Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of Key Issues  
Associated with the Transition to NextGen (11-SEP-08,		 
GAO-08-1154T).							 
                                                                 
To prepare for forecasted air traffic growth, the Federal	 
Aviation Administration (FAA), in partnership with other federal 
agencies and the aviation industry, is planning and implementing 
the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new,  
satellite-based air traffic management system that is expected to
increase the safety and enhance the capacity of the air transport
system. NextGen will replace the current radar-based air traffic 
control (ATC) system. Within FAA, the Air Traffic Organization	 
(ATO) is responsible for implementing the transition to NextGen, 
and ATO's Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) is	 
coordinating efforts to plan for this transition, including	 
developing a 20-year research and development (R&D) agenda for	 
NextGen. JPDO has drafted three basic planning documents for	 
NextGen--a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and
an Integrated Work Plan (IWP). This testimony responds to six	 
questions about NextGen and JPDO raised by the House Committee on
Science and Technology, and addresses two related challenges	 
identified by GAO. The statement is based on recent related GAO  
reports and testimonies, including a report issued today that	 
reflects GAO's analysis of interviews with 25 key NextGen	 
stakeholders about progress and challenges involved in the	 
transition to NextGen.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-1154T					        
    ACCNO:   A84133						        
  TITLE:     Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of Key 
Issues Associated with the Transition to NextGen		 
     DATE:   09/11/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Aerospace industry 				 
	     Aerospace research 				 
	     Air traffic control systems			 
	     Air traffic controllers				 
	     Air transportation 				 
	     Airports						 
	     Aviation						 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Continuity of operations				 
	     Cost control					 
	     Cost overruns					 
	     Employees						 
	     Human capital management				 
	     Human capital planning				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Procurement					 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     Reorganization					 
	     Research and development				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Skilled labor					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Technology 					 
	     Transportation costs				 
	     Transportation planning				 
	     Transportation policies				 
	     Transportation research				 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Transparency					 
	     Next Generation Air Transportation 		 
	     System						 
                                                                 

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GAO-08-1154T

   

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Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Science and Technology, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Thursday, September 11, 2008: 

Next Generation Air transportation system: 

Status of Key Issues Associated with the Transition to NextGen: 

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. 

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

GAO-08-1154T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-1154T, a testimony before the Committee on Science 
and Technology, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

To prepare for forecasted air traffic growth, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), in partnership with other federal agencies and 
the aviation industry, is planning and implementing the Next Generation 
Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new, satellite-based air traffic 
management system that is expected to increase the safety and enhance 
the capacity of the air transport system. NextGen will replace the 
current radar-based air traffic control (ATC) system. Within FAA, the 
Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is responsible for implementing the 
transition to NextGen, and ATOï¿½s Joint Planning and Development Office 
(JPDO) is coordinating efforts to plan for this transition, including 
developing a 20-year research and development (R&D) agenda for NextGen. 
JPDO has drafted three basic planning documents for NextGenï¿½a Concept 
of Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan 
(IWP). This testimony responds to six questions about NextGen and JPDO 
raised by the House Committee on Science and Technology, and addresses 
two related challenges identified by GAO. The statement is based on 
recent related GAO reports and testimonies, including a report issued 
today that reflects GAOï¿½s analysis of interviews with 25 key NextGen 
stakeholders about progress and challenges involved in the transition 
to NextGen. 

What GAO Found: 

Have the Views of Industry and Air Traffic Controllers Been Adequately 
Incorporated in NextGen Planning Documents? FAA and JPDO have 
established mechanisms for obtaining stakeholder views. However, given 
the large number of NextGen stakeholders and the evolution of 
opportunities for participation in NextGen, we believe that 
stakeholders will continue to differ on how adequately their views have 
been incorporated in NextGen planning. 

Is the Current Version of IWP Sufficiently Detailed for Effective Use 
in Overseeing and Managing NextGen? No. The current version lacks some 
needed information, but the next version, to be released this month, is 
to contain more detail, including schedule information, and is 
automated and searchable, making it more user friendly and useful for 
oversight. 

How Confident Should Congress Be that IWP Will Provide a Sufficient 
Basis for Achieving NextGenï¿½s Goals? The current plan does not provide 
a sufficient basis for Congress to be confident. The upcoming version 
will provide a firmer basis for confidence, but additional R&D issues 
that are not part of the plan will have to be addressed, including 
technology transfer issues. 

Can JPDO Continue to Be Viewed as an ï¿½Honest Brokerï¿½ in Light of FAAï¿½s 
Recent Restructuring? The restructuring made JPDO a component of ATO 
rather than an independent office, but other federal agencies are 
reportedly still cooperating with JPDO, suggesting that they continue 
to view it as an honest broker. However, it is too early to tell if the 
restructuring addresses stakeholdersï¿½ concerns about the fragmentation 
of management responsibility for NextGen activities. 

What Needs to Be Done to Move JPDO from Proposing R&D to Articulating a 
Clear R&D Program with Defined and Prioritized Tasks? The move is 
underway. JPDO needs to continue collaborating with its partner 
agencies to identify and prioritize R&D and leverage their R&D 
programs. It is too soon to assess the results of steps JPDO and the 
partner agencies have taken thus far. 

What Metrics Should Congress Use to Evaluate the Progress of NextGen? 
Schedule information in the upcoming version of IWP and cost 
information in the subsequent version will help provide Congress with 
metrics for evaluating NextGenï¿½s progress. 

Additional Infrastructure and Human Capital Challenges Identified by 
GAO. NextGenï¿½s implementation further depends on FAAï¿½s reconfiguring 
and maintaining its ATC facilities, expanding runways, and hiring staff 
with the engineering and contract management skills needed to provide 
oversight. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
GAO-08-1154T. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham at 
(202) 512-2834 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to 
discuss the status of issues associated with the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen)--the planned air traffic management 
system intended to address current and anticipated aviation congestion. 
Today, the nation's air traffic control (ATC) system is experiencing 
some of the worst delays in recent times, with one in four flights 
delayed. Currently, the U.S. air transportation system handles roughly 
50,000 flights over a 24-hour period. By 2025, air traffic is projected 
to double or triple, increasing to 100,000 to 150,000 flights every 24 
hours. Stakeholders acknowledge that the current air transportation 
system will not be able to meet these air traffic demands. 

Recognizing the need to transform the current system and to prepare for 
the forecasted growth in air traffic, Congress in 2003 mandated the 
creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)[Footnote 
1] to conceptualize and plan for NextGen. JPDO works in partnership 
with the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense (DOD), and 
Homeland Security (DHS); the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); the White House 
Office of Science and Technology Policy; and the private sector. Housed 
within FAA--first as an independent office and now, following 
restructuring, as a component of FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO)-
-JPDO is responsible for coordinating the related efforts of these 
partners to plan the transformation to NextGen. JPDO initially prepared 
three basic planning documents for NextGen--the Concept of Operations, 
Enterprise Architecture, and Integrated Work Plan (IWP)--which, 
collectively, form the basis of the joint planning environment for 
NextGen. 

My statement today responds to the six questions you raised about 
NextGen and JPDO and addresses two related challenges that we have 
identified in the course of our work--infrastructure issues associated 
with the configuration of ATC facilities and the capacity of airport 
runways and staffing issues related to FAA's in-house technical 
expertise. Your six questions are as follows: 

1. Have the views of industry and active air traffic controllers been 
adequately incorporated in NextGen plans, such as those embodied in the 
Concept of Operations, Enterprise Architecture, and IWP? 

2. Is the current version of IWP sufficiently detailed and prioritized 
for effective use in overseeing and managing the NextGen-related 
research of multiple agencies? 

3. How confident should Congress be that progress in meeting the 
research, development, and testing activities set out in IWP will 
provide a sufficient basis for achieving NextGen's goals and timetable 
for quieter, cleaner, and more efficient air traffic operations? 

4. Can the other partner agencies continue to view JPDO as an "honest 
broker" in light of FAA's recent restructuring action? 

5. What needs to be done to move JPDO from proposing research and 
development (R&D) for NextGen to articulating a clear R&D program with 
defined and prioritized tasks? 

6. What metrics should Congress use to evaluate the progress of the 
NextGen initiative? 

This statement is based on recent related GAO reports and testimonies, 
including a report to this committee and other congressional requesters 
we are issuing today.[Footnote 2] Our work on this most recent report 
included interviewing 25 key NextGen stakeholders about the progress of 
and challenges to planning for and achieving the transition to NextGen. 
We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the work to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

NextGen is a multidecade, multiagency effort to transform the current 
ATC system to the next generation air transportation system by moving 
from relying largely on ground-based radars to using precision 
satellites; digital, networked communications; and an integrated 
weather system. Often characterized as "curb to curb," NextGen involves 
every aspect of air transportation, from arrival at the airport to 
departure from the destination airport, and it is expected to increase 
the safety and enhance the capacity of the air transport system. JPDO 
was charged with coordinating the research activities of the federal 
partner agencies with the goal of developing a 20-year R&D agenda for 
NextGen. FAA will play the central role in implementing NextGen, since 
it will be responsible for acquiring, integrating, and operating the 
new ATC systems. Industry stakeholders will also play a key role in 
implementing NextGen because they are expected to develop, finance, and 
operate many of the new NextGen systems that will need to be installed 
in aircraft. FAA plans to spend roughly $5.4 billion from fiscal years 
2009 through 2013 on NextGen development and capital costs. JPDO 
estimated that total federal spending for NextGen may range from $15 
billion to $22 billion through 2025. The agency also noted that it 
expects system users to incur $14 billion to $20 billion in costs to 
equip themselves with the advanced avionics necessary to realize the 
full benefits of some NextGen technologies. 

JPDO's authorizing legislation requires the office to create an R&D 
plan for the transition to NextGen. This requirement led JPDO to 
develop initial versions of the Concept of Operations, Enterprise 
Architecture, and IWP. The Concept of Operations is the fundamental 
planning document from which the other two documents flow. Version 2 of 
the Concept of Operations, issued in June 2007, describes how the 
NextGen system is envisioned to operate in 2025. Version 2 of the 
Enterprise Architecture, issued in July 2007, is a technical 
description of the NextGen system, akin to blueprints for a building. 
The Enterprise Architecture provides a means for coordinating among the 
partner agencies and private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant 
R&D activities, and integrating equipment. Version 0.2 of IWP describes 
the integrated framework needed to transition to NextGen from the 
current system to the end state and will continually be refined and 
enhanced to reflect current priorities, budgets, and programs. It is 
JPDO's plan for achieving NextGen. Version 1.0 of IWP is scheduled to 
be released at the end of this month. 

Have the Views of Industry and Air Traffic Controllers Been Adequately 
Incorporated in NextGen Planning Documents? 

JPDO, FAA, and industry stakeholders have different perspectives on 
whether the views of industry and air traffic controllers have been 
adequately incorporated in NextGen planning. JPDO's organizational 
structure and processes provide for industry representatives and, to a 
lesser extent, air traffic controllers to participate in NextGen 
planning, but nearly all the industry stakeholders we spoke with 
questioned both the meaningfulness of their involvement and the 
usefulness of the NextGen planning documents. Furthermore, active air 
traffic controllers maintain that they have not participated in NextGen 
development activities. According to FAA, however, their involvement 
will increase as NextGen efforts shift from planning to implementation. 

JPDO includes several organizations with industry participants, and 
industry representatives have reviewed and provided input to key JPDO 
planning documents. For example, JPDO's NextGen Institute serves as a 
vehicle for incorporating the expertise of industry, state and local 
governments, and academia into the NextGen planning process. 
Additionally, the Institute Management Council, composed of top 
officials and representatives from the aviation community, including 
air traffic controllers, oversees the policies, recommendations, and 
products of the Institute and provides a means for advancing consensus 
positions on critical NextGen issues. JPDO also includes nine working 
groups,[Footnote 3] through which federal and private sector 
stakeholders come together to plan for and coordinate the development 
of NextGen technologies. JDPO created the working groups in early 2007 
to replace its integrated product teams and, in part, to address 
concerns expressed by stakeholders about their participation. Unlike 
the previous teams, which were chaired by a representative from a 
federal agency, the working groups, which have the same members as the 
previous teams, are jointly led by government and industry officials. 
(See table 1.) JPDO expected the working groups to be more efficient 
and output-or product-focused than the integrated product teams. 
Currently, 265 industry representatives participate in JPDO. In 
addition, JPDO provided a draft of the Concept of Operations and IWP to 
industry representatives for review and comment. For example, version 
0.2 of IWP was circulated to stakeholders and, according to a senior 
JPDO official, the office received about 1,100 stakeholder comments, 
which were addressed and incorporated in version 1.0 of the document. 

Table 1: JPDO's Working Groups, Strategies, and Agency and Industry 
Leads: 

Working group: Airport; 
Strategy: Develop airport infrastructure to meet future demand; 
Agency lead: FAA; 
Industry lead: Trillion Aviation. 

Working group: Security; 
Strategy: Establish an effective security system without limiting 
mobility or civil liberties; 
Agency lead: DHS; 
Industry lead: Global Initiative. 

Working group: Air Navigation Services; 
Strategy: Develop air traffic management and air traffic control 
procedures for safe and efficient flight operations; 
Agency lead: FAA; 
Industry lead: Computer Sciences Corporation. 

Working group: Aircraft; 
Strategy: Develop plans and recommendations for the performance, 
function, and capabilities of aircraft that will enable NextGen 
operations; 
Agency lead: FAA; 
Industry lead: Boeing. 

Working group: Net-Centric Operations; 
Strategy: Develop a robust, globally interconnected network in which 
information is shared in a timely and consistent way among aviation 
users; 
Agency lead: DOD; 
Industry lead: Boeing. 

Working group: Safety; 
Strategy: Establish a comprehensive and proactive approach to safety; 
Agency lead: FAA; 
Industry lead: Boeing. 

Working group: Environment; 
Strategy: Develop environmental protection that allows sustained 
aviation growth; 
Agency lead: FAA; 
Industry lead: Aerospace Industries Association. 

Working group: Weather; 
Strategy: Develop a systemwide capability to reduce weather impacts; 
Agency lead: Department of Commerce; 
Industry lead: National Business Aviation Association. 

Working group: Global Harmonization; 
Strategy: Harmonize equipment and operations globally; 
Agency lead: FAA; 
Industry lead: Lockheed Martin. 

Sources: GAO and JPDO. 

[End of table] 

With these efforts, JPDO has sought to obtain participation from 
industry stakeholders and air traffic controllers in its planning 
activities, and we have reported that many stakeholders felt they did 
have an opportunity to participate.[Footnote 4] In fact, one industry 
stakeholder group told us that it worked closely with JPDO to help 
revise an early version of the Concept of Operations. However, other 
stakeholders said they frequently attended meetings, but were 
frustrated by a lack of tangible products being developed and a lack of 
progress being made during these meetings. Furthermore, 13 of 15 
stakeholders who discussed the issue stated that they did not feel that 
their level of participation in either JPDO's planning for or FAA's 
implementation of NextGen allowed for sufficient or meaningful input 
toward decision making. Some stakeholders expressed concern that JPDO 
and FAA did not include their input in planning documents and other 
products. In their view, critical issues they raised are not being 
addressed or incorporated in NextGen plans. In particular, some 
stakeholders noted that planning documents were drafted by JPDO staff 
and then provided to them for review and comment. This approach, one 
industry stakeholder noted, did not take full advantage of 
stakeholders' capabilities. Others were critical of FAA's decision- 
making structure for implementing NextGen and indicated they felt that 
FAA and JPDO should lay out the broad plans and schedules for NextGen 
and then obtain industry input on the best ways to accomplish the 
technical changes for NextGen. Another stakeholder indicated it had the 
opportunity to provide input to FAA on decisions such as the deployment 
of ADS-B technology, but did not feel its input was considered by the 
agency. Still others felt that FAA provided sufficient briefings on 
NextGen activities, but allowed no opportunity for their input or 
comments. 

A number of stakeholders also expressed concerns about the usefulness 
of JPDO's three planning documents and of FAA's implementation plan for 
NextGen (a document previously known as the Operational Evolution 
Partnership and now called the NextGen Implementation Plan). Nineteen 
of 21 industry stakeholders who discussed the issue said that these 
planning documents lack the information that industry participants need 
for successful planning. Many of the stakeholders we interviewed said 
that while the planning documents provide a high-level view of NextGen 
benefits, they do not provide specific details such as a catalog of 
critical needs, clearly defined and prioritized intermediate 
objectives, and a structured plan for achieving tangible results. 
According to stakeholders who manufacture aviation equipment, the plans 
lack specific details to inform them about the types of technology they 
need to design for NextGen or to provide insights to market, build, and 
install systems that support NextGen. Some industry stakeholders 
further noted that the current planning does not identify all of the 
key research for NextGen, establish priorities for R&D, or show how to 
obtain those results. In addition, several stakeholders characterized 
the documents as long and confusing--qualities that detracted from 
their usefulness. We agree that the latest publicly available versions 
of these documents lack information that various stakeholders need. For 
example, the documents do not include key elements such as scenarios 
illustrating NextGen operations; a summary of NextGen's operational 
impact on users and other stakeholders; and an analysis of the 
benefits, alternatives, and trade-offs that were considered for 
NextGen. Our review of the upcoming version of IWP confirmed that it is 
to have information that is lacking in the current document. According 
to JPDO and FAA officials, it includes schedule information that has 
been updated to reflect newly available information, coordination with 
FAA's schedule and plans, and revisions in response to public comments 
received on the previous version. In addition, a senior JPDO official 
noted and we agree that these documents are not the appropriate place 
for some of the detailed information stakeholders would like and need, 
such as specific information on the types of technology stakeholders 
need to design or install. 

Active air traffic controllers are represented on JPDO's Institute 
Management Council, and other controllers and aviation technicians 
participate in certain JPDO efforts. However, stakeholders from the 
National Air Traffic Controllers Association--an FAA employee union-- 
have indicated that although the union participates in FAA meetings and 
briefings related to NextGen, it does so as a recipient of information 
rather than an equal party in the development of NextGen. Technicians 
in another FAA employee union--the Professional Aviation Safety 
Specialists--have indicated that they do not participate in NextGen 
planning or development activities. Although air traffic controllers 
and technicians will be responsible for a major part of the 
installation, operations, and maintenance of the systems that NextGen 
will comprise, our work has shown that these stakeholders have not 
fully participated in the development of NextGen. Insufficient 
participation on the part of these employees could delay the 
certification and integration of new systems and result in increased 
costs, as we have seen in previous ATC modernization efforts. 

FAA officials, however, note that both unions are represented on its 
NextGen Management Board, a decision-making body for resolving emerging 
NextGen implementation issues. Furthermore, FAA has indicated that air 
traffic controllers, pilots, and airline operations center personnel 
will be a part of the extended team that is directly involved in the 
planning and execution of a gradual rollout of NextGen technologies and 
procedures in a Florida demonstration. In addition, according to FAA, 
these stakeholders will continue to be heavily involved in NextGen 
throughout its life cycle through their participation on advisory 
committees such as RTCA,[Footnote 5] the Air Traffic Management 
Advisory Committee,[Footnote 6] the Performance-Based Operations 
Aviation Rulemaking Committee,[Footnote 7] and the Research, 
Engineering and Development Advisory Committee.[Footnote 8] 

FAA and JPDO have established mechanisms for obtaining stakeholder 
views. However, given the large number of NextGen stakeholders and the 
evolution of opportunities for participation in NextGen, we believe 
that stakeholders will continue to differ on how adequately their views 
have been incorporated in NextGen planning. 

Is the Current Version of IWP Sufficiently Detailed for Effective Use 
in Overseeing and Managing NextGen? 

Our work indicates that the current version of the IWP lacks critical 
information and is not sufficiently "user friendly" to be effectively 
used to oversee and manage NextGen activities. For instance, 19 of the 
21 stakeholders who discussed the issue said that the planning 
documents did not provide specific details such as a catalog of 
critical needs, clearly defined and prioritized intermediate 
objectives, and a structured plan for achieving tangible results. 
However, the next version of the plan, to be released at the end of 
September, is to have further details and research priorities that 
should be useful for NextGen oversight. According to senior JPDO 
officials, this next version will identify the specific operational 
improvements and capabilities that NextGen will incorporate and will 
show what policies, research, and other activities are needed to enable 
those improvements and capabilities, when they are needed, and what 
entities are responsible for them. Moreover, this version includes 
schedule information that has been updated to reflect newly available 
information, coordination with FAA schedules and plans, and public 
comments received on the previous version, according to JPDO and FAA 
officials. Our review of the upcoming version--which is an automated, 
searchable, user-friendly database--verified that it will have the 
capability to track dates and identify programs that are behind 
schedule, making it useful, but not sufficient, for oversight. 

Senior JPDO officials expect subsequent versions of IWP to include cost 
information and more detail on which programs are responsible for 
completing particular actions. We believe that JPDO's upcoming version 
of the work plan shows progress in providing needed details and making 
the document more useful than earlier versions. With cost information, 
subsequent versions of the plan should be even more useful for NextGen 
oversight. 

How Confident Should Congress Be that IWP Will Provide a Sufficient 
Basis for Achieving NextGen's Goals? 

The research, development, and testing activities set out in the 
current IWP do not provide a sufficient basis for Congress to be 
confident that the goals of NextGen will be achieved. However, the 
enhanced information that is planned for inclusion in the upcoming 
version will provide a firmer basis for congressional confidence. The 
current plan can best be viewed as a necessary but not a sufficient 
step in the planning and early implementation of NextGen. However, 
additional issues that are not part of the current plan will have to be 
addressed to achieve NextGen goals, such as obtaining the necessary 
funding, establishing the infrastructure to support the scope of needed 
R&D, and filling the gap that may exist between basic research and the 
research needed to bring technologies far enough along for transfer to 
industry for further development. 

JPDO and FAA have determined that research gaps now exist because of 
cuts in NASA's aeronautical research funding and NextGen's expanded 
research requirements. In the past, NASA performed a significant 
portion of aeronautics R&D. However, NASA's aeronautic research budget 
declined from about $959 million in fiscal year 2004 to $511 million in 
fiscal year 2008. While NASA still plans to focus some of its research 
on NextGen needs, the agency has moved toward a focus on fundamental 
research and away from developmental work and demonstration projects. 
As a result, in some cases, NASA's research focuses on developing 
technologies to a lower--and therefore less readily adopted--maturity 
level than in the past. 

Budget requests for FAA have increased to help provide the needed R&D 
funding for NextGen. According to FAA, the agency will spend an 
estimated $740 million on NextGen-related R&D during fiscal years 2009 
through 2013. The administration's proposed budget for fiscal year 2009 
requests $56.5 million for FAA R&D to support the integration and 
implementation of NextGen programs, a substantial increase over the 
$24.3 million authorized for fiscal year 2008. The actual and projected 
increase in FAA's overall R&D funding reflects the expected increases 
in NextGen research funding. (See fig. 1.) In addition, increased 
funding for NextGen R&D is contained in proposed legislation to 
reauthorize FAA, although that legislation has not been enacted. 

Figure 1: FAA's R&D Budget for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008 and 
Proposed Budget through Fiscal Year 2013, in Constant 2008 Dollars: 

This figure is a horizontal line graph showing FAA's R&D budget for 
fiscal years 2006 through 2008 and proposed budget through fiscal year 
2013, in constant 2008 dollars. The X axis represents the fiscal year, 
and the Y axis represents the dollars in millions. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Dollars in millions: 137. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Dollars in millions: 237. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Dollars in millions: 271. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Dollars in millions: 337. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Dollars in millions: 419. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Dollars in millions: 431. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Dollars in millions: 431. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Dollars in millions: 436. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

If FAA is authorized to receive increased R&D funding for NextGen, some 
observers believe that the agency lacks the R&D infrastructure to 
adequately address the developmental research needed for NextGen. 
According to a draft report by the Research, Engineering and 
Development Advisory Committee, establishing the infrastructure within 
FAA to conduct the necessary R&D could delay the implementation of 
NextGen by 5 years. Unless an adequate R&D infrastructure is in place 
as funds become available, the implementation of NextGen could be 
delayed. 

One critical area in which an R&D gap has been identified is the 
environmental impact of aviation. According to a JPDO analysis, 
environmental impacts will be the primary constraint on the capacity 
and flexibility of the national airspace system unless these impacts 
are managed and mitigated. FAA's Continuous Lower Energy, Emissions, 
and Noise (CLEEN) initiative, in which NASA would participate as an 
adviser, is intended to address the gap between NASA's fundamental 
research in noise reduction and the need for near-term demonstrations 
of technology. This program would establish a research consortium of 
government, industry, and academic participants that would allow for 
the maturation of these technologies via demonstration 
projects.[Footnote 9] In proposed legislation reauthorizing FAA, $111 
million for fiscal years 2008 through 2011 may be used for a new FAA 
program to reduce aviation noise and emissions.[Footnote 10] This 
program would, over the next 10 years, facilitate the development, 
maturation, and certification of improved airframe technologies. 

The CLEEN program would be a step toward further maturing emissions and 
noise reduction technologies, but experts agree that the proposed 
funding is insufficient to achieve needed emissions reductions. While 
acknowledging that CLEEN would help bridge the gap between NASA's R&D 
and manufacturers' eventual incorporation of technologies into aircraft 
designs, aeronautics industry representatives and experts we consulted 
said that the program's funding levels may not be sufficient to attain 
the goals specified in the proposal. According to these experts, the 
proposed funding levels would allow for the further development of one 
or possibly two projects. Moreover, in one expert's view, the funding 
for these projects may be sufficient to develop the technology only to 
the level that achieves an emissions-reduction goal in testing, not to 
the level required for the technology to be incorporated into a new 
engine design. Although we believe that this level of funding is a step 
in the right direction, additional funds would permit the agency to 
"buy down" R&D risks--that is, the more projects that can be funded, 
the greater the chance that at least one of the projects will yield a 
product for the next stage of development. FAA recognizes the 
implications of the proposed funding structure for CLEEN and 
characterizes the program as a "pilot." 

We are guardedly optimistic that the NextGen goals and timetable for 
quieter, cleaner, and more efficient air traffic operations can be 
achieved. The administration has requested increased funding for 
NextGen R&D and FAA and JPDO recognize the need to establish an R&D 
infrastructure and fill any gaps that may exist between basic research 
and the transfer to industry for further development. 

Can JPDO Continue to Be Viewed as an "Honest Broker" in Light of FAA's 
Recent Restructuring? 

Prior to May 2008, when FAA restructured ATO, JPDO reported directly to 
both the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of ATO and the FAA 
Administrator. Figure 2 shows FAA's management structure as of November 
2007, with the shaded boxes showing offices with responsibilities for 
NextGen activities. We expressed concerns about this dual reporting 
status, suggesting that it might keep JPDO from interacting on an equal 
footing with ATO and the other partner federal agencies.[Footnote 11] 
We recognized that JPDO needed to counter the perception that it was a 
proxy for ATO and, as such, was not able to act as an "honest broker" 
between ATO and the partner federal agencies, but we also understood 
that JPDO must continue to work with ATO and its partner agencies in a 
partnership in which ATO is the lead implementer of NextGen. Therefore, 
we reported that it was important for JPDO to have some independence 
from ATO and pointed out that, to address this issue, the JPDO Director 
could report directly to the FAA Administrator. We observed that such a 
change could also lessen what some stakeholders perceived as 
unnecessary bureaucracy and red tape associated with decision making 
and other JPDO and NextGen processes. 

Figure 2: FAA Organization, November 2007: 

This figure is a chart showing the hierarchy of the FAA organization. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: FAA. 

[End of figure] 

Since ATO was reorganized in May 2008, JPDO has been housed within the 
new NextGen and Operations Planning Office and reports through the 
Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations Planning only to ATO's 
COO. (See fig. 3.) Now that JPDO is no longer a separate, independent 
office within FAA and no longer reports directly to the FAA 
Administrator, its organizational position within FAA has declined. 
Nonetheless, we believe that it is too early to tell whether JPDO will 
be able to act as an "honest broker" between FAA and the other federal 
partner agencies. Currently, according to a senior JPDO official, 
JPDO's partner agencies are cooperating with JPDO, indicating that the 
office is apparently maintaining its status as an honest broker. 

Figure 3: ATO Organization, July 2008: 

This figure is a flowchart of the hierarchy of the ATO organization. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: FAA. 

[End of figure] 

However, it is also too early to tell if ATO's reorganization 
sufficiently addresses concerns that many industry stakeholders 
expressed about the adequacy of the previous organizational 
relationship between FAA and JPDO--when JPDO reported directly to both 
the COO and the Administrator--for the transition to NextGen. Proposed 
legislation reauthorizing FAA would address the earlier concern of 
stakeholders by designating the Director of JPDO as the Associate 
Administrator for the Next Generation Air Transportation System, 
appointed by and reporting directly to the Administrator.[Footnote 12] 
The proposed legislation would also address observations we have made 
about JPDO's organizational placement within FAA. 

Finally, it is too early to tell if the reorganization of FAA's 
management structure addresses concerns that stakeholders have 
expressed about the fragmentation of management responsibility for 
NextGen activities. Specifically, some industry stakeholders expressed 
frustration that a program as large and important as NextGen does not 
follow the industry practice of having one person authorized to make 
key decisions. They pointed out that although FAA's COO is nominally in 
charge of FAA's NextGen efforts, the COO must also manage the agency's 
day-to-day air traffic operations and may therefore be unable to devote 
enough time and attention to managing NextGen. In addition, these 
stakeholders noted that many of NextGen's capabilities span FAA 
operational units both within and outside ATO. The reorganization does 
not address concerns about this fragmentation, since other offices in 
ATO and FAA continue to have responsibility for parts of NextGen and 
the division of responsibility for NextGen efforts among them is not 
clear. A senior FAA official noted that ATO executives are 
knowledgeable and supportive of the reorganization, but that the agency 
could better communicate the changes to stakeholders outside of FAA. A 
focused outreach to industry stakeholders would help to get their buy- 
in and support of FAA's efforts. 

What Needs to Be Done to Move JPDO from Proposing R&D to Articulating a 
Clear R&D Program with Defined and Prioritized Tasks? 

To articulate a clear R&D program with defined and prioritized tasks, 
JPDO must continue to collaborate with its partner agencies--FAA, NASA, 
DOD, DHS, and Commerce--to identify and prioritize the R&D needed for 
NextGen. As it issues new versions of IWP, JPDO continues to update the 
R&D plans of the partner agencies. However, JPDO has not yet determined 
what NextGen R&D needs to be done first and at what cost to demonstrate 
and integrate NextGen technologies into the national airspace system. 
The next version of IWP, scheduled to be released later this month, is 
to identify the sequence of research activities that the partner 
agencies must complete before specific NextGen capabilities can be 
implemented. The plan should serve as a useful tool in prioritizing and 
tracking NextGen research. In addition, JPDO has worked with the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop a process that allows OMB to 
identify NextGen-related research and acquisition projects across the 
partner agencies and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency 
program. Under this process, JPDO and its partner agencies can jointly 
present OMB with business cases for the partner agencies' NextGen- 
related efforts, and these business cases can be used as inputs to 
funding decisions for NextGen research and acquisitions across the 
agencies. 

In addition, JPDO needs to continue to leverage the R&D programs of the 
partner agencies, which will conduct and define the research. For 
example, JPDO monitors NASA's and FAA's efforts to coordinate their 
research. NASA and FAA have developed a strategy to identify, conduct, 
and transfer to FAA the R&D needed for NextGen. The strategy 
establishes four "research transition teams"[Footnote 13] that align 
with JPDO's planning framework and outlines how the two agencies will 
jointly develop research requirements--FAA will provide user 
requirements and NASA will conduct the research and provide an 
understanding of the engineering rationale for design decisions. In 
addition, the strategy calls for clearly defining metrics for 
evaluating the research. According to JPDO, as of August 2008, four 
teams had been established and have conducted initial meetings. 

JPDO has begun to move from proposing research to articulating a 
defined and prioritized R&D program. In addition, JPDO, FAA, and NASA 
have established mechanisms, such as research transition teams, to 
define and prioritize R&D. We believe, however, that it is still too 
early to assess the adequacy of these efforts. 

What Metrics Should Congress Use to Evaluate the Progress of NextGen? 

Version 1.0 of IWP, scheduled to be released later this month, will 
provide a baseline for measuring NextGen progress. Congress can use the 
information contained in the plan to help evaluate whether the actions 
needed to achieve NextGen are on schedule and whether the specific 
operational improvements and capabilities that will make up NextGen are 
being accomplished. Specifically, subsequent versions of the plan will 
allow the development of metrics to show progress, by agency, in (1) 
achieving key activities and deploying technology, (2) issuing policies 
and guidance, and (3) prioritizing resources. 

Furthermore, subsequent versions of IWP are expected to include cost 
information that decision makers can use to help understand the 
rationale for budget requests, monitor costs, and improve future cost 
estimates for acquisitions. This information will be helpful to 
decision makers when budget constraints do not allow all system 
acquisitions to be fully funded at planned and approved levels and they 
must decide which programs to fund and which to cut or delay according 
to their priorities. 

Two Related Challenges: 

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly discuss two 
additional issues that present challenges to realizing the full 
potential of NextGen. The first, an infrastructure challenge, is to 
implement NextGen plans for a new configuration of ATC facilities and 
enhanced runway capacity. The second, a human capital challenge, is to 
ensure that FAA staff have the knowledge and skills needed to implement 
NextGen. 

To fully realize NextGen's capabilities, a new configuration of ATC 
facilities and enhanced runway capacity will be required to go along 
with new technologies and procedures. According to a senior ATO 
official, the agency plans to report on the cost implications of 
reconfiguring its facilities in 2009. However, FAA has no comprehensive 
plan for reconfiguring its facilities. Until the cost analysis is 
completed and a plan for facilities reconfiguration has been developed, 
the configurations needed for NextGen cannot be implemented and 
potential savings that could help offset the cost of NextGen will not 
be realized. Some FAA officials have said that planned facility 
maintenance and construction based on the current ATC system are 
significant cost drivers that could, without reconfiguration, 
significantly increase the cost of NextGen. Additionally, some of the 
capacity and efficiency enhancements expected from the implementation 
of NextGen maybe curtailed if the system's infrastructure needs are not 
fully addressed. 

In the meantime, FAA faces an immediate task to maintain and repair 
existing facilities so that the current ATC system continues to operate 
safely and reliably. The agency is currently responsible for 
maintaining over 400 terminal facilities. While FAA has not assessed 
the physical condition of all of these facilities, the agency rated the 
average condition of 89 of them as "fair." Based on its assessment of 
these 89 facilities, FAA estimated that a one-time cost to repair all 
400 terminal facilities would range from $250 million to $350 million. 
Two FAA employee unions (NATCA and PASS) contend that many of the 400 
facilities are deteriorating for lack of maintenance and that working 
conditions are unsafe because of leaking roofs, deteriorating walls and 
ceilings, and obsolete air-conditioning systems. According to FAA 
officials, while some of these facilities can accommodate NextGen's new 
technologies and systems, many of them are not consistent with the 
configurations that will be needed under NextGen. Once FAA develops and 
implements a facility consolidation plan, the costs of facility repairs 
and maintenance may be reduced. In the meantime, FAA will have to 
manage its budgetary resources so that it can maintain legacy systems 
and legacy infrastructure while configuring the national airspace 
system to accommodate NextGen technologies and operations. 

The transformation to NextGen will also depend on the ability of 
airports to handle greater capacity. While NextGen technologies and 
procedures will enhance this ability, new or expanded runways will 
likely be needed also to handle the expected increases in traffic. FAA 
has developed a rolling 10-year plan for capacity improvements at the 
nation's 35 busiest airports, and some airports are building new 
runways. However, even with these planned runway improvements, FAA 
analyses indicate that 14 more airports will still need additional 
capacity. Moreover, without significant reductions in emissions and 
noise around some of the nation's airports, efforts to expand their 
capacity could be stalled or the implementation of NextGen delayed. We 
believe that this is a significant issue that FAA and JPDO will have to 
address. 

To manage the implementation of NextGen, FAA will need staff with 
technical skills, such as systems engineering and contract management 
expertise. Because of the scope and complexity of the NextGen effort, 
the agency may not currently have the in-house expertise to manage the 
transition to NextGen without assistance. In November 2006, we 
recommended that FAA assess the technical and contract management 
skills FAA staff will need to define, implement, and integrate the 
numerous complex programs that will be involved in the transition to 
NextGen.[Footnote 14] In response to our recommendation, FAA contracted 
with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to determine 
the mix of skills and number of skilled persons, such as technical 
personnel and program managers, needed to implement NextGen and to 
compare those requirements with FAA's current staff resources. NAPA 
expects to complete its assessment in September 2008. We believe this 
is a reasonable approach that should help FAA begin to address this 
issue, recognizing that once the right skills have been identified, it 
may take considerable time to select, hire, and integrate what FAA 
estimates could be 150 to 200 more staff. This situation could 
contribute to delaying the integration of new technologies and the 
transformation of the national airspace system. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you or other members of the Committee 
may have. 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L. 
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]. Individuals making 
key contributions to this testimony include Teresa Spisak, Kevin Egan, 
Bess Eisenstadt, Bert Japikse, Taylor Reeves, and Richard Scott. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Vision 100--The Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub.L. No. 
108-176, ï¿½ 709. 

[2] Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of Systems 
Acquisition and the Transition to the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System, GAO-08-1078 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2008); 
Aviation and the Environment: NextGen and Research and Development Are 
Keys to Reducing Emissions and Their Impact on Health and Climate, GAO- 
08-706T (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2008); Aviation and the Environment: 
FAA's and NASA's Research and Development Plans for Noise Reduction Are 
Aligned but the Prospects of Achieving Noise Reduction Goals Are 
Uncertain, GAO-08-384 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2008); Next 
Generation Air Transportation System: Status of the Transition to the 
Future Air Traffic Control System, GAO-07-784T (Washington, D.C.: May 
9, 2007); Joint Planning and Development Office: Progress and Key 
Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System, 

GAO-07-693T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2007); and Federal Aviation 
Administration: Key Issues in Ensuring the Efficient Development and 
Safe Operation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System, GAO- 
07-636T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2007). 

[3] The nine working groups are Airport, Security, Air Navigation 
Services, Aircraft, Net-centric Operations, Safety, Environment, 
Weather, and Global Harmonization. 

[4] GAO-08-1078. 

[5] Once called the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, RTCA is 
a private, not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based 
performance standards for ATC systems. 

[6] The Air Traffic Management Advisory Committee, a component of RTCA, 
provides FAA with consensus-based, recommended investment priorities 
that are expected to improve the safety, capacity, and efficiency of 
the air transportation system. 

[7] The Performance-Based Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee was 
established by FAA to provide a forum for the U.S. aviation community 
to discuss, prioritize, and resolve issues; provide direction for U.S. 
flight operations criteria; and produce U.S. consensus positions for 
global harmonization. 

[8] The Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee 
advises the FAA Administrator on R&D issues and coordinates FAA's 
research, engineering, and development activities with industry and 
other government agencies. 

[9] GAO-08-384. 

[10] H.R. 2881, ï¿½ 505. 

[11] GAO, Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on the Future 
of Air Traffic Control Modernization, GAO-07-928R (Washington, D.C.: 
May 30, 2007). 

[12] H.R. 2881, ï¿½ 202. 

[13] The four teams are organized along the framework for near-, mid-, 
and long-term research goals established in JPDO's IWP. The teams are 
Separation Management, Trajectory Management, Flow Contingency 
Management, and Capacity Management. 

[14] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and 
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace 
System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).

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