Review of the Transportation Security Administration's Air Cargo 
Screening Exemptions Report (15-AUG-08, GAO-08-1055R).		 
                                                                 
This report formally transmits the attached briefing in response 
to section 1602(b) of the Implementing Recommendations of the	 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The act requires the Comptroller	 
General to provide an assessment of the methodology used by the  
Secretary of Homeland Security for maintaining, changing or	 
eliminating an exemption under 49 U.S.C. 44901(i)(1). We provided
the mandated reporting committees with a restricted version of	 
this briefing in July 2008. Based on the results of our review,  
we are not making any recommendations for congressional 	 
consideration or agency action. All information considered	 
Sensitive Security Information by the Transportation Security	 
Administration has been removed from this product.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-1055R					        
    ACCNO:   A83560						        
  TITLE:     Review of the Transportation Security Administration's   
Air Cargo Screening Exemptions Report				 
     DATE:   08/15/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Aircraft safety					 
	     Aviation						 
	     Aviation security					 
	     Cargo screening					 
	     Cargo security					 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Passenger screening				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Requirements definition				 
	     Risk management					 
	     Security threats					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Transportation legislation 			 
	     Transportation policies				 
	     Transportation safety				 
	     Travel						 
	     Air travel 					 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-08-1055R
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to [email protected]. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Washington, DC 20548: 

August 15, 2008: 

Congressional Committees: 

Subject: Review of the Transportation Security Administration's Air 
Cargo Screening Exemptions Report: 

This report formally transmits the attached briefing in response to 
section 1602(b) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007. The act requires the Comptroller General to 
provide an assessment of the methodology used by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security for maintaining, changing or eliminating an exemption 
under 49 U.S.C. ï¿½ 44901(i)(1). We provided the mandated reporting 
committees with a restricted version of this briefing in July 2008. 
Based on the results of our review, we are not making any 
recommendations for congressional consideration or agency action. All 
information considered Sensitive Security Information by the 
Transportation Security Administration has been removed from this 
product. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested 
parties. This report will also be available at no charge on our Web 
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Should you or your staff have 
any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-
3404 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Key contributors to this report were Steve Morris, 
Assistant Director; Lara Kaskie; Thomas Lombardi; Meg Ullengren; and 
Margaret Vo. 

Signed by: 

Cathleen A. Berrick: 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Peter T. King: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure: Briefing Slides: 

Review of the Transportation Security Administrationï¿½s (TSA) Air Cargo 
Screening Exemptions Report: 

Briefing to Congressional Committees: 

July 8, 2008: 

Overview: 

* Introduction; 
* Objectives, Scope, and Methodology; 
* Summary; 
* Background; 
* Results; 
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation; 

Introduction: 

Section 1602(b) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53) requires TSA to submit to 
the appropriate committees of Congress and GAO a report containing an 
assessment of each exemption granted under 49 U.S.C. ï¿½ 44901(i)(1) for 
the screening of cargo transported on passenger aircraft and an 
analysis of the risk of maintaining each exemption. The report is 
required to include (1) the rationale for each exemption; (2) the 
percentage of cargo not screened in accordance with 49 U.S.C. ï¿½ 
44901(g) (which defines ï¿½screeningï¿½ in this context to mean a physical 
examination or nonintrusive method of assessing whether cargo poses a 
threat to transportation security); (3) the impact of each exemption on 
aviation security; (4) the projected impact on the flow of commerce of 
eliminating an exemption; and (5) plans and rationale for maintaining, 
changing, or eliminating each exemption. 

Section 1602(b) of the act also requires GAO to provide an assessment 
of the methodology of determinations made by TSA for maintaining, 
changing, or eliminating an exemption under section 44901(i)(1). 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

In conducting our study, we reviewed TSAï¿½s methodology for determining 
which air cargo screening exemptions to maintain, revise, or eliminate. 
Specifically, our objectives were to determine: 

1) the extent to which TSAï¿½s methodology for determining whether to 
maintain, revise, or eliminate an exemption addresses the requirements 
set forth in the act was risk-based and was consistent with the mission 
of TSAï¿½s air cargo program to balance security with the flow of 
commerce; and: 

2) any challenges TSA may face in implementing its plans to maintain, 
revise or eliminate air cargo screening exemptions, and potential 
vulnerabilities that may continue to exist as a result of cargo being 
exempt from physical screening. 

This review is focused on TSA's air cargo screening exemptions 
report.[Footnote 1] In conducting our study, we:

* Reviewed TSAï¿½s Air Cargo Strategic Plan, security directives, and 
other documents that provide details on existing air cargo screening 
exemptions to obtain an understanding of TSAï¿½s current air cargo 
screening requirements. 

* Compared the results from TSA's report to our previous 
findings[Footnote 2] on air cargo screening exemptions to determine 
whether the continued use of alternative means to secure air cargo 
exempt from physical screening[Footnote 3] may result in any 
vulnerabilities, as identified by TSA and other stakeholders. 

Assessed the extent to which TSA sought to balance security with the 
flow of commerce when analyzing the exemptions, consistent with the 
mission of the agencyï¿½s air cargo program.

Met with TSA officials to: 

* determine the extent to which TSA addressed the reporting 
requirements set forth in the act and to determine the agencyï¿½s 
methodology for completing its assessment; 

* discuss the extent to which the agency used risk assessments when 
conducting its review of air cargo screening exemptions (GAO did not 
conduct an independent review of TSAï¿½s risk assessments); and: 

* discuss the extent to which the agency may face challenges as it 
proceeds with its plans to maintain, revise, or eliminate air cargo 
screening exemptions. 

Contacted air cargo associations to determine their input, if any, to 
TSAï¿½s assessment.

We provided the mandated reporting committees with a restricted version 
of this briefing in July 2008. All information considered Sensitive 
Security Information[Footnote 4] by TSA has been removed from this 
product. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 to July 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our 
audit objectives. 

Summary: 

TSAï¿½s report addresses the five key areas required by section 1602(b) 
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007,[Footnote 5] and its methodology was consistent with TSAï¿½s mission 
for the air cargo program to balance security with the flow of 
commerce. As part of their assessment, TSA officials stated that they 
considered and determined the threat to and vulnerability of the 
exempted cargo types, and relied primarily on professional judgment for 
determining which screening exemptions to revise, maintain, or 
eliminate.[Footnote 6] However, TSA has yet to complete its air cargo 
vulnerability assessments, which could help to identify potential 
security vulnerabilities associated with the exemptions. Without such 
information, TSA is limited in its ability to make risk-based decisions 
regarding the security of air cargo. TSA acknowledges the importance of 
completing air cargo vulnerability assessments and has plans to 
complete additional assessments by the end of calendar year 2009. 

TSA may face potential resource challenges as the agency moves forward 
with its plans to maintain, revise or eliminate domestic and outbound 
screening exemptions. In addition, TSA has not yet assessed the 
potential vulnerabilities posed by inbound air cargo screening 
exemptions, which are similar to those posed to domestic and outbound 
air cargo.[Footnote 7] 

Background: 

According to TSAï¿½s Air Cargo Strategic Plan, issued in November 2003, 
the agencyï¿½s mission for the air cargo program is to secure the air 
cargo transportation system while not unduly impeding the flow of 
commerce. 

Participants in the air cargo transportation system include individuals 
and businesses that ship their cargo on all-cargo and passenger 
aircraft, freight forwarders that consolidate shipments and deliver 
them to air carriers, and passenger and all-cargo air carriers that use 
their cargo facilities to store cargo until it is placed onboard an 
aircraft for transport. 

Assessing risk, a critical component of a risk-management approach in a 
homeland security setting, typically involves three key elements-
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences-that provide input into the 
decision-making process for homeland security.[Footnote 8] 

In October 2005 and April 2007, we reported that TSA had established 
requirements for air carriers to randomly screen air cargo, but had 
exempted some domestic, outbound, and inbound cargo from 
screening.[Footnote 9] Among other things, we identified potential 
vulnerabilities resulting from these exemptions and recommended that 
TSA examine the rationale for existing screening exemptions and 
determine whether such exemptions left the air cargo system 
unacceptably vulnerable. Since we have issued these reports, TSA has 
revised some of its screening exemptions for domestic and outbound air 
cargo carried on passenger aircraft. TSA has not revised its screening 
exemptions for inbound air cargo. 

In accordance with section 1602(a) of the Implementing Recommendations 
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, TSA is developing a system to 
physically screen 50 percent of air cargo originating in the United 
States carried on passenger aircraft by February 2009 and 100 percent 
of such cargo by August 2010.[Footnote 10] 

To meet this requirement, TSA has begun development of a Certified 
Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), which is to allow Certified Cargo 
Screening Facilities (CCSFs) to screen cargo prior to acceptance by a 
freight forwarder or air carrier. Manufacturing facilities and freight 
forwarders, among others, can apply to become a CCSF. In January 2008, 
TSA initiated its pilot test of the CCSP in three cities, which 
includes identifying participants for the voluntary program. TSA plans 
to expand the pilot to up to six additional cities during the first 
half of 2008. 

Results - Finding 1: 

TSAï¿½s Report Addresses the Requirements Set Forth in the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act: 

TSAï¿½s report addresses the five key areas required by the act: 

1. the rationale for each exemption; 

2. the percentage of cargo not screened in accordance with 49 U.S.C. ï¿½ 
44901(g); 

3. the impact of each exemption on aviation security; 

4. the projected impact on the flow of commerce of eliminating an 
exemption; and: 

5. the plans and rationale for maintaining, changing, or eliminating 
each exemption. 

According to TSAï¿½s report and subsequent discussions with agency 
officials, TSA plans to maintain six screening exemption categories, 
make revisions to two categories, and eliminate another two categories. 
TSA officials stated that the changes to the screening exemptions will 
be effective as of January 2009. 

Although TSAï¿½s report does not specifically provide a percentage of 
cargo not screened in accordance with 49 U.S.C. ï¿½ 44901(g), it does 
provide details on the types of such cargo not screened. In addition, 
TSA officials told us that they believe that approximately 5 percent of 
cargo carried on passenger aircraft will not be physically screened in 
accordance with 49 U.S.C. ï¿½ 44901(g) after the changes to the 
exemptions are implemented in January 2009. 

TSA Incorporated Elements of a Risk-Based Approach When Determining 
Whether to Maintain, Revise, or Eliminate Each Screening Exemption, But 
Has Not Completed Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessments: 

According to TSA officials, the agency used the results of select air 
cargo vulnerability assessments as well as compliance inspection 
results when determining which screening exemptions to maintain, 
revise, or eliminate; and also considered the introduction of an 
explosive device on a passenger aircraft, which the agency has 
identified as the primary threat to such cargo. 

In October 2005 and in April 2007,[Footnote 11] we reported that TSA 
had not conducted an assessment to identify the range of security 
weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists related to air cargo 
operations, and recommended that TSA develop a methodology and schedule 
for completing vulnerability assessments. Partly in response to our 
recommendation, and consistent with direction specified in 
law,[Footnote 12] TSA implemented an Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessment 
Program in November 2006. TSA officials reported that as of May 2008, 
the agency has completed air cargo vulnerability assessments at six 
domestic airports and plans to complete air cargo vulnerability 
assessments at all 27 domestic Category X airports[Footnote 13] by the 
end of calendar year 2009. 

Absent the results of these assessments, which could help to identify 
potential security vulnerabilities associated with the exemptions, TSA 
is limited in its ability to make risk- based decisions regarding the 
security of air cargo. TSA officials acknowledge the importance of 
completing air cargo vulnerability assessments. Officials noted that as 
the agency conducts additional air cargo vulnerability assessments, 
officials will assess these results to determine whether existing 
screening exemptions should be revised or eliminated. 

TSAï¿½s Methodology Was Consistent with its Goal to Balance Security with 
the Flow of Commerce: 

Consistent with the mission of TSAï¿½s air cargo program, TSA considered, 
among other things, the balance between security and the flow of 
commerce in determining which air cargo screening exemptions to 
maintain, revise, or eliminate. In follow-up discussions with TSA 
officials, they stated that they relied primarily on professional 
judgment to determine which screening exemptions to revise, maintain, 
or eliminate. In addition, TSA officials told us that they took the 
following actions to assist in their determinations: 

* Reviewed recommendations related to revising screening exemptions 
made by TSAï¿½s internal cargo policy working group in March 2006. 

* Held discussions with select air cargo industry stakeholders to 
discuss the potential impact on industry of revising or eliminating 
screening exemptions. However, according to TSA officials, there was no 
formal process by which they solicited industry input as a part of 
TSAï¿½s assessment of each exemption. 

Results-Finding 2: 

TSAï¿½s Plans to Maintain, Revise, or Eliminate Screening Exemptions May 
Pose Potential Resource Challenges to the Agency: 

As TSA moves forward with its plans to maintain, revise, or eliminate 
domestic and outbound air cargo screening exemptions, the agency may 
face resource challenges, including the following:

Screening Resources: Although TSA plans to expand the use of TSA-
certified explosives detection canine teams to screen air cargo before 
it is placed on passenger planes, TSA has not assessed how the agencyï¿½s 
plans to maintain, revise, or eliminate screening exemptions may impact 
canine team needs. TSA is in the process of adding 170 canine teams, of 
which 85 will be primarily used to screen air cargo.[Footnote 14] These 
teams are to be primarily located at the 20 airports that, according to 
TSA officials, receive approximately 65 percent of all air cargo 
transported within the United States. TSA officials could not tell us 
whether the additional 85 canine teams will be sufficient to meet the 
agencyï¿½s increasing screening needs. 

Compliance Resources: TSA officials stated that although they believe 
the revisions and eliminations of domestic and outbound air cargo 
screening exemptions should not severely impact the workload of 
Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs), TSA has not conducted an 
assessment to determine how the changes to air cargo screening 
exemptions may impact TSI resources. According to TSA officials, there 
may not be enough TSIs to conduct compliance inspections of all the 
entities that could be a part of the CCSP once the program is fully 
implemented in August 2010. 

TSA Has Not Assessed the Vulnerabilities Posed by Inbound Air Cargo 
Security Exemptions: 

Although TSA plans to conduct vulnerability assessments as part of its 
risk-based approach to securing inbound air cargo, the agency has not 
established a time frame for doing so. Such assessments could provide 
information on the potential vulnerabilities posed by inbound air cargo 
screening exemptions. We reported in April 2007 that TSA officials told 
us that they would conduct vulnerability assessments of inbound air 
cargo after they had assessed the vulnerability of domestic air 
cargo.[Footnote 15] Nevertheless, TSA officials acknowledged that 
vulnerabilities to inbound air cargo exist and that these 
vulnerabilities are in some cases similar to those facing the domestic 
air cargo supply chain.

In April 2007, we reported on the potential vulnerabilities associated 
with inbound air cargo screening exemptions.[Footnote 16] Specifically, 
we reported that screening exemptions could pose a risk to the inbound 
air cargo supply chain because TSA has limited information on the 
background of and security risks posed by foreign freight forwarders 
and shippers whose cargo may fall into one of the exemption categories. 
We recommended that TSA assess whether existing inbound air cargo 
screening exemptions pose an unacceptable vulnerability to the air 
cargo supply chain and if necessary, address these vulnerabilities. TSA 
agreed with this recommendation and noted that the agency had recently 
revised and eliminated domestic and outbound air cargo screening 
exemptions. TSA, however, has yet to fully address our recommendation 
for assessing inbound air cargo screening exemptions.    

TSA acknowledges that some categories of exempted cargo pose a 
potential vulnerability to the domestic air cargo supply chain and will 
be eliminated. TSA officials stated that the agency will evaluate these 
exemptions for inbound cargo in the future. TSA officials also noted 
that they do plan to increase the percentage of inbound air cargo 
required to be screened, but the screening exemptions for such cargo 
would be maintained. According to TSA officials, the requirement to 
screen an increased percentage of inbound air cargo will be implemented 
in early 2009. 

In response to a request by the Chairman of the House Homeland Security 
Committee and Congressman Edward Markey, GAO will initiate a review of 
TSAï¿½s efforts to meet the requirement to screen 100 percent of air 
cargo carried on passenger aircraft.[Footnote 17] As part of this 
review, GAO will likely examine TSAï¿½s plans to screen inbound air 
cargo. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of the information included in this briefing to TSA 
for review and comment. On June 25, 2008, TSA officials provided oral 
comments to the briefing slides. The Air Cargo Division General Manager 
noted that he generally agreed with the information presented and our 
findings. TSA also provided us with technical written comments to the 
slides, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Transportation Security Administration, Report to Congress on Air 
Cargo Subject to Alternate Screening, February 2008. 

[2] See GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen 
Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: October 17, 
2005) and GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound 
Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 
(Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2007).

[3] For certain types of cargo, TSA has authorized the use of TSA-
approved alternative methods for screening cargo carried on passenger 
aircraft. Alternative methods can include verifying shipper and cargo 
information and conducting a visual inspection of the cargo shipment.  
For the purposes of this briefing and to remain consistent with our 
prior work on air cargo security, the term screening exemption refers 
to cargo screened in accordance with such alternative methods; to the 
extent such cargo is no longer ï¿½exempt,ï¿½ TSA has determined that such 
cargo must be screened in accordance with current TSA requirements for 
the physical screening of cargo carried on board passenger aircraft. 

[4] 4 See 49 C.F.R. pt. 1520. 

[5] Pub. L. No. 110-53, ï¿½ 1602(b), 121 Stat. 266, 479-80 (2007). 

[6] TSA does not take any exemptions under 49 U.S.C. ï¿½ 44901(i), as 
contemplated by the mandate. According to TSA, no cargo transported on 
passenger aircraft is truly exempt screening. 

[7] Air cargo bound for the United States from a foreign country is 
referred to as inbound air cargo. Cargo transported by air within the 
United States is referred to as domestic air and cargo transported by 
air from the United States to a foreign location is referred to as 
outbound air cargo. 

[8] A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on 
the basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past 
activities. A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may 
be exploited by identified threats and suggests options to address 
those weaknesses. An assessment of consequences evaluates the personal, 
physical, and economic consequences to an area of a successful attack. 

[9] See GAO-06-76 and GAO-07-660. TSA does not presently plan for this 
system to address inbound cargo. 

[10] See 49 U.S.C. ï¿½ 44901(g). 

[11] See GAO-06-76 and GAO-07-660. 

[12 See Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112, 140-41 (2007) (providing 
that the $80 million appropriated for air cargo shall be used to 
complete air cargo vulnerability assessments for all Category X 
airports, among other purposes). 

[13] TSA classifies the commercial airports in the United States into 
one of five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, and IV). In 
general, Category X airports have the largest number of passenger 
boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest. Categories X, I, 
II, and III airports account for more than 90 percent of the nationï¿½s 
air traffic. 

[14] There are currently 370 TSA-certified explosives detection canine 
teams that are cross-trained to work in multiple aviation environments, 
including air cargo. 

[15] See GAO-07-660. 

[16] See GAO-07-660. 

[17] See 49 U.S.C. ï¿½ 44901(g). 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.  

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates."  

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to:  

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room LM: 
Washington, D.C. 20548:  

To order by Phone: 
Voice: (202) 512-6000: 
TDD: (202) 512-2537: 
Fax: (202) 512-6061:  

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:  

Contact:  

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: [email protected]: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:  

Congressional Relations:  

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, [email protected]: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548:  

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, [email protected]: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

*** End of document. ***