    Various Issues Led to the Termination of the United States-Canada
    Shared Border Management Pilot Project (04-SEP-08, GAO-08-1038R).

    In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks, balancing the need
    to secure U.S. borders while maintaining the flow of legitimate
    cross-border travel and commerce has taken on an added
    importance. The United States and Canada share a border that
    extends nearly 4,000 miles, and one of the world's largest
    trading relationships. Each year, approximately 70 million
    travelers and 35 million vehicles cross the border from Canada
    into the United States, according to the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS). Given the volume of cross-border travel and trade
    between the United States and Canada, border congestion and the
    resulting wait times have a substantial economic impact on both
    nations. Furthermore, according to an analysis by DHS, the
    heightened emphasis on border security following the 2001
    terrorist attacks has lengthened processing time for travelers
    and cargo crossing into the United States. Recognizing the need
    to improve both border security and border-crossing efficiency,
    the United States and Canada have cooperated on various
    cross-border management initiatives intended to increase the flow
    of legitimate travel across the border while maintaining
    security. For example, to facilitate the travel of low-risk
    prescreened individuals across the northern border, the United
    States and Canada jointly operate the NEXUS program. The NEXUS
    program allows registered border residents and frequent
    cross-border travelers identified as low-risk individuals access
    to dedicated lanes and expedited processing with minimal
    inspection. The United States and Canada also coordinate on
    border law enforcement programs such as the Integrated Border
    Enforcement Team Program (IBET), which is a bi-national,
    multi-agency law enforcement initiative that (1) provides, where
    necessary, support to national security investigations associated
    to the Canada/United States border and (2) investigates illegal
    cross-border activities. A key collaborative effort to improve
    security and relieve congestion at the ports of entry across the
    northern border is to move customs and immigration inspection
    activities away from the border--a concept known as "land
    preclearance" or "shared border management." In December 2004,
    the United States and Canada announced that the two governments
    had agreed to move forward with a land preclearance pilot project
    at the Buffalo, New York-Fort Erie, Ontario Peace Bridge and at
    one other border crossing site along the northern border, which
    had not yet been determined. The land preclearance pilot project
    flowed from the 2001 Smart Border Declaration and its associated
    action plan, which was meant to enhance the security along the
    northern border while facilitating information sharing and the
    legitimate flow of people and goods, and securing infrastructure.
    The preclearance pilot at the Peace Bridge would involve the
    relocation of all U.S. border inspection operations for both
    commercial and passenger traffic from the U.S. side of the border
    in Buffalo, New York, to the Canadian side of the border in Fort
    Erie, Ontario. From 2005 to 2007, the United States and Canada
    were engaged in negotiations to implement land preclearance at
    the Buffalo-Fort Erie Peace Bridge ports of entry. However, in
    April 2007, these negotiations were officially terminated by DHS.
    Section 566 of the 2008 DHS Appropriations Act mandates that we
    conduct a study on DHS's use of shared border management to
    secure the borders of the United States. In accordance with the
    mandate and discussions with Committee staff, this report
    addresses the following questions: (1) What negotiations have
    been conducted by the Department of Homeland Security regarding
    the shared border management pilot project? (2) What issues led
    to the termination of shared border management negotiations?
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-1038R
        ACCNO:   A84005
      TITLE:     Various Issues Led to the Termination of the United
    States-Canada Shared Border Management Pilot Project
         DATE:   09/04/2008
      SUBJECT:   Border control
    	     Border patrols
    	     Border security
    	     Facility management
    	     Federal facility relocation
    	     Homeland security
    	     Inspection
    	     International cooperation
    	     International relations
    	     Land management
    	     Law enforcement
    	     Port security
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Program management
    	     Standards
    	     Terrorism
    	     Canada
    	     Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration
    	     NEXUS Program

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    GAO-08-1038R

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    GAO-08-1038R:

    United States Government Accountability Office:
    Washington, DC 20548:

    September 4, 2008:

    The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
    Chairman:
    The Honorable Thad Cochran:
    Ranking Member:
    Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
    Committee on Appropriations:
    United States Senate:

    The Honorable David E. Price:
    Chairman:
    The Honorable Harold Rogers:
    Ranking Member:
    Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
    Committee on Appropriations:
    House of Representatives:

    The Honorable Hillary R. Clinton:
    United States Senate:

    Subject: Various Issues Led to the Termination of the United States-
    Canada Shared Border Management Pilot Project:

    In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks, balancing the need to
    secure U.S. borders while maintaining the flow of legitimate cross-
    border travel and commerce has taken on an added importance. The United
    States and Canada share a border that extends nearly 4,000 miles, and
    one of the world's largest trading relationships. Each year,
    approximately 70 million travelers and 35 million vehicles cross the
    border from Canada into the United States, according to the Department
    of Homeland Security (DHS). Given the volume of cross-border travel and
    trade between the United States and Canada, border congestion and the
    resulting wait times have a substantial economic impact on both
    nations. Furthermore, according to an analysis by DHS, the heightened
    emphasis on border security following the 2001 terrorist attacks has
    lengthened processing time for travelers and cargo crossing into the
    United States. Recognizing the need to improve both border security and
    border-crossing efficiency, the United States and Canada have
    cooperated on various cross-border management initiatives intended to
    increase the flow of legitimate travel across the border while
    maintaining security. For example, to facilitate the travel of low-risk
    prescreened individuals across the northern border, the United States
    and Canada jointly operate the NEXUS program. The NEXUS program allows
    registered border residents and frequent cross-border travelers
    identified as low-risk individuals access to dedicated lanes and
    expedited processing with minimal inspection. The United States and
    Canada also coordinate on border law enforcement programs such as the
    Integrated Border Enforcement Team Program (IBET), which is a bi-
    national, multi-agency law enforcement initiative that (1) provides,
    where necessary, support to national security investigations associated
    to the Canada/United States border and (2) investigates illegal cross-
    border activities.

    A key collaborative effort to improve security and relieve congestion
    at the ports of entry across the northern border is to move customs and
    immigration inspection activities away from the border--a concept known
    as "land preclearance" or "shared border management." In December 2004,
    the United States and Canada announced that the two governments had
    agreed to move forward with a land preclearance pilot project at the
    Buffalo, New York-Fort Erie, Ontario Peace Bridge and at one other
    border crossing site along the northern border, which had not yet been
    determined.

    The land preclearance pilot project flowed from the 2001 Smart Border
    Declaration and its associated action plan, which was meant to enhance
    the security along the northern border while facilitating information
    sharing and the legitimate flow of people and goods, and securing
    infrastructure. The preclearance pilot at the Peace Bridge would
    involve the relocation of all U.S. border inspection operations for
    both commercial and passenger traffic from the U.S. side of the border
    in Buffalo, New York, to the Canadian side of the border in Fort Erie,
    Ontario. The other preclearance location had not been determined, but
    would have relocated Canadian border inspection functions to the U.S.
    side of the border at a different port of entry. Currently, U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--a component of DHS and the lead
    federal agency in charge of securing our nation's borders--conducts
    inspections of travelers and cargo at all U.S. ports of entry,
    including the Buffalo port of entry at the Peace Bridge. Under the
    preclearance pilot project, the Buffalo port of entry would be moved to
    the Canadian side of the Peace Bridge, and all CBP inspections and
    operations would take place before travelers and cargo entered the
    United States.

    From 2005 to 2007, the United States and Canada were engaged in
    negotiations to implement land preclearance at the Buffalo-Fort Erie
    Peace Bridge ports of entry. However, in April 2007, these negotiations
    were officially terminated by DHS. Section 566 of the 2008 DHS
    Appropriations Act mandates that we conduct a study on DHS's use of
    shared border management to secure the borders of the United States.
    [Footnote 1] In accordance with the mandate and discussions with
    Committee staff, this report addresses the following questions:

    (1) What negotiations have been conducted by the Department of Homeland
    Security regarding the shared border management pilot project?

    (2 What issues led to the termination of shared border management
    negotiations?

    To address these objectives, we visited the Peace Bridge site in April
    2008. We observed the current U.S. inspection facility in Buffalo as
    well as where the shared border management site would have been located
    in Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada. In addition, we analyzed available
    documentation from DHS, CBP, and the Peace Bridge Authority (PBA), a
    public benefit corporation solely responsible for the maintenance and
    upkeep of the Peace Bridge and for building or expanding both Canadian
    and U.S. ports of entry at the Peace Bridge. The documentation included
    a 2004 CBP report on shared border management, a 2005 CBP
    infrastructure and strategic needs assessment of the U.S. port in
    Buffalo, a 2005 DHS analysis of shared border management, DHS
    correspondence to congressional staff on the status of the shared
    border management negotiations, DHS memos to the Canadian government,
    and the PBA's U.S. port of entry expansion plans. We did not seek
    access to documents from the Canadian government because GAO does not
    have a right of access to documents from foreign governments. However,
    we interviewed key officials from both countries who participated in
    the negotiations to gather their views on shared border management at
    the Peace Bridge site. Specifically, we met with officials from the
    Department of State, DHS, and Public Safety Canada (PSC), which was the
    lead Canadian agency involved in shared border management. We also met
    with officials from the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the
    General Manager of the PBA, the Canadian Consul General-Buffalo, and
    the Mayor of Fort Erie. In addition, we met with three local community
    leaders within the Buffalo/Fort Erie area to obtain their views on
    shared border management. We conducted this performance audit from
    January 2008 through September 2008 in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
    plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
    to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
    our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
    reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit objectives.

    Results in Brief:

    From 2005 to 2007, the United States and Canada were engaged in
    negotiations to implement a land preclearance pilot project (also
    referred to as "shared border management"), which would have relocated
    the U.S. border inspection facility from the Buffalo, New York, side of
    the Peace Bridge to the Fort Erie, Ontario, side. All CBP inspections
    and operations would then take place before travelers and cargo entered
    the United States. The Peace Bridge site was selected for the pilot
    because it is one of the busiest commercial crossings between the
    United States and Canada,[Footnote 2] yet the existing border
    infrastructure at the Peace Bridge contributes to a number of security
    and border crossing inefficiencies, according to DHS. Specifically, DHS
    had concluded that the U.S. inspection facility, which is located near
    the center of downtown Buffalo, is outdated, undersized, and lacks the
    modern amenities a port of its size should have to operate efficiently
    and securely. The facility is located on 17 acres of land, as opposed
    to the 80 acres that CBP recommends for a large port of entry. DHS has
    reported that additional inspection space is needed to address these
    infrastructure issues, but there is no easily available land adjacent
    to the facility in Buffalo. On the Canadian side of the Peace Bridge in
    Fort Erie, there are approximately 70 acres of land available on which
    the U.S. inspection facility could have been co-located with Canadian
    inspection facilities.

    In April 2007, DHS officially terminated negotiations with Canada
    because a mutually acceptable framework for United States-Canada shared
    border management could not be reached. Officials from both countries
    agreed that negotiations were conducted in good faith, and the two
    governments were able to reach accommodations on several key issues
    raised during the negotiations, such as the approval of all of the
    authorities Canada sought for its U.S.-based preclearance area,
    [Footnote 3] and the arming of CBP officers at the preclearance site on
    Canadian soil. However, certain issues pertaining to each country's
    sovereignty and the law enforcement authorities of U.S. CBP officers
    operating on Canadian soil could not be resolved. These issues included
    concerns over arrest authority; the right of individuals to withdraw an
    application to enter the United States while at the land preclearance
    site in Canada; mutually agreeable fingerprinting processes; how
    information collected by U.S. officials at the land preclearance site
    would be shared; and concerns that future interpretations of the
    Canadian Charter could adversely impact U.S. authorities at the
    preclearance site.[Footnote 4]

    DHS Entered into Shared Border Management Negotiations to Address Space
    Constraints at the Buffalo Port of Entry:

    From 2005 to 2007, DHS engaged in bi-national negotiations with Canada
    to create the first North American land border preclearance pilot
    project at the Peace Bridge site. The pilot project would have
    relocated the U.S. border inspection facility from Buffalo, New York,
    to Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada. The overarching goal of shared border
    management at the Peace Bridge site was to facilitate cross-border
    coordination and collaboration, while eliminating the need to expand
    the outdated inspection facility in Buffalo and the impact that
    expansion would have on the surrounding community. The current facility
    in Buffalo sits on 17 acres and is confined on three sides by the
    Niagara River, a historic park, and a residential neighborhood, as
    shown in figure 1 and figure 2.

    Figure 1: Overhead View of Buffalo Land Port of Entry:

    [See PDF for image]

    Aerial photograph of the Buffalo Land Port of Entry, with the following
    sites specifically noted:
    Buffalo Land Port of Entry;
    Residential community;
    Park;
    Interstate I-190;
    Niagara River;
    Peace Bridge.

    Source: Peace Bridge Authority.

    [End of figure]

    Figure 2: Photograph: Close-up View of Buffalo Land Port of Entry:

    [See PDF for image]

    Close-up View of Buffalo Land Port of Entry, with the following sites
    specifically noted:
    Buffalo Land Port of Entry;
    Residential community;
    Park;
    Interstate I-190;
    Niagara River;
    Peace Bridge.

    Source: Peace Bridge Authority.

    [End of figure]

    As a result, there is limited real estate available for the port to
    expand. On the Canadian side of the Peace Bridge, however, there is
    more land available on which a U.S. inspection facility could be
    located, as shown in figure 3.

    Figure 3: View of Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada Land Port of Entry:

    [See PDF for image]

    Photographic view of Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada Land Port of Entry,
    with the following sites specifically noted:
    Fort Erie Land Port of Entry;
    Proposed site for U.S. land preclearance facility.

    Source: Peace Bridge Authority.

    [End of figure]

    According to DHS, the existing infrastructure at the Buffalo port of
    entry contributes to a number of border crossing and security
    inefficiencies. In 2005, a DHS cost-benefit analysis of shared border
    management stated that infrastructure constraints and limitations at
    the Buffalo port of entry were major impediments to the smooth flow of
    traffic and trade across the Peace Bridge border crossing from Canada
    to the United States. Specifically, the size of the inspection facility
    site--17 acres--does not allow for a sufficient number of inspection
    lanes to accommodate and process the volume of traffic that crosses the
    bridge daily, according to DHS.

    In 2005, infrastructure improvements were made to the Buffalo
    inspection facility, which local officials told us have eased
    congestion. However, DHS stated that additional capacity--that is, more
    inspection lanes--is still needed. In 2005, the number of lanes for
    primary processing at the facility was increased from 8 car lanes and 4
    commercial vehicles lanes to 10 for cars and 7 for commercial vehicles
    (and 1 dedicated NEXUS lane). Furthermore, the new lanes are "hi/low"
    to allow for flexibility in converting them to commercial lanes for
    trucks ("hi") or passengers ("low"), depending on the specific demand.
    However, DHS stated that the renovations cannot eliminate the
    congestion at the port because additional inspection lanes are still
    needed to accommodate the volume of traffic that enters the port daily.
    Officials from CBP-Buffalo also noted that increased inspection lanes
    are necessary to improve the operation of the port.

    Because the 2005 renovations only included one lane dedicated to NEXUS,
    expanding the port was expected to help maximize other trusted traveler
    programs such as Free and Secure Trade (FAST), according to DHS. FAST
    is an expedited clearance program for known low-risk shipments. DHS
    reported that a dedicated FAST lane would enable greater processing
    efficiency, thereby reducing queue length and wait time. For example,
    lanes dedicated to FAST have average primary processing times of 30
    seconds versus Non-FAST lanes at 2 minutes, according to DHS.

    DHS has also stated that expansion of the Buffalo port is necessary to
    improve enforcement and security operations. According to CBP, the
    current port has inadequate space to handle the number of vehicles
    (both passenger and commercial) referred for secondary inspections,
    which are separate, more thorough screenings of selected travelers and
    cargo. CBP officials told us that if the secondary inspection area is
    full, CBP officers must hold vehicles referred for secondary inspection
    in the primary lane, causing congestion that could be avoided if there
    were sufficient space for secondary inspections. In addition, because
    of the configuration of the port, vehicles referred to secondary
    inspections must cross paths with commercial vehicles exiting the
    primary inspection area, thus creating an obstructive intersection as
    well as safety and security risks. However, because of space
    constraints at the facility, this is the only area that can handle
    secondary inspections, according to CBP. CBP officials also noted that
    the administration building at the port is not sufficient or effective
    for their operations. For example, these officials stated that the
    building has limited space for security and management operations, such
    as secondary inspection processing and agriculture inspections.

    Although DHS recognizes that increasing the size of the Buffalo
    inspection facility is necessary to address these issues, there is
    limited room adjacent to the facility for expansion without adversely
    affecting the surrounding community. According to the PBA--which would
    manage any port expansion project--expanding the port in Buffalo would
    require the acquisition and demolition of approximately 83 adjacent
    residential homes, some of which are historical.[Footnote 5] However,
    on the Canadian side of the Peace Bridge in Fort Erie, there is land
    available that could be used for a U.S. inspection facility without
    requiring the taking of any residential properties. Relocating the U.S.
    inspection facility from Buffalo to Fort Erie under shared border
    management was intended to address the need for improvements and
    expansion of the U.S. inspection facility while minimizing adverse
    impacts on the surrounding community in Buffalo. With sufficient land
    available, the facility was expected to include a total of 25
    commercial and passenger primary inspection lanes and booths, which is
    the standard for a large port of entry, according to CBP officials. In
    addition, DHS stated that shared border management would have also
    enabled informal information sharing between U.S. and Canadian border
    inspection officials because the inspection facilities would be located
    adjacent to each other. According to the PBA, another benefit of shared
    border management was that constructing a new U.S. inspection facility
    in Fort Erie would cost approximately $100 million less and take less
    time than expanding the inspection facility in Buffalo. Local community
    officials we spoke with also noted that relocating the U.S. inspection
    facility to Fort Erie would allow for better accommodation of future
    growth or new security measures that may be added, as more space is
    available for facility expansion.

    The United States and Canada Were Unable to Find an Acceptable
    Framework for Shared Border Management:

    According to U.S. and Canadian officials, shared border management
    negotiations were terminated in April 2007 because an acceptable
    agreement that would satisfy both countries could not be accomplished.
    Specifically, DHS stated that it would not have been able to exercise
    the same law enforcement authorities in Canada that it currently has at
    ports of entry in the United States. Officials from both countries
    agreed that negotiations were conducted in good faith, and the two
    governments were able to reach accommodations on several key issues
    raised during the negotiations. For example, all of the authorities
    sought by Canada for its preclearance area--which would have been
    located on U.S. soil--could be provided with minimal changes to U.S.
    laws, according to DHS. Another issue that was resolved was the arming
    of CBP officers at the pre-clearance site. When negotiations began in
    2005, CBP officers would not have been permitted to carry firearms at
    the pre-clearance site because Canadian border officers did not carry
    firearms. This was a concern for U.S. officials because CBP officers
    carry firearms at U.S. ports of entry. During negotiations, this issue
    was resolved as a result of a change in Canadian government policy that
    permitted the arming of Canadian border officers which allowed for the
    arming of CBP officers, according to Canadian officials.

    Despite agreement on the authorities sought by Canada and the arming of
    CBP officers, officials stated that an acceptable agreement that would
    satisfy both countries' sovereignty could not be accomplished.
    According to DHS, the overarching issue was the subordination of U.S.
    law enforcement personnel and authorities to Canadian law rather than
    U.S. law and the inability to ensure necessary U.S. law enforcement
    authorities under Canada's legal framework. One of the guiding
    principles of shared border management was that the inspecting
    country's operations would be consistent with the constitutional and
    legal frameworks of the host country. However, DHS officials stated
    that for shared border management to meet their requirements, U.S.
    border inspection personnel would require full legal authority,
    comparable to that provided under U.S. law, to replicate the inspection
    and enforcement activities DHS engages in today. DHS officials stated
    that operating under Canadian law would have limited DHS's ability to
    manage and secure the border. The following are key issues that
    surfaced during negotiations:

    * Arrest authority: According to officials from both countries, the
    host country would have sole authority to make arrests at the
    preclearance site, because of the sovereignty of the host government.
    These officials stated that for the majority of possible scenarios,
    negotiators agreed on how these arrests might work. However, U.S.
    officials told us they were concerned that the U.S. government would
    not have the ability to arrest and then prosecute high profile/high
    value terrorists or criminals who might present themselves at the
    border. For example, if a high value target of interest to the United
    States presented himself at the preclearance site, U.S. authorities
    could not arrest him; rather, Canadian authorities would make the
    arrest. The individual would then have to be extradited to the United
    States for prosecution. Canadian officials told us that they offered
    the United States the ability to prioritize cases in order to expedite
    the extradition process in such circumstances.

    * Right of withdrawal: Under Canadian law, individuals have the right
    to withdraw an application to enter Canada at a port of entry,
    according to Canadian and U.S. officials. For example, in a land
    preclearance scenario if an individual begins the inspection process at
    the port of entry and then decides that he or she no longer wants to
    enter into Canada, under Canadian law that person has the right to
    withdraw from inspection. However, U.S. negotiators wanted the ability
    to inspect and fingerprint individuals who present themselves to CBP
    officers for admission into the United States and then request to
    withdraw their application to enter the country. Under U.S. law, CBP
    officers have the discretion to allow an individual they have
    determined to be inadmissible to withdraw an application for admission
    in place of formal removal proceedings, but the individual does not
    have the right to withdraw from inspection and fingerprinting. U.S.
    officials stated that they were strongly opposed to providing a
    guaranteed right to withdraw because doing so could allow individuals
    to "probe for weaknesses" at the preclearance site. According to
    Canadian officials, they proposed an alternative whereby U.S. Customs
    and Border Protection would be permitted to search and question
    individuals who request withdrawal, but not take fingerprints. To
    address this point of disagreement, Canadian officials stated that they
    offered U.S. negotiators a compromise position whereby Canadian border
    authorities would investigate any suspicious person who requests
    withdrawal. However, U.S. officials told us that this approach was not
    satisfactory. Officials from both countries noted that the right of
    withdrawal issue was a major issue during negotiations.

    * Fingerprinting: According to officials involved, both countries
    differed on how and when fingerprints could be taken at the
    preclearance site. Currently, CBP has the authority to fingerprint any
    individuals who present themselves to CBP officers for admission into
    the United States, and CBP wanted to maintain this ability at the
    preclearance site. For example, CBP may fingerprint individuals who
    cross the border to determine if a person may be a wanted felon.
    However, according to Canadian officials, in a land preclearance
    scenario, fingerprints could not be taken unless the individual
    volunteers or has been charged with a crime. According to Canadian
    officials, they proposed that CBP would have the ability to take
    fingerprints only if certain criteria had been met. According to
    officials involved in the negotiations, this was not a viable
    alternative to U.S. negotiators, and this issue was not resolved.

    * Information sharing: According to officials from both countries,
    there was disagreement over how information collected by U.S officials
    at the land preclearance site could be shared. U.S. officials told us
    they wanted to maintain the ability to share information collected at
    the preclearance site with appropriate U.S. law enforcement agencies,
    which they can do under U.S. law. However, Canadian officials told us
    that the ability of U.S. authorities to share information collected in
    Canada would be guided by Canadian laws. As a result, under Canadian
    law, DHS would not be permitted to share all information collected at
    the preclearance site with U.S. law enforcement agencies, according to
    DHS officials.

    * Canadian Charter: According to DHS officials involved in the
    negotiations, future interpretations of the Canadian Charter could
    adversely impact U.S. authorities at the preclearance site. In
    addition, DHS officials stated that the Canadian Charter, as it has
    been interpreted by Canadian courts, would limit the use of certain law
    enforcement tools available to CBP. For example, under U.S. law, CBP
    officers can search individuals, conveyances, and cargo at the border
    without a warrant or probable cause. However, according to Canadian
    officials, under Canadian law, reasonable grounds are needed to conduct
    searches. According to DHS, these limitations would make it difficult
    for CBP officers to fully carry out their duties.

    Officials from both countries stated that these issues could not be
    resolved through negotiations because operating a U.S. port of entry in
    Canada under land pre-clearance/shared border management would have
    required the United States to abide by Canadian law--which U.S.
    officials stated would have limited the ability of U.S. law enforcement
    personnel to secure the border. DHS wanted to operate the shared border
    management facility according to the same standards as all other U.S.
    ports of entry, but to operate in Canada would have meant that those
    standards could not have been achieved, according to officials from
    both governments.

    According to officials from both countries, the best way to address
    U.S. concerns related to having a U.S. inspection facility located on
    Canadian soil would be to conduct what they termed a "land swap." Under
    a land swap, the United States would be granted land in Canada to place
    the inspection facility and Canada would be granted reciprocal land in
    the United States for placement of its inspection facility. Since the
    U.S. inspection facility would therefore be technically located on U.S.
    soil, CBP would be able to conduct its inspections with full U.S. legal
    authority and could operate the port of entry according to the same
    standards as all other U.S. ports. However, both U.S. and Canadian
    officials told us a land swap was never seriously pursued as an option
    because of the legal and political issues involved. Therefore,
    officials involved in the negotiations did not believe this was a
    realistic possibility.

    In June 2008, Canadian and U.S. officials told us there are currently
    no plans to re-open negotiations regarding shared border management at
    the Peace Bridge site. With the conclusion of the negotiations, the
    PBA, with the support of DHS, is moving forward with its plans to
    improve and expand the U.S. inspection facility in Buffalo. According
    to the PBA, the timeline for beginning construction on the new facility
    has not been finalized.

    We provided a draft of the report to DHS for its review and comment.
    CBP provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
    We also met with relevant officials within the Canadian Government who
    confirmed the accuracy of the report and provided technical comments,
    which we incorporated as appropriate.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
    Security. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
    addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site
    at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

    If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at Stanar@gao.gov. Contact
    points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
    be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key
    contributions to this report are listed in the enclosure.

    Signed by:

    Richard M. Stana:
    Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:

    Enclosure:

    [End of section]

    Enclosure:

    GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

    GAO Contact:

    Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov:

    Staff Acknowledgments:

    In addition to the contact named above, Mike Dino, Assistant Director,
    and Adam Hoffman, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Bintou
    Njie, Sally Williamson, Frances Cook, and Michele Fejfar made
    significant contributions to the work.

    [End of section]

    Footnotes:

    [1] Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L.
    No. 110-161, � 566, 121 Stat. 2042, 2092 (2007).

    [2] According to the PBA, approximately $700 million in goods crosses
    the Peace Bridge weekly, making it the third busiest crossing by truck
    volume. In 2007, about 1.3 million trucks crossed the Peace Bridge
    accounting for 16 percent of all Great Lakes border crossings.

    [3] The site for the Canadian preclearance facility had not been
    finalized.

    [4] The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms defines the rights and
    freedoms guaranteed to Canadians.

    [5] The PBA was granted limited eminent domain power by New York State
    in 2004 to acquire property surrounding the Buffalo inspection
    facility. The PBA stated that because of the historic significance of
    Front Park (which is adjacent to the Buffalo inspection facility),
    expanding the inspection facility into the park was not a viable
    option.

    [End of section]

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