Nuclear Energy: NRC Has Made Progress in Implementing Its Reactor
Oversight and Licensing Processes but Continues to Face
Challenges (03-OCT-07, GAO-08-114T).
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for
overseeing the nation's 104 commercial nuclear power reactors to
ensure they are operated safely. Since 2000, NRC has used a
formal Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to oversee safety. NRC is
also responsible for licensing the construction and operation of
new reactors. Electric power companies have announced plans to
submit 20 applications in the next 18 months. This testimony is
based on GAO reports that reviewed (1) how NRC implements the
ROP, (2) the results of the ROP over several years, (3) the
status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP, (4) NRC's efforts to
prepare its workforce and manage its workload for new reactor
licensing, and (5) NRC's efforts to develop its regulatory
framework and review processes for new reactor activities. In
conducting this work, GAO analyzed programwide information and
interviewed cognizant NRC managers and industry representatives.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-114T
ACCNO: A77028
TITLE: Nuclear Energy: NRC Has Made Progress in Implementing Its
Reactor Oversight and Licensing Processes but Continues to Face
Challenges
DATE: 10/03/2007
SUBJECT: Independent regulatory commissions
Inspection
Licenses
Nuclear facilities
Nuclear facility safety
Nuclear reactors
Occupational safety
Performance measures
Physical security
Safety regulation
Safety standards
Government agency oversight
NRC Reactor Oversight Process
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GAO-08-114T
* [1]Background
* [2]NRC Uses Various Tools and Takes a Risk-Informed and Graded
* [3]The ROP Has Identified Numerous Problems at Nuclear Power Fa
* [4]NRC Continues to Make Improvements to Its ROP in Key Areas
* [5]NRC Has Implemented Many Actions to Prepare Its Workforce fo
* [6]NRC Has Significantly Revised Its Overall Regulatory Framewo
* [7]Contact and Acknowledgments
* [8]Order by Mail or Phone
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, Committee on
Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Wednesday, October 3, 2007
NUCLEAR ENERGY
NRC Has Made Progress in Implementing Its Reactor Oversight and Licensing
Processes but Continues to Face Challenges
Statement of Mark Gaffigan, Acting Director
Natural Resources and Environment
GAO-08-114T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the adequacy of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to ensure
public health and safety. Through the ROP, NRC oversees the operation of
the nation's 104 commercial nuclear power reactors, which provide about 20
percent of the nation's electricity. The safety of these reactors, which
are located at 65 facilities in 31 states, has always been important
because an accident could result in the release of radioactive material
with potentially serious adverse effects on public health and the
environment. NRC is responsible for inspecting operating nuclear power
facilities, while facility operators are responsible for safely operating
their facilities. NRC has the authority to take actions, up to and
including shutting down a reactor, if conditions are not being met and the
reactor poses an undue risk to public health and safety.
NRC is also responsible for licensing the construction and operation of
new reactors. Since 1989, NRC has worked to develop a regulatory framework
and review process for licensing new reactors that allow an electric power
company to obtain a construction permit and an operating license through a
single combined license (COL) based on one of a number of standard reactor
designs. The COL is NRC's response to the nuclear industry's concerns
about the length and complexity of NRC's former two-step process of
issuing a construction permit followed by an operating license. NRC has
been working to complete this process because electric power companies
have announced plans to submit 20 applications in the next 18 months for
licenses to build and operate 31 new reactor units--nearly three decades
after the last order was placed for a new civilian nuclear power reactor
unit in the United States.
As requested, my remarks today will focus on our September 2006 report,
which examined how NRC implements the ROP to oversee reactor operations
safety, the results of the ROP over the past several years, and the status
of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP from 2001 through 2005.^1 In addition,
on September 21, 2007, we issued a report to you on the steps NRC has
taken to prepare its workforce and manage its workload for new reactor
licensing and to develop its regulatory framework and key review processes
for new reactor activities.^2
^1GAO, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Nuclear Power Plant
Safety Has Improved, but Refinements Are Needed, [9]GAO-06-1029
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2006).
To examine NRC's oversight of operating reactors through the ROP, we
assessed NRC's policies and guidance documents, examined inspection
manuals and findings reports, and reviewed the level of oversight it
provided as a result of its findings. We analyzed NRC data on nuclear
reactor safety for 2001 through 2005, including an assessment of their
reliability, which we determined were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our report. We also analyzed NRC's annual self-assessment
reports and relevant inspection documents, reviewed external evaluations
of the ROP, and interviewed several NRC managers and external
stakeholders. Physical security, which is also covered by the ROP, was not
included in this review. In addition, to examine NRC's readiness to
evaluate new reactor license applications, we reviewed NRC documents for
new reactor workforce staffing and training, examined NRC's regulations
and guidance, and interviewed managers in NRC's Office of New Reactors and
several other offices with responsibilities related to new reactor
efforts. Furthermore, we interviewed nearly all of the announced
applicants to obtain their views on the efficiency and usefulness of NRC's
application review process and observed several of NRC's public meetings
on the new reactor licensing process. Our ROP work was conducted from July
2005 through July 2006, and our new reactor licensing work from January
2007 through September 2007, in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Background
NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation provides overall direction for
the oversight process and the Office of Enforcement is responsible for
ensuring that appropriate enforcement actions are taken when performance
issues are identified. NRC's regional offices are responsible for
implementing the ROP, along with the inspectors who work directly at each
of the nuclear power facilities. NRC relies on on-site resident inspectors
to assess conditions and the licensees' quality assurance programs, such
as those required for maintenance and problem identification and
resolution. With its current resources, NRC can inspect only a relatively
small sample of the numerous activities going on during complex
operations. NRC noted that nuclear power facilities' improved operating
experience over more than 25 years allows it to focus its inspections more
on safety significant activities.
^2GAO, Nuclear Energy: NRC's Workforce and Processes for New Reactor
Licensing Are Generally in Place, but Uncertainties Remain as Industry
Begins to Submit Applications, [10]GAO-07-1129 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
21, 2007).
One key ROP goal is to make safety performance assessments more objective,
predictable, and understandable. The unexpected discovery, in March 2002,
of extensive corrosion and a pineapple-size hole in the reactor vessel
head--a vital barrier preventing a radioactive release--at the Davis-Besse
nuclear power facility in Ohio led NRC to re-examine its safety oversight
and other regulatory processes to determine how such corrosion could be
missed.^3 Based on the lessons learned from that event, NRC made several
changes to the ROP. NRC continues to annually assess the ROP by obtaining
feedback from the industry and other stakeholders such as public interest
groups, and incorporates this feedback and other information into specific
performance metrics to assess its effectiveness.
In anticipation of licensing new reactors, NRC has accelerated its efforts
to build up its new reactor workforce. NRC's workforce has grown from
about 3,100 employees in 2004 to about 3,500 employees as of August 2007,
and NRC projects that its total workforce size needs will grow to about
4,000 employees by 2010.
NRC estimates that the first few COL applications will require about
100,000 hours of staff review and identified around 2,500 associated
review activities related to each application's detailed safety,
environmental, operational, security, and financial information, which may
total several thousand pages. NRC anticipates that for each application,
the review process will take 42 months--including 30 months for its staff
review, followed by approximately 12 months for a public hearing.^4 In
addition to the COL, NRC has established (1) the design certification,
which standardizes the design of a given reactor for all power companies
using it, with modifications limited to site-specific needs, and (2) an
early site permit, which allows a potential applicant to resolve many
preliminary siting issues before filing a COL application.^5 Electric
power companies plan to use five different reactor designs in their COL
applications.
^3GAO, Nuclear Regulation: NRC Needs to More Aggressively and
Comprehensively Resolve Issues Related to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
Plant's Shutdown, [11]GAO-04-415 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).
^4While the evidentiary hearing occurs after NRC staff complete their
review of an application, such prehearing activities as decisions on
standing, contention admissibility, and procedural motions begin when the
application is docketed.
NRC Uses Various Tools and Takes a Risk-Informed and Graded Approach to Ensuring
the Safety of Nuclear Power Facilities
In implementing its ROP, NRC oversees the safe operation of nuclear power
facilities through physical inspections of the various complex plant
equipment and operations, reviews of reactor operator records, and
quantitative measures or indicators of each reactor's performance. (See
table 1 for a more expansive treatment of these tools.) These tools are
risk-informed in that they focus on the aspects of operations considered
most important to safety. NRC bases its oversight process on the principle
and requirement that licensees have programs in place to routinely
identify and address performance issues without NRC's direct involvement.
Thus, an important aspect of NRC's inspection process is ensuring the
effectiveness of licensee programs designed to identify and correct
problems. On the basis of the number and risk significance of inspection
findings and performance indicators, NRC places each reactor unit into one
of five performance categories on its action matrix, which corresponds to
graded, or increasing, levels of oversight. NRC assesses overall facility
performance and communicates the results to licensees and the public on a
semiannual basis.
^5NRC also plans to issue new regulations providing limited work
authorizations that would address the construction activities companies
can conduct with NRC authorization and oversight. Such activities as site
clearing, excavation, road building, transmission line routing, and
erecting construction-related support buildings or service facilities do
not require NRC authorization.
Table 1: The ROP's Multiple Tools and Graded Approach
ROP Tool Description
Baseline inspections NRC collects information about reactor units'
performance from baseline inspections by NRC
inspectors and quantitative measures reported by
the licensees. These physical inspections are the
main tool NRC uses to oversee safety performance of
facilities. NRC defined specific inspection areas
by developing a list of those elements most
critical to meeting the overall agency mission of
ensuring safety at nuclear power facilities.
Significance When NRC inspectors identify a finding they
determination process consider to be more than minor,^a they use a
significance determination process to assign one of
four colors--green, white, yellow, or red--to
reflect the finding's risk significance, which is
set on the basis of measures that reflect the
potential health effects that could occur from
radiological exposure. The significance
determination process assesses how an identified
inspection finding increases the risk that a
nuclear accident could occur, or how the finding
affects the ability of the facility's safety
systems or personnel to prevent such an accident.
For some findings, this process is more
deterministic in nature rather than being tied to
risk, such as for emergency preparedness or
radiation protection. In these areas, NRC defines a
response appropriate for the given performance
problem.
Supplemental When NRC issues one or more greater-than-green
inspections inspection findings for a reactor unit or facility,
it conducts supplemental inspections.^b There are
three levels of supplemental inspections performed
by regional inspectors that expand the scope beyond
baseline inspection procedures and focus on
diagnosing the cause of the performance deficiency:
o the lowest level assesses the licensee's
corrective actions to ensure they were
sufficient in both correcting the problem and
identifying and addressing the root and
contributing causes to prevent recurrence.
o the second level has an increased scope that
includes independently assessing the extent of
the condition for both the specific and any
broader performance problems.
o the highest level is yet more comprehensive
and includes determining whether the reactor
unit or facility can continue to operate and
whether additional regulatory actions are
needed. This level is usually conducted by a
multidisciplinary team of NRC inspectors and may
take place over several months.
Cross-cutting aspects As part of its inspection process, NRC evaluates
or issues all of its findings to determine if certain
elements of reactor facility performance, referred
to as cross-cutting aspects, were a contributing
cause to the performance problem. There are three
cross-cutting aspect areas: (1) problem
identification and resolution, (2) human
performance, and (3) a safety-conscious work
environment. If more than three findings have
similar causes within the same cross-cutting area
and if NRC is concerned about the licensee's
progress in addressing these issues, it determines
that the licensee has a "substantive" cross-cutting
issue. NRC notifies the licensee that it has opened
a substantive cross-cutting issue, and it may ask
the licensee to respond with the corrective actions
it plans to take.
Special inspections NRC conducts special inspections of reactors when
specific events occur that are of particular
interest to NRC because of their potential safety
significance or potential generic safety concerns
important to all reactor units or facilities.
Special inspections determine the cause of the
event and assess the licensee's response to the
event. For special inspections, a team of experts
is often formed and an inspection charter issued
that describes the scope of the inspection efforts.
Performance indicators In addition to its various inspections, NRC also
collects information through its performance
indicator program, which it maintains in
cooperation with the nuclear power industry. On a
quarterly basis, each facility voluntarily
self-reports data for 16 separate performance
indicators--quantitative measures of performance
related to safety in the different aspects of
operations.^c NRC inspectors review and verify the
data submitted for each performance indicator
annually through their baseline inspections.
Similar to its process for conducting supplemental
inspections, when colors indicating the risk level
are assigned and when greater-than-green indicators
are identified, NRC conducts supplemental
inspections in response. A green performance
indicator reflects performance within the
acceptable range, unlike inspection findings for
which green indicates a performance deficiency.
Action matrix NRC uses its action matrix to categorize reactor
unit or facility performance and apply increased
oversight in a graded fashion. On a quarterly
basis, NRC places each nuclear power reactor unit
into one of five performance categories on its
action matrix, which corresponds to graded, or
increasing, levels of oversight. The action matrix
is NRC's formal method of determining how much
additional oversight--mostly in the form of
supplemental inspections and NRC senior management
attention--is required on the basis of the number
and risk significance of inspection findings and
performance indicators.
Assessment letters and At the end of each 6-month period, NRC issues an
public meetings assessment letter to each nuclear power facility.
This letter describes what level of oversight the
facility will receive according to its placement in
the action matrix performance categories, what
actions NRC is expecting the licensee to take as a
result of the performance issues identified, the
inspection schedule for the next 15 months, and any
documented substantive cross-cutting issues. NRC
also holds an annual public meeting at or near each
facility's site to review performance and address
questions about the facility's performance from
members of the public and other interested
stakeholders.
Industry trends Annually, NRC assesses the results of its oversight
process on an industry-level basis by analyzing the
overall results of its inspection and performance
indicator programs and comparing them with other
industry-collected and reported performance data.
Source: GAO analysis of NRC documents.
Note: NRC conducts an annual self-assessment of the ROP, which includes
soliciting input from internal and external stakeholders on its
effectives.
aNRC defines "minor issues" as those that have little actual safety
consequences, little or no potential to impact safety, little impact on
the regulatory process, and no willfulness.
bSupplemental inspections are also conducted for greater-than-green
performance indicators.
cThere also are three physical security performance indicators that were
outside the scope of this review.
The ROP Has Identified Numerous Problems at Nuclear Power Facilities, but Few
Have Been Considered Significant to Their Safe Operation
From 2001 through 2005, the ROP identified performance deficiencies
through more than 4,000 inspection findings at nuclear power facilities.
Ninety-seven percent of these findings were designated green--very low
risk to safe facility operations, but important to correct. Two percent
(86) were white findings that were considered to be of low to moderate
risk significance. Twelve findings were of the highest levels of risk
significance--7 yellow and 5 red. More recently, from January 2006 through
June 2007, NRC identified an additional 1,174 green findings, 27 white
findings, 1 yellow finding, and no red findings.
NRC also reviews performance indicators data--used to monitor different
aspects of operational safety--that facility operators report to
categorize the level of reactor unit performance for each indicator. From
2001 through June 2007, NRC reported that less than 1 percent of over
39,000 indicator reports exceeded acceptable performance thresholds and
nearly half of all reactor units have never had a performance indicator
fall outside of the acceptable level. Through June 2007, 3 of the 16
performance indicators have always been reported to be within acceptable
performance levels--measuring the amount of time that the residual heat
removal safety system is unavailable, monitoring the integrity of a
radiation barrier, and monitoring radiological releases. Since 2001, three
reactor units have reported a yellow indicator for one performance
indicator. No red indicators have ever been reported.
For varying periods from 2001 through 2005, on the combined basis of
inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC has subjected more
than 75 percent of the reactor units to oversight beyond the baseline
inspections. While most reactors received the lowest level of increased
oversight through a supplemental inspection, five reactors were subjected
to NRC's highest level of oversight. Reactor units in this category were
generally subjected to this higher oversight for long periods due to the
more systemic nature of their performance problems. Currently, 1 unit is
receiving the highest level of oversight by NRC, and 10 units at 6
facilities are receiving the second level of oversight.
NRC inspectors at the facilities we reviewed indicated that when a reactor
unit's performance declines it is often the result of deficiencies or
ineffectiveness in one or more of the three cross-cutting areas--problem
identification and resolution, human performance, and a safety-conscious
work environment. NRC inspectors cited examples of possible cross-cutting
issues: (1) a facility does not have an effective corrective action
program that appropriately identified and resolved problems early; (2) a
facility employee has not followed correct maintenance procedures, and NRC
made a finding associated with the human performance area; and (3)
facility management is complacent by not paying attention to detail or
adhering to procedures. Our examination of ROP data found that all reactor
units that NRC subjected to its highest level of oversight had findings
related to one or more of these substantive cross-cutting issues. In
addition, recent NRC inspections have found more problems associated with
these cross-cutting issues, in part because of new guidance for
identifying and documenting them.
NRC Continues to Make Improvements to Its ROP in Key Areas
Our 2006 report found that NRC has generally taken a proactive approach to
continuously improving its oversight process, in response to
recommendations that grew out of the Davis-Besse incident; independent
reviews; and feedback that is usually obtained during NRC's annual
self-assessment of its oversight process from stakeholders, including its
regional and on-site inspectors. Continued efforts will be needed to
address other shortcomings or opportunities for improvement, however,
particularly in improving its ability to identify and address early
indications of declining safety performance at nuclear power facilities.
For the most part, NRC considers these efforts to be refinements to its
oversight process, rather than significant changes.
Specific areas that NRC is addressing include the following:
o To better focus efforts on the areas most important to safety,
NRC has formalized its process for periodically revising its
inspection procedures. In particular, NRC completed substantive
changes to its inspection and assessment program
documents--including those currently guiding the highest level of
NRC inspections--to more fully incorporate safety culture.
o To address concerns about the amount of time, level of effort,
and knowledge and resources required to determine the risk
significance of some inspection findings, NRC has modified its
significance determination process, which, according to NRC's 2006
self-assessment, has significantly improved timeliness.
o To address concerns that performance indicators did not
facilitate the early identification of poor performance, NRC has
modified several indicators to make them more risk-informed for
identifying the risks associated with changes in the availability
and reliability of important safety systems. In addition, NRC
revised an indicator to more accurately reflect the frequency of
events that upset reactor unit stability and challenge critical
safety functions. NRC is considering options for revising
indicators for emergency preparedness and reactor cooling systems.
Both NRC's 2006 self-assessment and internal staff survey cited
the need to further improve the performance indicators and their
associated guidance.
o Although NRC and others have long recognized the effects of a
facility's safety culture on performance, NRC did not undertake
efforts to better incorporate safety culture into the ROP until
2005, when it formed a working group to lead the agency's efforts.
To date, the group has completed guidance for identifying,
addressing, and evaluating cross-cutting issues specific to safety
culture.
Our 2006 report concluded that NRC's efforts to incorporate safety
culture into the ROP may be its most critical future change to the
ROP and recommended that NRC aggressively monitor; evaluate; and,
if needed, implement additional measures to increase the
effectiveness of its initial safety culture changes. We also
recommended that NRC consider developing specific indicators to
measure important aspects of safety culture through its
performance indicator program. While NRC has largely implemented
initial safety culture enhancements to the ROP that primarily
address cross-cutting issues, it does not plan to take any
additional actions to further implement either recommendation
before it completes its assessment of an 18-month implementation
phase at the end of this year. This assessment will include
lessons learned that NRC managers have compiled since July 2006,
including insights from internal and external stakeholders about
the effectiveness of ROP enhancements.
In addition, we recommended that NRC, in line with its desire to
make the ROP an open process, make available additional
information on the safety culture at nuclear power facilities to
the public and its other stakeholders to provide a more
comprehensive picture of performance. NRC has implemented this
recommendation by modifying its ROP Web site to fully explain the
review process regarding cross-cutting issues and safety culture,
and now provides data and correspondence on the reactor units or
facilities that have substantive open cross-cutting issues.
NRC Has Implemented Many Actions to Prepare Its Workforce for New
Reactor Licensing Reviews and Manage Its Workload, but Several Key
Elements Are Still Under Way
NRC has prepared its workforce for new reactor licensing reviews
by increasing funding for new reactor activities, reorganizing
several offices, creating and partly staffing the Office of New
Reactors (NRO), and hiring a significant number of entry-level and
midlevel professionals. As of August 2007, NRC had assigned about
350 staff to NRO, about 10 percent of the total NRC workforce;
however, some critical positions are vacant, and the office plans
to grow to about 500 employees in 2008. To assist its staff in
reviewing the safety and environmental portions of the
applications, NRC plans to contract out about $60 million in
fiscal year 2008 through support agreements with several
Department of Energy national laboratories and contracts with
commercial companies. NRC also has rolled out several new training
courses, but it is still developing content for in-depth training
on reactor designs.
NRC is using a project management approach to better schedule,
manage, and coordinate COL application and design certification
reviews. While NRC has made progress, several elements of NRC's
activities to prepare its workforce are still under way, as the
following illustrates:
o NRC has developed plans for allocating resources for a design
certification application and an early site permit it is currently
reviewing, 20 COL applications, 2 additional design certification
applications, and a design certification amendment application.
However, NRC has not yet developed specific criteria to set
priorities for reviewing these applications if it needs to decide
which applications take precedence. Without criteria, NRC managers
are likely to find it more difficult to decide how to allocate
resources across several high-priority areas. Accordingly, we
recommended that NRC fully develop and implement criteria for
setting priorities to allocate resources across applications by
January 2008, which NRC has agreed to do.
o NRC is developing computer-based project management and reviewer
tools to assist staff in scheduling and reviewing multiple
applications at the same time. For example, Safety Evaluation
Report templates are designed to assist COL reviewers by providing
standardized content that will enable them to leverage work
completed during the design certification review process. However,
the implementation of this and other tools has been delayed. We
recommended that NRC provide the resources for implementing
reviewer and management tools needed to ensure that the most
important tools will be available as soon as is practicable, but
no later than March 2008, which NRC has agreed to do.
o NRO established a cross-divisional resource management board
early in 2007 for resolving resource allocation issues if major
review milestones are at risk of not being met. However, it has
not clearly defined the board's role, if any, in setting
priorities or directing resource allocation. Because NRO expects
to review at least 20 COL applications and 6 design certification,
early site permit, and limited work authorization applications
associated with its new reactor program over the next 18 months,
it may not be able to efficiently manage thousands of activities
simultaneously that are associated with these reviews. NRC
managers we spoke with recognize this problem and plan to address
it. We recommended that NRC clarify the responsibilities of NRO's
Resource Management Board in facilitating the coordination and
communication of resource allocation decisions, which NRC has
agreed to do.
NRC Has Significantly Revised Its Overall Regulatory Framework
and Review Process, but Several Activities Are Still in Progress
NRC has significantly revised most of its primary regulatory
framework and review process to prepare for licensing new
reactors. Specifically, NRC has revised and augmented its rules,
guidance, and oversight criteria for licensing and constructing
new reactors primarily to provide for early resolution of issues,
standardization, and predictability in the licensing process. In
making these changes, NRC has regularly interacted with nuclear
industry stakeholders to determine which parts of an application's
technical and operational content could be standardized and to
clarify guidance on certain technical matters. In addition, NRC
just completed modifications to its acceptance review process to
include an evaluation of the application's technical sufficiency
as well as its completeness and made internal acceptance review
guidance available last week. While NRC has made progress in these
areas, it has not yet completed some ancillary rules and
regulatory guidance, or actions to implement certain review
process components. For example, because NRC only recently
solicited public comments to further update its environmental
guidance, applicants may have more difficulty developing specific
COL content for unresolved issues. In addition, while NRC proposed
a rule to update physical protection requirements in September
2006, officials told us that it will not be made final until 2008.
Furthermore, NRC's limited work authorization rule, while
substantially complete, will not be available in final form before
October 2007. Lastly, NRC is revising its policy for conducting
hearings on both the contested and uncontested portions of
applications.
In addition, NRC is refining its processes to track its requests
for additional information to each applicant. In some instances,
applicants using the same reference reactor design may be asked
the same question, and one applicant may have already provided a
satisfactory answer. With a completed tracking process, the second
reviewer could access the previously submitted information to
avoid duplication. We recommended that NRC enhance the process for
requesting additional information by (1) providing more specific
guidance to staff on the development and resolution of requests
for additional information within and across design centers and
(2) explaining forthcoming workflow and electronic process
revisions to COL applicants in a timely manner. NRC has agreed to
do so.
In conclusion, the safe operation of the nation's nuclear power
facilities has always been of fundamental importance and has
received even more emphasis recently as the nation faces an
expected resurgence in the licensing and construction of new
nuclear reactors to help meet our growing electricity needs. Our
assessment of the ROP has found that NRC has made considerable
effort to continuously improve its oversight activities and to
prompt industry to make constant management improvements. However,
while the current oversight process appears logical and
well-structured, NRC recognizes the need to make further
improvements in such areas as the timeliness of its significant
determination process and the redefinition of some performance
indicators. Regulating the often complex and intangible aspects of
safety culture is clearly challenging. While NRC had taken some
concrete actions to incorporate safety culture into the ROP and
now has a structured process in place through its inspection
program, we recommended that NRC continue to act to improve its
safety culture efforts. NRC plans to evaluate the effectiveness of
its current actions at the end of this year before considering any
further implementation of our recommendations. We continue to
believe that NRC needs to give this issue attention in further
revising the ROP so that it can better identify and address early
indications of declining safety performance at nuclear power
facilities.
NRC has made important strides in revising its regulatory
framework and review process for licensing new nuclear reactors to
improve timeliness and provide more predictability and consistency
during reviews. Nevertheless, NRC's workforce will face a daunting
task in completing certain regulatory actions currently under way
and implementing this new process as it faces a surge in
applications over the next 18 months--the first of which has just
been submitted. We identified four actions that NRC could take to
better ensure its workforce is prepared to review new reactor
applications and that its review processes more efficiently and
effectively facilitate reviews, and NRC agreed to implement them.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions you or the other Members of the
Subcommittee may have at this time.
Contact and Acknowledgments
For further information about this testimony, please contact Mark
Gaffigan, at (202) 512-3841 or by e-mail at [email protected].
Richard Cheston, Assistant Director; Sarah J. Lynch; Alyssa M.
Hundrup; and David Stikkers made key contributions to this
testimony.
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Highlights of [19]GAO-08-114T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, Committee on Environment and Public Works,
U.S. Senate
October 3, 2007
NUCLEAR ENERGY
NRC Has Made Progress in Implementing Its Reactor Oversight and Licensing
Processes but Continues to Face Challenges
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for overseeing the
nation's 104 commercial nuclear power reactors to ensure they are operated
safely. Since 2000, NRC has used a formal Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)
to oversee safety. NRC is also responsible for licensing the construction
and operation of new reactors. Electric power companies have announced
plans to submit 20 applications in the next 18 months.
This testimony is based on GAO reports that reviewed (1) how NRC
implements the ROP, (2) the results of the ROP over several years, (3) the
status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP, (4) NRC's efforts to prepare
its workforce and manage its workload for new reactor licensing, and (5)
NRC's efforts to develop its regulatory framework and review processes for
new reactor activities. In conducting this work, GAO analyzed programwide
information and interviewed cognizant NRC managers and industry
representatives.
[20]What GAO Recommends
GAO made recommendations to NRC to improve the effectiveness of (1) the
ROP in identifying declining safety performance at nuclear power
facilities before significant safety problems develop and (2) NRC's
workforce and processes in facilitating the review of new reactor license
applications. NRC generally agreed with the recommendations.
In implementing its ROP, NRC uses various tools and takes a risk-informed
and graded approach to ensure the safety of nuclear power facilities. The
ROP primarily relies on physical inspections of equipment and operations
and quantitative measures or indicators of performance at each facility to
assess the status of safety and determine appropriate levels of oversight.
Since 2001, NRC has made more than 4,000 inspection findings that reactor
unit operators had not fully complied with safety procedures. Almost all
of these findings were for actions NRC considered important to correct but
of low significance to safe operations. As a result of NRC inspections,
more than 75 percent of the nation's reactor units received some level of
increased oversight while five units were subjected to NRC's highest level
of oversight for long periods because their performance problems were more
systemic.
In 2006, GAO reported that NRC has generally taken a proactive approach to
improving its ROP. However, concerted efforts will be needed to address
shortcomings, particularly in identifying and addressing early indications
of declining reactor safety performance. For example, NRC is implementing
several enhancements to the ROP to better assess a facility's safety
culture--organizational characteristics that ensure safety issues receive
the attention their significance warrants. GAO made recommendations to
further improve this effort, and NRC has taken initial steps to implement
them.
NRC has taken important steps to prepare its workforce for new licensing
reviews, but several key activities are still underway and uncertainties
remain about its management of the expected surge of applications. For
example, NRC has increased funding, hired hundreds of new employees, and
created and partly staffed a new office. However, NRC has not completed
its development of some computer-based tools for enhancing the consistency
and coordination of application reviews and has not fully developed
criteria for setting priorities if the workload exceeds available
resources. Also, while NRC's Office of New Reactors established a resource
management board for coordinating certain office review activities, it has
not clearly defined the extent of the board's responsibilities. NRC agreed
with recommendations GAO made to further improve its workload management.
NRC has revised most of its primary regulatory framework and review
processes, including its rules, guidance, and oversight criteria to
provide for early resolution of issues, standardization, and enhanced
predictability. However, NRC has not yet completed some associated rules,
guidance, and review process components, including revisions to its
environmental guidance, its hearing process, and its process for
requesting additional information from applicants. Without these
components, expected efficiencies and predictability may be limited
regarding the total time an applicant needs to obtain a license. NRC
agreed with a recommendation GAO made to further improve its application
review process.
References
Visible links
9. ://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1029
10. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1129
11. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-415
12. http://www.gao.gov/
13. http://www.gao.gov/
14. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
15. mailto:[email protected]
16. mailto:[email protected]
17. mailto:[email protected]
18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-114T
19. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-114T
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