Aviation Security: DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the	 
Commercial Aviation System, but Key Challenges Remain (16-OCT-07,
GAO-08-139T).							 
                                                                 
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the		 
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) mission is to	 
protect the nation's transportation network. Since its inception 
in 2001, TSA has developed and implemented a variety of programs 
and procedures to secure commercial aviation. GAO examined (1)	 
the progress DHS and TSA have made in securing the nation's	 
commercial aviation system, and (2) challenges that have impeded 
the Department's efforts to implement its mission and management 
functions. This testimony is based on issued GAO reports and	 
testimonies addressing the security of the nation's commercial	 
aviation system, including a recently issued report (GAO-07-454) 
that highlights the progress DHS has made in implementing its	 
mission and management functions.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-139T					        
    ACCNO:   A77370						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the 
Commercial Aviation System, but Key Challenges Remain		 
     DATE:   10/16/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Aviation security					 
	     Checked baggage screening				 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Passenger screening				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Security policies					 
	     Transportation policies				 
	     Transportation security				 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 
	     GAO High Risk Series				 
	     TSA Secure Flight Program				 

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GAO-08-139T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background

          * [3]DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Nation's Commercial Av
          * [4]Cross-cutting Issues Have Hindered DHS's Efforts in Implemen

     * [5]Concluding Observations
     * [6]GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
     * [7]GAO's Mission
     * [8]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [9]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [10]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [11]Congressional Relations
     * [12]Public Affairs

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and
Infrastructure Protection, House Committee on Homeland Security

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Tuesday, October 16, 2007

AVIATION SECURITY

DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Commercial Aviation System, but Key
Challenges Remain

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director
Homeland Security and Justice Issues

GAO-08-139T

Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and challenges in
securing our nation's aviation system. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), originally established as an agency within the
Department of Transportation in 2001 but now a component within DHS, is
charged with securing the transportation network while also ensuring the
free movement of people and commerce. TSA has primary responsibility for
security in all modes of transportation and since its inception has
developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure
the commercial aviation system. Other DHS components, federal agencies,
state and local governments, and the private sector also play a role in
aviation security. For example, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) has responsibility for conducting passenger prescreening--in
general, the matching of passenger information against terrorist watch
lists prior to an aircraft's departure--for international flights
operating to or from the United States, as well as inspecting inbound air
cargo upon its arrival in the United States. In accordance with TSA
requirements, airport authorities are responsible for implementing
measures to secure access to restricted airport areas as well as airport
perimeters, while air carriers are responsible for inspecting air cargo,
among other things.

My testimony today will focus on: (1) the progress TSA and other DHS
components have made in securing the nation's commercial aviation system
and (2) challenges that have impeded DHS's (and, as they relate to
transportation security, TSA) efforts to implement its mission and
management functions. My comments are based on issued GAO reports and
testimonies addressing the security of the nation's aviation system,
including an August 2007 report that highlights the progress DHS has made
in implementing its mission and management functions.^1 In this report, we
reviewed the extent to which DHS has taken actions to achieve performance
expectations in each of its mission and management areas that we
identified from legislation, Homeland Security Presidential Directives,
and DHS strategic planning documents. Based primarily on our past work, we
made a determination regarding whether DHS generally achieved or generally
did not achieve the key elements of each performance expectation. An
assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has taken sufficient
actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation; however, an
assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no further action
is required of DHS or that functions covered by the expectation cannot be
further improved or enhanced. Conversely, an assessment of "generally not
achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken actions to satisfy most
elements of the performance expectation. In determining the department's
overall level of progress in achieving performance expectations in each of
its mission and management areas, we concluded whether the department had
made limited, modest, moderate, or substantial progress.^2 These
assessments of progress do not reflect, nor are they intended to reflect,
the extent to which actions by DHS and its components have made the nation
more secure. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

^1 GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation
of Mission and Management Functions, [13]GAO-07-454 (Washington, D.C.:
August 2007); GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, [14]GAO-07-1081T
(Washington, D.C.: September 2007); and GAO, Department of Homeland
Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management
Functions, [15]GAO-07-1240T (Washington, D.C.: September 2007).

Summary

Within DHS, TSA is the agency with primary responsibility for securing the
transportation sector and has undertaken a number of initiatives to
strengthen the security of the nation's commercial aviation system. In
large part, these efforts have been driven by legislative mandates
designed to strengthen the security of commercial aviation following the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In August 2007, we reported that
DHS had made moderate progress in securing the aviation transportation
network, but that more work remains.^3 Specifically, of the 24 performance
expectations we identified for DHS in the area of aviation security, we
reported that it has generally achieved 17 of these expectations and has
generally not achieved 7 expectations.

^2 Limited progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve 25 percent
or less of the identified performance expectations. Modest progress: DHS
has taken actions to generally achieve more than 25 percent but 50 percent
or less of the identified performance expectations. Moderate progress: DHS
has taken actions to generally achieve more than 50 percent but 75 percent
or less of the identified performance expectations. Substantial progress:
DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than 75 percent of the
identified performance expectations.

^3 [16]GAO-07-454 .

DHS, primarily through TSA, has made progress in many areas related to
securing commercial aviation, and their efforts should be commended.
Meeting statutory mandates to screen airline passengers and 100 percent of
checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. To do this, TSA
initially hired and deployed a federal workforce of over 50,000 passenger
and checked baggage screeners, and installed equipment at the nation's
more than 400 commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all
checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by law. TSA
has since turned its attention to, among other things, strengthening
passenger prescreening--in general, the matching of passenger information
against terrorist watch lists prior to an aircraft's departure; more
efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the transportation
security officer (TSO)--formerly known as screener--workforce;
strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more
effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic air
cargo security. In addition to TSA, CBP has also taken steps to strengthen
passenger prescreening for passengers on international flights operating
to or from the United States, as well as inspecting inbound air cargo upon
its arrival in the United States. DHS's Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate has also taken actions to research and develop aviation
security technologies.

While these efforts have helped to strengthen the security of the
commercial aviation system, DHS still faces a number of key challenges
that need to be addressed to meet expectations set out for them by the
Congress, the Administration, and the Department itself. For example, TSA
has faced challenges in developing and implementing its passenger
prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, and has not yet completed
development efforts. As planned, this program would initially assume from
air carriers the responsibility for matching information on airline
passengers traveling domestically against terrorists watch lists. In
addition, while TSA has taken actions to enhance perimeter security at
airports, these actions may not be sufficient to provide for effective
security. TSA has also begun efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of
security-related technologies, such as biometric identification systems.
However, TSA has not developed a plan for implementing new technologies to
meet the security needs of individual airports and the commercial airport
system as a whole. Further, TSA has not yet deployed checkpoint
technologies to address key existing vulnerabilities, and has not yet
developed and implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo.

A variety of cross-cutting issues have affected DHS's and, as they relate
to transportation security, TSA's efforts in implementing its mission and
management functions. These key issues include agency transformation,
strategic planning and results management, risk management, information
sharing, and stakeholder coordination. In working towards transforming the
department into an effective and efficient organization, DHS and its
components have not always been transparent, which has affected our
ability to perform our oversight responsibilities in a timely manner. They
have also not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts,
fully developed performance measures, or put into place structures to help
ensure that they are managing for results. In addition, DHS and its
components can more fully adopt and apply a risk management approach in
implementing its security mission and core management functions. ^4 They
could also better share information with federal, state, and local
governments and private sector entities, and more fully coordinate its
activities with key stakeholders.

Background

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in November
2001, created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all modes of
transportation.5 TSA's aviation security mission includes strengthening
the security of airport perimeters and restricted airport areas; hiring
and training a screening workforce; prescreening passengers against
terrorist watch lists; and screening passengers, baggage, and cargo at the
over 400 commercial airports nation-wide, among other responsibilities.
While TSA has operational responsibility for physically screening
passengers and their baggage, TSA exercises regulatory, or oversight,
responsibility for the security of airports and air cargo. Specifically,
airports, air carriers, and other entities are required to implement
security measures in accordance with TSA-issued security requirements,
against which TSA evaluates their compliance efforts.

TSA also oversees air carriers' efforts to prescreen passengers--in
general, the matching of passenger information against terrorist watch
lists-- prior to an aircraft's departure. TSA plans to take over
operational responsibility for this function with the implementation of
its Secure Flight program initially for passengers traveling domestically.
CBP has responsibility for conducting passenger prescreening for airline
passengers on international flights departing from and bound for the
United States,^6 while DHS's Science and Technology Directorate is
responsible for researching and developing technologies to secure the
transportation sector.

^4 A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing
risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and
objectives, assessing risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives
to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those initiatives.

^5 Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Nation's Commercial Aviation System, but
More Work Remains

DHS, primarily through the efforts of TSA, has undertaken numerous
initiatives since its inception to strengthen the security of the nation's
commercial aviation system. In large part, these efforts have been
affected by legislative mandates designed to strengthen the security of
commercial aviation following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
These efforts have also been affected by events external to the
department, including the alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to blow up
commercial aircraft bound from London to the United States. For example,
TSA has undertaken efforts to hire, train, and deploy a screening
workforce; and screen passengers, baggage, and cargo. Although TSA has
taken important actions to strengthen aviation security, the agency has
faced difficulties in implementing an advanced, government-run passenger
prescreening program for domestic flights, and in developing and
implementing technology to screen passengers at security checkpoints and
cargo placed on aircraft, among other areas. As shown in table 1, we
identified 24 performance expectations for DHS in the area of aviation
security, and found that overall, DHS has made moderate progress in
meeting these expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally
achieved 17 performance expectations and has generally not achieved 7
performance expectations. We identified these performance expectations
through reviews of key legislation, Homeland Security Presidential
Directives, and DHS strategic planning documents.

^6 Currently, air carriers departing the United States are required to
transmit passenger manifest information to CBP no later than 15 minutes
prior to departure but, for flights bound for the United States, air
carriers are not required to transmit the information until 15 minutes
after the flight's departure (in general, after the aircraft is in
flight). See 19 C.F.R. SS 122.49a, 122.75a. In a final rule published in
the Federal Register on August 23, 2007, CBP established a requirement for
all air carriers to either transmit the passenger manifest information to
CBP no later than 30 minutes prior to the securing of the aircraft doors
(that is, prior to the flight being airborne), or transmit manifest
information on an individual basis as each passenger checks in for the
flight up to but no later than the securing of the aircraft. See 72 Fed.
Reg. 48,320 (Aug. 23, 2007). This requirement is to take effect on
February 19, 2008.

Table 1: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Aviation Security

Performance expectation: 
Aviation security strategic approach: Implement a strategic approach 
for aviation security functions; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];  
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Airport perimeter security and access controls: Establish standards and 
procedures for effective airport perimeter security; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Airport perimeter security and access controls: Establish standards and 
procedures to effectively control access to airport secured areas; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Airport perimeter security and access controls: Establish procedures 
for implementing biometric identifier systems for airport secured areas 
access control; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Airport perimeter security and access controls: Ensure the screening of 
airport employees against terrorist watch lists; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Aviation security workforce: Hire and deploy a federal screening 
workforce; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].

Performance expectation: 
Aviation security workforce: Develop standards for determining aviation 
security staffing at airports; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];  
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Aviation security workforce: Establish standards for training and 
testing the performance of airport screener staff; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Aviation security workforce: Establish a program and requirements to 
allow eligible airports to use a private screening workforce; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Aviation security workforce: Train and deploy federal air marshals on 
high-risk flights; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Aviation security workforce: Establish standards for training flight 
and cabin crews; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Aviation security workforce: Establish a program to allow authorized 
flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or 
criminal acts; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 


Performance expectation: 
Passenger prescreening: Establish policies and procedures to ensure 
that individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk or 
threat to security are identified and subjected to appropriate action; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Passenger prescreening: Develop and implement an advanced prescreening 
system to allow DHS to compare domestic passenger information to the 
Selectee List and No Fly List; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].

Performance expectation: 
Passenger prescreening: Develop and implement an international 
passenger prescreening process to compare passenger information to 
terrorist watch lists before aircraft departure; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Checkpoint screening: Develop and implement processes and procedures 
for physically screening passengers at airport checkpoints; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].

Performance expectation: 
Checkpoint screening: Develop and test checkpoint technologies to 
address vulnerabilities; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].

Performance expectation: 
Checkpoint screening: Deploy checkpoint technologies to address 
vulnerabilities; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Checked Baggage screening: Deploy explosive detection systems (EDS) and 
explosive trace detection (ETD) systems to screen checked baggage for 
explosives; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Checked Baggage screening: Develop a plan to deploy in-line baggage 
screening equipment at airports; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Checked Baggage screening: Pursue the deployment and use of in-line 
baggage screening equipment at airports; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Air cargo security: Develop a plan for air cargo security; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Air cargo security: Develop and implement procedures to screen air 
cargo; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: 
Air cargo security: Develop and implement technologies to screen air 
cargo; 
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty]; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check]; 
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty]. 

Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved; 17; 
Assessment: Generally not achieved; 7; 
Assessment: No assessment made; 0. 

Source: GAO analysis.

Aviation Security Strategic Approach. We concluded that DHS has generally
achieved this performance expectation. In our past work, we reported that
TSA identified and implemented a wide range of initiatives to strengthen
the security of key components of the commercial aviation system. These
components are interconnected and each is critical to the overall security
of commercial aviation.^7 More recently, in March 2007, TSA released its
National Strategy on Aviation Security and six supporting plans that
provided more detailed strategic planning guidance in the areas of systems
security; operational threat response; systems recovery; domain
surveillance; and intelligence integration and domestic and international
outreach. According to TSA officials, an Interagency Implementation
Working Group was established under TSA leadership in January 2007 to
initiate implementation efforts for the 112 actions outlined in the
supporting plans.

Airport Perimeter Security and Access Controls. We concluded that DHS has
generally achieved one, and has generally not achieved three, of the
performance expectations in this area. For example, TSA has taken action
to ensure the screening of airport employees against terrorist watch lists
by requiring airport operators to compare applicants' names against the No
Fly and Selectee Lists.^8 However, in June 2004, we reported that although
TSA had begun evaluating commercial airport perimeter and access control
security through regulatory compliance inspections, covert testing of
selected access procedures, and vulnerability assessments at selected
airports, TSA had not determined how the results of these evaluations
could be used to make improvements to the nation's airport system as a
whole. We further reported that although TSA had begun evaluating the
controls that limit access into secured airport areas, it had not
completed actions to ensure that all airport workers in these areas were
vetted prior to being hired and trained.^9 More recently, in March 2007,
the DHS Office of Inspector General, based on the results of its access
control testing at 14 domestic airports across the nation, made various
recommendations to enhance the overall effectiveness of controls that
limit access to airport secured areas.^10 In March through July 2007, DHS
provided us with updated information on procedures, plans, and other
efforts it had implemented to secure airport perimeters and strengthen
access controls, including a description of its Aviation Direct Access
Screening Program. This program provides for TSOs to randomly screen
airport and airline employees and employees' property and vehicles as they
enter the secured areas of airports for the presence of explosives,
incendiaries, weapons, and other items of interest as well as improper
airport identification. However, DHS did not provide us with evidence that
these actions provide for effective airport perimeter security, nor
information on how the actions addressed all relevant requirements
established by law and in our prior recommendations.

^7 For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in
Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain,
GAO-06-371T (Washington, D.C: April 2006).

Regarding procedures for implementing biometric identification systems, we
reported that TSA had not developed a plan for implementing new
technologies to meet the security needs of individual airports and the
commercial airport system as a whole.^11

^8 For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation
Security Administration Has Made Progress in Managing a Federal Security
Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain,
[17]GAO-06-597T , (Washington, D.C.: April 2006) and GAO, Aviation
Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of Commercial
Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, [18]GAO-04-728 (Washington, D.C.:
June 2004).

^9 [19]GAO-06-597T and [20]GAO-04-728 .

^10 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Audit of
Access to Airport Secured Areas (Unclassified Summary), OIG-07-35
(Washington, D.C.: March 2007).

In December 2004 and September 2006, we reported on the status of the
development and testing of the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential program (TWIC)^12 - DHS's effort to develop biometric access
control systems to verify the identity of individuals accessing secure
transportation areas. Our 2004 report identified challenges that TSA faced
in developing regulations and a comprehensive plan for managing the
program, as well as several factors that caused TSA to miss initial
deadlines for issuing TWIC cards. In our September 2006 report, we
identified the challenges that TSA encountered during TWIC program
testing, and several problems related to contract planning and oversight.
Specifically, we reported that DHS and industry stakeholders faced
difficult challenges in ensuring that biometric access control
technologies will work effectively in the maritime environment where the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential program is being initially
tested. In October 2007, we testified that TSA had made progress in
implementing the program and addressing our recommendations regarding
contract planning and oversight and coordination with stakeholders. For
example, TSA reported that it added staff with program and contract
management expertise to help oversee the contract and developed plans for
conducting public outreach and education efforts.^13 However, DHS has not
yet determined how and when it will implement a biometric identification
system for access controls at commercials airports. We have initiated
ongoing work to further assess DHS's efforts to establish procedures for
implementing biometric identifier systems for airport secured areas access
control.

Aviation Security Workforce. We concluded that DHS has  generally achieved
all 7 performance expectations in this area. For example, TSA has hired
and deployed a federal screening workforce at over 400 commercial airports
nationwide, and has developed standards for determining TSO staffing
levels at airports. TSA also established numerous programs to train and
test the performance of its TSO workforce, although we reported that
improvements in these efforts can be made. Among other efforts, in
December 2005, TSA reported completing enhanced explosives detection
training for over 18,000 TSOs, and increased its use of covert testing to
assess vulnerabilities of existing screening systems. TSA also established
the Screening Partnership Program which allows eligible airports to apply
to TSA to use a private screening workforce. In addition, TSA has trained
and deployed federal air marshals on high-risk flights; established
standards for training flight and cabin crews; and established a Federal
Flight Deck Officer program to select, train, and allow authorized flight
deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or criminal
acts. Related to flight and cabin crew training, TSA revised its guidance
and standards to include additional training elements required by law and
improve the organization and clarity of the training. TSA also increased
its efforts to measure the performance of its TSO workforce through
recertification testing and other measures.

^11 [21]GAO-06-597T and [22]GAO-04-728 .

^12 GAO, Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate
Maritime Worker Identification Card Program, [23]GAO-05-106 (Washington,
D.C.: December 2004), and Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key
Challenges before Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential Program, [24]GAO-06-982 (Washington, D.C.: September 2006).

^13 GAO, Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our
Nation's Seaports, [25]GAO-08-86T  (Washington, D.C. October 4, 2007).

Passenger Prescreening. We reported that DHS has generally achieved one,
and has not generally achieved two, of the performance expectations in
this area. For example, TSA established policies and procedures to ensure
that individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk or threat
to security are identified and subjected to appropriate action.
Specifically, TSA requires that air carriers check all passengers against
the Selectee List, which identifies individuals that represent a higher
than normal security risk and therefore require additional security
screening, and the No Fly List, which identifies individuals who are not
allowed to fly.^14 However, TSA has faced a number of challenges in
developing and implementing an advanced prescreening system, known as
Secure Flight, which will allow TSA to take over the matching of passenger
information against the No Fly and Selectee lists from air carriers, as
required by law.^15 In 2006, we reported that TSA had not conducted
critical activities in accordance with best practices for large-scale
information technology programs and had not followed a disciplined life
cycle approach in developing Secure Flight.^16 In March 2007, DHS reported
that as a result of its rebaselining efforts, more effective government
controls were developed to implement Secure Flight and that TSA was
following a more disciplined development process. DHS further reported
that it plans to begin parallel operations with the first group of
domestic air carriers during fiscal year 2009 and to take over full
responsibility for watch list matching in fiscal year 2010. We are
continuing to assess TSA's efforts in developing and implementing the
Secure Flight program. We have also reported that DHS has not yet
implemented enhancements to its passenger prescreening process for
passengers on international flights departing from and bound for the
United States.^17 Although CBP recently issued a final rule that will
require air carriers to provide passenger information to CBP prior to a
flight's departure so that CBP can compare passenger information to the
terrorist watch lists before a flight takes off, this requirement is not
scheduled to take effect until February 2008. In addition, while DHS plans
to align its international and domestic passenger prescreening programs
under TSA, full implementation of an integrated system will not occur for
several years.

^14 In accordance with TSA-issued security requirements, passengers on the
No Fly List are denied boarding passes and are not permitted to fly unless
cleared by law enforcement officers. Similarly, passengers who are on the
Selectee List are issued boarding passes, and they and their baggage
undergo additional security measures.

^15 See 49 U.S.C. S 44903(j)(2)(C).

Checkpoint Screening. We reported that DHS has generally achieved two, and
has not generally achieved one, of the performance expectations in this
area. For example, we reported that TSA has developed processes and
procedures for screening passengers at security checkpoints and has worked
to balance security needs with efficiency and customer service
considerations.^18 More specifically, in April 2007, we reported that
modifications to standard operating procedures were proposed based on the
professional judgment of TSA senior-level officials and program-level
staff, as well as threat information and the results of covert testing.
However, we found that TSA's data collection and analyses could be
improved to help TSA determine whether proposed procedures that are
operationally tested would achieve their intended purpose. We also
reported that DHS and its component agencies have taken steps to improve
the screening of passengers to address new and emerging threats. For
example, TSA established two recent initiatives intended to strengthen the
passenger checkpoint screening process: (1) the Screening Passenger by
Observation Technique program, which is a behavior observation and
analysis program designed to provide TSA with a nonintrusive means of
identifying potentially high- risk individuals; and the (2) Travel
Document Checker program which replaces current travel document checkers
with TSOs who have access to sensitive security information on the threats
facing the aviation industry and check for fraudulent documents. However,
we found that while TSA has developed and tested checkpoint technologies
to address vulnerabilities that may be exploited by identified threats
such as improvised explosive devices, it has not yet effectively deployed
such technologies. In July 2006, TSA reported that it installed 97
explosives trace portal machines--which use puffs of air to dislodge and
detect trace amounts of explosives on persons--at 37 airports. However,
DHS identified problems with these machines and has halted their
deployment. TSA is also developing backscatter technology, which
identifies explosives, plastics and metals, giving them shape and form and
allowing them to be visually interpreted.^19 However, limited progress has
been made in fielding this technology at passenger screening checkpoints.
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11
Commission Act), enacted in August 2007, restates and amends a requirement
that DHS issue a strategic plan for deploying explosive detection
equipment at airport checkpoints and requires DHS to expedite research and
develop efforts to protect passenger aircraft from explosives devices.^20
We are currently reviewing DHS and TSA's efforts to develop, test and
deploy airport checkpoint technologies.^21

^16 GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the
Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program,
[26]GAO-06-864T (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).

^17 GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide
Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, [27]GAO-07-448T
(Washington, D.C.: February 2007) and GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to
Strengthen International Passenger Prescreening Are Under Way, but
Planning and Implementation Issues Remain, [28]GAO-07-346 (Washington,
D.C.: May 2007).

^18 For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience,
and Customer Concerns Drive Changes to Airline Passenger Screening
Procedures, but Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be
Improved, [29]GAO-07-634 (Washington, D.C.: May 2007); GAO, Aviation
Security: TSA's Change to Its Prohibited Items List Has Not Resulted in
Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of the Change on Screening
Operations Is Inconclusive, [30]GAO-07-623R (Washington, D.C.: April
2007); GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on
Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, [31]GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.:
September 2003); and GAO, Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in
Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain,
[32]GAO-06-371T (Washington, D.C.: April 2006).

^19 [33]GAO-06-371T

Checked Baggage Screening. We concluded that DHS has generally achieved
all three performance expectations in this area. Specifically, from
November 2001 through June 2006, TSA procured and installed about 1,600
Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and about 7,200 Explosive Trace
Detection (ETD) machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at over
400 commercial airports.^22 In response to mandates to field the equipment
quickly and to account for limitations in airport design, TSA generally
placed this equipment in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport
lobbies--to conduct the primary screening of checked baggage for
explosives.^23 Based in part on our previous recommendations, TSA later
developed a plan to integrate EDS and ETD machines in-line with airport
baggage conveyor systems. The installation of in-line systems can result
in considerable savings to TSA through the reduction of TSOs needed to
operate the equipment, as well as increased security. Despite delays in
the widespread deployment of in-line systems due to the high upfront
capital investment required, TSA is pursuing the installation of these
systems and is seeking creative financing solutions to fund their
deployment. In March 2007, DHS reported that it is working with airport
and air carrier stakeholders to improve checked baggage screening
solutions to enhance security and free up lobby space at airports. The
installation of in-line baggage screening systems continues to be an issue
of congressional concern. For example, the 9/11 Commission Act reiterates
a requirement that DHS submit a cost-sharing study along with a plan and
schedule for implementing provisions of the study, and requires TSA to
establish a prioritization schedule for airport improvement projects such
as the installation of in-line baggage screening systems.^24

^20 See Pub. L. No. 110-53, SS1607, 1610, 121 Stat. 266, 483-85 (2007).

^21 For more information, see [34]GAO-06-371T .

^22 Explosive detection systems (EDS) use specialized X-rays to detect
characteristics of explosives that may be contained in baggage as it moves
along a conveyor belt. Explosive trace detection (ETD) works by detecting
vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by
rubbing swabs along the interior and exterior of an object that TSOs
determine to be suspicious, and place the swabs in the ETD machine, which
then chemically analyzes the swabs to identify any traces of explosive
materials.

^23 For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of
Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be Strengthened, [35]GAO-06-869
(Washington, D.C.: July 2006), [36]GAO-06-371T , and [37]GAO-07-448T .

Air Cargo Security. We reported that TSA has generally achieved two, and
has not generally achieved one, of the performance expectations in this
area. Specifically, TSA has developed a strategic plan for domestic air
cargo security and has taken actions to use risk management principles to
guide investment decisions related to air cargo bound for the United
States from a foreign country, referred to as inbound air cargo, but these
actions are not yet complete. For example, TSA plans to assess inbound air
cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets--two crucial elements of a
risk-based management approach--but has not yet established a methodology
or time frame for how and when these assessments will be completed.^25 TSA
has also developed and implemented procedures to screen domestic and
inbound air cargo. We reported in October 2005 that TSA had significantly
increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections conducted of air
carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with security requirements.
However, we also reported that TSA exempted certain cargo from random
inspection because it did not view the exempted cargo as posing a
significant security risk, although air cargo stakeholders noted that such
exemptions may create potential security risks and vulnerabilities since
shippers may know how to package their cargo to avoid inspection.^26 In
part based on a recommendation we made, TSA is evaluating existing
exemptions to determine whether they pose a security risk, and has removed
some exemptions that were previously allowed. The 9/11 Commission Act
requires, no later than 3 years after its enactment, that DHS have a
system in place to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft.^27 Although TSA has taken action to develop plans for securing
air cargo and establishing and implementing procedures to screen air
cargo, DHS has not yet developed and implemented screening technologies.
DHS is pursuing multiple technologies to automate the detection of
explosives in the types and quantities that would cause catastrophic
damage to an aircraft in flight. However, TSA acknowledged that full
development of these technologies may take 5 to 7 years. In April 2007, we
reported that TSA and DHS's S&T Directorate were in the early stages of
evaluating and piloting available aviation security technologies to
determine their applicability to the domestic air cargo environment. We
further reported that although TSA anticipates completing its pilot tests
by 2008, it has not yet established time frames for when it might
implement these methods or technologies for the inbound air cargo system.
^28

^24 See Pub. L. No. 110-53, S 1603-04, 121 Stat. at 480-81.

^25 For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed
to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, , (Washington, D.C.: October
2005) and GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts [38]GAO-06-76 to Secure
U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened,
[39]GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).

^26 [40]GAO-06-76 .

Cross-cutting Issues Have Hindered DHS's Efforts in Implementing Its Mission and
Management Functions

Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut across DHS's
mission and core management functions. These issues have impeded the
department's progress since its inception and will continue as DHS moves
forward. While it is important that DHS continue to work to strengthen
each of its mission and core management functions, to include aviation
security, it is equally important that these key issues be addressed from
a comprehensive, department-wide perspective to help ensure that the
department has the structure and processes in place to effectively address
the threats and vulnerabilities that face the nation. These issues
include: (1) transforming and integrating DHS's management functions; (2)
establishing baseline performance goals and measures and engaging in
effective strategic planning efforts; (3) applying and strengthening a
risk management approach for implementing missions and making resource
allocation decisions; (4) sharing information with key stakeholders; and
(5) coordinating and partnering with federal, state and local, and private
sector agencies. We have made numerous recommendations to DHS to
strengthen these efforts, and the department has made progress in
implementing some of these recommendations.

^27 See Pub. L. No. 110-53, S 1602, 121 Stat. at 477-79.This provision
defines screening as a physical examination or non-intrusive method of
assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation security that
includes the use of technology, procedures, personnel, or other methods to
provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for
the screening of passenger checked baggage. Methods such as solely
performing a review of information about the contents of cargo or
verifying the identity of a shipper of the cargo, including whether a
known shipper is registered in TSA's known shipper database, do not
constitute screening under this provision.

^28 [41]GAO-07-660 .

DHS has faced a variety of difficulties in its efforts to transform into a
fully functioning department. We designated DHS's implementation and
transformation as high-risk in part because failure to effectively address
this challenge could have serious consequences for our security and
economy. DHS continues to face challenges in key areas, including
acquisition, financial, human capital, and information technology
management. This array of management and programmatic challenges continues
to limit DHS's ability to effectively and efficiently carry out its
mission. In addition, transparency plays an important role in helping to
ensure effective and efficient transformation efforts. We have reported
that DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent
enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and
economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives
annually. More specifically, in April 2007, we testified that we have
encountered access issues during numerous engagements at DHS, including
significant delays in obtaining requested documents that have affected our
ability to do our work in a timely manner.^29 The Secretary of DHS and the
Under Secretary for Management have stated their desire to work with us to
resolve access issues and to provide greater transparency. It will be
important for DHS and its components to become more transparent and
minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its
programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can
independently assess its efforts.

In addition, DHS has not always implemented effective strategic planning
efforts and has not yet fully developed performance measures or put into
place structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results.
We have identified strategic planning as one of the critical success
factors for new organizations, and reported that both DHS's and TSA's
efforts in this area have been mixed. For example, with regards to TSA's
efforts to secure air cargo, we reported that TSA completed an Air Cargo
Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a threat-based risk
management approach to securing the nation's domestic air cargo system,
and that this plan identified strategic objectives and priority actions
for enhancing air cargo security based on risk, cost, and deadlines.
However, we reported that TSA had not developed a similar strategy for
addressing the security of inbound air cargo--cargo transported into the
United States from foreign countries, including how best to partner with
CBP and international air cargo stakeholders. In another example, we
reported that TSA had not yet developed outcome-based performance measures
for its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs,
such as the percentage of security deficiencies that were addressed as a
result of TSA's on-site assistance and recommendations, to identify any
aspects of these programs that may need attention. We recommended that DHS
direct TSA and CBP to develop a risk-based strategy, including specific
goals and objectives, for securing air cargo;^30 and develop outcome-based
performance measures for its foreign airport assessment and air carrier
inspection programs.^31 DHS generally concurred with GAO's
recommendations.

^29 GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Observations on GAO Access to
Information on Programs and Activities, [42]GAO-07-700T , (Washington,
D.C.: April 2007).

DHS has also not fully adopted and applied a risk management approach in
implementing its mission and core management functions. Risk management
has been widely supported by the President and Congress as an approach for
allocating resources to the highest priority homeland security
investments, and the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Assistant
Secretary for Transportation Security have made it a centerpiece of DHS
and TSA policy. Several DHS component agencies and TSA have worked towards
integrating risk-based decision making into their security efforts, but we
reported that these efforts can be strengthened. For example, TSA has
incorporated certain risk management principles into securing air cargo,
but has not completed assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities or critical
assets--two crucial elements of a risk-based approach without which TSA
may not be able to appropriately focus its resources on the most critical
security needs. TSA has also incorporated risk-based decision making when
making modifications to airport checkpoint screening procedures, to
include modifying procedures based on intelligence information and
vulnerabilities identified through covert testing at airport checkpoints.
However, in April 2007 we reported that TSA's analyses that supported
screening procedural changes could be strengthened. For example, TSA
officials decided to allow passengers to carry small scissors and tools
onto aircraft based on their review of threat information--which indicated
that these items do not pose a high risk to the aviation system--so that
TSOs could concentrate on higher threat items.^32 However, TSA officials
did not conduct the analysis necessary to help them determine whether this
screening change would affect TSO's ability to focus on higher-risk
threats.^33

^30 [43]GAO-07-660 .

^31 GAO, Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier
Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These Efforts Can Be
Strengthened, [44]GAO-07-729 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2007).

We have further reported that opportunities exist to enhance the
effectiveness of information sharing among federal agencies, state and
local governments, and private sector entities. In August 2003, we
reported that efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing need
to be strengthened, and in 2005, we designated information sharing for
homeland security as high-risk. ^ 34 In January 2005, we reported that the
nation still lacked an implemented set of government-wide policies and
processes for sharing terrorism-information, but DHS has issued a strategy
on how it will put in place the overall framework, policies, and
architecture for sharing information with all critical partners--actions
that we and others have recommended.^35 DHS has taken some steps to
implement its information sharing responsibilities. States and localities
are also creating their own information "fusion" centers, some with DHS
support. With respect to aviation security, the importance of information
sharing was recently highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Act, which
requires DHS to establish a plan to promote the sharing of transportation
security information among DHS and federal, state and local agencies,
tribal governments, and appropriate private entities.^36 The Act also
requires that DHS provide timely threat information to carriers and
operators that are preparing and submitting a vulnerability assessment and
security plan, including an assessment of the most likely methods that
could be used by terrorists to exploit weaknesses in their security.^37

^32 GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns,
[45]GAO-07-634 (Washington, D.C.: May 2007).

^33 GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive
Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and
Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved, [46]GAO-07-634
(Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007).

^34 GAO, Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to
Be Strengthened, [47]GAO-03-760 (Washington, D.C.: August 2003) and GAO,
HIGH- RISK SERIES: An Update [48]GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January
2005).

^35 [49]GAO-07-454 .

^36 See Pub. L. No. 110-53, S 1203, 121 Stat. at 383-86.

In addition to providing federal leadership with respect to homeland
security, DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the activities of
key stakeholders, but has faced challenges in this regard. To secure the
nation, DHS must form effective and sustained partnerships between legacy
component agencies and a range of other entities, including other federal
agencies, state and local governments, the private and nonprofit sectors,
and international partners. We have reported that successful partnering
and coordination involves collaborating and consulting with stakeholders
to develop and agree on goals, strategies, and roles to achieve a common
purpose; identify resource needs; establish a means to operate across
agency boundaries, such as compatible procedures, measures, data, and
systems; and agree upon and document mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and
report to the public on the results of joint efforts.^38 We have found
that the appropriate homeland security roles and responsibilities within
and between the levels of government, and with the private sector, are
evolving and need to be clarified. For example, we reported that
opportunities exists for TSA to work with foreign governments and industry
to identify best practices for securing air cargo, and recommended that
TSA systematically compile and analyze information on practices used
abroad to identify those that may strengthen the department's overall
security efforts.^39 Further, regarding efforts to respond to in-flight
security threats, which--depending on the nature of the threat--could
involve 15 federal agencies and agency components, we recommended that DHS
and other departments document and share their respective coordination and
communication strategies and response procedures.^40

^37 See Pub. L. No. 110-53, SS 1512(d)(2), 1531(d)(2), 121 Stat. at 430,
455.

^38 GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing
the Department of Homeland Security, [50]GAO-07-833T (Washington, D.C.:
May 2007)

^39 [51]GAO-07-660

^40 GAO,Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight
Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened,
(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007). [52]GAO-07-891R

Concluding Observations

The magnitude of DHS's and more specifically TSA's responsibilities in
securing the nation's commercial aviation system is significant, and we
commend the department on the work it has done and is currently doing to
secure this network. Nevertheless, given the dominant role that TSA plays
in securing the homeland, it is critical that its programs and initiatives
operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. In the almost 6 years
since its creation, TSA has had to undertake its critical mission while
also establishing and forming a new agency. At the same time, a variety of
factors, including threats to and attacks on aviation systems around the
world, as well as new legislative requirements, has led the agency to
reassess its priorities and reallocate resources to address key events,
and to respond to emerging threats. Although TSA has made considerable
progress in addressing key aspects of commercial aviation security, more
work remains in the areas of checkpoint and air cargo technology, airport
security, and passenger prescreening. As DHS and TSA and other components
move forward, it will be important for the department to work to address
the challenges that have affected its operations thus far, including
developing results-oriented goals and measures to assess performance;
developing and implementing a risk-based approach to guide resource
decisions; and establishing effective frameworks and mechanisms for
sharing information and coordinating with homeland security partners. A
well-managed, high-performing TSA is essential to meeting the significant
challenge of securing the transportation network. As TSA continues to
evolve, implement its programs, and integrate its functions, we will
continue to review its progress and performance and provide information to
Congress and the public on its efforts.

Madam Chair, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any
questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at this
time.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen Berrick
at (202) 512- 3404 or at [email protected]. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony include Steve D. Morris, Assistant
Director, Gary Malavenda, Susan Langley, and Linda Miller.

(440667)

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Highlights of [60]GAO-08-139T , a testimony to the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, House Committee on
Homeland Security,

October 16, 2007

AVIATION SECURITY

DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Commercial Aviation System, but Key
Challenges Remain

In August 2007, GAO reported that DHS had made moderate progress in
securing the commercial aviation system, but that more work remains.
Specifically, DHS generally achieved 17 of the 24 performance expectations
that GAO identified in the area of aviation security but had generally not
achieved 7 of them. DHS and TSA have made progress in many areas related
to securing commercial aviation. For example, to meet congressional
mandates to screen airline passengers and 100 percent of checked baggage,
TSA initially hired and deployed a federal workforce of over 50,000
passenger and checked baggage screeners and installed equipment at the
nation's more than 400 commercial airports to provide the capability to
screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems. TSA has
since turned its attention to, among other things, strengthening passenger
prescreening; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the
transportation security officer (TSO)------formerly known as
screener------workforce; strengthening screening procedures; developing
and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; and
improving domestic air cargo security.

While these efforts have helped strengthen the security of the commercial
aviation system, DHS and TSA still face a number of key challenges in
further securing this system. For example, TSA has faced difficulties in
developing and implementing its advanced passenger prescreening system,
known as Secure Flight, and has not yet completed development efforts. In
addition, DHS's efforts to enhance perimeter security at airports may not
be sufficient to provide for effective security. TSA has also initiated
efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related technologies,
such as biometric identification systems, but has not developed a plan for
implementing new technologies to meet the security needs of individual
airports. TSA has also not yet effectively deployed checkpoint
technologies to address key existing vulnerabilities, and has not yet
developed and implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. GAO
also reported that a number of issues have impeded DHS's efforts in
implementing its mission and management functions, including not always
implementing effective strategic planning or fully adopting and applying a
risk management approach with respect to commercial aviation security.

Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation
Security Administration's (TSA) mission is to protect the nation's
transportation network. Since its inception in 2001, TSA has developed and
implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial
aviation. GAO examined (1) the progress DHS and TSA have made in securing
the nation's commercial aviation system, and (2) challenges that have
impeded the Department's efforts to implement its mission and management
functions. This testimony is based on issued GAO reports and testimonies
addressing the security of the nation's commercial aviation system,
including a recently issued report (GAO-07-454) that highlights the
progress DHS has made in implementing its mission and management
functions.

[61]What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO made a number of recommendations to DHS and TSA to
strengthen their efforts to secure the commercial aviation system. DHS and
TSA generally agreed with the recommendations and have taken steps to
implement some of them.

References

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*** End of document. ***