Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of Systems	 
Acquisition and the Transition to the Next Generation Air	 
Transportation System (11-SEP-08, GAO-08-1078). 		 
                                                                 
The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), an interagency 
organization within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),	 
was created to plan and coordinate research and development for  
the next generation air transportation system (NextGen).	 
Transitioning to NextGen will require FAA to continue to acquire 
new air traffic control (ATC) systems on schedule and on budget. 
GAO's concerns about the size, complexity, and cost of FAA's	 
acquisition of ATC systems led GAO to designate this issue as	 
high-risk in 1995. NextGen includes system acquisitions but is a 
significantly larger initiative involving multiple federal	 
agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space		 
Administration (NASA), which conducts aeronautics research and	 
development for NextGen, and nonfederal aviation stakeholders,	 
such as aviation equipment manufacturers, airports, and aircraft 
operators. GAO addressed (1) FAA's ATC systems acquisition	 
activities, (2) key NextGen planning and transition issues, and  
(3) key challenges that FAA faces in implementing NextGen. GAO	 
reviewed FAA's management processes and cost and schedule data	 
for acquiring ATC systems, interviewed senior FAA, JPDO, and NASA
officials, and 24 aviation stakeholders involved in NextGen. This
report is also based on recent GAO products. The Department of	 
Transportation (DOT) and NASA provided technical corrections,	 
which GAO included.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-1078					        
    ACCNO:   A84129						        
  TITLE:     Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of     
Systems Acquisition and the Transition to the Next Generation Air
Transportation System						 
     DATE:   09/11/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Aerospace industry 				 
	     Aerospace research 				 
	     Air traffic control systems			 
	     Air transportation 				 
	     Airports						 
	     Aviation						 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Continuity of operations				 
	     Cost control					 
	     Cost overruns					 
	     Critical infrastructure				 
	     Employees						 
	     Human capital management				 
	     Human capital planning				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Procurement					 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     Reorganization					 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Research and development				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Skilled labor					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Transportation costs				 
	     Transportation planning				 
	     Transportation policies				 
	     Transportation research				 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Transparency					 
	     Next Generation Air Transportation 		 
	     System						 
                                                                 

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GAO-08-1078

   

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

September 2008: 

Next Generation Air Transportation System: 

Status of Systems Acquisition and the Transition to the Next Generation 
Air Transportation System: 

GAO-08-1078: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-1078, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), an interagency 
organization within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was 
created to plan and coordinate research and development for the next 
generation air transportation system (NextGen). Transitioning to 
NextGen will require FAA to continue to acquire new air traffic control 
(ATC) systems on schedule and on budget. GAOï¿½s concerns about the size, 
complexity, and cost of FAAï¿½s acquisition of ATC systems led GAO to 
designate this issue as high-risk in 1995. NextGen includes system 
acquisitions but is a significantly larger initiative involving 
multiple federal agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), which conducts aeronautics research and 
development for NextGen, and nonfederal aviation stakeholders, such as 
aviation equipment manufacturers, airports, and aircraft operators. 

GAO addressed (1) FAAï¿½s ATC systems acquisition activities, (2) key 
NextGen planning and transition issues, and (3) key challenges that FAA 
faces in implementing NextGen. GAO reviewed FAAï¿½s management processes 
and cost and schedule data for acquiring ATC systems, interviewed 
senior FAA, JPDO, and NASA officials, and 24 aviation stakeholders 
involved in NextGen. This report is also based on recent GAO products. 
The Department of Transportation (DOT) and NASA provided technical 
corrections, which GAO included. 

What GAO Found: 

The majority of FAAï¿½s key ATC acquisition programs are currently being 
managed within the established cost and time estimates since FAA 
created the performance-based Air Traffic Organization (ATO) in 2004 
and improved its management of acquisitions. The agency has 
demonstrated executive-level commitment to addressing systemic factors 
that have contributed to historic cost overruns and schedule delays. 
FAAï¿½s response to over 45 recommendations by GAO contributed to 
significantly improved acquisition management. While FAA has 
implemented numerous acquisition management practices, areas remain 
that need further improvement, such as ensuring transparency on 
rebaselined programs. FAA plans to address this issue by reporting 
annually to Congress the original budget and schedule baselines and the 
reasons for the rebaselining. FAA needs to continue its progress in 
managing acquisitions, since it will be acquiring billions of dollars 
of new systems as part of the NextGen transformation. 

JPDO has completed the initial versions of three basic planning 
documents for NextGen, but many aviation stakeholders felt the 
documents, which focus on a 2025 time frame, lack the information that 
industry needs to make near-term business decisions to support NextGen. 
The next version of the NextGen work plan, scheduled to be issued in 
September 2008, will address some of these concerns. ATO recently 
reorganized to facilitate the transition to NextGen, but it is too 
early to tell if the reorganization addresses concerns about the 
fragmented management structure for NextGen, since multiple offices in 
ATO and FAA continue to have responsibility for NextGen. 

FAAï¿½s ability to implement NextGen will be affected by how it addresses 
research and development, human capital, and infrastructure challenges. 
Although research and development are critical for NextGen, research 
gaps exist because of a recent decline in NASAï¿½s aeronautical research 
funding and the expanded requirements of NextGen. FAA faces a human 
capital challenge of having the necessary knowledge and skills, such as 
contract management and system engineering expertise, to implement 
NextGen. In response to GAOï¿½s prior recommendation, in September 2008, 
FAA expects to complete an analysis comparing the skills needed for 
NextGen with its current staff resources. However, it may take 
considerable time to hire what FAA estimates could be up to 200 more 
staff with the needed skills. FAA also faces the challenge of 
maintaining and repairing existing ATC infrastructure, such as radar 
stations, while consolidating or realigning its facilities to 
accommodate NextGen technologies and operations. An additional 
infrastructure challenge is increasing airport runway capacity to 
handle the expected increases in traffic. While FAAï¿½s plans call for 
building or expanding runways at the nationï¿½s 35 busiest airports, its 
analyses indicate that 14 more airports will still need additional 
runway capacity. These efforts to expand capacity by means of runway 
development could be delayed without significant reductions in 
emissions and noise around some airports. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1078]. For more 
information, contact Gerald Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Most Acquisition Programs Are Meeting Cost and Schedule Estimates since 
the Creation of ATO: 

Basic Planning for NextGen Is Completed and ATO Has Reorganized as It 
Transitions to NextGen, but Stakeholders Have Concerns: 

FAA's Ability to Implement and Obtain Expected Benefits from NextGen 
Will Be Affected by Research and Development, Human Capital, and 
Infrastructure Challenges: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Stakeholder Responses to Semistructured GAO Interview 
Questions: 

Appendix III: ATC Acquisition Performance: 

Appendix IV: Baseline History for Programs Selected for Acquisition 
Performance Measurement: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System Controller 
Workstation: 

Figure 2: FAA Organization, November 2007: 

Figure 3: ATO Organization, July 2008: 

Figure 4: NASA's Aeronautics Research Budget for Fiscal Years 2003 
through 2008 and Proposed Budget through Fiscal Year 2013, in Constant 
2008 Dollars: 

Figure 5: FAA's Overall Research and Development Funding for Fiscal 
Years 2006 through 2008 and Proposed Funding through Fiscal Year 2013, 
in Constant 2008 Dollars: 

Figure 6: Example of Use of ADS-B: 

Abbreviations: 

ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast: 

ATC: air traffic control 

ATO: Air Traffic Organization 

CDA: Continuous Descent Arrival: 

CLEEN: Continuous Lower Energy, Emissions, and Noise 

COO: Chief Operating Officer: 

DOT: Department of Transportation 

ERAM: En Route Automation Modernization: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration 

JPDO: Joint Planning and Development Office 

MOU: memorandum of understanding 

NAPA: National Academy of Public Administration 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NATCA: National Air Traffic Controllers Association 

NextGen: next generation air transportation system: 

OEP: Operational Evolution Partnership 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget 

PASS: Professional Aviation Safety Specialists 

RNAV: Area Navigation 

RNP: Required Navigation Performance 

SWIM: System-Wide Information Management 

UPS: United Parcel Service: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 11, 2008: 

Congressional Requesters: 

The nation's air transportation system is experiencing some of the 
worst delays in recent times with one in four flights facing delays. 
Currently, the U.S. air transportation system handles about 50,000 
flights over a 24-hour period. By 2025, air traffic is projected to 
increase two-to three-fold, equating to about 100,000 to 150,000 
flights every 24 hours. It is acknowledged that the current U.S. air 
transportation system will not be able to meet these air traffic 
demands. In 2007, the aviation industry recorded the second worst year 
for delays since 1995; 27 percent of flights were delayed or canceled 
in 2007. According to the Senate Joint Economic Committee these delays 
cost passengers, airlines, and the U.S. economy over $40 billion. 
Although air traffic overall was down in the first half of 2008, in 
part because of economic factors that have led airlines to reduce 
service, there has been no significant reduction in traffic at the most 
congested airports, such as those in the New York and New Jersey area. 
Congestion and delays at key airports cascade across the entire system. 
Moreover, according to FAA, even if traffic is reduced, congestion at 
these key airports will not be significantly reduced. 

To try to reduce system congestion, FAA is in the process of 
implementing a number of initiatives, such as redesigning airspace in 
certain locations to improve efficiency, to try to alleviate choke 
points in the system. However, the existing air traffic control (ATC) 
system is not scalable to meet the forecasted traffic increases. To 
meet this expected increase in traffic, the Joint Planning and 
Development Office (JPDO) was established by Congress in 2003 to plan 
and coordinate an interagency effort to create a new air traffic 
management system that will transform the current radar-based ATC 
system into a more automated aircraft-centered, satellite-based system. 
This transformation to the next generation air transportation system 
(NextGen) will require the acquisition and integration of billions of 
dollars of sophisticated new ATC technologies with existing or legacy 
ATC technologies as well as a major shift in the operating paradigm 
from air traffic control to air traffic management by 2025. 

You asked us to assess FAA's ability to acquire and integrate new ATC 
systems and transition to NextGen. Accordingly, we established the 
following research questions: (1) What are the status and outcome of 
FAA's ATC systems acquisition activities? (2) What is the status of the 
key NextGen planning and transition issues? (3) What key challenges 
does FAA face in implementing NextGen? 

To address these questions, we reviewed documents from FAA, JPDO, and 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In addition, 
we held discussions with senior FAA, JPDO, and NASA officials; 
interviewed 24 private sector stakeholders involved in the NextGen 
effort, including representatives of aviation associations, 
manufacturers, and academics; and updated prior GAO studies. To address 
key NextGen planning and transition issues and challenges to 
implementation, we interviewed the 24 NextGen stakeholders and 
conducted a content analysis of their responses. We then obtained 
further information related to those responses from relevant NextGen 
federal partners--FAA, JPDO, and NASA. We did not obtain further 
information from the other federal partners--the Departments of 
Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security and the White House Office of 
Science and Technology Policy because the stakeholders did not 
articulate issues related to those agencies. We conducted our 
performance audit from July 2007 to September 2008 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. Additional information on our 
methodology is found in appendix I. See appendix II for our content 
analysis of the stakeholder interviews. 

Results in Brief: 

Most of FAA's major ATC acquisition programs are being managed within 
the established cost and time estimates since the creation of its 
performance-based Air Traffic Organization (ATO) in 2004. For example, 
24 major acquisition programs experienced a cumulative 2.5 percent cost 
underage and only a 2.7 percent schedule overage when the baseline 
status as of February 2004 was compared to the estimated total cost and 
schedule as of June 2008. These positive cost and schedule outcomes 
have occurred, in part, as a result of FAA's sustained executive-level 
commitment and improved acquisition management practices that include 
establishing a capital investment team to review financial performance 
data and provide early warnings of potential problems as well as 
corrective actions. However, since FAA measures progress related to 
current program baselines, the agency will need to ensure transparency 
so that rebaselined programs and performance reporting do not mask 
budget increases and schedule delays, which could have a cascading 
impact on the cost and schedule of NextGen. FAA plans to report 
annually to Congress on the original budget and schedule baselines for 
each rebaselined program and the reasons for the rebaselining. 

JPDO has completed the initial versions of three basic planning 
documents for NextGen--a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise 
Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan--and ATO recently reorganized 
to facilitate the transition to NextGen, but industry stakeholders have 
concerns about both efforts. Many aviation industry stakeholders we 
spoke with indicated that they were not satisfied with the impact of 
their participation in NextGen planning and felt that the planning 
documents lacked the information the industry needed for NextGen to be 
implemented by 2025. For example, 19 of 21 industry stakeholders who 
discussed the issue noted that the planning documents lacked the 
information that industry participants need for planning, such as 
information on the requirements or specifications needed to develop and 
manufacture NextGen equipment or make other business decisions needed 
to implement NextGen. However, a senior JPDO official noted that the 
JPDO planning documents were not intended to provide that level of 
detail. Stakeholders further believe FAA should develop, for the 2015 
time frame, an interim planning document that can provide sufficient 
details about NextGen to help industry plan for the investments they 
need to make in NextGen systems. According to FAA, it will annually 
update an interim NextGen planning document to reflect its annual 
budget submission and that document is currently being revised to 
reflect the fiscal year 2009 budget submission. Furthermore, the next 
version of the work plan, scheduled to be issued in September 2008, 
should address some of the stakeholders concerns. In addition, an 
effective management structure is a key issue for the transition to 
NextGen. However, all 10 stakeholders who discussed FAA's management 
structure believed that it was not adequate for the transition to 
NextGen, with multiple executives responsible for NextGen-related 
activities and the lack of a single manager with authority to make key 
decisions. In part, to address such comments and facilitate its role in 
implementing NextGen, ATO recently reorganized, designating a Senior 
Vice President for NextGen and Operations Planning who reports to ATO's 
Chief Operating Officer (COO). However, it is too early to tell if this 
reorganization addresses concerns about the fragmented management 
structure for NextGen, since other offices in ATO and FAA continue to 
have responsibility for parts of NextGen and the division of 
responsibility for NextGen efforts among the offices is not clear. 

FAA's ability to implement NextGen will be affected by how well it 
addresses some key challenges, including research and development, 
human capital, and infrastructure. Research and development is still 
needed to define and demonstrate the new NextGen technology; however, 
it is uncertain which entities will fund and conduct that research. 
Budget requests for FAA have increased to help provide the needed 
research and development funding for NextGen, and NASA and FAA have 
developed a strategy to identify, conduct, and transfer research from 
NASA to FAA to help bridge the gap between NASA's research and FAA's 
need to implement new technology. Unless NextGen's developmental 
research needs are met in a timely manner, the implementation of 
NextGen is also likely to be delayed, jeopardizing NextGen's goals of 
increased safety, efficiency, and capacity of the system. In addition, 
FAA faces a human capital challenge of having the necessary knowledge 
and skills, such as systems engineers and contract management 
expertise, to implement NextGen. In response to our prior 
recommendation, FAA contracted with the National Academy of Public 
Administration (NAPA) to determine the mix of skills and number of 
skilled persons needed to implement NextGen and compare those 
requirements with FAA's current staff resources. NAPA expects to 
complete this assessment in September 2008. Once the right skill set is 
identified, however, it may take considerable time to select, hire, and 
integrate what FAA estimates could be 150 to 200 more staff. This 
situation has the potential to contribute to delaying the integration 
of new technologies and transformation of the national airspace system. 
Further, FAA faces an immediate challenge to maintain and repair 
existing infrastructure to keep the current ATC system operating 
safely, while managing its resources to develop facilities that can 
accommodate NextGen technology and operations. According to FAA, it 
will require a new configuration of radar facilities to be consistent 
with NextGen. However, the agency has not developed a cost analysis or 
implementation plan for reconfiguring its facilities. Until that 
analysis and plan have been developed, the configurations needed for 
NextGen cannot be implemented and potential savings realized. In 
addition, NextGen will depend on the ability of airports to handle 
greater capacity. FAA's plans call for building or expanding runways at 
the nation's 35 busiest airports to help meet the expected increases. 
However, even with these planned runway improvements and the additional 
capacity gained through NextGen technologies and procedures, FAA 
analyses indicate that 14 more airports will still need additional 
capacity. Moreover, without significant reductions in emissions and 
noise around some of the nation's airports, efforts to expand their 
capacity could be stalled and the implementation of NextGen delayed. We 
provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) and NASA for their review and comments. Both agencies provided 
technical clarifications, which we incorporated into this report as 
appropriate. 

Background: 

For over two decades FAA has been conducting a major modernization of 
its ATC systems but, until the last several years, has had difficulties 
in meeting cost, schedule, and performance targets in acquiring major 
systems. In 1995, GAO designated the ATC modernization program as a 
high-risk information technology initiative because of its size, 
complexity, cost, and problem-plagued past. We have issued numerous 
reports on FAA's inability to meet its acquisition performance goals. 
[Footnote 1] In addition, we have reported that four key factors have 
historically contributed to acquisitions missing their original cost, 
schedule, and performance targets: (1) acquisitions receiving less 
funding than called for in agency planning documents, (2) adding 
requirements or unplanned work, (3) underestimating the complexity of 
software development, and (4) not sufficiently involving stakeholders 
throughout system development.[Footnote 2] 

FAA, in response to over 45 recommendations we have made, has taken 
steps to improve its acquisition management. For example, when 
reviewing acquisitions, FAA now focuses on the acquisition's impact on 
customer service and contribution to achieving the agency's strategic 
and performance goals, including expanding the overall capacity of the 
national airspace system, rather than on securing the approval of and 
managing individual acquisition programs. FAA has also established 
basic investment management capabilities, including many practices for 
selecting and controlling its mission-critical information technology 
investments. Our previous work showed that FAA was not regularly 
reviewing investments that are more than 2 years into their operations. 
As a result, FAA was limited in its ability to oversee, as a total 
package of competing investment options, more than $1 billion of its 
information technology investments, and to pursue only those that best 
meet its goals. As a response to our recommendation, FAA stated that it 
had changed its acquisition review process to a semiannual "service- 
level review" process that encompasses systems that are in service. 
Additionally, FAA has changed its format for justifying major 
technology investments to that prescribed by the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB). According to FAA, this change provides more 
comprehensive information than the previous format and provides 
efficiencies by avoiding the need to later translate the information 
into OMB's prescribed format. 

In August 2005, FAA submitted a plan to OMB of steps it intended to 
take to remove ATC modernization from GAO's high-risk list. FAA 
submitted this plan in response to a request from OMB, which had asked 
agencies with programs on GAO's high-risk list to identify their goals 
for reducing fraud, waste, or mismanagement. 

In addition to our recommendations and those of the Department of 
Transportation Inspector General[Footnote 3] for improving FAA's 
acquisition management, Congress and others have taken steps to address 
these issues. For example, in 1997, the congressionally appointed 
National Civil Aviation Review Commission recommended, among other 
things, that FAA's management become more performance-based. In 
December 2000, President Clinton signed an executive order, and 
Congress passed supporting legislation that, together, provided FAA 
with the authority to create the performance-based ATO to control and 
improve FAA's management of the modernization effort. FAA reorganized, 
transferring 36,000 employees, most of whom worked in air traffic 
services and research and acquisitions, to ATO in February 2004. By 
creating ATO, headed by a chief operating officer, FAA established a 
new, flatter organizational structure and adopted more leading 
practices of private sector businesses to address the cost, schedule, 
and performance shortfalls that have plagued ATC acquisitions. 

In 2003, Congress mandated the creation of JPDO,[Footnote 4] housed 
within FAA but involving several federal partner agencies, for the 
agencies to conceptualize and plan for NextGen. The previous ATC 
modernization program largely consisted of FAA's efforts to acquire 
more sophisticated ATC equipment with a 10-year planning horizon. 
NextGen also includes the acquisition of ATC systems. Moreover, NextGen 
is a multidecade, multiagency effort to transform the current air 
traffic system to the next generation air transportation system by 
moving from largely ground-based radars to precision satellite-based 
navigation and includes digital, networked communications and an 
integrated weather system. NextGen involves the coordinated research 
activities of multiple federal agencies, including NASA, FAA, and the 
Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security. To achieve the 
NextGen vision, JPDO was charged with coordinating research activities 
of the federal agencies in developing the 20-year research and 
development program for NextGen. FAA will play the central role in 
implementing NextGen, as it will be responsible for acquiring, 
integrating, and operating the new ATC systems. Industry stakeholders 
will also play a key role in implementing NextGen because they are 
expected to develop, finance, and operate many of the new NextGen 
systems that will need to be installed in aircraft. JPDO reported in 
2006 that the total cost for NextGen infrastructure may range from $15 
billion to $22 billion. The agency also noted that it expects a 
corresponding cost to system users, who will have to equip themselves 
with the advanced avionics necessary to realize the full benefits of 
some NextGen technologies, in the range of $14 billion to $20 billion. 

Most Acquisition Programs Are Meeting Cost and Schedule Estimates since 
the Creation of ATO: 

Since the creation of ATO in 2004, FAA has shown significant 
improvement in its management of ATC modernization through better 
acquisitions management and the introduction of more efficient business 
practices. FAA has demonstrated executive-level commitment to 
addressing the systemic factors that we have identified as contributing 
to FAA's historic cost overruns and schedule delays. Since 2004, many 
more acquisition programs are being completed within the original cost 
and time estimates than prior to ATO's existence. FAA data show that 
from February 2004 to June 2008, 24 major acquisition programs 
experienced a cumulative 2.5 percent cost underage and a cumulative 2.7 
percent schedule overage. Of the 24 programs, 19 were at or less than 
the baseline cost estimate and 15 were at or earlier than the baseline 
schedule estimate. However, the two programs with the largest 
reductions in cost--Airport Surveillance Radar Model 11 and FSAS 
Operations and Supportability System--also had large reductions in the 
number of systems to be acquired.[Footnote 5] Additional information on 
the 24 programs is shown in appendix III. 

A specific example of a successful acquisition management outcome is 
ATO's success in keeping the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM)-
-considered the heart of the new ATC system--acquisition on schedule 
and close to budget. The ERAM acquisition began in 2003, a few months 
before FAA formed ATO. ERAM replaces the software and hardware in the 
host computers at FAA's 20 en route ATC centers, which provide 
separation, routing, and advisory information to aircraft. We and the 
Department of Transportation's Inspector General identified ERAM as a 
high-risk effort because of its size and complex software requirements. 
According to FAA, ERAM has met its original schedule and has remained 
close to its original budget.[Footnote 6] Officials in the ERAM program 
office attribute the program's success to a number of factors, 
including having a thorough understanding of the project's requirements 
and costs prior to establishing a baseline, imposing disciplined 
requirements control, having early stakeholder involvement, and having 
a stable budget. Our research has shown that the absence of these 
factors contributed to past problems in acquisitions achieving cost and 
schedule targets. ERAM officials also noted benefits from ATO's flatter 
organizational structure and the consolidation of responsibility for 
acquisitions and operations under a single manager, the COO. They said, 
for example, that the elimination of organizational stovepipes has 
allowed important conversations to take place without going through 
several layers of administration. These officials also noted that 
working under the former organizational structure was much more 
difficult. 

The positive cost and schedule outcomes have occurred subsequent to 
ATO's improved acquisition management practices. More specifically, to 
better manage its acquisitions, ATO has done the following: 

* Established a portfolio approach to managing investments. This 
approach allows ATO to evaluate the relative merits of spending funds 
to develop new systems, enhance current systems, or continue operating 
and maintaining existing systems. 

* Applied a business case approach to each project, which includes an 
analysis of assumptions, constraints, and alternatives to the project, 
and for each alternative, the full life cycle cost, benefit, schedule, 
risk, and economics. 

* Established a capital investment team to review financial and 
performance data. These reviews provide early warnings of potential 
problems as well as help to develop corrective actions. 

* Implemented earned value management on all new major acquisitions as 
a way to prevent, detect, report, and correct problems in acquiring 
major systems and to ensure that major programs are within budget and 
schedule targets.[Footnote 7] While ATO has taken important steps to 
implement earned value management policies, we have found that it needs 
to strengthen its policies governing earned value management and add 
rigor to its oversight processes.[Footnote 8] 

* Developed and applied a process improvement model in a number of 
software-intensive system acquisitions, resulting in, among other 
things, enhanced productivity and greater ability to predict schedules 
and resource needs. 

* Undertaken human capital initiatives to improve its acquisition 
workforce culture and build toward a results-oriented, high-performing 
organization. 

* Established annual acquisition performance goals to improve oversight 
and accountability over acquisition processes. 

Additionally, agency executives have met regularly with GAO and OMB 
over the past 2 years to provide updates on FAA's efforts to improve 
its handling of ATC modernization and ensure transparency about these 
efforts both inside and outside the agency. These meetings have 
included updates on the status of a corrective action plan that FAA is 
implementing to institutionalize sound acquisition management practices 
and successful performance and outcomes. FAA is also working to 
establish an internal oversight capability to validate the information 
that executives receive on the status of the plan. OMB has seen 
sufficient progress in FAA's efforts to address the risk associated 
with ATC modernization that the meetings now occur semiannually, rather 
than quarterly. 

While FAA has made progress in improving acquisition management 
practices in the 4 years since ATO was created, areas remain that need 
further improvement. For example, in prior work we found that FAA does 
not publicly report changes in the cost and schedule baselines for some 
major ATC acquisitions and thus may not provide Congress and the public 
with a complete picture of the agency's overall performance in 
acquiring these systems.[Footnote 9] Such unreported rebaselining could 
make budget increases and schedule delays more difficult to identify. 
For instance, for fiscal years 2004 through 2006, FAA reported 
exceeding its annual goals to keep a high percentage of the major 
acquisition programs within 10 percent of budget and on schedule 80 
percent of the time. However, we found that FAA measures progress 
related only against current program baselines and does not disclose 
when a system has been rebaselined (when cost and schedule targets have 
been officially changed). According to ATO's performance reports, the 
organization showed nearly steady improvement in fiscal years 2003 
through 2006 and substantially exceeded its targets for those years, 
twice reaching 100 percent. However, when performance was measured 
against original baselines instead of annual budgets or milestones, 
acquisition performance was lower than reported, but still showed a 
general trend of improvement for that period. We believe that 
rebaselining may be appropriate in some cases and that measuring 
performance against the current baseline has value. However, annual 
measurements for acquisitions that have been rebaselined and span 
several years do not provide a complete picture of acquisition 
performance over time. 

In addition, based on original cost and schedule baselines, the 
acquisitions on which FAA reported performance from 2003 to 2006 
collectively exceeded their original budget estimates by approximately 
$4.4 billion, or over 66 percent, and experienced schedule slippages of 
from 1 to 10 years. The Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System 
(see fig. 1) and the Wide Area Augmentation System--both key NextGen 
systems--accounted for most of the budget increase. The acquisition of 
both of these systems began in the mid-to late 1990s, well before the 
establishment of ATO. (See app. IV for a baseline history of the 
acquisition programs FAA selected for performance measurement.) 

Figure 1: Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System Controller 
Workstation: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of a Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System 
Controller Workstation. 

Source: FAA. 

[End of figure] 

In December 2007, we recommended that FAA identify or establish a 
vehicle for regularly reporting to Congress and the public on the 
agency's overall, long-term performance in acquiring ATC systems by 
providing original budget and schedule baselines for each rebaselined 
program and the reasons for the rebaselining.[Footnote 10] We also 
recommended that FAA report information on the potential effects that 
any budget increases or schedule slippages could have on the overall 
transition to NextGen. FAA plans to address our recommendation by 
reporting such information in its Capital Improvement Plan, which it 
sends annually to Congress. 

FAA will need to continue to manage the acquisition of billions of 
dollars worth of new ATC systems as NextGen progresses. FAA plans to 
spend roughly $5.4 billion from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 on 
NextGen development and capital costs. The agency estimates that the 
total federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range 
from $15 billion to $22 billion.[Footnote 11] Therefore, it is now more 
important than ever for FAA to continue to maintain progress and avoid 
cost overruns and schedule delays, since they could have a cascading 
impact on the cost and schedule of NextGen. 

Basic Planning for NextGen Is Completed and ATO Has Reorganized as It 
Transitions to NextGen, but Stakeholders Have Concerns: 

Congress authorized JPDO to plan and coordinate the development of 
NextGen and placed JPDO organizationally within FAA. JPDO initially 
prepared three basic planning documents for NextGen--a Concept of 
Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan. 
[Footnote 12] Collectively, the three documents form the basis of the 
joint planning environment for NextGen. Further iterations of these 
planning documents will be needed as NextGen technologies are developed 
and implemented. As NextGen has now progressed from the initial 
planning to the early implementation phase, JPDO's role has evolved to 
include coordination and facilitation among the numerous federal and 
industry stakeholders, JPDO has sought to institutionalize the 
collaborative process with partner federal agencies by establishing a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by the secretary or other 
high-ranking official from each partner agency that broadly defines the 
partner agency's roles and responsibilities. As of June 2008, the MOU 
had been signed by all five partner agencies--the Departments of 
Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation and NASA. For 
the transition to NextGen, ATO has undergone a reorganization to 
facilitate its critical role in implementing NextGen. However, 
stakeholders have raised concerns about their lack of impact on NextGen 
planning, the usefulness of key planning documents, and the adequacy of 
FAA's management structure, including the organizational placement of 
JPDO, for implementing NextGen. 

Stakeholders Are Not Satisfied with their Participation in NextGen 
Planning or the Information Provided in NextGen Planning Documents: 

Thirteen of 15 industry stakeholders[Footnote 13] who discussed the 
issue raised concerns over what they perceive as a lack of impact on 
NextGen planning from their participation in the NextGen effort so far. 
Stakeholders can provide input into NextGen planning through 
participation in JPDO working groups and the NextGen Institute. JPDO's 
organizational structure includes nine working groups[Footnote 14] that 
were created[Footnote 15] to bring together federal and nonfederal 
experts to plan for and coordinate the development of NextGen systems. 
Similarly, the NextGen Institute was established to incorporate the 
expertise of industry, state and local governments, and academia into 
the NextGen planning process. The Institute Management Council, 
composed of top agency officials and representatives from the aviation 
community, oversees the policy, recommendations, and products of the 
institute and provides a means for advancing consensus positions on 
critical NextGen issues. All of the stakeholders we interviewed, with 
the exception of stakeholders from an FAA employee union--the 
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS)--indicated that they 
participated in NextGen planning and development activities as members 
of various JPDO working groups, as members of the Institute Management 
Council, or by serving as consultants to FAA. Stakeholders from the 
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)--another FAA 
employee union--indicated that while the union does participate in FAA 
meetings and briefings related to NextGen, their status is that of a 
recipient of information rather than an equal party with other 
stakeholders on the development of NextGen. 

While 21 of 22 stakeholders who discussed the issue felt that they were 
provided the opportunity to participate in NextGen planning, many were 
not satisfied with the impact of their participation on NextGen 
planning or with the outcomes of their participation. Some stakeholders 
said that they frequently attended meetings, but were frustrated by the 
lack of tangible products being developed and lack of progress being 
made during these meetings. Thirteen of 15 stakeholders who discussed 
the issue stated that they did not feel that their level of 
participation in NextGen allowed for sufficient or meaningful input 
toward decision making. Some stakeholders expressed concern that JPDO 
and FAA did not include their input in the development of planning 
documents and other products and that critical issues are not being 
addressed or incorporated in NextGen plans. In particular, some 
stakeholders noted that planning documents were drafted by JPDO staff 
and then provided to them for review and comment. By doing so, one 
industry stakeholder noted that JPDO was not taking full advantage of 
their capabilities. Some stakeholders also suggested examining the 
types of industry players involved with JPDO and how they contribute, 
indicating that certain types of expertise may not be represented, such 
as avionics experience. 

In addition, a number of stakeholders as well as members of Congress 
have expressed concerns with the key NextGen planning documents being 
developed by JPDO and FAA--JPDO's Concept of Operations, Enterprise 
Architecture, and Integrated Work Plan and FAA's implementation plan 
for NextGen (a document previously known as the Operational Evolution 
Partnership (OEP) and now called the NextGen Implementation Plan). 
Nineteen of 21 industry stakeholders who discussed the issue said that 
the planning documents lack the information that industry participants 
need for planning. Many of the stakeholders we interviewed said that 
while the planning documents provide a high-level view of NextGen 
benefits, they do not provide specific details such as a catalog of 
critical needs, clearly defined and prioritized intermediate 
objectives, and a structured plan for achieving tangible results. 
According to aviation manufacturing stakeholders, the plans lack 
specific details to inform them about the type of technology they need 
to design for NextGen or provide insights to market, build, and install 
systems that support NextGen. A senior JPDO official noted, however, 
that the JPDO planning documents were not intended to provide that 
level of detail. Some industry stakeholders further noted that the 
current planning does not identify all of the needed research, 
establish priorities for research and development, or show how to 
obtain those results. We agree that the latest publicly available 
versions of these documents lack information that various stakeholders 
need. For example, the documents do not include key elements such as 
scenarios illustrating NextGen operations, a summary of NextGen's 
operational impact on users and other stakeholders, and an analysis of 
the benefits, alternatives, and trade-offs that were considered for 
NextGen. However, the next version of the Integrated Work Plan, which 
JPDO plans to release at the end of September 2008, has schedule 
information that has been updated to reflect newly available 
information, coordination with FAA schedule and plans, and revisions in 
response to public comments received on the previous version, according 
to JPDO and FAA officials. Our review of the upcoming version--which is 
an automated, searchable database--verified that it will have the 
capability to track dates and identify programs that are behind 
schedule. In addition, the new version is able to identify programs, 
policies, or research that must be completed before specific NextGen 
capabilities can be implemented as well as identify whether industry or 
a specific federal agency is responsible for completing the action. 
Agency officials expect subsequent versions of the work plan to include 
cost information, which we believe will enhance the work plan's 
usefulness for NextGen oversight. 

In addition, a key intended purpose of these planning documents, 
according to JPDO officials, is to provide the means for coordinating 
among the partner agencies and private sector manufacturers, aligning 
relevant research and development activities, and integrating 
equipment. However, as mentioned previously, 19 of 21 stakeholders who 
discussed the issue said that the planning documents did not provide 
guidance for their organizational decision making. For example, some of 
the stakeholders noted that neither the JPDO planning documents nor 
FAA's NextGen Implementation Plan provide information on the 
requirements or specifications needed to develop and manufacture 
NextGen equipment or anticipate the changes resulting from the 
implementation of NextGen. As a result, some stakeholders believe that 
FAA should develop an interim architecture (a technical road map) that 
provides sufficient detail about what can be accomplished by 2015. This 
interim document would help bridge the gap between current systems and 
plans for the future and would help stakeholders plan for the 
investments that they will need to make in NextGen systems. According 
to FAA, it has updated its enterprise architecture for the national 
airspace system and plans to do so annually. According to the agency, 
the current version of the enterprise architecture reflects NextGen and 
is being revised to reflect the fiscal year 2009 budget submission and 
the budget planning time frame of fiscal years 2010 through 2013. 
However, FAA noted that the level of detail that some stakeholders 
asked for, such as specifications to develop and manufacture NextGen 
equipment, will not be available for projects that are still in the 
concept development and investment analysis phase. 

In addition, the Senate Appropriations Committee has expressed concern 
that the JPDO planning documents lack details on how the various 
NextGen initiatives will reduce delays and congestion between now and 
2025. It would have FAA and JPDO include in future budget 
justifications and NextGen planning documents a full explanation and 
quantitative estimate of how much each new capability will reduce 
congestion, increase capacity, and decrease delays; an explanation of 
how the data was modeled and compiled; and a time frame for when these 
capacity improvements and delay reduction measures will start to 
relieve congestion. 

Stakeholders Have Had Concerns over FAA's Overall Management Structure 
for NextGen and the Organizational Placement of JPDO: 

Many stakeholders had concerns about the adequacy of FAA's management 
structure for NextGen prior to the May 2008 reorganization of ATO, but 
that reorganization did not address all of their concerns. All 10 
stakeholders who discussed the issue viewed FAA's 2007 management 
structure as not adequate for the transition to NextGen. In addition, 
13 of 15 stakeholders who discussed the issue felt that FAA did not 
have the leadership in place for the transition to NextGen. Prior to 
May 2008, the executive responsible for developing and overseeing the 
OEP--FAA's implementation plan for NextGen--was one of nine FAA vice 
presidents who report to the COO of FAA's ATO, who, in turn, reports 
directly to the FAA Administrator. Other ATO vice presidents are 
responsible for NextGen-related activities in their designated areas, 
such as en route, oceanic, and terminal services. In addition, the FAA 
executives responsible for airports and aviation safety issues--areas 
that also encompass NextGen-related activities--are associate 
administrators who report through the Deputy FAA Administrator to the 
FAA Administrator. Thus, while some of the activities for which the 
other vice presidents and associate administrators are responsible are 
significant to NextGen's implementation, there was no direct line of 
authority between the Vice President for Operations Planning Services 
and these activities. Figure 2 shows FAA's management structure as of 
November 2007. 

Figure 2: FAA Organization, November 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the FAA Organization, as follows: 

Administrator: 
* Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO); 
* Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic Organization (ATO); 
- Vice President for Acquisition and Business Services; 
- Vice President for Communications Services; 
- Vice President for En Route and Oceanic Services (office with 
responsibilities for NextGen-related activities); 
- Vice President for Financial Services; 
- Vice President for Operations Planning Services (office with 
responsibilities for NextGen-related activities); 
- Vice President for System Operations Services (office with 
responsibilities for NextGen-related activities); 
- Vice President for Safety Services; 
- Vice President for Terminal Services (office with responsibilities 
for NextGen-related activities); 
- Vice President for Technical Operations Services (office with 
responsibilities for NextGen-related activities). 
 
Administrator: 
* Deputy Administrator; 
- Assistant Administrator for Civil Rights; 
- Chief Counsel; 
- Assistant Administrator for Government and Industry Affairs; 
- Assistant Administrator for Communications; 
- Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Travel; 
- Associate Administrator for Airports (office with responsibilities 
for NextGen-related activities); 
- Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (office with 
responsibilities for NextGen-related activities); 
- Assistant Administrator for Aviation Policy, Planning and 
Environment; 
- Assistant Administrator for Regions and Center Operations; 
- Assistant Administrator for Information Services; 
- Assistant Administrator for Human Resource Management; 
- Assistant Administrator for Security and Hazardous Materials; 
- Assistant Administrator for International Aviation; 
- Assistant Administrator for Financial Services. 

Source: FAA. 

[End of figure] 

To address the inadequacy they saw in the management structure for 
NextGen, some stakeholders we spoke with called for the establishment 
of a NextGen management position or program office that would report 
directly to the FAA Administrator to ensure accountability for NextGen 
results. Some of these stakeholders expressed frustration that a 
program as large and important as NextGen does not follow the industry 
practice of having one person designated with the authority to make key 
decisions. They pointed out that although FAA's COO is nominally in 
charge of FAA's NextGen efforts, the COO must also manage the agency's 
day-to-day air traffic operations and may therefore be unable to devote 
enough time and attention to managing NextGen. In addition, these 
stakeholders noted that many of NextGen's capabilities span FAA 
operational units whose heads are at the same organizational level as 
the Vice President for Operations and Planning Services or are outside 
ATO all together. Thus, they believed that a position or office above 
the Vice President for Operations and Planning Services and the other 
operational units is needed. In prior work, we have found that programs 
can be implemented most efficiently when managers are empowered to make 
critical decisions and are held accountable for results.[Footnote 16] 

In addition, over the last several years questions have been raised by 
members of Congress and stakeholders about the appropriateness of 
JPDO's placement within FAA and its dual reporting to both the FAA 
Administrator and the COO of ATO. We have reported that JPDO's dual 
reporting status hinders its ability to interact on equal footing with 
ATO and other federal agencies.[Footnote 17] On one hand, JPDO must 
counter the perception that it is a proxy for ATO and, as such, cannot 
act as an "honest broker." On the other hand, JPDO must continue to 
work with ATO and the other federal agencies in a partnership in which 
ATO is the lead implementer of NextGen. Therefore, we reported that it 
is important for JPDO to have some independence from ATO and suggested 
that one change that could begin to address this issue would be to have 
the JPDO Director report directly to the FAA Administrator. Such a 
change may also lessen what some stakeholders perceive as unnecessary 
bureaucracy and red tape associated with decision making and other JPDO 
and NextGen activities. 

In May 2008, FAA announced a reorganization of its NextGen management 
structure and named a Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations 
Planning who reports to the COO. According to ATO's COO, a purpose for 
the reorganization was to respond to industry stakeholders concerns 
about the fragmentation of authority over NextGen within FAA by 
creating one "team" that included NextGen implementation, planning, and 
oversight with one identified person in charge. According to FAA, the 
Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations Planning is 
responsible for integrating and implementing all elements of NextGen, 
most of which are executed by other FAA offices within and outside of 
ATO. The NextGen Senior Vice President also has authority over the 
allocation of the entire $5.4 billion NextGen budget requested for 
fiscal years 2009 through 2013, no matter where that budget is spent 
within FAA. However, it is too early to tell if this reorganization 
sufficiently addresses concerns raised by stakeholders about the 
fragmented management structure for NextGen since other executives 
continue to have responsibility for parts of NextGen mentioned earlier 
in this report, and the division of responsibility for NextGen efforts 
among the senior vice presidents and associate administrators is not 
clear. A senior FAA executive noted that internal ATO executives are 
knowledgeable and supportive of the reorganization, but that the agency 
could better communicate the changes to stakeholders outside of FAA. A 
focused outreach to industry stakeholders would help to get their buy- 
in and support of FAA's efforts. 

In addition, as part of this reorganization, JPDO is now housed within 
the new NextGen and Operations Planning Office and reports through the 
Senior Vice President for Next and Operations Planning only to ATO's 
COO. Now that JPDO is no longer a separate, independent office within 
FAA and no longer reports directly to the FAA Administrator, its 
organizational position within FAA has declined. This placement of JPDO 
also does not address a concern expressed by eight industry 
stakeholders who told us that the previous authority structure between 
FAA and JPDO--with JPDO reporting directly to both the COO and the 
Administrator--was not adequate for the transition to NextGen. 
Moreover, proposed legislation reauthorizing FAA would elevate the 
Director of JPDO to the Associate Administrator for the Next Generation 
Air Transportation System, appointed by and reporting directly to the 
FAA Administrator.[Footnote 18] We believe the proposed legislation 
comes closer to addressing concerns raised by stakeholders than ATO's 
action. In addition, the proposed legislation would address 
observations we have made about JPDO's organizational placement within 
FAA. (Fig. 3 shows ATO after the May 2008 reorganization.) 

Figure 3: ATO Organization, July 2008: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the ATO Organization, as follows: 

Administrator (office with responsibilities for NextGen-related 
activities): 
Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic Organization (office with 
responsibilities for NextGen-related activities); 
* Senior Vice President, Finance; 
* Senior Vice President, Strategy and Performance; 
* Vice President, Safety; 
* Vice President, Acquisitions and Business; 
* Senior Vice President, Operations (office with responsibilities for 
NextGen-related activities); 
- Vice President, Technical Training; 
- Vice President, Service Center; 
- Vice President, Terminal (office with responsibilities for NextGen-
related activities); 
- Vice President, Technical Operations (office with responsibilities 
for NextGen-related activities); 
- Vice President, En Route and Oceanic (office with responsibilities 
for NextGen-related activities); 
- Vice President, System Operations (office with responsibilities for 
NextGen-related activities); 
* Senior Vice President, NextGen and Operations Planning (office with 
responsibilities for NextGen-related activities); 
- System Engineering and Safety (office with responsibilities for 
NextGen-related activities); 
- Modeling and Simulations (office with responsibilities for NextGen-
related activities); 
- Research and Technology Development (office with responsibilities for 
NextGen-related activities); 
- WJHTC Test and Evaluation (office with responsibilities for NextGen-
related activities); 
- Administration (office with responsibilities for NextGen-related 
activities); 
- Financial Operations (office with responsibilities for NextGen-
related activities); 
- OEP Integration and Implementation (office with responsibilities for 
NextGen-related activities); 
- Aviation Weather (office with responsibilities for NextGen-related 
activities); 
- Joint Planning and Development (office with responsibilities for 
NextGen-related activities). 

Source: FAA. 

[End of figure] 

According to FAA's NextGen Implementation Plan, under this new 
structure, JPDO will focus on long-term planning and cross-agency 
cooperation. Other offices within the NextGen and Operations Planning 
Office will carry out other aspects of implementing and planning for 
NextGen. It is too early to tell how the reorganization will affect 
JPDO's overall role or its ability to coordinate and act as an honest 
broker among the federal partners. According to a senior ATO official, 
the placement of JPDO with the NextGen and Operations Planning Office 
was discussed with the NextGen partner federal agencies prior to the 
announcement of the reorganization, and no objections to the move were 
expressed. 

FAA's Ability to Implement and Obtain Expected Benefits from NextGen 
Will Be Affected by Research and Development, Human Capital, and 
Infrastructure Challenges: 

A number of areas are central to FAA's ability to implement NextGen and 
thus realize the safety and efficiency gains that are expected for the 
nation's air transportation system. Applied research and development 
are important for implementation because they will help to reduce risk 
by better defining and demonstrating new capabilities, setting 
parameters for the certification of new systems, and informing 
decisions about the later transfer of systems to industry for 
deployment into the national airspace system. However, it is uncertain 
which entities will fund and conduct the research and development 
needed for NextGen. The research and development of some new 
technologies and procedures have reached the point in which they can be 
demonstrated in the national airspace. FAA has only recently initiated 
a project to deploy available NextGen technologies simultaneously in 
Florida to better demonstrate their capabilities and 
interrelationships. In addition, a human capital challenge to FAA's 
implementation of NextGen will be having personnel with the appropriate 
knowledge, skills, and training. Furthermore, to fully realize NextGen 
capabilities, a new configuration of ATC facilities and enhanced runway 
capacity will be required. 

Research and Development Funding Uncertainties and Research Gaps Exist: 

In the past, NASA performed a significant portion of aeronautics 
research and development. However, NASA's aeronautics research budget 
has been declining since the mid-1990s. As shown in figure 4, NASA's 
aeronautics research budget declined from about $959 million in 2004 to 
$511 million in 2008. While NASA still plans to focus some of its 
research on NextGen needs, the agency has moved toward a focus on 
fundamental research and away from developmental work and demonstration 
projects. As a result, in some cases, NASA's research focuses on 
developing technologies to a lower--and therefore less readily adopted-
-maturity level than in the past. According to NASA officials, about 
$280 million of its proposed $447 million aeronautics research budget 
proposed for fiscal year 2009 would contribute to NextGen efforts. Ten 
industry stakeholders told us that the "research gap" left by NASA's 
declining aeronautics research budget needs to be addressed. 

Figure 4: NASA's Aeronautics Research Budget for Fiscal Years 2003 
through 2008 and Proposed Budget through Fiscal Year 2013, in Constant 
2008 Dollars: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a line graph depicting the following data: 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Budget: $986 million; 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Budget: $959 million; 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Budget: $906 million; 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Budget: $884 million; 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Budget: $594 million; 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Budget: $512 million; 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Budget: $447 million; 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Budget: $448 million; 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Budget: $452 million; 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Budget: $457 million; 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Budget: $468 million. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

FAA has also determined that research gaps now exist as a result of 
both the administration's cuts to NASA's aeronautics research funding 
and the expanded requirements of NextGen. Budget requests for FAA have 
increased to help provide the needed research and development funding 
for NextGen. According to FAA, the agency will spend an estimated $740 
million on NextGen-related research and development during fiscal years 
2009 through 2013. The administration's proposed budget for fiscal year 
2009 requests $56.5 million for FAA research and development to support 
the integration and implementation of NextGen programs, a substantial 
increase over the $24.3 million authorized for fiscal year 2008. The 
actual and projected increases in FAA's overall research and 
development funding (see fig. 5) reflect the expected increases in 
NextGen research funding. 

Figure 5: FAA's Overall Research and Development Funding for Fiscal 
Years 2006 through 2008 and Proposed Funding through Fiscal Year 2013, 
in Constant 2008 Dollars: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a line graph depicting the following data: 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Funding: $137 million; 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Funding: $237 million; 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Funding: $271 million; 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Funding: $337 million; 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Funding: $419 million; 

Fiscal year:3152 million; 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Funding: $431 million; 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Funding: $436 million. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

One critical area in which a research and development gap has been 
identified is the environmental impact of aviation. According to a JPDO 
analysis, environmental impacts will be the primary constraint on the 
capacity and flexibility of the national airspace system unless these 
impacts are managed and mitigated. In proposed legislation 
reauthorizing FAA, $111 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 may 
be used for a new FAA program to help close the research and 
development gap and reduce aviation noise and emissions.[Footnote 19] 
This program--the Continuous Lower Energy, Emissions, and Noise (CLEEN) 
initiative--would facilitate over the next 10 years the development, 
maturation, and certification of improved airframe technologies. The 
CLEEN program, in which NASA would participate as an adviser, is 
intended to address the gap between NASA's fundamental research in 
noise reduction and the need for near-term demonstrations of 
technology. The program would establish a research consortium of 
government, industry, and academic participants that would allow for 
the maturation of these technologies via demonstration projects. 
[Footnote 20] 

Our work indicates that a research gap also exists in the area of human 
factors research. Human factors research explores what is known about 
people and their abilities, characteristics, and limitations in the 
design of the equipment they use, the environments in which they 
function, and the jobs they perform. Seven of eight stakeholders that 
discussed the issue expressed concern that NextGen plans do not 
adequately address human factors research. For example, a central 
assumption of the NextGen system is an increased reliance on 
automation, which dramatically changes the roles and responsibilities 
of both air traffic controllers and pilots. These changes in roles and 
responsibilities raise significant human factors issues for the safety 
and efficiency of the national airspace system. According to an FAA 
official, verbal communication is an example of a human factors area 
that requires further research and development. Currently, air traffic 
controllers primarily rely on verbal communication to direct aircraft. 
Because NextGen will rely more on data link and other automated 
communications, controllers will require training in both understanding 
and operating in an automated communications environment. The research 
to support such training has not been conducted, according to FAA. 
[Footnote 21] FAA plans to invest $180.4 million in human factors 
research from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2013. Furthermore, NASA 
recently adjusted the size of its human factors research staff starting 
in fiscal year 2005, reassigning some staff to other programs and 
reducing the contractor and academic technical support for human 
factors research. However, according to NASA, human factors research 
continues to be a critical component of its aeronautics research 
program, with activity focused at the foundational level. It remains to 
be seen if FAA's planned research and development in this area will 
offset NASA's reductions, since FAA's research is typically at a more 
applied level. 

To help bridge the gap between NASA's research and FAA's need to 
develop and implement new technology, the two agencies have developed a 
strategy to identify, conduct, and transfer to FAA the research and 
development needed for NextGen. The strategy initially establishes four 
"research transition teams"[Footnote 22] that align with JPDO's 
planning framework and outlines how the two agencies will jointly 
develop research requirements--FAA will provide user requirements, and 
NASA will conduct the research and provide an understanding of the 
engineering rationale for design decisions. In addition, the strategy 
calls for defining metrics for evaluating the research. According to 
JPDO, as of August 2008, the four teams had been established and held 
initial meetings. While these developments are positive steps, it is 
too early to tell if they will be effective in addressing NextGen's 
overall research needs. Unless NextGen's developmental research needs 
are met in a timely manner, the implementation of NextGen is also 
likely to be delayed, jeopardizing NextGen's goals of increased safety, 
efficiency, and capacity of the system. 

FAA and NASA have worked to identify the research and development that 
is needed for NextGen, including research on aviation's impact on the 
environment and human factors research, and have prioritized their 
individual research portfolios. However, JPDO has not yet determined 
what NextGen research and development needs to be done first and at 
what cost to demonstrate and integrate NextGen technologies into the 
national airspace system. JPDO's prioritization of research needs is an 
essential step in identifying the resources required to undertake 
needed research and development. One stakeholder suggested a risk-based 
approach to prioritization. Prioritization of research is critical to 
avoid spending limited funds on lower-priority efforts or conducting 
work out of sequence. As mentioned previously in this report, the next 
version of the Integrated Work Plan, scheduled to be released in 
September 2008, will be able to identify the sequencing of research 
that must be completed before specific NextGen capabilities can be 
implemented. This should provide a useful tool in prioritizing and 
tracking NextGen research. 

Regional Demonstrations Could Accelerate Integration and Adoption of 
NextGen Technologies: 

Some stakeholders are concerned that although new technologies and 
procedures are being researched and developed, they are not being 
implemented as quickly as needed to reach the goal of having NextGen in 
place by 2025. Thirteen industry stakeholders told us that technologies 
are available now that should be used immediately. Among the NextGen 
technologies and procedures that are already available, FAA has 
implemented a few individually, such as Continuous Descent Arrival 
(CDA)[Footnote 23] procedures in use in Los Angeles and Louisville and 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)[Footnote 24] in 
Alaska. In addition, FAA is working with a few airlines, such as United 
Parcel Service (UPS), which is installing ADS-B on all of its Boeing 
757 and 767 aircraft. The equipment will record and transmit each 
aircraft's speed, heading, altitude, and global positioning system 
coordinates to all other aircraft similarly equipped, allowing each to 
map the traffic around it. With fleetwide equipage of ADS-B, carriers 
such as UPS may be able to increase landing rates enough to justify the 
equipage costs, according to an aviation research organization. (Fig. 6 
shows examples of ADS-B in use.) In past work, we have reported that 
available NextGen technologies and procedures have not yet been 
deployed simultaneously to demonstrate that they can be operated safely 
as an integrated suite of technologies and procedures in the national 
airspace system.[Footnote 25] 

Figure 6: Example of Use of ADS-B: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of Use of ADS-B, as follows: 

Incoming aircraft: 
* ADS-B permits each aircraft to support the controller in maintaining 
3 mile separation for other aircraft; 
* With ADS-B, air traffic control's role is more productive, since the 
controller in monitoring traffic rather than directing traffic; 
* An aircraft without ADS-B will have to be directed by air traffic 
controllers on the ground to maintain separation from other aircraft; 
* Once aircraft has landed, ADS-B will help to avoid collision with 
other aircraft. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Eleven of 12 stakeholders who discussed the issue suggested that FAA 
consider a gradual rollout of NextGen technologies and procedures in a 
designated area. For example, ADS-B technologies; CDA, Area Navigation 
(RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) procedures;[Footnote 
26] and high-density airport operations could be deployed in a defined 
location, possibly in sequence over time, to test their combined use 
and demonstrate the safety and efficiency of an integrated suite of 
NextGen advancements. Such a graduated rollout is sometimes referred to 
as "NextGen lite." 

Along these lines, in June 2008, FAA signed a memorandum of agreement 
with the state of Florida and DayJet--a carrier that provides air taxi 
[Footnote 27] service--to establish a government and industry 
partnership for demonstrating NextGen technologies prior to national 
implementation. For the Florida demonstration, FAA, together with 
aviation equipment manufacturers and municipalities, will use the 
NextGen capabilities of ADS-B, RNAV, and RNP for an on-demand air taxi 
fleet's operations. As other NextGen capabilities, such as System-Wide 
Information Management (SWIM),[Footnote 28] are deployed and if the air 
taxi fleet's operations move to other airports and regions, the 
demonstration is expected to be expanded to include those new 
capabilities and other airports and regions. In addition, in June 2008, 
FAA signed an agreement with Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University to 
Support future research and demonstrations that are expected to lead to 
proof of concept and early implementation of NextGen capabilities, 
according to FAA. According to the airlines and other stakeholders we 
interviewed, a demonstration of the integration of NextGen capabilities 
and of efficiencies resulting from their use would give airlines an 
incentive to equip their aircraft with NextGen technologies. They could 
then lower their costs by reducing their fuel consumption and decrease 
the impact of their operations on the environment. Our research 
indicate that such regional or targeted demonstrations could accelerate 
the delivery of NextGen benefits while helping to ensure safe 
operations within the current system. By establishing benefits early in 
a program's development, demonstrations can increase stakeholders' 
confidence in the overall NextGen initiative and provide incentives for 
the aviation community to equip aircraft with compatible technology. 

NextGen Will Require New Skills and Abilities of FAA Personnel: 

FAA will need technical skills such as systems engineers and contract 
management expertise to implement NextGen. Because of the scope and 
complexity of the NextGen effort, the agency may not currently have the 
in-house expertise to manage the transition to NextGen without 
assistance. In November 2006, we recommended that FAA examine its 
strengths and weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and 
contract management expertise that will be required to define, 
implement, and integrate the numerous complex programs inherent in the 
transition to NextGen.[Footnote 29] In response to our recommendation, 
FAA contracted with NAPA to determine the mix of skills and number of 
skilled persons, such as technical personnel and program managers, 
needed to implement NextGen and to compare those requirements with 
FAA's current staff resources. In December 2007, NAPA provided FAA with 
its report on the types of skills that will be needed by FAA.[Footnote 
30] NAPA has undertaken a second part of the study to identify skill 
gaps between FAA's current staff and the staff that would be required 
to implement NextGen. NAPA officials told us that they expect to 
publish the findings of the second part of the study in September 2008. 
We believe that this is a reasonable approach that should help FAA 
begin to address this issue, recognizing that once the right skill set 
is identified, it may take considerable time to select, hire, and 
integrate what FAA estimates could be 150 to 200 more staff. This 
situation has the potential to contribute to delays in integrating new 
technologies and transforming the national airspace system. 

In addition, the implementation of NextGen will involve training 
personnel across FAA as new systems are brought online. NextGen entails 
an increased reliance on automation and changing roles for both air 
traffic controllers and pilots. In such an automated environment, some 
of the responsibilities of controllers will shift from air traffic 
control to air traffic management,[Footnote 31] and pilots will take on 
a greater share of the responsibility for maintaining safe separation 
between aircraft and other tasks currently performed by controllers. 
FAA's air traffic controllers and repair technicians will have to be 
trained to operate and maintain both the old and new systems as new 
technologies are gradually brought online. While 15 stakeholders told 
us that it was too early to begin training for new systems that are not 
close to deployment, 4 stakeholders who represent groups that would be 
using the new systems or teaching those users said that now was the 
time to begin developing the training to prepare FAA personnel and 
others for the changing operating procedures that will occur under 
NextGen. For example, one stakeholder noted that the educational 
community needs to be engaged now so that it can be prepared to teach 
future air traffic controllers and pilots. Another stakeholder believed 
that during the transition to NextGen, FAA would need training 
capabilities at each ATC facility for air traffic controllers who may 
be using both NextGen systems and legacy systems. While FAA believes 
that it is too early to begin such training, according to the agency, 
it began a strategic job analysis in fiscal year 2008 to determine how 
the controller's job will change as a result of NextGen. In fiscal year 
2009, the agency plans to conduct a strategic training analysis to 
identify training for controllers that will be needed to address those 
job changes. 

Facilities and Airport Limitations Present Challenges to Realizing the 
Full Potential of NextGen: 

To fully realize all of NextGen's capabilities, a new configuration of 
ATC facilities and enhanced runway capacity will be required. According 
to a senior ATO official, the agency plans to report on the cost 
implications of reconfiguring its facilities in 2009. However, FAA has 
not developed a comprehensive plan to reconfigure its facilities. Until 
the cost analysis is completed and the reconfiguration plan has been 
developed, the configurations needed for NextGen cannot be implemented 
and potential savings that could help offset the cost of NextGen will 
not be realized. Some FAA officials have said that planned facility 
maintenance and construction based on the current ATC system are 
significant cost drivers that could, without reconfiguration, 
significantly increase the cost of NextGen. 

In the meantime, FAA faces an immediate task to maintain and repair 
existing facilities so that the current ATC system continues to operate 
safely and reliably. The agency is currently responsible for 
maintaining over 400 terminal facilities. While FAA has not assessed 
the physical condition of all of these facilities, the agency rated the 
average condition of 89 of them as "fair," with some rated "good" and 
others "very poor." Based on its assessment of these 89 facilities, FAA 
estimated that a onetime cost of repair to all of its terminal 
facilities would range from $250 million to $350 million. Two FAA 
employee unions (NATCA and PASS) contend that these facilities are 
deteriorating because of lack of maintenance and that working 
conditions are unsafe because of leaking roofs, deteriorating walls and 
ceilings, and obsolete air-conditioning systems. According to FAA 
officials, while some of these facilities can accommodate the new 
technologies and systems of NextGen, many of them are not consistent 
with the configurations that will be needed under NextGen. Once FAA 
develops a facility reconfiguration plan that identifies facilities for 
consolidation, the costs of repairing and maintaining its facilities 
may be reduced. In the meantime, FAA will have to manage its budgetary 
resources so that it can maintain legacy systems and legacy 
infrastructure while configuring the national airspace system to 
accommodate NextGen technologies and operations. 

With regard to airport infrastructure, a transition to NextGen will 
also depend on the ability of airports to handle greater capacity. One 
way that FAA is endeavoring to increase airport runway capacity is its 
High-Density Terminal and Airport Operations initiative, which the 
agency has just begun to implement. Under this initiative, aircraft 
arriving and departing from different directions would be assigned to 
multiple runways and safely merged into continuous flows despite bad 
weather and low visibility. To guarantee safe separation between 
aircraft, these airports would need enhanced navigation capabilities 
and controllers with access to increased automation. Under this 
initiative, aircraft would also move more efficiently on the ground, 
using procedures that are under development to reduce spacing and 
separation requirements and improve the flow of air traffic into and 
out of busy metropolitan airspace. Although the implementation of this 
initiative is in the early stages, FAA has identified the research and 
development needed to move it forward. FAA has also identified runway 
safety technologies for accelerated implementation. 

The increases in capacity expected from the High-Density Terminal and 
Airport Operations initiative are not likely to be sufficient to handle 
the expected increases in traffic. As a result, new or expanded runways 
will likely be needed. FAA has developed a rolling 10-year plan for 
capacity improvements at the nation's 35 busiest airports, and some 
airports are building new runways. Moreover, FAA simulated the expected 
capacity enhancement of these currently planned runway improvements and 
the additional capacity gained through the implementation of some 
NextGen initiatives[Footnote 32] and found that by 2025, 14 airports 
will still need additional capacity. In addition, building new runways 
at some of these airports will present considerable obstacles. The 14 
airports are as follows: 

* Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International: 

* Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International: 

* John F. Kennedy International: 

* John Wayne-Orange County: 

* LaGuardia: 

* Long Beach-Daugherty Field: 

* McCarran International: 

* Metropolitan Oakland International: 

* Midway: 

* Newark Liberty International: 

* Philadelphia International: 

* Phoenix Sky Harbor International: 

* San Diego International: 

* San Francisco International: 

In part, as a result of the continuing need for runway development, 
some of the planning for NextGen includes reducing the environmental 
impact of aviation because of local community concerns about aviation 
emissions and noise. Thirteen industry stakeholders view community 
opposition to the environmental impacts of aviation as a key issue 
affecting the success of NextGen. Furthermore, state and local 
governments play a large role in providing needed support for expanding 
airport capacity for the national air transportation system. Without 
significant reductions in emissions and noise around the nation's 
airports and continuing efforts at all levels of government, efforts to 
expand airport capacity could be stalled and the implementation of 
NextGen delayed. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOT and NASA for their review and 
comments. Both agencies provided technical clarifications, which we 
incorporated into this report as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of 
Transportation, Defense, Commerce, and Homeland Security and the 
Administrators of NASA and FAA. We will also make copies available to 
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Bart Gordon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ralph Hall: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Science and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John Mica: 
Ranking Republican Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Jerry F. Costello: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thomas Petri: 
Ranking Republican Member: 
Subcommittee on Aviation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

In this report, we assessed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) 
ability to acquire and integrate new air traffic control (ATC) systems 
and transition to the next generation air transportation system 
(NextGen). Specifically, we established the following research 
questions: (1) What are the status and outcome of FAA's ATC systems 
acquisition activities? (2) What is the status of the key NextGen 
planning and transition issues? (3) What key challenges does FAA face 
in implementing NextGen? 

To determine the status and outcome of FAA's ATC systems acquisition 
activities, we updated acquisition baseline information on cost and 
schedule and we summarized our recent work on acquisition performance. 
[Footnote 33] To determine FAA's Air Traffic Organization's (ATO) 
progress in acquisitions management, we analyzed the trends for budget 
and schedule outcomes between the original baselines and current budget 
and schedule baselines for the acquisitions that ATO selected for 
performance reporting and monitoring from fiscal years 2004 through 
2008. We also drew upon past work in which we undertook detailed 
reviews of the status of ATC acquisition programs, and obtained updated 
information as necessary from FAA by reviewing documents and 
interviewing agency officials. Through discussions with ATO officials, 
we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of our report. 

To determine the status of the key NextGen planning and transition 
issues and key challenges facing FAA in implementing NextGen, we 
interviewed senior ATO and Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) 
officials. We also reviewed relevant literature and JPDO publications, 
including JPDO's Concept of Operations, Enterprise Architecture, and 
Integrated Work Plan, and previous GAO reports on NextGen. In addition, 
we obtained the views of key nonfederal aviation stakeholders involved 
with NextGen and JPDO on the progress of, and challenges to achieving 
and planning for, the transition to NextGen. We identified those key 
stakeholders who, by virtue of their positions, possessed special 
knowledge that they were willing to share with us through formal 
interviews. We selected a sample of 24 key stakeholders from various 
categories of the community of aviation stakeholders. Within the 
categories (e.g., manufacturers, operators, airports, air traffic 
controllers, pilots, and academia) we balanced the selection of 
stakeholders to capture the views of the different stakeholder 
categories. The key stakeholders were representatives from the 
following organizations: 

* Aerospace Industries Association of America: 

* American Association of Airport Executives: 

* Airports Council International - North America: 

* Airbus: 

* Air Line Pilots Association: 

* Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association: 

* Air Transport Association: 

* Air Traffic Control Association: 

* Boeing Company: 

* Cargo Airline Association: 

* Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University: 

* Flight Safety Foundation: 

* General Aviation Manufacturers Association: 

* Honeywell: 

* ITT Corporation: 

* Lockheed-Martin: 

* National Association of State Aviation Officials: 

* National Air Traffic Controllers Association: 

* National Business Aviation Association: 

* Professional Aviation Safety Specialists: 

* Regional Airline Association: 

* Raytheon: 

* Rockwell-Collins: 

* RTCA (formerly known as the Radio Technical Corporation of America): 

We conducted the stakeholder interviews using open-ended questions 
arranged by topics with standard probe notes to help ensure consistent 
results. The topics included stakeholder participation in NextGen, JPDO 
activities, the transition to NextGen, training, environmental issues, 
and research and development. With the permission of stakeholders, we 
recorded the interviews and had them professionally transcribed. The 
information contained in the transcripts was analyzed and coded into 
response categories for each topic. A reviewer checked the resulting 
categories and coded responses and, when interpretations differed, 
agreement was reached between the initial coder and the reviewer. The 
result of this content analysis is found in appendix II. 

We then obtained further information related to the stakeholder 
responses by conducting interviews with representatives of relevant 
NextGen partner agencies--JPDO, FAA, and the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA). We also obtained and reviewed relevant 
documentation from these agencies, including research and development 
budget documents from FAA and NASA. We did not obtain further 
information from the other federal partners--the Departments of 
Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security and the White House Office of 
Science and Technology Policy--because the stakeholders did not 
articulate issues related to those agencies. We also interviewed 
representatives from the National Academy of Public Administration to 
obtain information on their work related to FAA's skill needs for 
NextGen. In addition, we summarized information on NextGen 
environmental issues from our recent report and testimony.[Footnote 34] 

We conducted our performance audit from July 2007 to September 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Stakeholder Responses to Semistructured GAO Interview 
Questions: 

Interview topics and answer categories: 

Stakeholder participation: Opportunity to participate; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 21;
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 1; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 2. 

Stakeholder participation: Participation involved input to decision 
making; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 2; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 13; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 9. 

Stakeholder participation: Satisfaction with the amount of 
participation; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 7; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 14; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 3. 

Views on NextGen: Presents a vision of high-level goals; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 15; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 2; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 7. 

Views on NextGen: Presents a programmatic path to high-level goals; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 0; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 23; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 1. 

Views on NextGen: Agreement that NextGen will reduce congestion; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 10; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 5; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 9. 

Views on NextGen: Congressional actions are needed for the transition 
to NextGen; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 18; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 1; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 5. 

JPDO planning documents: Have been reviewed by the individual or 
organization; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 22; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 0; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 2. 

JPDO planning documents: Useful for organizational or individual 
decision making; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 2; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 19; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 3. 

JPDO planning documents: Understood by policymakers; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 1; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 8; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 15. 

JPDO achievements: Provided a vision of a high-level end state; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 13; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 6; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 5. 

JPDO achievements: Developed planning documents for NextGen; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 16; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 2; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 6. 

JPDO achievements: Coordinated multiagency efforts; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 5; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 3; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 16. 

Avionics equipage: Advantages of incentives mentioned; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 17; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 1; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 7. 

Avionics equipage: Advantages of mandates mentioned; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 12; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 5; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 7. 

Avionics equipage: Organization has made plans or investments to 
accommodate need for avionics equipage; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 8; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 7; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 9. 

Training: Is an issue to be considered at some point, but it is too 
soon to take definite steps to address; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 15; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 1; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 7. 

Training: Is an issue that can be addressed immediately; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 4; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 0; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 21. 

Environmental issues: Noise is a key issue affecting the success of 
NextGen; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 16; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 1; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 7. 

Environmental issues: Emissions are a key issue affecting the success 
of NextGen; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 17; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 0; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 7. 

Environmental issues: Water pollution is a key issue affecting the 
success of NextGen; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 3; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 0; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 21. 

Environmental issues: Construction of buildings and runways are key 
issues affecting the success of NextGen; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 13; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 0; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 11. 

Environmental issues: Community opposition to the environmental impact 
of aviation is a key issue affecting the success of NextGen; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 13; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 0; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 11. 

Transition to NextGen: FAA has adequate expertise available for the 
transition; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 4; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 10; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 10. 

Transition to NextGen: FAA needs a "lead systems integrator" for the 
transition; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 3; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 3; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 18. 

Transition to NextGen: JPDO has the expertise available to help in the 
transition; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 5; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 8; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 11. 

Governance structure for NextGen: Current Operational Evolution 
Partnership (OEP) organization adequate for the transition; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 0; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 10; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 14. 

Governance structure for NextGen: JPDO's authority is adequate for its 
planning and coordination function; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 3; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 8; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 13. 

Governance structure for NextGen: FAA currently has the leadership in 
place for the transition to NextGen; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 3; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 13; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 8. 

Governance structure for NextGen: FAA, JPDO, and OEP have the 
leadership team needed for the transition to NextGen;
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 0; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 8; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 16. 

Governance structure for NextGen: The authority structure between FAA 
and JPDO is adequate for the transition to NextGen; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 0; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 8; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 16. 

Research and development: The "research gap" needs to be addressed; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 10; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 0; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 14. 

Research and development: Current plans and implementing operations do 
not adequately address human factors; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 7; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 1; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 16. 

Research and development: Technologies are available that should be 
used immediately; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 13; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 0; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 11. 

Research and development: Demonstrations, including regional 
implementation of technology, are needed; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Yes: 11; 
Number of stakeholders responding: No: 1; 
Number of stakeholders responding: Indecisive or no response: 12. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: ATC Acquisition Performance: 

Dollars in millions: 

Program: Free Flight Phase 2 Traffic Management Advisor - Single 
Center; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $135.5; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 55; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $135.5; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
64; 
Variances: Cost variance: $0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: (9) (16.4%) behind schedule. 

Program: Airport Surface Detection Equipment - Model X; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $424.3; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 108; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $550.1; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
118; 
Variances: Cost variance: ($44.9) (8.9%) over budget; 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: (10) (2.4%) behind schedule. 

Program: Airport Surface Detection Equipment - Model X Upgrade Sites 
with Multilateration; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $80.9; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 79; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: [Empty]; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
[Empty]; 
Variances: Cost variance: [Empty]; 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: [Empty]. 

Program: Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator Replacement; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $282.9; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 90; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $255.1; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
142; 
Variances: Cost variance: $27.8 (9.8%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: (52) (57.8%) behind schedule. 

Program: En Route Automation Modernization; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $2,154.6; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 90; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $2,154.6; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
90; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0 (0.0%). 

Program: FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $310.2; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 102; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $318.8; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
114; 
Variances: Cost variance: ($8.6) (2.8%) over budget; 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: (12) (11.8%) behind schedule. 

Program: Next Generation Air-to-Ground Communication System Segment 1a; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $318.4; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 124; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $324.7; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
160; 
Variances: Cost variance: ($6.3) (2.0%) over budget; 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: (36) (29.0%) behind schedule. 

Program: Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $2,769.5; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 135; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $2,719.2; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
135; 
Variances: Cost variance: $50.3 (1.8%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0; (0.0%). 

Program: Wide Area Augmentation System; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $3,339.6; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 55; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $3,339.6; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
55; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0 (0.0%). 

Program: Airport Surveillance Radar - Model 11; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $916.2; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 172; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $696.5; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
157; 
Variances: Cost variance: $219.7 (24.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 15 (8.7%). 

Program: Aviation Surface Weather Observation Network; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $403.8; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 218; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $384.3; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
254; 
Variances: Cost variance: $19.5 (4.8%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: (36) (16.5%) behind schedule. 

Program: Integrated Terminal Weather System; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $286.1; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 147; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $286.1; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
147; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0 (0.0%). 

Program: FSAS Operational and Supportability Implementation System; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $249.4; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 101; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $169.0; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
91; 
Variances: Cost variance: $80.4 (32.2%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 10 (9.9%). 

Program: National Airspace System Infrastructure Management System- 
Phase 2; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $90.2; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 76; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $90.2; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
90; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: (14) (18.4%) behind schedule. 

Program: ASR-9/Mode S SLEP Phase 1A External Modifications; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $14.3; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 52; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $15.5; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
38; 
Variances: Cost variance: ($1.2) (8.4%) over budget; 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 14 (26.9%). 

Program: ASR-9/Mode S SLEP Phase 1B Transmitter Modifications;
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $57.9; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 65; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $57.9; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
65; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0 (0.0%). 

Program: Instrument Flight Procedures Automation; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $50.8; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 60; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $50.8; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
60; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0 (0.0%). 

Program: Terminal Automation Modernization Replacement; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $139.5; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 29; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $139.5; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
29; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0 (0.0%). 

Program: Voice Switch and Control System Tech Refresh Phase 2; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $83.8; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 70; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $83.8; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
70; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0 (0.0%). 

Program: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast Segments 1 & 2; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $1,678.2; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 85; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $1,678.2; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
85; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0 (0.0%). 

Program: Traffic Flow Management-Infrastructure; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $398.1; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 56; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $398.1; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
56; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0 (0.0%). 

Program: System-Wide Information Management; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $96.6; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 39; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $96.6; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
39; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0 (0.0%). 

Program: Terminal Doppler Weather Radar SLEP; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $55.4; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 77; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $55.4; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
77; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0 (0.0%). 

Program: Ultra High Frequency Replacement; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $85.1; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 94; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $85.1; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
130; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: (36) (38.3%) behind schedule. 

Program: En Route Control Center System Modernization; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $201.9; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 69; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $167.9; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
45; 
Variances: Cost variance: $34.0 (16.8%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 24 (34.8%). 

Program: Voice Recorder Replacement Program Next Generation; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $48.1; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 80; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $48.1; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
80; 
Variances: Cost variance: 0.0 (0.0%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: 0 (0.0%). 

Program: Total; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Cost: $14,671.3; 
Baseline status as of February 2004: Schedule duration in months: 
2,328; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Cost: $14,300.6; 
Estimate at completion as of June 2008: Schedule duration in months: 
2,391; 
Variances: Cost variance: $370.7 (2.5%); 
Variances: Schedule variance in months: (63) (2.7%) behind schedule. 

Source: FAA. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV Baseline History for Programs Selected for Acquisition 
Performance Measurement: 

Dollars in millions: 

Program: Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Feb-96; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Oct-05; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: $940.2; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Oct-99; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Sep-08; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $1,402.6; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: May-04; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: Dec-07; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: $2,769.5. 

Program: Next Generation Air-to-Ground Communication System; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Sep-98; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Sep-08; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: $407.6; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: May-00; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Sep-10; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $318.4; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Dec-05; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: Sep-13; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: $324.7. 

Program: Operational and Supportability Implementation System; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Dec-96; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Aug-01; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 174.7; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Mar-00; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: May-05; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $249.5; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Feb-05; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: Jul-04; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: $169.0. 

Program: Integrated Terminal Weather System; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Jun-97; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Jul-03; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 276.1; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Aug-01; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Oct-03; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $282.3; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Jun-04; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: Apr-09; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: $286.1. 

Program: Wide Area Augmentation System; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Jan-98; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Aug-99; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 1,006.6; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Dec-99; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Dec-06; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $2,978.0; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: May-04; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: Dec-08; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: $3,339.7. 

Program: FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Jul-99; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Dec-08; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 205.7; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Dec-04; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Dec-07; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $310.2; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Aug-06; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: Dec-08; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: $318.8. 

Program: Aviation Surface Weather Observation Network; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Oct-99; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Apr-02; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 350.9; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Aug-01; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Sep-09; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $403.8; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Jun-06; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: Sep-12; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: $384.3. 

Program: National Airspace System Infrastructure Management System- 
Phase 2; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: May-00; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Sep-05; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 172.9; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Mar-06; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Sep-06; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $90.2; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Mar-07; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: Nov-07; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: $90.2. 

Program: Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator Replacement; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Aug-97; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Sep-04; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 282.9; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Jan-02; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Jan-06; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $282.9; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: May-08; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: May-10; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: $255.1. 

Program: Weather and Radar Processor; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Dec-96; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Feb-00; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 126.4; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Oct-99; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Feb-01; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $143.6; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Radio Control Equipment; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Oct-98; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Dec-01; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 260.4; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: N/A; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Sep-03; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $260.4; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Airport Surveillance Radar - Model 11; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Nov-97; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Sep-05; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 743.3; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Sep-05; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Sep-09; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $696.5; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Local Area Augmentation System; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Jan-98; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Dec-06; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 536.1; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Dec-99; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Oct-11; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $696.0; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: HOST/Oceanic Computer System Replacement; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Mar-98; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Sep-08; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 424.1; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: May-03; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Jun-04; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $368.5; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Airport Movement Area Safety System; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Oct-98; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Aug-00; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 74.1; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Mar-00; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Sep-02; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $151.7; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Low-Level Wind Shear Alert System; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Oct-98; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Oct-01; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 43.5; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: May-01; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Jun-04; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $52.6; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Airport Surface Detection Equipment - Model X (ASDE-X); 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Sep-01; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Jan-07; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 505.2[B]; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Sep-05; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: May-11; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $550.1; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Ultra High Frequency Replacement; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Nov-02; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Sep-10; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 85.1;
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: Dec-05; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: Sep-13; 
First rebaseline: Revised budget: $85.1; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Mar-99; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Dec-05; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 166.7; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Backup Emergency Communications; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Mar-00; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Apr-04; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 54.1; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: May-01; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Mar-06; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 548.2; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Precision Runway Monitor; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Dec-01; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Dec-05; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 145.8; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: En Route Communication Gateway; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Mar-02; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Dec-05;
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 315.1; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: User Request Evaluation Tool; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Jun-02; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Sep-06; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 285.3; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Traffic Management Advisor; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Jun-02; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Sep-07; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 135.5; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: En Route Automation Modernization; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Jun-03; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Dec-10; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 2,154.6; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: En Route System Modernization; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Aug-03; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: May-09; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 201.9; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Traffic Flow Management-Infrastructure; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Aug-05; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Apr-10; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 398.1; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Voice Recorder Replacement Program Next Generation; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Apr-07; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: May-13; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 48.1; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Weather Systems Processor Tech Refresh; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Mar-06; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Feb-09; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 6.1; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Program: Voice Switching and Control System Tech Refresh Phase 2; 
Original schedule and budget: Start date: Aug-06; 
Original schedule and budget: Completion date: Jun-12; 
Original schedule and budget: Budget: 83.8; 
First rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
First rebaseline: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: New APB[A] date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised completion date: [Empty]; 
Second rebaseline: Revised budget: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of FAA data. 

Note: The Integrated Terminal Weather System program was rebaselined in 
2007 with a new APB date of November 2007, a new program completion 
date of April 2009, and a budget of $286.1 million. 

[A] APB: acquisition program baseline. 

[B] Includes $80.9 million for the ASDE-3X baseline approved in June 
2002, which added ASDE-X capabilities to seven ASDE-3 sites. The ASDE- 
X and ASDE-3X acquisitions were combined in the September 2005 
rebaselining. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, individuals making key 
contributions to this report include Teresa Spisak (Assistant 
Director), Kevin Egan, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Brandon Haller, Bert 
Japikse, Edmond Menoche, Faye Morrison, Colleen Phillips, Taylor 
Reeves, and Richard Scott. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA's Acquisition Management Has 
Improved, but Policies and Oversight Need Strengthening to Help Ensure 
Results, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-23] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2004); National Airspace System: FAA Has 
Made Progress but Continues to Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air 
Traffic Control Systems, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-05-331] (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005); National 
Airspace System: Transformation Will Require Cultural Change, Balanced 
Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available Management Tools, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-154] (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct.14, 2005); and Air Traffic Control: FAA Reports Progress in 
System Acquisitions, but Changes in Performance Measurement Could 
Improve Usefulness of Information, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-42] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2007). 

[2] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-331]. 

[3] Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Air 
Traffic Control Modernization: FAA Faces Challenges in Managing Ongoing 
Projects, Sustaining Existing Facilities, and Introducing New 
Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2008), and Status of FAA's 
Major Acquisitions: Cost Growth and Schedule Delays Continue To Stall 
Air Traffic Modernization (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005). 

[4] Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 
108-176, ï¿½ 709. The office began operating in early 2004. 

[5] Airport Surveillance Radar Model 11 was originally estimated to 
cost $916.2 million to acquire 112 systems; the estimated cost at 
completion was reduced to $696.5 million to acquire 66 systems. 
Similarly, FSAS Operations and Supportability System was originally 
estimated to cost $249.4 million for installations at 61 sites; the 
estimated cost at completion was reduced to $169.0 million for 
installations at 16 sites. 

[6] Our recent work raised questions about the reliability of some ERAM 
contractor data. We recommended that the ERAM program office determine 
the root causes of the anomalies we found in the contactor's data and 
develop a corrective action plan to resolve the problem. GAO, Air 
Traffic Control: FAA Uses Earned Value Techniques to Help Manage 
Information Technology Acquisitions, but Needs to Clarify Policy and 
Strengthen Oversight, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
08-756] (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2008). 

[7] Earned value management compares the actual work performed at 
certain stages of a job to its actual costs--rather than comparing 
budgeted and actual costs, the traditional management approach to 
assessing progress. By measuring the value of the work that has been 
completed at certain stages in a job, earned value management can alert 
program managers, contractors, and administrators to potential cost 
growth and schedule delays and to problems that need correcting before 
they worsen. 

[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-756]. 

[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-42]. For 
additional reports on rebaselining, see GAO, Information Technology: 
Agencies Need to Establish Comprehensive Policies to Address Changes to 
Projects' Cost, Schedule, and Performance Goals, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-925] (Washington, D.C.: July 
31, 2008), and GAO-08-756. 

[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-42]. 

[11] This figure includes costs to other federal agencies that will 
acquire or help develop NextGen systems, such as the Transportation 
Security Administration within the Department of Homeland Security. 

[12] The Concept of Operations describes how the NextGen system is 
envisioned to operate in 2025 and beyond and identifies key research 
and policy issues. The Enterprise Architecture is a technical 
description of the NextGen system, akin to blueprints for a building; 
it is meant to provide a common tool for planning and understanding the 
complex, interrelated systems that will make up NextGen. JPDO's 
Integrated Work Plan is akin to a project plan and is meant to describe 
the capabilities needed to transition to NextGen from the current 
system and provide the research, policy, regulation, and acquisition 
timelines necessary to achieve NextGen by 2025. 

[13] We interviewed 24 industry stakeholders, but not all individuals 
responded to all questions. 

[14] The nine working groups are Airport, Security, Air Navigation 
Services, Aircraft, Net-centric Operations, Safety, Environment, 
Weather, and Global Harmonization. 

[15] The working groups replaced integrated product teams (IPT) in 
early 2007. The working groups had the same participants as the IPTs, 
but each working group was led jointly by government and industry. JPDO 
expected the working groups to be more efficient and output-or product- 
focused than the IPTs. 

[16] See GAO, Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program 
Managers Needed to Improve Outcomes, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-110] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2005). In this study 
of private sector best practices that could be applied to federal 
programs, we found that program managers at highly successful companies 
were empowered to decide whether programs were ready to move forward 
and to resolve problems and implement solutions. In addition, program 
managers were held accountable for their choices. 

[17] GAO, Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on JPDO and 
the Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status and Issues, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-918R] (Washington, 
D.C.: May 29, 2007). 

[18] H.R. 2881, ï¿½ 202. 

[19] H.R. 2881, ï¿½ 505. 

[20] GAO, Aviation and the Environment: FAA's and NASA's Research and 
Development Plans for Noise Reduction Are Aligned but the Prospects of 
Achieving Noise Reduction Goals Are Uncertain, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-384] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 
15, 2008). 

[21] FAA agreed with this statement, but noted that significant 
research on the use of data link and other automated communications has 
been conducted by FAA and others for the en route environment. 

[22] The four teams are organized along the framework for near-, mid-, 
and long-term research goals established in JPDO's Integrated Work 
Plan. The teams are Separation Management, Trajectory Management, Flow 
Contingency Management, and Capacity Management. 

[23] CDA allows aircraft to remain at cruise altitudes longer as they 
approach destination airports, use lower power levels, and thereby 
lower emissions and noise during landings. 

[24] ADS-B is a satellite aircraft navigation system that is designed, 
along with other navigation technologies, to enable more precise 
control of aircraft during en route flight, approach, and descent. 

[25] GAO, Aviation and the Environment: NextGen and Research and 
Development Are Keys to Reducing Emissions and Their Impact on Health 
and Climate, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-706T] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2008). 

[26] RNAV equipment can compute an airplane's position, actual track, 
and ground speed, and then provide meaningful information on the route 
of flight selected by the pilot. RNP will permit the airplane to 
descend on a precise route that will allow it to avoid populated areas, 
reduce its consumption of fuel, and lower its emissions of carbon 
dioxide and nitrogen oxides. 

[27] Air taxis are small aircraft that can be hired to provide per- 
seat, point-to-point air transportation service, either on demand or on 
scheduled flights. 

[28] SWIM is information management architecture for the national 
airspace system, acting as its "World Wide Web." SWIM will manage 
surveillance, weather, and flight data, as well as aeronautical and 
system status information, and will provide the information securely to 
users. 

[29] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and 
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace 
System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-25] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006). 

[30] National Academy of Public Administration, Workforce Needs 
Analysis for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NEXTGEN): 
Preliminary Findings and Observations (Washington, D.C.: December 
2007). 

[31] With current air traffic control, controllers handle individual 
planes through various phases of flight. Under air traffic management, 
controllers would likely oversee a greater number of planes but with 
less direct communication with each pilot. Controllers would monitor 
air traffic as a whole and intervene when necessary to avoid problems. 

[32] The NextGen concepts that were included in the simulation included 
revised separation standards, independent operations on closely spaced 
parallel runways, reduced in-trail wake vortex separation requirements, 
and the use of equivalent visual techniques. 

[33] GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA Reports Progress in System 
Acquisitions, but Changes in Performance Measurement Could Improve 
Usefulness of Information, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-42] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2007). 

[34] GAO, Aviation and the Environment: FAA's and NASA's Research and 
Development Plans for Noise Reduction Are Aligned but the Prospects of 
Achieving Noise Reduction Goals Are Uncertain, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-384] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 
15, 2008), and Aviation and the Environment: NextGen and Research and 
Development Are Keys to Reducing Emissions and Their Impact on Health 
and Climate, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-706T] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2008). 

[End of section] 

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