Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces'
Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities  
Are Not Fully Developed (30-NOV-07, GAO-08-143R).		 
                                                                 
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which 
operates under Multi-National Forces-Iraq, leads the Coalition	 
effort to train, equip, and organize the ISF. Previously, once	 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units were trained and equipped,	 
operational responsibility for their employment was turned over  
to Multi-National Corps-Iraq. As of June 2007, the Iraqi Ground  
Forces Command has assumed operational control of 8 of the 10	 
extant Iraqi Army divisions, and the Ministry of Interior has	 
assumed operational control of the National Police. Overall, the 
number of Iraqi military and police personnel the Coalition has  
trained and equipped increased from over 171,000 in July 2005 to 
about 359,600 in September 2007. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense	 
forces consist of the Joint Headquarters; the Iraqi Ground Forces
Command, which commands the Army and the Iraqi Special Operations
Forces; the Air Force; and the Navy (including Marines). The	 
Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces consist of the Iraqi Police	 
Service, the National Police, the Directorate of Border 	 
Enforcement, and other, smaller forces. According to the	 
September 2007 Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress, as
of September 3, 2007, the Coalition has trained approximately	 
165,400 Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) personnel and 194,200	 
Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) personnel, although there is	 
currently no reliable data concerning how many of these personnel
are still serving with the MOI. Moreover, in 2006 the Iraqi Prime
Minister, with Coalition support, decided to expand the size of  
Iraq's security forces by possibly as much as 62,500 by the end  
of 2007. This expansion includes an increase in the size of	 
extant Iraqi Army units that will bring them to 120 percent of	 
authorized strength, an initiative to expand the overall size of 
the Iraqi Army from 10 to 13 divisions, and an initiative to	 
increase the number of Iraqi police.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-143R					        
    ACCNO:   A78528						        
  TITLE:     Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security
Forces' Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support	 
Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed				 
     DATE:   11/30/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Defense appropriations				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Foreign military training				 
	     Iraq War and reconstruction			 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military procurement				 
	     National defense operations			 
	     Security assessments				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom			 
	     Iraqi Security Forces				 
	     National Strategy for Victory in Iraq		 

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GAO-08-143R

   

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November 30, 2007

Congressional Committees

Subject: Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces'
Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not
Fully Developed

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, issued by the National Security
Council in November 2005, asserted the Coalition's intention to adjust its
"posture and approaches as conditions evolve and Iraqi capabilities grow,"
and for Coalition troop levels in Iraq to decrease over time as the Iraqis
take on more responsibilities for themselves. Some three months later, in
response to the growing capability of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and
some other indicators of progress, the Department of Defense (DOD)
recommended a decrease in the U.S. force structure in Iraq from 17 to 15
combat brigades--a reduction of about 7,000 troops. Following the bombing
of the Golden Mosque of Samarra on February 22, 2006, however, an upsurge
in violence throughout the country undermined political gains and
challenged the Government of Iraq.

In light of these developments, the President commissioned a strategic
review in November 2006 that resulted in a new U.S. strategy for Iraq,
entitled the New Way Forward. President Bush announced this new strategy
on January 10, 2007, noting that he had made clear to the Iraqi Prime
Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America would hold the Iraqi
Government to a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks. On
May 25, 2007, the President signed into law the U.S. Troop Readiness,
Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations
Act of 2007 (the Act), which contained 18 benchmarks against which
progress by the Government of Iraq was to be measured.^1 One of those
benchmarks is the increase of the number of Iraqi Security Force units
capable of operating independently.

Since passage of the Act, several reports assessing the ability of the
Iraqi Security Forces to operate independently have been issued.

           o DOD's June 2007 report to Congress^2 stated that although the
           United States, its Coalition partners, and the Iraqi government
           continued to expand the size and capability of the Iraqi forces to
           meet emerging requirements, the persistence of violence by
           insurgents, terrorists, and militias means that Iraqi forces will
           require continued training, development, and equipping from
           Coalition forces in order to progressively assume missions on
           their own. The report outlined four major areas on which the
           Coalition would focus, one of which was support for the expansion
           of the Iraqi army.

           o Also in June 2007, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on
           Oversight & Investigations released its Stand Up and Be Counted:
           The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces, in
           which it reported that despite making significant progress in
           generating a sizeable national force, the Iraqi Security Forces
           have not developed as fast as the Coalition planned; that the
           Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI)
           were not capable of accounting for, supporting, or fully
           controlling their forces in the field; and that the ISF did not
           have critical enablers such as intelligence and logistics systems
           and processes that permit independent planning and operations.

           o In its Initial Benchmark Assessment Report to Congress,
           submitted on July 12, 2007, the Administration asserted that while
           the Coalition had significantly enhanced its training and
           mentoring commitment to the ISF, the Iraqi Government had made
           unsatisfactory progress toward increasing the number of Iraqi
           Security Force units capable of operating independently, and thus
           the presence of Coalition partners and support remained necessary
           for ISF operations.

           o In GAO's September 4, 2007, report to Congress (Securing,
           Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met
           Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks),^3 we
           assessed that although the ISF had grown in size and was
           increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations the Government
           of Iraq had not met the benchmark of increasing the number of
           Iraqi Security Force units capable of operating independently.
           Furthermore, we reported that because of Iraq's immature logistics
           systems, many Iraqi military and police units would continue to
           depend on Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) for key sustainment
           and logistics support until December 2008.

           o On September 6, 2007, the Independent Commission on the Security
           Forces of Iraq released its report, stating that in general Iraqi
           Security Forces have made uneven progress but would continue to
           rely on the Coalition to provide key enablers such as combat
           support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications),
           combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and
           maintenance), and training.

           o In its September 2007 report to Congress,^4 DOD stated that
           although there had been further improvement in the maturation of
           the Army and, to a lesser degree, the police since its last (June
           2007) report, Ministry of Defense logistics from tactical to
           strategic levels and Ministry of Interior logistics at the
           strategic level were fragile and not capable of independent
           execution.

           o Finally, the Administration's September 14, 2007, Benchmark
           Assessment Report stated that although some Iraqi Army and police
           forces were operating independently, it also stated that the
           greatest constraints on independent operations were a shortage of
           trained leaders and an immature logistics capability, and that for
           the present time Coalition partnership and support remained
           necessary for most ISF operations.

^1Pub. L. No 110--28, S1314 (2007).

^2DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraqi: Report to Congress in
Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, Section
9010, Public Law 109-289 (June 7, 2007).

Since January 2006, GAO has been assessing three support capabilities that
all the aforementioned reports have cited in whole or in part as being key
to the ISF's achieving independence. Those three capabilities are
logistics, command and control, and intelligence. The first of our
reports,^5 issued in March 2007, presented our preliminary observations on
the Iraqi Security Forces' support capabilities as of August 2006. In
those reports we noted that significant challenges had to be overcome
before the ISF attained self-sufficiency. Those challenges included
developing an effective logistics infrastructure to support the Iraqi
military and police; training Iraqi logisticians and communications and
intelligence specialists; maintaining vehicles and equipment; and
developing policies and procedures within the ministries. In light of the
continuing broad congressional interest in Iraq, we have undertaken this
follow-on engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General^6 to
conduct evaluations at his own initiative to examine in more detail the
progress achieved in the development of these capabilities. Specifically,
our objectives were to determine: (1) what progress has been made toward
the development of Iraqi Security Forces' logistical, command and control,
and intelligence capabilities, and what factors have affected further
progress; and (2) to what extent can DOD reports that ISF units are
capable of fully independent operations be supported. This report is one
of a series of products that GAO has produced since June 2004 addressing
the security situation in Iraq and the ISF. A list of our related
unclassified GAO products appears at the end of this report.

^3GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has
Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, GAO-07-1195
(Washington, D.C.: September 2007).

^4DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraqi: Report to Congress in
Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, Section
9010, Public Law 109-289 (September 14, 2007).

We use the term ISF in this report to refer to the combined forces of the
MOD and the MOI. However, the composition, structure, and logistical,
command and control, and intelligence systems of the two ministries are
significantly different. For example, the MOD is developing a centrally
directed logistics system composed of organizations with specific
responsibilities at various levels of the chain of command but the MOI's
logistics concept envisions a system with a hybrid of centralized and
decentralized logistics support structures and mechanisms. Likewise,
command and control in the MOD is predicated on a classic military model
headed by ministerial officials who rely on commissioned and
noncommissioned officers supported by a communications and intelligence
network that facilitates the transmission of information both up and down
the chain of command, while command and control and intelligence in the
MOI are organized very differently. Some MOI forces, such as the National
Police, receive direction and intelligence from the ministry itself;
others, most notably the Iraqi Police Service, receive their intelligence
information from and are commanded and controlled by provincial officials.
Because of these differences, the factors we have identified as impacting
the development of each ministry's support capabilities have affected the
ministries in commensurately different ways and we address the two in
separate sections, starting with the Ministry of Defense.

To determine the factors that have affected progress toward the
development of ISF support capabilities we reviewed relevant documents,
orders, and data that we obtained from the Department of Defense. We also
submitted written questions to DOD, received and reviewed those responses,
and met with and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and Iraq,
including representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. We also
conducted telephone, e-mail, and in-person interviews with former senior
Coalition officials who recently returned to the United States after
serving year-long tours in Iraq as advisers to the ISF and had
teleconferences with Coalition officials still in Iraq, during which we
obtained additional information directly from the appropriate individuals
in Iraq. During our visits with individuals, we determined that the data
they provided us was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report. We conducted our review from December 2006 through November 2007
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Finally, in order to determine what progress has been made in developing
the support capabilities of the MOD and MOI, we compared the state of
development of those capabilities as of summer 2007 with what we found to
be their state of development as of August 2006.

^5The first report we issued, GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary
Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Support Capabilities, GAO-07-120C
(Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007) is classified secret. We then provided
unclassified testimony on the development of the ISF's logistical
capabilities in GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on
Iraqi Security Forces' Logistical Capabilities, GAO-07-582T (Washington,
D.C.: March 9, 2007). The third report, GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom:
Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Logistics and Command
and Control Capabilities, GAO-07-503R (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007)
is an unclassified version of the first report.

^631 U.S.C. S 717(b)(1)(2000).

Results in Brief

While the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, with Coalition
assistance, made some progress since August 2006 in developing their
respective logistics, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities--for example, the MOD has formed most of its lower echelon
logistics units and the MOI has established an intelligence
organization--persistent violence^7 and sectarianism, along with immature
ministerial capacity, continue to impede this progress. For example,
sustained violence caused the Iraqi government to decide to increase the
size of the MOD forces and to prioritize the formation, replenishment, and
sustainment of its combat forces over combat support, combat service
support, and training formations. As a result, the development of a
national depot and garrison support units has lagged behind that of lower
level logistics units; Iraqi recruits designated for training as logistics
specialists have been diverted to combat roles; training schools are
inadequately staffed; and the shortage of noncommissioned officers
throughout the Iraqi Army has worsened. Moreover, because the Ministry of
Defense has yet to develop adequate personnel management and support
functions, Iraqi support specialists are not being employed in the
positions for which they were trained, and schools with the mission of
training these specialists lack fuel, equipment, and supplies. For the
Ministry of Interior, violence has prevented contractors from completing
the installation of a command and control network, hampered intelligence
capabilities, and caused the ministry to implement force structure
increases that have aggravated its logistics challenges, while
sectarianism threatens the MOI's ability to exert effective command and
control over its forces. Further, the MOI has not sufficiently developed
its capacity to maintain or sustain its police forces, nor has it
developed a personnel management system to accurately account for its
personnel, thus further hindering its ability to provide command and
control and logistical support for its units.

Although DOD has, in multiple reports, stated that a certain number of ISF
units are either "independent" or "fully independent," it is unclear how
DOD arrived at this determination for three reasons. First, since spring
2006 the process that Coalition transition teams use to assess ISF units
does not allow the option of giving a rating of independent or fully
independent; according to Multi-National Corps-Iraq's (MNC-I) Transitional
Readiness Assessment Report Implementing Instructions Update, the highest
rating any ISF unit can attain is "capable of planning, executing, and
sustaining counterinsurgency operations."^8 Second, in each of the reports
in which DOD asserts that a certain number of ISF units are independent or
fully independent it apparently contradicts this assertion by appending
significant qualifiers to the achievement of ISF independence. For
example, DOD reported in June 2007 that a certain number of MOD units were
either "in the lead with Coalition enablers" or "fully independent" but
then added the qualifying statements that fielded MOD forces "often do not
get the support they require without substantial Coalition assistance" and
"MOD's continued limited logistics and sustainment capacity is a key
hindrance to Iraqi forces' ability to assume missions from the Coalition."
Third, the MOD and MOI have yet to develop those support capabilities by
which they can logistically sustain their forces, effectively command and
control their forces, and provide intelligence to their forces--all of
which are inherent to independence. As a result of DOD's lack of clarity,
Congress and other decision makers may not obtain a clear picture of the
progress of the ISF and whether it is becoming capable of truly conducting
its operations independently, i.e., without Coalition assistance and
support. Therefore, we recommend that DOD clarify its use of the terms
"independent" or "fully independent" as they relate to the assessed
capabilities of ISF units, and particularly as they relate to the
logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of those
units. We also recommend that it clarify the process it uses to make this
assessment.

^7In October 2007 we reported that although enemy-initiated attacks
declined from a total of about 5,300 in June 2007 to about 3,000 in
September 2007, the recent decrease in monthly attacks was primarily due
to a decrease in the number of attacks against coalition forces. Attacks
against Iraqi Security Forces and civilians have declined less than
attacks against coalition forces. See GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and
Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues, GAO-08-231T
(Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007).

^8The Transitional Readiness Assessment process is now known as the
Operational Readiness Assessment process.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the department partially
concurred with our two recommendations, although it did not explicitly
outline any actions it would take to adopt them. Consequently, we continue
to believe that the actions we recommended are needed in order to ensure
that Congress and other decision makers are provided a clear picture of
ISF capabilities.

DOD agreed that the use of the terms "independent" and "fully independent"
can cause confusion, but stated that these terms were still being used in
reports and briefings because they are "more illustrative" than other
terms, although the department also stated that it will evaluate its
assessment terminology to more clearly describe progress in capability
development for the Iraqi forces. We do not argue that some ISF units are
more capable than others from an operational standpoint. However, given
the present state of the ISF's capabilities, especially in the areas of
logistics, command and control, and intelligence, we believe that using
the terms "independent" or "fully independent" without clarification to
describe the ISF in reports and briefings perpetuates the very confusion
DOD acknowledges. The department also partially concurred with our
recommendation that it clarify the process it uses to assess ISF units and
replied that both the objective and subjective criteria defining
effectiveness used by transition teams is contained in Multi-National
Corps-Iraq's implementing instructions. The last time that DOD provided
any information on this process in its quarterly reports to Congress,
however, was July 2005. Since that time, the implementing instructions for
the assessment process have changed at least twice. We believe, therefore,
that in order to ensure Congress has a more complete and up-to-date
understanding of the assessment process, DOD should provide it with an
updated and detailed explanation of the current process. Finally, the
department also provided more specific technical comments which we have
reproduced and addressed individually at the end of this report.

Background

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which operates
under Multi-National Forces-Iraq, leads the Coalition effort to train,
equip, and organize the ISF. Previously, once ISF units were trained and
equipped, operational responsibility for their employment was turned over
to Multi-National Corps-Iraq. As of June 2007, the Iraqi Ground Forces
Command has assumed operational control of 8 of the 10 extant Iraqi Army
divisions, and the Ministry of Interior has assumed operational control of
the National Police.

           Overall, the number of Iraqi military and police personnel the
           Coalition has trained and equipped increased from over 171,000 in
           July 2005 to about 359,600 in September 2007. The Iraqi Ministry
           of Defense forces consist of the Joint Headquarters; the Iraqi
           Ground Forces Command, which commands the Army and the Iraqi
           Special Operations Forces; the Air Force; and the Navy (including
           Marines). The Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces consist of the
           Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, the Directorate of
           Border Enforcement, and other, smaller forces. According to the
           September 2007 DOD report to Congress, as of September 3, 2007,
           the Coalition has trained approximately 165,400 MOD personnel and
           194,200 MOI personnel, although there is currently no reliable
           data concerning how many of these personnel are still serving with
           the MOI. Moreover, in 2006 the Iraqi Prime Minister, with
           Coalition support, decided to expand the size of Iraq's security
           forces by possibly as much as 62,500 by the end of 2007. This
           expansion includes an increase in the size of extant Iraqi Army
           units that will bring them to 120 percent of authorized strength,
           an initiative to expand the overall size of the Iraqi Army from 10
           to 13 divisions, and an initiative to increase the number of Iraqi
           police.

           Ministry of Defense

           In early 2005, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and MNF-I approved a
           multilayered logistics concept for the Iraqi military that called
           for the generation of a variety of organizations from the
           ministerial to the unit level. The provision of logistics support
           at the lowest levels is expected to be the purview of two
           organizations: Headquarters and Services Companies (HSC), which
           provide limited health, maintenance, supply, and transportation
           support to Iraqi Army battalions, brigades, and divisions; and
           Motorized Transport Regiments (MTR), which provide additional
           transportation, maintenance, and vehicle recovery support to each
           of the Iraqi Army's infantry divisions. Mid-level logistics
           support is expected to come from a National Depot, five Regional
           Support Units (RSU), and the number of logistics bases needed to
           support Iraqi Army requirements. A Support Command is to provide
           command and control of the National Depot and RSUs, while the
           Iraqi Joint Headquarters logistics staff (M-4) is to provide
           logistics input to plans and orders. Finally, atop the logistics
           structure are the Offices of the Director General, Armaments and
           Supply; Director General, Contracts and Purchases; Director
           General, Infrastructure; and Director General, Programs and
           Budget. These offices are tasked with management of the ministry's
           overall logistical capability and the acquisition of capital
           equipment, development of ministerial policies and procedures, and
           management of the budget. The envisioned end state is a
           comprehensive logistics system that will provide maintenance,
           supply, transportation, and garrison support to all elements of
           the Iraqi military.
           Concurrently, command and control and intelligence infrastructures
           are also being developed for the Iraqi military. The command and
           control system envisions approximately 3,600 Iraqi soldiers,
           sailors, and airmen to operate and maintain a command and control
           communications system, in concert with contractor support, that is
           responsive to program managers at the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. An
           additional element of this command and control system is a trained
           noncommissioned and commissioned officer corps. The MOD's
           intelligence system envisions two main intelligence organizations:
           the Directorate General of Intelligence and Security and the Joint
           Headquarters Intelligence Directorate (M-2). Both organizations
           are to provide effective intelligence support to Iraqi
           counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, each Iraqi Army
           division is to have an Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and
           Surveillance (ISR) company.
           To train the logistics, communications, and intelligence
           specialists for these systems, the Coalition and the MOD have
           established training schools at Taji. Logisticians are trained at
           the Iraqi Armed Service and Support Institute (IASSI), Iraqi
           communications specialists are trained at the Iraqi Signal School,
           and Iraqi intelligence specialists are trained at the Iraqi
           Military Intelligence School.

Ministry of Interior

By November 2006, the Coalition had developed a logistics concept of
support for the Iraqi Ministry of Interior that both MNSTC-I and MNF-I
subsequently approved. While the MOI did not adopt the MNSTC-I Logistics
Concept of Support, the MOI Logistics Directorate published its own
Logistics Policy. The Coalition and MOI have started to implement certain
aspects of the MOI approved concept, a concept composed of a hybrid of
national, provincial, and regional logistics support structures and
mechanisms. At the national level, the ministry is responsible for
purchasing and distributing vehicles, weapons, and ammunition for all its
forces as well as allocating budgeted money to police forces in 15 of
Iraq's 18 provinces.^9 Additionally, through the allocation of funds the
ministry is responsible for the sustainment and maintenance of the
National Police, the National Information and Investigation Agency, and
about 40 other organizations. In the provinces, provincial Directors of
Police are responsible for the sustainment and maintenance of each of
their respective Iraqi Police Service (IPS) forces. Using the funds
distributed to them by the MOI, the provincial Directors of Police direct
funds to IPS police stations in their provinces. These local police
stations, in turn, use the allocated funds to pay local vendors for life
support (e.g. food, water, electricity), fuel, and vehicle maintenance.
Finally, there are five regional headquarters of the Department of Border
Enforcement (DBE) and Ports of Entry (POE) that also receive funds from
the ministry that they, in turn, use to purchase life support,
maintenance, and fuel from local sources.

As of July 2007 MOI had not yet approved a communications plan.
Nonetheless, the MOI and Coalition are working together to build a command
and control structure throughout Iraq that, like the logistics concept,
has three parts--national, provincial, and local. The nexus of the MOI's
command and control architecture at the national level is the National
Command Center (NCC), which is responsible for exercising command and
control over all matters pertaining to police, receiving input from local
and provincial police organizations, and reporting to the Government of
Iraq's National Operations Center and National Joint Operations Center.
Providing provincial input to the NCC are more than 260 police, border,
and port communication centers that are, in turn, supported by the Iraqi
Command and Control Network (IC2N), which is designed to connect
provincial sites to each other and the NCC. A second network, the Advanced
First Responder Network (AFRN), is intended to link MOI first responders
in 15 Iraqi cities with both MOD forces and to the MOI's National Command
Center. Finally, underpinning this communications architecture are more
than 108,000 radios used by MOI personnel. All told, the Coalition has
spent approximately $360 million to install this communications structure
for the MOI.

Criminal intelligence operations for the MOI are the responsibility of one
organization, the National Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA).
While other MOI organizations gather law enforcement information, the NIIA
is akin to the American FBI, and is tasked with analyzing information
gathered through criminal investigations to counter serious crimes and
threats to Iraq's national security. The NIIA is organized as a
headquarters with 15 provincial offices and is authorized about 6,000
employees, including investigators, criminal analysts, and surveillance
personnel who are to work closely with the IPS on the local level and
liaison with other MOI organizations such as the National Police and port
forces.

^9The Kurdish Provinces are authorized 17 percent of Iraqi revenues (Gross
National Product) from which the provinces fund budgets to meet all the
financial obligations of their governments. There are two Ministries of
Interior within Kurdistan. One is located in Sulaymaniyah and the other in
Arbil. Both organizations are separate from the central Iraqi government's
Ministry of Interior addressed in this report.

Funding for Development of ISF Support Capabilities

           In September 2007, GAO reported that since 2003 the United States
           has provided about $19.2 billion to train and equip about 350,000
           Iraqi soldiers and police officers in an effort to develop Iraqi
           Security Forces, transfer security responsibilities to them and
           the Iraqi government, and ultimately withdraw U.S. troops from
           Iraq.^10 This figure includes approximately $3.8 billion in fiscal
           year 2007 supplemental funding for the Iraqi Security Forces Fund
           (ISFF) and an additional $2.0 billion of ISFF funding for fiscal
           year 2008.^11 Meanwhile, in calendar year 2007 the Iraqi
           Government has budgeted $4.14 billion for the MOD and $3.18
           billion for the MOI.
           Based on DOD's ISFF budget justifications, GAO has determined that
           DOD intends to allocate about $3.5 billion--or more than half of
           the $5.8 billion of fiscal year 2007 and 2008 ISFF money--to
           sustain the ISF and further develop its logistics, command and
           control, and intelligence capabilities. According to the
           categories in which DOD has organized its justifications, the $3.5
           billion is to be spent on infrastructure, equipment, and
           transportation for the ISF and the training, operation, and
           sustainment of Iraqi forces. See Table 1 for specific funding
           requests for sustainment and development of ISF support
           capabilities.

           Table 1: FY07 and FY08 ISFF Requests for Sustainment and
           Development of ISF Support Capabilities

      DOD Budget Justification      ISFF Funding Requested for Sustainment    
      Category                      and Development of ISF Support            
                                    Capabilities in FY07 and FY08 (in         
                                    millions)                                 
      Infrastructure                $409.8                                    
      Equipment & Transportation    $1,835.6                                  
      Training & Operations         $40.7                                     
      Sustainment                   $1,204.5                                  
      Total                         $3,490.6                                  

           Source: GAO analysis.

           Some Progress Has Been Achieved, but Persistent Violence,
           Sectarianism, and a Lack of Ministerial Capacity Continue to
           Impede Development of the Iraqi Security Forces' Support
           Capabilities

Although the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, with assistance from the
Coalition, has made some progress in developing its logistical, command
and control, and intelligence capabilities--for example, it has formed
most of the lower echelon units required by its logistical concept, it has
implemented more advanced communications training at its Signal School,
and its intelligence architecture is nearly complete--challenges remain
because of the impact of the persistent high levels of violence and the
inability of the ministry to carry out its responsibilities. Most notably,
the persistent violence in Iraq has induced the MOD to prioritize the
formation, replenishment, and sustainment of Iraqi Army combat forces
above combat service support forces and training schools. As a result the
development of mid-level logistics organizations has lagged behind the
development of lower level logistics units; Iraqi recruits designated for
training as logistics specialists have been diverted to combat roles;
training schools are inadequately staffed; and the ratio of
noncommissioned officers throughout the Iraqi Army has worsened. Moreover,
because the Ministry of Defense has yet to develop adequate personnel
management and support functions, Iraqi support specialists are not being
used in the jobs for which they were trained, and schools with the mission
to train these specialists lack fuel, equipment, and supplies.

^10GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has
Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmark, [8]GAO-07-1195
(Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007).

^11To fund a portion of necessary expansion of the ISF, an additional $1.0
billion was requested in the fiscal year 2008 ISSF amendment request.

           The Iraqi Ministry of Interior has likewise made progress in
           developing its logistical, command and control, and intelligence
           capabilities--it is in the process of implementing a logistics
           concept; increasingly capable personnel are manning its command
           and control centers; and it has established and largely equipped
           an intelligence organization--but escalated violence and, to a
           much greater extent than in the MOD, sectarianism have compelled
           its expansion to an extent that has strained its logistical
           capabilities and undermined command and control. The inability of
           the MOI to effectively perform its ministerial functions has
           further undermined the implementation of the MOI's logistical
           concept of support and eroded some intelligence and command and
           control capabilities. Moreover, the MOI cannot accurately account
           for its personnel, which makes questionable its ability to develop
           an effective command and control or logistical support capability.

           The Coalition and Iraqi Government have taken steps to address the
           persistent violence, sectarianism, and immature ministerial
           capacity that continue to impede progress in developing ISF
           support capabilities. For instance, the Iraqi government has
           decided to expand the size of MOD and MOI forces in response to
           this violence and since January 2007, the Iraqi government has
           replaced about 70 percent of the senior commanders in the National
           Police who were suspected of sectarianism. In addition, through
           its MOD and MOI transition teams, MNSTC-I works with both
           ministries to improve their capacity.

Persistent Violence and Lack of Ministerial Capacity Impede Development of
MOD's Support Capabilities

For the MOD, persistent violence has caused the establishment of a
national depot and garrison support units to lag behind that of lower
level logistics units, a condition we observed in 2006 that has served to
undermine the development of the Iraqi military's logistic support
capability. The violence has also aggravated shortages of trained
logisticians, training center faculty, and noncommissioned officers. Poor
ministerial oversight has also adversely impacted the training
institutions charged with training support specialists and spawned the
development of a bartering system as a workaround for shortages.

Persistent Violence Has Forced the Prioritization of the Formation of
Combat Over Critical Mid-Level Logistics Units

According to DOD and former senior Coalition officials, because of high
levels of violence the Coalition and MOD have given priority to the
formation, replenishment, and sustainment of combat units over mid-level
combat service support units, a circumstance that has negatively impacted
the development of the National Depot and Garrison Support Units (GSU).
According to DOD, the goal is for the National Depot to be completely
transitioned to Iraqi control in early 2008, while full transition of the
GSUs to Iraqi control is projected for late 2007. Although the MOD's
logistics concept does not specify any priority to the establishment of
one type of logistics unit over another, since August 2006 the priority
has been on generating lower echelon logistics formations, specifically
HSCs and MTRs. In a previous GAO report, we noted that as of August 2006,
most of the authorized HSCs and MTRs were already formed. According to
updated information we obtained in July 2007, all of the HSCs and MTRs
originally envisioned for the Iraqi Army have been formed, while 32
additional HSCs and 2 additional MTRs required by the Iraqi Prime
Minister's Initiative to increase the size of the Iraqi Army will be
formed and transitioned to Iraqi control in 2008. But the development of
the National Depot at Taji and the formation of Garrison Support Units,
which provide base support for Iraqi military installations and comprise
the basic building blocks of the Iraqi Armed Forces' area support
sustainment structure, have lagged behind.

           Coalition logisticians have emphasized that the development of all
           echelons of the logistics concept is crucial in order for the MOD
           to become capable of independently sustaining its forces. In
           February 2007, DOD underscored this by requesting approximately
           $654 million for the development of infrastructure and various
           systems at the National Depot at Taji and another $593 million for
           the development of Regional and Garrison Support Units. In its
           justification for these funds, DOD called the National Depot at
           Taji "the epicenter" of the logistical infrastructure for the ISF
           and stated that without the capability to provide logistical
           sustainment for the ISF through the National Depot, the ISF will
           be unable to effectively conduct operations without extensive
           Coalition support. Moreover, it emphasized that without the
           funding requested for Regional and Garrison Support Units, those
           facilities may go months or years without use while waiting for
           equipment to be delivered through Iraqi acquisition systems. Yet,
           despite significant U.S. funding, persistent violence in Iraq has
           dictated the prioritization of combat over mid-level combat
           service supports units, thereby hampering the MOD's ability to
           logistically sustain itself.

           Persistent Violence Has Undermined the Development of the National
           Depot and Garrison Support Units

           In August 2006, the National Depot was plagued by manpower
           shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, and poor
           maintenance. According to a former senior Coalition adviser to the
           National Depot, as of June 2007 these challenges remained because
           of the relatively low priority afforded the development of the
           depot vis-`a-vis the formation of Iraqi combat units. For example,
           according to this former Coalition official, although there was a
           100 percent increase in the number of Iraqi personnel assigned to
           the National Depot since August 2006, that increase brought the
           depot to only about 50 percent of its authorized personnel
           complement. According to this official, manning levels at the
           depot went from about 300 personnel assigned to about 600
           personnel assigned. The authorized complement is approximately
           1,200. This official attributed this personnel shortage to the
           higher priority given to filling Iraqi Army combat over combat
           service support units.

           Security at the National Depot is also problematic because of lack
           of personnel. We reported that in August 2006, the National
           Depot's security detachment was not filled. As of June 2007, this
           remained the case, necessitating the formation of an ad hoc
           security force composed of those Iraqi logisticians on hand,
           thereby further decrementing the depot's capacity. Fuel, too,
           remained a scarce commodity at the National Depot, a situation
           that adversely affected quality of life there, as well as the
           depot's maintenance, inventory management, and communications
           systems, all of which require generator-supplied electricity.
           According to a former senior Coalition official we interviewed,
           this fuel shortage was, like the shortage of trained logistics
           specialists, a direct effect of the decision to supply combat over
           combat service support units--again, a decision made in large part
           because of the operational environment.

The priority given to combat over combat service support units has also
affected the development of GSUs. As of August 2006, the Coalition and MOD
had not yet determined the exact number of GSUs to be formed, and only
five were in the process of being formed. By July 2007, the Coalition and
MOD had agreed to form a total of 80 GSUs, but only 3 had been completed
while another 14 were under construction. According to DOD, as the
security situation in Iraq continues to be tenuous the force generation of
security forces, to include those required by the Prime Minister's
Initiative, has taken precedence over the generation of Iraqi soldiers
with some of the special skill sets required to fill GSU sites.
Underscoring this is an observation by a senior Coalition adviser to
IASSI. He stated that those logisticians who were trained at IASSI were
all sent to combat units. As a result, other purely logistical formations,
such as Regional and Garrison Support Units, did not receive their quota
of trained logisticians and were therefore short-staffed and ineffective.

           Persistent Violence Aggravates Shortages of Trained Logisticians,
           Training Center Faculty, and Noncommissioned Officers

           The persistent violence in Iraq has also affected the MOD's combat
           support and combat service support training institutions. For
           example, according to two former senior Coalition logistics
           advisers to the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Army recruits identified for
           training as logistics specialists were often diverted during their
           basic training into combat roles because of the Prime Minister's
           announced increases to the size of the Army's combat formations.
           That diversion contributes to a paucity of trained logistics
           specialists across the MOD.

           According to DOD, the MOD's Military Intelligence School, which is
           responsible for training Iraqi soldiers in intelligence skills,
           has only 24 of 81 authorized instructors, a circumstance
           attributed in part to security concerns for Iraqi faculty members
           who live outside the military complex at Taji. Persistent violence
           also contributed to the faculty shortfalls at IASSI. As of July
           2007, of the 217 faculty positions authorized for IASSI, only 153
           were assigned and only 138 were present for duty. According to a
           former senior Coalition advisor to IASSI as well as information
           provided by DOD, this shortfall is a direct result of the higher
           priority given to combat units in the present operational
           environment.

           Finally, the persistent violence in Iraq has also contributed to a
           dearth of trained noncommissioned officers in the Iraqi Army. As
           of July 2007, the Iraqi Army was short 18,000 corporals, 14,500
           sergeants, and 7,500 sergeants first class. With MNSTC-I advice
           and assistance, the Iraqis are working a number of initiatives to
           address this leadership shortage. However, DOD notes that despite
           this shortage of trained noncommissioned officers--leaders that
           are critical to establishing effective command and control in the
           Iraqi military--attendance at noncommissioned officer schools is
           unsatisfactory because Iraqi Army commanders are challenged to
           balance the needs of the fight with the requirements to release
           students for training.

                        Underdeveloped Ministerial Capacity Undermines the
                        Development of Support Capabilities

           The lack of ministerial support has also stymied the development
           of the MOD's support capabilities by allowing Iraqi commanders to
           inappropriately assign trained logisticians and communications
           specialists and by perpetuating insufficiencies of fuel, equipment
           and instructional materials at the training institutions for these
           specialists. In our March 2007 report, we addressed some of these
           ministerial capacity challenges as they affected the development
           of the MOD's support capabilities. Updated information provided by
           DOD and obtained through interviews with former senior Coalition
           officials confirms the persistence of several of these
           challenges--particularly personnel management and support for
           IASSI and the Signal School.

For example, we noted in March 2007 that, according to a senior Iraqi Army
signal officer, there was a tendency throughout the Iraqi Army to
inappropriately assign the Signal School's enlisted graduates to jobs as
infantrymen while officers, who may not have graduated from the Signal
School, operated the radios. According to updated information obtained
from DOD in July 2007, this practice persists for both communications and
logistics specialists. DOD noted that although the Iraqi personnel
management system is evolving and that new systems for automated tracking
of personnel should improve the ability of senior levels of command to
monitor the proper assignment of trained personnel, Iraqi Army commanders
continue to have discretion regarding soldiers' position assignments.

           The problem of managing trained personnel is also endemic in the
           Iraqi Army's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
           companies, one of which is assigned to each Iraqi Army division.
           According to DOD, ISR company soldiers are routinely used as
           personal security details and guards, or to fill out combat units
           within the division. As a result of these personnel decisions, as
           well as challenges in recruiting and maintaining personnel, as of
           July 2007 DOD's assessment is that, overall, ISR companies are
           mission-ineffective throughout Iraq. Additionally, according to a
           former senior Coalition adviser to the National Depot, trained
           logistics specialists also often tend to be assigned to personal
           security detachments or as aides to senior Iraqi officers.

According to former senior Coalition advisers and updated information
provided by DOD, none of the three schools have enough fuel to run their
generators, a circumstance DOD attributed to the Ministry of Defense
receiving only about 50 percent of its stated fuel requirements. To
mitigate the effect of these fuel shortages senior Iraqi leaders,
supported by Coalition advisers, are to negotiate the hours for which fuel
for generators and hence electricity will be provided so that the impact
on training and critical life support is minimized. However, at both IASSI
and the Signal School, this has not always been possible. In September
2006,  for example, fuel shortages were so acute that the Iraqi commandant
of IASSI was forced to shut down training completely. As a result, 450
Iraqi soldiers who were to be trained in a variety of logistics
disciplines were sent back to their divisions. According to a former
senior Coalition adviser to the Signal School, the Iraqi commandant there
had also to shut down operations completely in January because of a lack
of fuel.

Training equipment and instructional materials used to support that
training were also in short supply, again the result of lack of support
from the MOD. For example, according to a former senior Coalition adviser
to the Signal School, MOD did not supply any instructional supplies, such
as pens, pencils, or paper, to the school during this adviser's year-long
tenure. All supplies were either purchased by Signal School faculty,
obtained by students themselves while they were on leave, or donated by
U.S. companies.

This lack of ministerial support also spawned a bartering system on which,
according to former senior Coalition advisers, both IASSI and the Signal
School came to rely and without which they could not perform their
missions. For example, according to a former senior Coalition adviser to
IASSI, during his year-long tenure there were never enough high mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) on which to train Iraqi mechanics
because MOD support to IASSI was minimal or nonexistent. He said that
IASSI was tasked with training 200 Iraqi mechanics per class and required
10 HMMWVs to do so effectively. However, IASSI had only 2 partial HMMWVs
for the first 6 months of his tenure. In January 2007, IASSI picked up 2
more by bartering with a nearby Coalition unit and obtained another 2
later through the intervention of a Coalition general officer.
Furthermore, both IASSI and the Signal School also obtained fuel through
bartering. When IASSI had to shut down its training completely for lack of
fuel in September 2006, the Signal School was able to obtain some in
exchange for allowing a Coalition unit to use its buildings. According to
a former Coalition adviser to IASSI, the practice of advisors obtaining
fuel from Coalition fuel points for their Iraqi counterparts became so
pervasive that eventually the fuel points were instructed not to supply
any more fuel to these advisors. Beyond fuel, however, the Signal School
also obtained computer maintenance support through bartering. According to
a former senior Coalition adviser to the Signal School, there were
approximately 150 laptop and desktop computers at the school for use in
instruction, yet the MOD had no means to repair them if they broke down.
To alleviate this problem the Iraqi commandant of the Signal School
bartered for computer repair services with a nearby U.S. sustainment unit.
In exchange for the use of a civilian pickup truck, the U.S. sustainment
unit agreed to provide computer maintenance support for the Signal School.
According to this official, the Signal School would not have been able to
accomplish its mission of training Iraqi communications specialists
without this support.

Persistent Violence, Widespread Sectarianism, and Lack of Ministerial
Capacity Impede Development of MOI Support Capabilities

The continued high levels of violence have hampered MOI communications
networks and intelligence capabilities while sectarianism has undermined
effective command and control in the Iraqi police forces. In addition, the
inability of the MOI to perform certain basic ministerial functions has
negatively impacted the development of its logistical, command and
control, and intelligence capabilities.

Persistent Violence Hampers MOI Communications Networks and Intelligence
Capabilities and Exacerbates Logistics Challenges

Persistent high levels of violence have seriously degraded the MOI's
national communications architecture, thereby leading to a commensurate
degradation of the MOI's ability to provide effective command and control
over its forces. Additionally, the high levels of violence have also
curtailed MOI intelligence operations. According to DOD, persistent
attacks on the Advanced First Responder Network in Basrah and southern
Iraq in the summer of 2007 have degraded the network's capability.
Likewise, persistence violence has also affected use of the Iraqi Command
and Control Network. According to DOD, one IC2N communications site has
been the target of insurgent activity, and a contractor has been unable to
install the network's final node due to insurgent activity in the area.
MOI intelligence capabilities have also been severely hampered by
violence. According to DOD, the current security environment in Baghdad
and other cities restricts the National Information and Investigation
Agency's staff from traveling to crime scenes. Because of this, the NIIA'a
ability to conduct investigations and intelligence operations is
significantly degraded. Due to the high levels of violence that have
curtailed NIIA operations, as well as delays in the construction of the
NIIA's headquarters which was supposed to be complete by May 2007 but for
which construction had not begun as of July 2007,^12 the Coalition stated
that it cannot estimate when the NIIA will be self-sufficient.

Persistent violence has also aggravated the MOI's logistics challenges.
This is because, in response to the violence, the MOI has increased its
authorized strength without a commensurate increase in its ability to
support its increased size. In 2006 the Iraqi Minister of Interior, in
conjunction with MNSTC-I, responded to the persistent violence in Iraq by
expanding the authorized strength of the MOI from approximately 188,000 to
about 195,000 personnel. Additionally, 2006 saw the incorporation of
security forces from 27 different Iraqi ministries into one Facilities
Protection Service, which, in turn, was placed under the MOI, bringing an
estimated 98,000 more personnel into the ministry. However, the MOI's
logistics infrastructure may not be able to accommodate these rapid
increases in size and organizational structure. Indeed, MNSTC-I's 2007
Campaign Action Plan states that the accelerated growth and transition of
the MOI may exceed the ministry's ability to adapt both operationally and
logistically. More specifically, a July 2007 Coalition assessment
indicates that MOI increases in end strength will stress the MOI's ability
to meet its requirements for general materials such as clothing,
individual equipment, construction materials, and some major end items.

^12DOD did not give a reason for these delays.

Widespread Sectarianism Has Undermined the Effective Command and Control
of Iraqi Police Forces

           The MOI continues to be plagued by sectarianism at the ministerial
           level as well as in the National Police and Iraqi Police Service.
           For example, in June 2007, DOD reported that sectarianism impacts
           every aspect of the ministerial offices in Baghdad and several
           other cities, an observation underscored by a recent MNSTC-I
           report which states that although it cannot quantify the amount of
           insurgent influence at the ministerial level, it suspects that
           various insurgent groups have significant influence throughout the
           ministry. According to both the former and current MNSTC-I
           commanders, the National Police are also beset with widespread
           sectarianism. In June 2007, the former MNSTC-I commander testified
           that the Iraqi National Police was the "single most sectarian
           organization in Iraq." Two months later, the current MNSTC-I
           commander echoed his predecessor's assessment, stating that the
           National Police were "overly infiltrated with militia elements"
           and that "there's no doubt that in the National Police the
           sectarian influence remains and will be hard to eradicate."
           Finally, evidence indicates that the Iraqi Police Service is also
           heavily infiltrated with sectarian elements. The former commander
           of the Iraq Assistance Group^13characterized the Iraqi Police
           Service as the ISF element most vulnerable to sectarianism,
           despite the MOI's removal of over 3,000 members considered to have
           a sectarian bias in January 2007. Finally, in September 2007, GAO
           determined that the Iraqi government has not eliminated militia
           control over local security forces, and that sectarianism in the
           ISF remains a serious problem in Baghdad and other areas of
           Iraq.^14

Such widespread sectarianism in the MOI has undermined Coalition efforts
to develop Iraqi police forces that are ethical, competent, loyal to the
principles of the Iraqi constitution, and accountable to the civilian
leadership and people of Iraq. Furthermore, efforts to root out sectarian
influence in the MOI have resulted in personnel turbulence among senior
police commanders. Since January 2007, the Iraqi government has replaced
70 percent of senior commanders in the National Police due to their
sectarianism, a list that includes 2 division, 7 brigade, and 17 battalion
commanders. These high level command changes are especially significant
given that the National Police are facing a critical officer shortage; by
the summer of 2007 they had filled fewer than half of their officer
positions. Despite these officer changes, however, according to a July
2007 DOD report, there continues to be a sectarian bias in the appointment
of senior Iraqi police commanders.

Undeveloped Ministerial Capacity Adversely Affects the Development of MOI
Support Capabilities

The inability of the MOI to develop key ministerial functions at the
national and local levels has also negatively impacted the development of
the ministry's logistic, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities. This, in turn, has had a negative impact on the ability of
certain MOI forces to perform their missions and has caused DOD to request
further funding for several of these programs. For example, according to a
DOD assessment, because the MOI does not have a unit that maintains the
National Police's vehicular fleet, the National Police cannot sustain
deployments without support from either the Iraqi Army or the Coalition.
Because of this, as well as an unexplained delay in the construction of
MOI maintenance facilities, DOD explains that the Coalition may extend the
duration of the Baghdad Area Maintenance Contract by six months. DOD
officials stated that this contract, which provides maintenance for all
MOI vehicles in Baghdad, is planned to cost the Coalition at least $22
million. Maintenance support for the MOI's border and port forces is also
a challenge. According to DOD, maintenance support for both the border and
port forces is "virtually non-existent" and DOD estimates that the DBE
will not be self-sufficient in maintenance until the summer of 2011,
although in its 2007 Iraqi Security Forces Fund request DOD sought $175
million to build and sustain MOI vehicle maintenance facilities in order
to redress this shortcoming. Maintenance problems have also plagued the
MOI's communications systems. For example, MOI personnel in two of the
three zones in which the AFRN is located have not demonstrated the ability
to maintain the network or the equipment required to run its systems,
negatively impacting command and control. As a result, in fiscal year 2007
the Coalition planned to spend at least $18 million to bolster the MOI's
command and control architecture, which accounts for 90 percent of the
amount the ministry had budgeted for command and control.

^13The Iraq Assistance Group is the overall executive agency for MNC-I for
all Iraqi Security Forces.

^14GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has
Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks,
[9]GAO-07-1195 (Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007).

The MOI's inability to perform key ministerial functions also means it has
had difficulty supplying its forces. For example, the MOI has had
difficulty supplying adequate amounts of fuel for its forces. According to
DOD, the MOI is not wholly responsible for this problem; one reason for
this lack of fuel is that the Ministry of Oil has not supplied the MOI
with sufficient amounts of fuel. This has most notably affected the MOI's
National Police which, because of these fuel shortfalls, have had
difficulty conducting patrols. However, the IPS and border and port
forces, which are to use local vendors for fuel, have also experienced
shortages. According to the Iraq Assistance Group, this is because only
one-fourth of the National Police's fuel requirements are funded while the
IPS, border, and port forces pay black market prices for fuel, which are
substantially higher than the official price. Overall, although the
Coalition transferred responsibility for fuel to the MOI in December 2006,
because of these shortages it was still supplying fuel to the MOI as of
July 2007. Moreover, the sustainment to two key MOI organizations, the
National Police and the National Intelligence and Investigation Agency, is
undermined by the fact that neither has an independent budget. Although
the reason for this is unclear, the result is that sustainment
requirements for both the National Police and the NIIA are subsumed in the
budgets for other MOI organizations. One result of this circumstance is
that the National Police have been unable to redress certain equipment
shortfalls and the Coalition has stated that because of challenges
regarding maintenance, fuel, budget independence, and manning, it cannot
estimate when the National Police will be able to operate
self-sufficiently. In an effort to rectify some of these challenges, DOD
sought $493 million in its 2007 ISFF request to modernize or replace MOI
equipment that will be lost due to combat loss or life cycle attrition,
including 52,200 weapons, 1,720 trucks, 130 police sedans, and equipment
for personnel.

Internal organizational challenges have also impeded development of the
MOI's command and control capability. For example, although the MOI has a
nascent communications network in place, the MOI has yet to develop a
comprehensive communications plan that governs its use and the absence of
such a plan makes effective command and control of MOI forces difficult.
According to Coalition sources, the needed communications plan has not
been developed because of internecine disagreements within the ministry
that have hindered its acceptance. Another organizational challenge is the
fact that, although the MOI's logistical concept envisions organizations
that will be responsible for vehicle maintenance, spare parts management,
and the running of national and provincial warehouses, the MOI has yet to
develop official organizational structures or equipment requirements for
these organizations. Without these plans, it is unclear how the MOI can
effectively implement an effective maintenance support plan. In addition,
the inability of the MOI to effectively manage contracts has led to
challenges in sustainment and command and control. In its 2007 ISFF
request, DOD sought $25 million for sustainment of MOI training academies
and medical facilities, explaining that the Government of Iraq does not
have appropriate contracting and budgetary procedures established to
sustain these facilities. MOI's ineffective contracting has also
undermined the sustainability of one of two critical communications
systems, the Advanced First Responder Network. According to DOD, in May
2007 the MOI signed a contract for the operation and maintenance of, and
training of personnel for, the network. However, as of summer 2007,
MNSTC-I reports that the MOI has not funded the contract, does not have
the capacity to fund it, and is reluctant to fund it. The Coalition
planned for the MOI to assume responsibility for operation and maintenance
of the network by March 2007. However, because of the ministry's inability
to maintain the network, as of July 2007 the Coalition was unable to
estimate when the MOI would be self-sufficient in operation of the AFRN.

Finally, because of problems with its personnel management system, the MOI
is facing the fundamental challenge of not being able to accurately
account for its personnel. According to DOD's June and September 2007
reports to Congress, there is currently no reliable data on how many
Coalition-trained personnel are still serving in the MOI's forces.
Moreover, DOD has also reported that the MOI has hired a significant
number of police beyond those trained by the Coalition. According to
testimony by the former MNSTC-I commander, the MOI's payroll accounts for
about 60,000 to 74,000 more personnel than the number trained and equipped
by the Coalition. However, he also stated that about 20 percent of this
overage are "ghosts," meaning personnel whose names appear on the MOI's
payroll but who are not actually serving. Effecting command and control or
fashioning a logistics system for an organization of indeterminate size is
problematic because both these capabilities are, by their very nature,
determined by the size of the organization for which they are designed. It
is unlikely that the MOI can effectively ensure command and control of
forces that it cannot accurately count, especially if thousands of the
personnel who appear on its payrolls do not exist. In addition, basic
logistics functions such as budgeting for and procuring the requisite
sustainment stocks also require accurate knowledge of a force's size.

DOD's Determination of ISF Independence Is Not Clear

Although DOD has in multiple reports stated that a certain number of ISF
units are either "independent" or "fully independent," it is unclear how
DOD arrived at this determination for three reasons. First, the process by
which ISF units are assessed does not allow for a rating of "independent"
or "fully independent." Second, statements in DOD reports seemingly
contradict claims of ISF independence. Third, the MOD and MOI are still
experiencing significant challenges with regard to developing the support
capabilities on which independence is contingent.

Assessments of ISF Independence Are Problematic

Since October 2005, DOD has asserted in its quarterly reports to Congress
that a certain number of ISF units are "independent" or "fully
independent," yet it is unclear how this determination can be made given
the process by which ISF units are evaluated, qualifying language about
ISF independence that DOD uses in its reports, and the challenges facing
the development of the ISF's support capabilities.

DOD began issuing quarterly reports to Congress in July 2005. In each of
these reports, except for the first,^15 DOD reported that a certain number
of ISF units had been assessed as either "in the lead with Coalition
enablers or fully independent" or "capable of planning, executing, and
sustaining counterinsurgency operations independently or with Iraqi or
Coalition forces." For example, in its most recent report to Congress,
issued in September 2007, DOD stated that 95 Army, Special Operations
Combat Forces, and Iraqi Army Infrastructure units; an indeterminate
number of MOD logistics enablers; 7 National Police Combat Battalions; and
3 National Police Brigade Headquarters were all "capable of planning,
executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations independently or
with Iraqi or Coalition forces." Although in none of these reports does
DOD distinguish between those forces that are capable of operating
independently and those that require Coalition or Iraqi assistance, the
tables in which DOD's data are presented lead one to believe that at least
one if not more than one of the units was rated as independent. This was
underscored during the MNF-I commander's September 10 and 11, 2007
testimony, during which he briefed the Congress that in every month since
November 2005, with only one exception (February 2006) the Coalition has
assessed at least one ISF unit as "fully independent."

^15DOD did provide a classified annex to its first report that contained a
rollup assessment of Iraqi Army unit capabilities.

However, despite DOD's reports and the MNF-I commander's recent testimony
that a certain number of ISF have been assessed as "fully independent,"
after March 2006 it was no longer possible for a Coalition transition team
member to rate the readiness of an ISF unit using these terms. Previously,
in guidance provided to Coalition transition teams for use in evaluating
Iraqi Security Forces, a level 1 unit was said to be "fully capable of
planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations." However, in
the spring of 2006, MNC-I removed the words "fully" and "independent" from
the definition. When we asked DOD officials for the reason for this change
they were not able to provide us with an explanation. Therefore, according
to the current guidance, a level 1 unit is one that is "capable of
planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations." It is
important to note that, according to the guidance, a Coalition transition
team cannot judge an ISF unit as "independent." However, in its most
recent report to Congress, DOD asserted that an "independent unit is one
that is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency
operations." Thus, DOD's continued reporting that some ISF units are
"independent" or "fully independent" is not congruent with MNC-I's
instructions for filling out the Operational Readiness Assessments on
which DOD's assertions and reports seem to be based. If independence is
still a relevant descriptor of ISF unit capabilities, then why was the
term removed from the definition of a level 1 unit in 2006?

Further obfuscating the issue are statements that DOD has made in each of
its reports to Congress that apparently contradict the assertion that at
least some ISF units are "fully independent." For example, in its August
2006 report, DOD stated that in the absence of a self-reliant logistics
system, MNF-I must provide extensive support to Iraqi forces. In its
November 2006 report, DOD stated that perhaps the most significant
shortcoming in both the MOD and MOI forces' capabilities lay in planning
and executing their logistics and sustainment requirements, and that
efforts were underway to reduce Iraqi forces' reliance on U.S. support and
sustainment. The March 2007 report echoed this observation, stating that
the most significant shortcoming in both the MOD and MOI forces'
capabilities lay in planning and executing sustainment requirements. In
its June 2007 report to Congress, DOD stated that building the logistics
and sustainment capabilities of the MOD and MOI constitutes one of four
major areas on which the Coalition is focusing. The report goes on to note
that fielded MOD forces often do not get the support they require without
substantial Coalition assistance. Finally, in its most recent report to
Congress, released in September 2007, DOD stated that MOD logistics from
the tactical to strategic levels, and MOI logistics at the strategic
level, are fragile and not capable of independent execution. Underscoring
these qualifying statements are the comments of the MNF-I commander, who
stated during his recent Congressional testimony that although there are
about 95 ISF units capable of taking the lead in operations, they still
need some Coalition support and that, furthermore, were U.S. forces to
withdraw rapidly from Iraq, the ISF would face "a high risk of
disintegration."

Finally, because of the many  challenges facing the Coalition and Iraqi
government in developing the ISF's support capabilities, it is clear that
the ISF is not independent of the Coalition. From January 2006, when we
began our investigation of ISF support capabilities, to September 2007,
the date of the latest information contained in this report, the ISF have
been unable to fully meet their logistics, command and control, and
intelligence requirements. Because these capabilities are inherent to
independence, until the ISF develops them, neither the MOD nor MOI can be
considered independent.

Although we are not discounting DOD assertions that there are some ISF
units that are more capable than others from an operational standpoint, we
find that using the terms "independent" or "fully independent" to describe
their overarching development is both confusing and misleading. Every ISF
unit, regardless of its operational ability, is dependent upon
institutional logistic, command and control, and intelligence capabilities
that are designed to support it and as this report and our previous
reports demonstrate, these capabilities in both the MOD and MOI are facing
significant challenges to their development.

Conclusions

The MOD and MOI face significant challenges in developing their logistic,
command and control, and intelligence capabilities. Two factors, in
particular, have thwarted their development--the persistence of high
levels of violence and sectarianism and a lack of ministerial capacity. As
a result, the ability of both ministries to maintain and sustain their
forces, provide effective command and control of their forces, and provide
their forces with intelligence is undermined and cannot be accomplished
without Coalition support. Furthermore, since these support capabilities
have yet to be fully developed, DOD claims that ISF units are either
"independent" or "fully independent" are confusing and misleading.
Although we are not discounting DOD reports that there are some ISF units
that are more capable than others from an operational standpoint, we do
not find sufficient evidence for an assessment of "independent" or "fully
independent" for any ISF unit. Moreover, without clarity regarding the
criteria according to which ISF units are assessed as independent,
especially with regard to their logistical, command and control, and
intelligence capabilities, Congress cannot have clear visibility over
DOD's role in assisting the ISF in becoming independent of Coalition
support.

Recommendations

In order to provide the Congress and other decision makers with a clear
picture of ISF capabilities, we recommend that DOD clarify 1) its use of
the terms "independent" or "fully independent" as they relate to the
assessed capabilities of ISF units, especially with regard to the
logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of those
units, and 2) the process it uses to make this assessment.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our two recommendations and provided a matrix of narrower technical
comments. In its written comments, DOD stated that it would evaluate its
assessment terminology to more clearly describe progress in capability
development for the Iraqi forces. However, DOD did not explicitly outline
any actions it would take to adopt our recommendation to clarify its
terminology. Furthermore, DOD stated that while the terms "independent"
and "fully independent" can cause confusion, they are still being used in
reports and briefings because they are "more illustrative" than other
terms. Consequently, we continue to believe that the actions we
recommended are needed in order to ensure that Congress and other decision
makers are provided a clear picture of ISF capabilities. DOD's written
comments and its technical comment matrix are reprinted in appendix I.

With regard to the first recommendation that DOD clarify its use of the
terms "independent" or "fully independent" as they relate to the assessed
capabilities of Iraqi Security Force units, especially with regard to the
logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of those
units, the department partially concurred. DOD agreed that the use of the
terms "independent" and "fully independent" can cause confusion, but
stated that these terms were still being used in reports and briefings
because they are "more illustrative" than other terms, although the
department also stated that it will evaluate its assessment terminology to
more clearly describe progress in capability development for the Iraqi
forces. We believe, however, that DOD's evaluation of the terms is
insufficient; that the continued use of "independent" or "fully
independent" in briefings and reports only perpetuates the very confusion
that DOD recognizes; and that therefore our recommendation that DOD
clarify its terms is warranted for three reasons. First, the process by
which ISF units are assessed does not allow for a rating of "independent"
or "fully independent," a point amplified by the definition of a level 1
unit DOD supplied in its written comments. Second, statements in DOD
reports seemingly contradict claims of ISF independence. This was
underscored by the written statement submitted by the MNF-I commander in
conjunction with his September 2007 Congressional testimony, in which he
stated that although there are about 95 ISF units capable of taking the
lead in operations, they still need some Coalition support and that were
U.S. forces to withdraw rapidly from Iraq, the ISF would face "a high risk
of disintegration." Finally, as this report demonstrates, the MOD and MOI
are still experiencing significant challenges with regard to developing
the logistics, command and control, and intelligence capabilities on which
independence is contingent.

DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that it clarify the
process its uses to assess ISF units, stating that although MNC-I modified
the wording used to describe a level 1 unit in 2006, the metrics and
processes transition teams use to assess Ministry of Interior and Defense
units have not changed and that this process is clearly defined in the
MNC-I Transition Readiness Assessment Report Implementing Instructions
Update. We examined both the March 2006 and the December 2006 updates (the
latter being, according to DOD, the most current update). Even a cursory
look at the example forms reproduced in the respective updates shows that
the metrics have, in fact, changed. For example, the number of sustainment
and logistics categories by which units are evaluated has gone from 3 to 5
and the subjective and objective criteria used to determine unit ratings
in the areas of leadership, communications, administration, and training
have also changed. Furthermore, the last time that DOD provided any
information on the ISF assessment process in its quarterly reports to
Congress was July 2005. Since that time, the implementing instructions for
the assessment process have changed at least twice. We believe, therefore,
that in order to ensure Congress has a more complete and up-to-date
understanding of the assessment process, DOD should provide it with an
updated and detailed explanation of the current process.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. This report will also be available at no
charge on the GAO web site at [10]http://www.gao.gov .

Please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [11][email protected] if you or your
staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for our
Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. Key contributors to this report included Marilyn
Wasleski, Assistant Director, Whitney Havens, Kate Lenane, Guy LoFaro,
Terry Richardson, Leo Sullivan, Christopher Turner, and Cheryl Weissman.

William M. Solis, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman
Chairman
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Tom Lantos
Chairman
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Davis
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable John F. Tierney
Chairman
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments.

1. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments.

2. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments.

3. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments.

4. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments.

5. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments.

6. Although we have not assessed the rate at which the National Depot at
Taji is currently expanding, according to information we obtained from DOD
in July 2007 and interviews with a former senior Coalition official who
was assigned to the depot until June 2007, many of the same challenges
affecting the development of the National Depot that we identified in our
March 2007 reports remain and continue to hamper its capacity. Moreover,
in light of the persistent violence in Iraq new challenges have cropped up
as well. As we point out in this report, the formation of lower-echelon
logistics units is complete, save those required by the Prime Minister's
expansion plan. DOD documents confirm that since August 2006 the priority
has been on creating lower-echelon logistics units over national and
regional logistics center, to include GSUs. Hence, both by design and
because of persistent violence, the development of the National Depot and
GSUs has lagged behind.

7. We have changed the sentence to read "According to DOD, the MOD's
Military Intelligence School, which is responsible for training Iraqi
soldiers in intelligence skills, has only 24 of 81 authorized instructors,
a circumstance attributed in part to security concerns for Iraqi faculty
members who live outside the military complex at Taji."

8. In written replies to our questions about the NIIA, DOD outlined the
conditions by which NIIA self-sufficiency could be achieved. However, DOD
could not give an estimate of when it expects those conditions would come
about.

Appendix II: Related GAO Products

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met
Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. GAO-07-1220T.
Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met
Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. GAO-07-1195.
Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007.

Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached
Iraqi Security Forces.  [12]GAO-07-711 . Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007.

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Conditions in Iraq Are Conducive to
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. [13]GAO-07-525T . Washington, D.C.: April 23,
2007.

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security
Forces' Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities. [14]GAO-07-503R .
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007.

Stabilizing Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Budget and Management
Challenges of Iraq's Security Ministries. GAO-07-637T. Washington, D.C.:
March 22, 2007.

Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the
Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future
Operations Planning. GAO-07-444. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2007

Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi
Security Forces. GAO-07-612T. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007.

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security
Forces' Logistical Capabilities. GAO-07-582T. Washington, D.C.: March 9,
2007.

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audit Approach and
Findings. GAO-07-385T. Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2007.

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight. GAO-07-308SP. Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007.

Rebuilding Iraq: Status of DOD's Reconstruction Program. GAO-07-30R.
Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2006.

Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Competition for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts.
GAO-07-40. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2006.

Rebuilding Iraq: Continued Progress Requires Overcoming Contract
Management Challenges. GAO-06-1130T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006.

Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation, GAO-06-1094T.
Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2006.

Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help
Achieve U.S. Goals. GAO-06-788. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006.

Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help
Achieve U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges. GAO-06-953T. Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2006.

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private
Security Providers, GAO-06-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006.

Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing
Challenges. GAO-06-697T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.

Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and
Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and
Sustainable Progress. GAO-06-179T. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005.

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed To Improve Use of Private Security
Providers. GAO-05-737. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.

Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring
Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police. GAO-05-431T.
Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005.

Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and
Oversight Issues. GAO-04-902R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004.

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