Nuclear Weapons: Views on NNSA's Proposal to Transform the	 
Nuclear Weapons Complex (17-JUL-08, GAO-08-1032T).		 
                                                                 
Over the past several years, a serious effort has begun to	 
comprehensively reevaluate how the United States maintains its	 
nuclear deterrent and what the nation's approach should be for	 
transforming its aging nuclear weapons complex. The National	 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized	 
agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for 
overseeing this weapons complex, which comprises three nuclear	 
weapons design laboratories, four production plants, and the	 
Nevada Test Site. In December 2007, NNSA issued a draft report on
potential environmental impacts of alternative actions to	 
transform the nuclear weapons complex, which NNSA refers to as	 
Complex Transformation. NNSA's preferred action is to establish a
number of "distributed centers of excellence" at sites within the
existing nuclear weapons complex, including the Los Alamos	 
National Laboratory for plutonium capabilities, the Y-12 Plant	 
for uranium capabilities, and the Pantex Plant for weapons	 
assembly, disassembly, and high explosives manufacturing. NNSA	 
would continue to operate these facilities to maintain and	 
refurbish the existing nuclear weapons stockpile as it makes the 
transition to a smaller, more responsive infrastructure. GAO was 
asked to discuss NNSA's Complex Transformation proposal. This	 
testimony is based on previous GAO work.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-1032T					        
    ACCNO:   A82920						        
  TITLE:     Nuclear Weapons: Views on NNSA's Proposal to Transform   
the Nuclear Weapons Complex					 
     DATE:   07/17/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Federal agency reorganization			 
	     Industrial facilities				 
	     Laboratories					 
	     Nuclear facilities 				 
	     Nuclear facility security				 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Nuclear weapons plant security			 
	     Nuclear weapons plants				 
	     Plutonium						 
	     Program management 				 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Uranium						 
	     Weapons industry					 
	     Weapons research and development			 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 
	     DOE Stockpile Stewardship Program			 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-08-1032T

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to [email protected]. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, July 17, 2008: 

Nuclear Weapons: 

Views on NNSA's Proposal to Transform the Nuclear Weapons Complex: 

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 

GAO-08-1032T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-1032T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Over the past several years, a serious effort has begun to 
comprehensively reevaluate how the United States maintains its nuclear 
deterrent and what the nationï¿½s approach should be for transforming its 
aging nuclear weapons complex. The National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the 
Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for overseeing this weapons 
complex, which comprises three nuclear weapons design laboratories, 
four production plants, and the Nevada Test Site. 

In December 2007, NNSA issued a draft report on potential environmental 
impacts of alternative actions to transform the nuclear weapons 
complex, which NNSA refers to as Complex Transformation. NNSAï¿½s 
preferred action is to establish a number of ï¿½distributed centers of 
excellenceï¿½ at sites within the existing nuclear weapons complex, 
including the Los Alamos National Laboratory for plutonium 
capabilities, the Y-12 Plant for uranium capabilities, and the Pantex 
Plant for weapons assembly, disassembly, and high explosives 
manufacturing. NNSA would continue to operate these facilities to 
maintain and refurbish the existing nuclear weapons stockpile as it 
makes the transition to a smaller, more responsive infrastructure. 

GAO was asked to discuss NNSAï¿½s Complex Transformation proposal. This 
testimony is based on previous GAO work. 

What GAO Found: 

Transforming the nuclear weapons complex will be a daunting task. In 
April 2006 testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water 
Development, House Committee on Appropriations, GAO identified four 
actions that, in its view, were critical to successfully achieving the 
transformation of the complex. On the basis of completed and ongoing 
GAO work on NNSAï¿½s management of the nuclear weapons complex, GAO 
remains concerned about NNSAï¿½s and the Department of Defenseï¿½s (DOD) 
ability to carefully and fully implement these four actions. For this 
reason, GAO believes that the Congress must remain vigilant in its 
oversight of Complex Transformation. Specifically: 

* NNSA and DOD have not established clear, long-term requirements for 
the nuclear weapons stockpile. While NNSA and DOD have considered a 
variety of scenarios for the future composition of the nuclear weapons 
stockpile, no requirements have been issued. It is GAOï¿½s view that NNSA 
will not be able to develop accurate cost estimates or plans for 
Complex Transformation until stockpile requirements are known. Further, 
recent GAO work found that the absence of stockpile requirements is 
affecting NNSAï¿½s plans for manufacturing a critical nuclear weapon 
component. 

* NNSA has had difficulty developing realistic cost estimates for 
large, complex projects. In September 2007, a contractor provided NNSA 
with a range of cost estimates for over 10 different Complex 
Transformation alternatives. However, the contractor stated that (1) 
its analysis was based on rough order-of-magnitude estimates and (2) 
NNSA should not use its cost estimates to predict budget-level project 
costs. In addition, in March 2007 GAO reported that 8 of 12 major 
construction projects being managed by DOE and NNSA had exceeded their 
initial cost estimates. 

* NNSA will need to develop a transformation plan with clear, realistic 
milestones. GAO expects that once NNSA decides the path forward for 
Complex Transformation later this year, NNSA will put forward such a 
plan. However, GAO has repeatedly documented problems with NNSAï¿½s 
ability to implement its plans. For example, in February 2006 GAO 
reported problems with the planning documents that NNSA was using to 
manage the implementation of its new approach for assessing and 
certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. 

* Successful transformation requires strong leadership. In 2006, NNSA 
created an Office of Transformation to oversee its Complex 
Transformation activities. However, GAO is concerned that the Office of 
Transformation may not have sufficient authority to set transformation 
priorities for all of NNSA, specifically as they affect nuclear 
nonproliferation programs. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1032T]. For more 
information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to provide our observations on the 
National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) proposal, known as 
Complex Transformation, to modernize the nuclear weapons complex. As 
you know, NNSA, a separately organized agency within the Department of 
Energy (DOE), is responsible for conducting nuclear weapon and 
nonproliferation-related national security activities in research and 
development laboratories, production plants, and other facilities. 
[Footnote 1] With the moratorium on underground nuclear testing that 
began in 1992 and the subsequent creation of the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program, the mission of the nuclear weapons complex changed from 
"designing, building, and testing" successive generations of weapons to 
extending the life of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile through 
"scientific study, computer simulation, and refurbishment." To carry 
out its weapons activities, NNSA received about $6.3 billion for fiscal 
year 2008 and has requested about $6.6 billion for fiscal year 2009. 
Between fiscal years 2010 and 2013, NNSA is proposing to spend almost 
$29 billion for these programs. 

Over the past decade, NNSA has invested billions of dollars in 
sustaining the Cold War-era stockpile and upgrading the three nuclear 
weapons design laboratories with new, state-of-the-art experimental and 
computing facilities. In contrast, the production infrastructure of the 
nuclear weapons complex is aging and increasingly outdated. The 2001 
Nuclear Posture Review found that the nuclear weapons manufacturing 
infrastructure had atrophied and needed to be repaired[Footnote 2]. 
NNSA estimates that it will cost $2.4 billion to reduce the backlog of 
deferred maintenance at these facilities to an appropriate level 
consistent with industry best practices. The 2001 Nuclear Posture 
Review also called for the development of a "responsive infrastructure" 
that would support a smaller nuclear deterrent. The United States 
subsequently committed to stockpile reductions in the Moscow Treaty 
with Russia, which was ratified in 2003. 

NNSA's Complex Transformation effort seeks to address these issues by 
transforming to a smaller, more responsive infrastructure--one that 
will ultimately support a smaller nuclear weapons stockpile--while 
continuing to maintain and refurbish the existing nuclear weapons 
stockpile in the interim. In recent years, NNSA and the Department of 
Defense (DOD) have advocated replacing the existing stockpile with one 
composed of reliable replacement warheads (RRW), which could 
potentially be easier to manufacture, maintain, and certify without the 
need for underground nuclear tests. They believe the RRW program would 
help transform the complex. In addition, in January 2008 the Congress 
established the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of 
the United States, which must conduct a review of nuclear weapons 
policies and requirements.[Footnote 3] NNSA and DOD must cooperate with 
the Commission as it conducts its review.[Footnote 4] 

In December 2007, NNSA issued a draft report on the potential 
environmental impacts of alternative Complex Transformation actions. 
[Footnote 5] NNSA's preferred action is to establish a number of 
"distributed centers of excellence" at sites within the existing 
nuclear weapons complex.[Footnote 6] The individual centers of 
excellence proposed include the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) 
for plutonium capabilities, the Y-12 Plant for uranium capabilities, 
and the Pantex Plant for weapons assembly and disassembly as well as 
for high explosives manufacturing. In addition, NNSA's preferred action 
includes the consolidation of significant quantities of special nuclear 
material. Implementation of the preferred action is supported by two 
major construction projects: (1) the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
Replacement Facility at LANL, which would provide upgraded analytical 
chemistry capabilities to support manufacturing of "pits"--a key 
nuclear weapons component that contains plutonium; and (2) the Uranium 
Processing Facility at Y-12, which would provide upgraded capabilities 
to support manufacturing and processing of weapons components 
containing uranium. The total costs of these two projects are currently 
estimated to be as high as $5.5 billion. 

Our testimony discusses our concerns with NNSA's Complex Transformation 
proposal and is based on completed and ongoing GAO work. To carry out 
our objective, we relied on previous GAO work, including our April 2006 
testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, 
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives;[Footnote 7] a 
May 2008 report on nuclear weapon pit manufacturing;[Footnote 8] and 
our March 2007 report on DOE's management of major construction 
projects.[Footnote 9] We conducted the performance audit work that 
supports this statement in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to produce 
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our statements today. 

In summary: 

Transforming the nuclear weapons complex will be a daunting task. The 
facilities that maintain and refurbish the legacy nuclear weapons 
stockpile must remain operational during the transition to a smaller, 
more responsive infrastructure while minimizing the potential safety, 
security, and environmental impacts of relocating and constructing this 
infrastructure. In our April 2006 testimony, we identified four actions 
that, in our view, are critical to successfully achieving the 
transformation of the complex. We continue to believe these actions 
must be addressed. Specifically: 

* NNSA and DOD will need to establish clear, long-term requirements for 
the stockpile by determining the types and quantities of nuclear 
weapons needed; 

* After stockpile requirements are developed, NNSA will need to provide 
accurate estimates of the costs of transformation; 

* NNSA will need to develop and implement a plan with clear milestones 
for measuring progress; and: 

* NNSA's Office of Transformation must have the authority to make and 
enforce its decisions on transformation and be held accountable by the 
Congress for achieving timely and cost-effective results. 

On the basis of our review of recent and ongoing GAO work on NNSA's 
management of the nuclear weapons complex, we remain concerned about 
NNSA's and DOD's ability to carefully and fully implement these four 
actions. For this reason, we believe that the Congress must remain 
vigilant in its oversight of Complex Transformation. 

NNSA and DOD Have Not Established Clear, Long-Term Requirements for the 
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile: 

The United States' nuclear weapons stockpile comprises nine nuclear 
weapons types, all of which were designed during the Cold War. Two of 
these systems--the B61 and the W76--are currently being refurbished to 
extend their useful lives for up to 30 years through NNSA's Life 
Extension Program.[Footnote 10] In May 2008, we reported that, over the 
past few years, NNSA and DOD have considered a variety of scenarios for 
the future composition of the nuclear stockpile that would be based on 
different stockpile sizes and the degree to which the stockpile would 
incorporate new RRW designs.[Footnote 11] For example, NNSA and DOD 
have considered how large the stockpile needs to be in order to 
maintain a sufficiently robust and responsive manufacturing 
infrastructure to respond to future global geopolitical events. In 
addition, NNSA and DOD have considered the number of warheads that will 
need to be either refurbished or replaced in the coming decades. 
However, NNSA and DOD have not issued requirements defining the size 
and composition of the future stockpile.[Footnote 12] 

We discussed one effect of this lack of clear stockpile requirements in 
our May 2008 report on plutonium pit manufacturing. Specifically, we 
found that in October 2006, NNSA proposed building a new, consolidated 
plutonium center at an existing DOE site that would be able to 
manufacture pits at a production capacity of 125 pits per year. 
However, by December 2007, NNSA stated that instead of building a new, 
consolidated plutonium center, its preferred action was to upgrade the 
existing pit production building at LANL to produce up to 80 pits per 
year.[Footnote 13] Although DOD officials agreed to support NNSA's 
plan, these officials also stated that future changes to stockpile 
size, military requirements, and risk factors may ultimately lead to a 
revised, larger rate of production. This uncertainty has delayed NNSA 
in issuing final plans for its future pit manufacturing capability. 

NNSA Has Had Difficulty Developing Realistic Cost Estimates for Large, 
Complex Projects: 

Once a decision is made about the size and composition of the 
stockpile, NNSA should develop accurate estimates of the costs of 
transforming the nuclear weapons complex. In September 2007, a 
contractor provided NNSA with a range of cost estimates for over 10 
different Complex Transformation alternatives.[Footnote 14] For 
example, the contractor estimated that the cost of NNSA's preferred 
action would be approximately $79 billion over the period 2007 through 
2060.[Footnote 15] This option was also determined to be the least 
expensive. In contrast, the contractor's estimate for a consolidated 
nuclear production center--another alternative that would consolidate 
plutonium, uranium, and weapons assembly and disassembly at one site-- 
totaled $80 billion over the same period.[Footnote 16] Although these 
estimates differ by only $1 billion over 53 years, they are based on 
significantly different assumptions. Specifically, NNSA's preferred 
action assumes a manufacturing capacity of up to 80 pits per year, and 
the alternative for a consolidated nuclear production center assumes a 
capacity of 125 pits per year. In addition, the contractor cautioned 
that because its cost analysis was not based on any specific conceptual 
designs for facilities such as the consolidated nuclear production 
center, it had not developed cost estimates for specific projects. As a 
result, the contractor stated that its estimates should not be used to 
predict a budget-level project cost. 

Historically, NNSA has had difficulty developing realistic, defensible 
cost estimates, especially for large, complex projects. For example, in 
March 2007,[Footnote 17] we found that 8 of the 12 major construction 
projects that DOE and NNSA were managing had exceeded their initial 
cost estimates. One project, the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials 
Facility nearing completion at the Y-12 Plant, has exceeded its 
original cost estimate by over 100 percent, or almost $300 million. We 
reported that the reasons for this cost increase included poor 
management and contractor oversight. In addition, NNSA's cost estimate 
for constructing the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 
Facility has more than doubled--from $838 million to over $2 billion-- 
since our April 2006 testimony. This revised cost estimate is so 
uncertain that NNSA did not include any annual cost estimates beyond 
fiscal year 2009 in its fiscal year 2009 budget request to the 
Congress. Finally, the preliminary results of our ongoing review of 
NNSA's Life Extension Program for this Subcommittee show that NNSA's 
cost estimate for refurbishing each B61 nuclear bomb has doubled since 
2002.[Footnote 18] 

NNSA Will Need to Develop a Transformation Plan with Clear, Realistic 
Milestones: 

NNSA does not expect to issue a record of decision on Complex 
Transformation until later this year. As a result, we do not know the 
ultimate decision that NNSA will make--whether to modernize existing 
sites in the weapons complex or consolidate operations at new 
facilities. We expect that once NNSA makes this decision, NNSA will put 
forward a transformation plan with specific milestones to implement its 
decision. Without such a plan, NNSA will have no way to evaluate its 
progress, and the Congress will have no way to hold NNSA accountable. 

However, over the past decade, we have repeatedly documented problems 
with NNSA's process for planning and managing its activities. For 
example, in a December 2000 report, we found that NNSA needed to 
improve its planning process so that there were linkages between 
individual plans across the Stockpile Stewardship Program and that the 
milestones contained in NNSA's plans were reflected in contractors' 
performance criteria and evaluations.[Footnote 19] However, in February 
2006, we reported similar problems with how NNSA is managing the 
implementation and reliability of the nuclear stockpile.[Footnote 20] 
Specifically, we found that NNSA planning documents did not contain 
clear, consistent milestones or a comprehensive list of the scientific 
research being conducted across the weapons complex in support of 
NNSA's Primary and Secondary Assessment Technologies programs. These 
programs are responsible for setting the requirements for the computer 
codes and experimental data needed to assess and certify the safety and 
reliability of nuclear warheads. We also found that NNSA had not 
established adequate performance measures to determine the progress of 
the weapons laboratories in developing and implementing this new 
methodology. 

Successful Transformation Requires a Strong Office of Transformation: 

As we noted in July 2003, one of the key practices for successfully 
transforming an organization is to ensure that top leadership sets the 
direction, pace, and tone for the transformation.[Footnote 21] One of 
the key problems that NNSA has experienced has been its inability to 
build an organization with clear lines of authority and responsibility. 
We also reported in January 2004 that NNSA, as a result of 
reorganizations, has shown that it can move from what was often called 
a "dysfunctional bureaucracy" to an organization with clearer lines of 
authority and responsibility.[Footnote 22] In this regard, we stated in 
our April 2006 testimony that NNSA's proposed Office of Transformation 
needed to be vested with the necessary authority and resources to set 
priorities, make timely decisions, and move quickly to implement those 
decisions.[Footnote 23] It was our view that the Office of 
Transformation should (1) report directly to the Administrator of NNSA; 
(2) be given sufficient authority to conduct its studies and implement 
its recommendations; and (3) be held accountable for creating real 
change within the weapons complex. 

In 2006, NNSA created an Office of Transformation to oversee its 
Complex Transformation efforts. This office has been involved in 
overseeing early activities associated with Complex Transformation, 
such as the issuance of the December 2007 draft report on the potential 
environmental impacts of alternative Complex Transformation actions. 
However, the Office of Transformation does not report directly to the 
Administrator of NNSA. Rather, the Office reports to the head of NNSA's 
Office of Defense Programs. In this respect, we are concerned that the 
Office of Transformation may not have sufficient authority to set 
transformation priorities for all of NNSA, specifically as they affect 
nuclear nonproliferation programs. Because NNSA's ultimate decision on 
the path forward for Complex Transformation has not yet been made, it 
remains to be seen whether the office has sufficient authority to 
enforce transformation decisions or whether it will be held accountable 
within NNSA for these decisions. 

Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy 
to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may 
have at this time. 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202) 
512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this statement. Ryan T. Coles, Assistant Director; Allison 
Bawden; Jason Holliday; Leland Cogliani; Marc Castellano; and Carol 
Herrnstadt Shulman made key contributions to this testimony. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Specifically, NNSA operates three national nuclear weapon design 
laboratories--Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California; Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico; and the Sandia National 
Laboratories, New Mexico and California--four nuclear weapons 
production sites--the Pantex Plant, Texas; theY-12 Plant, Tennessee; 
the Kansas City Plant, Missouri; and a portion of the Savannah River 
Site, South Carolina--and the Nevada Test Site. 

[2] In section 1401 of the Floyd D. Spence Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub. L. No. 106-398), the Congress required the 
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, to 
"conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United 
States for the next 5 to 10 years." The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review was 
the second post-Cold War review of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The 
first one was conducted in 1994. 

[3] Commissioners include William Perry, James Schlesinger, John 
Foster, Lee Hamilton, Keith Payne, Ellen Williams, Harry Cartland, John 
Glenn, Fred Ikle, Morton Halperin, James Woolsey, and Bruce Tarter. 

[4] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Pub. L. 
No. 110-181) ï¿½1062. 

[5] NNSA, Draft Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement (Washington, D.C., Dec. 2007). 

[6] According to NNSA, this preferred action is based on the 
consideration of environmental impacts, as well as consideration of 
other factors such as mission and infrastructure compatibility, 
economic analysis, safety, safeguards and security, and workforce 
training and retention. 

[7] GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Views on Proposals to Transform the Nuclear 
Weapons Complex, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-
606T] (Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2006). 

[8] GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs to Establish a Cost and Schedule 
Baseline for Manufacturing a Critical Nuclear Weapon Component, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-593] (Washington, 
D.C.: May 23, 2008). 

[9] GAO, Department of Energy: Major Construction Projects Need a 
Consistent Approach for Assessing Technology Readiness to Help Avoid 
Cost Increases and Schedule Delays, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-336] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 2007). 

[10] NNSA has already refurbished the W87. However, as we reported in 
December 2000--GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Improved Management Needed to 
Implement Stockpile Stewardship Program Effectively, GAO-01-48 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2000)--the W87 life extension experienced 
significant design and production problems that raised its costs by 
over $300 million and caused schedule delays of about 2 years. We found 
that one of the main causes for these problems was an inadequate 
management structure and unclear leadership. 

[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-593]. 

[12] NNSA had planned to complete a detailed design definition and cost 
study of the RRW during 2008. However, the explanatory statement 
accompanying the fiscal year 2008 NNSA appropriation stated that the 
bill provided no funding for the RRW program. 

[13] At LANL, pit manufacturing currently takes place within the 
Plutonium Facility-4 building, which was constructed in 1978 as a 
multiuse research and development facility. As of September 1, 2007, 
pit manufacturing and certification operations occupied about 35 
percent of this building. 

[14] TechSource, Inc., LMI Government Consulting, Independent Business 
Case Analysis of Consolidation Options for the Defense Programs SNM and 
Weapons Production Missions, preliminary draft, September 2007. 

[15] This cost estimate is reported using net present value, base year 
2007. 

[16] The contractor assumed this consolidated nuclear production center 
would be constructed at LANL. 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-336]. 

[18] NNSA is currently refurbishing two types of B61 nuclear bombs: the 
B61-7 and the B61-11. 

[19] GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Improved Management Needed to Implement 
Stockpile Stewardship Program Effectively, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-48] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 
14, 2000). 

[20] GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs to Refine and More Effectively 
Manage Its New Approach for Assessing and Certifying Nuclear Weapons, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-261] (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2006). 

[21] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 
2, 2003). 

[22] GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Key Management 
Structure and Workforce Planning Issues Remain as NNSA Conducts 
Downsizing, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-545] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004). 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-606T]. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room LM: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: 
Voice: (202) 512-6000: 
TDD: (202) 512-2537: 
Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: [email protected]: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, [email protected]: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, [email protected]: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

*** End of document. ***