    Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of
    SBInet Program Implementation (24-OCT-07, GAO-08-131T).

    In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear,
    multibillion dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element
    of SBI is SBInet--the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
    program responsible for developing a comprehensive border
    protection system through a mix of security infrastructure (e.g.,
    fencing), and surveillance and communication technologies (e.g.,
    radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones). The House
    Committee on Homeland Security asked GAO to monitor DHS progress
    in implementing the SBInet program. This testimony provides GAO's
    observations on (1) SBInet technology implementation; (2) SBInet
    infrastructure implementation; (3) the extent to which CBP has
    determined the impact of SBInet technology and infrastructure on
    its workforce needs and operating procedures; and (4) how the CBP
    SBI Program Management Office (PMO) has defined its human capital
    goals and the progress it has made to achieve these goals. GAO's
    observations are based on analysis of DHS documentation, such as
    program schedules, contracts, status, and reports. GAO also
    conducted interviews with DHS officials and contractors, and
    visits to sites in the southwest border where SBInet deployment
    is underway. GAO performed the work from April 2007 through
    October 2007. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-131T
        ACCNO:   A77567
      TITLE:     Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected
    Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation
         DATE:   10/24/2007
      SUBJECT:   Border control
    	     Border security
    	     Command control communications systems
    	     Communication systems
    	     Contract administration
    	     Cost overruns
    	     Electronic surveillance
    	     Fences
    	     Homeland security
    	     Human capital planning
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Program management
    	     Schedule slippages
    	     Systems integration
    	     Program implementation
    	     SBInet Program
    	     Secure Border Initiative

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    GAO-08-131T

         * [1]Summary
         * [2]Background
         * [3]SBInet Technology Deployment Delays May Increase Schedule Ri
         * [4]SBInet Tactical Infrastructure Deployment on Track but May B
         * [5]SBInet Impact on Border Patrol's Workforce Needs and Operati
         * [6]SBI PMO Did Not Meet All of Its Staffing Goals and Has Not Y
         * [7]Concluding Observations
         * [8]Contacts and Acknowledgments
         * [9]GAO's Mission
         * [10]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

              * [11]Order by Mail or Phone

         * [12]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
         * [13]Congressional Relations
         * [14]Public Affairs

    Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Management, Investigations, and
    Oversight, and Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, Committee on
    Homeland Security,

    House of Representatives

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    For Release on Delivery
    Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
    Wednesday, October 24, 2007

    SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE

    Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation

    Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director
    Homeland Security and Justice Issues

    GAO-08-131T

    Chairman Sanchez, Mr. Souder, Chairman Carney, Mr. Rogers and Members of
    the Subcommittees:

    I am pleased to be here today to discuss observations on selected aspects
    of the Secure Border Initiative's SBInet program implementation.

    Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband,
    including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a
    major concern. Much of the United States' 6,000 miles of international
    borders with Canada and Mexico remains vulnerable to illegal entry.
    Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) apprehends hundreds of
    thousands of people entering the country illegally each year, several
    hundreds of thousands of individuals also enter the United States
    illegally and undetected. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of
    the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar
    program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration.
    Elements of SBI will be carried out by several organizations within DHS.
    One element of SBI is SBInet. Under SBInet, the U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP) is responsible for developing a comprehensive border
    protection system.

    You requested that we monitor the SBInet program and provide periodic
    updates on the status of the program. My testimony today is the first in a
    series of interim reports on SBInet implementation and focuses on the
    following issues:

               o SBInet's technology implementation;

               o SBInet's infrastructure implementation;

               o the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of SBInet
               technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and operating
               procedures; and

               o how the CBP SBI Program Management Office (PMO)^1 has defined
               its human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve
               these goals.

    ^1The SBInet PMO is part of the CBP SBI PMO. The SBInet PMO is responsible
    for overseeing all SBInet activities; for acquisition and implementation,
    including establishing and meeting program goals, objectives, and
    schedules; for overseeing contractor performance; and for coordinating
    among DHS agencies.

    To address these issues, we analyzed DHS documents, including program
    schedules and status reports, and workforce data. We interviewed DHS and
    CBP headquarters and field officials, including representatives of the
    SBInet PMO, Border Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, and the DHS Science and
    Technology Directorate. We also visited the Tucson and Yuma, Arizona
    Border Patrol sectors^2--two sites where SBInet deployment was underway at
    the time of our review. We performed our work from April 2007 through
    October 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards. (App. I provides a detailed discussion of our scope and
    methodology.)

    We also have work underway to review other components of the SBInet
    program. Specifically, we are conducting work for the House Committee on
    Homeland Security to assess the development and deployment of SBInet's
    command, control, and communications systems, and surveillance and
    detection systems and expect to issue a report next year. In addition, we
    are reviewing DHS's use of performance-based services acquisition, an
    acquisition method structured around the results to be achieved instead of
    the manner by which the service should be performed. We expect to issue a
    report on this effort in January 2008.

    Summary

    DHS has made some progress to implement the first segment of SBInet
    technology, Project 28--a $20 million project to secure 28 miles along the
    southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned schedule.
    Boeing--the prime contractor that DHS selected to acquire, deploy, and
    sustain systems of new surveillance and communications technology across
    U.S. borders--delivered and deployed the system components (i.e., radars,
    sensors, computers) to the Project 28 site in the Tucson sector on
    schedule. However, Project 28 is incomplete more than 4 months after it
    was to become operational--at which point Border Patrol agents were to
    begin using SBInet technology to support their activities, and CBP was to
    begin its operational test and evaluation phase. According to CBP and
    Boeing officials, the delays are primarily attributed to software
    integration problems--such as long delays in radar information being
    displayed in command centers. In September 2007, CBP officials told us
    that Boeing was making progress in correcting the system integration
    problems, but CBP was unable to provide us with a specific date on when
    Boeing would complete the necessary corrections to make Project 28
    operational. CBP reports that it is in the early stages of planning for
    additional SBInet technology projects along the southwest border; however,
    Boeing's delay in completing Project 28 has led CBP to extend timelines
    for deploying some technology projects scheduled for calendar years 2007
    and 2008. CBP reports that it has taken steps to strengthen its contract
    management for this project.

    ^2The U.S. Border Patrol has 20 sectors responsible for detecting,
    interdicting, and apprehending those who attempt illegal entry or smuggle
    people--including terrorists or contraband, including weapons of mass
    destruction--across U.S. borders between official ports of entry.

    Deploying SBInet's infrastructure along the southwest border is on
    schedule, but meeting the SBInet program's goal to have 370 miles of
    pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December
    31, 2008, may prove challenging and more costly than planned. CBP met its
    intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new fencing in fiscal year 2007
    and the average cost per mile was $2.9 million. The SBInet PMO estimates
    that deployment costs for remaining fencing will be similar to those thus
    far. In the past, DHS has minimized infrastructure construction labor
    costs by using Border Patrol agents and Department of Defense (DOD)
    military personnel. However, CBP officials report that they plan to use
    commercial labor for future fencing projects. The additional cost of
    commercial labor and potential unforeseen increases in contract costs
    suggest future deployment could be more costly than planned. Also, while
    deployment of tactical infrastructure is on schedule, CBP officials
    reported that meeting deadlines has been challenging because of factors
    the officials will continue to face, including conducting outreach
    necessary to address border-community resistance, identifying and
    completing steps necessary to comply with environmental regulations, and
    addressing difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands.

    The impact of SBInet on the Border Patrol's workforce's needs and
    operating procedures remains unclear because the SBInet technology is not
    fully identified or deployed. CBP officials expect the number of Border
    Patrol agents required to meet mission needs to change from the current
    projections, but until the system is fully deployed, the direction and
    magnitude of the change is unknown. In addition, for the Tucson sector,
    where Project 28 is being deployed, the Border Patrol is developing a plan
    on how to integrate SBInet into its operating procedures. Moreover, the
    delays in deploying Project 28 will require revising the SBInet's training
    curriculum, and trainers and operators will be retrained.

    The SBI PMO tripled in size in fiscal year 2007 but fell short of its
    staffing goal of 270 employees. Agency officials expressed concerns that
    staffing shortfalls could affect the agency's capacity to provide adequate
    contractor oversight. In addition, the SBI PMO has not yet completed its
    long-term human capital planning.

    In their oral comments on a draft of this statement, DHS generally agreed
    with our findings and provided clarifying information that we incorporated
    as appropriate.

    Background

    The SBInet program is responsible for identifying and deploying an
    appropriate mix of technology (e.g., sensors, cameras, radars,
    communications systems, and mounted laptop computers for agent vehicles),
    tactical infrastructure (e.g., fencing, vehicle barriers, roads,), rapid
    response capability (e.g., ability to quickly relocate operational assets
    and personnel) and personnel (e.g., program staff and Border Patrol
    agents) that will enable CBP agents and officers to gain effective
    control^3 of U.S. borders. SBInet technology is also intended to include
    the development and deployment of a common operating picture (COP) that
    provides uniform data through a command center environment to Border
    Patrol agents in the field and all DHS agencies and to be interoperable
    with stakeholders external to DHS, such as local law enforcement. The
    initial focus of SBInet is on the southwest border areas between ports of
    entry^4 that CBP has designated as having the highest need for enhanced
    border security because of serious vulnerabilities. Through SBInet, CBP
    plans to complete a minimum of 387 miles of technology deployment across
    the southwest border by December 31, 2008. Figure 1 shows the location of
    select SBInet projects underway on the southwest border.

    ^3DHS defines effective control of U.S. borders as the ability to
    consistently: (1) detect illegal entries into the United States; (2)
    identify and classify these entries to determine the level of threat
    involved; (3) respond to these entries; and (4) bring events to a
    satisfactory law enforcement resolution.

    ^4At a port of entry location, CBP officers secure the flow of people and
    cargo into and out of the country, while facilitating legitimate travel
    and trade.

    Figure 1: Select SBInet Projects Under Way on the Southwest Border

    In September 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract to the Boeing Company for
    3 years, with three additional 1-year options. As the prime contractor,
    Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and sustaining selected
    SBInet technology and tactical infrastructure projects. In this way,
    Boeing has extensive involvement in the SBInet program requirements
    development, design, production, integration, testing, and maintenance and
    support of SBInet projects. Moreover, Boeing is responsible for selecting
    and managing a team of subcontractors that provide individual components
    for Boeing to integrate into the SBInet system.^5 The SBInet contract is
    largely performance-based--that is, CBP has set requirements for SBInet
    and Boeing and CBP coordinate and collaborate to develop solutions to meet
    these requirements--and designed to maximize the use of commercial
    off-the-shelf technology. ^6 CBP's SBInet PMO oversees and manages the
    Boeing-led SBInet contractor team. The SBInet PMO workforce includes a mix
    of government and contractor support staff. The SBInet PMO reports to the
    CBP SBI Program Executive Director.

    CBP is executing part of SBInet activities through a series of task orders
    to Boeing for individual projects. As of September 30, 2007, CBP had
    awarded five task orders to Boeing for SBInet projects. These include task
    orders for (1) Project 28, Boeing's pilot project and initial
    implementation of SBInet technology to achieve control of 28 miles of the
    border in the Tucson sector; (2) Project 37, for construction
    approximately 32 miles of vehicle barriers and pedestrian fencing in the
    Yuma sector along the Barry M. Goldwater Range (BMGR);^7 (3) Program
    Management, for engineering, facilities and infrastructure, test and
    evaluation, and general program management services; (4) Fence Lab, a
    project to evaluate the performance and cost of deploying different types
    of fences and vehicle barriers; and (5) a design task order for developing
    the plans for several technology projects to be located in the Tucson,
    Yuma, and El Paso sectors.

    ^5Boeing employs several companies as subcontractors on the SBInet
    project. These companies provide Boeing with a variety of services. For
    example, Boeing has used a subcontractor to install laptops into CBP
    vehicles, while it has used another to develop and deploy mobile sensor
    towers.

    ^6Commercial off-the-shelf is a term for software or hardware, generally
    technology or computer products, that are available for sale, lease, or
    license to the general public.

    ^7Project 37 consists of three phases, which when complete are to provide
    control over 37 miles of border in the Yuma sector. The first two phases
    focus on deployment of tactical infrastructure. The third phase will focus
    on technology systems.

    In addition to deploying technology across the southwest border, the
    SBInet PMO  plans to deploy 370 miles of single-layer pedestrian fencing
    and 200 miles of vehicle barriers by December 31, 2008. Whereas pedestrian
    fencing is designed to prevent people on foot from crossing the border,
    vehicle barriers are other physical barriers meant to stop the entry of
    vehicles. The SBInet PMO is utilizing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
    (USACE) to contract for fencing and supporting infrastructure (such as
    lights and roads), complete required environmental assessments, and
    acquire necessary real estate.^8

    DHS has estimated that the total cost for completing the deployment for
    the southwest border--the initial focus of SBInet deployment--will be $7.6
    billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2011. DHS has not yet reported the
    estimated life cycle cost for this program, which is the total cost to the
    government for a program over its full life, consisting of research and
    development, operations, maintenance, and disposal costs.^9 For fiscal
    year 2007, Congress appropriated about $1.2 billion for SBInet, about
    which 40 percent DHS had committed or obligated as of September 30, 2007.
    For fiscal year 2008, DHS has requested an additional $1 billion.^10

    SBInet Technology Deployment Delays May Increase Schedule Risks

    DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28--the first segment of
    technology on the southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned
    schedule. Project 28 is the first opportunity for Boeing to demonstrate
    that its technology system can meet SBInet performance requirements in a
    real-life environment.^11 Boeing's inability thus far to resolve system
    integration issues has left Project 28 incomplete more than 4 months after
    its planned June 13 milestone to become operational--at which point,
    Border Patrol agents were to begin using SBInet technology to support
    their activities, and CBP was to begin its operational test and evaluation
    phase. Boeing delivered and deployed the individual technology components
    of Project 28 on schedule.^12 Nevertheless, CBP and Boeing officials
    reported that Boeing has been unable to effectively integrate the
    information collected from several of the newly deployed technology
    components, such as sensor towers, cameras, radars, and unattended ground
    sensors. Among several technical problems reported were that it was taking
    too long for radar information to display in command centers and newly
    deployed radars were being activated by rain, making the system unusable.
    In August 2007, CBP officially notified Boeing that it would not accept
    Project 28 until these and other problems were corrected. In September
    2007, CBP officials told us that Boeing was making progress in correcting
    the system integration problems; however, CBP was unable to provide us
    with a specific date when Boeing would complete the corrections necessary
    to make Project 28 operational. See figures 2 and 3 below for photographs
    of SBInet technology along the southwest border.

    ^8The SBInet PMO contracted with Boeing Company to construct 32 miles of
    fencing in the BMGR. Deployment of this fencing has been completed, and
    the SBInet PMO plans to use USACE to contract for all remaining pedestrian
    fencing and vehicle barriers to be deployed through December 31, 2008.

    ^9GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for
    Supporting Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements, GAO-07-430
    (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).

    ^10DHS and DOD appropriations bills for fiscal year 2008 that include
    additional funding for border security are awaiting final action in
    Congress.

    ^11CBP has established performance requirements for SBInet technology.
    These include requirements for (1) probability of detection; (2) correctly
    identifying threats; (3) apprehension; (4) system availability; and (5)
    false alarm rate.

    Figure 2: Project 28 Mobile Sensor Tower Deployed in Tucson Sector

    ^12Project 28 components include: 9 mobile radar/sensor towers; 4
    underground sensors, 70 small hand-held satellite phones for agents to
    communicate throughout the Tucson sector; and 50 CBP agent vehicles with
    secure-mounted laptop computers and communications capabilities.

    Figure 3: At Left, Mounted Laptop Installed in Border Patrol Vehicle; at
    Right, Project 28 Command and Control Center

    The SBInet PMO reported that is in the early stages of planning for
    additional SBInet technology projects along the southwest border; however,
    Boeing's delay in completing Project 28 has led the PMO to change the
    timeline for deploying some of these projects. In August 2007, SBInet PMO
    officials told us they were revising the SBInet implementation plan to
    delay interim project milestones for the first phase of SBInet technology
    projects, scheduled for calendar years 2007 and 2008.^13 For example,
    SBInet PMO officials said they were delaying the start dates for two
    projects^14 that were to be modeled on the design used for Project 28
    until after Project 28 is operational and can provide lessons learned for
    planning and deploying additional SBInet technology along the southwest
    border. According to the SBInet master schedule dated May 31, 2007, these
    projects were to become operational in December 2007 and May 2008. Despite
    these delays, SBInet PMO officials said they still expected to complete
    all of the first phase of technology projects by the end of calendar year
    2008. As of October 15, 2007, the SBInet PMO had not provided us with a
    revised deployment schedule for this first phase.

    ^13The SBInet PMO plans to deploy SBInet projects in three phases. Phase
    one projects are scheduled between April 2007 and December 2008; phase two
    projects are scheduled between May 2008 and early 2010; and phase three
    projects are scheduled to begin in May 2009.

    ^14The two projects are Project 37 BMGR phase three technology deployment,
    and the Texas Mobile System, technology deployment for about 70 miles of
    border in the El Paso sector.

    CBP reports that it is taking steps to strengthen its contract management
    for Project 28. For example, citing numerous milestone slippages by Boeing
    during Project 28 implementation, in August 2007, CBP sought and reached
    an agreement with Boeing to give it greater influence in milestone setting
    and planning corrective actions on the Project 28 task order. While CBP
    had selected a firm-fixed-price contract to limit cost overruns on Project
    28,^15 CBP officials told us that the firm-fixed-price contract CBP used
    for Project 28 had limited the government's role in directing Boeing in
    its decision making process. For example, CBP and contractor officials
    told us they expressed concern about the timeline for completing Project
    28, but CBP chose not to modify the contract because doing so would have
    made CBP responsible for costs beyond the $20 million fixed-price
    contract.^16 In mid-August 2007, CBP organized a meeting with Boeing
    representatives to discuss ways to improve the collaborative process, the
    submission of milestones, and Boeing's plan to correct Project 28
    problems. Following this meeting, CBP and Boeing initiated a Change
    Control Board.^17 In mid-September representatives from Boeing's SBInet
    team and its subcontractors continued to participate on this board and
    vote on key issues for solving Project 28 problems. Although CBP
    participates on this committee as a non-voting member, a senior SBInet
    official said the government's experience on the Change Control Board had
    been positive thus far. For example, the official told us that the Change
    Control Board had helped improve coordination and integration with Boeing
    and for suggesting changes to the subcontractor companies working on
    Project 28.

    ^15A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to
    any adjustment on the basis of the contractor's cost experience in
    performing the contract. This contract type places maximum risk upon the
    contractor and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or
    loss.

    ^16In April 2007, CBP and Boeing reached an agreement to modify the terms
    of the Project 28 contract, increasing it to about $20.66 million. CBP
    modified the contract to add several project design requirements that the
    existing task order did not address.

    ^17The Change Control Board is a voting body that represents the interests
    of program and project management by ensuring that a structured process is
    used to consider proposed changes and incorporate them into a specified
    release of a product.

    SBInet Tactical Infrastructure Deployment on Track but May Be Challenging and
    More Costly than Planned

    Deploying SBInet's tactical infrastructure along the southwest border is
    on schedule, but meeting the SBInet program's goal to have 370 miles of
    pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December
    31, 2008, may be challenging and more costly than planned. CBP set an
    intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new pedestrian fencing by the
    close of fiscal year 2007 and, having deployed 73 miles by this date,
    achieved its goal. Table 1 summarizes CBP`s progress and plans for
    tactical infrastructure deployment.

    Table 1: Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Progress as of September 30,
    2007

                        Miles in Miles    Total
                        place    deployed miles
    Infrastructure   before   through  in    Target for Miles remaining to
    type             SBInet   SBInet   place 12/31/08   meet 12/31/08 target
    Pedestrian
    fencing          78       73       151   370        219
    Vehicle barriers 57       53       110   200        90

    Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.

    Costs for the 73 miles of fencing constructed in fiscal year 2007 averaged
    $2.9 million per mile and ranged from $700,000 in San Luis, Arizona, to
    $4.8 million per mile in Sasabe, Arizona. CBP also deployed 11 miles of
    vehicle barriers and, although CBP has not yet been able to provide us
    with the cost of these vehicle barriers, it projects that the average per
    mile cost for the first 75 miles of barriers it deploys will be $1.5
    million. Figure 4 presents examples of fencing deployed.

    Figure 4: At Left, SBInet Fencing Being Deployed at Sasabe, Arizona; at
    Right, SBInet Fencing Deployed at Yuma, Arizona

    CBP estimates costs for the deployment of fencing in the future will be
    similar to those thus far. However, according to CBP officials, costs vary
    due to the type of terrain, materials used, land acquisition, who performs
    the construction, and the need to meet an expedited schedule. Although CBP
    estimates that the average cost of remaining fencing will be $2.8 million
    per mile, actual future costs may be higher due to factors such as the
    greater cost of commercial labor, higher than expected property
    acquisition costs, and unforeseen costs associated with working in remote
    areas. To minimize one of the many factors that add to cost, in the past
    DHS has used Border Patrol agents and DOD military personnel. However, CBP
    officials reported that they plan to use commercial labor for future
    infrastructure projects to meet their deadlines. Of the 73 miles of
    fencing completed to date, 31 were completed by DOD military personnel and
    42 were constructed through commercial contracts. While the non-commercial
    projects cost an average of $1.2 million per mile,^18 the commercial
    projects averaged over three times more--$4 million.^19 According to CBP
    officials, CBP plans to utilize exclusively commercial contracts to
    complete the remaining 219 miles of fencing. If contract costs for
    deployment of remaining miles are consistent with those to deploy tactical
    infrastructure to date and average $4 million per mile, the total contract
    cost will be $890 million, considerably more than  CBP's initial estimate
    of $650 million.

    ^18CBP's estimates of non-commercial fencing projects do not include labor
    costs associated with using government personnel.

    ^19According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), DHS predicts
    that the San Diego fence will have a total cost of $127 million for its
    14-mile length when it is completed-- roughly $9 million a mile.
    Construction of the first 9.5 miles of fencing cost $31 million, or
    roughly $3 million a mile, while construction of the last 4.5 miles of
    fencing is projected to cost $96 million, or roughly $21 million a mile.
    DHS is proposing to hire private contractors to expedite the construction
    of the remaining 4.5 miles of fencing; according to CRS this fact, and the
    complexity of the construction, may account for part of the difference in
    cost.

    Although deployment of tactical infrastructure is on schedule, CBP
    officials reported that meeting deadlines has been challenging because
    factors they will continue to face include conducting outreach necessary
    to address border community resistance, devoting time to identify and
    complete steps necessary to comply with environmental regulations,^20 and
    addressing difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands. As of July
    2007 CBP anticipated community resistance to deployment for 130 of its 370
    miles of fencing. According to community leaders, communities resist
    fencing deployment for reasons including the adverse effect they
    anticipate it will have on cross-border commerce and community unity. In
    addition to consuming time, complying with environmental regulations, and
    acquiring rights to border land can also drive up costs. Although CBP
    officials state that they are proactively addressing these challenges,
    these factors will continue to pose a risk to meeting deployment targets.

    In an effort to identify low cost and easily deployable fencing solutions,
    CBP funded a project called Fence Lab. CBP plans to try to contain costs
    by utilizing the results of Fence Lab in the future. Fence Lab tested nine
    fence/barrier prototypes and evaluated them based on performance criteria
    such as their ability to disable a vehicle traveling at 40 miles per hour
    (see fig. 5), allowing animals to migrate through them, and their
    cost-effectiveness. Based on the results from the lab, SBInet has
    developed three types of vehicle barriers and one pedestrian fence that
    meet CBP operational requirements (see fig. 6). The pedestrian fence can
    be installed onto two of these vehicle barriers to create a hybrid
    pedestrian fence and vehicle barrier. CBP plans to include these solutions
    in a "toolkit" of approved fences and barriers,^21 and plans to deploy
    solutions from this toolkit for all remaining vehicle barriers and for 202
    of 225 miles of remaining fencing. Further, CBP  officials anticipate that
    deploying these solutions will reduce costs because cost-effectiveness was
    a criterion for their inclusion in the toolkit. SBInet officials also told
    us that widely deploying a select set of vehicle barriers and fences will
    lower costs through enabling it to make bulk purchases of construction and
    maintenance materials.

    ^20Although the REAL ID Act of 2005 gives DHS the authority to waive all
    legal requirements necessary to ensure expeditious construction of certain
    specified barriers and roads along the southern border (Pub. L. No.
    109-13, div. B, S 102, 119 Stat. 302, 306), DHS officials told us that
    they only use this authority after they have pursued alternatives.

    Figure 5: Fence Lab crash testing conducted in May 2007

    ^21 As the SBInet PMO uses testing and evaluation to identify tactical
    infrastructure and technology components that effectively secure the
    border, the SBInet PMO is approving them for inclusion in a master
    "toolkit" of approved solutions. In addition to vehicle barriers and
    fences, the toolkit will include technology components such as radars and
    satellite phones as well as a list of approved vendors. In the future, the
    SBInet PMO plans to choose among its toolkit components to craft border
    security solutions.

    Figure 6: Vehicle Barriers and Fencing Developed by Fence Lab That Meet
    Performance Requirements and Are Included in SBInet's "Toolbox" of
    Approved Fences and Barriers.

    SBInet Impact on Border Patrol's Workforce Needs and Operating Procedures
    Remains Unclear

    While SBInet Program officials expect SBInet to greatly reduce the time
    spent by CBP enforcement personnel in performing detection activities,^22
    a full evaluation of SBInet's impact on the Border Patrol's workforce
    needs has not been completed. The Border Patrol currently uses a mix of
    resources including personnel, technology, infrastructure, and rapid
    response capabilities to incrementally achieve its strategic goal of
    establishing and maintaining operational control of the border. ^23 Each
    year through its Operational Requirements Based Budget Program (ORBBP),
    the Border Patrol sectors outline the amount of resources needed to
    achieve a desired level of border control.^24 Border Patrol officials
    state this annual planning process allows the organization to measure the
    impact of each type of resource on the required number of Border Patrol
    agents. A full evaluation of SBInet's impact on the Border Patrol's
    workforce needs is not yet included in the ORBBP process; however, the
    Border Patrol plans to incorporate information from Project 28 a few
    months after it is operational.

    ^22SBI PMO expects SBInet to provide the capability to predict, deter,
    detect, identify, classify, track, respond to, and resolve border
    incursion; and the operational enhancements of SBInet will provide
    efficiencies by reducing the time agents spend performing detection and
    characterization activities.

    ^23CBP defines operational control as the ability to detect, respond, and
    interdict border penetrations in areas deemed as high priority for threat
    potential or other national security objectives.

    According to agency officials, CBP is on track to meet its hiring goal of
    6,000 new Border Patrol agents by December 2008, but after SBInet is
    deployed, CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents required
    to meet mission needs to change from current projections, although the
    direction and magnitude of the change is unknown. In addition, in June
    2007, we expressed concern that deploying these new agents to the
    southwest sectors coupled with the planned transfer of more experienced
    agents to the northern border will create a disproportionate ratio of new
    agents to supervisors within those sectors--jeopardizing the supervisors'
    availability to acclimate new agents.^25 Tucson Sector officials stated
    CBP is planning to hire from 650 to 700 supervisors next year. To
    accommodate the additional agents, the Border Patrol has taken initial
    steps to provide additional work space through constructing temporary and
    permanent facilities, at a projected cost of about $550 million from
    fiscal year 2007 to 2011.

    The SBInet PMO expects SBInet to support day-to-day border enforcement
    operations; however, analysis of the impact of SBInet technology on the
    Border Patrol's operational procedures cannot be completed at this time
    because agents have not been able to fully use the system as intended.
    Leveraging technology is part of the National Border Patrol Strategy which
    identifies the objectives, tools, and initiatives the Border Patrol uses
    to maintain operational control of the borders. The Tucson sector, where
    Project 28 is being deployed, is developing a plan on how to integrate
    SBInet into its operating procedures. Border Patrol officials stated they
    intend to re-evaluate this strategy, as SBInet technology is identified
    and deployed, and as control of the border is achieved.

    ^24The Border Patrol defines five levels of border security ranging from
    "controlled"--the highest sustainable level of control to "remote/low
    activity"--the lowest level of control.

    ^25GAO, Border Patrol Costs and Challenges Related to Training New Agents,
    GAO-07-997T (Washington, D.C.: June 2007).

    According to agency officials, 22 trainers and 333 operators were trained
    on the current Project 28 system, but because of deployment delays and
    changes to the COP software, the SBInet training curriculum is to be
    revised by Boeing and the government. Training is continuing during this
    revision process with 24 operators being trained each week. According to
    CBP officials, Border Patrol agents are receiving "hands on" training
    during evening and weekend shifts at the COP workstations to familiarize
    themselves with the recent changes made to the Project 28 system. However,
    training is to be stopped once a stabilized version of the COP can be used
    and both trainers and operators are to be retrained using the revised
    curriculum. Costs associated with revising the training material and
    retraining the agents are to be covered by Boeing as part of the Project
    28 task order; however, the government may incur indirect costs associated
    with taking agents offline for retraining.

    SBI PMO Did Not Meet All of Its Staffing Goals and Has Not Yet Completed
    Long-Term Human Capital Planning

    The SBI PMO tripled in size in fiscal year 2007 but fell short of its
    staffing goal of 270 employees.^26 As of September 30, 2007, the SBI PMO
    had 247 employees onboard, with 113 government employees and 134
    contractor support staff. SBI PMO officials also reported that as of
    October 19, 2007, they had 76 additional staff awaiting background
    investigations. In addition, these officials said that a Human Capital
    Management Plan has been drafted, but as of October 22, 2007, the plan had
    not been approved. In February 2007, we reported that SBInet officials had
    planned to finalize a human capital strategy that was to include details
    on staffing and expertise needed for the program.^27 At that time, SBI and
    SBInet officials expressed concern about difficulties in finding an
    adequate number of staff with the required expertise to support planned
    activities about staffing that shortfalls could limit government oversight
    efforts. Strategic human capital planning is a key component used to
    define the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve
    programmatic goals and outlines ways the organization can fill gaps in
    knowledge, skills, and abilities.^28 Until SBInet fully implements a
    comprehensive human capital strategy, it will continue to risk not having
    staff with the right skills and abilities to successfully execute the
    program.

    ^26GAO, SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better Support Oversight and
    Accountability, GAO-07-309 (Washington, D.C.: February 2007).

    ^27GAO-07-309.

    ^28See GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic
    Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: December 2003) and GAO,
    Framework for Accessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies
    GAO-05-218G (Washington, D.C.: September 2005).

    Concluding Observations

    Project 28 and other early technology and infrastructure projects are the
    first steps on a long journey towards SBInet implementation that will
    ultimately require an investment of billions of taxpayer dollars. Some of
    these early projects have encountered unforeseen problems that could
    affect DHS's ability to meet projected completion dates, expected costs,
    and performance goals. These issues underscore the need for both DHS and
    Boeing, as the prime contractor, to continue to work cooperatively to
    correct the problems remaining with Project 28 and to ensure that the
    SBInet PMO has adequate staff to effectively plan and oversee future
    projects. These issues also underscore Congress's need to stay closely
    attuned to DHS's progress in the SBInet program to make sure that
    performance, schedule, and cost estimates are achieved and the nation's
    border security needs are fully addressed.

    This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to any
    questions that members of the Subcommittees may have.

    Contacts and Acknowledgments

    For questions regarding this testimony, please call Richard M. Stana at
    (202) 512-8777 or [15]StanaR@gao.gov . Other key contributors to this
    statement were Robert E. White, Assistant Director; Rachel Beers; Jason
    Berman; Katherine Davis; Jeanette Espinola; Taylor Matheson; and Sean
    Seales.

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    To determine the progress that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    has made in implementing the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) SBInet's
    technology deployment projects, we analyzed DHS documentation, including
    program schedules, project task orders, status reports, and expenditures.
    We also interviewed DHS and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
    headquarters and field officials, including representatives of the SBInet
    Program Management Office (PMO), Border Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, and
    the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, as well as SBInet contractors.
    We visited the Tucson Border Patrol sector--the site where SBInet
    technology deployment was underway at the time of our review.

    To determine the progress that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
    made in infrastructure project implementation, we analyzed DHS
    documentation, including schedules, contracts, status reports, and
    expenditures. In addition, we interviewed DHS and CBP headquarters and
    field officials, including representatives of the SBInet PMO, and Border
    Patrol. We also interviewed officials from the U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers and the Department of the Interior. We visited the Tucson and
    Yuma, Arizona Border Patrol sectors--two sites where tactical
    infrastructure projects were underway at the time of our review. We did
    not review the justification for infrastructure project cost estimates or
    independently verify the source or validity of the cost information.

    To determine the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of SBInet
    technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and operating
    procedures, we reviewed documentation of the agency's decision to hire an
    additional 6,000 agents and the progress hiring these agents. We also
    interviewed headquarters and field officials to track if and how CBP (1)
    is hiring and training its target number of personnel, (2) it is planning
    to train new agents on SBInet technology, and (3) it will incorporate the
    new system into its operational procedures, and any implementation
    challenges it reports facing in conducting this effort.

    To determine how the SBInet PMO defined its human capital goals and
    progress it has made in achieving these goals, we reviewed the office's
    documentation on its hiring efforts related to SBInet, related timelines,
    and compared this information with agency goals. We determined that the
    workforce data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report. We
    also interviewed SBI and SBInet officials to identify challenges in
    meeting the goals and steps taken by the agency to address those
    challenges.

    We performed our work from April 2007 through October 2007 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    (440584)

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    Highlights of [23]GAO-08-131T , a testimony before the subcommittee on
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    Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

    October 24, 2007

    SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE

    Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation

    In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established
    the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar
    program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is SBInet--the U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection (CBP) program responsible for developing a
    comprehensive border protection system through a mix of security
    infrastructure (e.g., fencing), and surveillance and communication
    technologies (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones).

    The House Committee on Homeland Security asked GAO to monitor DHS progress
    in implementing the SBInet program. This testimony provides GAO's
    observations on (1) SBInet technology implementation; (2) SBInet
    infrastructure implementation; (3) the extent to which CBP has determined
    the impact of SBInet technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs
    and operating procedures; and (4) how the CBP SBI  Program Management
    Office (PMO) has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has
    made to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on analysis of
    DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, status, and
    reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS officials and contractors,
    and visits to sites in the southwest border where SBInet deployment is
    underway. GAO performed the work from April 2007 through October 2007. DHS
    generally agreed with GAO's findings.

    DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28--the first segment of
    SBInet technology across the southwest border, but it has fallen behind
    its planned schedule.  The SBInet contractor delivered the components
    (i.e., radars, sensors and cameras) to the Project 28 site in Tucson,
    Arizona on schedule. However, Project 28 is incomplete more than 4 months
    after it was to become operational--at which point Border Patrol agents
    were to begin using SBInet technology to support their activities.
    According to DHS, the delays are primarily due to software integration
    problems. In September 2007, DHS officials said that the Project 28
    contractor was making progress in correcting the problems, but DHS was
    unable to specify a date when the system would be operational. Due to the
    slippage in completing Project 28, DHS is revising the SBInet
    implementation schedule for follow-on technology projects, but still plans
    to deploy technology along 387 miles of the southwest border by December
    31, 2008. DHS is also taking steps to strengthen its contract management
    for Project 28.

    SBInet infrastructure deployment along the southwest border is on
    schedule, but meeting CBP's goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and
    200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December 31, 2008, may be
    challenging and more costly than planned. CBP met its intermediate goal to
    deploy 70 miles of new fencing in fiscal year 2007 and the average cost
    per mile was $2.9 million. The SBInet PMO estimates that deployment costs
    for remaining fencing will be similar to those thus far. In the past, DHS
    has minimized infrastructure construction labor costs by using Border
    Patrol agents and Department of Defense military personnel. However, CBP
    officials report that they plan to use commercial labor for future fencing
    projects. The additional cost of commercial labor and potential unforeseen
    increases in contract costs suggest future deployment could be more costly
    than planned. DHS officials also reported other challenging factors they
    will continue to face for infrastructure deployment, including community
    resistance, environmental considerations, and difficulties in acquiring
    rights to land along the border.

    The impact of SBInet on CBP's workforce needs and operating procedures
    remains unclear because the SBInet technology is not fully identified or
    deployed. CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents required
    to meet mission needs to change from current projections, but until the
    system is fully deployed, the direction and magnitude of the change is
    unknown. For the Tucson sector, where Project 28 is being deployed, Border
    Patrol officials are developing a plan on how to integrate SBInet into
    their operating procedures.

    The SBI PMO tripled in size during fiscal year 2007, but fell short of its
    staffing goal of 270 employees. Agency officials expressed concerns that
    staffing shortfalls could affect the agency's capacity to provide adequate
    contractor oversight. In addition, the SBInet PMO has not yet completed
    long-term human capital planning.

    References

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