Defense Acquisitions: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing  
on Mine Countermeasures Capabilities (12-OCT-07, GAO-08-13).	 
                                                                 
The Navy initiated a move away from traditional minesweepers in  
favor of putting new kinds of anti-mine capabilities aboard ships
with a variety of missions--most recently, the Littoral Combat	 
Ship. In addition to a new ship, this approach includes several  
new systems and new operational concepts. GAO assessed the Navy's
progress in (1) developing new mine countermeasures systems,	 
including the Littoral Combat Ship, and (2) introducing these new
capabilities to the fleet. To accomplish this, GAO reviewed Navy 
and program documents and previous GAO work. GAO supplemented its
analysis with discussions with Navy and Department of Defense	 
officials and contractors.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-13						        
    ACCNO:   A77387						        
  TITLE:     Defense Acquisitions: Overcoming Challenges Key to       
Capitalizing on Mine Countermeasures Capabilities		 
     DATE:   10/12/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Explosives 					 
	     Explosives detection systems			 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Military research and development			 
	     Military vessels					 
	     Naval procurement					 
	     Operational testing				 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Ships						 
	     Systems conversions				 
	     Systems testing					 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     Littoral Combat Ship				 

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GAO-08-13

   

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Report to the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

October 2007: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on Mine Countermeasures 
Capabilities: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

GAO-08-13: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-13, a report to the Subcommittee on Seapower and 
Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Navy initiated a move away from traditional minesweepers in favor 
of putting new kinds of anti-mine capabilities aboard ships with a 
variety of missionsï¿½most recently, the Littoral Combat Ship. In 
addition to a new ship, this approach includes several new systems and 
new operational concepts. GAO assessed the Navyï¿½s progress in (1) 
developing new mine countermeasures systems, including the Littoral 
Combat Ship, and (2) introducing these new capabilities to the fleet. 
To accomplish this, GAO reviewed Navy and program documents and 
previous GAO work. GAO supplemented its analysis with discussions with 
Navy and Department of Defense officials and contractors. 

What GAO Found: 

The Navy has made progress developing individual mine countermeasures 
systems and the Littoral Combat Ship. The Navy expects 3 of the 19 
systems it is developing to be ready for fleet use by the end of 2007, 
and recent test results have been promising. However, significant 
challenges remain to fielding new capabilities. 

* Operational testing plans for four systems in limited production will 
not provide a complete understanding of how the systems will perform 
when operated from the Littoral Combat Ship. Other ships will be used 
in testing to inform full-rate production decisions on the individual 
systems. While other ships may serve as platforms for the anti-mine 
systems, the Littoral Combat Ship is their primary platform, and it 
will have different launch, recovery, and handling systems. In 
addition, Navy plans call for testing these systems in smooth, 
uncluttered environments, although operating environments are expected 
to be less favorable. 

* The first two Littoral Combat Ships have encountered design and 
production challenges. Costs are expected to more than double from 
initial estimates, and the Navy anticipates lead ship delivery nearly 
18 months later than first planned. This may slow the planned 
transition from current mine countermeasures platforms. 

* The Navy has reduced its investments in intelligence preparation of 
the environment capabilitiesï¿½including the capability to locate and map 
minefield boundariesï¿½even though improvements in this area could reduce 
mine countermeasures mission timelines by 30 to 75 percent. These 
capabilities are especially important for the Littoral Combat Ship, as 
it must stand clear of suspected minefields. 

The Navy has refined its concepts of operation for the Littoral Combat 
Ship, increasing awareness of operational needs. However, the Navy has 
not yet reconciled these concepts with the shipï¿½s physical constraints, 
and the trade-offs involved ultimately will determine the shipï¿½s 
capabilities. For example, operation of mine countermeasures systems is 
currently expected to exceed the personnel allowances of the ship, 
which could affect the shipï¿½s ability to execute this mission. In 
addition, the Littoral Combat Ship will have only limited capability to 
conduct corrective maintenance aboard. However, because the Navy 
recently reduced the numbers of certain mission systems from two to one 
per ship, operational availability for these systems may decrease below 
current projections. Moreover, the mine countermeasures mission package 
currently exceeds its weight limitation, which may require the Navy to 
accept a reduction in speed and endurance capabilities planned for the 
Littoral Combat Ship. It is important that the Navy assess these 
uncertainties and determine whether it can produce the needed mine 
countermeasures capabilities from the assets it is likely to have and 
the concepts of operation it can likely execute. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that the Department of Defense analyze intelligence 
preparation capabilities, determine if Littoral Combat Ship concepts of 
operation can be reconciled, examine the need for and feasibility of 
fielding mine countermeasures systems on other ships, and delay full-
rate production of certain systems. The Department of Defense concurred 
or partially concurred with the first three recommendations. It did not 
agree to delay full-rate production of systems, citing training needs 
and production efficiencies. GAO maintains that a delay is warranted as 
long as the Littoral Combat Ship remains the systemsï¿½ main platform. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-13]. For more information, contact Paul 
Francis at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Current Acquisition and Testing Challenges Could Affect the Navy's 
Ability to Transition to New Mine Countermeasures Systems: 

The Capabilities Envisioned by the Concepts of Operation Have Not Been 
Reconciled with the Capabilities of the Ship Design: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Review: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: Overview of Littoral Combat Ship Design and Production 
Challenges: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package 
Configurations (Quantities of Individual Mission Systems Identified in 
Parentheses): 

Table 2: Navy's Progress Developing and Fielding Systems Intended to 
Hunt, Neutralize, and Sweep Sea Mines: 

Table 3: Dates of Operational Test and Evaluation and Initial Littoral 
Combat Ship Testing for Mine Countermeasures Systems in Development: 

Table 4: Mine Countermeasure Systems That Will Perform the Intelligence 
Preparation of the Environment Mission: 

Table 5: Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe and Mine Countermeasures Mission 
Package Characteristics: 

Table 6: Reductions to System Quantities within the Baseline Littoral 
Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe Designs: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

October 12, 2007: 

The Honorable Gene Taylor: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Sea mines offer potential enemies a low-cost, simple-to-deploy, and 
sometimes highly effective weapon against U.S. Navy ships. These mines 
currently exist in more than 300 different forms and are possessed by 
over 50 countries. Since 1950, enemy sea mines have directly caused 
damage to or destruction of 15 Navy ships--more than all other weapons 
combined. After mines damaged two U.S. ships during Operation Desert 
Storm, the Navy renewed its focus on defeating enemy sea mines and 
began to develop several new mine countermeasures systems. It initiated 
a move away from traditional minesweepers--ships dedicated chiefly to 
mine countermeasures--in favor of putting anti-mine capabilities aboard 
other ships. Initial plans called for these systems to be deployed from 
aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, surface combatants, and 
submarines. 

More recently, the Navy has decided to employ the Littoral Combat Ship 
as its primary platform for conducting mine countermeasures. The 
Littoral Combat Ship is envisioned as a new kind of vessel that will be 
able to be reconfigured to meet three different missions including mine 
countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare. To 
execute its mine countermeasures mission, the Littoral Combat Ship will 
transport manned and unmanned systems to suspected minefields and 
deploy them while the ship remains clear of the minefield. The ship 
will rely upon "intelligence preparation of the environment"--an 
approach used to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, 
environment, and terrain--to designate minefield boundaries. The Navy 
currently plans to invest over $9 billion in Littoral Combat Ships. 

In recent years, the Navy's required annual update of its master plan 
outlining its progress developing new mine countermeasures capabilities 
has begun to reflect tightening fiscal constraints across mine 
countermeasures programs and increasing mission responsibilities for 
the Littoral Combat Ship. In light of these developments, you asked us 
to review the Navy's acquisition plans for mine countermeasures 
systems. In response to your request, we assessed the Navy's progress 
and identified remaining challenges in (1) developing new mine 
countermeasures systems, including the Littoral Combat Ship, and (2) 
introducing these new capabilities to the fleet. 

To assess the Navy's progress and identify remaining challenges to 
developing new mine countermeasures systems, we reviewed program 
documents, including acquisition strategies, requirements documents, 
test plans and reports, and cost and schedule performance reports. To 
supplement our analysis, we held discussions with a number of Navy 
offices, Department of Defense agencies, and contractor officials 
responsible for acquiring and testing the Littoral Combat Ship, its 
mine countermeasures mission package, and other mine countermeasures 
systems external to the Littoral Combat Ship. We also drew from our 
prior work on these systems. To assess progress and identify remaining 
challenges associated with introducing new mine countermeasures systems 
to the fleet, we analyzed concepts of operation for the Littoral Combat 
Ship and mine warfare campaign analyses. We corroborated this 
information through discussions with Navy operational forces and 
commands, the Navy's assessments directorate, and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. For more information on the methodology used in 
this report, see appendix I. We conducted our analysis from October 
2006 to August 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

The Navy has made progress developing individual mine countermeasures 
systems and the Littoral Combat Ship. The Navy has authorized 
production for 5 of the 19 systems it is developing, 3 of which it 
expects to be ready for fleet use by the end of 2007. Several of these 
new systems have shown promising performance in recent testing. 
However, significant challenges remain to fielding these new 
capabilities. 

* Operational testing for four systems in limited production--all 
planned to deploy from the Littoral Combat Ship--will not provide a 
complete understanding of how the systems will perform when they are 
operated from the ship. Ships other than the Littoral Combat Ship will 
be used in this testing and will serve as the basis for making full- 
rate production decisions on the individual systems. While other ships 
may be capable of serving as platforms for the mine countermeasures 
systems, the Littoral Combat Ship is their primary platform, and it 
will have different launch and recovery systems from the other ships. 
In addition, Navy plans call for testing of these systems in smooth, 
uncluttered sea environments, which represent favorable conditions for 
conducting mine countermeasures, while the Navy expects undersea 
operating environments to be more rocky and cluttered. 

* The first two Littoral Combat Ship seaframes have encountered design 
and production challenges, resulting in significant cost growth. The 
Navy expects the ships to exceed their initial budgets by over 100 
percent and anticipates lead ship delivery will occur nearly 18 months 
later than initially planned. These issues may slow the Navy's planned 
transition from current mine countermeasures platforms to the Littoral 
Combat Ship. 

* The Navy has reduced its investments in intelligence preparation 
capabilities--including the capability to locate and map minefield 
boundaries--even though improvements in this area could reduce mine 
countermeasures mission timelines by 30 to 75 percent. These 
capabilities are especially important for the Littoral Combat Ship, as 
it must stand clear of suspected minefields. 

The Navy has refined its concepts of operation for the Littoral Combat 
Ship. This has produced a better understanding of operational needs. At 
the same time, the physical constraints of the ship have become better 
understood, and they may limit the Navy's ability to implement the 
operational concepts, resulting in less capability than currently 
expected. For example, the ship's ability to complete operations within 
desired operational timelines remains unclear. The physical 
characteristics of the seaframe have yet to be fully reconciled with 
manning and sustainment concepts. Operation of mine countermeasures 
systems is currently expected to exceed the personnel allowances of the 
Littoral Combat Ship seaframe. In addition, many of the systems within 
this mission package were designed for fielding from larger platforms 
with more robust onboard maintenance facilities than those offered by 
the Littoral Combat Ship. The Littoral Combat Ship will have a limited 
capability to conduct corrective maintenance aboard. Furthermore, the 
Navy has recently reduced some mission system quantities from two to 
one per ship. These quantity reductions may decrease operational 
availability for these systems below current projections. Moreover, the 
mine countermeasures mission package currently exceeds its weight 
limitation, a fact that may require the Navy to accept a reduction in 
speed and endurance capabilities planned for the Littoral Combat Ship. 
Alternatively, the Navy could alter its concepts of operation. 
Acknowledging these challenges, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
recently directed the Navy to revisit its planned number of mission 
packages and associated system spares. 

We are making several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed 
at improving the department's transition to the Littoral Combat Ship, 
including the following: (1) analyzing whether capabilities resulting 
from current intelligence preparation investments will enable the 
Littoral Combat Ship to meet required mission timelines, (2) 
determining the extent to which concepts of operation and the likely 
performance of the Littoral Combat Ship and other assets can be 
reconciled to provide the needed mine countermeasures capability, (3) 
evaluating the need for and feasibility of fielding mine 
countermeasures systems on other platforms in addition to the Littoral 
Combat Ship, and (4) delaying approval of full-rate production for 
systems within the mine countermeasures mission package until 
operational testing is successfully completed from their primary 
platform, presently identified as the Littoral Combat Ship. The 
Department of Defense agreed or partially agreed with most of our 
recommendations, but did not agree with our recommendation aimed at 
ensuring an accurate understanding of operational suitability for new 
mine countermeasures systems. The department stated that delaying full- 
rate production for these systems would result in gaps in industrial 
production, cost increases, and delays in delivering mine warfare 
capability to operational forces. However, we do not believe full-rate 
production of new mine countermeasures systems is warranted until the 
Department of Defense has ensured they are compatible with the unique 
operating environment posed by their primary platform, the Littoral 
Combat Ship. 

Background: 

Mine countermeasures involves detecting, classifying, localizing, 
identifying, and neutralizing enemy sea mines in areas ranging from 
deep water through beach zones against the full spectrum of bottom, 
moored, floating, buried, stealthy, contact, and influence mines. The 
Navy's mine countermeasures strategy focuses on closing identified 
capability gaps, measurably reducing timelines for deployment and the 
detect-to-engage sequence for mine countermeasures systems, and 
removing the sailor from the minefield. To achieve these goals, the 
Navy is transitioning from current dedicated mine countermeasures 
ships, helicopters, and manned undersea assets to the Littoral Combat 
Ship as its primary mine countermeasures platform of the future. 

Mine countermeasures missions can require mine hunting, mine 
neutralization, and minesweeping. Mine hunting involves towing sonar 
devices that detect and classify objects in the ocean and on the ocean 
bottom. The Navy marks the coordinates of any objects classified as 
minelike for later destruction. Mine neutralization requires placing an 
explosive charge near the mine target in order to destroy the mine in 
place. This task is currently performed by Navy explosive ordnance 
disposal divers, marine mammals, or mechanical systems. Minesweeping 
includes towing devices that either (1) mechanically cut the lines 
holding mines in place or (2) simulate the magnetic or acoustic 
signatures of a passing ship, resulting in mine detonation. Mines that 
have been mechanically swept are typically destroyed by divers after 
severing. 

For more than a decade, the Navy has pursued a transformation in the 
way it conducts mine countermeasures operations. Until now, the Navy 
has relied on 14 MCM 1 Avenger-class ships and 12 MHC 51 Osprey-class 
vessels to conduct surface mine countermeasures operations. These ships 
are slow-moving, requiring transport to theater by another ship, but 
designed with features such as fiberglass-sheathed wooden hulls that 
enable them to operate within minefields.[Footnote 1] While the Navy 
has retired all but four of its Osprey-class ships, it plans to 
maintain its full complement of Avenger-class ships until 2017 to 
enable the Littoral Combat Ship and its mine countermeasures systems to 
be fielded in sufficient quantities. To support these plans, the Navy 
is currently upgrading Avenger-class combat systems and mechanical 
equipment to improve the mission effectiveness of these ships. 

The Navy also relies upon the MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter to perform 
airborne mine countermeasures missions. The MH-53E is a large aircraft 
that operates from shore bases or ships of opportunity--often 
amphibious ships with flight decks. The Navy's 31 MH-53E helicopter 
airframes are rapidly approaching the end of their planned service 
lives. To sustain this capability, the Navy has, to date, funded a 
fatigue life extension program for 20 MH-53E aircraft, which will 
enable these airframes to be structurally reinforced. The Navy plans to 
retire its MH-53E helicopters from service beginning in 2015. 

The Littoral Combat Ship represents the Navy's mine countermeasures 
platform of the future. It is fast-moving and designed to transport 
manned and unmanned mine countermeasures systems to the vicinity of the 
minefield and deploy them while remaining clear of the minefield. Its 
design concept consists of two distinct parts--the ship itself and the 
mission package it carries and deploys. For the Littoral Combat Ship, 
the ship is referred to as the seaframe and consists of the hull; 
command and control systems; automated launch, recovery, and handling 
systems; and certain core systems like the radar and 57-millimeter gun. 
The Navy is designing the seaframe to meet speed, endurance, weight, 
manning, and cost parameters. The Littoral Combat Ship's mine 
countermeasures capability will be embedded within its mission package. 
The Navy is also developing and procuring systems to support anti- 
submarine warfare and surface warfare mission packages. The Navy's 
acquisition approach is to populate initial versions of these mission 
packages with a mixture of developmental and production-representative 
systems, gradually moving to all production-representative systems that 
constitute the baseline configuration for each package. Table 1 shows 
how the Navy is employing this approach for its first four mine 
countermeasures mission packages. 

Table 1: Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package 
Configurations (Quantities of Individual Mission Systems Identified in 
Parentheses): 

Planned delivery date: Production-representative mission systems 
included; 
Mission package 1: Fiscal year 2007: 
* AN/AQS-20A Sonar (2); 
* Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (1); 
Mission package 2: Fiscal year 2009: 
* AN/AQS-20A Sonar (3); 
* Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (2); 
* Airborne Mine Neutralization System (2); 
* Remote Multi- Mission Vehicle (2); 
Mission package 3: Fiscal year 2010: 
* AN/AQS-20A Sonar (3); 
* Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (1); 
* Airborne Mine Neutralization System (1); 
* Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (2); 
* Organic Airborne Surface Influence Sweep System (1); 
* Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis System (1); 
Mission package 4 (baseline configuration): Fiscal year 2011: 
* AN/AQS-20A Sonar (3); 
* Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (1); 
* Airborne Mine Neutralization System (1); 
* Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (2); 
* Organic Airborne Surface Influence Sweep System (1); 
* Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis System (2); 
* Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (1); 
* Unmanned Surface Vehicle (1); 
* Unmanned Surface Sweep System (1). 

Planned delivery date: Engineering development models included; 
Mission package 1: Fiscal year 2007: 
* Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (2); 
* Airborne Mine Neutralization System (1); 
* Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (1); 
* Unmanned Surface Vehicle (1); 
* Unmanned Surface Sweep System (1); 
Mission package 2: Fiscal year 2009: 
* Unmanned Surface Vehicle (1); 
* Unmanned Surface Sweep System (1); 
Mission package 3: Fiscal year 2010: 
* Unmanned Surface Vehicle (1); 
* Unmanned Surface Sweep System (1); 
Mission package 4 (baseline configuration): Fiscal year 2011: [Empty]. 

Planned delivery date: Estimated unit cost; 
Mission package 1: Fiscal year 2007: $37.7 million; 
Mission package 2: Fiscal year 2009: $66.0 million; 
Mission package 3: Fiscal year 2010: $65.3 million; 
Mission package 4 (baseline configuration): Fiscal year 2011: $76.2 
million. 

Source: Navy. 

Note: Mission package cost figures are in fiscal-year 2005 dollars and 
do not include procurement costs for the Littoral Combat Ship mission 
package computing environment, mission package backfit costs, stowage 
containers, MH-60S helicopter, or Vertical Take-off and Landing 
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. 

[End of table] 

The mine countermeasures mission package capability is made up of 
airborne mine countermeasures systems employing the MH-60S helicopter, 
unmanned underwater vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned 
surface vehicles. To operate these mission package systems, the Navy 
will deploy additional crew members with the Littoral Combat Ship and 
plans to assign each mine countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat 
Ship an MH-60S helicopter sourced from an expeditionary squadron. The 
full suite of Littoral Combat Ship countermine systems will be used to 
hunt, neutralize, and sweep mines as the operational need dictates. 

In addition to the mine countermeasures capability resident on the 
Littoral Combat Ship, the Navy is developing unmanned underwater 
vehicles launched from submarines. These vehicles will provide 
clandestine minefield mapping capability, enabling advance intelligence 
preparation of the environment, and detection of changes within the 
ocean environment. Intelligence gathering of suspected waters is a 
necessary precursor to deploying the Littoral Combat Ship, as the ship 
itself must stay clear of the mined area. Intelligence preparation of 
the environment is necessary to determining appropriate tactics, 
planning mine countermeasures missions, managing and evaluating the 
performance of sensors and systems, and assessing battle damage. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics is statutorily required to be primarily responsible for 
developing and testing naval mine countermeasures.[Footnote 2] The 
Secretary of Defense may waive this requirement if he certifies certain 
matters to the congressional defense committees to include that the 
Secretary of the Navy submitted a master plan outlining its progress 
toward developing new mine countermeasures capabilities and the budget 
provides sufficient resources for executing the updated mine 
countermeasures master plan.[Footnote 3] 

Current Acquisition and Testing Challenges Could Affect the Navy's 
Ability to Transition to New Mine Countermeasures Systems: 

The Navy has made progress in developing new mine countermeasures 
systems and platforms, including the Littoral Combat Ship, but 
significant challenges remain to fielding these capabilities. Current 
test plans for systems that will be operated from the Littoral Combat 
Ship do not require testing from this platform prior to entering full- 
rate production. In addition, planned test environments for these 
systems may not be realistic as compared to current threat 
environments. As a result, the Navy may develop an incomplete 
understanding of the operational suitability and effectiveness of mine 
countermeasures systems it plans to field on the Littoral Combat Ship. 
Also, unanticipated design and production challenges with the first two 
Littoral Combat Ships have increased program costs and required the 
Navy to delay purchase of additional seaframes. This may slow the 
Navy's planned transition from current mine countermeasures platforms 
to the Littoral Combat Ship. Finally, limited planned investment for 
new intelligence preparation of the environment capabilities, including 
capability to locate and map minefield boundaries, increases risk to 
the safety of the Littoral Combat Ships operating inside minefields and 
extends the amount of time required to complete mine countermeasures 
missions. 

The Navy Has Made Progress Developing New Mine Countermeasures Systems: 

The Navy is in the process of developing 16 new systems to provide 
future mine hunting, mine neutralization, and minesweeping capability 
to the joint forces. To date, the Navy has authorized production for 
five new systems, three of which are expected to enter the fleet by the 
end of 2007. Beyond these, six systems are in varying stages of system 
development, while the Navy continues science and technology efforts 
for another five systems. Table 2 outlines the Navy's progress 
developing and fielding these capabilities. 

Table 2: Navy's Progress Developing and Fielding Systems Intended to 
Hunt, Neutralize, and Sweep Sea Mines: 

Mission: Mine hunting; 
System: Coastal battlefield reconnaissance and analysis system; 
Description: Provides intelligence preparation of the battlefield 
information, which accurately depicts tactical objectives, minefields, 
and obstacles in the surf zone, on the beach, and through the beach 
exit during amphibious and expeditionary operations; 
future increments planned will provide active (day/night), surf zone, 
buried minefield detection, and real-time processing capabilities; 
Host platform: MQ-8B Fire Scout vertical takeoff and landing tactical 
unmanned aerial vehicle on the Littoral Combat Ship; 
Development status: Low-rate initial production; 
Planned fielding date: 2007. 

Mission: Mine hunting; 
System: AN/AQS-20A sonar; 
Description: Provides for identification of bottom mines in shallow 
water and detection, localization, and classification of bottom, close-
tethered, and volume mines in deep water; 
Host platform: MH-60S helicopter and/or the Remote Multi-Mission 
Vehicle on the Littoral Combat Ship; 
Development status: Low-rate initial production; 
Planned fielding date: 2007. 

Mission: Mine hunting; 
System: Remote minehunting system; 
Description: Underwater vehicle towing the AN/AQS-20A sonar to detect, 
classify, locate, and identify minelike objects; 
Host platform: Littoral Combat Ship primarily, but six Arleigh Burke-
class destroyers (DDG 91-96) are also capable; 
Development status: Low-rate initial production; 
Planned fielding date: 2008. 

Mission: Mine hunting; 
System: SQQ-32 with high-frequency wideband; 
Description: Detects, classifies, and localizes bottom, close-tethered, 
and volume mines in deep water using high-frequency broadband sonar; 
Host platform: MCM 1 Avenger class ships; 
Development status: System development; 
Planned fielding date: 2009. 

Mission: Mine hunting; 
System: Airborne laser mine detection system; 
Description: Detects, classifies, and localizes floating and near-
surface moored mines in deep water; 
Host platform: MH-60S helicopter on the Littoral Combat Ship; 
Development status: Low-rate initial production; 
Planned fielding date: 2011. 

Mission: Mine hunting; 
System: Surface mine countermeasures unmanned undersea vehicle with low-
frequency broadband; 
Description: Detects bottom and buried mines in shallow water using low-
frequency broadband sonar; 
Host platform: MCM 1 Avenger class ships and Littoral Combat Ship; 
Development status: Science and technology; 
Planned fielding date: 2011. 

Mission: Mine hunting; 
System: Search-classify-map unmanned undersea vehicle; 
Description: Performs mine reconnaissance and maps near-shore areas of 
the littorals for mines and minefields; 
Host platform: Small boats; 
Development status: Science and technology; 
Planned fielding date: TBD. 

Mission: Mine hunting; 
System: Inspect/identify unmanned undersea vehicle; 
Description: Provides detection of capability of floating, near-
surface, and volume mines in very shallow water environments; 
Host platform: To be determined; 
Development status: Science and technology; 
Planned fielding date: TBD. 

Mission: Mine hunting; 
System: Joint direct attack munitions assault breaching system; 
Description: Neutralizes surface-laid mines and obstacles in the beach 
and surf zones; 
Host platform: Air Force bombers or naval tactical aircraft; 
Development status: Production; 
Planned fielding date: 2007. 

Mission: Mine neutralization; 
System: Expendable mine neutralization system; 
Description: Neutralizes volume, close-tethered, and bottom mines in 
shallow water; 
Host platform: MCM 1 Avenger class ships; 
Development status: System development; 
Planned fielding date: 2008. 

Mission: Mine neutralization; 
System: Airborne mine neutralization system; 
Description: Positively identifies and explosively neutralizes unburied 
bottom and moored sea mines in shallow water that are impractical or 
unsafe to counter using existing minesweeping systems; 
Host platform: MH-60S helicopter on the Littoral Combat Ship; 
Development status: System development; 
Planned fielding date: 2009. 

Mission: [Empty]; 
System: Rapid airborne mine clearance system; 
Description: Mounted 30-millimeter gun firing supercavitating 
projectiles to neutralize near-surface and floating moored mines; 
Host platform: MH-60S helicopter on the Littoral Combat Ship; 
Development status: System development; 
Planned fielding date: 2010. 

Mission: [Empty]; 
System: Countermine system; 
Description: Neutralizes buried and surface-laid surface mines in the 
beach and surf zones; 
Host platform: Air Force bombers or naval tactical aircraft; 
Development status: System development; 
Planned fielding date: 2016. 

Mission: [Empty]; 
System: Autonomous unmanned undersea vehicle; 
Description: Provides neutralization of floating and near-surface mines 
in very shallow water environments; 
Host platform: To be determined; 
Development status: Science and technology; 
Planned fielding date: TBD. 

Mission: [Empty]; 
System: Organic airborne and surface influence sweep system; 
Description: Provides organic, high-speed magnetic/acoustic influence 
minesweeping capability where mine hunting is not feasible (adverse 
environmental conditions); 
Host platform: MH-60S helicopter on the Littoral Combat Ship; 
Development status: System development; 
Planned fielding date: 2010. 

Mission: Mine sweeping; 
System: Unmanned surface vehicle sweep system; 
Description: Micro-turbine-powered magnetic towed cable and acoustical 
signal generator towed from a rigid hull inflatable boat; 
Host platform: Littoral Combat Ship; 
Development status: Science and technology; 
Planned fielding date: 2010. 

Source: Navy. 

[End of table] 

Recent Navy testing of several of these new mine countermeasures 
systems has produced encouraging results. The Navy has completed over 
1,000 hours of offshore vehicle operations using the Remote Minehunting 
System--demonstrating performance in several key performance 
parameters--and has installed this system on the USS Bainbridge for 
operational test and evaluation. The Navy has also completed initial 
integration for four of the five new airborne systems it plans to 
deploy using the MH-60S helicopter. Sensor performance during testing 
for these airborne systems has met or exceeded Navy expectations-- 
particularly for the AN/AQS-20A sonar, Airborne Laser Mine Detection 
System, and Airborne Mine Neutralization System, which have 
demonstrated significant progress toward achieving their key 
performance parameters. 

Testing Limitations Could Preclude a Full Understanding of System 
Suitability and Effectiveness: 

Several of the mine countermeasures systems have begun or are planned 
to shortly begin operational testing. These tests aim at assessing 
operational suitability and operational effectiveness. Operational 
suitability is concerned with placing and sustaining the system when 
fielded and is concerned with, for example, how long a system can 
operate before failing and how quickly a system can be repaired. 
Operational effectiveness measures the overall ability of a system to 
accomplish a mission; in the case of a mine countermeasures system, 
effectiveness measures may be concerned with the frequency of 
accurately detecting the presence of a mine or the speed at which a 
system can cover a particular area. 

Of the 16 mine hunting, neutralization, or sweeping systems in 
development, the Navy plans to field at least 9 on the Littoral Combat 
Ship as part of its mine countermeasures mission package. The Navy 
approved many of these nine systems to enter system development on the 
basis of earlier plans to field them on aircraft carriers, amphibious 
ships, and guided missile destroyers. As a result, the Navy's 
acquisition and testing plans for these systems do not require 
operational test and evaluation onboard the Littoral Combat Ship prior 
to entering full-rate production. Table 3 outlines these plans. 

Table 3: Dates of Operational Test and Evaluation and Initial Littoral 
Combat Ship Testing for Mine Countermeasures Systems in Development: 

System: AN/AQS-20A sonar; 
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2007; 
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal 
year 2009. 

System: Remote minehunting system; 
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2008; 
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal 
year 2009. 

System: Airborne laser mine detection system; 
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2008; 
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal 
year 2009. 

System: Airborne mine neutralization system; 
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2008; 
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal 
year 2009. 

System: Coastal battlefield reconnaissance and analysis system; 
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2008[B]; 
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal 
year 2009. 

System: Organic airborne and surface influence sweep system; 
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2009; 
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal 
year 2009. 

System: Rapid airborne mine clearance system; 
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2010; 
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal 
year 2009. 

System: Surface mine countermeasures unmanned undersea vehicle with low-
frequency broadband; 
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2010; 
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal 
year 2009. 

System: Unmanned surface sweep system; 
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: To be determined; 
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: To be 
determined. 

Source: Navy. 

[A] This testing will demonstrate systems interface and usage aboard 
ship as part of the planned Littoral Combat Ship operational 
assessment. 

[B] Represents date of operational assessment for first increment. 

[End of table] 

The Navy plans to make full-rate production decisions for many of these 
systems using performance data collected during operational testing 
aboard existing ships. For example, the Navy intends to operationally 
test and evaluate the Remote Minehunting System using an Arleigh Burke- 
class guided missile destroyer. Similarly, the Navy plans to test 
airborne mine countermeasures systems using their intended aircraft-- 
the MH-60S helicopter--but will service and base these tests from 
existing fleet assets or shore. 

While existing ships may serve as platforms for these systems, the 
Littoral Combat Ship is the primary platform. The other ships cannot 
replicate the unique conditions that will be found onboard the Littoral 
Combat Ship, a fact that could place the Navy at risk for 
overestimating the operational suitability of its new mine 
countermeasures systems. For instance, the Navy plans to move, load, 
and deploy all Littoral Combat Ship mine countermeasures systems using 
an automated launch, recovery, and handling system. This system is 
newly designed and is necessary to achieve reduced manning onboard each 
Littoral Combat Ship. Because the launch, recovery, and handling system 
is fully integrated with each seaframe, the Navy will not be able to 
test this system with mine countermeasures systems until a Littoral 
Combat Ship is delivered to the fleet in 2009. As a result, the Navy 
may not have a complete understanding of the suitability of these 
systems to operate from the Littoral Combat Ship. 

Also, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Director, Operational 
Test and Evaluation, noted in a fiscal year 2006 report that the 
delivery schedule for the first Littoral Combat Ship omits significant 
events normally associated with lead ships, including analysis of 
performance characteristics. The report also noted that the delivery 
schedule does not allow for an adequate initial operational test and 
evaluation of the ship to make informed decisions. Because the Navy has 
not proposed a test and evaluation strategy that allows acquisition 
decisions to be informed by timely reporting of adequate operational 
test results, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, has not 
yet approved the Navy's test and evaluation master plan for the 
Littoral Combat Ship. 

Further, the Navy is testing the performance of new mine 
countermeasures systems in an A-1 environment, which is the least 
stressing environments for these systems to detect, identify, 
neutralize, and/or sweep for mines.[Footnote 4] While this testing 
approach is consistent with achieving threshold performance levels, as 
outlined in each system's key performance parameters, the Littoral 
Combat Ship is expected to perform its mine countermeasures mission in 
more rocky and cluttered underwater environments that contain rugged 
terrain and many different objects that could be mistaken for mines. 
The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, has reported that the 
testing of subsurface systems associated with the Littoral Combat Ship 
needs to be conducted in operationally realistic littoral environments. 
Testing in unrealistic environments increases risk that systems may not 
perform effectively when operated from the Littoral Combat Ship. 

In addition, the AN/AQS-20A sonar, Airborne Laser Mine Detection 
System, Airborne Mine Neutralization System, Organic Airborne and 
Surface Influence Sweep System, and Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance 
System will perform their missions from an MH-60S Block 2A or 2B 
helicopter the Navy intends to assign to each Littoral Combat 
Ship.[Footnote 5] The Navy plans to acquire 69 Block 2A aircraft and 
148 Block 2B capable aircraft, which will support a variety of 
missions, including mine countermeasures. In addition, the Navy has 
identified funding to retrofit 42 Block 2A aircraft to the Block 2B 
configuration, minus the capability to employ the Rapid Airborne Mine 
Clearance System. However, due to strong demand for the MH-60S across 
the fleet, as well as the Block 2B version only recently entering 
production, the Navy has had difficulty allocating operationally 
representative helicopters to complete developmental testing of mine 
countermeasures systems. As a result, the Navy has used surrogate 
platforms including the MH-53E helicopter to complete developmental 
tests for many of these systems. However, the Navy may not be able to 
replicate the level of performance demonstrated in these tests when the 
systems are operated from the MH-60S. Furthermore, because previous 
technical challenges have delayed the fielding of new mine 
countermeasures systems, several systems will be competing for MH-60S 
flight testing at the same time, potentially requiring the Navy to 
further modify its test plans for these systems, a possibility that 
could affect their planned fielding dates within the fleet. 

Continuing technical challenges with the MH-60S carriage, stream, tow, 
and recovery system could further affect Navy test plans for mine 
countermeasures systems. The carriage, stream, tow, and recovery system 
includes a winch, tow cable, and an external carriage/docking mechanism 
and is used by the MH-60S to lower the AN/AQS-20A sonar, the Airborne 
Mine Neutralization System, and the Organic Airborne and Surface 
Influence Sweep System into the water, and then later to recover the 
systems. According to Navy officials, the system's tow cable has not 
worked properly in recent testing with the Organic Airborne and Surface 
Influence Sweep System. If this cable continues to malfunction in 

testing, the Navy may have to redesign the tow cable and/or the 
carriage, stream, tow, and recovery system, possibly further delaying 
operational testing of mine countermeasures systems from MH-60S 
aircraft. 

Slower Delivery of Littoral Combat Ships May Affect the Navy's Planned 
Transition from Legacy Mine Countermeasures Platforms: 

Littoral Combat Ship seaframe construction has progressed on both lead 
ship designs, although both seaframes have substantial design changes, 
schedule delays, and cost growth. The Navy expects the first two 
Littoral Combat Ships to exceed their combined budget of $472 million 
by over 100 percent and anticipates lead ship delivery will occur 
nearly 18 months later than initially planned. An expanded discussion 
of Littoral Combat Ship design and production challenges can be found 
in appendix III. As a result of these challenges, the Navy canceled 
construction of the third Littoral Combat Ship after failing to reach 
agreement with the prime contractor to modify the existing cost basis 
contract to a fixed price contract. Also, Littoral Combat Ship cost 
growth has required the Navy to defer construction of additional 
seaframes. The Navy plans to use funds previously appropriated for 
construction of the fifth and sixth Littoral Combat Ships to instead 
pay for cost growth on the remaining three ships under contract. 
Finally, the Navy is modifying its acquisition strategy for the 
Littoral Combat Ship and now plans to conduct an evaluation in 2009 
prior to selecting a single design for the acquisition of the next 
increment of Littoral Combat Ships, called Flight 1. 

These acquisition challenges create a disconnect between the 
availability of mine countermeasures systems--several of which are 
scheduled to field in 2007--and the availability of Littoral Combat 
Ships to deploy them. Delays could also affect the Navy's plan to 
transfer mission responsibilities from current airborne and surface 
mine countermeasures assets to Littoral Combat Ships beginning in 2015 
if sufficient numbers of Littoral Combat Ships are not fielded by that 
time. According to some Navy officials, this risk could be mitigated by 
deploying new mine countermeasures systems from other surface ships, 
including destroyers, amphibious ships, and aircraft carriers. These 
officials report that this action may require the Navy to upgrade 
certain engineering or computing systems on these vessels, but note 
that the Navy has already borne such costs on six Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyers modified to accommodate the Remote Minehunting System. 
Despite these capability improvements, the Navy has significantly 
scaled back plans to field the Remote Minehunting System from the 
destroyers. 

Limited Planned Investment for New Intelligence Preparation 
Capabilities Could Affect Mission Timelines: 

While the Navy has made significant investment in new mine 
countermeasures systems and the Littoral Combat Ship, planned 
investments for intelligence preparation of the environment 
capabilities have been reduced. The Littoral Combat Ship relies on 
intelligence preparation capabilities to a greater degree than existing 
dedicated mine countermeasures ships. As these capabilities degrade, 
the distance at which the Littoral Combat Ship must stand off from a 
suspected minefield can be expected to increase. This situation could 
impact the Littoral Combat Ship's ability to achieve desired mission 
timelines. The Navy estimates that intelligence preparation of the 
environment could reduce mine countermeasures mission timelines by 30 
to 75 percent. 

The Littoral Combat Ship is not designed to operate in a minefield. 
Instead, the Navy intends the ship to stand off from the minefield and 
deploy its sensors forward. As a result, the Littoral Combat Ship is 
designed to perform to Level 1 survivability requirements. Level 1 
includes minimal survivability features and is the standard for 
existing mine countermeasures ships in the fleet. However, these ships 
are designed with unique features--including hulls that minimize 
magnetic signatures--that enable them to operate in minefields. 
Typically, surface combatants like the Littoral Combat Ship are 
designed to Level 3 survivability. As a result, the Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation, has previously recommended that the 
Navy assess the risks to be sure Level 1 survivability is sufficient 
for the Littoral Combat Ship. Since then, the Navy has maintained its 
intent for the Littoral Combat Ship to have Level 1 survivability. 
Accordingly, the Littoral Combat Ship will require intelligence 
preparation of the environment to conduct its mine countermeasures 
mission while remaining outside of the minefield. Intelligence 
preparation of the environment will serve to map the boundaries of the 
minefield and subsequently reduce risk to the warfighters who will be 
operating the mine countermeasures systems from the Littoral Combat 
Ship. However, as table 4 shows, according to current development and 
fielding plans for intelligence preparation of the environment systems, 
the Navy will not have the assets in place to perform these functions 
when Littoral Combat Ships enter the fleet. 

Table 4: Mine Countermeasure Systems That Will Perform the Intelligence 
Preparation of the Environment Mission: 

System: Battlespace preparation autonomous undersea vehicle; 
Description: Uses side scan sonar and environmental sensors to support 
mine reconnaissance and intelligence preparation of the environment; 
Host platform: Littoral Combat Ship; 
Development status: System development; 
Planned fielding date: 2007 (engineering development model only will be 
fielded; 
there is no program funding for procurement). 

System: Mission reconfigurable unmanned undersea vehicle system; 
Description: Conducts autonomous, clandestine intelligence preparation 
of the environment in support of mine countermeasures missions; 
Host platform: Nuclear submarines; 
Development status: Technology development; 
Planned fielding date: 2016. 

System: Littoral remote sensing; 
Description: Conducts wide-area surveillance of the near-shore 
environment using remote surveillance and reconnaissance assets; 
Host platform: Various platforms; 
Development status: Science and technology; 
Planned fielding date: To be determined. 

Source: Navy. 

[End of table] 

Currently, intelligence preparation of the environment capability is 
provided to a limited degree through the mine countermeasures and 
environmental decision aids library, which is a software-based 
collection of meteorological and oceanographic condition data gathered 
by survey ships. However, the Navy has reduced funding for additional 
systems intended to perform the battlespace preparation mission 
necessary for the Littoral Combat Ship. For example, the Navy reduced 
its planned funding for the Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea 
Vehicle System by $200 million across the future years defense program 
in its fiscal year 2008 budget request, resulting in a delay to initial 
operational capability of this system from 2013 to 2016. This decision 
follows a series of program delays, starting with the predecessor Long- 
term Mine Reconnaissance System program. After completing approximately 
95 percent of the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System's design, the 
Navy canceled acquisition plans for 12 operational systems due to cost 
growth and remaining technical challenges facing the program. Also, the 
Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Undersea Vehicle, which the Navy 
previously planned to include in the baseline configuration of the 
Littoral Combat Ship mine countermeasures mission package, will now 
only be in the form of an engineering development model, not a fully 
developed system. In addition, while development of the Surface Mine 
Countermeasures Unmanned Undersea Vehicle with Low Frequency Broadband 
capabilities offers potential benefits for intelligence preparation of 
the environment, the technology is still early in development within 
the Office of Naval Research and will not be available when the 
Littoral Combat Ship enters the fleet and begins conducting mine 
countermeasures missions. 

Intelligence preparation of the environment is also necessary for 
commanders to determine the right tactics, conduct mission planning, 
conduct asset and sensor management, monitor sensor and system 
performance, conduct battle damage assessments, and determine remaining 
risk to follow-on forces. Intelligence preparation of the environment 
also provides the necessary means to perform the change detection 
mission, which determines if objects in the water are existing objects 
that were previously identified or new objects that must be further 
investigated to determine if they are mines. This activity can reduce 
mine countermeasures mission timelines up to an hour for each object 
that does not have to be further investigated to determine if it is 
actually a mine. 

The Capabilities Envisioned by the Concepts of Operation Have Not Been 
Reconciled with the Capabilities of the Ship Design: 

The Navy has refined its concepts of operation for Littoral Combat Ship 
warfighting, manning, training, and sustainment. These concepts have 
evolved concurrently with the design of the ship's seaframe and the 
development of individual mission systems. As table 5 shows, however, 
the Navy has not yet fully reconciled Littoral Combat Ship operational 
concepts with design characteristics of the ship. 

Table 5: Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe and Mine Countermeasures Mission 
Package Characteristics: 

Mission package personnel; 
Littoral Combat Ship seaframe characteristics: 15 allocated; 
Mine countermeasures mission package needs: 19 needed to conduct mine 
countermeasures missions; 
Mitigation options and limitations: 
* Plans for 4 shore-based personnel to support post-mission analysis 
may be unrealistic. 

Aviation detachment personnel; 
Littoral Combat Ship seaframe characteristics: 20 allocated; 
Mine countermeasures mission package needs: 23 needed to operate and 
sustain MH-60S helicopter and Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle; 
Mitigation options and limitations: 
* 3 personnel may perform post-mission analysis; 
* Additional berthing and other impacts on accommodations are under 
review. 

Sustainment; 
Littoral Combat Ship seaframe characteristics: Minimal maintenance and 
sparing aboard; 
Mine countermeasures mission package needs: Some onboard sparing to 
maintain operational availability of mission systems; 
Mitigation options and limitations: 
* Intent to maintain and supply spares from shore-based interim support 
and Mission Package Support Facility. 

Weight; 
Littoral Combat Ship seaframe characteristics: 180 metric tons 
allocated for mission package; 
Mine countermeasures mission package needs: Baseline mission package 
(MP4) exceeds weight allowance by about 10 percent; 
Mitigation options and limitations: 
* Mitigation plans have not been identified for baseline package; 
* Mission packages 1 and 2 do not include all systems planned for 
baseline package; 
Navy plans to backfit earlier packages to include all baseline systems. 

Source: Navy. 

[End of table] 

In particular, the Littoral Combat Ship is designed to accommodate 
fewer personnel, mission systems, and spares than envisioned to execute 
its mine countermeasures mission. As a result, even though the Littoral 
Combat Ship is designed to transit to and within theater quickly, a 
fact that should reduce mission timelines, the Navy expects it to 
require an extended period of time once it arrives on station to 
complete the detect-to-engage sequence relative to dedicated surface 
mine countermeasures assets. 

The Navy now has better knowledge regarding how it will introduce mine 
countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat Ships to the fleet. To date, 
the Navy has approved two concepts of operation: a warfighting concept 
of operations covering the conduct of missions from the Littoral Combat 
Ship and a wholeness concept of operations covering manning, training, 
and sustainment for the Littoral Combat Ship. In addition, the Navy has 
begun drafting a concept of operations for mission package support. The 
Navy continues to refine these documents to reflect evolving program 
plans and incorporate new perspectives from within the fleet. 

Number of Mission Personnel Currently Expected to Exceed Littoral 
Combat Ship Seaframe Personnel Capacity: 

While the manning construct for the Littoral Combat Ship is minimal by 
design, conducting mine countermeasures missions may be challenging 
given the variety and complexity of mission tasks personnel aboard the 
ship are expected to perform. Currently, the Navy plans to embark a 
maximum of 15 mission package personnel and 20 aviation detachment 
personnel with each mine countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat 
Ship. These personnel are expected to conduct mission planning, operate 
and support the MH-60S and its airborne sensors, safely launch and 
recover unmanned systems, and conduct post-mission analysis.[Footnote 
6] 

While sailors and aviators can perform some steps in the detect-to- 
engage sequence concurrently, others must be performed in order. For 
example, personnel must conduct detection, classification, and 
identification of mines before neutralization can begin. The 
availability of Littoral Combat Ship personnel to manage these 
operations may be constrained in light of current plans to deploy and 
operate multiple offboard sensors at one time. Fleet operators are 
concerned that current manning limits would require the Navy to work 
Littoral Combat Ship personnel more hours than fleet commanders 
consider safe or accept an inability to meet mission requirements 
within desired timelines.[Footnote 7] Navy operators currently estimate 
that 19 mission package personnel and 23 aviation detachment personnel 
will be needed per ship to complete planned missions--an excess of 7 
personnel above seaframe constraints. The Navy is exploring 
alternatives as it continues to refine concepts of operation. 

Some Navy officials have suggested that conducting post-mission 
analysis of Littoral Combat Ship sensor data on shore may reduce the 
number of personnel needed to embark each ship by up to four. However, 
the use of shore-based personnel to conduct this analysis is not 
possible because the Littoral Combat Ship is not designed with 
communications capabilities to transmit the volume of data collected by 
some of its mine countermeasures systems. A scenario where the data 
would be physically carried to shore is also unlikely given where the 
ship may be deployed. 

A Minimally Manned Littoral Combat Ship Requires Different Training 
Concepts and Strategies: 

The Navy has made progress in identifying and developing training 
programs for Littoral Combat Ship capabilities. However, as key systems 
remain in development--including the seaframes themselves--the Navy 
acknowledges that developing a training curriculum for operating new 
mine countermeasures systems aboard the ship is difficult. The limited 
number of mission system operators planned for the Littoral Combat Ship 
permits only limited training aboard ship as compared to other ship 
classes. The Navy is taking a new train-to-qualify approach for the 
Littoral Combat Ship that is significantly different from the approach 
used for other ship classes in that it embarks fully qualified 
personnel aboard rather than bringing personnel aboard first and then 
training them. Therefore, the Navy is training Littoral Combat Ship 
personnel ashore, requiring the Navy to begin establishing a new 
training infrastructure that includes a robust simulation capability. 
The Navy is struggling to identify requirements and estimate costs for 
this training infrastructure because of continuing uncertainty 
regarding numbers of personnel per ship, ship basing locations, and 
seaframe and mine countermeasures system acquisition schedules. As a 
result, the additional investment required of the Navy to support a 
mine countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat Ship is unclear. 

Achieving the minimal manning concepts for the Littoral Combat Ship 
increases the importance of robust training for fleet sailors assigned 
to the ship. Training to meet the higher level of readiness expected of 
sailors aboard the Littoral Combat Ship to conduct missions entails 
realistic training opportunities that represent the variety of mine 
countermeasures missions and tasks identified for the ship. Some 
training opportunities, such as the Rim of the Pacific--a large 
conventional exercise occurring every 2 years--offer significant and 
challenging scenarios that help fleet personnel gain valuable 
experience. As the schedules for Littoral Combat Ship seaframe and 
mission system deliveries adjust to accommodate ongoing acquisition 
challenges, the opportunities to fully train in such exercises are 
further postponed. The first opportunity to participate in Rim of the 
Pacific will now be in 2010 because of seaframe schedule delays. As a 
result, it may take the Navy longer than planned to complete training 
for its full complement of Littoral Combat Ship personnel. 

Littoral Combat Ship Sustainment Capabilities May Affect Operational 
Availability of Mine Countermeasures Systems: 

The Navy designed new mine countermeasures systems to operate from 
platforms with more robust sustainment capabilities than those offered 
by the Littoral Combat Ship. As such, these systems largely require 
intermediate-or depot-level maintenance in the event a component breaks 
or malfunctions.[Footnote 8] This approach was implemented prior to the 
Navy identifying the Littoral Combat Ship as a host platform for these 
new systems. The original platforms on which the Navy planned to field 
these systems--including aircraft carriers, destroyers, and amphibious 
ships--have the ability to perform many of these corrective maintenance 
tasks, while the Littoral Combat Ship does not. Alternatively, the 
Littoral Combat Ship will rely on shore support to a degree greater 
than any previous ship class. As such, if a mine countermeasures system 
breaks onboard the Littoral Combat Ship and a spare is not readily 
available, the ship may not be able to achieve its mission requirements 
within desired timelines as envisioned in current concepts of 
operation. 

In addition, while the Navy's plans to logistically support Littoral 
Combat Ships from shore include establishing a forward mission support 
facility, decisions regarding forward-basing locations for these ships 
are pending, requiring the Navy to establish an interim support 
facility based in the United States. The Navy has not yet determined 
the size and scope of the infrastructure due to continuing uncertainty 
with seaframe and mission package deployments worldwide, package 
configuration, and system quantities. Although the Navy plans to stand 
up an interim sustainment facility, plans for long-term support hinge 
on resolving these uncertainties and identifying funding to construct 
and maintain permanent facilities. 

The Navy also continues to evaluate sparing plans for Littoral Combat 
Ship mine countermeasures systems, but seaframe design characteristics 
may limit these options. The Navy has specified seaframe weight as a 
key performance parameter, as it significantly affects the speed at 
which the ship can travel. The weight requirement for the mission 
packages is 180 metric tons.[Footnote 9] This requirement was 
established while mine countermeasures systems were still early in 
development, and their weights were relatively unknown. Currently, the 
baseline mine countermeasures package--the fourth mine countermeasures 
package to be configured--exceeds the weight requirement by 
approximately 10 percent. While the initial mine countermeasures 
packages meet the weight requirement, they do not contain all of the 
systems that constitute the baseline package. Because the Navy plans to 
backfit the first three mission packages to the baseline configuration, 
the Navy can expect to face challenges meeting the weight requirement 
for all packages currently planned. These weight challenges increase 
risk that the level of capability planned for the Littoral Combat Ship 
mine countermeasures mission package may not be achievable and could 
require the Navy to further reduce the number of mine countermeasures 
systems planned across the program. To meet the seaframe weight 
allowance, the Navy may be forced to remove systems from the baseline 
mission package, resulting in less mine warfare capability per ship. 
The weight constraint might also force a reevaluation of the Navy's 
current plans to backfit the first three packages with new systems as 
they become available. Recognizing this, the Navy is exploring ways to 
reduce weight while maintaining capability. 

In addition, the Navy has decreased the number of mine countermeasures 
systems planned for the Littoral Combat Ship. Prior plans indicated the 
ship would carry multiple quantities of each mine countermeasures 
system. However, between fiscal years 2007 and 2008, the Navy reduced 
its planned number of individual airborne mine countermeasures systems 
within the mission package. Table 6 outlines these changes. 

Table 6: Reductions to System Quantities within the Baseline Littoral 
Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package: 

System: AN/AQS-20A Sonar; 
Fiscal year 2007 plan: 4; 
Fiscal year 2008 plan: 3. 

System: Airborne Mine Neutralization System; 
Fiscal year 2007 plan: 2; 
Fiscal year 2008 plan: 1. 

System: Airborne Laser Mine Detection System; 
Fiscal year 2007 plan: 2; 
Fiscal year 2008 plan: 1. 

System: Organic Airborne Surface Influence Sweep System; 
Fiscal year 2007 plan: 2; 
Fiscal year 2008 plan: 1. 

System: Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System; 
Fiscal year 2007 plan: 2; 
Fiscal year 2008 plan: 1. 

Source: Navy. 

[End of table] 

Given the assumptions for how mission systems will operate and their 
projected operational availability, and in light of the minimal onboard 
logistics and maintenance capability of the Littoral Combat Ship, a 
decrease in certain mission system quantities from two to one per 
package introduces additional risk that a needed capability will not be 
available during a mine countermeasures mission. The occurrence of such 
an event could significantly extend mission timelines. For example, the 
area that a mine countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat Ship could 
cover in a given timeframe could be expected to decrease. However, as 
previously discussed, the weight limitation of the seaframe further 
compounds this challenge as it effectively prohibits embarkation of 
more than one of several types of mine countermeasures systems, 
regardless of mission need. 

In March 2007, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics requested that the Secretary of the Navy 
reassess the planned number of mine countermeasures mission systems 
contained within a mission package. This request also tasked the Navy 
with reexamining planned quantities of mine countermeasures mission 
packages needed to support 55 Littoral Combat Ship seaframes. 

Conclusions: 

The Navy's mine countermeasures strategy seeks to close capability 
gaps, reduce mission timelines, and remove the sailor from the 
minefield. Plans for implementing this strategy originally sought to 
shift mission responsibilities away from dedicated mine countermeasures 
ships to other ship platforms--aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, 
surface combatants, and submarines--but more recently have tasked 
primary responsibility for this mission to the Littoral Combat Ship. 

The Navy's ability to carry out mine countermeasures missions as 
currently envisioned depends upon the collective capability yielded by 
(1) fleet assets, including seaframes, mission packages, and 
intelligence preparation resources; and (2) new concepts of operation. 
At this point, there are several uncertainties about the performance 
and availability of these assets as well as their compatibility with 
planned concepts of operation. For example, the weight and manpower 
demands of the mine countermeasures mission package currently exceed 
the capacity of the Littoral Combat Ship seaframes, and the reduced 
investment in intelligence preparation assets could affect mission 
timelines. 

It is possible that the Navy can compensate for the shortcomings of one 
asset by using other assets or changing its planned concepts of 
operation. At the same time, it is possible that certain shortcomings-
-including slower delivery of Littoral Combat Ships and deficiencies in 
intelligence preparation capabilities--may not be reconcilable without 
lowering expected mission capabilities. The Navy has time now to assess 
these uncertainties and determine whether it can produce the needed 
mine countermeasures capabilities from the assets it is likely to have 
and the concepts of operation it can likely execute. The Navy can also 
avail itself of options to close or narrow potential capability gaps by 
changing the mix of assets, altering the concepts of operation, or 
both--thus capitalizing on the substantial investments it is making. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Given the importance of intelligence preparation of the environment for 
enabling Littoral Combat Ship operations, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense analyze whether capabilities resulting from 
current intelligence preparation investments will enable the Littoral 
Combat Ship to meet required mission timelines. If necessary, the 
Secretary of Defense should assess options for improving intelligence 
preparation of the environment capabilities. 

Given the importance of well-developed manning and sustainment concepts 
to achieving mine countermeasures timelines, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Navy to determine the extent to which 
concepts of operation and the likely performance of the Littoral Combat 
Ship and other assets can be reconciled to provide the needed mine 
countermeasures capability. 

In light of delays facing the Littoral Combat Ship program, as well as 
the planned decommissioning of existing mine countermeasures ships and 
helicopters, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Navy 
to evaluate the need for and feasibility of fielding mine 
countermeasures systems currently planned for the Littoral Combat Ship 
on alternative ship platforms as well. 

To ensure an accurate understanding of operational suitability for new 
mine countermeasures systems, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense delay approval of full-rate production for systems contained 
within the mine countermeasures mission package, pending successful 
completion of operational testing onboard their primary platform, 
currently identified as the Littoral Combat Ship. 

Agency Comments and Our Review: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of 
Defense agreed with our recommendation to analyze whether capabilities 
resulting from current intelligence preparation investments will enable 
the Littoral Combat Ship to meet mission timelines as planned and to 
assess options for improving these capabilities, if necessary. 
Intelligence preparation investments are important for enabling the 
Navy's transition to the Littoral Combat Ship as its mine 
countermeasures platform of the future. The Department of Defense noted 
that it has completed analysis in the past and continues to evaluate 
intelligence preparation investments. According to the department, 
there is merit in examining the risks and capabilities from emerging 
satellite and other remote sensing technologies. The Department of 
Defense also stated that systems such as the Littoral Remote Sensing 
system and the Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle System 
show promise and warrant continued consideration. Nevertheless, 
department investments in intelligence preparation capabilities-- 
including the Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle System-
-have continued to be reduced. While such decisions may be warranted, 
their cumulative effects must be analyzed against objective criteria, 
especially the Littoral Combat Ship's mission timelines. 

The Department of Defense also concurred with our recommendation to 
evaluate the need for and feasibility of fielding mine countermeasures 
systems now planned for the Littoral Combat Ship on alternative ship 
platforms. The department stated that it intends to include this 
analysis in its fiscal year 2010 Naval Mine Countermeasures Master Plan 
(expected to be completed in early 2009 in support of the Navy's fiscal 
year 2010 budget request). 

The Department of Defense partially concurred with our recommendation 
to determine the extent to which concepts of operation and the likely 
performance of the Littoral Combat Ship and other assets can be 
reconciled to provide the required mine countermeasures capability. The 
department agreed with our recommended action, but did not believe new 
tasking was necessary. Specifically, it stated that concepts of 
operation remain under heavy scrutiny from multiple agencies including 
the Navy, Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
According to the department, manning requirements, systems integration, 
logistics, system performance parameters, and maintainability of 
equipment are all being considered and reconciled in the Littoral 
Combat Ship concepts of operation as the ship's mission is reviewed and 
evaluated. We agree with the department that new tasking is not 
necessary as long as these actions are taken. 

The Department of Defense did not concur with our recommendation to 
delay approval of full-rate production for systems contained within the 
mine countermeasures mission package until those systems complete 
operational testing onboard the Littoral Combat Ship--their primary 
platform. The department stated that delaying full-rate production for 
these systems would result in gaps in industrial production, cost 
increases, and delays in delivering mine warfare capability to 
operational forces. The department further noted that mine 
countermeasures systems intended for employment from the MH-60S 
helicopter and/or Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
do not require the Littoral Combat Ship to continue testing and 
development because these aerial systems will have the ability to 
operate from a variety of sea and land based platforms. However, as 
long as the Littoral Combat Ship remains the primary host platform for 
new mine countermeasures systems, we believe the prudent course is to 
delay full-rate production of these systems until the Navy has 
operationally tested and evaluated them onboard this unique ship. 
Should the department decide to field these systems from other 
platforms, then full-rate production decisions prior to testing aboard 
the Littoral Combat Ship may be warranted. Further, we note that our 
recommendation would continue low-rate initial production of systems as 
planned--not suspend production entirely, which would invite production 
gaps and increase costs. We also believe that by maintaining low-rate 
initial production of systems, the Navy will have sufficient quantities 
on hand to enable operational forces to train in advance of the 
Littoral Combat Ship joining the fleet. 

The Department of Defense's written comments are included in their 
entirety in appendix II. The department also provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
from its date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to 
interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Secretary of the Navy. We will also make copies available to others on 
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions about this report or need additional 
information, please contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for 
our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Paul L. Francis: 

Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the Navy's progress and identify remaining challenges in 
developing new mine countermeasures systems, we analyzed program 
documentation including acquisition strategies, performance 
requirements, budget submissions, test plans and reports, and cost and 
schedule performance reports. We also drew from our prior work related 
to the Littoral Combat Ship and individual airborne mine 
countermeasures systems. In addition, we reviewed Department of Defense 
reports related to these and other programs for mine countermeasures. 
To supplement our analysis, we held discussions with a number of Navy 
and Defense officials responsible for acquiring and testing the 
Littoral Combat Ship, its mine countermeasures mission package, and 
other mine countermeasures systems external to the Littoral Combat 
Ship. 

To assess the Navy's progress and identify remaining challenges 
associated with introducing new mine countermeasures systems to the 
fleet, we analyzed concepts of operation for the Littoral Combat Ship 
and mine countermeasures mission requirements. We compared these 
documents with Littoral Combat Ship performance requirements and design 
specifications to determine the degree to which the Navy had reconciled 
manning, sustainment, and warfighting concepts with key characteristics 
of the Littoral Combat Ship. To supplement this analysis, we further 
discussed these issues with Navy and Defense officials responsible for 
developing and reviewing Littoral Combat Ship concepts of operation and 
introducing the ship to the fleet. 

To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from 
the Navy's Surface Warfare, Expeditionary Warfare, and Assessments 
Divisions; Commander, U.S. Third Fleet; Commander, Naval Surface 
Forces; Navy Warfare Development Command; Commander, Operational Test 
and Evaluation Force, Navy; Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Command; and the mine warfare, mission modules, unmanned maritime 
vehicle systems, and Littoral Combat Ship program offices. We also met 
with officials from the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense; Joint Staff; the Naval Surface 
Warfare Center--Panama City; Naval Special Clearance Team One; the 
Office of Naval Research; the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy for Littoral and Mine Warfare; Navy Supervisor of 
Shipbuilding; Lockheed Martin; Marinette Marine Corporation; General 
Dynamics; and Austal. 

We conducted our analysis from October 2006 to August 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 

September 26, 2007: 

Mr. Paul L. Francis: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Francis:

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO Draft Report 08-
13, "Defense Acquisitions: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on 
Mine Countermeasures Capabilities," dated August 24, 2007, GAO Code 
120597. The Department's comments on the recommendations are enclosed. 
I submitted separately a list of technical changes for your 
consideration. 

The Department partially concurs with the statements in the draft 
report, concurs with recommendations one and three, partially concurs 
with recommendation two, and non-concurs with recommendation four. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. For further questions concerning this report, please contact 
Ms. Darlene Costello, Deputy Director, Naval Warfare, (703) 697-2205. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

David G. Ahern: 

Director: 

Portfolio Systems Acquisition: 

GAO Draft Report Dated August 24, 2007: 
GAO-08-13 (GAO CODE 120597): 

"Defense Acquisitions: Overcoming Challenges Key To Capitalizing On 
Mine Countermeasures Capabilities": 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Gao Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
analyze whether capabilities resulting from current intelligence 
preparation investments will enable the Littoral Combat Ship to meet 
required mission timelines. If necessary, the Secretary of Defense 
should assess options for improving intelligence preparation of the 
environment capabilities. (Page 25/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department has completed analysis in the past 
and continues to evaluate intelligence preparation investments to 
enable the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to meet required mission 
timelines. No additional investment is necessary at this time. There is 
merit in examining the risks and capabilities from emerging satellite 
and other remote sensing technologies. Systems such as the Littoral 
Remote Sensing system and the Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea 
Vehicle System (MRUUVS) show promise and warrant continued 
consideration. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Navy to determine the extent to which concepts of operation 
and the likely performance of the Littoral Combat Ship and other assets 
can be reconciled to provide the needed mine countermeasures 
capability. (Page 25/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Partially concur. All aspects of the concept of 
operations remain under heavy scrutiny from multiple agencies, 
including Navy, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. New tasking is not necessary. The points highlighted in the 
report are recognized as key enablers or inhibitors of the platform's 
mission performance capability. Manning requirements, systems 
integration, logistics, system performance parameters, and 
maintainability of equipment onboard Littoral Combat Ship are all being 
considered and reconciled in the concept of operations as the 
platform's mission is reviewed and evaluated. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Navy to evaluate the need for and feasibility of fielding 
mine countermeasures systems currently planned for the Littoral Combat 
Ship on alternative ship platforms as well. (Page 25/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Concur. The modular capabilities inherent in Mine 
Countermeasure Systems under development should provide the flexibility 
to operate these systems from a number of alternative ship and aircraft 
platforms. Maximizing the number of platforms available for testing and 
or future deployment could be advantageous to the department. The 
department intends to include an analysis of alternate platforms in the 
fiscal year 2010 Naval Mine Countermeasures Master Plan. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
delay approval of full-rate production for systems contained within the 
mine countermeasures mission package, pending successful completion of 
operational testing onboard their primary platform, currently 
identified as the Littoral Combat Ship. (Page 25/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Non-concur. Full Rate Production (FRP) decisions on 
current programs of record (Acquisition Category designated) have and 
will continue to be made following the guidance of Department of 
Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operations of the Defense Acquisition 
System. Each of these systems has its own, approved requirements 
documents, including testing plans, which support individual FRP 
Decisions by the Milestone Decision Authority. Other systems under 
development may require operational testing on Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) prior to FRP. 

Delaying FRP of Mine Warfare Systems that have met all the FRP criteria 
would result in gaps in industrial production, cost increases and 
delays in delivering Mine Warfare (MIW) capability to operational 
forces. The modular capabilities inherent in the Mine Countermeasure 
Systems under development will provide the flexibility to operate these 
systems from a number of alternative ship and aircraft platforms. Mine 
Countermeasure Systems intended for employment from MH-60S and/or 
FIRESCOUT do not require the LCS to continue testing and development. 
Although designed to operate from LCS, a MIW equipped MH-60S or 
FIRESCOUT will have the ability to operate from a variety of sea and 
land based platforms. In addition, the training concepts employed for 
the LCS Mission Packages requires full training and proficiency 
qualifications to be met prior to reporting onboard LCS. For the 
Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasure Systems, this requires sufficient 
assets to train and qualify air detachments prior to initial 
deployment. Current production profiles are required to meet this 
demand. Any reduction in procurement quantities will have a significant 
operational impact on the ability to deploy initial and future MIW 
Mission Packages. Delaying full-rate production is neither economically 
or operationally prudent.

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Overview of Littoral Combat Ship Design and Production 
Challenges: 

The Littoral Combat Ship is a new class of warship to address the 
challenges of operating U.S. military forces in the shallow waters 
close to shore, known as the littorals. The three principal threats it 
is expected to address are from mines, small surface boat attacks, and 
submarines. The Littoral Combat Ship differs from existing types of 
Navy surface warships in two critical ways. First, it will accomplish 
its mine, anti-submarine, and surface warfare missions primarily 
through the use of helicopters, unmanned vehicles, and other systems 
that operate at a distance from the ship itself. Second, the systems 
used to conduct each main or focused mission will be contained in 
mission packages; for example, one mission package will consist of the 
systems needed for detecting, engaging, and neutralizing mines. The 
mission packages will be interchangeable, so that the Littoral Combat 
Ship can be rapidly reconfigured for different missions. 

The Navy is developing the Littoral Combat Ship using an evolutionary 
acquisition approach. Capabilities are delivered by "flight," with the 
first eight ships referred to as Flight 0 and the next increment of 
capability as Flight 1. Flight 0 will provide an initial limited 
capability from two platform designs to experiment with the critical 
mission technologies and test the overall concept. Illustrations of the 
two seaframe designs are shown in figure 1. Flight 1 will provide 
greater capability and serve as the basis for learning lessons that 
will be incorporated into additional follow-on ships. 

Figure 1: Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe Designs: 

This figure is a combination of two illustrations of a littoral combat 
ship. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Lockheed Martin (top), General Dynamics (bottom). 

[End of figure] 

From the outset, the Navy sought to concurrently design and construct 
two lead ships in the Littoral Combat Ship program in an effort to 
rapidly meet pressing needs in the mine countermeasures, anti-submarine 
warfare, and surface warfare mission areas. The Navy believed it could 
manage this approach, even with little margin for error, because it 
considered each Littoral Combat Ship to be an adaptation of an existing 
high-speed ferry design. It has since been realized that transforming a 
high-speed ferry into a capable, networked, survivable warship was a 
complex venture. Implementation of new Naval Vessel Rules (design 
guidelines) further complicated the Navy's concurrent design-build 
strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship. These rules required program 
officials to redesign major elements of each Littoral Combat Ship 
design to meet enhanced survivability requirements, even after 
construction had begun on the first ship. While these requirements 
changes improved the robustness of the Littoral Combat Ship designs, 
they contributed to out-of-sequence work and rework on the lead ships. 
The Navy failed to fully account for these changes when establishing 
its $220 million cost target and 2-year construction cycle for the lead 
ships. 

Complicating Littoral Combat Ship construction was a compressed and 
aggressive schedule. When design standards were clarified with the 
issuance of Naval Vessel Rules and major equipment deliveries were 
delayed (e.g., main reduction gears), adjustments to the schedule were 
not made. Instead, with the first Littoral Combat Ship, the Navy and 
shipbuilder continued to focus on achieving the planned schedule, 
accepting the higher costs associated with out-of-sequence work and 
rework. This approach enabled the Navy to achieve its planned launch 
date for the first Littoral Combat Ship, but required it to sacrifice 
its desired level of outfitting. Program officials report that schedule 
pressures also drove low outfitting levels on the second Littoral 
Combat Ship design as well, although rework requirements have been less 
intensive to date. However, because remaining work on the first two 
ships will now have to be completed out of sequence, the initial 
schedule gains most likely will be offset by increased labor hours to 
finish these ships. 

The Navy acknowledges that the Littoral Combat Ship program was 
hampered by an unwavering focus on achieving schedule and performance 
goals, a fact that dissuaded industry from identifying cost growth in a 
timely fashion. Moreover, prior to September 2006, poor earned value 
management processes and reporting in the shipyard led the Navy to 
incorrectly conclude that the first Littoral Combat Ship remained 
within budget and was executing to that level. 

The Navy also stated that it had initially lacked a sufficient number 
of personnel in the shipyard to review and manage cost and schedule 
performance of the first Littoral Combat Ship. This oversight 
responsibility was allocated to the Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding, 
which had challenges allocating sufficient numbers of staff among the 
competing demands of different shipbuilding programs it oversees. 

The Navy is taking steps to restructure the Littoral Combat Ship 
program to better balance government and contractor cost risk. These 
changes include restructuring contract terms with industry, increasing 
Littoral Combat Ship construction time from 24 to 32 months to improve 
stability, and requiring increased government oversight of contractor 
performance. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Key contributors to this report were Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant 
Director; Gwyneth M. Blevins; Martin G. Campbell; Todd Dice; 
Christopher R. Durbin; and Sylvia Schatz. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes:  

[1] M 51 Osprey-class hulls are made of glass-reinforced plastic 
fiberglass. 

[2] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 
Pub. L. No. 102-190, ï¿½ 216 (a), as amended by the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, ï¿½ 215. The 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-65, ï¿½ 911(a)(1) re-designated the position of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Technology in the Department of Defense 
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics. 

[3] In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, ï¿½ 216, as most 
recently amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, ï¿½ 216. 

[4] The Navy classifies sea floor (bottom) types as either A, B, C, or 
D depending on floor composition, predicted mine case burial, and 
degree of roughness. The Navy categorizes the amount of clutter in the 
water as 1, 2, or 3 depending on the amount of non-mine bottom objects 
per square nautical mile. The A-1 environment has smooth surfaces and 
zero to few objects that could be mistaken for mines. 

[5] The MH-60S Block 2A helicopter is designed to employ the AN/AQS-20A 
sonar and Airborne Laser Mine Detection System. The Block 2B helicopter 
is designed to operate these two systems plus the Airborne Mine 
Neutralization System, Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep 
System, and Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System. 

[6] Post-mission analysis involves analyzing large amounts of data 
collected by mine countermeasures sensors in order to plan and execute 
additional mission tasks in the detect-to-engage sequence. 

[7] This concern is also reflected in the Director, Operational Test 
and Evaluation's fiscal year 2006 report on the Littoral Combat Ship 
and a recent draft of the Littoral Combat Ship Platform Wholeness 
Concept of Operations (Revision B). 

[8] Intermediate-level maintenance consists of off-equipment repair 
capabilities possessed by operating units and in-theater sustainment 
organizations. Depot maintenance consists of all repairs beyond the 
capabilities of the operating units, including rebuild, overhaul, and 
extensive modification of equipment. 

[9] The 180 metric ton requirement is composed of 75 metric tons for 
fuel and 105 metric tons for mission systems. 

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