly to the President on matters of strategic operational planning for
counterterrorism and works under the policy direction of the NSC.
^3P.L. 108-458, section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 404o).
Some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to help foreign
nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, the FBI
has increased its overseas activities and DHS has worked with foreign
nations to implement the Container Security Initiative to screen
U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports. However, almost 6 years after the 9/11
attacks, the United States lacks clear implementing guidance for
integrating the variety of overseas LEA activities to help foreign nations
to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We found that, because
most LEAs have not been provided clear directives, they generally lacked
(1) clearly articulated roles and responsibilities to assist foreign
nations; (2) guidance on setting funding priorities and providing
resources; (3) performance monitoring systems to assess LEA progress; (4)
formal structures to coordinate LEA operational and technical assistance
to foreign nation LEAs; and (5) comprehensive country needs assessments to
tailor LEA technical and operational assistance to specific foreign nation
needs.
Looking forward, the United States needs to develop clear implementing
guidance for integrating the variety of overseas LEA activities assisting
foreign nations to combat terrorism. In our recent report, we recommend
that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the National Security
Council (NSC), ensure that the implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan
for combating terrorism clearly articulates the specific objectives for
each LEA, clarifies their roles and responsibilities, and proposes actions
linked to available resources and directed at the most pressing needs for
assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
In addition, since these activities are central to the overall U.S. effort
to combat terrorism, DHS, Justice, and State need to ensure that their
component agencies have clear guidance to implement the national security
strategies' goal of using the full capabilities of LEAs to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and also need to
assess progress toward objectives and provide regular reporting to
Congress on the results, impediments, and planned improvements. NCTC
stated it had already begun to implement our recommendations. DHS
generally agreed with our recommendations. State and Justice stated they
would consider ways to improve overseas coordination.
Background
State, Justice, and DHS each include LEAs that operate from U.S.
embassies. LEAs abroad work on a wide array of law enforcement issues,
including those that cover criminal enterprises, drug cartels, visa and
immigration fraud, financial crimes, criminal and terrorist threats
against U.S. embassies and personnel, and fugitive capture and
extraditions. In this statement, we are focused primarily on ICE, FBI, and
DS operations abroad, although in our report we also reviewed the overseas
counter-terrorism activities of the Drug Enforcement Administration; the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the U.S. Marshals
Service; Customs and Border Protection; and the U.S. Secret Service.
ICE investigates threats to U.S. border security and works to eliminate
the potential threat of terrorist acts against the United States. The FBI
is charged with protecting the United States from terrorist attacks;
preventing, disrupting, and defeating terrorist operations; and expanding
operational partnerships with foreign nation law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to disrupt and prevent terrorism. DS is State's law
enforcement arm and is responsible for protecting U.S. embassies,
diplomats, and their families from criminal and terrorist attacks.
The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act created the NCTC and charged it with
integrating all instruments of national power--including diplomatic,
financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement
activities--within and among agencies, with the ultimate goal of
preventing future attacks against America and its interests worldwide. The
NCTC is a part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and
reports to the Director on matters of intelligence collection and
analysis; however, on matters of strategic operational planning for
counterterrorism, the Director of the NCTC reports directly to the
President. As a result, the NCTC works under the policy direction of the
NSC on matters of counterterrorism planning.
National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance, but Lack Key Elements for a
Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration
A series of national strategies have provided broad guidance for U.S. LEAs
to help foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
However, the strategies lack essential elements of a strategic plan and
for facilitating interagency collaboration, and they do not clearly
delineate what role, if any, the various LEAs should play in assisting
foreign nations to combat terrorism. The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act
requires the NCTC to develop U.S. governmentwide strategic operational
plans to combat terrorism, which should include the mission, objectives,
tasks to be performed, interagency coordination of operational activities,
and assignment of roles and responsibilities among participating agencies.
NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act, they had drafted a
general plan, which was approved by the President in June 2006, but the
implementing guidance for the plan was still under development.
National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance for LEAs to Assist Foreign Nations to
Combat Terrorism
A series of national strategies have provided some strategic-level
guidance for U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. For example, the National Security Strategy, issued
in 2002 and updated in March 2006, states that the United States will
continue to encourage regional partners to take up a coordinated effort
that isolates the terrorists, and help ensure that foreign nations have
the law enforcement, military, political, and financial tools necessary to
disrupt and destroy terrorist operations before they reach American
borders.
Additionally, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security primarily
focuses on domestic efforts to secure America from further terrorist
attacks. It clarifies the role of LEAs in the post 9/11 world, stating
that, "Our Nation's highest law enforcement objective must be the
prevention of terrorist acts--a significant shift from pre-9/11
objectives." The strategy also notes that, in a world where the terrorist
threat pays no respect to traditional boundaries, the American strategy
for homeland security cannot stop at the country's borders.
It also calls for a sustained and systematic international agenda to
counter the global terrorist threat and improve homeland security, and
identifies a number of initiatives in this area, including (1)
intensifying international law enforcement cooperation and helping foreign
nations fight terrorism and (2) augmenting the FBI's overseas presence by
increasing the number of LEGATs around the world. It states that Justice,
in cooperation with State, is to work with foreign nation counterparts on
these law enforcement issues.
Also, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued in 2003 and
updated in 2006, focuses on the United States' efforts to combat terrorism
abroad. It also provides greater detail on the objectives and strategies
for U.S. LEAs in working with their foreign nation counterparts. According
to the strategy, the United States is to:
o Expand, where appropriate, the U.S. law enforcement presence
abroad to further the investigative and operational assistance
related to the interdiction, investigation, and prosecution of
terrorist suspects.
o Increase technical and operational assistance efforts to help
foreign nation LEAs acquire the necessary capabilities to fight
terrorism through a variety of means, including (1) improved
legislation, (2) technical assistance, (3) new investigative
techniques, (4) intelligence sharing, and (5) law enforcement
training.
o Enhance operational assistance to expand international
cooperation to combat terrorism through expanded sharing of law
enforcement information.
In 2006, the White House released updates of the National Security
Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. Both
updated strategies reinforce the basic concepts of using U.S. LEAs
to assist foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and
prosecuting terrorists abroad. For example, the National Strategy
to Combat Terrorism supports intensifying training and other types
of assistance to improve foreign nation LEA capacities to identify
and disrupt terrorists threats, as well as implementing legal
reforms aimed at ensuring that foreign nations have the necessary
laws to carry out this effort, and that investigators,
prosecutors, and judges have the capacity to effectively prosecute
terrorists using these new laws. The strategies state that this
approach has succeeded in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
terrorists since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The National Strategies Lack Key Elements for a Strategic Plan and
Interagency Collaboration
Our past work has stressed the importance of developing a strategy
to combat terrorism that would establish goals, objectives,
priorities, outcomes, milestones, and performance measures.^4 In
March 2003, we reported that strategic plans should clearly define
objectives to be accomplished, identify the roles and
responsibilities for meeting each objective, ensure that funding
necessary to achieve the objectives is available, and employ
monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed
improvements. For example, our past work has found that
identifying clear roles and responsibilities for each federal
agency combating terrorism is a major challenge in implementing
national strategies related to terrorism.
In addition, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
requires each federal agency to develop strategic plans that cover
a period of at least 5 years and include the agency's mission
statement; identify the agency's general goals and objectives; and
describe how the agency intends to achieve those goals through its
activities and human, capital, information, and other resources.
Under GPRA, strategic plans are the starting point for agencies to
set annual performance plans for programs and to measure the
performance of the programs in achieving those goals. Our past
work has found that GPRA has the potential for greatly enhancing
agency performance. For example, managers can use performance
information to identify problems in existing programs, to try to
identify the causes of problems, and to develop corrective
actions.^5
Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort where interagency
collaboration is essential, we have found that agencies should (1)
define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually
reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address funding
needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and
responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures,
and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop
mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7)
reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through
agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce individual
accountability for collaborative efforts through performance
management systems.^6 We have specifically noted that, given the
number of agencies involved in U.S. government efforts to combat
terrorism, it is particularly important that there be mechanisms
to coordinate across agencies.^7
^4GAO, Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to
Terrorism, [22]GAO-03-519T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003).
^5GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
Information for Management Decision Making, [23]GAO-05-927 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005).
We found that while the national strategies, as well as their
updates in 2006, provided broad guidance, they lacked key
strategic elements, including those to promote LEA collaboration
in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. For example, none of the three national strategies
established joint agency strategies that would capitalize on the
unique capacity of each LEA to combat terrorism. Further, none of
them identified funding needs or leveraged resources; reached
agreement on roles and responsibilities; or established procedures
to operate across agency boundaries. Moreover, none of the
strategies included mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on
their overall results, nor did they reinforce agency
accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and
reports.
NCTC Has Drafted Plan for Combating Terrorism, but Implementing
Guidance Is Still under Development
In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform
Act, creating the NCTC and charging it with developing strategic
operational plans to combat terrorism using every element of
national power, including those of U.S. LEAs. Under the act, the
NCTC is expected to (1) conduct strategic operational planning for
counterterrorism activities; (2) integrate all instruments of
national power in such planning, including law enforcement,
diplomatic, military, intelligence, and financial activities; (3)
assign roles and responsibilities to lead departments and
agencies; (4) ensure that agencies have access to intelligence and
intelligence support needed to execute their counterterrorism
plans and accomplish their assigned activities; and (5) monitor
implementation of these operational plans.
In June 2006, the NCTC Director testified before Congress that the
lack of a detailed plan to ensure full implementation of the
national security strategy had been a void that stretched back for
decades.^8 According to the director, what has long been missing
is a plan to ensure that national strategies are implemented at
the operational level in a coordinated, integrated fashion, and
that there has been no formal process to translate the national
strategies into strategic and tangible objectives, assigned to
lead agencies, with roles and responsibilities clearly defined. In
addition, there has been no plan to ensure the coordination,
integration, and synchronization of joint departmental operations,
or any effort to monitor the combined impact of the multiple
agencies engaged in implementing the national security strategy.
^6GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 21, 2005).
^7 [24]GAO-03-519T .
^8Admiral John Scott Redd, in testimony before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, June 13, 2006.
NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act, they had
drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in
June of 2006. According to NCTC officials, implementing guidance
for the plan was still under development as of May 2007, and they
would not discuss the plan, its contents, or the implementing
guidance.
Several Factors Limit LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to
Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists
Although some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to
help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists,
most LEAs have not been given clear guidance for helping foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We found
that LEA efforts to assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists have been hindered because the LEAs generally
lacked (1) clearly articulated roles and responsibilities from
NCTC to assist foreign nations; (2) guidance on setting funding
priorities and providing resources; (3) performance monitoring
systems to assess LEA progress; (4) formal structures to
coordinate LEA operational and technical assistance to foreign
nation LEAs; and (5) comprehensive country needs assessments to
tailor LEA technical and operational assistance to specific
foreign nation needs.
Some LEAs Have Taken Steps to Assist Foreign Nations to Combat Terrorism
Some LEAs have increased their efforts to help foreign nations
combat terrorism. For example, the FBI is attempting to
operationally assist foreign nations to identify and disrupt
terrorist attacks before they occur, and it has responded to
specific terrorist attacks by assisting foreign nations to
identify and prosecute the suspected terrorists. In addition, new
programs have been specifically designed to assist foreign nations
to identify and disrupt potential terrorist threats, such as the
DHS Container Security Initiative (CSI). Moreover, some existing
technical assistance programs, like State's Antiterrorism
Assistance (ATA) program, have been expanded in an effort to
improve foreign nation capabilities. While this list is not all
inclusive, these represent some significant U.S. efforts to use
U.S. LEAs to assist foreign nations to combat terrorism. We found
that these three efforts were limited by a variety of factors.
We found that the FBI has both responded to specific terrorist
attacks by operationally assisting foreign nation LEAs to identify
and prosecute terrorists involved in those attacks, as well as
tried to proactively assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the FBI
provided limited but vital operational assistance to locate
terrorist suspects and provided key evidence for their successful
prosecution. In another country we visited, the FBI was working
proactively with ICE and with foreign nation counterparts to track
suspicious migrants and identify and disrupt potential terrorists
before they entered the United States. However, as we will discuss
below, we found that the impact of the FBI's efforts to combat
terrorism has been limited in some posts overseas.
DHS's CSI effort targets for inspection at foreign seaports
high-risk cargo shipments before they leave for the United States.
It was created after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and requires U.S.
law enforcement personnel to be physically colocated with foreign
nation LEAs to identify and disrupt terrorist threats to America.
In 2005, we reported that CSI had led to improved information
sharing between U.S. and foreign customs staff and a heightened
level of bilateral cooperation and international awareness of the
need to identify and disrupt terrorist threats.^9 However, we also
found that several issues limited its effectiveness, such as the
inability to fully staff some ports because of diplomatic
constraints.
LEAs Lack Clear Roles and Responsibilities
Despite such actions, we found that most LEAs have not been given
clear guidance for helping foreign nations to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists. We found that neither NCTC nor the
executive departments have clearly translated the national
strategies' broad strategic objectives to agency-specific roles
and responsibilities. In addition, we found that, with one
exception, neither Justice, DHS, nor State had issued guidance to
their component LEAs to implement this new national security goal
of assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute
terrorists. Only Justice had issued some guidance to the FBI. As a
result, most U.S. LEAs lacked clearly defined roles and
responsibilities for implementing their efforts to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
^9GAO, Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment
Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts,
[25]GAO-05-557 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005).
We found problems because of this lack of guidance on roles and
responsibilities. For example:
o Although Justice told us in February 2007 that the FBI was
designated the lead federal LEA on investigating terrorism-related
crimes abroad, this view was not shared by the other LEAs or even
the FBI itself. LEAs, including DHS's ICE, Justice's FBI, and
State's DS all told us there was no lead LEA charged with using
the combined capabilities of federal LEAs to assist foreign
nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
o In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and
responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised
several joint operations intended to identify and disrupt
potential terrorist activities, according to the U.S. and foreign
nation LEAs. ICE was responsible for tracking special interest
aliens, while the FBI was responsible for identifying terrorists
trying to enter the United States. Because it was unclear whether
some of these special interest aliens were migrants or potential
terrorists--and ICE and FBI were not given clear guidance to
determine which LEA had the lead role--foreign nation and agency
officials noted instances where joint U.S.-foreign nation
investigations or operations were poorly coordinated. As a result,
ICE and FBI, unknowingly working with different foreign nation
LEAs, moved in on the same subject. According to the foreign
nation law enforcement and FBI officials, such actions may have
compromised several of their investigations.
o DS's Regional Security Officers (RSO) have been given no post
9/11 guidance from State on how to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and RSOs voiced
confusion about this role. In three of the four countries we
visited, RSOs told us that they were not working with foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, while in
another country, the RSO played a critical role in embassy efforts
to help the foreign nation capture and prosecute terrorists
responsible for attacks against Americans and others.
o At the four embassies we visited, we found State had not
provided guidance on how to use LEA assets to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
Ambassadors or deputy chiefs of mission at each embassy we visited
voiced their concern that, despite combating terrorism being the
embassy's highest priority, they received little to no guidance on
how to design a coordinated assistance program using the full
capacities of U.S. technical and operational assistance from LEAs,
and ensure that LEAs had the necessary goals, skills,
capabilities, and time to work closely with foreign nation
officials to stop terrorists attacks.
In commenting on our findings in February 2007, officials from
DHS, Justice, and State agreed that there had been a lack of clear
guidance instructing LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Officials noted that the NSC
and now the NCTC have the authority to compel U.S. LEAs to work
together in a coordinated, systematic fashion to help stop
terrorist attacks. Officials said that no executive department has
the authority to direct the LEAs from other departments to focus
on this goal, and they noted that recommendations to individual
agencies would not result in a unified multidepartmental effort to
help foreign nations combat terrorism.
LEAs Lack Guidance on Prioritizing Funds
Officials from DHS, Justice, and State told us that they are
attempting to fund a broad array of LEA activities abroad with
limited staffing and funds, and without guidance from the NSC on
reprioritizing funds from other activities. As a result, their
efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists have been hindered. For example,
o DHS officials from ICE and Customs and Border Protection said
they were limited in their ability to undertake new overseas
counterterrorism initiatives or to fully staff existing positions
already approved by embassies.
o Although FBI's Strategic Plan states that it will expand the
role of its LEGAT offices to undertake joint investigative and
operational partnerships with foreign nation LEAs to identify and
stop terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, we found several
problems that reduced their ability to meet this goal. For
example, the LEGATs in three of the four countries we visited said
they generally lacked the resources, time, and staff to develop
the close, collaborative relationships necessary to conduct joint
investigations or operations.
o A 2006 report from State's Office of Inspector General found
that State lacked adequate resources to meet its mandate to
coordinate all U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad, and was
too under-funded to provide advice, coordination, and action on
counterterrorism issues to its embassies.
o In all four countries we visited, terrorist transit and border
vulnerabilities were identified as primary terrorist threats; yet,
in three of these countries, funding had not been realigned to
support this effort, so the respective embassies could not provide
specific assistance to address these needs.
o In all four countries we visited, there was more funding to
assist foreign nations combat illegal drugs and crime than to
combat terrorism, despite the fact that efforts to combat
terrorism were the highest priority of each embassy. For example,
in one country with an extremely high terrorist threat to American
interests globally, State provided more than six times the amount
of funding to stop illicit drugs and crime ($220.2 million) than
it did for antiterrorism assistance ($34.5 million) from fiscal
years 2002 to 2006.
LEAs Lack Performance Monitoring Systems
DHS, Justice, and State officials said that they lacked systems to
assess their performance and progress in assisting foreign nations
to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. As a result, none
of the LEAs had in place a method for determining progress or
documenting their accomplishments in assisting foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, either for technical
or operational assistance.
Because the LEAs lack such a monitoring system, they could not
provide a comprehensive list of key accomplishments in assisting
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists from
2001 to 2005. As a result, we could not conduct a full assessment
of the LEAs' progress in these efforts.
LEAs Lack Mechanisms to Foster Joint Collaboration
We found that neither NCTC, State, Justice, nor DHS had developed
policies to facilitate joint LEA investigations and operations
abroad. As a result,
o LEAs told us that the embassies had not been reoriented to
harness the combined capabilities of all LEAs in a collective
effort to prevent another terrorist attack on the United States or
its interests.
o In three of the four embassies we visited, we found that the
embassies generally retained pre-9/11 structures for information
sharing among LEAs. Although embassies generally use law
enforcement working groups to share information, we found they
were not focused on joint investigative or operational efforts to
identify and disrupt terrorist acts. For example, in one country
we visited with an extremely high terrorist threat, an FBI
official told us that the law enforcement working group had never
been asked to try to identify or disrupt any of the terrorists on
the most wanted lists of the departments of State or Defense, or
of the foreign nation itself.
LEAs Lack Comprehensive Country Needs Assessments
In each country we visited, we found that there were no
comprehensive needs assessments being conducted that consider all
U.S. assistance available for addressing the country's needs in
combating terrorism. As a result, we found that State, Justice,
DHS, and their LEAs may not be targeting their full range of
training and assistance to help foreign countries to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example,
o According to embassy officials in three of the four countries we
visited, terrorist transit across their borders was a key
vulnerability. However, there was no comprehensive effort by
State, Justice, DHS, or their LEAs to provide training to the
foreign nation border patrols, immigration officers, and customs
agents to identify and disrupt terrorists transiting their
borders.
Conclusion
In closing, the enhanced missions of LEAs to work with foreign
nations to combat terrorism and the creation of the NCTC are
potentially significant steps to resolving some of the serious
national security problems identified by the 9/11 Commission.
However, in our recent report, we found important gaps between the
broad goals of the national strategies and what was actually being
implemented in the field. While the national strategies
articulated changes in the direction and emphasis of overseas LEA
activities, they have not provided specific roles, objectives, or
mechanisms for determining success. As a result of these and other
weaknesses, LEAs, a key element of national power, are not being
fully utilized abroad to help protect U.S. citizens and interests
from future terrorist attacks. Looking forward, the United States
needs to develop clear implementing guidance for integrating the
variety of overseas LEA activities assisting foreign nations to
combat terrorism. As such, it is imperative that the NCTC plan for
combating terrorism be clear in assigning roles and
responsibilities and ensuring that each LEA has the means, the
incentives, and the procedures to work with other agencies to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists.
Recommendations to Improve U.S. LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations
to Combat Terrorism
In our report, we recommended that the NCTC ensure that the
implementing guidance for the NCTC's plan for combating terrorism
articulates a clear strategy for using LEAs to help foreign
nations combat terrorism. We also recommended that State, Justice,
and DHS explore enhancements to overseas coordination mechanisms
and develop clear guidance and performance monitoring to enhance
efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism. NCTC stated it
had already begun to implement our recommendations. DHS generally
agreed with our recommendations. State and Justice stated they
would consider ways to improve overseas coordination, but did not
indicate whether they concurred with our other recommendations.
I would be pleased to meet with you or your staff to answer any
questions you may have or to discuss this statement.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T.
Ford at (202) 512-4128 or [21][email protected] . Individuals making
key contributions to this statement include: Dave Maurer,
Assistant Director; Edward J. George; J. Addison Ricks; and Joe
Carney.
(320527)
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on [26]GAO-08-144T .
For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-4128 or
[email protected].
Highlights of [27]GAO-08-144T , a statement for the record to the
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Terrorism, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives
October 4, 2007
COMBATING TERRORISM
Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations
Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks,
directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on the prevention of
terrorist attacks. The strategies called for LEAs to intensify their
efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. This testimony addresses (1) the guidance for LEAs to assist
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the
extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance.
[28]What GAO Recommends
In our recent report on this issue, we recommended that the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), ensure that the implementing guidance for
its plan for combating terrorism articulates a clear strategy for using
LEAs to help foreign nations combat terrorism. We also recommended that
State, Justice, and DHS explore enhancements to overseas coordination
mechanisms and develop clear guidance and performance monitoring to
enhance efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism.
NCTC stated it had already begun to implement our recommendations. DHS
generally agreed with our recommendations. State and Justice stated they
would consider ways to improve overseas coordination, but did not indicate
whether they concurred with our other recommendations.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of strategies
that provided broad direction for overseas law enforcement efforts to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
However, these strategies did not articulate which LEAs should implement
the guidance to enhance efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism
or how they should do so. In December 2004, Congress passed the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which charged
the NCTC with developing a plan to use all elements of national power,
including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had
drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June of
2006. According to NCTC, State, Justice, and DHS officials, implementing
guidance for the plan is under development, and they would not discuss the
contents of the plan or the guidance.
LEAs have increased efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. For example, DHS has implemented its Container
Security Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports, and State
has expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance program. However, we found that
because most LEAs, with the exception of the FBI, have not been given
clear guidance, they lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities on
helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In
one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities
between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations
intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according
to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. In addition, we found LEAs generally
lacked guidance on using resources to assist foreign nations in addressing
terrorist vulnerabilities and generally lacked performance monitoring
systems and formal structures for sharing information and collaborating.
We also found that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not
conducted, LEAs may not be tailoring their full range of training and
assistance to address key terrorism vulnerabilities in foreign countries.
U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism Exercises
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced
and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO.
However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other
material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you
wish to reproduce this material separately.
GAO's Mission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site ( [29]www.gao.gov ). Each weekday, GAO posts
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To
have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
[30]www.gao.gov and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
DC 20548
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000
TDD: (202) 512-2537
Fax: (202) 512-6061
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Contact:
Web site: [31]www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: [32][email protected]
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Congressional Relations
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [33][email protected] , (202) 512-4400
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
Washington, DC 20548
Public Affairs
Susan Becker, Acting Manager, [34][email protected] , (202) 512-4800 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington,
DC 20548
References
Visible links
20. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697
21. mailto:[email protected]
22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-927
24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T
25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-557
26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-144T
27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-144T
29. http://www.gao.gov/
30. http://www.gao.gov/
31. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
32. mailto:[email protected]
33. mailto:[email protected]
34. mailto:[email protected]
*** End of document. ***