Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM):	 
Exposure Draft (31-JUL-08, GAO-08-1029G).			 
                                                                 
This letter transmits the exposure draft of the Government	 
Accountability Office (GAO) Federal Information System Controls  
Audit Manual (FISCAM) for review and comment. The FISCAM presents
a methodology for performing information system (IS) control	 
audits of federal and other governmental entities in accordance  
with professional standards, and was originally issued in January
1999. We have updated the FISCAM for significant changes	 
affecting IS audits.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-1029G					        
    ACCNO:   A83163						        
  TITLE:     Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual	      
(FISCAM): Exposure Draft					 
     DATE:   07/31/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Auditing procedures				 
	     Auditing standards 				 
	     Computer security					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Federal agency accounting systems			 
	     Financial statement audits 			 
	     Information management				 
	     Information security				 
	     Information security management			 
	     Information security regulations			 
	     Information systems				 
	     Information technology				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Software						 
	     Software verification and validation		 
	     Standards evaluation				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Systems analysis					 
	     Systems evaluation 				 
	     Systems integration				 
	     Systems management 				 
	     Systems monitoring 				 

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GAO-08-1029G

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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

July 2008: 

Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM): 

Exposure Draft: 

GAO-08-1029G: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 2008: 

To Audit Officials, Agency CIOs, And Others Interested In Federal 
Information System Controls Auditing And Reporting: 

This letter transmits the exposure draft of the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) Federal Information System
Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM) for your review and comment.
The FISCAM presents a methodology for performing information
system (IS) control[Footnote 1] audits of federal and other governmental
entities in accordance with professional standards, and was
originally issued in January 1999. We have updated the FISCAM
for significant changes affecting IS audits. 

GAO would like to thank the Presidentï¿½s Council on Integrity and
Efficiency (PCIE) and the state auditor community for their
significant input into the development of this revised FISCAM. 

Summary of Major Revisions to FISCAM: 

The exposure draft revisions reflect changes in (1) technology
used by government entities, (2) audit guidance and control
criteria issued by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), and (3) generally accepted government auditing 
standards (GAGAS), as presented in Government Auditing Standards (also 
known as the ï¿½Yellow Bookï¿½). [Footnote 2] The Federal Information 
System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM) provides a methodology for 
performing information system (IS) control audits in accordance with 
GAGAS. However, at the discretion of the auditor, this manual may be 
applied on other than GAGAS audits. As defined in GAGAS, IS controls 
consist of those internal controls that are dependent on information 
systems processing and include general controls and application 
controls. This manual focuses on evaluating the effectiveness of such 
general and application controls. This manual is intended for both (1) 
auditors to assist them in understanding the work done by IS controls 
specialists, and (2) IS controls specialists to plan and perform the IS 
controls audit. 

In addition, the FISCAM is consistent with the GAO/PCIE Financial Audit 
Manual (FAM). Also, the FISCAM control activities are consistent with 
and have been mapped to the NIST Special Publication 800-53. 

The FISCAM, which is consistent with NIST and other criteria, is 
organized to facilitate effective and efficient IS control audits. 
Specifically, the methodology in the FISCAM incorporates: 

* Top-down, risk based approach that considers materiality and 
significance in determining effective and efficient audit procedures. 

* Evaluation of entitywide controls and their effect on audit risk. 

* Evaluation of general controls and their pervasive impact on business 
process application controls. 

* Evaluation of security management at all levels (entitywide, system, 
and business process application levels). 

* A control hierarchy (control categories, critical elements, and 
control activities) to assist in evaluating the significance of 
identified IS control weaknesses. 

* Groupings of control categories consistent with the nature of the 
risk. 

* Experience gained in GAOï¿½s performance and review of IS control 
audits, including field testing the concepts in this revised FISCAM. 

As discussed above, this manual is organized in a hierarchical 
structure to assist the auditor in performing the IS controls audit. 
Chapter 3 (general controls) and Chapter 4 (business process 
application level controls) contain several control categories, which 
are groupings of related controls pertaining to similar types of risk. 
For each control category, the manual identifies critical 
elementsï¿½tasks that are essential for establishing adequate controls 
within the category. For each critical element, there is a discussion 
of the associated control activities that are generally necessary to 
achieve the critical element, as well as related potential control 
techniques and suggested audit procedures. This hierarchical structure 
facilitates the auditorï¿½s audit planning and the auditorï¿½s analysis of 
identified control weaknesses. 

Because control activities are generally necessary to achieve the 
critical elements, they are generally relevant to a GAGAS audit unless 
the related control category is not relevant, the audit scope is 
limited, or the auditor determines that, due to significant IS control 
weaknesses, it is not necessary to assess the effectiveness of all 
relevant IS controls. Within each relevant control activity, the 
auditor should identify control techniques implemented by the entity 
and determine whether the control techniques, as designed, are 
sufficient to achieve the control activity, considering IS audit risk 
and the audit objectives. The auditor may be able to determine whether 
control techniques are sufficient to achieve a particular control 
activity without evaluating and testing all of the control techniques. 
Also, depending on IS audit risk and the audit objectives, the nature 
and extent of control techniques necessary to achieve a particular 
control objective will vary. 

If sufficient, the auditor should determine whether the control 
techniques are implemented (placed in operation) and are operating 
effectively. Also, the auditor should evaluate the nature and extent of 
testing performed by the entity. Such information can assist in 
identifying key controls and in assessing risk, but the auditor should 
not rely on testing performed by the entity in lieu of appropriate 
auditor testing. If the control techniques implemented by the entity, 
as designed, are not sufficient to address the control activity, or the 
control techniques are not effectively implemented as designed, the 
auditor should determine the effect on IS controls and the audit 
objectives. 

Throughout the updated FISCAM, revisions were made to reflect todayï¿½s 
networked environment. The nature of IS risks continues to evolve. 
Protecting government computer systems has never been more important 
because of the complexity and interconnectivity of systems (including 
Internet and wireless), the ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, 
the steady advances in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack 
technology, and the emergence of new and more destructive attacks. 

In addition, the FISCAM includes narrative that is designed to provide 
a basic understanding of the methodology (Chapter 2), general controls 
(Chapter 3) and business process application controls (Chapter 4) 
addressed by the FISCAM. The narrative may also be used as a reference 
source by the auditor and the IS control specialist. More experienced 
auditors and IS control specialists may find it unnecessary to 
routinely refer to such narrative in performing IS control audits. For 
example, a more experienced auditor may have sufficient knowledge, 
skills, and abilities to directly use the control tables in Chapters 2 
and 3 (which are summarized in Appendices II and III). 

A summary of significant changes to FISCAM is presented on the
pages 6-10. 

Instructions for Commenting on the Exposure Draft: 

The exposure draft of FISCAM is available only in electronic form at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?rptno=GAO-08-1029G] on 
GAOï¿½s Web page. We request comments from federal audit officials, CIOs, 
financial managers, the public accounting profession, and other
interested parties. Please associate your comments with specific
references to section, paragraph, and page number. Also, please
provide the rationale for your comments and proposed changes,
along with suggested revised language. Please send your comments
electronically to [email protected] no later than September 5, 2008.
We anticipate that the final version of FISCAM will be issued in the
fall of 2008 for use in conducting fiscal year 2009 federal financial
statement audits. 

Should you need additional information, please call Greg Wilshusen
at (202) 512-6244; David Irvin at (214) 777-5643; or me at (202) 512-
7439. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Robert F. Dacey: 
Chief Accountant: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Attachment and enclosures: 

Summary Of Significant Changes To The FISCAM: 

Chapter 1: 

* Expanded purpose: 
- provide guidance for performing effective and efficient Information 
System (IS) controls audits, either alone or as part of a performance 
audit, a financial audit, or an attestation engagement, including 
communication of any identified IS control weaknesses; and; 
- inform financial, performance, and attestation auditors about IS 
controls and related audit issues, so that they can (1) plan their work 
in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards 
(GAGAS) and (2) integrate the work of IS controls specialists with 
other aspects of the financial or performance audit or attestation 
engagement. 

* Conformity with July 2007 Revision to Government Auditing Standards ï¿½ 
(ï¿½Yellow Bookï¿½)(GAGAS), including information system control 
categories. 

* Conformity with AICPA auditing standards, including new risk 
standards. 

* An overall framework of IS control objectives (see summary on pages 
11-13). 

Chapter 2: 

* IS audit methodology consistent with GAGAS and FAM, including 
planning, testing, and reporting phases (see a summary of methodology 
steps on pages 14-15), which incorporates: 

- A top-down, risk-based evaluation that considers materiality and 
significance in determining effective and efficient audit procedures 
(the auditor determines which IS control techniques are relevant to the 
audit objectives and which are necessary to achieve the control 
activities; generally, all control activities are relevant unless the 
audit scope is limited or the auditor determines that, due to 
significant IS control weaknesses, it is not necessary to test all 
relevant IS controls). 

- An evaluation of entitywide IS controls and their effect on audit 
risk, and therefore on the extent of audit testing (effective 
entitywide IS controls can reduce audit risk, while ineffective 
entitywide IS controls result in increased audit risk and generally are 
a contributory cause of IS control weaknesses at the system and 
business process application levels)ï¿½NIST SP 800-53 principally relates 
to controls at the system and application level. 

- An evaluation of general controls and their pervasive impact on 
business process application controls (effective general controls 
support the effectiveness of business process application controls, 
while ineffective general controls generally render business process 
application controls ineffective). 

- An evaluation of security management at all levels of control --
entitywide, system (includes networks, operating systems, and 
infrastructure applications), and business process application levels. 

- A control hierarchy (control categories, critical elements, and 
control activities) to assist in evaluating the significance of 
identified IS control weaknesses (if a critical element is not 
achieved, the respective control category is not likely to be achieved; 
if one of the nine control categories are not effectively achieved, IS 
controls are ineffective, unless other factors sufficiently reduce the 
risk). 

- Groupings of control categories consistent with the nature of the 
risk. 

* Change from ï¿½installation levelï¿½ general controls to ï¿½system levelï¿½ 
general controls to reflect the logically networked structure of 
todayï¿½s systems 

* IS controls audit documentation guidance for each audit phase ?? 
Additional audit considerations that may affect an IS audit, including: 
- information security risk factors; 
- automated audit tools; 
- sampling techniques. 

Chapter 3: 

* Reorganized general control categories, consistent with GAGAS: 
- Security management; 
- broadened to consider statutory requirements and best practices; 
- Access controls - restructured to incorporate system software, 
eliminate redundancies, and facilitate IS auditing in a networked 
environment: 
System boundaries; 
Identification and authentication; 
User authorization; 
Sensitive system resources; 
Audit and monitoring; 
Physical security. 
- Configuration management - broadened to include network components 
and applications; 
- Segregation of Duties - relatively unchanged; 
- Contingency Planning - updated for new terminology. 

* Updated general control activities that (1) are consistent with 
current NIST and OMB information security guidance (particularly NIST 
Special Publication 800-53) including references/mapping of each 
critical element to such guidance, and (2) consider new IS risks and 
audit experience. 

Chapter 4: 

* Audit methodology and IS controls for business process applications 
that (1) are consistent with GAGAS and current NIST and OMB information 
security guidance (particularly NIST Special Publication 800-53) 
including references/mapping to such guidance, and (2) consider new IS 
risks and audit experience: 
- Application security (formerly general controls at the application 
level); 
- Business process controls related to the validity, completeness, 
accuracy, and confidentiality of transactions and data during 
application processing: 
Transaction data input; 
Transaction data processing; 
Transaction data output; 
Master file data setup and maintenance; 
* Interface controls; 
* Data management systems controls. 

Appendices: 

* Expanded appendices to support IS audits; 
- Updated information system controls audit planning checklist; 
- Tables for summarizing the results of the IS audit; 
- Mapping of FISCAM to NIST Special Publication 800-53; 
- Knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform IS audits; 
- Scope of an IS audit in support of a financial audit; 
- Entityï¿½s use of service organizations; 
- Application of FISCAM to Single Audits; 
- Application of FISCAM to FISMA; 
- Complete FISMA text; 
- Information System Controls Audit Documentation; 
- Updated Glossary. 

[End of section] 

Information System Controls Objectives: 

General Controls: 

Security Management: 

Controls provide reasonable assurance that security management is 
effective, including effective: 
* security management program; 
* periodic assessments and validation of risk; 
* security control policies and procedures; 
* security awareness training and other security-related personnel 
issues; 
* periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information 
security policies, procedures, and practices; 
* remediation of information security weaknesses, and; 
* security over activities performed by external third parties. 

Access Controls: 

Controls provide reasonable assurance that access to computer resources 
(data, equipment, and facilities) is reasonable and restricted to 
authorized individuals, including effective: 
* protection of information system boundaries; 
* identification and authentication mechanisms; 
* authorization controls; 
* protection of sensitive system resources; 
* audit and monitoring capability, including incident handling, and; 
* physical security controls. 

Configuration Management: 

Controls provide reasonable assurance that changes to information 
system resources are authorized and systems are configured and operated 
securely and as intended, including effective: 
* configuration management policies, plans, and procedures; 
* current configuration identification information; 
* proper authorization, testing, approval, and tracking of all 
configuration changes; 
* routine monitoring of the configuration; 
* updating software on a timely basis to protect against known 
vulnerabilities, and; 
* documentation and approval of emergency changes to the configuration. 

Segregation of Duties: 

Controls provide reasonable assurance that incompatible duties are 
effectively segregated, including effective: 
* segregation of incompatible duties and responsibilities and related 
policies, and; 
* control of personnel activities through formal operating procedures, 
supervision, and review. 

Contingency Planning: 

Controls provide reasonable assurance that contingency planning (1) 
protects information resources and minimizes the risk of unplanned 
interruptions and (2) provides for recovery of critical operations 
should interruptions occur, including effective: 
* assessment of the criticality and sensitivity of computerized 
operations and identification of supporting resources; 
* steps taken to prevent and minimize potential damage and 
interruption; 
* comprehensive contingency plan, and; 
* periodic testing of the contingency plan, with appropriate 
adjustments to the plan based on the testing. 

[End of section] 

Business Process Application Controls: 

Completeness ï¿½ controls provide reasonable assurance that all 
transactions that occurred are input into the system, accepted for 
processing, processed once and only once by the system, and properly 
included in output. 

Accuracy ï¿½ controls provide reasonable assurance that transactions are 
properly recorded, with correct amount/data, and on a timely basis (in 
the proper period); key data elements input for transactions are 
accurate; data elements are processed accurately by applications that 
produce reliable results; and output is accurate. 

Validity ï¿½ controls provide reasonable assurance (1) that all recorded 
transactions and actually occurred (are real), relate to the 
organization, are authentic, and were properly approved in accordance 
with managementï¿½s authorization; and (2) that output contains only 
valid data. 

Confidentiality ï¿½ controls provide reasonable assurance that 
application data and reports and other output are protected against 
unauthorized access. 

[End of section] 

IS Audit Methodology Steps: 

Plan the Information System Controls Audit: 

* Understand the Overall Audit Objectives and Related Scope of the 
Information System Controls Audit. 

* Understand the Entityï¿½s Operations and Key Business Processes. 

* Obtain a General Understanding of the Structure of the Entityï¿½s 
Networks. 

* Identify Key Areas of Audit Interest. 

* Assess Information System Risk on a Preliminary Basis. 

* Identify Critical Control Points. 

* Obtain a Preliminary Understanding of Information System Controls. 

* Perform Other Audit Planning Procedures; 
- Relevant Laws and Regulations; 
- Consideration of the Risk of Fraud; 
- Audit Resources; 
- Multiyear Testing Plans; 
- Communication with Entity Management and Those Charged with 
Governance; 
- Service Organizations; 
- Using the Work of Others; 
- Audit Plan. 

Perform Information System Controls Audit Tests: 

* Understand Information Systems Relevant to the Audit Objectives. 

* Determine which IS Control Techniques are Relevant to the Audit 
Objectives. 

* For each Relevant IS Control Technique Determine Whether it is 
Suitably Designed to Achieve the Critical Activity and has been 
Implemented. 

* Perform Tests to Determine Whether such Control Techniques are 
Operating Effectively. 

* Identify Potential Weaknesses in IS Controls and Consider 
Compensating Controls. 

Report Audit Results: 

* Evaluate the Effects of Identified IS Control Weaknesses: 
- Financial Audits, Attestation Engagements, and Performance Audits. 

* Consider Other Audit Reporting Requirements and Related Reporting 
Responsibilities. 

[End of section] 

Exposure Draft Contents: 

Chapter 1: 
Introduction: 
1.0 Chapter 1 Overview: 
1.1 Purpose and Anticipated Users of the Manual: 
1.2 Nature of Information System Controls: 
1.3 Determining the Nature and Extent of Audit Procedures: 
1.4 Organization of This Manual: 
1.4.1 Appendices: 

Chapter 2. Performing the Information System Controls Audit: 
2.0 Introduction: 
2.1 Planning the Information System Controls Audit: 
2.1.1 Overview: 
2.1.2 Understand the Overall Audit Objectives and Related Scope of the 
Information System Controls: 
2.1.3 Understand the Entityï¿½s Operations and Key Business Processes: 
2.1.4 Obtain a General Understanding of the Structure of the Entityï¿½s 
Networks: 
2.1.5 Identify Key Areas of Audit Interest: 
2.1.6 Assess Information System Risk on a Preliminary Basis: 
2.1.7 Identify Critical Control Points: 
2.1.8 Obtain a Preliminary Understanding of Information System 
Controls: 
2.1.9 Perform Other Audit Planning Procedures: 
2.1.9.A Relevant Laws and Regulations: 
2.1.9.B Consideration of the Risk of Fraud: 
2.1.9.C Audit Resources: 
2.1.9.D Multiyear Testing Plans: 
2.1.9.E Communication with Entity Management and Those Charged with 
Governance: 
2.1.9.F Service Organizations: 
2.1.9.G Using the Work of Others: 
2.1.9.H Audit Plan: 
2.1.10 Documentation of Planning Phase: 
2.2 Perform Information System Controls Audit Tests: 
2.2.1 Overview: 
2.2.2 Appropriateness of Control Tests: 
2.2.3 Documentation of Control Testing Phase: 
2.3 Report Audit Results: 
2.3.1 Financial Audits and Attestation Engagements: 
2.3.2 Performance Audits: 
2.3.3 Other Audit Reporting Considerations: 
2.3.4 Related Reporting Responsibilities: 
2.3.5 Documentation of Reporting Phase: 
2.4 Documentation: 
2.5 Other Information System Controls Audit Considerations: 
2.5.1 Additional IS Risk Factors: 
2.5.1.A Defense-In-Depth Strategy: 
2.5.1.B Web Applications: 
2.5.1.C ERP Systems: 
2.5.1.D Interface Controls: 
2.5.1.E Database Management Systems: 
2.5.1.F Network-based Access Control Systems: 
2.5.1.G Workstations: 
35 2.5.2 Automated Audit Tools: 
2.5.3 Use of Sampling Techniques: 

Chapter 3. Evaluating and Testing General Controls: 
3.0 Introduction: 
3.1. Security Management (SM): 
Security Program Guidance: 
Security Management Critical Elements: 
Critical Element SM-1: Establish a Security Management Program: 
SM-1.1. The security management program is adequately documented, 
approved, and up-to-date: 
SM-1.2. A security management structure has been established: 
SM-1.3. Information security responsibilities are clearly assigned: 
SM-1.4. Subordinate security plans are documented, approved, and kept 
up-to-date: 
SM-1.5. An inventory of systems is developed, documented, and kept up-
to-date: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-1: 
Critical Element SM-2. Periodically assess and validate risks: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-2: 
Critical Element SM-3. Document security control policies and 
procedures: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-3: 
Critical Element SM-4. Implement effective security awareness and other 
security-related personnel policies: 
SM-4.1 Ensure that resource owners, system administrators, and users 
are aware of security policies: 
SM-4.2. Hiring, transfer, termination, and performance policies address 
security: 
SM-4.3. Employees have adequate training and expertise: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-4: 
Critical Element SM-5. Monitor the effectiveness of the security 
program: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-5: 
Critical Element SM-6. Effectively Remediate Information Security 
Weaknesses: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-6: 
Critical Element SM-7. Ensure that activities performed by external 
third parties are adequately secure: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-7: 
3.2. Access Controls (AC): 
Critical Element AC-1. Adequately protect information system 
boundaries: 
AC-1.1. Appropriately control connectivity to system resources: 
AC-1.2. Appropriately control network sessions: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
AC-1: 
Critical Element AC-2. Implement effective identification and 
authentication mechanisms: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
AC-2: 
Critical Element AC-3. Implement effective authorization controls: 
AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled: 
AC-3.2. Processes and services are adequately controlled: 
Critical Element AC-4. Adequately protect sensitive system resources: 
AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is restricted and 
monitored: 
AC-4.2. Adequate media controls have been implemented: 
AC-4.3. Cryptographic controls are effectively used: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
AC-4: 
Critical Element AC-5. Implement an effective audit and monitoring 
capability: 
AC-5.1. An effective incident response program is documented and 
approved: 
AC-5.2. Incidents are effectively identified and logged: 
AC-5.3. Incidents are properly analyzed and appropriate actions taken: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
AC-5: 
Critical Element AC-6. Establish adequate physical security controls: 
AC-6.1. Establish a physical security management program based on risk:
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk: 
AC-6.3. Establish adequate security at entrances and exits based on 
risk: 
AC-6.4. Establish adequate interior security based on risk: 
AC-6.5. Adequately protect against emerging threats based on risk: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
AC-6: 
3.3. Configuration Management (CM): 
Critical Element CM-1. Develop and document CM policies, plans, and 
procedures: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CM-1: 
Critical Element CM-2. Maintain current configuration identification 
information: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CM-2: 
Critical Element CM-3. Properly authorize, test, approve, track, and 
control all configuration changes: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CM-3: 
Critical Element CM-4. Routinely monitor the configuration: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CM-4: 
Critical Element CM-5. Update software on a timely basis to protect 
against known vulnerabilities: 
Vulnerability scanning: 
Patch management: 
Virus protection: 
Emerging threats: 
Noncurrent software: 
Software usage: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CM-5: 
Critical Element CM-6. Appropriately document and approve emergency 
changes to the configuration: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CM-6: 
3.4. Segregation of Duties (SD): 
Critical Element SD-1. Segregate incompatible duties and establish 
related policies: 
SD-1.1. Incompatible duties have been identified and policies 
implemented to segregate these duties: 
SD-1.2. Job descriptions have been documented: 
SD-1.3. Employees understand their duties and responsibilities: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SD-1: 
Critical Element SD-2. Control personnel activities through formal 
operating procedures, supervision, and review: 
SD-2.1. Formal procedures guide personnel in performing their duties: 
SD-2.2. Active supervision and review are provided for all personnel: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SD-2: 
3.5. Contingency Planning (CP): 
Critical Element CP-1. Assess the criticality and sensitivity of 
computerized operations and identify supporting resources: 
CP-1.1. Critical data and operations are identified and prioritized: 
CP-1.2. Resources supporting critical operations are identified and 
analyzed: 
CP-1.3. Emergency processing priorities are established: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CP-1: 
Critical Element CP-2. Take steps to prevent and minimize potential 
damage and interruption: 
CP-2.1. Data and program backup procedures have been implemented: 
CP-2.2. Adequate environmental controls have been implemented:
CP-2.3. Staff have been trained to respond to emergencies:
CP-2.4. Effective hardware maintenance, problem management, and change 
management help prevent unexpected interruptions: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CP-2: 
Critical Element CP-3. Develop and document a comprehensive contingency 
plan: 
CP-3.1. An up-to-date contingency plan is documented: 
CP-3.2. Arrangements have been made for alternate data processing, 
storage, and telecommunications facilities: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CP-3: 
Critical Element CP-4. Periodically test the contingency plan and 
adjust it as appropriate: 
CP-4.1. The plan is periodically tested: 
CP-4.2. Test results are analyzed and the contingency plan is adjusted 
accordingly: 
Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CP-4: 

Chapter 4. Evaluating and Testing Business Process Application 
Controls: 
4.0 Overview: 
4.0.1 The Auditorï¿½s Consideration of Business Process Control 
Objectives: 
4.0.2 Steps in Assessing Business Process Application Level Controls: 
4.0.3 Plan the Information System Controls Audit of Business Process 
Application Level Controls: 
4.0.3.A Understand the overall audit objectives and related scope of 
the business process application control assessment: 
4.0.3.B Understand the entityï¿½s operations and key business processes: 
4.0.3.C Obtain a general understanding of the structure of the entityï¿½s 
networks: 
4.0.3.D Identify key areas of audit interest (files, applications, 
systems, locations): 
4.0.3.E Assess information system risk on a preliminary basis: 
4.0.3.F Identify critical control points: 
4.0.3.G Obtain a preliminary understanding of application controls: 
4.0.3.H Perform other audit planning procedures: 
4.0.4 Perform Information System Controls Audit Tests of Business 
Process Application Level Controls: 
4.0.5 Report Audit Results: 
4.1. Application Level General Controls (AS): 
Critical Element AS-1. Implement effective application security 
management: 
Establish an application security plan: 
Periodically assess and validate application security risks: 
Document and implement application security policies and procedures: 
Implement effective security awareness and other security-related 
personnel policies: 
Monitor the effectiveness of the security program: 
Effectively remediate information security weaknesses: 
Implement effective security-related personnel policies: 
Adequately secure, document, and monitor external third party 
activities: 
Critical Element AS-2. Implement effective application access controls: 
Adequately protect application boundaries: Implement effective 
identification and authentication mechanisms: 
Implement effective authorization controls: 
Adequately protect sensitive application resources: 
Implement an effective audit and monitoring capability: 
Establish adequate physical security controls: 
Critical Element AS-3 ï¿½ Implement effective application configuration 
management: 
Critical Element ï¿½ AS-4: Segregate user access to conflicting 
transactions and activities and monitor segregation: 
Critical Element ï¿½ AS-5: Implement effective application contingency 
planning: 
Assess the criticality and sensitivity of the application: 
Take steps to prevent and minimize potential damage and interruption: 
Develop and document an application contingency plan: 
5 Periodically test the contingency plan and adjust it as appropriate: 
4.2. Business Process Controls (BP): 
Master Data vs. Transaction Data: 
Business Process Control Objectives: 
NIST Guidance: 
Business Process Control Critical Elements: 
BP-1 Transaction Data Input is complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential (Transaction Data Input Controls): 
Implement an effective transaction data strategy and design: 
Establish Input Preparation (approval and review) Policies and 
Procedures: 
Build Data Validation and Edits within the Application: 
Implement Effective Auditing and Monitoring Capability: 
BP-2 Transaction Data Processing is complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential (Transaction Data Processing Controls): 
Formal Transaction Processing Procedures: 
Effective auditing and monitoring capability: 
BP-3 Transaction data output is complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential (Transaction Data Output Controls): 
Implementing a reporting strategy: 
Establishing security and controls over report generation and 
distribution: 
BP-4 Master Data Setup and Maintenance is Adequately Controlled: 
Implementing an effective design of master data elements: 
Establishing master data maintenance procedures, including approval, 
review, and adequate support for changes to master data: 
Implementing an effective auditing and monitoring capability: 
4.3. Interface Controls (IN): 
Critical Element IN-1: Implement an effective interface strategy and 
design: 
Critical Element IN-2: Implement effective interface processing 
procedures: 
4.4 Data Management System Controls (DA): 
Key Concepts - Database Management Systems: 
Authentication/Authorization: 
SQL Commands: 
System, Role, Object Privileges: 
Stored Procedures: 
Key Concepts ï¿½ Middleware: 
Middleware Controls: 
Key Concepts ï¿½ Cryptography: 
Key Concepts ï¿½ Data Warehouse, Data Reporting and Data Extraction 
Software: 
Segregation of Duties: 
Control Activities: 

Appendices: 

Appendix I - Information System Controls Audit Planning Checklist: 

Appendix II - Tables for Summarizing Work Performed in Evaluating and 
Testing General and Business Process Application Controls: 

Appendix III - Tables for Assessing the Effectiveness of General and 
Business Process Application Controls: 

Appendix IV - Mapping of FISCAM to SP 800-5: 

Appendix V - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities Needed to Perform 
Information System Controls Audits: 

Appendix VI - Scope of an Information System Controls Audit in Support 
of a Financial Audit: 

Appendix VII - Entityï¿½s Use of Service Organizations: 

Appendix VIII - Application of FISCAM to Single Audits: 

Appendix IX - Application of FISCAM to FISMA: 

Appendix X - Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 
(FISMA): 

Appendix XI - Information System Controls Audit Documentation: 

Appendix XII - Glossary: 

Appendix XIII ï¿½ Bibliography: 

Figures: 

Figure 1. An Example of Typical Networked Systems: 

Figure 2: Example of Router Control Dependencies: 

Figure 3. Example of Network Schematic Describing System Weaknesses: 

Figure 4. Layered Approach to Network Security: 

Figure 5. Layered Security Mitigates the Risk of Individual 
Cybersecurity Threats: 

Figure 6: Steps in Assessing IT Systems Controls in a Financial 
Statement Audit: 

Figure 7: Steps for Each Significant Application in Assessing 
Information System Controls in a Financial Statement Audit: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Control Categories Applicable at Different Levels of Audit: 

Table 2. General Control Categories Applicable at Different Levels of 
Audit: 

Table 3. Critical Elements for Security Management: 

Table 4. Security Controls to Include in System Security Plans: 

Table 5. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical 
Element SM-1: Establish a security management program: 

Table 6. NIST Impact Definitions for Security Objectives: 

Table 7 Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical 
Element SM-2: Periodically assess and validate risks: 

Table 8. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical 
Element SM-3: Document security control policies and procedures: 

Table 9. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical 
Element SM-4: Implement effective security awareness and other security-
related personnel policies: 

Table 10. Types of Security Testing: 

Table 11. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element SM-5: Monitor the effectiveness of the security 
program: 

Table 12. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element SM-6: Effectively remediate information security 
weaknesses: 

Table 13. Examples of Agency-Identified Risks to Federal Systems and 
Data Resulting from Reliance on Contractors: 

Table 14. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element SM-7: Ensure that activities performed by external 
third parties are adequately secure: 

Table 15. Critical Elements for Access Control: 

Table 16. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AC-1: Adequately protect information system 
boundaries: 

Table 17. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AC-2: Implement effective identification and 
authentication mechanisms: 

Table 18. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AC-3: Implement effective authorization controls: 

Table 19. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AC-4: Adequately protect sensitive system resources: 

Table 20. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AC-5: Implement an effective audit and monitoring 
capability: 

Table 21. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AC-6: Establish adequate physical security controls: 

Table 22. Critical Elements for Configuration Management: 

Table 23. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CM-1: Develop and document CM policies, plans, and 
procedures: 

Table 24. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CM-2: Maintain current configuration identification 
information: 

Table 25. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CM-3: Properly authorize, test, approve, and track all 
configuration: 

Table 26. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CM-4: Routinely monitor the configuration: 

Table 27. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CM-5: Update software on a timely basis to protect 
against known vulnerabilities: 

Table 28. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CM-6: Appropriately document and approve emergency 
changes to the configuration: 

Table 29. Critical Elements for Segregation of Duties: 

Table 30. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element SD-1: Segregate incompatible duties and establish 
related policies: 

Table 31. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element SD-2: Control personnel activities through formal 
operating procedures, supervision, and review: 

Table 32. Critical Elements for Contingency Planning: 

Table 33. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CP-1: Assess the criticality and sensitivity of 
computerized operations and identify supporting resources: 

Table 34. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CP-2: Take steps to prevent and minimize potential 
damage and interruption: 

Table 35: Types of Contingency-Related Plans: 

Table 36. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CP-3: Develop and document a comprehensive contingency 
plan: 

Table 37. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CP-4: Periodically test the contingency plan and 
adjust it as appropriate: 

Table 38. General and Application Control Categories Applicable at 
Different Levels of Audit: 

Table 39. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AS-1: Implement effective application security 
management: 

Table 40. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AS-2: Implement effective application access controls: 

Table 41. Control Techniques and suggested audit procedures for AS-3 - 
Implement Effective Application Configuration Management: 

Table 42. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element AS-4 - Segregate user access to conflicting 
transactions and activities and monitor segregation.: 

Table 43. Control Techniques And Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element AS-5 ï¿½ Maintain an effective contingency planning 
program: 

Table 44. Control Techniques And Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element BP-1 - Transaction Data Input is complete, accurate, 
valid, and confidential: 

Table 45. Control Techniques And Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element BP-2 Transaction Data Processing is complete, 
accurate, valid, and confidential: 

Table 46. Control Techniques And Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element BP-3 Transaction data output is complete, accurate, 
valid, and confidential: 

Table 47. Control Techniques And Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element BP-4 Master Data Setup and Maintenance is Adequately 
Controlled: 

Table 48. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element IN-1: Implement an effective interface strategy and 
design: 

Table 49. Control Techniques And Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element Critical Element Critical Element IN-2: Implement 
effective interface processing procedures: 

Table 50. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element DA-1 - Implement an effective data management system 
strategy and design: 

[End of section] 

Chapter 1. Introduction: 

1.0 Chapter 1 Overview: 

This manual provides a methodology for performing information system 
(IS) control audits in accordance with ï¿½generally accepted government 
auditing standardsï¿½ (GAGAS), as presented in Government Auditing 
Standards (also known as the ï¿½Yellow Bookï¿½).[Footnote 3] However, at 
the discretion of the auditor, this manual may be applied on other than 
GAGAS audits. As defined in GAGAS, IS controls consist of those 
internal controls that are dependent on information systems processing 
and include general controls and application controls. This manual 
focuses on such general and application controls. 

As computer technology has advanced, federal agencies and other 
government entities have become dependent on computerized information 
systems to carry out their operations and to process, maintain, and 
report essential information. Virtually all federal operations are 
supported by automated systems and electronic data, and agencies would 
find it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out their missions and 
account for their resources without these information assets. Hence, 
ineffective IS controls can result in significant risk to a broad array 
of government operations and assets. For example: 

* resources, such as payments and collections, could be lost or stolen; 

* computer resources could be used for unauthorized purposes, including 
the launching of attacks on others; 

* sensitive information, such as taxpayer data, Social Security 
records, medical records, other personally identifiable information, 
and proprietary business information, could be inappropriately added, 
deleted, read, copied, disclosed, or modified for purposes such as 
espionage, identity theft, or other types of crime; 

* critical operations, such as those supporting national defense and 
emergency services, could be disrupted; 

* data could be modified or destroyed for purposes of fraud or 
disruption; and; 

* agency/entity missions could be undermined by embarrassing incidents 
that result in diminished confidence in an agencyï¿½s ability to conduct 
operations and fulfill its responsibilities. 

The nature of IS risks continues to evolve. Protecting government 
computer systems has never been more important because of the 
complexity and interconnectivity of systems (including Internet and 
wireless), the ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, the steady 
advances in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack technology, 
and the emergence of new and more destructive attacks. 

As a result, the reliability of computerized data and of the systems 
that process, maintain, and report these data is a major concern to 
managements of government entities and their auditors. Auditors may 
need to evaluate the effectiveness of information system controls over 
data supporting financial statements or data used to analyze specific 
program costs and outcomes. In addition, auditors may be called on to 
evaluate the effectiveness of IS controls to help reduce the risk due 
to errors, fraud, and other illegal acts and disasters or other 
incidents that cause the systems to be unavailable. 

Figure 1 illustrates the potential complexity of a typical networked 
infrastructure. Such infrastructures are built upon multiple hosts, 
including desktop personal computers (PCs), servers, and mainframes. 
Data communications links and network devices such as routers, hubs, 
and switches enable the hosts to communicate with one another through 
local area networks (LANs) within entities. Wide area networks (WANs) 
connect LANs at different geographical locations. Moreover, entities 
are typically connected to the Internet. 

Figure 1. An Example of Typical Networked Systems: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure illustrates an example of typical networked systems. 
Included in the networked systems are the following components: 
General public; 
Remote users; 
Business partners; 
Internet; 
External routers; 
Intrusion detection system; 
External switch; 
Firewall; 
Public access servers; 
VPN concentrator; 
Dial-in access server; 
Internal router and switch; 
Wireless access point; 
Local Area Networks (desktop PCs, printers, internal servers); 
Gateway; 
Mainframe; 
Routers; 
Wide Area Network; 
Interorganization; 
Intraorganization. 

Source: GAO analysis and Microsoft Vision (TM). 

[End of figure] 

1.1 Purpose and Anticipated Users of the Manual: 

This manual describes (1) an audit methodology for assessing the 
effectiveness of IS controls, and (2) the IS controls that auditors 
evaluate when assessing the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of information and information systems. The Federal 
Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM) is designed to be 
used primarily on financial and performance audits and attestation 
engagements performed in accordance with ï¿½generally accepted government 
auditing standardsï¿½ (GAGAS), as presented in Government Auditing 
Standards (also known as the ï¿½Yellow Bookï¿½). However, at the discretion 
of the auditor, this manual may be applied on other than GAGAS audits. 
This manual is intended for both (1) auditors performing financial and 
performance audits and attestation engagements to assist them in 
understanding the work done by IS controls specialists, and (2) IS 
controls specialists to plan and perform the IS controls audit. Federal 
and other government auditors may use this manual. It is not an 
auditing standard and it would be incorrect to refer to it as a 
standard. Its purposes are to: 

* provide guidance for performing effective and efficient IS controls 
audits, either alone or as part of a performance audit, a financial 
audit, or an attestation engagement, including communication of any 
identified IS control weaknesses; and; 

* inform financial, performance, and attestation auditors about IS 
controls and related audit issues, so that they can (1) plan their work 
in accordance with GAGAS and (2) integrate the work of IS controls 
specialists with other aspects of the financial or performance audit or 
attestation engagement. 

The auditor should determine whether IS controls are relevant to the 
audit objectives. IS controls generally are relevant to a financial 
audit, as financial information is usually processed by information 
systems. For financial audits, the GAO/PCIE Financial Audit Manual 
(FAM)[Footnote 4] provides a framework for evaluating IS controls as 
part of a financial audit. The scope of an information system controls 
audit in support of a financial audit is summarized in Appendix VI. For 
performance audits, GAGAS 7.27 states that auditors should determine 
which audit procedures related to information system controls are 
needed to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to support the audit 
findings and conclusions.[Footnote 5] This GAGAS paragraph provides 
factors that may assist auditors in making this determination. 

This manual lists specific control activities and techniques and 
related suggested audit procedures. These are described at a high level 
and assume some level of expertise for an auditor to perform these 
audit procedures effectively. Accordingly, the auditor should develop 
more detailed audit steps based on the specific software and control 
techniques employed by the entity, the audit objectives, and 
significant areas of audit interest. 

In addition, the FISCAM includes narrative that is designed to provide 
a basic understanding of the methodology (Chapter 2), general controls 
(Chapter 3) and business process application controls (Chapter 4) 
addressed by the FISCAM. The narrative may also be used as a reference 
source by the auditor and the IS control specialist. More experienced 
auditors and IS control specialists may find it unnecessary to 
routinely refer to such narrative in performing IS control audits. For 
example, a more experienced auditor may have sufficient knowledge, 
skills, and abilities to directly use the control tables in Chapters 2 
and 3 (which are summarized in Appendices II and III). 

Further, many of the suggested audit procedures start with the word 
ï¿½review.ï¿½ The intent of such language is for the auditor to do more 
than simply look at the subject to be reviewed. Rather, a critical 
evaluation is envisioned, in which the auditor uses professional 
judgment and experience and undertakes the task with a certain level of 
skepticism, critical thinking, and creativity. 

Although IS controls audit work, especially control testing, is 
generally performed by an IS controls specialist, financial or 
performance auditors with appropriate training, expertise, and 
supervision may undertake specific tasks in this area of the audit. 
Throughout this manual, the term ï¿½auditorï¿½ means either (1) an IS 
controls specialist or (2) a financial or performance auditor working 
in consultation with or under the supervision of an IS controls 
specialist. The FISCAM may be used by other staff that possess adequate 
IT competence. GAGAS requires that staff assigned to conduct an audit 
must collectively possess the technical knowledge, skills, and 
experience necessary to be competent for the type of work being 
performed. See Appendix V for additional information on the knowledge, 
skills, and abilities needed to perform information system control 
audits. 

The following terms are used in the FISCAM to describe the degree of 
responsibility they impose on auditors and audit organizations: 

* must - Auditors and audit organizations are required to comply with 
this unconditional requirement in all cases in which the circumstances 
exist to which the unconditional requirement applies. The term ï¿½mustï¿½ 
is used only in FISCAM when the related requirement is specified as a 
ï¿½mustï¿½ in GAGAS. 

* should - Auditors and audit organizations are also required to comply 
with this presumptively mandatory requirement in all cases in which the 
circumstances exist to which the presumptively mandatory requirement 
applies; however, in rare circumstances, auditors and audit 
organizations may depart from a presumptively mandatory requirement 
provided they document their justification for the departure and how 
the alternative procedures performed in the circumstances were 
sufficient to achieve the objectives of the presumptively mandatory 
requirement. The term ï¿½shouldï¿½ is used when (1) the related requirement 
is specified as a ï¿½shouldï¿½ in GAGAS, or (2) performance is deemed 
necessary to meet GAGAS evidence requirements for an IS controls audit. 

* generally should ï¿½ Although optional, compliance with this policy is 
strongly encouraged. 

* may ï¿½ Compliance with this procedure or action is optional. It is 
descriptive rather than required. It is explanatory material that 
provides further explanation and guidance on the professional 
requirements or identifies and describes other procedures or actions 
relating to auditorsï¿½ or audit organizationsï¿½ activities. 

When these or similar terms are used to describe management or entity 
actions (rather than actions of the auditor or audit organization), the 
general meaning of the terms is intended. If the entity does not comply 
with a ï¿½mustï¿½ or ï¿½shouldï¿½, the auditor should assess the impact of the 
noncompliance on the effectiveness of related IS controls. 

1.2 Nature of Information System Controls: 

An evaluation of IS controls generally includes both general and 
business process application controls (also called application 
controls). The entity must have effective general and business process 
application controls to achieve the appropriate confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of critical information and information 
systems. 

Information system (IS) controls consist of those internal controls 
that are dependent on information systems processing and include 
general controls (entitywide, system, and business process application 
levels), business process application controls (input, processing, 
output, master file, interface, and data management system controls), 
and user controls[Footnote 6] (controls performed by people interacting 
with information systems). General and business process application 
controls are always IS controls. A user control is an IS control if its 
effectiveness depends on information systems processing or the 
reliability (accuracy, completeness, and validity) of information 
processed by information systems. Conversely, a user control is not an 
IS control if its effectiveness does not depend on information systems 
processing or the reliability of information processed by information 
systems. 

General controls are the policies and procedures that apply to all or a 
large segment of an entityï¿½s information systems and help ensure their 
proper operation. Examples of primary objectives for general controls 
are to safeguard data, protect business process application programs, 
and ensure continued computer operations in case of unexpected 
interruptions. General controls are applied at the entitywide, system, 
and business process application levels. The effectiveness of general 
controls is a significant factor in determining the effectiveness of 
business process application controls, which are applied at the 
business process application level. Without effective general controls, 
business process application controls can generally be rendered 
ineffective by circumvention or modification. For example, automated 
edits designed to preclude users from entering unreasonably large 
dollar amounts in a payment processing system can be an effective 
application control. However, this control is not effective (cannot be 
relied on) if the general controls permit unauthorized program 
modifications that might allow some payments to be exempted from the 
edits or unauthorized changes to be made to data files after the edit 
is performed. GAGAS paragraph 7.23 discusses the following types of 
general controls: security management, logical and physical access, 
configuration management, segregation of duties, and contingency 
planning. Chapter 3 discusses the general controls in an IS controls 
audit and provides more detail on the critical elements of each type of 
general control. 

Business process application controls are directly related to 
individual computerized applications. They help ensure that 
transactions are complete, accurate, valid, and confidential. Business 
process application controls include (1) programmed control techniques, 
such as automated edits, and (2) manual follow-up of computer-generated 
reports, such as reviews of reports identifying rejected or unusual 
items. GAGAS paragraph 7.23 defines application controls, or business 
controls, as those controls that help ensure the validity, 
completeness, accuracy, and confidentiality of transactions and data 
during application processing. Chapter 4 discusses the business process 
application level controls in an IS controls audit and provides more 
detail on the critical elements of each type of business process 
application control. 

The overall framework of IS control objectives presented in the FISCAM 
can be viewed in different ways. One way to summarize the objectives is 
presented below. 

General Controls: 

Security Management: 

Controls provide reasonable assurance that security management is 
effective, including effective: 

* security management program, 
* periodic assessments and validation of risk, 
* security control policies and procedures, 
* security awareness training and other security-related personnel 
issues, 
* periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information 
security policies, procedures, and practices, 
* remediation of information security weaknesses, and; 
* security over activities performed by external third parties. 

Access Controls: 

Controls provide reasonable assurance that access to computer resources 
(data, equipment, and facilities) is reasonable and restricted to 
authorized individuals, including effective: 

* protection of information system boundaries, 
* identification and authentication mechanisms, 
* authorization controls, 
* protection of sensitive system resources, 
* audit and monitoring capability, including incident handling, and; 
* physical security controls. 

Configuration Management: 

Controls provide reasonable assurance that changes to information 
system resources are authorized and systems are configured and operated 
securely and as intended, including effective: 
* configuration management policies, plans, and procedures, 
* current configuration identification information, 
* proper authorization, testing, approval, and tracking of all 
configuration changes, 
* routine monitoring of the configuration, 
* updating software on a timely basis to protect against known 
vulnerabilities, and, 
* documentation and approval of emergency changes to the configuration. 

Segregation of Duties: 

Controls provide reasonable assurance that incompatible duties are 
effectively segregated, including effective: 

* segregation of incompatible duties and responsibilities and related 
policies, and; 
* control of personnel activities through formal operating procedures, 
supervision, and review. 

Contingency Planning: 

Controls provide reasonable assurance that contingency planning (1) 
protects information resources and minimizes the risk of unplanned 
interruptions and (2) provides for recovery of critical operations 
should interruptions occur, including effective: 

* assessment of the criticality and sensitivity of computerized 
operations and identification of supporting resources, 
* steps taken to prevent and minimize potential damage and 
interruption, 
* comprehensive contingency plan, and; 
* periodic testing of the contingency plan, with appropriate 
adjustments to the plan based on the testing. 

Business Process Application Controls: 

Completeness ï¿½ controls provide reasonable assurance that all 
transactions that occurred are input into the system, accepted for 
processing, processed once and only once by the system, and properly 
included in output. 

Accuracy ï¿½ controls provide reasonable assurance that transactions are 
properly recorded, with correct amount/data, and on a timely basis (in 
the proper period); key data elements input for transactions are 
accurate; data elements are processed accurately by applications that 
produce reliable results; and output is accurate. 

Validity ï¿½ controls provide reasonable assurance (1) that all recorded 
transactions and actually occurred (are real), relate to the 
organization, are authentic, and were properly approved in accordance 
with managementï¿½s authorization; and (2) that output contains only 
valid data. 

Confidentiality ï¿½ controls provide reasonable assurance that 
application data and reports and other output are protected against 
unauthorized access. 

1.3 Determining the Nature and Extent of Audit Procedures: 

The nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures performed to assess 
IS controls vary, depending on the audit objectives, the nature and 
extent of audit risks and other factors. Factors that can affect the 
nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures include the nature and 
complexity of the entityï¿½s information systems, the entityï¿½s control 
environment, and particular data and applications that are significant 
to the financial statements or operations of the entity. As 
appropriate, the IS controls specialist, and the financial, 
performance, or attestation auditor generally should work cooperatively 
to determine the nature, timing, and extent of IS controls audit 
procedures. 

Inadequate coordination can result in ineffective auditing, for 
example, incomplete IS controls audits or improper consideration of the 
work performed by the IS controls specialist. When performed as part of 
a financial statement audit, an assessment of IS controls is part of a 
comprehensive effort to evaluate both the controls over and reliability 
of financial reporting. In performance audits and attestation 
engagements, the nature and extent of IS controls audit procedures vary 
depending on the objectives of the audit. 

1.4 Organization of This Manual: 

This manual is organized as follows: 

* Chapter 2 describes the methodology for performing the IS controls 
audit. 

* Chapter 3 provides information concerning the five general control 
categories, supporting critical elements, critical activities, 
potential control techniques, and suggested audit procedures. 

* Chapter 4 provides information concerning the four business process 
application control level categories, supporting critical elements, 
critical activities, potential control techniques, and suggested audit 
procedures. 

* Appendices provide supplemental information to assist the auditor in 
applying the FISCAM methodology. 

This manual provides a risk-based approach for performing the 
information system controls audit that is consistent with government 
auditing standards and the GAO/PCIE Financial Audit Manual (FAM). 
[Footnote 7] The FISCAM is consistent with GAGAS and, where 
appropriate, the FISCAM discusses the applicable GAGAS requirements. 
Each of the nine control categories (five general control categories 
and four business process level control categories) represents a 
grouping of related controls having similar types of risk. For each 
category, this manual discusses the key underlying concepts, associated 
risks if the controls in the category are ineffective, and the critical 
elements that should be achieved for IS controls to be effective. 

This organization structure facilitates the following: 

* Audit planning: Related audit steps can be grouped and broken down 
into three primary levels: the entitywide level, the system level, and 
the application level. 

* Evaluation of findings: The effectiveness of IS controls can be 
evaluated by control technique, control activity, critical element, and 
control category. 

* Audit report drafting: Findings can be summarized by control category 
and critical element. 

To evaluate IS controls, the auditor should use appropriate criteria 
that are relevant to the audit objectives. For audits of federal 
entities, criteria are provided by the Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA) (see Appendix X) and, for non-national security 
systems, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special 
Publication (SP) 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal 
Information Systems and other NIST guidance. The Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) requires federal entities to apply other NIST guidance 
to non-national security systems. Also, other sources, such as vendor 
recommended IS practices and other generally accepted IS resources, may 
provide criteria.[Footnote 8] In addition, NIST is responsible for 
developing minimum security standards and guidelines that are 
complementary with standards and guidelines employed for the protection 
of national security systems and information contained in such systems. 

FISMA states that standards and guidelines for national security 
systems shall be developed, prescribed, enforced, and overseen as 
otherwise authorized by law and as directed by the President. Also, 
FISMA states that the head of each agency operating or exercising 
control of a national security system shall be responsible for ensuring 
that the agency: 

* provides information security protections commensurate with the risk 
and magnitude of the harm resulting from the unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the information 
contained in such system; 

* implements information security policies and practices as required by 
standards and guidelines for national security systems, issued in 
accordance with law and as directed by the President; and; 

* complies with the requirements of FISMA. 

GAO has consulted with NIST, as provided for in FISMA, and the FISCAM 
is mapped to NIST SP 800-53. Appendix IV provides a mapping of the two 
documents. In addition, each critical element includes references to 
related NIST SP 800-53 controls. NIST SP 800-53 includes a table of the 
mapping. Also, to assist auditors, individual FISCAM control activities 
reference related NIST SP 800-53 controls. This manual provides 
additional narrative to assist the auditor in evaluating IS controls. 
In addition, FISCAM incorporates other NIST guidance, including, for 
example, NIST SP 800-100, Information Security Handbook: A Guide for 
Managers, which includes coverage of programmatic areas such as 
information security governance, capital planning and investment 
control, and system development life cycle. 

The FISCAM, which is consistent with NIST and other criteria, is 
organized to facilitate effective and efficient IS controls audits. 
Specifically, the methodology in the FISCAM incorporates: 

* A top-down, risk-based evaluation that considers materiality and 
significance in determining effective and efficient audit procedures 
(the auditor determines which IS control techniques are relevant to the 
audit objectives and which are necessary to achieve the control 
activities; generally, all control activities are relevant unless the 
audit scope is limited or the auditor determines that, due to 
significant IS control weaknesses, it is not necessary to test all 
relevant IS controls). 

* An evaluation of entitywide IS controls and their effect on audit 
risk, and therefore on the extent of audit testing (effective 
entitywide IS controls can reduce audit risk, while ineffective 
entitywide IS controls result in increased audit risk and generally are 
a contributory cause of IS control weaknesses at the system and 
business process application levels)ï¿½NIST SP 800-53 principally relates 
to controls at the system and application level. 

* An evaluation of general controls and their pervasive impact on 
business process application controls (effective general controls 
support the effectiveness of business process application controls, 
while ineffective general controls generally render business process 
application controls ineffective). 

* An evaluation of security management at all levels of control 
(entitywide, system, and business process application levels). 

* A control hierarchy (control categories, critical elements, and 
control activities) to assist in evaluating the significance of 
identified IS control weaknesses (if a critical element is not 
achieved, the respective control category is not likely to be achieved; 
if one of the nine control categories are not effectively achieved, IS 
controls are ineffective, unless other factors sufficiently reduce the 
risk). 

* Groupings of control categories consistent with the nature of the 
risk. 

* Experience gained in GAOï¿½s performance and review of IS control 
audits, including field testing the concepts in this revised FISCAM. 

As discussed above, this manual is organized in a hierarchical 
structure to assist the auditor in performing the IS controls audit. 
Chapter 3 (general controls) and Chapter 4 (business process 
application level controls) contain several control categories, which 
are groupings of related controls pertaining to similar types of risk. 
For each control category, the manual identifies critical 
elementsï¿½tasks that are essential for establishing adequate controls 
within the category. For each critical element, there is a discussion 
of the associated objectives, risks, and control activities, as well as 
related potential control techniques and suggested audit procedures. 
This hierarchical structure facilitates the auditorï¿½s audit planning 
and analysis of identified control weaknesses. 

Because control activities are generally necessary to achieve the 
critical elements, they are generally relevant to a GAGAS audit unless 
the related control category is not relevant, the audit scope is 
limited, or the auditor determines that, due to significant IS control 
weaknesses, it is not necessary to assess the effectiveness of all 
relevant IS controls. Within each relevant control activity, the 
auditor should identify control techniques implemented by the entity 
and determine whether the control techniques, as designed, are 
sufficient to achieve the control activity, considering IS audit risk 
and the audit objectives. The auditor may be able to determine whether 
control techniques are sufficient to achieve a particular control 
activity without evaluating and testing all of the control techniques. 
Also, depending on IS audit risk and the audit objectives, the nature 
and extent of control techniques necessary to achieve a particular 
control objective will vary. 

If sufficient, the auditor should determine whether the control 
techniques are implemented (placed in operation) and are operating 
effectively. Also, the auditor should evaluate the nature and extent of 
testing performed by the entity. Such information can assist in 
identifying key controls and in assessing risk, but the auditor should 
not rely on testing performed by the entity in lieu of appropriate 
auditor testing. As discussed later in this section, if the control 
techniques implemented by the entity, as designed, are not sufficient 
to address the control activity, or the control techniques are not 
effectively implemented as designed, the auditor should determine the 
effect on IS controls and the audit objectives. 

The entityï¿½s management is responsible for implementing an appropriate 
system of cost-effective IS controls, including an effective monitoring 
program to provide management with reasonable assurance that IS 
controls are properly designed and effectively operating. The auditorï¿½s 
responsibility is to perform tests of the IS controls and provide 
conclusions on the results of such tests to support the audit 
objectives. 

1.4.1 Appendices: 

The appendices to the FISCAM, summarized below, provide additional 
information to assist the auditor in performing the IS controls audit. 

List of Appendices: 

Appendix I: 
Description: Information System Controls Audit Planning Checklist; 
Purpose: To assist the auditor in requesting relevant background 
information. 

Appendix II: 
Description: Tables for Summarizing Work Performed in Evaluating and 
Testing General and Business Process Application Controls; 
Purpose: To assist the auditor in summarizing work performed. 

Appendix III: 
Description: Tables for Assessing the Effectiveness of General and 
Business Process Application Controls; 
Purpose: To assist the auditor in assessing and reporting on IS 
controls. 

Appendix IV: 
Description: Mapping of FISCAM to SP 800-53; 
Purpose: To show correlation between FISCAM critical elements and NIST 
SP 800-53. 

Appendix V: 
Description: Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities Needed to Perform 
Information System Controls Audits; 
Purpose: Skill sets necessary to perform the IS controls audit. 

Appendix VI: 
Description: Scope of an Information System Controls Audit in Support 
of a Financial Audit; 
Purpose: To show relation of FISCAM to relevant FAM sections. 

Appendix VII: 
Description: Entityï¿½s Use of Service Organizations; 
Purpose: Audit issues related to an entityï¿½s use of a service 
organization and use of FISCAM as a basis for performing a SAS 70 
audit. 

Appendix VIII: 
Description: Application of FISCAM to Single Audits; 
Purpose: Use of FISCAM to assess IS controls over compliance 
requirements and financial reporting in connection with a single audit. 

Appendix IX: 
Description: Application of FISCAM to FISMA; 
Purpose: Use of FISCAM for the independent evaluation of a federal 
agencyï¿½s information security program required by FISMA. 

Appendix X: 
Description: Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 
(FISMA); 
Purpose: Key legislation containing criteria for federal IS controls 
audits. 

Appendix XI: 
Description: Information System Controls Audit Documentation; 
Purpose: Summarizes IS controls audit documentation. 

Appendix XII: 
Description: Glossary; 
Purpose: Key terms used in the FISCAM. 

Appendix XIII: 
Description: Bibliography; 
Purpose: List of information sources. 

[End of chapter] 

Chapter 2. Performing the Information System Controls Audit: 

2.0 Introduction: 

The information system (IS) controls audit involves the following three 
phases: 

* Planning: The auditor determines an effective and efficient way to 
obtain the evidential matter necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
IS controls audit and the audit report. For financial audits, the 
auditor develops an audit strategy and an audit plan. For performance 
audits, the auditor develops an audit plan. 

* Testing: The auditor tests the effectiveness of IS controls that are 
relevant to the audit objectives. 

* Reporting: The auditor concludes on the effect of any identified IS 
control weaknesses on the audit objectives and reports the results of 
the audit, including any material weaknesses and other significant 
deficiencies. 

Appendix VI provides the scope of an IS controls audit in support of a 
financial statement audit. 

For each of the three phases, the auditor prepares appropriate audit 
documentation. 

2.1 Planning the Information System Controls Audit: 

2.1.1 Overview: 

In planning the IS controls audit, the auditor uses the equivalent 
concepts of materiality (in financial audits) and significance 
[Footnote 9] (in performance audits) to plan both effective and 
efficient audit procedures. Materiality and significance are concepts 
the auditor uses to determine the planned nature, timing, and extent of 
audit procedures. The underlying principle is that the auditor is not 
required to spend resources on items of little importance; that is, 
those that would not affect the judgment or conduct of a reasonable 
user of the audit report, in light of surrounding circumstances. On the 
basis of this principle, the auditor may determine that some areas of 
the IS controls audit (e.g., specific systems) are not material or 
significant, and therefore warrant little or no audit attention. 

Materiality and significance include both quantitative and qualitative 
factors in relation to the subject matter of the audit. Even though a 
system may process transactions that are quantitatively immaterial or 
insignificant, the system may contain sensitive information or provide 
an access path to other systems that contain information that is 
sensitive or otherwise material or significant. For example, an 
application that provides public information via a website, if 
improperly configured, may expose internal network resources, including 
sensitive systems, to unauthorized access. Materiality is more fully 
discussed in the FAM in section 230 (Determine Planning, Design, and 
Test Materiality), and both terms are discussed further in GAGAS. 

Planning occurs throughout the audit as an iterative process. (For 
example, based on findings from the testing phase, the auditor may 
change the planned audit approach, including the design of specific 
tests.) However, planning activities are concentrated in the planning 
phase, during which the objectives are to obtain an understanding of 
the entity and its operations, including its internal control, identify 
significant issues, assess risk, and design the nature, extent, and 
timing of audit procedures. To accomplish this, the methodology 
presented in this chapter includes guidance to help the auditor do the 
following: 

* Understand the overall audit objectives and related scope of the IS 
controls audit; 

* Obtain an understanding of an entity and its operations and key 
business processes; 

* Obtain a general understanding of the structure of the entityï¿½s 
networks; 

* Identify key areas of audit interest (files, applications, systems, 
locations); 

* Assess IS risk on a preliminary basis ? Identify critical control 
points (for example, external access points to networks); 

* Obtain a preliminary understanding of IS controls; 

* Perform other audit planning procedures. 

Although each of these areas is discussed separately in this chapter, 
they are not generally performed as discrete, sequential steps. For 
example, the IS controls specialist may gather information related to 
several steps concurrently, such as through interviews with key 
information technology (IT) staff or through data requests, or may 
perform steps in a different sequence. The auditor performs planning to 
determine an effective and efficient way to obtain the evidential 
matter necessary to support the objectives of the IS controls audit and 
the audit report. The nature and extent of audit planning procedures 
varies for each audit depending on several factors, including the 
entityï¿½s size and complexity, the auditorï¿½s experience with the entity, 
and the auditorï¿½s knowledge of the entityï¿½s operations. 

A key to a high-quality audit, the senior members of the audit team 
should be involved in planning. The auditor should coordinate with the 
entity being audited and, if the IS controls audit is part of another 
audit, with senior members of the overall audit team. In addition, 
auditors generally should determine the needs of other auditors who 
plan to use the work being performed and consult with them in a timely 
manner, especially when making decisions involving significant 
judgment. 

If the IS controls audit is performed as part of a financial audit, 
GAGAS require the auditor to obtain an understanding of internal 
control over financial reporting sufficient to assess the risk of 
material misstatement of the financial statements whether due to error 
or fraud, and to design the nature, timing, and extent of further audit 
procedures based on that assessment. This includes performing risk 
assessment procedures to evaluate the design of controls relevant to an 
audit of financial statements and to determine whether they have been 
implemented. In obtaining this understanding, the auditor considers how 
an entityï¿½s use of information technology (IT) and manual procedures 
affect controls relevant to the audit. The auditorï¿½s responsibilities 
for considering internal control in a financial audit are described in 
more detail in the FAM. 

If the IS controls audit is performed as part of a performance audit, 
GAGAS[Footnote 10] (para. 7.24) states that when information systems 
controls are determined to be significant to the audit objectives, 
auditors should then evaluate the design and operating effectiveness of 
such controls. This evaluation would include other information systems 
controls that impact the effectiveness of the significant controls or 
the reliability of information used in performing the significant 
controls. Auditors should obtain a sufficient understanding of 
information systems controls necessary to assess audit risk and plan 
the audit within the context of the audit objectives. 

Additionally, GAGAS (para. 7.27) states that auditors should determine 
which audit procedures related to information systems controls are 
needed to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to support the audit 
findings and conclusions. It also provides the following factors to 
assist the auditor in making this determination: 

a. The extent to which internal controls that are significant to the 
audit depend on the reliability of information processed or generated 
by information systems. 

b. The availability of evidence outside the information system to 
support the findings and conclusions: It may not be possible for 
auditors to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence without assessing 
the effectiveness of relevant information systems controls. For 
example, if information supporting the findings and conclusions is 
generated by information systems or its reliability is dependent on 
information systems controls, there may not be sufficient supporting or 
corroborating information or documentary evidence that is available 
other than that produced by the information systems. 

c. The relationship of information systems controls to data 
reliability: To obtain evidence about the reliability of computer-
generated information, auditors may decide to assess the effectiveness 
of information systems controls as part of obtaining evidence about the 
reliability of the data. If the auditor concludes that information 
systems controls are effective, the auditor may reduce the extent of 
direct testing of data. 

d. Assessing the effectiveness of information systems controls as an 
audit objective: When assessing the effectiveness of information 
systems controls is directly a part of an audit objective, auditors 
should test information systems controls necessary to address the audit 
objectives. For example, the audit may involve the effectiveness of 
information systems controls related to certain systems, facilities, or 
organizations. 

2.1.2 Understand the Overall Audit Objectives and Related Scope of the 
Information System Controls Audit: 

The nature, timing, and extent of IS controls audit procedures vary 
depending upon the audit objectives. For example, the IS controls 
audit: 

* may be performed as part of a financial or performance audit, or may 
be performed as a separate engagement; 

* may comprehensively address an entire entity, a component, or a 
network, or may narrowly target an application, specific technology 
(e.g., wireless, operating system, etc.), or location; and/or; 

* may include all control objectives or only a subset of control 
objectives (e.g., general controls, business process controls, or 
selected components of them, such as focusing on an entityï¿½s security 
management program). 

If achieving the audit objectives does not require an overall 
conclusion on the effectiveness of the entityï¿½s IS controls or relates 
only to certain components of the entity or a subset of controls, the 
auditorï¿½s assessment would not necessarily identify all significant IS 
control weaknesses that may exist. For example, a limited review of 
controls over a type of operating system may not identify any 
significant weaknesses, although there may be very significant 
weaknesses in other areas that the auditor is unaware of because the 
scope of the audit is limited. Consequently, the auditor should 
evaluate the potential limitations of the auditorï¿½s work on the 
auditorï¿½s report and the needs and expectations of users. The auditor 
may determine that, because the limitations are so significant, the 
auditor will (1) communicate the limitations to the management of the 
audited entity, those charged with governance, and/or those requesting 
the audit, and (2) clearly report such limitations on the conclusions 
in the audit report. For example, in reporting on an audit of an 
operating system, the auditor may determine that it is appropriate to 
clearly report that the scope of the assessment was limited to the 
operating system and that, consequently, additional IS control 
weaknesses may exist that could impact the effectiveness of IS controls 
related to the operating system and to the entity as a whole. 

Based on the overall engagement objectives, the auditor should develop 
and document the objectives of the IS controls audit. Typical IS 
controls audit objectives include the following: 

* To support financial statement audits by, for example, assessing the 
effectiveness of IS controls related to financial reporting. (Note: The 
assessment of IS controls generally occurs during the internal control 
phase of a financial statement audit.) This assessment affects the 
nature, timing, and extent of financial audit procedures to be 
performed, as well as provide timely recommendations for improvements 
in IS controls. In addition, it may cover the entire audit year or 
relate only to controls at a point in time, such as at the end of the 
fiscal year. The scope of an IS controls audit in support of a 
financial audit is described further in the FAM and in Appendix VI. 

* To supplement IT performance audits by assessing the effectiveness of 
security within the context of a broader systems review. 

* To support other performance audits, such as assessing data 
reliability or how well an information system protects the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and the effect of 
this level of protection on program performance. 

* To determine the effectiveness of IS controls, not in support of 
another audit, so that any risks are identified. Such audits may be 
designed to provide a conclusion on the effectiveness of IS controls 
and describe any material weaknesses and other significant 
deficiencies, or merely describe any IS control weaknesses without an 
overall conclusion as to the effectiveness of IS controls. 

* To support evaluation of IS controls as required by FISMA. 

* To support single audits. 

The auditor should also determine and document (such as in an audit 
strategy and audit plan) the appropriate scope of the IS controls 
audit, including: 

* the organizational entities to be addressed (e.g., entitywide, 
selected component(s), etc.); 

* the breadth of the audit (e.g., overall conclusion on IS control 
effectiveness, review of a specific application or technology area, 
such as wireless or UNIX, etc.); 

* the types of IS controls to be tested: ? general and/or business 
process application level controls to be tested, or selected 
components; or; 

* all levels of the entityï¿½s information systems, or selected levels 
(e.g., entitywide, system level, or business process application level, 
or selected components of themï¿½for definitions of each level, see the 
section below entitled ï¿½2.2 Perform Information System Controls Audit 
Tests,ï¿½). 

If the IS controls audit is performed as part of another audit, the 
auditor should understand the overall audit objectives and how the IS 
controls audit will integrate with the audit. The auditor should reach 
a common understanding of objectives with the audit team responsible 
for the overall audit. 

2.1.3 Understand the Entityï¿½s Operations and Key Business Processes: 

The auditor should obtain and document an understanding of the entity 
sufficient to plan and perform the audit in accordance with applicable 
auditing standards and requirements. In planning the audit, the auditor 
obtains information that will provide an overall understanding of the 
entity, such as its mission, size and location, organization, business, 
strategies, risks, and internal control structure. Understanding the 
entityï¿½s operations in the planning process enables the auditor to 
identify, respond to, and resolve problems early in the audit. 

The auditorï¿½s understanding of the entity includes: 

* entity management and organization, 

* external and internal factors affecting the entityï¿½s operations, and, 

* key business processes (defined below). 

To plan the audit, the auditor obtains a general understanding of the 
entityï¿½s and the IT functionï¿½s organizational structure, including key 
members of entity and IT management. 

The auditorï¿½s main objective is to understand how the entity is managed 
and how the organization is structured. The auditor should identify 
significant external and internal factors that affect the entityï¿½s 
operations, particularly IT. External factors might include (1) IT 
budget, (2) external systems users, (3) current political climate, and 
(4) relevant legislation. Internal factors might include (1) size of 
the entity, (2) number of locations, (3) structure of the entity 
(centralized or decentralized), (4) complexity of operations, (5) IT 
management structure, (6) impact of information systems on business 
operations, (7) qualifications and competence of key IT personnel, and 
(8) turnover of key IT personnel. 

The auditor should document any significant factors that could affect 
the IS controls audit, including the auditorï¿½s risk assessment. The 
auditor should also obtain a general understanding of the entityï¿½s 
business processes, particularly those processes most closely related 
to the audit objectives. Business processes are the primary functions 
that the entity performs in accomplishing its mission. Examples of 
typical business processes in government entities include: 

* mission-related processes, typically at the program or subprogram 
level, such as education, public health, law enforcement, or income 
security; 

* financial management processes, such as collections, disbursements, 
or payroll; and; 

* other support processes, such as human resources, property 
management, or security. 

Understanding the entity's operations and business processes includes 
understanding how business process applications are used to support key 
business processes, as it tends to vary from entity to entity. The 
auditor should obtain and review documentation, such as design 
documents, blueprints, business process procedures, user manuals, etc., 
and inquire of knowledgeable personnel to obtain a general 
understanding of each significant business process application that is 
relevant to the audit objectives. This includes a detailed 
understanding of: 

* business rules (e.g. removing all transactions that fail edits or 
only selected ones based on established criteria), 

* transaction flows (detailed study of the entityï¿½s internal controls 
over a particular category of events that identifies all key procedures 
and controls relating to the processing of transactions), and; 

* application and software module interaction (transactions leave one 
system for processing by another, e.g. payroll time card interfaces 
with pay rate file to determine salary information). 

Obtaining this understanding is essential to assessing information 
system risk, understanding application controls, and developing 
relevant audit procedures. For efficiency, the auditor may combine this 
step with the steps in FISCAM section 2.2.1 subsection entitled 
ï¿½Understand Information Systems Relevant to the Audit Objectivesï¿½ to 
aid in the identification of relevant controls. 

The auditor should identify and document the key business processes 
that are relevant to the audit objectives. For each key business 
process, the auditor should identify the significant general support 
systems and major applications that are used to support each key 
business process.[Footnote 11] Also, for each key business process, the 
auditor should identify the use of contractors and others to process 
information and/or operate systems for or on behalf of the entity. 
Throughout the remainder of this manual, references to entity systems 
and business processes include the use of contractors and others to 
process information and/or operate systems for or on behalf of the 
entity. If the IS controls audit is performed as part of a financial 
audit, as discussed in FAM 320 (Understand Information Systems) and 
other FAM sections, the auditor should obtain an understanding of the 
entityï¿½s information systems (including methods and records) for 
processing and reporting accounting (including supplemental 
information), compliance, and operations data (including performance 
measures reported in the Managementï¿½s Discussion and Analysis). 

The auditor should document an understanding of the entityï¿½s operations 
and key business processes, including the following items to the extent 
relevant to the audit objectives: 

* the significance and nature of the programs and functions supported 
by information systems; 

* a general understanding of the entityï¿½s and the IT functionï¿½s 
organizational structure; 

* key business processes relevant to the audit objectives, including 
business rules, transaction flows, and application and software module 
interaction; 

* significant general support systems and major applications that 
support each key business process; ? background information checklist, 
if used; 

* significant internal and external factors that could affect the IS 
controls audit objectives; 

* a detailed organization chart, particularly the IT and the IS 
components; 

* significant changes in the IT environment or significant applications 
implemented within the recent past (e.g. 2 years) or planned within the 
near future (e.g., 2 years); and; 

* the entityï¿½s reliance on third parties to provide IT services (e.g., 
in-house, remote connectivity, remote processing). 

Appendix I includes an Information System Controls Audit Planning 
Checklist that can be provided to the entityï¿½s management to facilitate 
gathering appropriate information for this audit step. 

The auditor generally gathers planning information through different 
methods (observation, interviews, reading policy and procedure manuals, 
etc.) and from a variety of sources, including: 

* previous audits and management reviews, 

* top-level entity and IT management, 

* entity management responsible for relevant significant programs, 

* Office of Inspector General (IG) and internal audit management 
(including any internal control officer), 

* other members of the audit organization, concerning relevant 
completed, planned or in-progress assignments, 

* personnel in the Office of General Counsel, and; 

* personnel in the Special Investigator Unit. 

Also, the auditor generally gathers information from relevant reports 
and articles issued by or about the entity, including: 

* GAO reports; 

* IG, internal audit, or other audit reports (including those for 
performance audits and other reviews); 

* congressional hearings and reports; 

* consultant reports; and; 

* material published about the entity in newspapers, magazines, 
Internet sites, and other publications. 

2.1.4 Obtain a General Understanding of the Structure of the Entityï¿½s 
Networks: 

The auditor should obtain and document a general understanding of the 
structure of the entityï¿½s networks as a basis for planning the IS 
controls audit. The auditorï¿½s understanding includes a high-level view 
of the network architecture that the entity uses to implement key 
business processes. Such an understanding helps the auditor to assess 
risk, identify potential critical control points on a preliminary 
basis, understand technologies that may be subject to audit, and 
identify key locations. The auditor generally should request 
documentation of such information from the entity, including both high-
level and detailed network schematics. The auditor should obtain the 
following information about the network architecture, generally 
documented in network schematics: 

* Internet presence; 

* firewalls, routers, and switches; 

* intrusion detection or prevention systems; 

* critical systems, such as Web and mail systems, file transfer 
systems, etc.; 

* network management systems; 

* connections to inter- and intra-agency sites; 

* connections to other external organizations; 

* remote accessï¿½virtual private network and dial-in; and; 

* wireless connections. 

2.1.5 Identify Key Areas of Audit Interest: 

The auditor should identify key areas of audit interest, which are 
those that are critical to achieving the audit objectives (e.g., 
general support and business process application systems and files (or 
components thereof)). For a financial audit, this would include key 
financial applications and data and related feeder systems.[Footnote 
12] For a performance audit, this would include key systems that are 
likely to be significant to the audit objectives. For each key area of 
audit interest, the auditor should document relevant general support 
systems and major applications and files, including (1) the operational 
locations of each key system or file, (2) significant components of the 
associated hardware and software (e.g., firewalls, routers, hosts, 
operating systems), (3) other significant systems or system level 
resources that support the key areas of audit interest, and (4) prior 
audit problems reported. The auditor should also identify all access 
paths into and out of the key areas of audit interest. By identifying 
the key systems, files, or locations, the auditor can concentrate 
efforts on them, and do little or no work associated with other areas. 
The auditor generally should prioritize important systems, files, or 
locations in order of importance to the audit objectives. The auditor 
may characterize these items by the sensitivity or significance of the 
information processed, dollar value of the transactions processed, or 
presence or number of key edits or other controls performed by a 
business process application. 

2.1.6 Assess Information System Risk on a Preliminary Basis: 

Overview: 

The auditor should assess, on a preliminary basis, the nature and 
extent of IS risk that relates to the key areas of audit interest. IS 
risk is the likelihood that a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability could occur that would materially/significantly affect the 
audit objectives (e.g., for a financial audit, a material 
misstatement). Assessing IS risk involves evaluation of both the 
likelihood that such a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability could occur and the materiality or significance of a loss 
of confidentiality, integrity, or availability to the audit objectives. 
The auditor should document factors that significantly increase or 
decrease the level of IS risk and their potential impact on the 
effectiveness of information system controls. 

Assessing IS risk relating to the audit is different from managementï¿½s 
risk assessment. In assessing IS risk, the auditor is not required or 
expected to reperform managementï¿½s risk assessment. Rather, the auditor 
assesses IS risk on a preliminary basis using data that would be 
collected in the planning of audit (this includes using the entityï¿½s 
risk assessments and performing other audit procedures as outlined 
below). The auditorï¿½s risk assessment should reflect the impact of the 
effectiveness of IS controls on the audit objectives. 

The auditorï¿½s assessment of IS risk affects the nature, timing, and 
extent of IS controls audit procedures. As IS risk increases, the 
auditor should perform more extensive or more effective tests of IS 
controls. For example, a significant number of Internet access points 
that are not centrally controlled increases IS risk. In this case, the 
auditor would expand the auditorï¿½s testing, as there are more potential 
access paths to the key areas of audit interest. Risk assessments 
prepared by the entity may serve as a useful tool to assist in the 
identification of IS risk. However, the auditor should not rely on them 
without performing audit procedures to identify and assess risk. 

To develop a framework for analyzing IS risk, the auditor should 
consider IS risk in the context of the following three security 
objectives for information and information systems: 

* Integrityï¿½guarding against improper information modification or 
destruction, which includes ensuring information nonrepudiation 
[Footnote 13] and authenticity [Footnote 14]. A loss of integrity is 
the unauthorized modification or destruction of information. 

* Confidentialityï¿½preserving authorized restrictions on information 
access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy 
and proprietary information. A loss of confidentiality is the 
unauthorized disclosure of information. 

* Availabilityï¿½ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information. A loss of availability is the disruption of access to or 
use of information or an information system. 

In some instances, one or more of the security objectives may have more 
significance to the audit objectives than the others. 

The auditor should identify factors or conditions that significantly 
increase or decrease IS risk. These factors are general in nature; the 
auditor uses judgment in determining (1) the extent of procedures to 
identify the risks and (2) the impact of such risks on the entityï¿½s 
operations and the audit objectives. Because this risk assessment 
involves the exercise of significant audit judgment, the auditor should 
use experienced audit team personnel to perform the risk assessment. 
Factors considered would include those related to inherent risk 
[Footnote 15] as well as those related to the control environment, risk 
assessment, communication, and monitoring components of internal 
control [Footnote 16]. The auditor identifies such factors based on 
information obtained in the planning phase, primarily from 
understanding the entityï¿½s operations and key business processes, 
including significant IT processing performed outside the entity. 

For each risk identified, the auditor should document the nature and 
extent of the risk; the conditions that gave rise to that risk; and the 
specific information or operations affected (if not pervasive). The 
auditor should also document compensating controls or other 
considerations that may mitigate the effects of identified risks. The 
auditor should assess and document, on a preliminary basis, the nature 
and extent of IS risks for the information and information systems 
related to the key areas of audit interest, considering 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The auditor should 
document the basis for the assessed risk and its potential impact on 
the audit objectives. For example, in a financial audit, the auditor 
should evaluate the possibility of a material misstatement as a result 
of a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. As discussed 
above, risk assessments prepared by the entity may serve as a useful 
tool to assist the auditor in the identification of IS risks. 

As noted above, IS risk includes the risk of loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability. Such risk includes the potential impact of 
a loss to entity operations, assets, and individuals. However, 
depending on the audit objectives, the impact on the audit objectives 
could be greater or lesser. Federal agencies are required to use the 
following three levels to categorize their systems based on the 
potential impact of a breach of security on organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or individuals:[Footnote 17] 

* Low. The loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be 
expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or individuals.[Footnote 18] A limited adverse 
effect means that, for example, the loss of confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability might (i) cause a degradation in mission capability to 
an extent and duration that the organization is able to perform its 
primary functions, but the effectiveness of the functions is noticeably 
reduced; (ii) result in minor damage to organizational assets; (iii) 
result in minor financial loss; or (iv) result in minor harm to 
individuals. 

* Moderate. The loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability 
could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational 
operations, organizational assets, or individuals. A serious adverse 
effect means that, for example, the loss of confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability might (i) cause a significant degradation in mission 
capability to an extent and duration that the organization is able to 
perform its primary functions, but the effectiveness of the functions 
is significantly reduced; (ii) result in significant damage to 
organizational assets; (iii) result in significant financial loss; or 
(iv) result in significant harm to individuals that does not involve 
loss of life or serious life-threatening injuries. 

* High. The loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could 
be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on 
organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. A 
severe or catastrophic adverse effect means that, for example, the loss 
of confidentiality, integrity, or availability might (i) cause a severe 
degradation in or loss of mission capability to an extent and duration 
that the organization is not able to perform one or more of its primary 
functions; (ii) result in major damage to organizational assets; (iii) 
result in major financial loss; or (iv) result in severe or 
catastrophic harm to individuals involving loss of life or serious life-
threatening injuries. 

The auditorï¿½s assessment of IS risk may change as audit evidence is 
obtained. To determine whether audit procedures continue to be 
appropriate, the auditor should periodically reassess the IS risk 
during the audit. For example, the auditor may reassess the IS risk 
level at the end of the planning and testing phases, as well as when 
evidence is obtained that significantly affects the auditorï¿½s risk 
assessment. If IS risk changes during the audit, the auditor should 
make any necessary changes to the nature, timing, and extent of planned 
audit procedures. 

Inherent Risk Factors: 

Information systems can introduce additional risk factors not present 
in a manual system. To properly assess IS risk, the auditor should (1) 
evaluate each of the following factors and (2) assess the overall 
impact of information systems on IS risk. The impact of these factors 
typically will be pervasive in nature. 

* The nature of the hardware and software may affect IS risk, as 
illustrated below. 

* The type of processing (online, batch oriented, or distributed) 
presents different levels of IS risk. Distributed networks enable 
multiple computer processing units to communicate with each other, 
increasing the number of potential access points and the risk of 
unauthorized access to computer resources and possible data alteration. 
On the other hand, distributed networks may decrease the risk of data 
inconsistencies at multiple processing units if the units share a 
common database. 

* Peripheral access devices or system interfaces can increase IS risk. 
For example, Internet or wireless access to a system increases the 
systemï¿½s accessibility to additional persons and therefore increases 
the risk of unauthorized access to computer resources. 

* Highly customized application software may have higher IS risk than 
vendor-supplied software that has been thoroughly tested and is in 
general commercial use. On the other hand, vendor-supplied software new 
to commercial use may not have been thoroughly tested or undergone 
client processing to a degree that would encounter existing flaws. 

* Certain hardware and software may have more significant identified 
weaknesses than others. 

* In certain systems (e.g., enterprise resource planningï¿½ERPï¿½systems 
[Footnote 19]), the audit trails and supporting information produced by 
the systems may be limited in their usefulness (1) as a basis for 
applying certain types of controls or (2) as audit evidence. 

* Highly decentralized applications, particularly Web applications, 
increase IS risk by adding complexity to IS and increasing potential 
vulnerabilities. 

* The application of new technologies generally increases the risk that 
secure configurations of such technologies may not be well developed or 
tested, or that IT personnel may not properly implement security over 
such new technologies. 

* The manner in which the entityï¿½s networks are configured can affect 
the related IS risk. For example, factors increasing IS risks include a 
significant number of Internet access points that are not centrally 
controlled, networks that are not segmented to protect sensitive 
systems or information, use of technologies that are no longer 
supported, or lack of technologies that enhance security. 

* The consistency of the entityï¿½s enterprise architecture and IT 
strategy with its business strategies can affect the proper planning 
and implementation of IT systems and related security. 

Also, the following risk factors, discussed in FAM 260 (Identify Risk 
Factors) are relevant to both financial and performance audits: 

* Uniform processing of transactions: Because information systems 
process groups of identical transactions consistently, any 
misstatements arising from erroneous computer programming will occur 
consistently in the same types of transactions. However, the risk of 
random processing errors is reduced substantially in information 
systemsï¿½based accounting systems. 

* Automatic processing: The information system may automatically 
initiate transactions or perform processing functions. Evidence of 
these processing steps (and any related controls) may or may not be 
visible. 

* Increased potential for undetected misstatements: Information systems 
use and store information in electronic form and require less human 
involvement in processing than manual systems. Without adequate 
controls, there is increased risk that individuals could gain 
unauthorized access to sensitive information and alter data without 
leaving visible evidence. Because information is in electronic form, 
changes to computer programs and data are not readily detectable. Also, 
users may be less likely to challenge the reliability of information 
systems output than manual reports. 

* Existence, completeness, and volume of the audit trail: The audit 
trail is the evidence that demonstrates how a specific transaction was 
initiated, processed, and summarized. For example, the audit trail for 
a purchase could include a purchase order; a receiving report; an 
invoice; an entry in an invoice register (purchases summarized by day, 
month, and/or account); and general ledger postings from the invoice 
register. Some computer systems are designed to maintain the audit 
trail for only a short period, only in an electronic format, or only in 
summary form. Also, the information generated may be too voluminous to 
be analyzed effectively without software. For example, one transaction 
may result from the automatic summarization of information from 
hundreds of locations. Without the use of audit or retrieval software, 
tracing transactions through the processing may be extremely difficult. 

* Unusual or nonroutine transactions: As with manual systems, unusual 
or nonroutine transactions increase IS risk. Programs developed to 
process such transactions may not be subject to the same procedures as 
programs developed to process routine transactions. For example, the 
entity may use a utility program to extract specified information in 
support of a nonroutine management decision. 

In addition, the auditor should evaluate the additional audit risk 
factors discussed in the ï¿½Additional IS Risk Factorsï¿½ at the end of 
this chapter. 

Risk Factors Related to the Control Environment, Risk Assessment, 
Communication, and Monitoring Components of Internal Control: 

Also, the auditor should evaluate the following IT system factors, to 
the extent relevant to the audit objectives, in making an overall 
assessment of the control environment, risk assessment, communication, 
and monitoring components of internal control. 

a. Management's attitudes and awareness with respect to IT systems: 
Managementï¿½s interest in and awareness of IT system functions 
(including those performed for the entity by other organizations) is 
important in establishing an organizationwide consciousness of control 
issues. Management may demonstrate its interest and awareness by: 

* considering the risks and benefits of computer applications; 

* communicating policies regarding IT system functions and 
responsibilities; 

* overseeing policies and procedures for developing, modifying, 
maintaining, and using computers, and for controlling access to 
programs and files; 

* considering the risk of material misstatement, including fraud risk, 
related to IT systems; 

* responding to previous recommendations or concerns; 

* quickly and effectively planning for, and responding to, computerized 
processing crises; and; 

* using reliable computer-generated information for key operating 
decisions. 

b. Organization and structure of the IT system function: The 
organizational structure affects the control environment. Centralized 
structures often have a single computer processing organization and use 
a single set of system and applications software, enabling tighter 
management control over IT systems. In decentralized structures, each 
computer center generally has its own computer processing organization, 
application programs, and system software, which may result in 
differences in policies and procedures and various levels of compliance 
at each location. 

c. Clearly defined assignment of responsibilities and authority: 
Appropriate assignment of responsibility according to typical IT system 
functional areas can affect the control environment. Factors to 
consider include: 

* how the position of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) fits into the 
organizational structure; 

* whether duties are appropriately segregated within the IT systems 
function, such as operators and programmers, since lack of segregation 
typically affects all systems; 

* the extent to which management external to the IT systems function is 
involved in major systems development decisions; and; 

* the extent to which IT system policies, standards, and procedures are 
documented, understood, followed, and enforced. 

d. Managementï¿½s ability to identify and to respond to potential risk: 
Computer processing, by its nature, introduces additional risk factors. 
The entity should be aware of these risks and should develop 
appropriate policies and procedures to respond to any IT system issues 
that might occur. The auditor may evaluate: 

* the methods for monitoring incompatible functions and for enforcing 
segregation of duties and; 

* managementï¿½s mechanism for identifying and responding to unusual or 
exceptional conditions. 

Examples of potential IT-related control environment, risk assessment, 
communication, and monitoring weaknesses include: 

* Management and personnel in key areas (such as accounting, IT 
systems, IG, and internal auditing) have a high turnover. 

* Management attitude toward IT systems and accounting functions is 
that these are necessary ï¿½ï¿½bean countingï¿½ï¿½ functions rather than a 
vehicle for exercising control over the entity's activities or making 
better decisions. 

* The number of people, particularly in IT systems and accounting, with 
requisite skill levels relative to the size and complexity of the 
operations is inadequate. 

* Management has not adequately identified risks arising from internal 
sources, such as human resources (ability to retain key people) or IT 
(adequacy of backup systems in the event of systems failure). 

* Accounting systems and/or information systems, including IT systems, 
are not modified in response to changing conditions. 

2.1.7 Identify Critical Control Points: 

The auditor should identify and document critical control points in the 
design of the entityï¿½s information systems based on the auditorï¿½s 
understanding of such systems, key areas of audit interest, and IS 
risk. Critical control points are those system control points that, if 
compromised, could allow an individual to gain unauthorized access to 
or perform unauthorized or inappropriate activities on entity systems 
or data, which could lead directly or indirectly to unauthorized access 
or modifications to the key areas of audit interest. Control points 
typically include external access points to the entityï¿½s networks, 
interconnections with other external and internal systems, system 
components controlling the flow of information through the entityï¿½s 
networks or to the key areas of audit interest, critical storage and 
processing devices, and related operating systems, infrastructure 
applications, and relevant business process applications. Typical 
control points also include network components where business process 
application controls are applied. As the audit testing proceeds and the 
auditor gains a better understanding of the entityï¿½s information 
systems, of control weaknesses, and of the related risks, the auditor 
should periodically reassess the critical control points. Based on 
information obtained during audit planning, the auditor should identify 
those critical control points in the entityï¿½s IT systems that are 
significant to the effectiveness of security over the key areas of 
audit interest. 

An analysis of critical control points includes consideration of 
alternate work sites. Since multiple FISCAM control categories are 
relevant to alternate work sites, it is not addressed as a specific 
control in this document. For further information on this subject refer 
to NIST guidance contained in SP 800-53 and SP 800-46. 

In identifying critical control points and in planning and performing 
the assessment of IS controls, auditors apply the concept of control 
dependencies. A control dependency exists when the effectiveness of an 
internal control is dependent on the effectiveness of other internal 
controls. An assessment of the effectiveness of information system 
controls over a critical control point includes testing the 
effectiveness of controls over other control points upon which the 
security of the critical control point is dependent. Figure 2 
illustrates the concept of a control dependency in relation to a router 
for a typical network. 

Figure 2: Example of Router Control Dependencies: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of Router Control Dependencies. The 
following items are depicted: 

* Private or public network; 
* Firewall; 
* Switch; 
* outer; 
- Dial-in; modem; 
- Console port; 
* Switch; 
-Administrator workstation; 
- Log server; 
- Network management server; 
- Authentication server; 
- Trivial file transfer protocol server; 
- Remote access server. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

The figure illustrates that the effectiveness of controls over the 
router in this example network are dependent on controls over other 
control points. In this example, because unauthorized or inappropriate 
access to the other control points could affect the security of the 
router, the auditorï¿½s tests of IS controls generally should include 
controls over: 

* the trivial file transfer protocol (tftp) servers used to maintain a 
central repository of sensitive configuration files (tftp servers do 
not require authentication and are also used as remote boot devices for 
routers); 

* the centralized authentication server that authenticates users to the 
router and other network devices; 

* network switches that could share sensitive data with routers such as 
passwords and shared keys (also, network switches provide a trusted 
path to the routers); 

* administrative workstations used to manage network devices, such as 
routers; and; 

* the log server, which maintains logs containing relevant information 
about significant network events, such as router access. 

In addition, as part of a review of the system level controls over the 
router, the auditor generally should test controls over: 

* the network management servers used to manage configuration files 
that contain sensitive information about network devices such as 
routers; 

* remote access to the router via the auxiliary and console ports that 
could be used to remotely manage the router; 

* the firewalls that provide boundary protection (i.e., limits 
connectivity to the router); 

* unencrypted network traffic that could be ï¿½sniffedï¿½ to obtain router 
or other privileged passwords; and; 

* the PC connected to the router that could facilitate direct 
connectivity to the router. 

Further, the auditor generally should test other controls that may 
affect the security of the router, based on the auditorï¿½s judgment. 
Note that, in addition to controls over access to the router itself, IS 
controls include controls over the routing of traffic throughout the 
network (see AC-1 in Chapter 3). 

As the auditor performs the IS controls audit, based on the auditorï¿½s 
assessment of risk and the results of audit tests, the auditor may 
determine that it is necessary to modify the scope of the audit. For 
example, if significant IS control weaknesses are identified during the 
audit, it may not be necessary to perform all planned tests of IS 
controls. If testing is reduced due to the identification of 
significant weaknesses, the auditor should document such a decision. 
Also, testing may result in the identification of additional risks, and 
critical control points, and/or control dependencies; the auditor 
should determine whether to adjust the scope for them. 

2.1.8 Obtain a Preliminary Understanding of Information System 
Controls: 

The auditor should obtain and document a preliminary understanding of 
the design of the entityï¿½s IS controls, including the organization, 
staffing, responsibilities, authorities, and resources of the entityï¿½s 
security management function. The auditor should document a preliminary 
understanding of entitywide controls (or componentwide controls if only 
a component is being audited) related to security management, access 
controls, configuration management, segregation of duties and, 
contingency planning. 

The auditor should understand the design of each of the three types of 
IS controls (general, business process application, and user controls) 
to the extent necessary to tentatively conclude whether these controls 
are likely to be effective. If they are likely to be effective, the 
auditor should consider specific IS controls in determining whether 
relevant IS control objectives are achieved. If IS controls are not 
likely to be effective, the auditor should obtain a sufficient 
understanding of control risks arising from IS controls to assess audit 
risk, design appropriate audit procedures, and develop appropriate 
findings. 

In addition, the auditor should obtain a preliminary understanding of 
the business process application controls (business process, interface, 
and data management system controls) over key business process 
applications identified as or related to key areas of audit interest, 
determine where those controls are applied, and determine whether the 
controls are designed effectively and have been implemented (placed in 
operation). For example, authentication and authorization may be 
applied in network components that are different from those where key 
data files or applications reside; (e.g., Web applications that reside 
on one server may be used to authenticate and authorize users of legacy 
systems that run on different servers or systems). The auditor should 
determine the potential impact of any identified design weaknesses on 
the completeness, accuracy, validity, and confidentiality of related 
application data. (See Chapter 4 for a description of completeness, 
accuracy, validity, and confidentiality.) 

The auditor should make a preliminary assessment of whether IS controls 
are likely to be effective to assist in determining the nature, timing, 
and extent of testing. This assessment is based primarily on 
discussions with personnel throughout the entity, including program 
managers, system administrators, information resource managers, and 
systems security managers; on observations of IT operations and 
controls; on reviewing examples of evidence of control performance; on 
prior audits or the work of others; and on reading written policies and 
procedures. This preliminary assessment for financial audits is 
discussed further at FAM 270 (Determine Likelihood of Effective 
Information System Controls). Based on the preliminary assessment, the 
auditor should make any adjustments, as necessary, to the IS risk 
level, critical control points, and planned scope of the audit work. 

Control activities for critical elements in each general control and 
business process control category are described in Chapters 3 and 4, 
respectively, and summarized in Appendix II. The auditor may use the 
summary tables in Appendix II, which are also available in electronic 
form from GAO [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov], to document preliminary 
findings and to assist in making the preliminary assessment of 
controls. As the audit progresses through testing of internal controls, 
the auditor may continue to use the electronic version of the tables to 
document controls evaluated and tested, test procedures performed, 
conclusions, and supporting documentation references. 

The auditor should include the following information in the 
documentation of their preliminary understanding of the design of IS 
controls, to the extent relevant to the audit objectives: 

* An identification of relevant entitywide, system, and business 
process application level controls designed to achieve the control 
activities for each critical element within each general control area 
and a determination of whether they are designed effectively and 
implemented (placed in operation), including identification of control 
activities for which there are no or ineffective controls at the 
entitywide level and the related risks. 

* Identification of business process controls for key applications 
identified as key areas of audit interest, determination of where those 
controls are implemented within the entityï¿½s systems, and the auditorï¿½s 
conclusion about whether the controls are designed effectively and 
implemented (placed in operation), including identification of control 
activities for which there are no or ineffective controls and the 
related risks and the potential impact of any identified design 
weaknesses on the completeness, accuracy, validity, and confidentiality 
of application data. 

* Any internal or third-party information systems reviews, audits, or 
specialized systems testing (e.g., penetration tests, disaster recovery 
tests, and application-specific tests) performed during the last year 
and the auditorï¿½s evaluation of the other auditorï¿½s objectivity, 
competence and conclusions. 

* Managementï¿½s plans of action and milestones, or their equivalent, 
that identify corrective actions planned to address known IS control 
weaknesses. 

* Status of the prior yearsï¿½ audit findings. 

* Documentation for any significant computer security related incidents 
identified and reported for the last year. 

* Documented security plans. 

* Documented risk assessments for relevant systems (e.g., general 
support systems and major applications). 

* System certification and accreditation documentation or equivalent 
for relevant systems. 

* Documented business continuity of operations plans and disaster 
recovery plans. 

* A description of the entityï¿½s use of third-party IT services. 

The auditor should obtain information from relevant reports and other 
documents concerning IS that are issued by or about the entity, 
including: 

* the entityï¿½s prior FISMA or equivalent reports on IS; 

* the entityï¿½s annual performance and accountability report or 
equivalent reports on performance including reports filed to comply 
with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 [Footnote 
20] (FFMIA) and Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1982 
[Footnote 21] (FMFIA); 

* other reports by management or the auditor about IS; 

* other reports that contain information concerning IS that are 
relevant to the audit objectives; 

* GAO reports; 

* IG and internal audit reports (including those for performance audits 
and other reviews); and; 

* consultant reports. 

2.1.9 Perform Other Audit Planning Procedures: 

The auditor should address the following areas during the planning 
phase, even though related audit procedures may be applied during the 
other phases. More specifically, the auditor should address any other 
issues, not identified in the previous steps, that could affect the 
objectives, scope, or methodology of the IS controls audit, including: 

* relevant laws and regulations; 

* the risk of fraud; 

* staffing and other resources needed to perform the audit; 

* multiyear testing plans; 

* communication to management officials and those charged with 
governance concerning the planning and performance of the audit, and to 
others as applicable; 

* use of service organizations; 

* using the work of others; and; 

* preparation of an audit plan (and an audit strategy for financial 
statement audits). 

2.1.9.A Relevant Laws and Regulations: 

The auditor should identify applicable laws and regulations that are 
relevant to IS at the entity. Such laws and regulations may establish 
general or specific IS control requirements or criteria. Laws and 
regulations generally relevant to audits of federal agencies include 
FISMA, FMFIA, FFMIA, Appendix III of OMB Circular A-130,[Footnote 22] 
OMB Circular A-123,[Footnote 23] and FISMA implementing guidance. 
Specific federal laws and regulations that may affect the entity 
include: 

* Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA),[Footnote 24]; 

* Gramm-Leach-Bliley,[Footnote 25]; 

* Requirements for information security for Medicare Administrative 
Contractors,[Footnote 26]; 

* Chief Privacy Officer statutory requirements,[Footnote 27]; 

* OMB Memorandum M-05-08, Designation of Senior Agency Officials for 
Privacy, and[Footnote 28]; 

* OMB Memorandum M-06-19, Reporting Incidents Involving Personally 
Identifiable Information.[Footnote 29] 

* OMB Memorandum M 07-16, Safeguarding Against and Responding to the 
Breach of Personally Identifiable Information.[Footnote 30] 

In IS controls audits of state and local governments, the auditor 
should identify applicable legal and reporting requirements and issues. 
Further information specifically related to audits of state and local 
government entities can be obtained from the National Association of 
State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers (NASACT).[Footnote 31] 

Under GAGAS, the auditor should design and perform procedures to 
provide reasonable assurance of detecting instances of violations of 
legal and regulatory requirements that are significant within the 
context of the audit objectives. Consequently, if one of the objectives 
of the audit is to determine whether the entity violated specific laws 
or regulations, the auditor should plan the audit to detect significant 
violations of such laws or regulations. In financial audits, the 
auditor should test those laws and regulations that could have a direct 
and material effect on the financial statements. 

As part of an IS controls audit, the auditorï¿½s findings will typically 
be reported in terms of whether IS controls are effective. While such 
general laws and regulations as FISMA, FMFIA, FFMIA, and OMB guidance 
provide requirements and criteria for assessing IS, IS controls audit 
objectives generally are not focused on detecting violations of such 
laws and regulations, but rather on assessing controls and identifying 
any control weaknesses. Consequently, such laws and regulations 
generally would not be considered significant to the audit objectives 
for the purposes of designing compliance tests to meet GAGAS. However, 
audit objectives may sometimes include specific objectives to determine 
compliance with such laws, in which case such laws and regulations 
would be significant. Also, other laws such as HIPAA, which provide for 
potential penalties, may be significant to the audit objectives. 

2.1.9.B Consideration of the Risk of Fraud: 

In audits performed under GAGAS, the auditor should assess the risks of 
fraud [Footnote 32] occurring that is significant within the context of 
the audit objectives (for financial audits, a material misstatement). 
Auditors should gather and assess information to identify risks of 
fraud that are significant within the scope of the audit objectives or 
that could affect the findings or conclusions. When auditors identify 
factors or risks related to fraud that has occurred or is likely to 
have occurred that they believe are significant within the context of 
the audit objectives, they should design procedures to provide 
reasonable assurance of detecting such fraud. In financial audits, 
GAGAS indicates that auditors should assess the risk of material 
misstatements of financial statement amounts or other financial data 
significant to the audit objectives due to fraud and to consider that 
assessment in designing the audit procedures to be performed.[Footnote 
33] The auditorï¿½s responsibilities with respect to the risk of fraud in 
financial statement audits are discussed further in the GAGAS and in 
the AICPAï¿½s Auditing Standards Board Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 99, titled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, 
as amended (AU section 316). 

If the IS controls audit is performed as part of a broader financial or 
performance audit, the auditor should coordinate with the audit team in 
the identification of and response to the risk of fraud. The auditor 
should be aware of fraud risks identified by the overall audit team and 
communicate any fraud risks or suspected fraud associated with IT to 
the overall audit team. Also, the overall audit team may identify audit 
procedures to be performed by the IS controls specialist to detect 
fraud significant to the audit. 

The audit team should hold a brainstorming session at the start of the 
audit to discuss potential fraud risks, fraud factors such as 
individualsï¿½ incentives or pressures to commit fraud, the opportunity 
for fraud to occur, and rationalizations or attitudes that could allow 
individuals to commit fraud. For example, the following factors related 
to IS may indicate a risk of fraud: 

* failure to provide an adequate security management program, including 
inadequate monitoring of control effectiveness; 

* weaknesses in access and other IS controls that could allow overrides 
of internal controls or access to systems susceptible to fraud (e.g., 
payment systems); 

* lack of adequate segregation of duties;[Footnote 34] and; 

* pervasive or long-standing IS control weaknesses. 

The auditor should gather and assess information necessary to identify 
fraud risks that could be relevant to the audit objectives or affect 
the results of their audit. For example, the auditor may obtain 
information through discussion with officials of the audited entity or 
through other means to determine the susceptibility of the program to 
fraud, the status of internal controls the entity has established to 
detect and prevent fraud, or the risk that officials of the audited 
entity could override internal control. The auditor should exercise 
professional skepticism in assessing these risks to determine which 
factors or risks could significantly affect the results of their work 
if fraud has occurred or is likely to have occurred. 

When the auditor identifies factors or risks related to fraud that they 
believe are significant within the context of the audit objectives or 
the results of the audit, they should design procedures to provide 
reasonable assurance of detecting such fraud. The auditor should 
prepare audit documentation related to their identification and 
assessment of and response to fraud risks. 

Assessing the risk of fraud is an ongoing process throughout the audit 
and relates not only to planning the audit but also to evaluating 
evidence obtained during the audit. When testing general and business 
process application level controls, the auditor should be alert for 
information or other conditions that indicate fraud that is significant 
within the context of the audit objectives may have occurred. 

A specific area of concern for fraud is override of controls, 
particularly in ERP applications. Because ERP applications are by their 
nature highly integrated, the potential risk of management override of 
controls is heightened. The audit generally should include procedures 
to identify system-based overrides. These procedures might include 
testing for instances of users performing inappropriate combinations of 
transactions (i.e., transactions that should have been segregated) and 
other similar procedures. Some examples of antifraud controls to 
consider include: workflow approvals, restricting access to sensitive 
files, segregation of duties, review of audit trails, and review of key 
management reports. Access controls, segregation of duties, and audit 
trails are discussed in Chapter 3. 

The auditor should also evaluate situations or transactions that could 
be indicative of fraud. When information comes to the auditorsï¿½ 
attention (through audit procedures, allegations received through fraud 
hotlines, or other means) indicating that fraud may have occurred, the 
auditor should evaluate whether the possible fraud could significantly 
affect the audit results. If the fraud could significantly affect the 
audit results, auditors should modify the audit steps and procedures, 
as necessary, to (1) determine if fraud likely has occurred and (2) if 
so, determine its effect on the audit results. 

The auditorï¿½s training, experience, and understanding of the program 
being audited may provide a basis for recognizing that some acts coming 
to his or her attention may be indicative of fraud. Whether an act is, 
in fact, fraud is a determination to be made through the judicial or 
other adjudicative system and is beyond auditorsï¿½ professional 
expertise and responsibility. However, the auditor is responsible for 
being aware of vulnerabilities to fraud associated with the area being 
audited to identify indications that fraud may have occurred. 

2.1.9.C Audit Resources: 

As with other types of audits, the staff assigned to perform the IS 
controls audit must collectively possess adequate professional 
competence. Therefore, it is important to carefully plan IS controls 
audits to ensure that adequate and appropriate resources are available 
to perform the audit. IS controls audits need a broad range of 
technical skills. In addition to skills necessary to assess each 
control category, IS controls audits generally use technical 
specialists with skills in such areas as networks, Windows/Novell, 
Unix, data management systems, and mainframe system and access control 
software. See Appendix V for a discussion of typical skill sets for IS 
controls specialists. Based on the knowledge obtained during audit 
planning, the auditor should identify resource requirements and 
determine whether internal resources are available or whether 
contractors will be necessary to complete the audit. The auditor should 
then schedule the resources for the appropriate periods of time. 

Regardless of the size of the entity, the auditor must still perform 
the necessary planning to ensure that audit requirements are fully 
satisfied. This includes small/independent agencies which generally 
have a less complex, less risky IS control environment, which requires 
inherently fewer IS controls audit resources. The Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations (COSO)[Footnote 35] publication ï¿½Internal 
Controls over Financial Reporting ï¿½ Guidance for Smaller Public 
Companiesï¿½ includes guidance that could be used by smaller agencies in 
planning their audits. 

The auditor may determine that it is necessary to contract for audit 
services for all or a portion of the IS controls audit. For example, 
the auditor may determine that it is necessary to contract only for 
certain technical skills needed to perform the audit. Contracting for 
audit services offers two significant benefits to an entityï¿½s audit 
organizationï¿½it allows audit coverage beyond that possible with the 
existing audit staff level, and it allows the audit activity to address 
technical and other issues in which the in-house staff is not skilled. 
Engagements that employ contractors in this way may help train in-house 
staff for future audits. However, when contracting for audit services, 
some in-house audit personnel generally should be actively involved. 
For example, the audit organization should be instrumental in 
determining the scope of the contracted services, and in developing the 
task order or request for proposal for the work. The FISCAM may be 
required to be used as a basis for the work to be performed. 

Also, an auditor generally should be designated to monitor the contract 
for the entity. The contract monitor should have sufficient knowledge 
of IS controls to monitor and to assess the quality and adequacy of the 
work performed by the contractor, including the adequacy of the audit 
documentation. The contract monitor should discuss the contract with 
the contractor, including the product deliverables, the established 
time frames for deliverables, and documentation standards to adhere to. 
The auditor generally should hold this meeting before the contractor 
begins work. In addition, the contract monitor should attend critical 
meetings the contractor has with entity representatives, including the 
opening and close-out meetings. 

The contract monitor should conduct a technical review of the work 
performed and may use this manual as guidance to determine whether the 
work addressed relevant issues and the audit procedures were adequate. 
For financial audits, the contract monitor may reperform some tests in 
accordance with FAM 650, ï¿½Using the Reports and Work of Others.ï¿½ Also, 
the contract monitor should review the audit report and supporting 
audit documentation to determine whether the audit report is adequately 
supported. 

2.1.9.D Multiyear Testing Plans: 

In circumstances where the auditor regularly performs IS controls 
audits of the entity (as is done, for example, by an IG or for annual 
financial audits), the auditor may determine that a multiyear plan for 
performing IS controls audits is appropriate. Such a plan will cover 
relevant key agency applications, systems, and processing centers . 
These strategic plans should cover no more than a 3-year period and 
include the schedule and scope of assessments to be performed during 
the period and the rationale for the planned approach. The auditor 
typically evaluates these plans annually and adjusts them for the 
results of prior and current audits and significant changes in the IT 
environment, such as implementation of new systems. 

Multiyear testing plans can help to assure that all agency systems and 
locations are considered in the IS control evaluation process, to 
consider relative audit risk and prioritization of systems, and to 
provide sufficient evidence to support an assessment of IS control 
effectiveness, while helping to reduce annual audit resources under 
certain conditions. When appropriate, this concept allows the auditor 
to test computer-related general and business process application 
controls on a risk basis rather than testing every control every year. 
Under a multiyear testing plan, different controls are comprehensively 
tested each year, so that each significant general and business process 
control is selected for testing at least once during the multiyear 
period, which should not be more than 3 years. For example, a multiyear 
testing plan for an entity with five significant business process 
applications might include comprehensive tests of two or three 
applications annually, covering all applications in a 2 or 3 year 
period. For systems with high IS risk, the auditor generally should 
perform annual testing. 

Such multiyear testing plans are not appropriate in all situations. For 
example, they are not appropriate for first-time audits, for audits 
where some significant business process applications or general 
controls have not been tested within a sufficiently recent period (no 
more than 3 years), or for audits of entities that do not have strong 
entitywide controls. Also, using this concept, the auditor performs 
some limited tests and other activities annually for general and 
business process controls not selected for full testing; examples of 
such activities include updating the auditorï¿½s understanding of the 
control environment, inquiring about control changes, and conducting 
walk-throughs. For example, because of the importance of system level 
critical control points, the auditor generally updates the 
understanding of these yearly through limited tests. Multiyear testing 
is discussed in greater detail in FAM section 395 G: ï¿½Multiyear Testing 
of Controls.ï¿½ 

2.1.9.E Communication with Entity Management and Those Charged with 
Governance: 

The auditor should communicate information about the audit to 
appropriate entity management and those charged with governance. The 
auditor should document this communication, usually with an engagement 
letter. This step is particularly important in an IS controls audit 
because of the sensitivity of entity information systems and the nature 
of tests performed. Multiple meetings may be necessary with various 
levels of management so that they are adequately aware of the audit 
process. GAGAS requires that to help the various parties involved in 
the audit understand the audit objectives, time frames, and any data 
needs, the auditor should provide them with information about the 
specific nature of the audit, as well as general information concerning 
the planning and conduct of the audit and reporting. 

As part of this communication, it may be useful to provide general 
protocols for conducting the IS controls audit. Such protocols might 
include the following: 

* Define the scope of the engagement. This might include an overview of 
the audit objectives, information about what is to be tested, when 
testing will occur, where and from what locations testing will be 
performed, who will be performing and monitoring the testing, and how 
the testing will be performed (for example, the methodology and tools 
that will be employed). However, it is important to not disclose 
detailed audit procedures so that the tests become ineffective. 

* Communicate risks and steps taken by management to manage such risks. 
While risks cannot be eliminated entirely, they can be managed to an 
acceptable level to avoid, or at least minimize, service degradation or 
interruption. Auditors can communicate actions they have taken to 
minimize risks such as (a) not performing denial-of-service testing, 
(b) coordinating testing with the audited site, (c) having 
knowledgeable personnel from the audited site monitoring all testing, 
(d) testing the tools that will be used and gaining expertise in their 
use, (e) logging test parameters, (f) logging testing and results, (g) 
using network analyzers to monitor loads placed on the network during 
testing, and (h) performing testing during nonpeak hours, if possible. 

* Identify roles and responsibilities. Address the roles and 
responsibilities of each participant. Participants will likely include 
the test team, the auditors, the system owners, the systems security 
officer, the systems administrators, and contractors, if applicable. 

* Address logistical requirements. Logistical requirements would 
include information about such items as the organizationï¿½s range of 
Internet Protocol addresses and telephone numbers (particularly 
sensitive numbers that should be excluded from testing), analog 
telephone lines, wireless connections, Internet access paths, policies 
governing user accounts and passwords, etc. On-site workspace 
arrangements and agency points of contact might also be addressed. 

GAGAS requires certain communications with management, those charged 
with governance, and others. For financial audits, see AU 380 and GAGAS 
4.06. For performance audits, see GAGAS 7.46-7.48. In situations in 
which those charged with governance are not clearly evident, auditors 
should document the process followed and conclusions reached for 
identifying those charged with governance. 

2.1.9.F Service Organizations: 

When IS controls, which are significant to a GAGAS audit, are performed 
by a service organization external to the audited entity, the auditor 
should determine how to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence about 
the operating effectiveness of such controls. The auditor should 
coordinate these procedures with the audit procedures performed in 
support of critical element SM-7 ï¿½Ensure That Activities Performed by 
External Third Parties are Adequately Secureï¿½. For example, the auditor 
should determine how management of the audited entity monitors the 
effectiveness of IS controls at the service organization, such as 
through the receipt and analysis of a service auditor (SAS 70) report. 
SAS 70 reports are discussed in more detail in Appendix VII. If the 
auditor uses a SAS 70 report, the auditor is responsible for 
determining whether SAS 70 report provides sufficient evidence about 
the operating effectiveness of IS controls performed by the service 
organization that are significant to the audit. Also, see section 
2.1.9.G below. If IS controls are performed by service organizations, 
the auditor should document conclusions whether such controls are 
significant to the audit objectives and any audit procedures performed 
with respect to such controls (e.g., review of service auditor 
reports). 

The auditor should integrate evidence obtained about the operating 
effectiveness of service auditor controls into the IS controls audit. 
For example, the auditor should evaluate the effectiveness of IS 
controls for the combination of IS controls at the audited entity and 
at the service organization collectively. The preparation and use of 
service auditor reports are discussed further in Appendix VII, 
including how to determine whether the service auditor report contains 
sufficient, appropriate evidence. 

2.1.9.G Using the Work of Others: 

The auditor may be able to use the work of the other auditors to 
support findings or conclusions for the current audit. If auditors use 
the work of other auditors, they should perform procedures that provide 
a sufficient basis for using that work. For financial audits, further 
information on using the work of other auditors is discussed in FAM 650 
and AU 336. For performance audits, as discussed in GAGAS 7.41-.43, 
auditors should obtain evidence concerning the other auditorsï¿½ 
qualifications and independence and should determine whether the scope, 
quality, and timing of the audit work performed by the other auditors 
is adequate for reliance in the context of the current audit 
objectives. Procedures that auditors may perform in making this 
determination include reviewing the other auditorsï¿½ report, audit plan, 
or audit documentation, and/or performing tests of the other auditorsï¿½ 
work. The nature and extent of evidence needed will depend on the 
significance of the other auditorsï¿½ work to the current audit 
objectives and the extent to which the auditors will use that work. 

As discussed in GAGAS 7.43, some performance audits may necessitate the 
use of specialized techniques or methods that require the skills of a 
specialist. If auditors intend to use the work of specialists, they 
should obtain an understanding of the qualifications and independence 
of the specialists. (See GAGAS paragraph 3.05 for independence 
considerations when using the work of others.) Evaluating the 
professional qualifications of the specialist involves the following: 

a. the professional certification, license, or other recognition of the 
competence of the specialist in his or her field, as appropriate; 

b. the reputation and standing of the specialist in the views of peers 
and others familiar with the specialistï¿½s capability or performance; 

c. the specialistï¿½s experience and previous work in the subject matter; 
and; 

d. the auditorsï¿½ prior experience in using the specialistï¿½s work. 

If the auditor plans to use the work of others, the auditor should 
document conclusions concerning the planned use of the work of others 
and any audit procedures performed with respect to using the work of 
others. 

2.1.9.H Audit Plan: 

The auditor should prepare a written audit plan for each audit. The 
auditor should describe the objectives, scope, and methodology for the 
IS controls audit. The auditor should include planning information, 
discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter. If the IS controls 
audit is a component of a performance audit or attestation engagement, 
the auditor should integrate such information, as appropriate, into the 
overall audit plan. If the IS controls audit is a component of a 
financial audit, the auditor should integrate such information, as 
appropriate, with the overall audit strategy and audit plan for the 
financial audit. Additionally, the auditor generally should use the IS 
controls audit plan as a tool to communicate with the audit team. If 
the auditor believes that another auditor will use his or her work, the 
auditor may use the plan to coordinate with the other auditor. 

In planning the audit, the auditor generally will first assess the 
effectiveness of entitywide and system level general controls prior to 
testing business process application level controls, unless the purpose 
of the audit is to identify control weaknesses in the application area. 
Without effective entitywide and system level general controls, 
business process application level controls may be rendered ineffective 
by circumvention or modification. Consequently, if general controls are 
not designed or operating effectively, the auditor may conclude that 
assessing business process application level controls is not efficient 
or necessary to achieve the audit objectives. In such cases, the 
auditor should develop appropriate findings and consider the nature and 
extent of risks and their effect on the audit objectives and the 
nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures. However, if an audit 
objective is to identify control weaknesses within a business process 
application, an assessment of the business process application level 
controls may be appropriate. Also, testing of business process 
application level controls may be warranted when the auditor finds 
general control weaknesses mainly in areas with a relatively 
insignificant impact on business process controls and the key areas of 
audit interest, but not in more significant areas. 

GAGAS require that a written audit plan be prepared for each 
performance audit. The form and content of the written audit plan may 
vary among audits and may include an audit strategy, audit program, 
project plan, audit planning paper, or other appropriate documentation 
of key decisions about the audit objectives, scope, and methodology and 
of the auditorï¿½s basis for these decisions. The auditor should update 
the plan, as necessary, to reflect any significant changes to the plan 
made during the audit. GAGAS include financial audit planning 
documentation standards. 

2.1.10 Documentation of Planning Phase: 

The auditor should document the following information developed in the 
planning phase: 

* Objectives of the IS audit IS controls audit and, if it is part of a 
broader audit, a description of how such objectives support the overall 
audit objectives. 

* The scope of the IS audit IS controls audit. 

* The auditorï¿½s understanding of the entityï¿½s operations and key 
business processes, including, to the extent relevant to the audit 
objectives, the following: 
- The significance and nature of the programs and functions supported 
by information systems; 
- Key business processes relevant to the audit objectives, including 
business rules, transaction flows, and application and software module 
interaction; 
- Significant general support systems and major applications that 
support each key process; 
- Background information request, if used; 
- Significant internal and external factors that could affect the IS 
auditIS controls audit objectives; 
- Detailed organization chart, particularly the IT and the IS 
components; 
- Significant changes in the IT environment/architecture or significant 
applications implemented within the past 2 years or planned within the 
next 2 years; and; 
- The entityï¿½s reliance on third parties to provide IT services (e.g., 
in-house, remote connectivity, remote processing). 

* A general understanding of the structure of the entityï¿½s or 
componentï¿½s networks as a basis for planning the IS auditIS controls 
audit, including high-level and detailed network schematics relevant to 
the audit objectives. 

* Key areas of audit interest, including relevant general support 
systems and major applications and files. This includes (1) the 
operational locations of each key system or file, (2) significant 
components of the associated hardware and software (e.g., firewalls, 
routers, hosts, operating systems), (3) other significant systems or 
system-level resources that support the key areas of audit interest, 
and (4) prior audit problems reported. Also, the auditor should 
document all access paths in and out of the key areas of audit 
interest. 

* Factors that significantly increase or decrease IS risk and their 
potential impact on the effectiveness of information system controls. 
For each risk identified, the auditor should document the nature and 
extent of the risk; the conditions that gave rise to that risk; and the 
specific information or operations affected (if not pervasive). 

* Preliminary assessment of IS risks related to the key areas of audit 
interest and the basis for the assessed risk. For each risk identified, 
the auditor should document the nature and extent of the risk; the 
conditions that gave rise to that risk; and the specific information or 
operations affected (if not pervasive). The auditor should also 
document other considerations that may mitigate the effects of 
identified risks. 

* Critical control points. 

* A preliminary understanding of the entityï¿½s IS controls, including 
the organization, staffing, responsibilities, authorities, and 
resources of the entityï¿½s security management function. The auditor 
should include the following information in the documentation of their 
preliminary understanding of the design of IS controls, to the extent 
relevant to the audit objectives: 
- Identification of entitywide level controls (and appropriate system 
level controls) designed to achieve the control activities for each 
critical element within each general control area and a determination 
of whether they are designed effectively and implemented (placed in 
operation), including identification of control activities for which 
there are no or ineffective controls at the entitywide level and the 
related risks; 
- Identification of business process level controls for key 
applications identified as key areas of audit interest, determination 
of where those controls are implemented (placed in operation) within 
the entityï¿½s systems, and the auditorï¿½s conclusion about whether the 
controls are designed effectively, including identification of control 
activities for which there are no or ineffective controls and the 
related risks and the potential impact of any identified design 
weaknesses on the completeness, accuracy, validity, and confidentiality 
of application data; 
- Any internal or third-party information systems reviews, audits, or 
specialized systems testing (e.g., penetration tests, disaster recovery 
tests, and application-specific tests) performed during the last year; 
- Managementï¿½s plans of action and milestones, or their equivalent, 
that identify corrective actions planned to address known IS weaknesses 
IS control weaknesses; 
- Status of the prior yearsï¿½ audit findings; 
- Documentation for any significant computer security related incidents 
identified and reported for the last year; 
- Documented security plans; 
- Documented risk assessments for relevant systems (e.g., general 
support systems and major applications); 
- System certification and accreditation documentation or equivalent 
for relevant systems; 
- Documented business continuity of operations plans and disaster 
recovery plans; and; 
- A description of the entityï¿½s use of third-party IT services. 

* Relevant laws and regulations and their relation to the audit 
objectives. 

* Description of the auditorï¿½s procedures to consider the risk of 
fraud, any fraud risk factors that the auditor believes could affect 
the audit objectives, and planned audit procedures to detect any fraud 
significant to the audit objectives. 

* Audit resources planned. 

* Current multiyear testing plans. 

* Documentation of communications with entity management. 

* If IS controls are performed by service organizations, conclusions 
whether such controls are significant to the audit objectives and any 
audit procedures performed with respect to such controls (e.g., review 
of service auditor reports) 

* If the auditor plans to use the work of others, conclusions 
concerning the planned use of the work of others and any audit 
procedures performed with respect to using the work of others. 

* Audit plan that adequately describes the objectives, scope, and 
methodology of the audit. 

* Any decision to reduce testing of IS controls due to the 
identification of significant IS control weaknesses. 

2.2 Perform Information System Controls Audit Tests: 

2.2.1 Overview: 

In the testing phase of the IS controls audit, the auditor uses 
information obtained in the planning phase to test the effectiveness of 
IS controls that are relevant to the audit objectives. As audit 
evidence is obtained through performing control testing, the auditor 
should reassess the audit plan and consider whether changes are 
appropriate. 

While determining whether IS controls are appropriately designed and 
implemented and while performing tests of IS controls, the auditor 
should periodically assess the cumulative audit evidence obtained to 
identify any revisions needed to the audit plan. For example, if 
significant weaknesses have been identified, the auditor may decide to 
perform less testing in remaining areas if audit objectives have been 
achieved. Conversely, the performance of tests may uncover additional 
areas to be tested. For those IS controls that the auditor determines 
are properly/suitably designed and implemented, the auditor determines 
whether to perform tests of the operating effectiveness of such 
controls. In determining whether to test the operating effectiveness of 
IS controls, the auditor should determine whether it is possible and 
practicable to obtain sufficient, appropriate audit evidence without 
testing IS controls. For federal financial statement audits and for 
single audits (compliance requirements), the auditor is required to 
test controls that are suitably designed and implemented to achieve a 
low assessed level of control risk. 

As discussed in Chapter 1, this manual is organized in a hierarchical 
structure to assist the auditor in performing the IS controls audit. 
Chapter 3 provides information concerning the general controls, and 
Chapter 4 provides information concerning four business process 
application level controls. Each of the chapters contains several 
control categories, which are groupings of related controls pertaining 
to similar types of risk. For each control category, this manual 
discusses the key underlying concepts and associated risks if the 
controls in the category are ineffective. 

Chapter 3 is organized by five general control categories: 

* security management, 
* access controls, 
* configuration management, 
* segregation of duties, and, 
* contingency planning. 

Chapter 4 is organized into four business process application level 
control categories: 

* business process application level general controls [Footnote 36] 
(also referred to as application security), 
* business process controls, 
* interface and conversion controls, and, 
* data management systems controls. 

The last three business process application level control categories 
are collectively referred to as ï¿½business process application 
controls.ï¿½ 

For each control category, the manual identifies critical 
elementsï¿½tasks that are essential for establishing adequate controls 
within the category. For each critical element, there is a discussion 
of the associated objectives, risks, and control activities, as well as 
related potential control techniques and suggested audit procedures. 
This hierarchical structure facilitates the auditorï¿½s analysis of 
identified control weaknesses. 

Within each relevant control activity, the auditor should identify 
control techniques implemented by the entity and determine whether the 
control techniques, as designed, are sufficient to achieve the control 
activity. If sufficient, the auditor should determine whether the 
control techniques are implemented (placed in operation) and are 
operating effectively. Also, the auditor should evaluate the nature and 
extent of testing performed by the entity. Such information can assist 
in identifying key controls and in assessing risk, but the auditor 
should not rely on testing performed by the entity in lieu of 
appropriate auditor testing. As discussed later in this section, if the 
control techniques implemented by the entity, as designed, are not 
sufficient to address the control activity, or the control techniques 
are not effectively implemented as designed, the auditor should 
determine the effect on IS controls and the audit objectives. 

The auditor identifies control techniques and determines the 
effectiveness of controls at each of the following levels: 

* Entitywide or component level.(general controls) Controls at the 
entity or component level consist of the entitywide or componentwide 
processes designed to achieve the control activities. They are focused 
on how the entity or component manages IS related to each general 
control activity in Chapter 3. For example, the entity or component may 
have an entitywide process for configuration management, including 
establishment of accountability and responsibility for configuration 
management, broad policies and procedures, development and 
implementation of monitoring programs, and possibly centralized 
configuration management tools. The absence of entitywide processes may 
be a root cause of weak or inconsistent controls, by increasing the 
risk that IS controls are not applied consistently across the 
organization. 

* System level (general controls). Controls at the system level consist 
of processes for managing specific system resources related to either a 
general support system or major application. These controls are more 
specific than those at the entity or component level and generally 
relate to a single type of technology. Within the system level are 
three further levels that the auditor should assess: network, operating 
system, and infrastructure application. The three sublevels can be 
defined as follows: 
- Network. A network is an interconnected or intersecting configuration 
or system of components. For example, a computer network allows 
applications operating on various computers to communicate. 
- Operating system. An operating system is software that controls the 
execution of computer programs and may provide various services. For 
example, an operating system may provide services such as resource 
allocation, scheduling, input/output control, and data management. 
- Infrastructure applications. Infrastructure applications are software 
that is used to assist in performing systems operations, including 
management of network devices. These applications include databases, e-
mail, browsers, plug-ins, utilities, and applications not directly 
related to business processes. 

For example, infrastructure applications allow multiple processes 
running on one or more machines to interact across a network. For an 
example of the identification of system level controls, take 
configuration management. The auditor who is evaluating configuration 
management at the system level should determine whether the entity has 
applied appropriate configuration management practices for each 
significant type of technology (e.g., firewalls, routers) in each of 
the three sublevels (e.g., specific infrastructure applications). Such 
configuration management practices typically include standard 
configuration guidelines for the technology and tools to effectively 
determine whether the configuration guidelines are effectively 
implemented. 

* Business process application level. Controls at the business process 
application level consist of policies and procedures for controlling 
specific business processes. For example, the entityï¿½s configuration 
management should reasonably ensure that all changes to application 
systems are fully tested and authorized. 

Chapter 3 includes general control activities that are applicable to 
the entitywide and system levels, and Chapter 4 includes the general 
controls applied at the business process application level (also 
referred to as application security) as well as the three categories of 
business process application controls. The control techniques for 
achieving the control activities and the related audit tests vary 
according to the level to which they are being applied. However, they 
are described at a high level in this manual, and these descriptions 
assume some expertise about the subject to be effectively performed. 
Thus, the auditor should develop more detailed audit steps based on the 
entityï¿½s specific software and control techniques, after consulting 
with the financial or performance auditor about audit objectives and 
significant areas of audit interest. This manual lists specific control 
activities and techniques and related suggested audit procedures. Table 
1 shows the control categories applicable at each level. 

Table 1: Control Categories Applicable at Different Levels of Audit: 

General Controls: 

Control Categories: Security Management: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Access Controls: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Configuration Management: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Segregation of Duties: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Contingency Planning: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Business Process Application Controls: 

Control Categories: Business Process Controls: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Not applicable; 
System Level, Network: Not applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Not applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Not applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Interfaces: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Not applicable; 
System Level, Network: Not applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Not applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Not applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Data Management Systems: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Not applicable; 
System Level, Network: Not applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Not applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Not applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Source: GAO. 

[Ed of table] 

The auditor should evaluate the effectiveness of IS controls including 
system and/or application level controls related to each critical 
control point. The auditor should evaluate all potential ways in which 
the critical control point could be accessed. Generally, for each 
critical control point, this would include assessing controls related 
to the network, operating system, and infrastructure application 
components. For example, if a particular router was deemed to be a 
critical control point, the auditor generally should test controls 
related to the router itself (a network component), its operating 
system, and the infrastructure application that is used to manage the 
router. Access to any of these could lead to access to the control 
point. See the discussion of control dependencies in the above section 
entitled ï¿½Identify Critical Control Pointsï¿½. 

As discussed in audit planning (section 2.1.2), the auditor determines 
the appropriate scope of the IS controls audit, including: 

* the organizational entities to be addressed (e.g., entitywide, 
selected component(s), etc.); 

* the breadth of the audit (e.g., overall conclusion on IS control 
effectiveness, review of a specific application or technology area, 
such as wireless or UNIX, etc.); 

* the types of IS controls to be tested: 

* general and/or business process application level controls to be 
tested, or selected components; or; 

* all levels of the entityï¿½s information systems, or selected levels 
(e.g., entitywide, system level, or business process application level, 
or selected components of them. 

The auditor should perform the following procedures as part of testing 
the effectiveness of information system controls: 

* Understand information systems relevant to the audit objectives, 
building on identification of key areas of audit interest and critical 
control points. 

* Determine which IS control techniques are relevant to the audit 
objectives. The control categories, critical elements, and control 
activities in Chapters 3 and 4 are generally relevant to all audits. 
However, if the auditor is not performing a comprehensive audit, for 
example, an application review, then there may be no need to assess 
controls in Chapter 3. 

* For each relevant IS control technique, determine whether it is 
suitably designed to achieve the critical activity and has been 
implemented -- placed in operation (if not done earlier). 

* Perform tests to determine whether such control techniques are 
operating effectively. 

* Identify potential weaknesses in IS controls. For each potential 
weakness, consider the impact of compensating controls or other factors 
that mitigate or reduce the risks related to potential weaknesses. 

Understand Information Systems Relevant to the Audit Objectives: 

The auditor should obtain and document an understanding of the 
information processing steps performed in information systems that are 
significant to the audit objectives, including: 

* The manner in which transactions are initiated; 

* The nature and type of records and source documents; 

* The processing involved from the initiation of transactions to their 
final processing, including the nature of computer files and the manner 
in which they are accessed, updated, and deleted; and; 

* For financial audits, the process used to prepare the entity's 
financial statements and budget information, including significant 
accounting estimates, disclosures, and computerized processing. 

This understanding builds on information obtained in audit planning 
(e.g., identification of key areas of audit interest and critical 
control points). For efficiency, the auditor may combine this step with 
audit planning to aid in the identification of relevant controls. The 
auditor should perform and document walk-throughs for all business 
process applications that are significant to the audit objectives. Walk-
throughs are important for understanding the information processing and 
for determining appropriate audit procedures. 

Identify IS Control Techniques That Are Relevant to the Audit 
Objectives: 

Based on the results of audit planning and other procedures performed, 
the auditor should identify the control categories, critical elements, 
control activities, and control techniques that are relevant to the IS 
audit. In doing this, the auditor considers the audit objectives and 
audit scope, the extent of IS risk and the preliminary understanding of 
IS controls. The process for identifying relevant control techniques is 
summarized below. 

For IS audits that are stand alone GAGAS audits, generally all of the 
control categories, critical elements, and control activities are 
relevant to the audit objectives, unless specifically not part of the 
audit objectives. For example, in an evaluation of the effectiveness of 
business process controls in a specific application, the general 
controls in Chapter 3 may or may not be part of the audit objectives. 

At the entitywide level and for each critical control point (including 
control dependencies) at the system and business process application 
levels, the auditor should identify and document the control techniques 
used by the entity to achieve each relevant control activity. For 
purposes of illustration, using the example of the router serving as a 
critical control point (as discussed in section 2.1.7), the auditor 
would identify and document the control techniques used by the entity 
to achieve the control activities related to each relevant control 
category and critical element for the router and for the related 
control dependencies. 

If the IS audit is part of a broader financial audit, performance 
audit, or attestation engagement, the auditor should obtain, from the 
overall audit team, audit documentation that identifies internal 
controls that are significant to the audit objectives. For financial 
audits performed under the FAM, such controls are identified in the SCE 
form. For each internal control technique that is identified as 
significant to the audit objectives (significant control technique), 
the audit team should determine whether it is an IS control. An IS 
controls specialist generally should review and concur with the audit 
teamï¿½s identification of IS controls, particularly with respect to 
whether all IS controls were properly identified as such. 

The auditor should identify and document the other entitywide, system, 
and business process level IS controls upon which the effectiveness of 
each significant IS control technique depends. These other IS controls 
will principally relate to the entitywide level controls and to 
controls over each of the critical control points (including control 
dependencies) at the system and business process application levels. 
For example, if the IS control is the review of an exception report, 
the auditor should identify and test the business process application 
controls directly related to the production of the exception report, as 
well as the general and other business process application controls 
upon which the reliability of the information in the exception report 
depends, including the proper functioning of the business process 
application that generated the exception report and the reliability of 
the data used to generate the exception report. In addition, the 
auditor should test the effectiveness of the user control (i.e., 
management review and followup on the items in the exception report). 

For each relevant IS control technique, the auditor should determine 
whether it is (1) designed effectively to achieve the related control 
activity, considering IS audit risk and the audit objectives, and (2) 
implemented (placed in operation). The auditor may be able to determine 
whether control techniques are sufficient to achieve a particular 
control activity without evaluating and testing all of the control 
techniques. Also, depending on IS audit risk and the audit objectives, 
the nature and extent of control techniques necessary to achieve a 
particular control objective will vary. 

The auditor generally should evaluate the design effectiveness and test 
only the control techniques necessary to achieve the relevant audit 
activities. For example, if there are two control techniques, each of 
which individually would achieve the control activity, the auditor 
generally would evaluate and test only one control technique. However, 
if the auditor determines that the control technique evaluated and 
tested was not effective, the auditor would consider the effectiveness 
of the other control technique. 

Also, the auditor should evaluate the nature and extent of testing 
performed by the entity. Such information can assist in identifying key 
controls and in assessing risk, but the auditor should not rely on 
testing performed by the entity in lieu of appropriate auditor testing. 
If the control techniques implemented by the entity, as designed, are 
not sufficient to address the control activity, or the control 
techniques are not effectively implemented as designed, the auditor 
should determine the effect on IS controls and the audit objectives. 

For efficiency, the auditor may implement a tiered approach to the 
identification and evaluation of the design effectiveness of relevant 
IS control techniques, as discussed later in this session, beginning 
with entitywide level controls, followed by system level controls, then 
by business process application level controls. 

Appendices II and III may be used to identify and summarize relevant IS 
controls at the entitywide, system, and business process application 
levels. 

Test Information System Controls: 

The auditor should design and conduct tests of relevant control 
techniques that are effective in design to determine their 
effectiveness in operation. 

It is generally more efficient for the auditor to test IS controls on a 
tiered basis, starting with the general controls at the entitywide and 
system levels, followed by the general controls at the business process 
application level, and concluding with tests of business process 
application, interface, and data management system controls at the 
business process application level. Such a testing strategy may be used 
because ineffective IS controls at each tier generally preclude 
effective controls at the subsequent tier. 

If the auditor identifies IS controls for testing, the auditor should 
evaluate the effectiveness of: 

* general controls at the entitywide and system level; 

* general controls at the business process application level; and; 

* specific business process application controls (business process 
controls, interface controls, data management system controls), and/or 
user controls, unless the IS controls that achieve the control 
objectives are general controls. 

The auditor should determine whether entitywide and system level 
general controls are effectively designed, implemented, and operating 
effectively by: 

* identifying applicable general controls; 

* determining how those controls function, and whether they have been 
placed in operation; and; 

* evaluating and testing the effectiveness of the identified controls. 

The auditor generally should use knowledge obtained in the planning 
phase. The auditor should document the understanding of general 
controls and should conclude whether such controls are effectively 
designed, placed in operation, and, for those controls tested, 
operating as intended. 

Tests of General Controls at the Entitywide and System Levels: 

The auditor may test general controls through a combination of 
procedures, including observation, inquiry, inspection (which includes 
a review of documentation on systems and procedures), and reperformance 
using appropriate test software. Although sampling is generally not 
used to test general controls, the auditor may use sampling to test 
certain controls, such as those involving approvals. 

If general controls at the entitywide and system levels are not 
effectively designed and operating as intended, the auditor will 
generally be unable to obtain satisfaction that business process 
application-level controls are effective. In such instances, the 
auditor should (1) determine and document the nature and extent of 
risks resulting from ineffective general controls and (2) identify and 
test any manual controls that achieve the control objectives that the 
IS controls were to achieve. 

However, if manual controls do not achieve the control objectives, the 
auditor should determine whether any specific IS controls are designed 
to achieve the objectives. If not, the auditor should develop 
appropriate findings principally to provide recommendations to improve 
internal control. If specific IS controls are designed to achieve the 
objectives, but are in fact ineffective because of poor general 
controls, testing would typically not be necessary, except to support 
findings. 

Tests of General Controls at the Business Process Application Level: 

If the auditor reaches a favorable conclusion on general controls at 
the entitywide and system levels, the auditor should evaluate and test 
the effectiveness of general controls for those applications within 
which business process application controls or user controls are to be 
tested. These business process application level general controls are 
referred to as Application Security (AS) controls in Chapter 4. 

If general controls are not operating effectively within the business 
process application, business process application controls and user 
controls generally will be ineffective. If the IS controls audit is 
part of a financial or performance audit, the IS controls specialist 
should discuss the nature and extent of risks resulting from 
ineffective general controls with the audit team. The auditor should 
determine whether to proceed with the evaluation of business process 
application controls and user controls. 

Tests of Business Process Application Controls and User Controls: 

The auditor generally should perform tests of those business process 
application controls (business process, interface, data management), 
and user controls necessary to achieve the control objectives where the 
entitywide, system, and application-level general controls were 
determined to be effective. 

If IS controls are not likely to be effective, the auditor should 
obtain a sufficient understanding of control risks arising from 
information systems to: 

* identify the impact on the audit objectives, 

* design audit procedures, and, 

* develop appropriate findings. Also, in such circumstances, the 
auditor considers whether manual controls achieve the control 
objectives, including manual controls that may mitigate weaknesses in 
IS controls. If IS controls are not likely to be effective and if 
manual controls do not achieve the control objectives, the auditor 
should identify and evaluate any specific IS controls that are designed 
to achieve the control objectives to develop recommendations for 
improving internal controls. 

IS controls that are not effective in design do not need to be tested. 
If the auditor determined in a prior year that controls in a particular 
accounting application were ineffective and if management indicates 
that controls have not significantly improved, the auditor need not 
test them. 

2.2.2 Appropriateness of Control Tests: 

To assess the operating effectiveness of IS controls, auditors should 
perform an appropriate mix of audit procedures to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to support their conclusions. Such procedures 
could include the following: 

* Inquiries of IT and management personnel can enable the auditor to 
gather a wide variety of information about the operating effectiveness 
of control techniques. The auditor should corroborate responses to 
inquiries with other techniques. 

* Questionnaires can be used to obtain information on controls and how 
they are designed. 

* Observation of the operation of controls can be a reliable source of 
evidence. For example, the auditor may observe the verification of edit 
checks and password controls. However, observation provides evidence 
about controls only when the auditor was present. The auditor needs 
other evidence to be satisfied controls functioned the same way 
throughout the period. 

* The auditor may review documentation of control polices and 
procedures. For example, the entity may have written policies regarding 
confidentiality or logical access. Review of documents will allow the 
auditors to understand and assess the design of controls. 

* Inspection of approvals/reviews provides the auditor with evidence 
that management is performing appropriate control checks. The auditor 
may combine these tests with discussions and observations. 

* Analysis of system information (e.g., configuration settings, access 
control lists, etc.) obtained through system or specialized software 
provides the auditor with evidence about actual system configuration. 

* Data review and analysis of the output of the application processing 
may provide evidence about the accuracy of processing. For example, a 
detailed review of the data elements or analytical procedures of the 
data as a whole may reveal the existence of errors. Computer-assisted 
audit techniques (CAAT) may be used to test data files to determine 
whether invalid transactions were identified and corrected by 
programmed controls. However, the absence of invalid transactions alone 
is insufficient evidence that the controls effectively operated. 

* Reperformance of the control could be used to test the effectiveness 
of some programmed controls by reapplying the control through the use 
of test data. For example, the auditor could prepare a file of 
transactions that contains known errors and determine if the 
application successfully captures and reports the known errors. 

Based on the results of the IS controls audit tests, the auditor should 
determine whether the control techniques are operating effectively to 
achieve the control activities. Controls that are not properly designed 
to achieve the control activities or that are not operating effectively 
are potential IS control weaknesses. For each potential weakness, the 
auditor should determine whether there are specific compensating 
controls or other factors that could mitigate the potential weakness. 
If the auditor believes that the compensating controls or other factors 
could adequately mitigate the potential weakness and achieve the 
control activity, the auditor should obtain evidence that the 
compensating or other control is effectively operating and actually 
mitigates the potential weakness. If it effectively mitigates the 
potential weakness, the auditor can conclude that the control activity 
is achieved; however, the auditor may communicate such weaknesses to 
the entity. If the potential weakness is not effectively mitigated, the 
potential weakness is an actual weakness. The auditor evaluates its 
effects on IS controls in combination with other identified weaknesses 
in the reporting phase. 

2.2.3 Documentation of Control Testing Phase: 

Information developed in the testing phase that the auditor should 
document includes the following: 

* An understanding of the information systems that are relevant to the 
audit objectives; 

* IS Control objectives and activities relevant to the audit 
objectives; 

* By level (e.g., entitywide, system, business process application) and 
system sublevel (e.g., network, operating system, infrastructure 
applications), a description of control techniques used by the entity 
to achieve the relevant IS control objectives and activities; 

* By level and sublevel, specific tests performed, including: 
- related documentation that describes the nature, timing, and extent 
of the tests; 
- evidence of the effective operation of the control techniques or lack 
thereof (e.g., memos describing procedures and results, output of tools 
and related analysis); 
- if a control is not achieved, any compensating controls or other 
factors and the basis for determining whether they are effective; 
- the auditorï¿½s conclusions about the effectiveness of the entityï¿½s IS 
controls in achieving the control objective; and; 
- for each weakness, whether the weakness is a material weakness, 
significant deficiency or just a deficiency, as well as the criteria, 
condition, cause, and effect if necessary to achieve the audit 
objectives. 

Appendices II and III may be used to summarize the results of testing. 

2.3 Report Audit Results: 

After completing the testing phase, the auditor summarizes the results 
of the audit, draws conclusions on the individual and aggregate effect 
of identified IS control weaknesses on audit risk and audit objectives 
and reports the results of the audit. The auditor evaluates the 
individual and aggregate effect of all identified IS control weaknesses 
on the auditorï¿½s conclusions and the audit objectives. The auditor 
evaluates the effect of any weaknesses on the entityï¿½s ability to 
achieve each of the critical elements in Chapters 3 and 4 and on the 
risk of unauthorized access to key systems or files. Also, the auditor 
evaluates potential control dependencies. 

For each critical element, the auditor should make a summary 
determination as to the effectiveness of the entityï¿½s related controls, 
considering entitywide, system, and business process application levels 
collectively. The auditor should evaluate the effect of related 
underlying control activities that are not achieved. In addition, the 
auditor should determine whether the weaknesses preclude the 
effectiveness of each of the five categories of general controls or the 
four categories of application-level controls. If the controls for one 
or more of each categoryï¿½s critical elements are ineffective, then the 
controls for the entire category are not likely to be effective. The 
auditor uses professional judgment in making such determinations. For 
federal entities, if identified weaknesses relate to IS measures 
reported in FISMA reporting, the auditor should determine whether they 
were properly reported. Also, the auditor should determine whether IS 
control weaknesses identified by the audit were identified in the 
entityï¿½s Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&Mï¿½s) or equivalent 
document. If not, the auditor generally should attempt to determine why 
they were not identified by the entity as appropriate and report 
weaknesses in the reporting process. 

Also, the auditor should evaluate whether the aggregate combination of 
weaknesses could result in unauthorized access to systems or files 
supporting key areas of audit interest. Guidance for evaluating IS 
controls and determining the appropriate reporting are discussed 
separately for financial audits and attestation engagements and for 
performance audits in the following sections. 

For example, a series of weaknesses might result in individuals having 
the ability to gain unauthorized external access to agency systems, 
escalate their privileges to obtain a significant level of access to 
critical control points, and consequently achieve access to key areas 
of audit interest. The auditor can use simplified network schematics 
annotated with weaknesses related to key system components to document 
the impact of a series of weaknesses. Such documentation may be 
developed as the audit progresses, allowing the auditor to demonstrate 
on the system that the weaknesses in fact exist and can be exploited to 
achieve the expected result. Also, such documentation can assist in 
communicating the related risks to entity management. Figure 3 is an 
example of a simplified network schematic annotated with weaknesses 
related to key system components. 

Figure 3. Example of Network Schematic Describing System Weaknesses: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of a network schematic describing system 
weaknesses. The following items and information are depicted: 

1) Router: 
* Access lists not applied; 
* Unencrypted management protocols. 

2) Firewall; 

3) Intrusion detection system: 
* Ineffective with encrypted traffic; 
* Full data capture not performed; 
* Default installation. 

4) Server: 
* Operating system, database management system, and application servers 
unpatched and vulnerable; 
* Unnecessary and vulnerable services; 
* Weak certificate management; 
* Weak session management; 
* Clear text passwords; 
* Application input not effective. 

5) Switch (see number 9); 

6) Firewall: 
* Excessive rules (in/out); 
* unpatched and vulnerable firewall and operating system. 

7) Wireless access: 
* unencrypted protocols; 
* Unauthorized wireless access points; 
* Terminates on internal network. 

8) Switch (see number 9); 

9) Network devices: 
* Unpatched and vulnerable services; 
* Default Simple Network Management Protocols read/write strings; 
* Network not segmented; 
* Access lists not applied; 
* Unencrypted management protocols. 

10) Workstations: 
* Operating system unpatched and vulnerable; 
* Applications unpatched and vulnerable; 
* Unnecessary and vulnerable services; 
* Users running as local admin; 
* Insecure Active X settings; 
* Personal firewalls not used. 

11) Servers: 
* Operating system and management system unpatched and vulnerable; 
* Unnecessary and vulnerable services; 
* Poorly configured services; 
* Outdated and vulnerable applications; 
* Default and easily guessed passwords; 
* Excessive directory and file permissions; 
* Unencrypted or weak protocols. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Further, the auditor should evaluate the potential impact of any 
identified weaknesses on the completeness, accuracy, validity, and 
confidentiality of application data relevant to the audit objectives. 
(See Chapter 4 for a description of completeness, accuracy, validity, 
and confidentiality.) 

When IS controls audits are performed as part of a broader financial or 
performance audit or attestation engagement, the IS controls specialist 
should coordinate with the auditor to determine whether significant 
controls are dependent on IT processing. In very rare circumstances, 
the auditor may determine that IS controls, in the aggregate, are 
ineffective, but that the entity has overall compensating controls not 
dependent on IT processing or that other factors mitigate or reduce the 
risks arising from IS control weaknesses. For example, manual reviews 
of support for all disbursements could mitigate certain IS risks 
related to a disbursement system. If compensating controls or other 
factors are present, the auditor should document such controls or 
factors, test them appropriately to determine whether they effectively 
mitigate the identified IS control weaknesses, and draw conclusions 
about the nature and extent of the risks that remain after considering 
such controls or factors. 

As noted earlier in the section entitled ï¿½Understand the Overall Audit 
Objectives and Related Scope of the Information System Controls Audit,ï¿½ 
if achieving the audit objectives does not require an overall 
conclusion on IS controls or only relates to certain components of the 
entity or a subset of controls, the auditorï¿½s assessment would not 
necessarily identify all significant IS control weaknesses. For 
example, a limited review of controls over a type of operating system 
may not identify any significant weaknesses, although there may be very 
significant weaknesses in other areas that the auditor may not be aware 
of because of the limited scope of the audit. Consequently, the auditor 
should evaluate the potential limitations of the auditorï¿½s work on the 
auditorï¿½s report and the needs and expectations of users. The auditor 
may determine that, because the limitations are so significant, the 
auditor (1) will communicate the limitations to the audited entity, 
those charged with governance, and those requesting the audit and (2) 
clearly report such limitations on the conclusions in the audit report. 
For example, in reporting on an audit of an operating system, the 
auditor may determine that it is appropriate to clearly report that the 
scope of the assessment was limited to the operating system and that, 
consequently, additional IS control weaknesses may exist that could 
impact the effectiveness of IS controls related to the operating system 
and to the entity as a whole. 

The auditor should express the effect of identified IS control 
weaknesses in terms of the audit objectives. The following sections 
provide guidelines for assessing IS controls in financial and 
performance audits. For financial audits and attestation engagements, 
GAGAS states that auditors should report material weaknesses and other 
significant deficiencies. 

2.3.1 Financial Audits and Attestation Engagements: 

The auditor should conclude whether IS control weaknesses, individually 
or in the aggregate, constitute a significant deficiency or material 
weakness in financial reporting. The auditor should coordinate these 
procedures with the overall audit team. For financial audits, GAGAS and 
OMB Circular A-123 state that a control deficiency exists when the 
design or operation of a control does not allow management or 
employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, 
to prevent or detect misstatements on a timely basis. A deficiency in 
design exists when (a) a control necessary to meet the control 
objective is missing or (b) an existing control is not properly 
designed so that even if the control operates as designed, the control 
objective is not always met. A deficiency in operation exists when a 
properly designed control does not operate as designed or when the 
person performing the control does not possess the necessary authority 
or qualifications to perform the control effectively. In addition, in 
financial audits of federal entities, the auditor should evaluate the 
effect of IS control weaknesses on FFMIA and FMFIA reporting. 

GAGAS uses the following definitions and guidelines for classifying 
internal control weaknesses: 

A significant deficiency is a deficiency in internal control, or 
combination of deficiencies, that adversely affects the entityï¿½s 
ability to initiate, authorize, record, process, or report financial 
data reliably in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles such that there is more than a remote likelihood [Footnote 
37] that a misstatement of the entityï¿½s financial statements that is 
more than inconsequential[Footnote 38] will not be prevented or 
detected. 

A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or combination of 
significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood 
that a material misstatement of the financial statements will not be 
prevented or detected. 

OMB Circular A-123 uses the same definition for significant deficiency, 
but continues to refer to it as a reportable condition. 

In determining whether IS control deficiencies, individually or in the 
aggregate, constitute a significant deficiency or material weakness, 
the auditor should evaluate several factors, including the following: 

* The likelihood that an individual could obtain unauthorized access to 
or perform unauthorized or inappropriate activities on key entity 
systems or files that could affect information recorded in the 
financial statements. This might include (1) the ability to obtain root 
access to systems that house key financial systems (including feeder 
systems), thereby enabling unauthorized users to read, add, delete, or 
modify financial data either directly or through the introduction of 
unauthorized software; (2) the ability to directly access and modify 
files containing financial information; or (3) the ability to assign 
unauthorized application user rights, thereby entering unauthorized 
transactions. 

* The nature of unauthorized access that could be obtained (e.g., 
limited to system or application programmers or system administrators; 
all authorized system users; or anyone through unauthorized external 
access through the Internet) or the nature of unauthorized or 
inappropriate activity that could be performed. 

* The likelihood that financial statement amounts could be materially 
affected. 

* The likelihood that other controls including business process 
application controls would prevent or detect such unauthorized access. 
Generally, if the effectiveness of such other controls depends on 
computer processed information, it is unlikely that they could 
effectively prevent or detect such access, unless the identified IS 
control weaknesses could not reasonably result in the ability to 
compromise such other controls. 

* The risk that management could override controls (such as through 
excessive access rights). 

Based upon these considerations, the auditor should determine whether 
IS control deficiencies, individually or in the aggregate, are a 
material weakness or significant deficiency. Also, the auditor should 
evaluate whether significant deficiencies, in combination, result in 
material weaknesses. If so, the auditor should determine them to be 
material weaknesses in drawing conclusions as to the effectiveness of 
internal control and reporting findings, as discussed in FAM paragraphs 
580.42ï¿½.48 and 580.51ï¿½.58. If the control deficiencies constitute a 
material weakness, the auditor should conclude that internal controls 
are not effective. 

Financial auditors may take one of two different approaches to 
reporting on internal control: (1) express an opinion on internal 
control (see FAM paragraphs 580.38-.48) or (2) report weaknesses found, 
categorized as material weaknesses or other significant deficiencies, 
but do not give an opinion (see FAM paragraphs 580.49-.50). GAO 
auditors generally express an opinion on internal control. In either 
case, the auditor considers whether internal control is sufficient to 
meet the following control objectives insofar as those objectives 
pertain to preventing or detecting misstatements, losses, or 
noncompliance that would be material in relation to the financial 
statements: 

* Reliability of financial reportingï¿½transactions are properly 
recorded, processed, and summarized to permit the preparation of the 
financial statements and supplemental information in accordance with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and assets are 
safeguarded against loss from unauthorized acquisition, use, or 
disposition. 

* Compliance with applicable laws and regulationsï¿½transactions are 
executed in accordance with laws governing the use of budget authority; 
other laws and regulations that could have a direct and material effect 
on the financial statements or required supplementary information 
(RSI); and any other laws, regulations, and governmentwide policies 
identified by OMB in its audit guidance. 

The auditor may report weaknesses that do not meet the criteria for 
significant deficiencies in a letter to management or orally to an 
appropriate level of the entity. The auditor may include suggestions 
for corrective action for these less significant weaknesses if enough 
is understood about their cause. (More detailed information on how and 
where to report control weaknesses for financial statement audits is 
presented in sections 580.48 through 580.52 of the FAM.) 

2.3.2 Performance Audits: 

The auditor should draw conclusions on the effectiveness of IS controls 
relevant to the audit objectives. Depending on the audit objectives, 
the auditorï¿½s report will vary. For example, the auditorï¿½s report may: 

* provide an overall conclusion (e.g., the entityï¿½s IS controls are or 
are not effective in achieving the IS control objectives relevant to 
the audit) and communicate identified weaknesses; 

* limit reporting to identified weaknesses without providing an overall 
conclusion (e.g., ï¿½based on our work, we identified the following IS 
control weaknessesï¿½); or; 

* if in support of a broader performance audit, report findings in the 
context of the audit objectives, such as how they relate to the 
assessment of the reliability of computer-processed data. 

GAGAS state that auditors should include in their audit reports the 
scope of their work on internal control (which includes IS controls) 
and any deficiencies in internal control that are significant within 
the context of the audit objectives and based upon the audit work 
performed. Determining whether and how to communicate to officials of 
the audited entity internal control deficiencies that have an 
inconsequential effect on the financial statement or subject matter is 
a matter of professional judgment. Auditors should document such 
communications. The auditor may report such inconsequential weaknesses 
orally to officials of the entity or in a separate written 
communication. 

In determining the significance of the IS control weaknesses, the 
auditor should evaluate several factors, including the following: 

* The likelihood that an individual could obtain unauthorized access to 
or perform unauthorized or inappropriate activities on key entity 
systems or files that could affect key areas of audit interest. This 
might include (1) the ability to obtain root access to systems that 
house key areas of audit interest (including supporting systems), 
thereby enabling an intruder to read, add, delete, or modify data 
either directly or through the introduction of unauthorized software; 
(2) the ability to directly access and modify files related to key 
areas of audit interest; or (3) the ability to assign unauthorized 
application user rights, thereby enabling an intruder to enter 
unauthorized transactions or perform unauthorized activities. 

* The nature of unauthorized access that could be obtained (e.g., 
limited to system or application programmers or system administrators; 
authorized system users; or anyone through unauthorized external access 
through the Internet). 

* The likelihood that the achievement of the audit objectives would be 
significantly affected. 

* The likelihood that other controls including business process 
application controls would prevent or detect such unauthorized access. 
Generally, if the effectiveness of such other controls depends on 
computer processed information, it is unlikely that they could 
effectively prevent or detect such access, unless the identified IS 
control weaknesses could not reasonably result in the ability to 
compromise such other controls. 

* The risk that management could override controls (such as through 
excessive access rights). 

2.3.3 Other Audit Reporting Considerations: 

It is important to report IS control weaknesses in terms that are 
understandable to individuals who may have limited expertise regarding 
information systems issues. In this regard, the auditor generally 
should define technical terms and avoid jargon and undefined 
abbreviations and acronyms. 

Auditors should develop the elements of the findings to the extent 
necessary to achieve the audit objectives. The extent to which the 
auditor should develop the elements for a finding (criteria, condition, 
cause, and effect) depends on the audit objectives. If auditors are 
able to sufficiently develop the findings, they should provide 
recommendations for corrective action if they are significant within 
the context of the audit objectives. 

Criteria describe the required or desired state, or what is expected 
from the program or operation. Condition is the actual situation. Cause 
is the factor or factors responsible for the difference between 
condition and criteria. Effect is the impact of the difference between 
the condition and the criteria. This information helps senior 
management understand the significance of the weakness and develop 
appropriate corrective actions. For most types of IS control 
weaknesses, this manual includes a discussion of risks and potential 
negative effects that can be adapted for audit reports. GAO has issued 
numerous reports that can be used as models for reporting computer-
related weaknesses. Current IS reports can be obtained from GAOï¿½s 
report database on GAOï¿½s Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

In many cases, auditors will have detailed information on control 
weaknesses that is too technical to be meaningful to most senior 
managers and other users of the audit report, but may be valuable to 
the audit report, but that may be valuable to the entityï¿½s technical 
staff in understanding the precise cause of the weaknesses and in 
developing corrective actions. The auditors generally should provide 
this information to the entityï¿½s technical staff in briefings. The 
auditor should provide information to technical staff that is in 
substance the same as that reported to senior management. 

The auditor should effectively communicate the results of an IS 
controls audit to the appropriate persons through appropriate reports. 
This serves several purposes, including: 

* informing the audited entity and those charged with governance of 
control weaknesses; issues of noncompliance with laws, regulations, and 
provisions of contracts or grant agreements; and instances of fraud, 
illegal acts, or abuse; 

* providing the audited entity with recommendations to correct such 
control weaknesses; 

* providing the financial or performance auditor an understanding of 
the information systems control environment and the effects of IT on 
the processing of transactions; 

* complying with legal reporting requirements; and; 

* complying with auditing standards, including generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

However, the auditor should avoid the disclosure of sensitive IS data. 
An individual could potentially compromise a system from any location 
in the world, as long as they have access to a computer and a telephone 
line or Internet connection. Technical information discussed in an 
audit report could potentially assist individuals by reducing the time 
and effort to obtain unauthorized access and compromise a system. Also, 
to avoid disclosure of sensitive information, the auditor should 
provide draft IS reports to the entity for a sensitivity review. The 
auditor should evaluate entity sensitivity concerns and make 
appropriate report revisions, considering legal or regulatory 
requirements, including the exercise of information classification 
authority. 

Generally, in the federal environment, either one report with limited 
distribution or two reports, one of which has limited distribution, are 
issued. Information systems security audit reports may or may not be 
put on agency Web sites or released under FOIA, generally depending on 
the degree or extensiveness of sensitive data. Even though these 
reports may not be posted on agency Web sites, they are still typically 
issued to agency management. Also, state laws and regulations may 
affect the form of reporting. For further information, see Information 
Systems Security Auditing: Legal and Reporting Considerations. 
[Footnote 39] 

2.3.4 Related Reporting Responsibilities: 

In addition to reporting the results of the audit, the auditor may have 
other related reporting responsibilities established by law, 
regulation, or policy. The auditor should identify any other reporting 
requirements and respond appropriately. 

In financial audits of federal entities, the auditor should determine 
whether the IS control weaknesses, individually or in the aggregate, 
constitute a material weakness for FMFIA reporting or a lack of 
substantial compliance of the entityï¿½s systems with FFMIA. See FAM 
260.53-57 for further information. Also, further information about 
reporting IS control weaknesses in relation to a financial audit are 
discussed in FAM 580 (Draft Reports). 

OMB Circular A-123 provides requirements for complying with FMFIA. The 
Circular requires management to assess controls and provide an annual 
assurance statement on the overall adequacy and effectiveness of 
internal control within the agency. In addition, management is required 
to provide a separate assurance statement on the effectiveness of 
internal control over financial reporting, which includes safeguarding 
of assets and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Also, 
OMB audit guidance requires management to include representations about 
internal control in its management representation letter to the 
auditor. 

FMFIA requires agencies to evaluate and report on the adequacy of the 
systems of internal accounting and administrative control. For the 
overall assessment of internal control, OMB Circular A-123 defines a 
material weakness as a reportable condition which the agency head 
determines to be significant enough to report outside of the agency. It 
defines a reportable condition as a control deficiency, or combination 
of control deficiencies, that in managementï¿½s judgment, should be 
communicated because they represent significant weaknesses in the 
design or operation of internal control that could adversely affect the 
organizationï¿½s ability to meet its internal control objectives. For the 
assessment of internal control over financial reporting, Circular A-123 
uses the same definitions for material weakness and significant 
deficiency described above for financial audits, except that OMB uses 
the term reportable condition rather than the term significant 
deficiency. Also, FMFIA and OMB Circular A-123 require management to 
report nonconformances with system requirements. The Circular defines 
nonconformances as instances in which financial management systems do 
not substantially conform to financial systems requirements. Financial 
management systems include both financial and financially-related (or 
mixed) systems. 

The auditor should evaluate the material weaknesses reported under 
FMFIA to determine whether they meet the definitions of material 
weakness and reportable condition for reporting as part of managementï¿½s 
assertion about the effectiveness of internal control. 

FISMA requires federal agencies to report significant deficiencies in 
IS as material weaknesses under FMFIA and, if relating to financial 
management systems, as an instance of a lack of substantial compliance 
of systems with FFMIA. The term ï¿½significant deficiencyï¿½ used in FISMA 
differs from the same term used in GAGAS. OMB defines a FISMA 
significant deficiency as ï¿½a weakness in an agencyï¿½s overall 
information systems security program or management control structure, 
or within one or more information systems that significantly restricts 
the capability of the agency to carry out its mission or compromises 
the security of its information, information systems, personnel, or 
other resources, operations, or assets. In this context, the risk is 
great enough that the agency head and outside agencies must be notified 
and immediate or near-immediate corrective action must be taken.ï¿½ The 
following points provide guidance in determining whether there is a 
FISMA significant deficiency: 

* If IS controls are ineffective with respect to one of the nine 
control categories (see table 1), such ineffective control(s) represent 
a FISMA significant deficiency. 

* If IS controls are ineffective with respect to one or more critical 
elements (that is, tasks that are essential for establishing adequate 
controls within a given control category; examples are given in 
Chapters 3 and 4), such ineffective control(s) represent a FISMA 
significant deficiency unless, based upon the facts and circumstances, 
other factors sufficiently mitigate the effect of the control 
weaknesses. 

* If individual weaknesses meet the above definition, such ineffective 
control(s) represent FISMA significant deficiencies. 

FFMIA requires agencies to implement and maintain financial management 
systems that comply substantially with federal financial management 
systems requirements, applicable federal accounting standards, and the 
U.S. Government Standard General Ledger[Footnote 40] at the transaction 
level. FFMIA requires auditors to assess whether an agencyï¿½s financial 
management systems comply with system requirements. IS control 
weaknesses are a major concern for federal agencies and the general 
public and are one of the frequently cited reasons for noncompliance 
with FFMIA. 

2.3.5 Documentation of Reporting Phase: 

The auditor should document appropriate IS information developed in the 
reporting phase, including: 

* The auditorï¿½s conclusion about the effectiveness of IS controls (in 
relation to the IS controls audit objectives) in achieving the critical 
elements and the relevant control activities and the basis for the 
conclusion, including the factors that the auditor considered in making 
the determination. 

* If part of a broader audit, the impact of any identified IS control 
weaknesses on the overall audit objectives. 

* Copies of any reports or written communications issued in connection 
with the audit, including the draft the agency commented on and entity 
management comments related to such reports and communications. 

* For financial audits and attestation engagements, the auditorï¿½s 
determination of whether identified weaknesses represent material 
weaknesses or significant deficiencies, and the basis for the auditorï¿½s 
conclusions. 

* Other documentation required by the audit organizationï¿½s policies and 
procedures, including quality assurance processes. 

* Results of procedures to detect any fraud significant to the audit 
objectives and the impact on the audit. 

* Results of audit follow-up procedures to determine whether agency 
corrective actions have been implemented, to sufficiently remediate 
previously reported IS control weaknesses. 

* As appropriate, the auditorï¿½s considerations and determinations 
concerning FMFIA, FFMIA, and other reporting responsibilities 

2.4 Documentation: 

The auditor should adequately document the IS controls audit. GAGAS has 
general documentation requirements for financial and performance audits 
and attestation engagements. In summary, they are as follows: 

Financial Audits - Auditors must prepare audit documentation in 
connection with each engagement in sufficient detail to provide a clear 
understanding of the work performed (including the nature, timing, 
extent, and results of audit procedures performed), the audit evidence 
obtained and its source, and the conclusions reached. Auditors should 
prepare audit documentation that enables an experienced auditor, having 
no previous connection to the audit, to understand a. the nature, 
timing, and extent of auditing procedures performed to comply with 
GAGAS and other applicable standards and requirements; b. the results 
of the audit procedures performed and the audit evidence obtained; c. 
the conclusions reached on significant matters; and d. that the 
accounting records agree or reconcile with the audited financial 
statements or other audited information. 

Attestation Engagements - Auditors must prepare attest documentation in 
connection with each engagement in sufficient detail to provide a clear 
understanding of the work performed (including the nature, timing, 
extent, and results of attest procedures performed); the evidence 
obtained and its source; and the conclusions reached. Auditors should 
prepare attest documentation in sufficient detail to enable an 
experienced auditor, having no previous connection to the attestation 
engagement, to understand from the documentation the nature, timing, 
extent, and results of procedures performed and the evidence obtained 
and its source and the conclusions reached, including evidence that 
supports the auditorsï¿½ significant judgments and conclusions. Auditors 
should prepare documentation that contains support for findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations before they issue their report. 

Auditors also should document the following for attestation engagements 
performed under GAGAS: a. the objectives, scope, and methodology of the 
attestation engagement; b. the work performed to support significant 
judgments and conclusions, including descriptions of transactions and 
records examined; c. evidence of supervisory review, before the attest 
report is issued, of the work performed that supports findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations contained in the attest report; and d. 
the auditorsï¿½ consideration that the planned procedures are designed to 
achieve objectives of the attestation engagement when (1) evidence 
obtained is dependent on computerized information systems, (2) such 
evidence is material to the objective of the engagement, and (3) the 
auditors are not relying on the effectiveness of internal control over 
those computerized systems that produced the evidence. Auditors should 
document (1) the rationale for determining the nature, timing, and 
extent of planned procedures; (2) the kinds and competence of available 
evidence produced outside a computerized information system, or plans 
for direct testing of data produced from a computerized information 
system; and (3) the effect on the attestation engagement report if 
evidence to be gathered does not afford a reasonable basis for 
achieving the objectives of the engagement. 

Performance Audits ï¿½ Auditors must prepare audit documentation related 
to planning, conducting, and reporting for each audit. Auditors should 
prepare audit documentation in sufficient detail to enable an 
experienced auditor, having no previous connection to the audit, to 
understand from the audit documentation the nature, timing, extent, and 
results of audit procedures performed, the audit evidence obtained and 
its source and the conclusions reached, including evidence that 
supports the auditorsï¿½ significant judgments and conclusions. Auditors 
should prepare audit documentation that contains support for findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations before they issue their report. 
Auditors should document the following: a. the objectives, scope, and 
methodology of the audit; b. the work performed to support significant 
judgments and conclusions, including descriptions of transactions and 
records examined; and c. evidence of supervisory review, before the 
audit report is issued, of the work performed that supports findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations contained in the audit report. 

In addition to meeting these general requirements, the auditor should 
include, in IS controls audit documentation, the specific information 
discussed throughout this chapter, and summarized in Appendix XI. 

2.5 Other Information System Controls Audit Considerations: 

In addition to the above, the auditor should apply the following topics 
and techniques to the extent they are relevant to the entity, the audit 
objectives, and the audit procedures. 

* Additional IS risk factors. 

* Automated audit tools. 

* Sampling techniques Also, guidance is provided to the auditor in the 
evaluation of IS controls associated with service organizations, single 
audits, and FISMA independent evaluations. Guidance on each of these 
areas is included in Appendix VII, VIII, and IX, respectively. 

2.5.1 Additional IS Risk Factors: 

As part of the risk assessment, the auditor should also evaluate the 
following additional IS risk factors to the extent that they are 
relevant to the entity and the audit objectives. The auditorï¿½s risk 
assessment also includes other risk factors not listed here (e.g., 
Voice over Internet Protocol ï¿½ VoIP) 

2.5.1.A Defense-In-Depth Strategy: 

Defense-in-Depth is a commonly accepted ï¿½best practiceï¿½ for 
implementing computer security controls in todayï¿½s networked 
environments. In some agencies, the auditor may encounter this strategy 
as part of the agencyï¿½s security management program. Where an effective 
Defense-in-Depth strategy has been implemented by the entity, the 
auditorï¿½s assessment of IS risk would generally be lower. Conversely, 
where this strategy is not used, the auditorï¿½s assessment of IS risk 
would generally be higher. The auditorï¿½s IS control testing generally 
provides evidence about the effectiveness of a Defense-in-Depth 
strategy. See Chapter 3 (AC-1 and CM-5) for additional information on 
Defense-in-Depth strategy. 

According to the National Security Agency, Defense-in-Depth integrates 
people, operations, and technology capabilities to protect information 
systems across multiple layers and dimensions. For example, successive 
layers of defense will cause an adversary who penetrates or breaks down 
one barrier to promptly encounter successive barriers until the attack 
ends. The strategy recommends a balance between protection capabilities 
and cost, performance, and operational considerations. 

The people component of Defense-in-Depth begins with a senior-level 
management commitment (normally at the chief information officer level) 
that is based on a clear understanding of the perceived threat. This 
component must be implemented with effective information security 
policies and procedures, assignment of roles and responsibilities, 
commitment of resources, training and awareness programs (for both 
users and system administrators), and personnel accountability, which 
includes the establishment of physical and personnel security measures 
to control and monitor access to facilities and critical elements of 
the information technology environment. 

The operations component focuses on all activities required to sustain 
an agencyï¿½s security posture on a day-to-day basis. These activities 
include: 

* maintaining up-to-date system security policies, 

* establishing certification and accreditation programs, 

* managing information system security (for example, installing patches 
and virus updates, maintaining access control lists), 

* performing system security assessments (for example, vulnerability 
assessments), 

* auditing and monitoring system activity and responding to threats, 
and; 

* implementing recovery and reconstitution procedures in the event of a 
security breach. 

The technology component includes defense in multiple places and 
layered defense mechanisms that provide intrusion prevention, 
detection, and response to security incidents. Since attackers may 
target multiple points in an information system, an agency needs to 
deploy protection mechanisms at multiple locations including the 
protection of local and wide area communication networks (for example, 
from denial of service attacks), protection for data transmitted over 
the networks (for example, use of encryption and traffic flow security 
measures), defense of enclave boundaries (for example, deploy firewalls 
and intrusion detection systems), and defense of the computing 
environment (for example, access control on hosts and servers). Even 
the best security products have inherent weaknesses, so it is only a 
matter of time before an attacker finds an exploitable vulnerability. 
Therefore, it is important to deploy layered defense mechanisms such as 
nested firewalls coupled with intrusion detection at outer and inner 
network boundaries, between the adversary and the target. 

2.5.1.B Web Applications: 

Web applications, which use a web browser as part of the application, 
present significant additional IS risks because, if not properly 
controlled, they can expose the application and the entityï¿½s systems to 
unauthorized access. In some instances, the risk related to the 
application itself may be low because it is not critical or it does not 
contain sensitive information. However, if not properly controlled, it 
could be used to obtain unauthorized access to other entity system 
resources. Therefore, due to the heightened risk, even if a web 
application itself is not part of the scope of the audit, the auditor 
should assess the effectiveness of web application security and, as 
appropriate, general controls to determine whether the information 
system controls over the application could allow unauthorized access 
through the application to other system resources. 

2.5.1.C ERP Systems: 

ERP systems present additional IS risks. While IS control objectives 
contained in the FISCAM, if properly achieved, should address such 
risks, it is important for the auditor to properly consider how the 
control objectives are achieved in ERP systems. This section provides 
some considerations in auditing ERP systems. The auditor should 
supplement the FISCAM with audit considerations and techniques that are 
specific to the particular ERP system(s) being audited. Although ERP 
systems share some similar functionality, the way they are implemented 
and the audit techniques (e.g., specific system queries, analysis of 
superuser capabilities) applied will vary with the particular vendor. 

Factors affecting the overall risk related to ERP systems include the 
following: 

* ERP systems are highly integrated (e.g., common databases, common 
security administration) and cover/include/address a broad range of 
entity activities, which leads to increased risks related to several 
control areas. For example, an ERP application generally includes a 
broader cross-section of users in the entity, increasing the need for 
access (particularly least privilege) and segregation of duties 
controls. Also, because loss of an ERP system/application can have 
devastating consequences to an entity, the entity needs effective 
controls over (1) system development/configuration management controls 
to provide reasonable assurance that the system will operate as 
intended, (2) service continuity/contingency planning to recover the 
more comprehensive ERP systems, and (3) access and other general 
controls to prevent unauthorized access to entity system resources that 
could lead to denial of service. Further, general controls over the ERP 
system and supporting databases and operating systems are important to 
adequately protect access to the underlying data and processing. 

* Because ERP systems are on-line-real-time systems, data validation 
controls are critical to reasonably assure that only valid data is 
processed by the ERP systems. Controls in ERP systems tend to be 
preventive rather than detective, as subsequent detection and 
correction of errors may be costly or impossible. Also, fewer controls 
may be in place as the data is generally entered and validated once. 

* The network architectures for ERP systems are typically more 
distributed, resulting in increased access controls and other risks 
than for more centralized systems. 

* Because security administration is generally centralized and powerful 
access is provided to system administrators, access controls over 
security administration and segregation of duties controls are 
important. In addition, ERP systems have powerful default user IDs that 
need to be adequately controlled. 

* The broader number of users may also lead to an increase in external 
access (wireless or other remote access), from both a broader range of 
internal users as well as external users (e.g., vendors, customers), 
increasing the number of access points to the entityï¿½s systems. 

* ERP systems typically have limited, if any, paper audit trails. 
Consequently, controls over audit logs and other general controls are 
important for the reliability of data in the ERP systems. Also, 
auditing access to ERP systems is typically performed online. 

* In many instances, interfaces are developed between the ERP system 
and legacy applications. As a result, the adequacy of interface 
controls and configuration management controls are important to ensure 
that data from legacy systems is reliable, valid, complete, and 
properly converted from the legacy application into the ERP system. 

* ERP systems may have a program change control module that allows for 
direct changes to production code. Therefore, controls related to 
segregation of development, test and production facilities and 
functions may not be present. Consequently, IS risks related to 
configuration management and monitoring are increased, and the entity 
should secure and monitor such modules. 

ERP systems contain certain controls that are not changeable by the 
entity. It is important to understand these controls and how they may 
help to achieve the IS control objectives. 

In addition, due to the increased risks discussed above, there are a 
number of other controls that are of increased significance in ERP 
systems, including controls relating to: 

* user access to sensitive application capabilities (e.g., pages, 
screens, transactions, menus, queries), including related segregation 
of duties. 

* powerful user roles/profiles, including defaults. 

* default user IDs and default passwords. 

* default system configurations. 

* access to critical tables/databases. 

* access to log files. 

* the effectiveness of the settings of configurable controls. 

* sensitive reports/outputs. 

2.5.1.D Interface Controls: 

Interface controls are particularly important when applications rely on 
input from legacy systems. Such legacy systems are sometimes referred 
to as feeder systems. In certain instances, such legacy applications 
may not have been designed to fully achieve the objectives of the 
application they support. Consequently, the auditor evaluates the 
adequacy of interface controls and of application controls related to 
such legacy applications to provide reasonable assurance that data from 
legacy systems is reliable, valid, complete, and properly converted 
from the legacy applications into the applications they support. In 
addition, the auditor should assess the effectiveness of application 
controls over the legacy applications, if the reliability of input is 
relevant to the audit objectives. 

2.5.1.E Database Management Systems: 

Operational characteristics of various system architectures that 
include Database Management Systems (DBMS) software introduce several 
potential vulnerabilities to the data/application the DBMS directly 
supports and the general controls environment, itself. The degree to 
which these potential vulnerabilities increase risk is determined by 
the characteristics of the networks and host system(s) involved. One 
area of risk exists when the DBMS architecture involves multiple 
installations of the DBMS, which may be located on more than one host 
system. System and/or application architectures that utilize multiple 
DBMS installations are commonly used to support functionally or 
geographically distributed operations, high performance requirements, 
high availability requirements or some combination of these factors. 
When multiple DBMSs exist, the mechanisms that allow them to 
communicate with each other need to be implemented and controlled to 
prevent unintended data and/or system access. Additionally, modern DBMS 
software contains powerful capabilities to access the hostï¿½s operating 
system and other operating systems and other DBMSs across networks. The 
ability to use these capabilities needs to be carefully controlled for 
each DBMS installation. Finally, some administrator accounts in DBMS 
software provide privileged levels of access to the hostï¿½s operating 
system. So, users with system administration privileges in DBMS 
software may also have significant privileges in host operating systems 
and those systems and network devices accessible from the DBMSï¿½s host. 

2.5.1.F Network-based Access Control Systems: 

Implementations of network-based access control systems (such as LDAPs, 
including the Microsoft Active Directoryï¿½) introduce the potential for 
specific vulnerabilities. Network-based access control systems are 
typically hosted on one or more server-class systems. The appropriate 
configuration of the operating systems and all factors that can effect 
the functioning of the operating systems for these hosts needs to be 
carefully controlled. A flaw in operating system-level controls on 
these hosts potentially jeopardizes the reliability of the control 
functions provided by the network-based access control system and/or 
the sensitive access control data contained in that system. Network-
based access control systems are designed to support high performance 
and simplify network administration and maintenance. To facilitate 
these design considerations, the systems provide flexible methods to 
connect to and transfer information with other systems. Due to these 
characteristics, it is essential that effective controls be in place to 
prevent unintended system functions or data access that could 
compromise access controls. The nature of networks and application 
architectures that employ network-based access control systems involves 
a shared or common reliance on them for critical controls. Therefore, a 
compromise of a network-based access control system has the potential 
of contributing to the compromise of other systems. 

2.5.1.G Workstations: 

In modern systems best described as networks of networks, the effect of 
workstation controls can be much more significant than control over the 
functions nominally identified as associated with a specific 
workstation. Workstations can become critical components of a networkï¿½s 
perimeter as a result of the manner in which they are configured in the 
network, the types of sessions they can create with other devices, the 
access privileges allowed to workstation users, software running on 
those workstations, and controls over both inbound and outbound network 
traffic to and from the workstation. An understanding of the 
configuration of controls on workstations and network-based controls 
over workstations in the context of network perimeter controls is 
necessary to assess risk for any network. 

2.5.2 Automated Audit Tools: 

Various automated audit tools can be used to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the IS controls audit. Sometimes referred to as 
CAATs, or computer-assisted audit techniques, such tools may be used by 
the auditor to gather, or assist in gathering, audit evidence. If the 
auditor plans to use automated audit tools, the auditor should 
understand: 

* when they could be used, 
* how they can be used, and, 
* the associated risks. 

In addition, the auditor should be adequately trained in the 
use/operation of these tools and in the interpretation of the results. 
Because some tools generate a significant volume of information, the 
auditor should understand how to analyze such information. 

Also, the auditor should obtain reasonable assurance that the tools and 
their use/application produce reliable results and present a reasonably 
low risk of disrupting the entityï¿½s systems. Organizations should 
develop a process to select, evaluate, and revise software security 
tools. The following are some typical steps: 

* Research available security tools, listing several in each category. 

* Discuss with other members of your audit organization which tools 
could be most useful in-house and at sites to be audited. Discuss with 
other audit organizations as appropriate. 

* Determine the degree of platform-specific security software needed. 

* Determine a methodology to evaluate and select software. 

* Develop a procedure to train personnel in its use. 

* Develop a review process to determine whether the software tool has 
produced results commensurate with its cost. 

There are many different types of automated audit tools: 

* Commercial software, such as Microsoft Excelï¿½, etc., may be used by 
the auditor for analyzing data imported from client files, writing 
audit programs, etc. 

* Generalized audit software may be used by the auditor to query and 
extract information from the entityï¿½s information system. For example, 
data extraction tools and reporting facilities for access control 
software can identify users with excess privileges that circumvent 
segregation of duties. IDEA is the generalized software package 
available to GAO auditors. 

* An embedded audit module is a CAAT in which code prepared by the 
auditor is embedded in the clientï¿½s software to replicate a specific 
aspect of a control procedure, or to record details of certain 
transactions in a file accessible only to the auditor. 

* An integrated test facility is testing software that is integrated 
into the clientï¿½s software and enables the auditorï¿½s test data to be 
integrated and processed with the clientï¿½s live input. 

* Using an integrated test facility allows the auditor to be satisfied 
that test data are processed in the same way that live data are 
processed and to verify that the results are correct. Parallel 
simulation is a technique in which actual client data are processed by 
a copy of the clientï¿½s software that is under separate control of the 
auditor and has undergone program code analysis to ensure that the 
processing is identical to that of the clientï¿½s operational software. 

* Program code analysis is the analysis of the clientï¿½s program code to 
ensure that the instructions given to the computer are the same 
instructions that the auditor has previously identified when reviewing 
the systems documentation. 

* A test data CAAT is a technique in which test data prepared by the 
auditor are processed on the current production version of the clientï¿½s 
software, but separately from the clientï¿½s normal input data. Using the 
current production software provides evidence that the transactions 
were processed in the manner expected. 

* Specialized audit software is software designed to perform specific 
tasks in specific circumstances, such as comparison of source and 
object code, the analysis of unexecuted code, and the generation of 
test data. 

* Other specialized tools can be used to test IS controls. For example: 
- Password crackers can identify the use of vendor-default or easily 
guessed passwords. 
- Network ï¿½sniffersï¿½ (software that can intercept and log traffic 
passing over a network) can identify the transmission of passwords or 
sensitive information in clear text. 
- Network scanners, along with standard operating system commands, can 
help identify an organizationï¿½s network security profile and determine 
whether dangerous services are active in components. 
- Modem locators (ï¿½war dialingï¿½ software) can help identify unsecured 
dial-in modems. 

CAATs can also be used in testing the effectiveness of controls, as a 
companion to other controls testing. This would typically involve 
making a small selection of transactions and walking them through the 
system, or developing an integrated test facility and processing test 
transactions through the system. The advantage of using CAATs in 
controls testing is that it is possible to test every transaction 
(either in a master file or transaction file), to determine whether 
there were any control failures. 

Any analysis performed using CAATS should be adequately documented. In 
addition, a technical review should be performed by audit staff 
independent of the preparer to determine that the implementation of 
CAATS and the analysis of results is complete and accurate and that any 
conclusions are supported by the analysis. 

2.5.3 Use of Sampling Techniques: 

Controls that leave documented evidence of their existence and 
application (such as logs) may be tested by inspecting such evidence. 
If sufficient evidence cannot be obtained through walkthroughs in 
combination with observation, inquiry, and other tests, the auditor 
generally should obtain more evidence by using sampling procedures to 
select individual items for inspection. The auditor may use 
multipurpose testing to use the same sample to test controls, 
compliance, and/or substantive results (such as balances in financial 
statements). Multipurpose testing is usually more efficient than 
separately designed samples. Alternatively, the auditor may design a 
sample to test controls alone. In this case, the auditor generally 
should use random attribute sampling. FAM section 450 (Sampling Control 
Tests) provides additional information on the use of this sampling 
technique, including those that can be applied to performance audits. 

[End of chapter] 

Chapter 3. Evaluating and Testing General Controls: 

3.0 Introduction: 

General controls are the policies and procedures that apply to all or a 
large segment of an agencyï¿½s information systems and help ensure their 
proper operation. Examples of primary objectives for general controls 
are to safeguard data, protect application programs, and ensure 
continued computer operations in case of unexpected interruptions. 
General controls are applied at the entitywide, system, and business 
process application levels. The effectiveness of general controls at 
the entitywide and system levels is a significant factor in determining 
the effectiveness of business process controls at the application 
level. Without effective general controls at the agency and system 
levels, business process controls generally can be rendered ineffective 
by circumvention or modification. For example, edits [Footnote 41] 
designed to preclude users from entering unreasonably large dollar 
amounts in a payment processing system can be an effective application 
control. However, this control cannot be relied on if the general 
controls permit unauthorized program modifications that might allow 
some payments to be exempt from the edit. Consequently, the auditor may 
decide that it is efficient to evaluate the effectiveness of general 
controls separately from and before evaluating business process 
controls. 

In planning the evaluation of IS controls, the auditor identifies areas 
of audit interest and critical control points. In identifying these 
areas, the auditor considers business process applications that are 
relevant to the audit objectives. Also, the auditor considers the 
network components that are most significant to the effectiveness of IS 
controls over the areas of audit interest. In planning the evaluation 
of general controls, the auditor considers the most effective and 
efficient manner to gather evidence to determine the effectiveness of 
general controls over these critical control points. For example, if a 
business process application for benefit payments is a key area of 
audit interest, the auditorï¿½s testing of general controls is designed, 
to the extent possible, to focus on those general controls that most 
directly affect the application. 

The evaluation of general controls includes the following five general 
control areas: 

* security management, which provides a framework and continuing cycle 
of activity for managing risk, developing security policies, assigning 
responsibilities, and monitoring the adequacy of the agencyï¿½s computer-
related controls; 

* access controls, which limit or detect access to computer resources 
(data, programs, equipment, and facilities), thereby protecting them 
against unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure; 

* configuration management, which prevents unauthorized changes to 
information system resources (for example, software programs and 
hardware configurations) and provides reasonable assurance that systems 
are configured and operating securely and as intended; 

* segregation of duties, which includes policies, procedures, and an 
organizational structure to manage who can control key aspects of 
computer-related operations; and; 

* contingency planning, so that when unexpected events occur, critical 
operations continue without disruption or are promptly resumed, and 
critical and sensitive data are protected. 

For each of these five general control areas, this manual identifies 
several critical elements that are essential for establishing adequate 
controls. For each critical element, the FISCAM provides a description 
of risks, control activities, and suggested audit procedures. The 
auditor can use this information to evaluate agency practices. For each 
critical element, the auditor should make a summary determination as to 
the effectiveness of the agencyï¿½s related controls at the entitywide, 
system, and application levels. If a critical element is not achieved, 
the respective control category is not likely to be achieved. The 
auditor should use professional judgment in making such determinations. 

To evaluate the effectiveness of general controls, the auditor 
identifies control techniques implemented by the agency to address each 
of the general controls and determine whether these control techniques, 
as designed, are sufficient to achieve the control. If sufficient, the 
auditor determines whether they are implemented (placed in operation) 
and operating effectively. As discussed later in this section, if the 
control techniques are not sufficient or are not implemented as 
designed, the auditor should determine the effect on IS controls and 
the audit objectives. 

As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, general controls are 
applicable at the entitywide, system, and application levels, and so 
the auditor should consider general controls at each of these levels. 
The control techniques and the related audit tests vary according to 
the level to which they are being applied. However, in this manual they 
are described at a high level in order to be applicable to many 
computer environments; they may require some technical expertise about 
the subject to be effectively performed at an agency. More detailed 
audit steps generally should be developed by the auditor based on the 
specific software and control techniques employed by the agency. Table 
2 shows the relationship between the general control areas and the 
levels. 

Table 2. General Control Categories Applicable at Different Levels of 
Audit: 

General Controls: 

Control Categories: Security Management: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Access Controls: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Configuration Management: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Segregation of Duties: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Contingency Planning: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

The auditorï¿½s evaluation of the effectiveness of IS controls should 
include system level controls related to each critical control point. 
Assessing the effectiveness of controls over critical control points 
should include consideration of all potential ways in which the 
critical control point could be accessed. Generally, for each critical 
control point, this would include assessing controls related to the 
network, operating system, and infrastructure application components. 
For example, if a particular router was deemed to be a critical control 
point, the auditor would test controls related to the router itself (a 
network component), as well as its operating system, and the 
infrastructure applications used to manage the router. Access to any of 
these could lead to access to the control point. 

To facilitate the auditorï¿½s evaluation, tables identifying commonly 
used control techniques and related audit procedures are included after 
the discussion of each critical element and also in Appendix II. 

These tables can be used for both the preliminary evaluation and the 
more detailed evaluation and testing of controls. For the preliminary 
evaluation, the auditor can use the tables to guide and document 
initial inquiries and observations; for the more detailed evaluation 
and testing, the auditor can use the suggested procedures in developing 
and carrying out a testing plan. Such a plan would include more 
extensive inquiries; inspections of facilities, systems, and written 
procedures; and tests of key control techniques, which may include 
using audit or system software and vulnerability analysis tools. To 
help document these evaluations and allow steps to be tailored to 
individual audits, electronic versions of the tables are available on 
our Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/aac.html]. 

When evaluating general controls, auditors may want to supplement the 
control techniques and audit procedures contained in this document with 
other guidance, including: 

* National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) information 
security standards and guidelines; 

* international security standards published by the International 
Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission; 

* Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) auditing 
standards, guidelines, and procedures; and; 

* requirements unique to the environment and agency being audited. 

3.1. Security Management (SM): 

An entitywide information security management program is the foundation 
of a security control structure and a reflection of senior managementï¿½s 
commitment to addressing security risks. The security management 
program should establish a framework and continuous cycle of activity 
for assessing risk, developing and implementing effective security 
procedures, and monitoring the effectiveness of these procedures. 
Overall policies and plans are developed at the entitywide level. 
System and application-specific procedures and controls implement the 
entitywide policy. Without a well-designed program, security controls 
may be inadequate; responsibilities may be unclear, misunderstood, or 
improperly implemented; and controls may be inconsistently applied. 
Such conditions may lead to insufficient protection of sensitive or 
critical resources and disproportionately high expenditures for 
controls over low-risk resources. Through FISMA, Congress requires each 
federal agency to establish an agencywide information security program 
to provide security to the information and information systems that 
support the operations and assets of the agency, including those 
managed by a contractor or other agency. 

Security Program Guidance: 

General guidance on planning and managing an agency information 
security program is contained in (1) NIST SP 800-12,[Footnote 42] which 
provides guidance on security-related management, operational, and 
technical controls and (2) our executive guide describing risk 
management principles found at leading organizations (discussed in the 
next section).[Footnote 43] In response to FISMA, NIST has since 
published a series of information security standards and guidelines for 
agencies to effectively manage risk to agency operations and agency 
assets. Key publications are: 

* FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal 
Information and Information Systems; 

* FIPS Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of 
Federal Information and Information Systems 

* NIST SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information 
Systems. 

FIPS Publication 200 provides: 

1. a specification for minimum security requirements for federal 
information and information systems; 

2. a standardized approach to security control selection using the 
security categorization standard, FIPS Publication 199; and; 

3. links to NIST SP 800-53, containing the security controls needed for 
compliance with these minimum security requirements. 

In applying the provisions of FIPS 200, agencies first categorize their 
systems as required by FIPS 199 (see Table 5), and then typically 
select an appropriate set of security controls from NIST SP 800-53 to 
satisfy their minimum security requirements. NIST reviews and updates 
the controls in NIST SP 800-53 annually to ensure that the controls 
represent the current state of practice in safeguards and 
countermeasures for information systems. 

FIPS 200 and its supporting publication NIST SP 800-53 establish 
conditions to enable organizations to be flexible in tailoring their 
security control baselines. Agencies, may, for example, apply scoping 
guidance taking into consideration the issues related to such things as 
the technologies employed by the agency, size and complexity of the 
systems, unique circumstances, and risks involved. Agencies may use 
compensating controls in lieu of those controls prescribed by NIST SP 
800-53. Agencies may also supplement the controls in NIST SP 800-53 
with additional controls that may be needed. 

In addition, NIST SP 800-100 provides a broad overview of information 
security program elements, including capital planning and investment 
control, performance measures, and security services, to assist 
managers in understanding how to establish and implement an information 
security program. This handbook summarizes and augments a number of 
existing NIST standards and guidance documents and provides additional 
information on related topics. 

Other guidance supporting implementation of FIPS 199 and FIPS 200 
include: 

* NIST SP 800-18, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal 
Information Systems. 

* NIST SP 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology 
Systems ? NIST SP 800-37, Guide for the Security Certification and 
Accreditation of Federal Information Systems. 

* NIST SP 800-60, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and 
Information Systems to Security Categories 

These and other publications, directives, and policies that support 
compliance with FISMA are available from NISTï¿½s website [hyperlink, 
http://csrc.nist.gov]. 

Security Management Critical Elements: 

Assessing an entitywide security management program involves evaluating 
the agencyï¿½s efforts to perform each of the critical elements shown in 
table 3. 

Table 3. Critical Elements for Security Management: 

Number: SM-1; 
Description: Establish a security management program; 

Number: SM-2; 
Description: Periodically assess and validate risks; 

Number: SM-3; 
Description: Document security control policies and procedures; 

Number: SM-4; 
Description: Implement effective security awareness and other security-
related personnel policies; 

Number: SM-5; 
Description: Monitor the effectiveness of the security program; 

Number: SM-6; 
Description: Effectively remediate information security weaknesses; 

Number: SM-7; 
Description: Ensure that activities performed by external third parties 
are adequately secure. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

The following sections discuss each of these critical elements and the 
control activities that support their achievement. At the end of each 
critical element, a summary table is presented that associates each 
activity with techniques that agencies can use to perform the activity, 
as well as procedures for auditing the critical elements and control 
activities. 

Critical Element SM-1: Establish a Security Management Program: 

Agencies should have policies, plans, and procedures that clearly 
describe the agencyï¿½s security management program. FISMA requires 
federal agencies to develop, document, and implement an agencywide 
information security program to provide security for the information 
and information systems that support the operations and assets of the 
agency, including those provided or managed by another agency, 
contractor, or other source. The security management program should 
cover all major systems and facilities and outline the duties of those 
who are responsible for overseeing security and those who own, use, or 
rely on the agencyï¿½s computer resources. As part of this entitywide 
program, the entity should have a security management structure in 
place at the system and application levels. Thus, in managing a 
particular operating system or network device, the agency should have a 
clearly assigned structure and responsibilities for the security of the 
operating system and device. Similarly, the entity should have a 
clearly assigned structure and responsibilities related to particular 
business process applications. The security program policies, plans, 
and procedures should be kept up-to-date and revised to reflect system 
and organizational changes, problems identified during plan 
implementation, and security control assessments or audit reports. 

SM-1.1. The security management program is adequately documented, 
approved, and up-to-date: 

The entityï¿½s security management program should be adequately 
documented. The nature and extent of the documentation of the program 
may vary. For federal entities, at a minimum, the program should 
adequately reflect the agencyï¿½s consideration of the following eight 
elements of an agency wide information security program required by 
FISMA. 

1. periodic risk assessments; 

2. policies and procedures to ensure cost-effective risk reduction and 
compliance with applicable standards and guidance and with agency-
determined system configuration requirements; 

3. subordinate information security plans for networks, facilities, and 
systems; 

4. security awareness training for agency employees and contractors; 

5. periodic management testing and evaluation that includes testing of 
all major systems; 

6. a remedial action process to address any deficiencies; 

7. security-incident procedures for detecting, reporting, and 
responding to incidents; and; 

8. continuity of operations plans and procedures for information 
systems. 

While most of these elements are covered in this section, security 
incident procedures are covered in section 3.2 on access controls, and 
continuity of operations is covered in section 3.5 on contingency 
planning. 

The security management program may be documented in the form of a 
separate written security management program plan or may consist of 
several documents that collectively record the security management 
program. The documentation should be supported by subordinate (system 
and application level) plans and procedures; related policies should 
cover all major systems and facilities and outline the duties of those 
responsible for overseeing security (the security management function), 
as well as those who own, use, or rely on the agencyï¿½s computer 
resources. An entitywide plan may describe such things as the overall 
security architecture, applicable procedures, and applicable system and 
application-level plans. The system-level plans identify the system-
level architecture (for example, network configuration, control points, 
etc.), operational policies and procedures, and any business process 
(application-level) plans. Similarly, application-level plans should 
contain structures, procedures, and controls specific to the 
application. 

The security management program should be approved by an appropriate 
level of management. In some instances, the entity may include the 
documentation in a policy document issued by management. In addition, 
for federal agencies, FISMA requires that the Director of OMB review 
federal agency security management programs at least annually and 
approve or disapprove them. 

Finally, to be effective, the security program documentation should be 
maintained to reflect current conditions. It should be periodically 
reviewed and, if appropriate, updated and reissued to reflect changes 
in risk due to factors such as changes in entity mission or the types 
and configuration of computer resources in use. Revisions to policies 
and plans should be reviewed, approved, and communicated to all 
employees. Outdated policies and plans not only reflect a lack of 
adequate top management concern, but also may be ineffective because 
they may not address current risks. 

SM-1.2. A security management structure has been established: 

Senior management should establish a structure to implement the 
security management program throughout the entity. The structure 
generally consists of a core of personnel who are designated as 
security managers. These personnel play a key role in developing, 
communicating, and monitoring compliance with security polices and 
reporting on these activities to senior management. The security 
management function also serves as a focal point for other personnel 
who play a role in evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
computer-related controls on a day-to-day basis. These personnel 
include program managers who rely on the agencyï¿½s computer systems, 
system administrators, and system users. 

As an illustration of the different responsibilities of a security 
management structure, FISMA establishes responsibilities for certain 
agency officials as follows: 

* The agency head is responsible for (1) providing risk-based 
information security, (2) complying with FISMA requirements and related 
NIST standards, (3) ensuring integration of information security 
management with agency strategic and operational planning, (4) ensuring 
adequacy of trained information security personnel, and (5) ensuring 
receipt of annual reporting from the CIO. 

* The CIO is to have authority from the agency head to ensure 
compliance with FISMA, including responsibility for (1) designating a 
senior agency information security official, (2) developing and 
maintaining the agency information security program and related 
policies and procedures, (3) training and overseeing information 
security personnel, and (4) assisting senior agency officials with 
their information security responsibilities. 

* Senior agency officials are responsible for information security for 
operations and assets under their control, including (1) assessing 
risk, (2) determining levels of appropriate security, (3) implementing 
policies and procedures to cost-effectively reduce risks to an 
acceptable level, and (4) periodically testing and evaluating security 
controls. 

Our survey of leading organizations[Footnote 44] found that a central 
management focal point is key to ensuring that the various activities 
associated with managing risk are carried out. Such responsibility is 
assigned to a central security program office. A central security 
program office may be supplemented by individual security program 
managers, designated in units within the entity who assist in the 
implementation and management of the organizationï¿½s security program. 
These individual unit security managers should report to or coordinate 
with the central security program office. 

Responsibilities of the central security program office may include: 

* facilitating risk assessments, 

* coordinating development and distribution of security policies and 
procedures, 

* routinely monitoring compliance with these policies, 

* promoting security awareness among system users, 

* planning and coordinating security-related activities, including 
coordination of geographically dispersed security groups, 

* ensuring that desktop security plans are integrated with 
infrastructure and database security plans, 

* providing reports to senior management on policy and control 
evaluation results and advice to senior management on security policy 
issues, and; 

* representing the entity in the security community. 

In assessing the effectiveness of the security management structure for 
an entitywide, system, or application level, the auditor considers the 
security functionï¿½s scope of authority, placement, training and 
experience, and tools. For example, security management personnel 
should: 

* have sufficient authority to obtain data needed to monitor compliance 
with policies, report results to senior management, and elevate 
concerns regarding inappropriate risk management decisions or 
practices; 

* have sufficient resources to carry out their responsibilities, 
including staff and tools (for example, computers, established audit 
trails, and specialized security software); 

* report to a level of management that maximizes the independence and 
objectivity of the security function; 

* not be assigned responsibilities that diminish their objectivity and 
independence; and; 

* have sufficient training and knowledge of control concepts, computer 
hardware, software, telecommunications concepts, physical and logical 
security, data architecture, database management and data access 
methods, pertinent legislation, and administration and organizational 
issues. 

SM-1.3. Information security responsibilities are clearly assigned: 

Security-related responsibilities of offices and individuals throughout 
the entity that should be clearly defined include those of (1) 
information resource owners and users, (2) information resources 
management and data processing personnel, (3) senior management, and 
(4) security administrators. Further, responsibilities for individual 
employee accountability regarding the use and disclosure of information 
resources should be established. Appendix III of OMB Circular A-130 
requires that the rules of the system and application ï¿½shall clearly 
delineate responsibilities and expected behavior of all individuals 
with access...and shall be clear about the consequences of behavior not 
consistent with the rules.ï¿½ 

Senior management and information resource management have ultimate 
responsibility for providing direction and ensuring that information 
security responsibilities are clearly assigned and carried out as 
intended. Security plans should clearly establish who ï¿½ownsï¿½ the 
various computer resources, particularly data files, and what the 
responsibilities of ownership are. Ownership of computer resources 
should be assigned to persons responsible for their reliability and 
integrity. For example, owners of data files and application programs 
are generally the managers of the programs supported by these 
applications. These managers are primarily responsible for the proper 
operation of the program and for accurate reporting of related computer 
data. Similarly, owners of computer facilities and equipment are 
generally managers who are responsible for the physical protection of 
these resources. If a resource has multiple owners, policies should 
clearly describe whether and how ownership responsibilities are to be 
shared. 

Assignment of ownership responsibilities is important because the 
managers who own the resources are in the best position to (1) 
determine the sensitivity of the resources, (2) analyze the duties and 
responsibilities of users, and (3) determine the specific access needs 
of these users. Once these factors are determined, the resource owner 
can identify persons authorized to access the resource and the extent 
of such access. The owners should communicate these authorizations to 
the security administrators, who are then responsible for implementing 
access controls in accordance with the ownersï¿½ authorizations. Section 
3.2, Access Controls, further discusses access authorization. 

If management and ownership responsibilities are not clearly assigned, 
access authorizations may be left to personnel who are not in the best 
position to determine usersï¿½ access needs. Such personnel are likely to 
authorize overly broad access in an attempt to ensure that all users 
can access the resources they need. This defeats the purpose of access 
controls and, depending on the sensitivity of the resources involved, 
can unnecessarily provide opportunities for fraud, sabotage, and 
inappropriate disclosures. 

SM-1.4. Subordinate security plans are documented, approved, and kept 
up-to-date: 

Entities should have written security plans at the system and 
application levels that cover networks, facilities, and systems or 
groups of systems, as appropriate. The plans and related policies 
should cover all major systems and facilities and outline the duties of 
those who are responsible for overseeing security and those who own, 
use, or rely on the entityï¿½s computer resources. In addition, these 
system-level plans should provide an overview of the security 
requirements for the system and a description of the security controls 
in place or planned for meeting those requirements. These plans should 
be kept up-to-date and revised to reflect system and organizational 
changes, problems identified during plan implementation, and security 
control assessments or audit reports. NIST SP 800-18 requires that all 
security plans should be reviewed and updated, if appropriate, at least 
annually. Further, NIST SP 800-18 and Appendix III of OMB Circular A-
130 provide specific guidance on what should be included in federal 
agency system security plans. 

FISMA states that ï¿½each agency shall develop, document, and 
implement...subordinate plans for providing adequate information 
security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information 
systems, as appropriate.ï¿½ System-level plans should identify the system-
level architecture (for example, network configuration, control points, 
etc.), operational policies and procedures, and any application-level 
plans. Application plans should contain similar elements such as 
procedures and controls specific to the application. 

System security plans should be clearly documented and, according to 
Appendix III of OMB Circular A-130, cover each general support system 
and each major application. The circular further specifies the topics 
to include in the plans. Topic names will differ depending on whether 
the plan is for a general support system or a major application, but 
the subject matter will be similar. The required topics are shown in 
table 4. 

Table 4. Security Controls to Include in System Security Plans: 

General support system: rules of the system[A]; 
Major application: application rules[A]; 

General support system: training; 
Major application: specialized training; 

General support system: personnel controls; 
Major application: personnel security; 

General support system: incident-response capability; 
Major application: NA; 

General support system: continuity of support; 
Major application: contingency planning; 

General support system: technical security; 
Major application: technical controls; 

General support system: system interconnection; 
Major application: information sharing; 

General support system: NA; 
Major application: public access controls. 

Source: Appendix III of OMB Circular A-130. 

[A] These include rules delineating responsibilities and expected 
behaviors of staff. 

Note: In this manual, access controls are addressed in section 3.2 and 
contingency planning in section 3.5. 

[End of table] 

To help ensure that the system security plan is complete and supported 
by the agency as a whole, senior management should obtain agreement 
from all affected parties to establish policies for a security program. 
Such agreements will also help ensure that policies and procedures for 
security developed at lower levels within the agency are consistent 
with overall organizational policies and procedures. In accordance with 
Appendix III of OMB Circular A-130, final responsibility for 
authorization of a system to process information should be granted by a 
management official. Generally, the manager whose program operations 
and assets are at risk is the most appropriate management official. 
However, any disagreements between program managers and security 
specialists as to the adequacy of policies and controls should be 
resolved by senior management. 

Like the overall security policies and plans, the subordinate security 
policies and plans should be maintained to reflect current conditions. 
As described in SM-1.1, they should be periodically reviewed and 
updated to reflect changes in risk and revisions should be reviewed, 
approved, and communicated to employees. Outdated policies and plans 
may be ineffective because they may not address current risks. 

SM-1.5. An inventory of systems is developed, documented, and kept up-
to-date: 

To implement an effective security program, entities need to maintain a 
complete, accurate, and up-to-date inventory of their systems. Without 
one, the entity cannot effectively manage IS controls across the 
entity. For example, effective configuration management requires the 
entity to know what systems they have and whether the systems are 
configured as intended. Furthermore, the inventory is necessary for 
effective monitoring, testing, and evaluation of IS controls, and to 
support information technology planning, budgeting, acquisition, and 
management. 

FISMA requires that each agency develop, maintain, and annually update 
an inventory of major information systems operated by the agency or 
under its control. OMB Circular A-130 defines a major information 
system as a system that requires special management attention because 
of its importance to an agency mission; its high development, 
operating, or maintenance costs; or its significant role in the 
administration of agency programs, finances, property, or other 
resources. The inventory must include identification of the interfaces 
between the agency systems and all other systems or networks, including 
interfaces not controlled by the agency. The inventory is needed to 
effectively track the agency systems for annual testing and evaluation 
and contingency planning. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-1: 

Table 5 presents control activities for critical element SM-1, 
techniques that entities may use to perform the activity and procedures 
for auditing the critical element and control activities. 

SM-1 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 

See the first control for each family (e.g., AC-1, AT-1): 
PL-2 System Security Plan; 
PL-3 System Security Plan Update; 
PL-6 Security-Related Activity Planning; 
SA-2 Allocation of Resources. 

Table 5. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical 
Element SM-1: Establish a security management program: 

Control activities: 
SM-1.1. The security management program is adequately documented, 
approved, and up-to-date; 
Control techniques: 
SM-1.1.1. An agency/entitywide security management program has been 
developed, documented, and implemented that: 
* covers all major facilities and operations, 
* has been approved by senior management and key affected parties, and, 
* covers the key elements of a security management program: 
- periodic risk assessments, 
- adequate policies and procedures, 
- appropriate subordinate information security plans, 
- security awareness training, 
- management testing and evaluation, 
- a remedial action process, 
- security-incident procedures, and, 
- continuity of operations. 
Audit procedures: 
Review documentation supporting the agency/entitywide security 
management program and discuss with key information security management 
and staff. Determine whether the program: 
* adequately covers the key elements of a security management program, 
* is adequately documented, and, 
* is properly approved. 
Determine whether all key elements of the program are implemented. 
Consider audit evidence obtained during the course of the audit. 

Control activities: 
SM-1.1. The security management program is adequately documented, 
approved, and up-to-date; 
Control techniques: 
SM-1.1.2. The agency/entitywide security management program is updated 
to reflect current conditions. 
Audit procedures: 
Based on a review of security management program documentation and 
interviews with key information security management and staff, 
determine whether the entity has adequate policies and procedures to 
identify significant changes in its IT environment that would 
necessitate an update to the program, and whether the program is 
periodically updated to reflect any changes. 

Control activities: 
SM-1.2. A security management structure has been established. 
Control techniques: 
SM-1.2.1. Senior management establishes a security management structure 
for the entitywide, system, and applications that has adequate 
independence, authority, expertise, and resources. 
Audit procedures: 
Review security policies and plans, the entityï¿½s organization chart, 
and budget documentation. Interview security management staff. Evaluate 
the security structure: independence, authority, expertise, and 
allocation of resources required to adequately protect the information 
systems. 

Control activities: 
SM-1.2. A security management structure has been established. 
Control techniques: 
SM-1.2.2. An information systems security manager has been appointed at 
an agency/entity level and at appropriate subordinate (i.e., system and 
application) levels and given appropriate authority. 
Audit procedures: 
Review security program documentation detailing security 
responsibilities and rules of behavior for security officials, resource 
owners, and users at the entitywide, system, and application levels. 

Control activities: 
SM-1.4. Subordinate security plans are documented, approved, and kept 
up-to-date. 
Control techniques: 
SM-1.4.1. System and application security plans have been documented 
and implemented that: 
* cover all major facilities and operations, 
* have been approved by key affected parties, 
* cover appropriate topics (for federal agencies, those prescribed by 
OMB Circular A-130; see table 4). 
Audit procedures: 
Review agency/entity policies and procedures for preparing security 
plans. Review the system and application security plans encompassing 
key areas of audit interest and critical control points. Determine 
whether the plans adequately cover appropriate topics (for federal 
agencies, those prescribed by OMB Circular A-130) and are properly 
approved. When conducting the audit, determine whether the plans have 
been implemented and accurately reflect the conditions noted. 

Control activities: 
SM-1.4. Subordinate security plans are documented, approved, and kept 
up-to-date. 
Control techniques: 
SM-1.4.2. The subordinate security plans are updated on a regular basis 
or whenever there are significant changes to the agency/entity 
policies, organization, IT systems, facilities, applications, 
weaknesses identified, or other conditions that may affect security. 
Audit procedures: 
Review relevant security plans and any related documentation indicating 
whether they have been reviewed and updated and are current. 

Control activities: 
SM-1.5. An inventory of systems is developed, documented, and kept up-
to-date. 
Control techniques: 
SM-1.5.1. A complete, accurate, and up-to-date inventory exists for all 
major systems that includes the identification of all system interfaces.
Audit procedures: 
Obtain the agencyï¿½s/entityï¿½s systems inventory. Discuss with 
agency/entity management (1) the methodology and criteria for including 
or excluding systems from the inventory and (2) procedures and controls 
for ensuring the completeness, accuracy, and currency of the inventory. 
Determine whether systems tested during the audit are included in the 
inventory. Test the inventory for completeness, accuracy, and currency. 
The objective of this step in an IS controls audit being performed as 
part of a financial audit or data reliability assessment is generally 
limited to understanding managementï¿½s process and controls for ensuring 
the accuracy of the inventory. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element SM-2. Periodically assess and validate risks: 

A comprehensive risk assessment should be the starting point for 
developing or modifying an entityï¿½s security policies and security 
plans. Such assessments are important because they help make certain 
that all threats and vulnerabilities are identified and considered, 
that the greatest risks are addressed, and that appropriate decisions 
are made regarding which risks to accept and which to mitigate through 
security controls. Appropriate risk assessment policies and procedures 
should be documented and based on the security categorizations. 

FISMA, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, and the Clinger-Cohen Act, 
explicitly emphasize a risk-based policy for cost-effective security. 
In support of and reinforcing this legislation, OMB Circular A-130, 
Appendix III, Security of Federal Automated Information Resources, 
requires executive agencies within the federal government to plan for 
security; ensure that appropriate officials are assigned security 
responsibility; review the security controls in their information 
systems; and authorize system processing prior to operations and 
periodically thereafter. 

Risk assessments should consider threats and vulnerabilities at the 
entitywide level, system level, and application levels. For example, at 
the entitywide level, risk assessments should consider personnel 
policies and procedures, training, and security awareness activities. 
At the system level, risks related to connectivity issues (for example, 
Internet, dial-up, wireless) and access controls (for example, both 
logical and physical) need to be assessed. At the application level, 
risk assessments need to consider specific business processes and 
highly-integrated enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications 
(discussed in Chapter 4). 

Risk assessments should consider risks to data confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability, and the range of risks that an entityï¿½s 
systems and data may be subject to, including those posed by authorized 
internal and external users, as well as unauthorized outsiders who may 
try to break into the systems. For example, risk assessments should 
take into account observed trends in the types and frequency of hacker 
activity and threats. Such analyses should also draw on reviews of 
system and network configurations, as well as observations and testing 
of existing security controls. 

Our study of security programs at leading organizations found that the 
following were key success factors for risk assessments. 

* Organizations had a defined process that allowed an entitywide 
understanding of what a risk assessment was and avoided individual 
units developing independent definitions. 

* Organizations required that risk assessments be performed and 
designated a central security group to schedule and facilitate them. 

* Risk assessments involved a mix of individuals who have knowledge of 
business operations and technical aspects of the organizationï¿½s systems 
and security controls. 

* The business managers were required to provide a final sign-off 
indicating agreement with risk-reduction decisions and acceptance of 
the residual risk. 

* Organizations required that final documentation be forwarded to more 
senior officials and to internal auditors so that participants could be 
held accountable for their decisions. 

* Leading organizations did not attempt to precisely quantify risk. 
Although they would have liked to place a dollar value on risks and 
precisely quantify the costs and benefits of controls, they felt that 
spending time on such an exercise was not worth the trouble. They 
believed that few reliable data were available on either the actual 
frequency of security incidents or on the full costs of controls and of 
damage due to a lack of controls. 

Risk assessments are more likely to be effective when performed by 
personnel with enough independence to be objective and with enough 
expertise (training and experience) to be able to adequately identify 
and assess technical and security risks. 

Risk assessment and risk management are ongoing efforts. Although a 
formal, comprehensive risk assessment is performed periodically, such 
as part of a system security plan, risk should be considered whenever 
there is a change in an entityï¿½s operations or its use of technology or 
in outside influences affecting its operations. Changes to systems, 
facilities, or other conditions and identified security vulnerabilities 
should be analyzed to determine their impact on risk, and the risk 
assessment should be performed or revised as necessary. The risk 
assessment and validation and related management approvals should be 
documented and maintained on file. Such documentation should include 
risk assessments, security test and evaluation results, security plans, 
and appropriate management approvals. Further, according to NIST SP 800-
37, systems should be certified and accredited before being placed in 
operation and when major system changes occur. 

The NIST SP 800-30 risk management guide discusses the development of 
an effective risk management program and contains both the definitions 
and the practical steps necessary for assessing and mitigating risks 
within IT systems. 

According to this guide, the principal goal of an entityï¿½s risk 
management process should be to protect the entity and its ability to 
perform its mission, not only its information technology assets. 
According to FISMA, federal agencies must periodically assess the risk 
and magnitude of the harm that could result from the unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of 
information and information systems that support their operations and 
assets. Policies and procedures are based on risk, and the rigor of 
management testing and evaluation of information security should also 
be based on risk. Also, the Federal Managersï¿½ Financial Integrity Act 
of 1982 requires agencies to conduct risk assessments to identify and 
prioritize their vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, and abuse; Appendix 
III of OMB Circular A-130 requires that agencies consider risk when 
determining the need for and selecting computer-related control 
techniques. However, the Circular no longer requires formal periodic 
risk analyses that attempt to quantify in dollars an annual loss 
exposure resulting from unfavorable events. 

Pursuant to FISMA, NIST developed standards for security categorization 
of federal information and information systems according to a range of 
potential impacts (FIPS Pub 199). Table 6 summarizes these NIST 
standards using potential impact definitions for each security 
objective (confidentiality, integrity, and availability). Federal 
agencies should categorize/classify their non-national security systems 
according to these impact levels. The security categories are based on 
the potential impact on an agency should certain events occur that 
jeopardize the information and information systems needed by the agency 
to accomplish its assigned mission, protect its assets, fulfill its 
legal responsibilities, maintain its day-to-day functions, and protect 
individuals. NIST also issued a guide for mapping types of information 
and information systems to security categories (NIST SP 800-60). 
Security categories are to be used in conjunction with vulnerability 
and threat information in assessing the risk to an agency. 

Table 6. NIST Impact Definitions for Security Objectives: 

Security objective: 
Confidentiality: Preserving authorized restrictions on information 
access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy 
and proprietary information. {44 U.S.C., Sec 3542}; 
Potential impact, Low: 
The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a 
limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational 
assets, or individuals. 
Potential impact, Moderate: 
The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a 
serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational 
assets, or individuals. 
Potential impact, High: 
The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a 
severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or individuals. 

Security objective: 
Integrity: Guarding against improper information modification or 
destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and 
authenticity. {44 U.S.C., Sec 3542}. 
Potential impact, Low: 
The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be 
expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or individuals. 
Potential impact, Moderate: 
The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be 
expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or individuals. 
Potential impact, High: 
The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be 
expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on 
organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. 

Security objective: 
Availability: Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information. {44 U.S.C. 3542} 
Potential impact, Low: 
The disruption of access to or use of information or an information 
system could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on 
organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. 
Potential impact, Moderate: 
The disruption of access to or use of information or an information 
system could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on 
organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. 
Potential impact, High: 
The disruption of access or use of information or an information system 
could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on 
organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. 

Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), FIPS 
Publication 199, page 6. 

[End of table] 

One area that merits additional emphasis is the appropriate 
consideration of risks associated with sensitive privacy information. 
In addition to an appropriate consideration of related risk, specific 
controls are discussed at SM-5 and AC-4.2. 

In addition to FISMA, federal agencies are subject to privacy laws 
aimed at preventing the misuse of personally identifiable 
information.[Footnote 45] The Privacy Act of 1974 and the privacy 
provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002 contain the major 
requirements for the protection of personal privacy by federal 
agencies. The Privacy Act places limitations on agenciesï¿½ collection, 
disclosure, and use of personal information maintained in systems of 
records[Footnote 46] and requires that when agencies establish or make 
changes to a system of records; they must notify the public by a 
ï¿½system-of-records notice.ï¿½[Footnote 47] The E-Government Act of 2002 
strives to enhance protection for personal information in government 
information systems or information collections by requiring that 
agencies conduct privacy impact assessments. These privacy impact 
assessments include an analysis of how personal information is 
collected, stored, shared, and managed in a federal system. According 
to OMB guidance, these privacy impact assessments must analyze and 
describe how the information will be secured including administrative 
and technological controls and should be current.[Footnote 48] 

As discussed in NIST SP 800-60[Footnote 49], in establishing 
confidentiality impact levels for each information type, responsible 
parties must consider the consequences of unauthorized disclosure of 
privacy information (with respect to violations of Federal policy 
and/or law). The impact of privacy violations will depend in part on 
the penalties associated with violation of the relevant statutes and 
policies. Further, it says that, in most cases, the impact on 
confidentiality for privacy information will be in the moderate range. 

SM-2 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
CA-4 Security Certification; 
CA-6 Security Accreditation; 
RA-2 Security Categorization; 
RA-3 Risk Assessment; 
RA-4 Risk Assessment Update. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-2: 

Table 7 Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical 
Element SM-2: Periodically assess and validate risks: 

Control activities: 
SM-2.1. Risk assessments and supporting activities are systematically 
conducted. 
Control techniques: 
SM-2.1.1. Appropriate risk assessment policies and procedures are 
documented and based on security categorizations. 
Audit procedures: 
Review risk assessment policies, procedures, and guidance. 

Control activities: 
SM-2.1. Risk assessments and supporting activities are systematically 
conducted. 
Control techniques: 
SM-2.1.2. Information systems are categorized based on the potential 
impact that the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability 
would have on operations, assets, or individuals. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if security risk categorizations are documented and, for 
federal entities, if they comply with FISMA, NIST FIPS Pub 199 and SP 
800-60. 

Control activities: 
SM-2.1. Risk assessments and supporting activities are systematically 
conducted. 
Control techniques: 
SM-2.1.3. Risks are reassessed for the entitywide, system, and 
application levels on a periodic basis or whenever systems, 
applications, facilities, or other conditions change. 
Audit procedures: 
Obtain the most recent risk assessments encompassing key areas of audit 
interest and critical control points. Determine if the risk assessments 
are up-to-date, appropriately documented, approved by management, and 
supported by sufficient testing. For federal systems, consider 
compliance with FISMA, OMB, and NIST requirements/guidance and whether 
the technology used is appropriately considered in the risk assessment 
and validations. The objective of this step in an IS controls audit 
being performed as part of a financial audit or data reliability 
assessment is generally limited to understanding managementï¿½s risk 
assessment process (including related controls), reading the risk 
assessments for the key systems relevant to the audit objectives, and 
determining whether risks identified by the IS controls audit are 
properly considered in the risk assessments. 

Control activities: 
SM-2.1. Risk assessments and supporting activities are systematically 
conducted. 
Control techniques: 
SM-2.1.4. Risk assessments and validations, and related management 
approvals are documented and maintained on file. Such documentation 
includes security plans, risk assessments, security test and evaluation 
results, and appropriate management approvals.
Audit procedures: 
For a selection of risk assessments determine whether required 
management approvals are documented and maintained on file. 

Control activities: 
SM-2.1. Risk assessments and supporting activities are systematically 
conducted. 
Control techniques: 
SM-2.1.5. Changes to systems, facilities, or other conditions and 
identified security vulnerabilities are analyzed to determine their 
impact on risk and the risk assessment is performed or revised as 
necessary based on OMB criteria.
Audit procedures: 
Review criteria used for revising risk assessments. For recent changes 
that meet the criteria, determine if the risk assessment was redone or 
updated. 

Control activities: 
SM-2.1. Risk assessments and supporting activities are systematically 
conducted. 
Control techniques: 
SM-2.1.6. Federal systems are certified and accredited before being 
placed in operation and at least every 3 years, or more frequently if 
major system changes occur. 
Audit procedures: 
For federal systems that are significant to the audit objectives,, 
review certification and accreditation documentation and determine 
compliance with NIST SP 800-37. The objective of this step in an IS 
controls audit being performed as part of a financial audit or data 
reliability assessment is generally limited to understanding the 
certification and accreditation process (including related controls), 
reading the certifications and accreditations for the key systems 
relevant to the audit objectives, and determining whether the 
certification and accreditation documentation for the systems tested is 
consistent with the testing results. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element SM-3. Document security control policies and 
procedures: 

Security control policies and procedures should be documented and 
approved by management. They should also appropriately consider risk, 
address general and application controls, and ensure that users can be 
held accountable for their actions. Control policies and procedures may 
be written to be more general at the entitywide level and more specific 
at the systems (for example, specific configurations) and application 
levels (for example, user access rules for specific applications). For 
example, access control policies may be implemented at the entitywide 
level through communication of formal written guidance; at the system 
level through system-level security software, firewall rules, and 
access control lists; and at the application level through very 
specific controls built into the application. Also, a formal sanctions 
process should be established for personnel who fail to comply with 
established IS control policies and procedures. 

According to FISMA, each agency information security program must 
include policies and procedures that are based on risk assessments that 
cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable 
level, and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the 
life cycle of each agency information system. NIST provides guidance 
pertaining to computer security policy and procedures, described here. 

Security policy is senior managementï¿½s directives to create a computer 
security program, establish its goals, and assign responsibilities. The 
term is also used to refer to the specific security rules for 
particular systems. Because policy is written at a broad level, 
agencies also develop standards, guidelines, and procedures that offer 
users, managers, and others a clear approach to implementing policy and 
meeting organizational goals. Standards and guidelines specify 
technologies and methodologies to be used to secure systems. Standards, 
guidelines, and procedures may be promulgated throughout an entity via 
handbooks, regulations, or manuals. 

Procedures are detailed steps to be followed to accomplish particular 
security-related tasks (for example, preparing new user accounts and 
assigning the appropriate privileges). Procedures provide more detail 
in how to implement the security policies, standards, and guidelines. 
Manuals, regulations, handbooks, or similar documents may mix policy, 
guidelines, standards, and procedures, since they are closely linked. 
In order for manuals and regulations to serve as important tools, they 
should clearly distinguish between policy and its implementation. This 
can help in promoting flexibility and cost-effectiveness by offering 
alternative approaches to implementing policies. 

SM-3 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
See the first control for each family (e.g., AC-1, AT-1). 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-3: 

Table 8. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical 
Element SM-3: Document security control policies and procedures: 

Control activities: 
SM-3.1 Security control policies and procedures are documented, 
approved by management and implemented. 
Control techniques: 
SM-3.1.1. Security control policies and procedures at all levels: 
* are documented, 
* appropriately consider risk, 
* address purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, and compliance, 
* ensure that users can be held accountable for their actions, 
* appropriately consider general and application controls, 
* are approved by management, and, 
* are periodically reviewed and updated.
Audit procedures: 
Review security policies and procedures at the entitywide level, system 
level and application level. Compare the content of the policies and 
procedures to NIST guidance (e.g. SP 800-30, SP 800-37,SP 800-100) and 
other applicable criteria (e.g. configuration standards). 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element SM-4. Implement effective security awareness and other 
security-related personnel policies: 

Effective security-related personnel policies are critical to effective 
security. Ineffective personnel policies can result in employees or 
contractors inadvertently or intentionally compromising security. For 
example, security may be compromised due to an inadequate awareness or 
understanding, inadequate security training, or inadequate screening of 
employees. 

An ongoing security awareness program should be implemented that 
includes first-time training for all new employees, contractors, and 
users; periodic refresher training for all employees, contractors and 
users; and distribution of security policies detailing rules and 
expected behaviors to all affected personnel. Relevant security 
awareness requirements and guidance are contained in FISMA, OMB 
Circular A-130, and NIST SP 800-50, Building an Information Technology 
Security Awareness and Training Program. In addition, employees with 
significant security responsibilities should receive specialized 
training, as described in NIST SP 800-16, ï¿½Information Technology 
Security Training Requirements: A Role- and Performance-Based Modelï¿½ 
(April 1998). 

According to FISMA, an agencywide information security program must 
include security awareness training for not only agency personnel but 
also contractors and other users of information systems that support 
the agencyï¿½s operations and assets. This training must cover (1) 
information security risks associated with usersï¿½ activities and (2) 
usersï¿½ responsibilities in complying with agency policies and 
procedures designed to reduce these risks. FISMA also includes 
requirements for training of personnel with significant 
responsibilities for information security. Further, OMB requires 
personnel to be trained before they are granted access to systems or 
applications. The training is to make sure that personnel are aware of 
the system or applicationï¿½s rules, their responsibilities, and their 
expected behavior. 

Other security-related personnel policies are also relevant to 
effective security. Policies related to personnel actions, such as 
hiring, termination, and employee expertise, are important 
considerations in securing information systems. If personnel policies 
are not adequate, an entity runs the risk of (1) hiring unqualified or 
untrustworthy individuals; (2) providing terminated employees 
opportunities to sabotage or otherwise impair entity operations or 
assets; (3) failing to detect continuing unauthorized employee actions; 
(4) lowering employee morale, which may in turn diminish employee 
compliance with controls; and (5) allowing staff expertise to decline. 

As mentioned, FISMA requires agencies to implement agencywide security 
programs that include effective policies and procedures to ensure cost-
effective risk reduction and ensure compliance with FISMA and 
applicable OMB (e.g., OMB Circular A-130) and NIST (e.g., SP 800-30) 
guidance. This guidance specifically addresses security-related 
personnel policies and procedures. For example, NIST SP 800-53 
addresses personnel security and controls related to personnel 
screening, termination and transfer, and third-party security. 

SM-4.1 Ensure that resource owners, system administrators, and users 
are aware of security policies: 

For a security program to be effective, those expected to comply with 
it must be aware of it. Typical means for establishing and maintaining 
security awareness include: 

* informing users of the importance of the information they handle and 
the legal and business reasons for maintaining its integrity and 
confidentiality; 

* distributing documentation describing security policies, procedures, 
and usersï¿½ responsibilities, including their expected behavior; 

* requiring users to periodically sign a statement acknowledging their 
awareness and acceptance of responsibility for security (including the 
consequences of security violations) and their responsibilities for 
following all organizational policies (including maintaining 
confidentiality of passwords and physical security over their assigned 
areas); and; 

* requiring comprehensive security orientation, training, and periodic 
refresher programs to communicate security guidelines to both new and 
existing employees and contractors. 

The leading organizations studied considered promoting awareness to be 
one of the most important factors in the risk management process. 
Awareness was considered to be especially important in reducing the 
risks of ï¿½social engineering,ï¿½ where users are talked into revealing 
passwords or other sensitive information to potential thieves. 
Educating users about such risks makes them think twice before 
revealing sensitive data and makes them more likely to notice and 
report suspicious activity. 

Employee awareness is also critical in combating security threats posed 
by spam, spyware, and phishing. Spam (unsolicited commercial e-mail) 
consumes significant resources and is used as a delivery mechanism for 
other types of cyberattacks; spyware (software that monitors user 
activity without user knowledge or consent) can capture and release 
sensitive data, make unauthorized changes, and decrease system 
performance; and phishing (fraudulent messages to obtain personal or 
sensitive data) can lead to identity theft, loss of sensitive 
information, and reduced trust and use of electronic government 
services. The blending of these threats creates additional risks that 
cannot be easily mitigated with currently available tools. 

SM-4.2. Hiring, transfer, termination, and performance policies address 
security: 

The security policies and procedures (including relevant personnel and 
human resources policies and procedures) that should generally be in 
place include the following: 

* Hiring procedures include contacting references, performing 
background investigations, and ensuring that periodic investigations 
are performed as required by law and implementing regulations, 
consistent with the sensitivity of the position, per criteria from the 
Office of Personnel Management. 

* Individuals are screened before they are authorized to have access to 
organizational information and information systems. 

* For employees and contractors assigned to work with confidential 
information, confidentiality, nondisclosure, or security access 
agreements specify precautions required and unauthorized disclosure 
acts, contractual rights, and obligations during employment and after 
termination. 

* Periodic job rotations and vacations are used, if appropriate, and 
work is temporarily reassigned during vacations. 

* A formal sanctions process enforces (including performance ratings 
for individual employees) compliance with security policies and 
procedures. 

* Compensation and recognition are appropriate to promote high morale. 

* Where appropriate, termination and transfer procedures include: 
- exit interview procedures; 
- return of property, such as keys, identification cards, badges, and 
passes; 
- notification to security management of terminations, and prompt 
termination of access to the agencyï¿½s resources and facilities 
(including passwords); 
- the immediate escorting of terminated employeesï¿½especially those who 
have access to sensitive resourcesï¿½out of the agencyï¿½s facilities; and; 
- identification of the period during which nondisclosure requirements 
remain in effect. 

SM-4.3. Employees have adequate training and expertise: 

Management should ensure that employeesï¿½including data owners, system 
users, data processing personnel, and security management 
personnelï¿½have the expertise to carry out their information security 
responsibilities. To accomplish this, a security training program 
should be developed that includes: 

* job descriptions that include the education, experience, and 
expertise required; 

* periodically reassessing the adequacy of employeesï¿½ skills; 

* annual training requirements and professional development programs to 
help make certain that employeesï¿½ skills, especially technical skills, 
are adequate and current; and; 

* monitoring employee training and professional development 
accomplishments. 

SM-4 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
AT-2 Security Awareness; 
AT-3 Security Training; 
AT-4 Security Training Records; 
PL-4 Rules of Behavior; 
PS-1 Personnel Security Policy and Procedures; 
PS-2 Position Categorization; 
PS-3 Personnel Screening; 
PS-4 Personnel Termination; 
PS-5 Personnel Transfer; 
PS-6 Access Agreements; 
PS-7 Third-Party Personnel Security; 
PS-8 Personnel Sanctions. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-4: 

Table 9. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical 
Element SM-4: Implement effective security awareness and other security-
related personnel policies: 

Control activities: 
SM-4.1. Owners, system administrators, and users are aware of security 
policies. 
Control techniques: 
SM-4.1.1. An ongoing security awareness program has been implemented 
that includes security briefings and training that is monitored for all 
employees with system access and security responsibilities. Coordinate 
with the assessment of the training program in SM-4.3. 
Audit procedures: 
Review documentation supporting or evaluating the awareness program. 
Observe a security briefing. Interview data owners, system 
administrators, and system users. Determine what training they have 
received and if they are aware of their security-related 
responsibilities. 

Control activities: 
SM-4.1. Owners, system administrators, and users are aware of security 
policies. 
Control techniques: 
SM-4.1.2. Security policies are distributed to all affected personnel, 
including system and application rules and expected user behaviors. 
Audit procedures: 
Review memos, electronic mail files, or other policy distribution 
mechanisms. Review personnel files to test whether security awareness 
statements are current. If appropriate, call selected users, identify 
yourself as security or network staff, and attempt to talk them into 
revealing their password. 

Control activities: 
SM-4.2. Hiring, transfer, termination, and performance policies address 
security. 
Control techniques: 
SM-4.2.1. For prospective employees, references are contacted and 
background checks performed. Individuals are screened before they are 
given authorization to access organizational information and 
information systems. 
Audit procedures: 
Review hiring policies. For a selection of recent hires, inspect 
personnel records and determine whether references have been contacted 
and background checks have been performed. 

Control activities: 
SM-4.2. Hiring, transfer, termination, and performance policies address 
security. 
Control techniques: 
SM-4.2.2. Periodic reinvestigations are performed as required by law, 
and implementing regulations [at least once every 5 years], consistent 
with the sensitivity of the position per criteria from the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM). 
Audit procedures: 
Review applicable laws, regulations and reinvestigation policies (e.g. 
5CFR 731.106(a); OPM/Agency policy, regulations and guidance; FIPS 201 
& NIST SP 800-73, 800-76, 800-78; and, any criteria established for the 
risk designation of the assigned position.) For a selection of 
sensitive positions, inspect personnel records and determine whether 
background reinvestigations have been performed as required. 

Control activities: 
SM-4.2. Hiring, transfer, termination, and performance policies address 
security. 
Control techniques: 
SM-4.2.3. Nondisclosure or security access agreements are required for 
employees and contractors assigned to work with confidential 
information. 
Audit procedures: 
Review policies on confidentiality or security agreements. For a 
selection of such users, determine whether confidentiality or security 
agreements are on file. 

Control activities: 
SM-4.2. Hiring, transfer, termination, and performance policies address 
security. 
Control techniques:
SM-4.2.4. When appropriate, regularly scheduled vacations exceeding 
several days are required, and the individualï¿½s work is temporarily 
reassigned. 
Audit procedures: 
Review vacation policies. Inspect personnel records to identify 
individuals who have not taken vacation or sick leave in the past year. 
Determine who performed employeeï¿½s work during vacations. 

Control activities: 
SM-4.2. Hiring, transfer, termination, and performance policies address 
security. 
Control techniques: 
SM-4.2.5. A formal sanctions process is employed for personnel failing 
to comply with security policy and procedures. 
Audit procedures: 
Review the sanctions process. Determine how compliance with security 
policies is monitored and how sanctions were administered. 

Control activities: 
SM-4.2. Hiring, transfer, termination, and performance policies address 
security. 
Control techniques: 
SM-4.2.6. Where appropriate, termination and transfer procedures 
include: 
* exit interview procedures; 
* return of property, keys, identification cards, passes, etc.; 
* notification to security management of terminations and prompt 
revocation of IDs and passwords; 
* immediate escort of terminated employees out of the agencyï¿½s 
facilities; and; 
* identification of the period during which nondisclosure requirements 
remain in effect. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures. For a selection of terminated 
or transferred employees, examine documentation showing compliance with 
policies. Compare a system-generated list of users to a list of active 
employees obtained from personnel to determine whether IDs and 
passwords for terminated employees still exist. 

Control activities: 
SM-4.3. Employees have adequate training and expertise. 
Control techniques: 
SM-4.3.1. Skill needs are accurately identified and included in job 
descriptions, and employees meet these requirements. 
Audit procedures: 
Review job descriptions for security management personnel and for a 
selection of other personnel. For a selection of employees, compare 
personnel records on education and experience with job descriptions. 

Control activities: 
SM-4.3. Employees have adequate training and expertise. 
Control techniques: 
SM-4.3.2. A security training program has been developed and includes 
first-time security awareness training entitywide for all new 
employees, contractors, and users before they are authorized to access 
the system, and periodic refresher training thereafter; technical 
training for personnel with significant system roles and 
responsibilities before they are authorized access to the system; and 
periodic refresher training thereafter; and documented entitywide 
security training records that are monitored for all employees who have 
system access and security responsibilities. 
Audit procedures: 
Review training program documentation. See NIST SP 800-16 and 800-50 
for guidance. Coordinate with the assessment of security awareness in 
SM-4.1. 

Control activities: 
SM-4.3. Employees have adequate training and expertise. 
Control techniques: 
SM-4.3.3. Employee training and professional development are documented 
and monitored. 
Audit procedures: 
Review training records and related documentation showing whether such 
records are monitored and whether employees are receiving the 
appropriate training. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element SM-5. Monitor the effectiveness of the security 
program: 

An important element of risk management is ensuring that policies and 
controls intended to reduce risk are effective on an ongoing basis. 
Effective monitoring involves the entity performing tests of IS 
controls to evaluate or determine whether they are appropriately 
designed and operating effectively to achieve the entityï¿½s control 
objectives. Senior managementï¿½s awareness, support, and involvement are 
essential in establishing the control environment needed to promote 
compliance with the agencyï¿½s/entityï¿½s information security program. 
However, because security is not an end in itself, senior managers 
should balance the emphasis on security with the larger objective of 
achieving the agencyï¿½s/entityï¿½s mission. To do this effectively, top 
management should understand the agencyï¿½s/entityï¿½s security risks and 
actively support and monitor the effectiveness of its security 
policies. If senior management does not monitor the security program, 
it is unlikely that others in the organization will be committed to 
properly implementing it. Monitoring is one of GAOï¿½s five internal 
control standards.[Footnote 50] 

Over time, policies and procedures may become inadequate because of 
changes in threats, changes in operations or deterioration in the 
degree of compliance. Periodic assessments are an important means of 
identifying areas of noncompliance, reminding employees of their 
responsibilities, and demonstrating managementï¿½s commitment to the 
security plan. Such assessments can be performed by entity staff or by 
external reviewers engaged by management. Independent audits performed 
or arranged by GAO and by agency inspectors general, while an important 
check on management performance, should not be viewed as substitutes 
for management evaluations of the adequacy of the agencyï¿½s security 
program. 

FISMA requires periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of 
information security policies, procedures, and practices. First, 
agencies must provide management testing of every system every year, 
but the level of rigor may vary depending on the risk. However, OMB in 
past FISMA reporting guidance (M-03-19) has noted that annual FISMA 
testing does not alter OMBï¿½s policy requiring system reauthorization 
(certification and accreditation) at least every 3 years or when 
significant changes are made.51 Second, FISMA requires annual 
independent evaluations of agency information security programs and 
practices to determine their effectiveness. These independent 
evaluations must test the effectiveness of control techniques for a 
representative subset of systems. 

As part of its monitoring function, management should have policies and 
procedures for periodically assessing the appropriateness of security 
policies and the agencyï¿½s compliance with them. At a minimum, such 
policies and procedures should address the following areas: 

* Frequency of periodic testing. The frequency, nature, and extent of 
managementï¿½s assessment should appropriately consider information 
security risks. Consequently, certain higher-risk systems may be tested 
more frequently or more extensively than lower-risk systems. FISMA 
requires periodic testing to be performed with a frequency depending on 
risk, but no less than annually. 

* Depth and breadth of testing. The depth and breadth of testing should 
be based on a consideration of potential risk and magnitude of harm, 
the relative comprehensiveness of prior reviews, the nature and extent 
of tests performed as part of periodic risk and vulnerability 
assessments, and the adequacy and successful implementation of 
remediation plans. 

* Common controls. To facilitate efficient periodic testing, entities 
should identify common IS controls that can be tested and the results 
used for multiple systems. 

* Roles and responsibilities of personnel involved in testing. 
Personnel assigned to perform and supervise periodic testing should 
possess appropriate technical skills and have appropriate 
organizational placement to reasonably assure that tests are properly 
performed and results properly reported to entity management. In 
addition, personnel should not perform tests of controls for which they 
are responsible for implementation or operation. 

* Documentation. Tests performed and the results and related analysis 
of such tests should be documented to the extent necessary to support 
effective supervisory review and independent evaluation. 

An integrated testing plan or strategy helps to facilitate effective 
and efficient periodic testing. Without such an integrated plan or 
strategy, the nature and extent of periodic testing may be inadequate 
or testing may be inefficient. 

Such tests may include tests performed as part of periodic risk and 
vulnerability assessments, continuous monitoring through scanning or 
agent-based software tools, or specifically designed tests. Management 
should periodically perform vulnerability assessments to help ensure 
that entity information resources are adequately protected. 
Vulnerability assessments involve analyzing a network to identify 
potential vulnerabilities that would allow unauthorized access to 
network resources, simulating what might be performed by someone trying 
to obtain unauthorized access. Vulnerability assessments typically 
consider both unauthorized access by outsiders as well as insiders. 
Vulnerability assessments typically include the use of various tools 
discussed in Table 10 below, such as scanning tools, password crackers, 
and war dialing and war driving tools. Also, vulnerability assessments 
may include penetration testing. Vulnerability assessments should be 
performed in addition to testing individual access controls and other 
control categories. 

Since the methods used for unauthorized access vary greatly and are 
becoming more sophisticated, the vulnerability assessment techniques 
defined here are general in nature and should be supplemented with 
techniques and tools specific to the specific environment. 

The effectiveness of managementï¿½s security testing, including 
vulnerability assessments, may affect the auditorï¿½s judgements about 
audit risk and consequently, the nature, timing, and extent of audit 
testing. Factors to consider in assessing the effectiveness of 
managementï¿½s testing include: 

* the nature of managementï¿½s testing (the types of testing management 
applied, the strength of the evidence obtained, the experience, 
capabilities, and objectivity of the persons performing the testing, 
and the quality of documentation of testing), 

* the timing of managementï¿½s testing (the recentness of testing), and, 

* extent of managementï¿½s testing (the completeness of testing). 

The auditor should review management vulnerability assessments and may 
independently perform their own vulnerability assessments to determine 
whether management vulnerability assessments are effective. 

The type of vulnerability assessments that are conducted by the auditor 
affect the scope of the evaluation, methodology used, and the level of 
assurance achieved. It is important that the methods chosen by the 
auditor provide the least amount of disruption to the entity based on a 
cost/risk analysis. Auditors may need to conduct these types of audits 
without tools,[Footnote 52] because some audited entities will not want 
to accept the risk of an auditor running tools in a ï¿½liveï¿½ environment. 
There should be an agreement between the auditor and the audited entity 
on the type of testing to be conducted (intrusive or nonintrusive). 
Section 2.1.9.E ï¿½Communication with Entity Management and Those Charged 
With Governanceï¿½ provides further guidance on communicating the nature 
and extent of planned testing with the entity. 

Due to the highly technical nature of such testing by the auditor, it 
should be performed by persons possessing the necessary technical 
skills (e.g., an IT specialist). See Appendix V for additional 
information on the Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities needed to perform 
IS control audits. Also, section 2.5.2 ï¿½Automated Audit Toolsï¿½ provides 
further guidance on the auditorï¿½s use of testing tools. Audit testing 
is discussed further in connection with AC-.1.1. 

There are several different types of security testing. Some testing 
techniques are predominantly manual, requiring an individual to 
initiate and conduct the test. Other tests are highly automated and 
require less human involvement. Testing may also be conducted from 
external connections (for example, from the Internet, dial-up, 
wireless), from wide area network connections, or from internal 
connections. Regardless of the type of testing, staff that set up and 
conduct security testing should have significant security and 
networking knowledge, including significant expertise in the following 
areas: network security, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, 
operating systems, programming and networking protocols (such as 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) ï¿½ which is a 
low-level communication protocol that allows computers to send and 
receive data). 

Table 10 summarizes types of security testing. 

Table 10. Types of Security Testing: 

Test type: Network scanning; 
What it does: 
* Enumerates the network structure and determines the set of active 
hosts and associated software; 
* Identifies unauthorized hosts connected to a network; 
* Identifies open ports; 
* Identifies unauthorized services. 

Test type: General vulnerability scanning; 
What it does: 
* Enumerates the network structure and determines the set of active 
hosts and associated software; 
* Identifies a target set of computers to focus vulnerability analysis; 
* Identifies potential vulnerabilities on the target set; 
* Verifies that software (e.g., operating systems and major 
applications) is up-to-date with security patches and software 
versions. 

Test type: Penetration testing; 
What it does: 
* Determines how vulnerable an organizationï¿½s network is to penetration 
and the level of damage that can be incurred; 
* Tests IT staffï¿½s response to perceived security incidents and their 
knowledge of and implementation of the organizationï¿½s security policy 
and systemï¿½s security requirements; 
* Verifies potential impact of multiple security weaknesses. 

Test type: Password cracking; 
What it does: 
* Verifies that the policy is effective in producing passwords that are 
more or less difficult to break; 
* Verifies that users select passwords that are compliant with the 
organizationï¿½s security policy. 

Test type: Log reviews; 
What it does: 
* Verifies that the system is operating according to policy. 

Test type: Integrity checkers; 
What it does: 
* Detects unauthorized file modifications. 

Test type: Virus detectors; 
What it does: 
* Detects and deletes viruses before successful installation on the 
system. 

Test type: War dialing; 
What it does: 
* Detects unauthorized modems and prevents unauthorized access to a 
protected network. 

Test type: War driving; 
What it does: 
* Detects unauthorized wireless access points and prevents unauthorized 
access to a protected network. 

Test type: Specialty scanning tools; 
What it does: 
* Detects security risks related to specific IS control areas (e.g., 
weaknesses in web pages, application code, and databases, network 
sniffers[Footnote 53]). 

Source: Guideline on Network Security Testing (NIST SP 800-42, October 
2003). 

[End of table] 

Often, several of these testing techniques are used together for a more 
comprehensive assessment of the overall network security posture. For 
example, penetration testing usually includes network scanning and 
vulnerability scanning to identify vulnerable hosts and services that 
may be targeted for later penetration. Some vulnerability scanners 
incorporate password cracking. None of these tests by themselves will 
provide a complete picture of the network or its security posture. NIST 
SP 800-42 describes these testing types in detail and summarizes the 
strengths and weaknesses of each test. 

However, since penetration testing requires extensive planning and 
experienced staff to conduct, the auditor typically considers several 
factors before deciding to perform this testing. For example, 
penetration testing may be a desirable testing option when significant 
changes have been made to the entityï¿½s network (e.g., upgrades to 
server, routers, switches, network software), there are no recent 
penetration tests performed, or results of recent penetration testing 
identified significant security weaknesses that management represented 
were substantially corrected. Conversely, if recent penetration testing 
disclosed few security weaknesses and the scope and level of testing is 
determined by the auditor to be sufficient, then the use of other types 
of testing may be more appropriate. 

Other tools that may be used include specialty scanning tools (for 
example, application code, Web, database, SNMP[Footnote ]54), host data 
extraction tools, packet analyzers or sniffers (for example, ethereal), 
and patch assessment tools. Separate patch assessment tools are more 
reliable than vulnerability scanners for this purpose. Also, the 
auditor is more likely to check for the presence of integrity checkers 
and virus detectors than to use them in an audit. After running any 
tests, certain procedures should be followed, including documenting the 
test results, informing system owners of the results, and ensuring that 
vulnerabilities are patched or mitigated. 

When implementing system security plans for federal systems, as 
required by FISMA and OMB Circular A-130, management should monitor 
their implementation and adjust the plans in accordance with changing 
risk factors. Management should: 

* develop and document appropriate testing policies and procedures (all 
levels), 

* test and document security controls related to each major system at 
least annually (system level), 

* ensure that the frequency and scope of testing is commensurate with 
risk (all levels), and, 

* employ automated mechanisms to verify the correct operation of 
security functions when anomalies are discovered (system and 
application level). 

In addition to the FISMA provisions in the E-Government Act of 2002, 
Section 208 requires that agencies conduct privacy impact assessments. 
A privacy impact assessment is an analysis of how information is 
handled (1) to ensure handling conforms to applicable legal, 
regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy; (2) to determine 
the risks and effects of collecting, maintaining, and disseminating 
information in identifiable form in an electronic information system; 
and (3) to examine and evaluate protections and alternative processes 
for handling information to mitigate potential privacy risks (OMB 
Memorandum M-03-22). OMB combined the FISMA and privacy annual 
reporting beginning in fiscal year 2005 (OMB Memorandum M-05-15). 

Further, OMB has developed performance measures for federal agency 
reporting and requires that agencies provide quarterly performance 
metric updates. For example, one such measure requests the number of 
systems for which security controls have been tested and evaluated in 
the past year. Incomplete reporting on OMBï¿½s performance measures will 
be noted in OMBï¿½s public report to Congress and will be a consideration 
in OMBï¿½s annual approval or disapproval of the agencyï¿½s security 
program. NIST SP 800-55 provides additional guidance on performance 
measures and compliance metrics to monitor the security process and 
periodically report on the state of compliance. 

In addition, NIST SP 800-100 provides information on how entities can 
develop information security metrics that measure the effectiveness of 
their security program, and provide data to be analyzed and used by 
program managers and system owners to isolate problems, justify 
investment requests, and target funds specifically to the areas in need 
of improvement. It describes metric types and discusses development and 
implementation approaches. 

As mentioned, OMB Circular A-130 requires that federal agencies review 
and test the security of their general support systems and major 
applications at least once every 3 yearsï¿½sooner if significant 
modifications have occurred or where the risk and magnitude of harm are 
high. Although not required, it would be appropriate for an agency to 
describe its evaluation program, including the expected type of testing 
and frequency of evaluations, in its security plan. (Security plans are 
discussed in critical element SM-1.) 

OMB also requires that a management official authorize in writing the 
use of each general support system and major application. NIST SP 800-
37 refers to this authorization as accreditation. OMD Circular A-130 
allows self-reviews of controls for general support systems, but 
requires an independent review or audit of major applications. The 
authorizations or accreditations are to be provided by the program or 
functional managers whose missions are supported by the automated 
systems; these represent the managersï¿½ explicit acceptance of risk 
based on the results of any security reviews, including those performed 
as part of financial statement audits and during related risk 
assessments. Additional guidance on accrediting federal automated 
systems can be found in NIST SP 800-37, Guide for the Security 
Certification and Accreditation of Federal Information Systems. 

In addition, the Federal Managersï¿½ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 
(FMFIA) and OMB Circular A-123[Footnote 55] require agencies to 
annually assess their internal controls, including computer-related 
controls, and report any identified material weaknesses to the 
President and the Congress. The quality of the FMFIA process is a good 
indicator of managementï¿½s (1) philosophy and operating style, (2) 
methods of assigning authority and responsibility, and (3) control 
methods for monitoring and follow-up. Weaknesses identified during 
security reviews conducted under OMB Circular A-130 are to be 
considered for reporting under FMFIA and OMB Circular A-123, 
particularly if the weakness involves no assignment of security 
responsibility, an inadequate security plan, or missing management 
authorization. 

FISMA requires that each agency conduct an annual independent 
evaluation to determine the effectiveness of its information security 
program and practices. This evaluation must include testing of 
information security policies, procedures, and practices of a 
representative subset of the agencyï¿½s information systems. The head of 
each agency must report the evaluation results to OMB, which summarizes 
the results in a report to the Congress. GAO must also provide Congress 
with its independent assessment of agency information security policies 
and practices, including compliance with the annual evaluation and 
reporting requirements. 

SM-5 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
CA-2 Security Assessments; 
CA-7 Continuous Monitoring; 
PL-5 Privacy Impact Assessment; 
RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-5: 

Table 11. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element SM-5: Monitor the effectiveness of the security 
program: 

Control activities: 
SM-5.1. The effectiveness of security controls are periodically 
assessed. 
Control techniques: 
SM-5.1.1. Appropriate monitoring and testing policies and procedures 
are documented. 
Audit procedures: 
Review testing policies and procedures. Determine if there is an 
overall testing strategy or plan. 

Control activities: 
SM-5.1. The effectiveness of security controls are periodically 
assessed. 
Control techniques: 
SM-5.1.2. Management routinely conducts vulnerability assessments and 
promptly corrects identified control weaknesses. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview officials who conducted the most recent agency/entity 
vulnerability assessment. Review the methodology and tools used, test 
plans and results obtained, and corrective action taken. Determine if 
testing is performed that complies with OMB and NIST certification and 
accreditation and other testing requirements. If appropriate, perform 
independent testing with the approval of management. Determine if 
identified control weaknesses are promptly corrected. 

Control activities: 
SM-5.1. The effectiveness of security controls are periodically 
assessed. 
Control techniques: 
SM-5.1.3. Management routinely conducts privacy impact assessments and 
promptly corrects identified control weaknesses. 
Audit procedures: 
Review privacy impact assessments, including the methodology, a sample 
of test plan, and related testing results. 

Control activities: 
SM-5.1. The effectiveness of security controls are periodically 
assessed. 
Control techniques: 
SM-5.1.4. The frequency and scope of security control testing is 
commensurate with risk.
Audit procedures: 
Determine if control testing is based on risk. 

Control activities: 
SM-5.1. The effectiveness of security controls are periodically 
assessed. 
Control techniques: 
SM-5.1.5. Performance measures and compliance metrics monitor the 
security processes and report on the state of compliance in a timely 
manner. 
Audit procedures: 
Review agency/entity performance measures and compare to OMBï¿½s 
performance measures and NIST guidance. 

Control activities: 
SM-5.1. The effectiveness of security controls are periodically 
assessed. 
Control techniques: 
SM-5.1.6. An annual independent evaluation of the federal agencyï¿½s 
information security program tests the effectiveness of the security 
policies, procedures, and practices. 
Audit procedures: 
Review the results of these annual evaluations for both FISMA and 
privacy reporting and any assessments of their adequacy and 
effectiveness. 

Control activities: 
SM-5.1. The effectiveness of security controls are periodically 
assessed. 
Control techniques: 
SM-5.1.7. Federal agencies report on the results of the annual 
independent evaluations to appropriate oversight bodies. Under OMB 
guidance, the head of each agency must submit security and privacy 
reports to OMB, which consolidates the information for a report to 
Congress. The Comptroller General must also periodically evaluate and 
report to Congress on the adequacy and effectiveness of agency 
information security policies and practices. 
Audit procedures: 
Evaluate the reporting process and identify any significant 
discrepancies between reports at each level and whether the reports 
agree with independent audit evaluations. Note that OMB has annual 
requirements for FISMA and privacy reporting. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element SM-6. Effectively Remediate Information Security 
Weaknesses: 

When weaknesses are identified, the related risks should be reassessed, 
appropriate corrective or remediation actions taken, and follow-up 
monitoring performed to make certain that corrective actions are 
effective. Procedures should be established to reasonably assure that 
all IS control weaknesses, regardless of how or by whom they are 
identified, are included in the entityï¿½s remediation processes. For 
each identified IS control weakness, the entity should develop and 
implement appropriate action plans and milestones. Action plans and 
milestones should be developed based on findings from security control 
assessments, security impact analyses, continuous monitoring of 
activities, audit reports, and other sources. When considering 
appropriate corrective actions to be taken, the entity should, to the 
extent possible, consider the potential implications throughout the 
entity and design appropriate corrective actions to systemically 
address the deficiency. Limiting corrective action only to identified 
deficiencies would not necessarily address similar weaknesses in other 
systems or applications or result in the most effective and efficient 
corrective action. 

In addition to developing action plans and modifying written policies 
to correct identified problems, entities should test the implementation 
of the corrective actions to determine whether they are effective in 
addressing the related problems. Management should continue to 
periodically review and test such corrective actions to determine if 
they remain effective on a continuing basis. This is an important 
aspect of managersï¿½ risk management responsibilities. 

FISMA specifically requires that agencywide information security 
programs include a ï¿½process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and 
documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the 
information security policies, procedures, and practices of the 
agency.ï¿½ Further, agencies must report on the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the information security program and practices in 
annual reports to OMB, Congress, and GAO and in annual budget and 
management plans and reports. The latter include reporting a FISMA 
ï¿½significant deficiencyï¿½ in information security as a material 
weakness. Government Performance and Results Act performance plans must 
describe time periods and resources needed to effectuate a risk-based 
program. 

SM-6 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-6: 

Table 12. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element SM-6: Effectively remediate information ssecurity 
weaknesses: 

Control activities: 
SM-6.1. Information security weaknesses are effectively remediated. 
Control techniques: 
SM-6.1.1. Management initiates prompt action to correct deficiencies. 
Action plans and milestones are documented. 
Audit procedures: 
Review recent POA&Ms, FMFIA reports and prior year audit reports and 
determine the status of corrective actions. The objective of this 
procedure in an IS controls audit being performed as part of a 
financial audit or data reliability assessment is generally limited to 
understanding managementï¿½s POAM process and related controls to ensure 
the accuracy of the information in the POA&Ms, determining whether IS 
control weaknesses identified by the IS controls audit are included in 
the POA&Ms, and, if not, determining the cause. 

Control activities: 
SM-6.1. Information security weaknesses are effectively remediated. 
Control techniques: 
SM-6.1.2. Deficiencies are analyzed in relation to the entire 
agency/entity, and appropriate corrective actions are applied 
entitywide. 
Audit procedures: 
Evaluate the scope and appropriateness of corrective actions. 

Control activities: 
SM-6.1. Information security weaknesses are effectively remediated. 
Control techniques: 
SM-6.1.3. Corrective actions are tested and are monitored after they 
have been implemented and monitored on a continuing basis. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if implemented corrective actions have been tested and 
monitored periodically. 
Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element SM-7. Ensure that activities performed by external 
third parties are adequately secure: 

Appropriate policies and procedures should be developed, implemented, 
and monitored to ensure that the activities performed by external third 
parties (for example, service bureaus, contractors, other service 
providers such as system development, network management, and security 
management) are documented, agreed to, implemented, and monitored for 
compliance. These should include provisions for (1) security clearances 
(where appropriate and required), (2) background checks, (3) required 
expertise, (4) confidentiality/nondisclosure agreements, (5) security 
roles and responsibilities, (6) connectivity agreements, (7) individual 
accountability (for example, expectations, remedies), (8) audit access 
and reporting, (9) termination procedures, and (10) security awareness 
training. In addition, checks should be performed to periodically 
ensure that the procedures are being correctly applied and consistently 
followed, including the security of relevant contractor systems. 
Appropriate controls also need to be applied to outsourced software 
development. 

FISMA information security requirements apply not only to information 
systems used or operated by an agency but also to information systems 
used or operated by a contractor of an agency or other agency on behalf 
of an agency. In addition, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
requires that federal agencies prescribe procedures for ensuring that 
agency planners on information technology acquisitions comply with the 
information technology security requirements of FISMA, OMBï¿½s 
implementing policies including Appendix III of OMB Circular A-130, and 
guidance and standards from NIST.[Footnote 56] For example, NIST SP 800-
35 Guide to Information Technology Security Services provides guidance 
pertaining to the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information 
system security services such that (1) incident monitoring, analysis, 
and response; (2) operation of information system security devices (for 
example, firewalls); and (3) key management services are supported by a 
risk assessment and approved by the appropriate, designated agency 
official. Acquisition or outsourcing of information system services 
explicitly addresses government, service provider, and end-user 
security roles and responsibilities. Governmental and private entities 
face a range of risks from contractors and other users with privileged 
access to their systems, applications and data. Contractors that 
provide systems and services or other users with privileged access to 
agency/entity systems, applications, and data can introduce risks to 
their information and systems; for example, contractors often provide 
unsupervised remote maintenance and monitoring of agency/entity 
systems. Contractor risks to people, processes, and technology are 
summarized in table 13. 

Table 13. Examples of Agency-Identified Risks to Federal Systems and 
Data Resulting from Reliance on Contractors: 

Category: People; 
Risk description: Unauthorized personnel having physical access to 
agency IT resources (including systems, applications, facilities, and 
data). 

Category: People; 
Risk description: Unauthorized personnel having electronic access to 
agency IT resources (including systems, applications, and data). 

Category: People; 
Risk description: Increased use of foreign nationals. 

Category: People; 
Risk description: Contractor or privileged users of federal data and 
systems who may not receive appropriate, periodic background 
investigations. 

Category: People; 
Risk description: Inadequate segregation of duties (for example, 
software developer is the same individual who puts the software into 
production). 

Category: Processes; 
Risk description: Failure by contractor or privileged users of federal 
data and systems to follow agency IT security requirements. 

Category: Processes; 
Risk description: Possible disclosure of agency-sensitive information 
to unauthorized individuals or entities. 

Category: Processes; 
Risk description: Lack of effective compliance monitoring of 
contractors performing work off-site or privileged users of federal 
data and systems. 

Category: Processes; 
Risk description: Contractor or privileged users of federal data and 
systems may have ineffective patch management processes. 

Category: Technology; 
Risk description: Incorporation of unauthorized features in customized 
application software. For example, a third-party software developer has 
the potential to incorporate ï¿½back doors,ï¿½ spyware, or malicious code 
into customized application software that could expose agency IT 
resources to unauthorized loss, damage, modification, or disclosure of 
data. 

Category: Technology; 
Risk description: Encryption technology may not meet federal standards. 

Category: Technology; 
Risk description: Intentional or unintentional introduction of viruses 
and worms. 

Source: Improving Oversight of Access to Federal Systems and Data by 
Contractors Can Reduce Risk (GAO-05-362, April 2005). 

Note: The various risks identified could represent multiple risks 
(i.e., risks in one or more of the identified categories of people, 
processes, and technology). 

[End of table] 

In addition to the risks identified in the table, there are specific 
risks from contractor software development activities and off-site 
operations. These risks include a poor patch management process that 
could impact entity operations (for example, entity Web sites), a 
hosting infrastructure that may not separate customer and company data, 
and inadequate oversight at an off-site facility. 

SM-7 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
AC-20 Use of External Information Systems; 
MA-4 Remote Maintenance; 
PS-7 Third-Party Personnel Security; 
SA-9 External Information System Services. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SM-7: 

Table 14. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element SM-7: Ensure that activities performed by external 
third parties are adequately secure: 

Control activities: 
SM-7.1. External third party activities are secure, documented, and 
monitored. 
Control techniques: 
SM-7.1. External third party activities are secure, documented, and 
monitored. SM-7.1.1. Appropriate policies and procedures concerning 
activities of external third parties (for example, service bureaus, 
contractors, other service providers such as system development, 
network management, security management) are documented, agreed to, 
implemented, and monitored for compliance and include provisions for: 
* clearances, 
* background checks, 
* required expertise, 
* confidentiality agreements, 
* security roles and responsibilities, 
* connectivity agreements, 
* expectations, 
* remedies, 
* audit access/audit reporting, 
* termination procedures, and, 
* security awareness training. 
Audit procedures: 
Review policies and procedures pertaining to external third parties for 
the entitywide, system, and application levels. Identify use of 
external third parties and review activities including compliance with 
FISMA, and applicable policies and procedures. See NIST SP 800-35 for 
guidance on IT security services. Determine how security risks are 
assessed and managed for systems operated by a third party. Determine 
whether external third party services that relate to the technology are 
adequately controlled. Coordinate assessment of security awareness 
training with SM-4. 

Control activities: 
SM-7.1. External third party activities are secure, documented, and 
monitored. 
Control techniques: 
SM-7.1.2. Security requirements are included in the information system 
acquisition contracts based on an assessment of risk. 
Audit procedures: 
Review security provisions of selected contracts and determine that 
requirements are implemented. See FAR requirements for acquisition 
plans (48 CFR 7.1, 7.103 (u). 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

3.2. Access Controls (AC): 

Access controls limit or detect inappropriate access to computer 
resources (data, equipment, and facilities), thereby protecting them 
from unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure. Such controls 
include both logical and physical controls. Logical access controls 
require users[Footnote 57] to authenticate themselves (through the use 
of secret passwords or other identifiers) and limit the files and other 
resources that authenticated users can access and the actions that they 
can execute. Physical access controls involve restricting physical 
access to computer resources and protecting them from intentional or 
unintentional loss or impairment. Without adequate access controls, 
unauthorized individuals, including outside intruders and former 
employees, can surreptitiously read and copy sensitive data and make 
undetected changes or deletions for malicious purposes or personal 
gain. In addition, authorized users can intentionally or 
unintentionally read, add, delete, or modify data or execute changes 
that are outside their span of authority. 

Access control policies and procedures should be formally developed, 
documented, disseminated, and periodically updated. Policies should 
address purpose, scope, roles, responsibility, and compliance issues; 
procedures should facilitate the implementation of the policy and 
associated access controls. NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on 
security policies and procedures. It is fundamental that control 
techniques for both logical and physical access controls be risk-based. 
Access control policies and procedures and risk assessments are covered 
in section 3.1 of the manual. 

For access controls to be effective, they should be properly 
authorized, implemented, and maintained. First, an entity should 
analyze the responsibilities of individual computer users to determine 
what type of access (for example, read, modify, delete) users need to 
fulfill their responsibilities. Then, specific control techniques, such 
as specialized access control software, should be implemented to 
restrict access to these authorized functions alone. Such software can 
be used to limit a userï¿½s activities associated with specific systems 
or files and keep records of individual usersï¿½ actions on the computer. 
Finally, access authorizations and related controls should be 
monitored, maintained, and adjusted on an ongoing basis to accommodate 
new and departing employees and changes in usersï¿½ responsibilities and 
related access needs. 

Inadequate access controls diminish the reliability of computerized 
data and increase the risk of destruction or inappropriate disclosure 
of data. The following examples illustrate the potential consequences 
of such vulnerabilities. 

* By obtaining direct logical access to data files, an individual could 
make unauthorized changes for personal gain or obtain sensitive 
information. For example, a person could (1) alter the address of a 
payee and thereby direct a disbursement to himself or herself, (2) 
alter inventory quantities to conceal a theft of assets, (3) alter 
critical data needed to make a strategic policy decision, or (4) obtain 
confidential personal, commercial, and governmental information. 

* By obtaining logical access to business process applications 
[Footnote 58] used to process transactions, an individual could grant 
unauthorized access to the application, make unauthorized changes to 
these programs, or introduce malicious programs, which, in turn, could 
be used to access data files, resulting in situations similar to those 
just described, or the processing of unauthorized transactions. For 
example, a person could alter a payroll or payables program to 
inappropriately generate a check for him/herself. 

* By obtaining access to system-level resources, an individual could 
circumvent security controls to read, add, delete, or modify critical 
or sensitive business information or programs. Further, authorized 
users could gain unauthorized privileges to conduct unauthorized 
actions or to circumvent edits and other controls built into the 
application programs. 

* By obtaining physical access to computer facilities and equipment, an 
individual could (1) obtain access to terminals or telecommunications 
equipment that provide input into the computer, (2) obtain access to 
confidential or sensitive information on magnetic or printed media, (3) 
substitute unauthorized data or programs, or (4) steal or inflict 
malicious damage on computer equipment and software. 

The objectives of limiting access are to ensure that: 

* outsiders (for example, hackers) cannot gain unauthorized access to 
the agencyï¿½s systems or data; 

* authorized users have only the access needed to perform their duties; 

* access to very sensitive resources, such as operating systems and 
security software programs, are limited to very few individuals; 

* employees/contractors are restricted from performing incompatible 
functions or functions beyond their responsibility. (Segregation of 
duties is discussed in greater detail in section 3.4.) 

If these objectives are met, the risk of inappropriate modification or 
disclosure of data can be reduced without interfering with usersï¿½ 
practical needs. However, establishing the appropriate balance between 
user needs and security requires a careful analysis of the criticality 
and sensitivity of information resources available and the tasks 
performed by users. Access controls also apply to alternate work sites 
(for example, employee residence or contractor facility). 

Implementing adequate access controls involves first determining what 
level and type of protection is appropriate for individual resources 
based on a risk assessment and on who needs access to these resources. 
These tasks should be performed by the resource owners. For example, 
program managers should determine how valuable their program data 
resources are and what access is appropriate for personnel who must use 
an automated system to carry out, assess, and report on program 
operations. Similarly, managers in charge of systems development and 
modification should determine the sensitivity of hardware and software 
resources under their control and the access needs of systems analysts 
and programmers, and system administration officials should determine 
the access needs of their personnel. Levels of access granted to 
information resources should be consistent with FIPS 199 risk levels. 

This section defines a set of critical elements that should be 
considered when conducting a comprehensive assessment of access 
controls. Todayï¿½s networks and control environments are highly diverse, 
complex, and interconnected. Devices that are interconnected develop 
control dependencies (discussed in Chapter 2), directly and indirectly, 
on other devices such as routers, firewalls, switches, domain name 
servers, Web servers, network management stations, e-mail systems, and 
browser software. Audit objectives that are limited to targeted 
assessments such as a UNIX or Windows audit may not fully recognize the 
control dependencies on these systems. 

Unfortunately, there are no simple solutions to controlling logical 
access. Each entity decides what combination of technologies to deploy 
and to what degree, based on business needs and priorities, risk 
management, and other factors. For instance, an entity may decide not 
to require users to periodically change passwords for e-mail because 
initial entry to the system relies on a two-factor token-based 
authentication system. Other entities may rely less on boundary 
protection but place more emphasis on audit and monitoring. 
Accordingly, the collection of controls used will vary from entity to 
entity. 

The six critical elements for access controls are described here. 

* Boundary Protection. Boundary protection pertains to the protection 
of a logical or physical boundary around a set of information resources 
and implementing measures to prevent unauthorized information exchange 
across the boundary in either direction. Firewall devices represent the 
most common boundary protection technology at the network level. 

* Identification and authentication. If logical connectivity is 
allowed, then the users, processes acting on behalf of users, services, 
and specific devices are identified and authenticated by the 
information system. For example, usersï¿½ identities may be authenticated 
through something they know (a traditional password), something they 
have (such as a smart card), or something about them that identifies 
them uniquely (such as a fingerprint). 

* Authorization. If authentication is successful, authorization 
determines what users can do; i.e., it grants or restricts user, 
service, or device access to various network and computer resources 
based on the identity of the user, service, or device. 

* Sensitive system resources. Controls over sensitive system resources 
are designed to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of system data such as passwords and keys during transmission and 
storage. Technologies used to control sensitive data include 
encryption, certificate management, hashing, checksums, and 
steganography.[Footnote 59] 

* Audit and monitoring. Audit and monitoring control involves the 
collection, review, and analysis of auditable events for indications of 
inappropriate or unusual activity. These controls should be used to 
routinely assess the effectiveness of information security controls, 
perform investigations during and after an attack, and recognize an 
ongoing attack. 

* Physical security. Physical security controls restrict physical 
access or harm to computer resources and protect these resources from 
intentional or unintentional loss or impairment. Such controls include 
guards, gates, and locks, and also environmental controls such as smoke 
detectors, fire alarms and extinguishers, and uninterruptible power 
supplies. 

Although the primary relevance of these concepts is to access controls, 
they are also relevant to other areas, such as security management and 
configuration management. For example, configuration management 
assurance controls help ensure that network devices are configured and 
are operating as intended. This would include verifying operational 
patch levels, disabling unnecessary and dangerous services, correcting 
poorly configured services, and protecting against viruses and worms. 
Also, these concepts are relevant to activities such as periodic self-
assessment programs (covered in Section 3.1, Security Management). 

Assessing access controls involves evaluating the agencyï¿½s success in 
performing each of the critical elements listed in Table 15. When 
evaluating control techniques and performing audit procedures for 
access controls, the auditor considers access to networks, access to 
operating systems, and access to infrastructure applications.[Footnote 
60] 

Table 15. Critical Elements for Access Control: 

Number:AC-1. 
Description: Adequately protect information system boundaries. 

Number:AC-2. 
Description: Implement effective identification and authentication 
mechanisms. 

Number:AC-3. 
Description: Implement effective authorization controls. 

Number:AC-4. 
Description: Adequately protect sensitive system resources. 

Number:AC-5. 
Description: Implement an effective audit and monitoring capability. 

Number:AC-6. 
Description: Establish adequate physical security controls. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element AC-1. Adequately protect information system 
boundaries: 

Boundary protection controls logical connectivity into and out of 
networks and controls connectivity to and from network connected 
devices. At the entitywide level, access control policy is developed 
and promulgated through procedures, manuals, and other guidance. At the 
system level, any connections to the Internet, or to other external and 
internal networks or information systems, should occur through 
controlled interfaces (for example, proxies, gateways, routers and 
switches, firewalls, and concentrators). At the host or device level, 
logical boundaries can be controlled through inbound and outbound 
filtering provided by access control lists and personal firewalls. At 
the application level, logical boundaries to business process 
applications may be controlled by access control lists in security 
software or within the applications. 

Implementing multiple layers of security to protect information system 
internal and external boundaries provides Defense-in-Depth(described 
earlier in Additional IS Risk Factors). According to security experts, 
a best practice for protecting systems against cyber attacks is for 
entities to build successive layers of defense mechanisms at strategic 
points in their information technology infrastructures. By using the 
strategy of Defense-in-Depth, entities can reduce the risk of a 
successful cyber attack. For example, multiple firewalls could be 
deployed to prevent both outsiders and trusted insiders from gaining 
unauthorized access to systems: one firewall could be deployed at the 
networkï¿½s Internet connection to control access to and from the 
Internet, while another firewall could be deployed between wide area 
networks and local area networks to limit employeesï¿½ access. 

In addition to deploying a series of security technologies at multiple 
layers, deploying diverse technologies at different layers also 
mitigates the risk of successful cyber attacks. If several different 
technologies are deployed between the adversary and the targeted 
system, the adversary must overcome the unique obstacle presented by 
each of the technologies. For example, firewalls and intrusion 
detection technologies can be deployed to defend against attacks from 
the Internet, and antivirus software can be used to provide integrity 
protection for data transmitted over the network. Thus, Defense-in-
Depth can be effectively implemented through multiple security measures 
among hosts, local area networks and wide area networks, and the 
Internet. 

Defense-in-Depth also entails implementing an appropriate network 
configuration, which can, in turn, affect the selection and 
implementation of cybersecurity technologies. For example, configuring 
the agencyï¿½s network to channel Internet access through a limited 
number of connections improves security by reducing the number of 
points that can be attacked from the Internet. At the same time, the 
entity can focus technology solutions and attention on protecting and 
monitoring the limited number of connections for unauthorized access 
attempts. Figure 4 depicts how applying a layered approach to security 
through deploying both similar and diverse cybersecurity technologies 
at multiple layers can deflect different types of attacks. 

Figure 4. Layered Approach to Network Security: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of a layered approach to network 
security, as follows: 

Internet: 

Virus: 
through firewall; 
through Intrusion detection system; 
through Wide area network; 
through firewall; 
through Local area network; 
stopped at PC by Antivirus software. 

Remote user: 
through firewall; 
through Intrusion detection system; 
through Wide area network; 
through firewall; 
through Local area network; 
through to PC. 

Hacker: 
through firewall; 
stopped by Intrusion detection system. 

Source: GAP analysis and Corel Draw. 

Note: Excerpt from GAO, Technologies to Secure Federal Systems, GAO-04-
467 (Washington, D.C.: March 2004). AC-1.1. 

[End of table] 

Appropriately control connectivity to system resources: 

Users obtain access to data files and software programs through one or 
more access paths through the networks and computer hardware and 
software. Accordingly, to implement an appropriate level of security, 
it is important that the entity, to the extent possible, identify, 
document, and control all access paths. Further, connectivity between 
systems should be approved only when appropriate by entity management. 
Consideration should be given to the risk and corresponding safeguards 
needed to protect sensitive data. NIST SP 800-47 provides guidance on 
interconnecting information systems. 

Networks should be appropriately configured to adequately protect 
access paths between systems and consider the existing technologies. 
For standalone computers, identifying access paths may be relatively 
simple. However, in a networked environment, careful analysis is needed 
to identify all of the systemï¿½s entry points and paths to sensitive 
files. Networked systems typically consist of multiple personal 
computers that are connected to each other and to larger computers, 
such as file servers or mainframe processors. Many allow remote access 
(for example, dial-up, wireless, Internet) to the information systems 
from virtually any remote location. As a result, the entry points to 
the system can be numerous. Also, once the system has been entered, the 
programs available may provide multiple paths to various data resources 
and sensitive applications. Consequently, it is very important that all 
access paths be appropriately controlled and protected based on risk. 

It is critical that access paths are identified as part of a risk 
analysis and documented in an access path diagram or similar network 
schematic. Such a diagram or schematic identifies the users of the 
system, the type of device from which they can access the system, the 
software used to access the system, the resources they may access, the 
system on which these resources reside, and the modes of operation and 
telecommunications paths. The goal in identifying access paths is to 
assist in identifying the points from which system resources could be 
accessed and the data storedï¿½points that, therefore, must be 
controlled. Specific attention should be given to ï¿½backdoorï¿½ methods of 
accessing data by operators and programmers. As with other aspects of 
risk analysis, the access path diagram should be reviewed and updated 
whenever any changes are made to the system or to the nature of the 
program and program files maintained by the system. 

If entry points and access paths are not identified, they may not be 
adequately controlled and may be exploited by unauthorized users to 
bypass existing controls to gain access to sensitive data, programs, or 
password files. Should this happen, managers will have an incomplete 
understanding of the risks associated with their systems and, 
therefore, may make erroneous risk management decisions. 

Connecting to the Internet presents a multitude of vulnerabilities for 
an entity due to the Internetï¿½s potential access to billions of people 
worldwide. Some Internet users are motivated to try to penetrate 
connected systems and have sophisticated software tools as aids, such 
as to repeatedly attempt access using different passwords. A variety of 
specialized software and hardware is available to limit access by 
outside systems or individuals through telecommunications networks. 
Examples of network components that can be used to limit access include 
secure gateways (firewalls) that restrict access between networks (an 
important tool to help reduce the risk associated with the Internet); 
teleprocessing monitors, which are programs incorporated into the 
computerï¿½s operating system that can be designed to limit access; and 
communications port protection devices, such as a security modem that 
requires a password from a dial-in terminal before establishing a 
network connection. Also available is the smart card, a device about 
the size of a credit card that contains a microprocessor, which can be 
used to control remote access to a computer with authenticating 
information generated by the microprocessor and communicated to the 
computer. Encryption is often used to protect the confidentiality of 
remote access sessions and is extremely important to protecting 
wireless access to information systems. 

Information systems may identify and authenticate specific devices 
before establishing a connection. Device authentication typically uses 
either shared known information (for example, media access control or 
transmission control program/Internet protocol addresses) or an 
organizational authentication solution to identify and authenticate 
devices on local and wide area networks. Thus, it is important for the 
auditor to identify the controls over devices that provide this type of 
protection. 

Emerging threats from the Internet (for example, spam and spyware) 
require new and updated protection mechanisms. The entity should employ 
spam and spyware protection mechanisms at critical information system 
entry points (for example, firewalls, electronic mail servers, remote 
access servers) and at workstations, servers, or mobile computing 
devices on the network. Consideration should be given to using spam and 
software protection products from multiple vendors (for example, using 
one vendor for boundary devices and another vendor for workstations) to 
provide additional layers of defense. It is also important to centrally 
manage spam and software protection mechanisms and to have the system 
automatically update these mechanisms. 

Depending on how access control techniques and devices are implemented, 
they can be used to: 

* verify terminal identifications to restrict access through specific 
terminals, 

* verify IDs and passwords for access to specific applications, 

* control access between telecommunications systems and terminals, 

* restrict an applicationï¿½s use of network facilities, 

* automatically disconnect at the end of a session, 

* provide network activity logs that can be used to monitor network use 
and configuration, 

* allow authorized users to shut down network components, 

* monitor dial-in access to the system by monitoring the source of 
calls or by disconnecting and then dialing back users at preauthorized 
phone numbers, 

* restrict in-house access to communications software, 

* control changes to communications software, and, 

* restrict and monitor access to telecommunications hardware or 
facilities. 

As with other access controls, to be effective, remote access controls 
should be properly implemented in accordance with authorizations that 
have been granted. In addition, tables or lists used to define security 
limitations should be protected from unauthorized modification, and in-
house access to communications security software should likewise be 
protected from unauthorized access and modification. Dial-in phone 
numbers should not be published, and should be changed periodically. 

An understanding of the system and network configurations and the 
control techniques that have been implemented is necessary to assess 
the risks associated with external access through telecommunications 
networks and the effectiveness of related controls. This is likely to 
require assistance from an auditor with special expertise in 
communications-related controls. 

Connectivity should only be approved when appropriate to perform 
assigned official duties. Significant threats are posed by portable and 
mobile devices and personally owned information systems. Portable and 
mobile devices (for example, notebook computers, workstations, personal 
digital assistants) should not be allowed access to entity networks 
without first complying with security policies and procedures. Security 
policies and procedures might include activities such as scanning the 
devices for malicious code, updating virus protection software, 
scanning for critical software updates and patches, conducting primary 
operating system (and possibly other resident software) integrity 
checks, and disabling unnecessary hardware (for example, wireless). 
Security controls include: 

* usage restrictions and implementation guidance, 

* authorization by appropriate organizational officials, and, 

* documentation and monitoring of device access to entity networks. 

The entity should also establish strict terms and conditions for the 
use of personally-owned information systems. The terms and conditions 
should address, at a minimum: (1) the types of applications that can be 
accessed from personally-owned information systems; (2) the maximum 
FIPS 199 security category of information that can be processed, 
stored, and transmitted; (3) how other users of the personally-owned 
information system will be prevented from accessing federal 
information; (4) the use of virtual private networking and firewall 
technologies; (5) the use of and protection against the vulnerabilities 
of wireless technologies; (6) the maintenance of adequate physical 
security controls; (7) the use of virus and spyware protection 
software; and (8) how often the security capabilities of installed 
software are to be updated (for example, operating system and other 
software security patches, virus definitions, firewall version updates, 
spyware definitions). 

AC-1.2. Appropriately control network sessions: 

It is desirable that information systems prevent further access to the 
system by initiating a session lock that remains in effect until the 
user reestablishes access using appropriate identification and 
authentication procedures. Users should be able to directly initiate 
session-lock mechanisms. The information system may also activate 
session-lock mechanisms automatically after a specified period of 
inactivity defined by the entity. A session lock is not, however, a 
substitute for logging out of the information system. When connectivity 
is not continual, network connections should automatically disconnect 
at the end of a session. OMB Memorandum M-06-16[Footnote 61] requires 
that all federal agencies use a ï¿½time-outï¿½ function for remote access 
and mobile devices requiring user re-authentication after 30 minutes 
inactivity. 

In addition to technical controls, the initial screen viewed by an 
individual accessing an agencyï¿½s systems through a telecommunications 
network should provide a warning banner to discourage unauthorized 
users from attempting access, and make it clear that unauthorized 
browsing will not be tolerated. For example, an opening warning screen 
should state that the system is for authorized users only and that 
activity will be monitored. The information system should also display 
the agencyï¿½s privacy policy before granting access. Previous logon 
notification is another control that can identify unauthorized access. 
The information system notifies the user on successful logon, of the 
date and time of the last logon, the location of the last logon, and 
the number of unsuccessful logon attempts since the last successful 
logon. 

AC-1 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement; 
AC-8 System use Notification; 
AC-9 Previous Logon Notification; 
AC-11 Session Lock; 
AC-12 Session Termination; 
AC-17 Remote Access; 
AC-18 Wireless Access Restrictions; 
AC-19 Access Control for Portable and Mobile Devices; 
CA-3 Information System Connections; 
SC-7 Boundary Protection; 
SC-10 Network Disconnect. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
AC-1: 

Table 16. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AC-1: Adequately protect information system 
boundaries: 

Control activity: 
AC-1.1. Appropriately control connectivity to system resources. 
Control techniques: 
AC-1.1.1. Connectivity, including access paths and control technologies 
between systems and to internal system resources, is documented, 
approved by appropriate entity management, and consistent with risk. 
Audit procedures: 
Review access paths in network schematics, interface agreements, 
systems documentation, and in consultation with IT management and 
security personnel identify control points; determine whether the 
access paths and related system documentation is up-to-date, properly 
approved by management, and consistent with risk assessments. 

Control activity: 
AC-1.1. Appropriately control connectivity to system resources. 
Control techniques: 
AC-1.1.2. Networks are appropriately configured to adequately protect 
access paths within and between systems, using appropriate 
technological controls (e.g. routers, firewalls, etc.). 
Audit procedures: 
Interview the network administrator; determine how the flow of 
information is controlled and how access paths are protected. Identify 
key devices, configuration settings, and how they work together.
Perform security testing by attempting to access and browse computer 
resources including critical files, security software, and the 
operating system. These tests may be performed as (1) an ï¿½outsiderï¿½ 
with no information about the agencyï¿½s computer systems, (2) an 
ï¿½outsiderï¿½ with prior knowledge about the systemsï¿½for example, an ex-
insider, and (3) an ï¿½insiderï¿½ with and without specific information 
about the agencyï¿½s computer systems and with access to the agencyï¿½s 
facilities. Note: Due to the highly technical nature of such testing, 
it should be performed by persons possessing the necessary technical 
skills (e.g., an IT specialist). See Appendix V for additional 
information on the Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities needed to perform 
IS control audits. When performing insider tests, use an ID with no 
special privileges to attempt to gain access to computer resources 
beyond those available to the account. Also, try to access the agencyï¿½s 
computer resources using default/generic IDs with easily guessed 
passwords. See NIST SP 800-42 for more details. When performing 
outsider tests, test the controls over external access to computer 
resources, including networks, dial-up, wireless, local area network, 
wide area network, and the Internet. See NIST SP 800-42 for more 
details. 

Control activity: 
AC-1.1. Appropriately control connectivity to system resources. 
Control techniques: 
AC-1.1.3. The information system identifies and authenticates specific 
network devices before establishing a connection. (for example, Media 
Access Control (MAC) or TCP/IP addresses). 
Audit procedures: 
When performing outsider tests, test the controls over external access 
to computer resources, including networks, dial-up, wireless, local 
area network, wide area network, and the Internet. See NIST SP 800-42 
for more details. 

Control activity: 
AC-1.1. Appropriately control connectivity to system resources. 
Control techniques: 
AC-1.1.4. Remote dial-up access is appropriately controlled and 
protected. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview network administrator and users; determine how remote dial-up 
access is controlled and protected (for example, monitor the source of 
calls and dial back mechanism); identify all dial-up lines through 
automatic dialer software routines and compare with known dial-up 
access; discuss discrepancies with management. 

Control activity: 
AC-1.1. Appropriately control connectivity to system resources. 
Control techniques: 
AC-1.1.5. Remote Internet access is appropriately controlled and 
protected. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview network administrator and users; determine how connectivity 
is controlled and protected. Determine if federal agency policies, 
procedures, and practices comply with NIST SP 800-63 guidance on remote 
electronic authentication. Supplement with appropriate assessments in 
NIST 800-53A. 

Control activity: 
AC-1.1. Appropriately control connectivity to system resources. 
Control techniques: 
AC-1.1.6. Remote wireless access is appropriately controlled and 
protected. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview network administrator and users; determine how connectivity 
is controlled and protected. Refer to NIST SP 800-97 Establishing 
Wireless Robust Security Networks: A guide to IEEE.802.11i for 
additional security assessment guidance. Test and validate entity 
controls: (1) use a wireless sniffer to capture data (for example, 
service set IDs (SSID), (2) if an SSID is obtained, associate the SSID 
to the access point, (3) identify what network resources are available, 
(4) determine if a security protocol[Footnote 62] such as wired 
equivalent privacy (WEP) is implemented, and (5) if a security protocol 
is used, employ a program to test the strength of the encryption 
algorithm. Test and validate entity controls to identify rogue wireless 
access points. Test for rogue wireless access points. 

Control activity: 
AC-1.1. Appropriately control connectivity to system resources. 
Control techniques: 
AC-1.1.7. Connectivity is approved only when appropriate to perform 
assigned official duties. This includes portable and mobile devices, 
and personally-owned information systems. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview network administrator and users; review justifications for a 
sample of connections. Determine if these systems use appropriate 
safeguards such as automatic updates for virus protection and up-to-
date patch protection, etc. 

Control activity: 
AC-1.2. Appropriately control network sessions. 
Control techniques: 
AC-1.2.1. The information system prevents further access to the system 
by initiating a session lock, after a specified period of inactivity 
that remains in effect until the user reestablishes access using 
identification and authentication procedures. 
Audit procedures: 
Observe whether the system automatically initiates a session lock 
during a period of inactivity, and how the user can directly initiate a 
session lock, and then unlock the session. 

Control activity: 
AC-1.2. Appropriately control network sessions. 
Control techniques: 
AC-1.2.2 Where connectivity is not continual, network connection 
automatically disconnects at the end of a session. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview network administrator and users; observe whether the control 
is implemented. 

Control activity: 
AC-1.2. Appropriately control network sessions. 
Control techniques: 
AC-1.2.3. Appropriate warning banners are displayed before logging onto 
a system: 
* system use notification (for example, U.S. Government system, consent 
to monitoring, penalties for unauthorized use, privacy notices); 
* previous logon notification (for example, date and time of last logon 
and unsuccessful logons). 
Audit procedures: 
Interview network administrator and users; observe whether the control 
is fully implemented and complies with NIST guidance. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element AC-2. Implement effective identification and 
authentication mechanisms: 

Users (or processes on behalf of users), and devices should be 
appropriately identified and authenticated through the implementation 
of adequate logical access controls. User authentication establishes 
the validity of a userï¿½s claimed identity, typically during access to a 
system or application (for example, login). Users can be authenticated 
using mechanisms such as requiring them to provide something they have 
(such as a smart card); something they alone know (such as a password 
or personal identification number); or something that physically 
identifies them uniquely (such as a biometric fingerprint or retina 
scan). Logical controls should be designed to restrict legitimate users 
to the specific systems, programs, and files that they need, and 
prevent others, such as hackers, from entering the system at all. 

At the entitywide level, information systems accounts need to be 
managed to effectively control user accounts and identify and 
authenticate users. Account management includes the identification of 
account types (i.e., individual, group, system), establishment of 
conditions for group membership, and assignment of associated 
authorizations. Resource owners should identify authorized users of the 
information system and specify access rights. Access to the information 
system should be granted based on a valid need to know that is 
determined by assigned official duties and should also consider proper 
segregation of duties. The entity should require proper identification 
for requests to establish information system accounts and approve all 
such requests. The entity should also specifically authorize and 
monitor the use of guest/anonymous accounts and remove, disable, or 
otherwise secure unnecessary accounts. Finally, the entity should 
ensure that account managers are notified when information system users 
are terminated or transferred and associated accounts are removed, 
disabled, or otherwise secured. 

AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated: 

Identification and authentication is unique to each user (or processes 
acting on behalf of users). Account policies (for example, password 
policies, account lock out policies) should be formally established and 
enforced based on risk. Passwords, tokens, or other devices are used to 
identify and authenticate users. Identification is the process of 
distinguishing one user from all others, usually through user IDs. 
These are important because they are the means by which specific access 
privileges are assigned and recognized by the computer. However, the 
confidentiality of user IDs is typically not protected. For this 
reason, other means of authenticating usersï¿½that is, determining 
whether individuals are who they say they areï¿½are typically implemented 
(for example, passwords, security tokens, etc.). In addition, the 
information system should limit the number of concurrent sessions for 
any user. 

An entity may allow limited user activity without identification and 
authentication for publicly available information systems and Web 
sites. However, for actions without identification and authentication, 
management should consider the risk and only allow such actions to the 
extent necessary to accomplish mission objectives. 

The most widely used means of authentication is through the use of 
passwords. However, passwords are not conclusive identifiers of 
specific individuals since they may be guessed, copied, overheard, or 
recorded and played back. Typical controls for protecting the 
confidentiality of passwords include the following: 

* Individual users are uniquely identified rather than having users 
within a group share the same ID or password; generic user IDs and 
passwords should not be used. 

* Passwords are not the same as user IDs. 

* Password selection is controlled by the assigned user and not subject 
to disclosure. 

* Passwords are changed periodically, about every 30 to 90 days. The 
more sensitive the data or the function, the more frequently passwords 
should be changed. 

* Passwords are not displayed when they are entered. 

* Passwords contain alphanumeric and special characters and do not use 
names or words that can be easily guessed or identified using a 
password-cracking mechanism. 

* A minimum character length, at least 8 characters, is set for 
passwords so that they cannot be easily guessed. 

* Use of old passwords (for example, within six generations) is 
prohibited. 

* Vendor-supplied passwords such as SYSTEM, DEFAULT, USER, DEMO, and 
TEST, are replaced immediately on implementation of a new system. 

To help ensure that passwords cannot be guessed, attempts to logon to 
the system with invalid passwords should be limited. Typically, 
potential users are allowed 3 to 7 attempts to log on. This, in 
conjunction with the use of pass phrases or other complex passwords, 
reduces the risk that an unauthorized user could gain access to a 
system by using a computer to try thousands of words or names until 
they found a password that provided access. NIST SP 800-63 provides 
guidance on password selection and content. 

Another technique for reducing the risk of password disclosure is 
encrypting the password file. Encryption may be used to transform 
passwords into a form readable only by using the appropriate key, held 
only by authorized parties. Access to this file should be restricted to 
only a few people; encryption further reduces the risk that passwords 
could be accessed and read by unauthorized individuals. Passwords 
transmitted on the network may likewise be encrypted to prevent 
disclosure. Cryptographic controls and related audit procedures are 
covered in section AC-4.3. 

In addition to passwords, identification devices such as ID cards, 
access cards, tokens, and keys may be used. Factors affecting the 
effectiveness of such devices include (1) the frequency that possession 
by authorized users is checked and (2) usersï¿½ understanding that they 
should not allow others to use their identification devices and should 
report the loss of such devices immediately. Procedures should also be 
implemented to handle lost or compromised passwords, access cards, or 
tokens. OMB Memorandum M-06-16 requires that federal agencies allow 
remote access to personally identifiable information and other 
sensitive information only with two-factor authentication where one of 
the factors is provided by a device separate from the computer gaining 
access. Also see AC-4.2. 

A less common means of authentication is based on biometrics, an 
automated method of verifying or recognizing the identity of a person 
based on physiological or behavioral characteristics. Biometrics 
devices include fingerprints, retina patterns, hand geometry, speech 
patterns, and keystroke dynamics. Tests of biometric techniques include 
reviewing the devices, observing the operations, and taking whatever 
other steps may be necessary to evaluate their effectiveness, including 
obtaining the assistance of a specialist. 

To further increase security, identification and authentication may be 
accomplished using any combination of multiple mechanisms such as a 
token ID in conjunction with a number, or a biometric reader in 
conjunction with a password (also known as multifactor identification). 
Management should implement effective procedures to determine 
compliance with authentication policies. Whatever technique is used, 
the implementation cost versus the risk and potential loss to the 
agencyï¿½s operations from a breach in security should be taken into 
consideration. 

Electronic signatures such as digital signatures and public key 
infrastructure (PKI) are used to identify the sender of information and 
ensure the integrity of critical information received from the sender. 
Several technologies such as personal identification numbers, smart 
cards, biometrics, or digital signatures (an encrypted set of bits that 
identify the user) can be used to create electronic signatures. The 
most common electronic signature in use today is the digital signature, 
which is unique to each individual and to each message. Digital 
signatures are used in conjunction with certificate authorities and 
other PKI encryption hardware, software, policies, and people to verify 
that the individuals on each end of a communication are who they claim 
to be and to authenticate that nothing in the message has been changed. 
A digital certificate or shared secret may also be used to authenticate 
the identity of a device or devices involved in system communications, 
as opposed to the users. 

In addition, appropriate session-level identification and 
authentication controls should be implemented, such as those related to 
name/address resolution service and the authenticity of communication 
sessions. 

AC-2 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
AC-7 Unsuccessful Login Attempts; 
AC-10 Concurrent Session Control; 
AC-14 Permitted Actions Without Identification or Authentication; 
AU-10 Non-Repudiation; 
IA-2 User Identification and Authentication; 
IA-3 Device Identification and Authentication; 
IA-4 Identifier Management; 
IA-5 Authenticator Management; 
IA-6 Authenticator Feedback; 
SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates; 
SC-20 Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source); 
SC-21 Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching 
Resolver); 
SC-22 Architecture and Provisioning for Names/Address Resolution 
Service; 
SC-23 Session Authenticity. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
AC-2: 

Table 17. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AC-2: Implement effective identification and 
authentication mechanisms: 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques: 
AC-2.1.1. Identification and authentication is unique to each user (or 
processes acting on behalf of users), except in specially approved 
instances (for example, public Web sites or other publicly available 
information systems). 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures and NIST guidance pertaining 
to the authentication of user identities; interview users; review 
security software authentication parameters. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques: 
AC-2.1.2. Account policies (including authentication policies and 
lockout policies) are appropriate given the risk, and enforced. 
Audit procedures: 
Review account policies and determine if they are based on risk and 
seem reasonable, based on interviews with system administrator and 
users. Determine how they are enforced, and test selected policies. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques: 
AC-2.1.3. Effective procedures are implemented to determine compliance 
with authentication policies. 
Audit procedures: 
Review adequacy of procedures for monitoring compliance with 
authentication policies; selectively test compliance with key policies. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques: 
AC-2.1.4. Selection of authentication methods (for example, passwords, 
tokens, biometrics, key cards, PKI certificates, or a combination 
therein) are appropriate, based on risk. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine whether authentication methods used are appropriate, based on 
risk. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques: 
AC-2.1.5. Authenticators are unique for specific individuals, not 
groups; 
* are adequately controlled by the assigned user and not subject to 
disclosure; and; 
* cannot be easily guessed or duplicated. 
Additional considerations for passwords are described below. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent entity policies and procedures; assess procedures for 
generating and communicating authenticators to users; interview users; 
review related security software parameters. Observe users using 
authenticators; attempt to logon without a valid authenticator. Assess 
compliance with NIST guidance on authenticator selection, content, and 
usage. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques: 
AC-2.1.6. Password-based authenticators: 
* are not displayed when entered; 
* are changed periodically (e.g., every 30 to 90 days); 
* contain alphanumeric and special characters; 
* are sufficiently long (e.g., at least 8 characters in length); 
* have an appropriate minimum life (automatically expire); 
* are prohibited from reuse for a specified period of time (e.g., at 
least 6 generations); and; 
* are not the same as the user ID. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent entity policies and procedures; assess procedures for 
generating and communicating passwords to users; interview users; 
review security software password parameters. Observe users keying in 
passwords; attempt to logon without a valid password; make repeated 
attempts to guess passwords. Assess entity compliance with NIST SP 800-
63, which provides guidance on password selection and content. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques: 
AC-2.1.7. Attempts to log on with invalid passwords are limited (e.g., 
3ï¿½7 attempts). 
Audit procedures: 
Examine security parameters for failed log-on attempts; review security 
logs to determine whether attempts to gain access are logged and 
reviewed by entity security personnel; if appropriate, repeatedly 
attempt to logon using invalid passwords. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques: 
AC-2.1.8. Use of easily guessed passwords (such as names or words) are 
prohibited. 
Audit procedures: 
Review a system-generated list of current passwords; search password 
file using audit software to identify use of easily guessed passwords. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques:
AC-2.1.9. Generic user IDs and passwords are not used. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview users and security managers; review a list of IDs and 
passwords to identify generic IDs and passwords in use. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques:
AC-2.1.10. Vendor-supplied default passwords are replaced during 
installation. 
Audit procedures: 
Attempt to log on using common vendor-supplied passwords; search 
password file using audit software. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques:
AC-2.1.11. Passwords embedded in programs are prohibited. (Note: An 
embedded password is a password that is included into the source code 
of an application or utility. Applications often need to communication 
with other applications and systems and this requires an 
ï¿½authenticationï¿½ process which is sometimes accomplished through the 
use of embedded passwords). 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if passwords are embedded in programs and if this practice is 
explicitly prohibited. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques:
AC-2.1.12. Use of and access to authenticators is controlled (e.g., 
their use is not shared with other users). 
Audit procedures: 
Interview users. To evaluate biometrics or other technically 
sophisticated authentication techniques, the auditor may need to obtain 
the assistance of a specialist. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques:
AC-2.1.13. Effective procedures are implemented to handle lost, 
compromised, or damaged authenticators (e.g., tokens, PKI certificates, 
biometrics, passwords, and key cards). 
Audit procedures: 
Identify procedures for handling lost or compromised authenticators; 
interview users and selectively test compliance with procedures. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques:
AC-2.1.14. Concurrent sessions are appropriately controlled. 
Audit procedures: 
Review procedures for controlling and auditing concurrent logons from 
different workstations. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques:
AC-2.1.15. Where appropriate, digital signatures, PKI, and electronic 
signatures are effectively implemented. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine how nonrepudiation is assured and if PKI and 
electronic/digital signatures are effectively implemented. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques:
AC-2.1.16. PKI-based authentication: 
* validates certificates by constructing a certification path to an 
accepted trust anchor; 
* establishes user control of the corresponding private key; and; 
* maps the authenticated identity to the user account. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent entity policies and procedures; assess procedures for 
generating and communicating certificates to users; interview users; 
review security software certificate parameters; obtain the help of 
experts if needed. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques:
AC-2.1.17. Authentication information is obscured (e.g., password is 
not displayed). 
Audit procedures: 
Review procedures for controlling the display of authentication 
information. 

Control activity: 
AC-2.1. Users are appropriately identified and authenticated. 
Control techniques:
AC-2.1.18. Appropriate session-level controls are implemented (e.g., 
name/address resolution service, session authenticity). 
Audit procedures: 
Assess the adequacy of session-level controls. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element AC-3. Implement effective authorization controls: 

Once a user is authenticated, authorization[Footnote 63] is used to 
allow or prevent actions by that user based on predefined rules. 
Authorization includes the principles of legitimate use, least 
privilege, and separation of duties (discussed in section 3.4). 
Operating systems have some built-in authorization features such as 
user rights and privileges, groups of users, and permissions for files 
and folders. Network devices, such as routers, may have access control 
lists that can be used to authorize users who can access and perform 
certain actions on the device. 

Access rights and privileges are used to implement security policies 
that determine what a user can do after being allowed into the system. 
Access rights, also known as permissions, allow the user to look, read, 
or write to a certain file or directory. Privileges are a set of access 
rights permitted by the access control system. In a Microsoft Windowsï¿½ 
system, rights are what give the user or members of a group the access 
needed to perform management tasks or simply to access a system. 
Information system access permissions are a Unix term that describe the 
kind of access to files a user is granted. A set of permissions is 
associated with every file and directory that determines who can read 
it, write to it, or execute it. Only the owner of the file (or the 
super user[Footnote 64]) can change these permissions. Maintaining 
access rights, permissions, and privileges is one of the most important 
aspects of administering system security. 

AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled: 

In order to adequately control user accounts, an entity should 
institute policies and procedures for authorizing logical access to 
information resources and document such authorizations. These policies 
and procedures should cover user access needed for routine operations, 
emergency access, and the sharing and disposition of data with 
individuals or groups outside the entity. Further, logical access 
controls should enforce segregation of duties. 

The computer resource owner should identify the specific user or class 
of users authorized to obtain direct access to each resource for which 
they are responsible. Access should be limited to individuals with a 
valid business purpose (least privilege). Unnecessary accounts 
(default, guest accounts) should be removed, disabled, or otherwise 
secured. This process can be simplified by developing standard 
profiles, which describe access needs for groups of users with similar 
duties, such as accounts payable clerks. 

The owner should also identify the nature and extent of access to each 
resource that is available to each user. This is referred to as the 
userï¿½s profile. In general, users may be assigned one or more of the 
following types of access to specific computer resources: 

* read accessï¿½the ability to look at and copy data or a software 
program; 

* update accessï¿½the ability to change data or a software program; 

* delete accessï¿½the ability to erase or remove data or programs; 

* merge accessï¿½the ability to combine data from two separate sources; 

* execute accessï¿½the ability to execute a software program. 

Access may be permitted at the file, record, or field level. Files are 
composed of records, typically one for each item or transaction. 
Individual records are composed of fields that contain specific data 
elements relating to each record. 

Owners should periodically review access authorization listings and 
determine whether they remain appropriate. Access authorizations should 
be documented on standard forms and maintained on file. Listings of 
authorized users and their specific access needs and any modifications 
should be approved by an appropriate senior manager and directly 
communicated in writing by the resource owner to the security 
management function. A formal process for transmitting these 
authorizations, including the use of standardized access request forms, 
should be established to reduce the risk of mishandling, alterations, 
and misunderstandings. 

Security managers should review access authorizations for new or 
modified access privileges and discuss any questionable authorizations 
with the resource owners (authorizing officials). 

Approved authorizations should be maintained on file. Compliance with 
access authorizations should be monitored by periodically comparing 
authorizations to actual access activity. Access control software 
typically provides a means of reporting user access authorizations and 
access activity. All changes to security access authorizations should 
be automatically logged and periodically reviewed by management 
independent of the security function. Unusual activity should then be 
investigated. 

Broad or special access privileges, such as those associated with 
operating system software that allow normal controls to be overridden, 
are only appropriate for a small number of users who perform system 
maintenance or manage emergency situations. Such special privileges may 
be granted on a permanent or temporary basis. However, any such access 
should also be approved by a senior security manager, written 
justifications should be kept on file, and the use of highly sensitive 
files or access privileges should be routinely reviewed by management. 
Special access privileges, access to sensitive files, and related audit 
procedures are covered in section AC-4.1. 

For systems that can be accessed through public telecommunications 
lines, some users may be granted dial-up access. This means that these 
individuals can use a modem to access and use the system from a remote 
location, such as their home or a field office. Because such access can 
significantly increase the risk of unauthorized access, it should be 
limited and the associated risks weighed against the benefits. To help 
manage the risk of dial-up access, justification for such access should 
be documented and approved by owners. (See section AC-1 for controls to 
help manage the risks of dial-up access, such as dial-back procedures 
to preauthorized phone numbers or the use of security modems, tokens, 
or smart cards to authenticate a valid user.) 

Inactive accounts and accounts for terminated individuals should be 
disabled or removed in a timely manner. It is important to notify the 
security function immediately when an employee is terminated or, for 
some other reason, is no longer authorized access to information 
resources. 

Notification may be provided by the human resources department or by 
others, but policies should exist that clearly assign responsibility 
for such notification. Terminated employees who continue to have access 
to critical or sensitive resources pose a major threat, as do 
individuals who may have left under acrimonious circumstances. 

Owners should determine disposition and sharing of data. A mechanism 
should be established so that the owners of data files and programs 
determine whether and when these resources are to be maintained, 
archived, or deleted. Standard disposition forms can be used and 
maintained on file to document the usersï¿½ approvals. In addition, 
resource owners should determine if, with whom, and by what means 
information resources can be shared. When files are shared with other 
entities, it is important that (1) data owners understand the related 
risks and approve such sharing and (2) receiving entities understand 
the sensitivity of the data involved and safeguard the data 
accordingly. This should require a written agreement before sensitive 
information is shared. 

Required access to shared file systems should be restricted to the 
extent possible (for example, only to particular hosts, and only for 
the level of access required). Many scientific agencies, such as the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) use file sharing networks. File sharing 
facilitates connections between persons who are looking for certain 
types of files. A type of file sharing known as peer-to-peer (P2P) 
refers to any software or system allowing individual users of the 
Internet to connect directly to each other and trade files. While there 
are many appropriate uses of this technology, several studies show that 
the vast majority of files traded on P2P networks are copyrighted music 
files and pornography. Data also suggest that P2P is a common avenue 
for the spread of computer viruses within IT systems. As required by 
FISMA, agencies are to use existing NIST standards and guidance to 
complete system risk and impact assessments in developing security 
plans and authorizing systems for operation. Operational controls 
detailing procedures for handling and distributing information and 
management controls outlining rules of behavior for users should ensure 
that proper controls are in place to prevent and detect improper file 
sharing.[Footnote 65] 

Emergency and temporary access authorization needs to be controlled. 
Occasionally, there will be a need to grant temporary access privileges 
to an individual who is not usually authorized access. Such a need may 
arise during emergency situations, when an individual is temporarily 
assigned duties that require access to critical or sensitive resources, 
or for service or maintenance personnel. In addition, contractor 
personnel may require temporary access while involved in systems 
development or other work. As with normal access authorizations, 
temporary access should be approved and documented and the related 
documentation maintained on file. Temporary user identifications and 
authentication devices, such as passwords, should be designed to 
automatically expire after a designated date. Also, management should 
periodically review emergency and temporary access accounts to 
determine that they are still necessary. 

AC-3.2. Processes and services are adequately controlled: 

Only authorized processes and services should be permitted in 
information systems and they should be limited to what is essential to 
effectively perform an agencyï¿½s mission and business functions. In an 
information system, processes are systematic sequences of operations to 
produce a specified result. This includes all functions performed 
within a computer such as editing, calculating, summarizing, 
categorizing, and updating. Services refer to ï¿½customer or product-
related business functionsï¿½ such as file transfer protocol (FTP), 
hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), and mainframe supervisor calls. 
Each system provides a set of services. For example, a computer network 
allows its users to send packets to specified destinations; a database 
system responds to queries; and a processor performs a number of 
different instructions. 

Controls related to processes and services include all of the 
technological and managerial safeguards established and applied to an 
information system to protect hardware, software, and data from 
accidental or malicious modification, destruction, or disclosure. 

When evaluating an agencyï¿½s processes and services, it is important to 
consider the following: 

* available processes and services should be minimized, 

* the functions and purposes of processes and services should be 
documented and approved by management, and, 

* information available to unauthorized users should be restricted. 

Proper control of information system processes and services is critical 
to ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of user 
data and, ultimately, the accomplishment of an agencyï¿½s mission. Access 
control policies and enforcement mechanisms are employed by entities to 
control access between users (or processes acting on behalf of users) 
and objects (for example, segments, devices, files, records, fields, 
processes, programs) in the information system. Access control policies 
can be identity-based, role-based, or rule-based. [Footnote 66] 
Associated enforcement mechanisms include access control lists, access 
control matrices, and cryptography. Where encryption of stored 
information is used as an access enforcement mechanism, the 
cryptography used should be in compliance with applicable standards. 

Configuring systems only for necessary capabilities minimizes processes 
and services. First, only required services should be installed. 
Second, the number of individuals with access to such services should 
be restricted based on the concept of least privilege; this means that 
users should have the least amount of privileges (access to services) 
necessary to perform their duties. Third, the use of information 
services needs to be monitored. Fourth, it is important to maintain 
current service versions. According to NIST guidance, the information 
system should be periodically reviewed to identify and eliminate 
unnecessary services (for example, FTP, HTTP, mainframe supervisor 
calls) and protocols that would introduce an unacceptable level of risk 
should be disabled.[Footnote 67] The information system that supports 
the server functionality should be, as much as possible, dedicated to 
that purpose. In addition, the function and purpose of processes and 
services should be documented and approved by appropriate entity 
officials. 

According to NIST SP 800-53, additional process and service controls 
should be implemented to: 

* prohibit remote activation of collaborative computing mechanisms 
(e.g. video and audio devices), 

* ensure that lower priority process do not interfere with higher 
priority processes, and, 

* ensure proprietary information and applications is protected from 
processes and systems available to the public. 

AC-3 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
AC-2 Account Management; 
AC-3 Access Enforcement; 
AC-6 Least Privilege; 
CM-7 Least Functionality; 
SC-6 Resource Priority; 
SC-14 Public Access Protections; 
SC-15 Collaborative Computing. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
AC-3: 

Table 18. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AC-3: Implement effective authorization controls: 

Control activity: 
AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.1.1. Resource owners have identified authorized users and the 
access they are authorized to have. 
Audit procedures: 
These audit procedures should be coordinated with section 3.4 
(segregation of duties) to ensure that users do not have access to 
incompatible functions. Review written policies and procedures; for a 
selection of users (both application and information security 
personnel), review access authorization documentation and applicable 
rights and privileges in the information system. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.1.2. Security administration personnel set parameters of security 
software to provide access as authorized and restrict access that has 
not been authorized. This includes access to data files, load and 
source code libraries (if applicable), security files, and operating 
system files. Standard naming conventions are established and used 
effectively as a basis for controlling access to data, and programs. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine directory names for sensitive or critical files and obtain 
security reports of related access rules. Using these reports, 
determine who has access to sensitive files and whether the access 
matches the level and type of access authorized. Determine whether 
standard naming conventions are established and used effectively. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.1.3. Security managers review access authorizations and discuss 
any questionable authorizations with resource owners. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview security managers and review documentation provided to them. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.1.4. All changes to security access authorizations are 
automatically logged and periodically reviewed by management 
independent of the security function; unusual activity is investigated. 
Audit procedures: 
Review a selection of recent changes to security access authorizations 
and related logs for evidence of management review and unusual 
activity; determine if unusual activity is being/has been investigated. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.1.5. Resource owners periodically review access authorizations for 
continuing appropriateness. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview owners and review supporting documentation; determine whether 
inappropriate access rights are removed in a timely manner. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.1.6. Access is limited to individuals with a valid business 
purpose (least privilege). 
Audit procedures: 
Identify who has access to user accounts and sensitive system resources 
and the business purpose for this access. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.1.7. Unnecessary accounts (default, guest accounts) are removed, 
disabled, or otherwise secured. 
Audit procedures: 
Verify that unnecessary accounts are removed, disabled, or secured. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.1.8. Inactive accounts and accounts for terminated individuals are 
disabled or removed in a timely manner. 
Audit procedures: 
Review security software parameters; review system-generated list of 
inactive logon IDs, and determine why access for these users has not 
been terminated. Obtain a list of recently terminated employees from 
Personnel and, for a selection, determine whether system access was 
promptly terminated. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.1.9. Access to shared file systems are restricted to the extent 
possible (for example, only to particular hosts, and only for the level 
of access required). 
Audit procedures: 
Determine how access to shared file systems is restricted and verify 
that it works effectively. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.1. User accounts are appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.1.10. Emergency or temporary access is appropriately controlled, 
including: 
* documented and maintained, 
* approved by appropriate managers, 
* securely communicated to the security function, 
* automatically terminated after a predetermined period, and, 
* all activity is logged. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures; compare a selection of both 
expired and active temporary and emergency authorizations (obtained 
from authorizing parties) with a system-generated list of authorized 
users. Determine the appropriateness of access documentation and 
approvals and the timeliness of terminating access authorization when 
no longer needed. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.2. Processes and services are adequately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.2.1. Available processes and services are minimized, such as 
through: 
* installing only required processes and services based on least 
functionality, 
* restricting the number of individuals with access to such services 
based on least privilege, 
* monitoring the use of such services, and, 
* maintaining current service versions. 
Audit procedures: 
Review procedures for minimizing processes and services; interview 
system administrator; identify what services are installed and 
determine if they are required; determine who has access to these 
services and if they need them; determine how access to these services 
is monitored; and determine if the service versions are kept current. 
If appropriate, scan for poorly configured, unnecessary, and dangerous 
processes and services. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.2. Processes and services are adequately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.2.2. The function and purpose of processes and services are 
documented and approved by management. 
Audit procedures: 
Obtain documentation describing the function and purpose of processes 
and services, and evidence of management approval. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.2. Processes and services are adequately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.2.3. Information available to potential unauthorized users is 
appropriately restricted. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if information about available processes and services is 
appropriately restricted. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.2. Processes and services are adequately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.2.4. The information system prohibits remote activation of 
collaborative computing mechanisms (for example, video and audio 
conferencing) and provides an explicit indication of use to the local 
users (for example, use of camera or microphone). 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if remote activation of collaborative computing services have 
been physically disconnected. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.2. Processes and services are adequately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.2.5. The information system limits the use of resources by 
priority. (Priority protection ensures that a lower-priority process is 
not able to interfere with the information system servicing any higher-
priority process.) 
Audit procedures: 
Interview the systems administrator and review appropriate systems 
documentation. 

Control activity: 
AC-3.2. Processes and services are adequately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AC-3.2.6. For publicly available systems, the information system 
controls protect the integrity and availability of the information and 
applications. 
Audit procedures: 
Identify controls used to protect the integrity and availability of the 
information and applications on such systems and test controls to 
ensure their effectiveness. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element AC-4. Adequately protect sensitive system resources: 

Certain system resources are more sensitive than others because, if 
compromised, serious security breaches could occur. Three areas related 
to sensitive system resources are: (1) restricting and monitoring 
access, (2) implementing adequate media controls over sensitive data, 
and (3) where appropriate, implementing effective cryptographic 
controls. Such sensitive system resources include system software, 
system utilities, configuration management systems, file maintenance 
systems, security software, data communications systems, and database 
management systems. Restricting access to sensitive system resources 
such as system software and related documentation is critical to 
controlling the overall integrity of information systems. For example, 
if system software is not adequately protected, an individual could 
gain access to capabilities that would allow him or her to bypass 
security features found in either operating system security software or 
access controls built into application software. The individual would 
then be able to read, modify, or destroy application programs, master 
data files, and transaction data, and subsequently erase any electronic 
audit trail of his or her activities. In addition, inadequate media 
controls can result in a loss of confidentiality of sensitive data. 
Further, cryptographic controls may be needed to protect sensitive 
information where it is not otherwise possible or practical to 
adequately restrict access through either physical or logical access 
controls. 

AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is restricted and 
monitored: 

Access to sensitive system resources, such as system software and 
powerful system utilities, should be appropriately restricted and 
monitored. System software is a set of programs designed to operate and 
control the processing activities of computer equipment. Generally, one 
set of system software is used to support and control a variety of 
applications that may run on the same computer hardware. System 
software helps control and coordinates the input, processing, output, 
and data storage associated with all of the applications that run on a 
system. Some system software can change data and program code on files 
without leaving an audit trail. The following are examples of system 
software: 

* operating system software; 
* system utilities; 
* configuration management systems; 
* file maintenance software; 
* security software; 
* data communications systems; 
* database management systems. 

Access to sensitive system resources should be restricted to 
individuals or processes that have a legitimate need for this access 
for the purposes of accomplishing a valid business purpose. For 
example, access to system software should be restricted to a limited 
number of personnel who have job responsibilities associated with the 
use of that software. Responsibilities for using system utilities 
should be clearly defined and understood by systems programmers. 
Application programmers and computer operators should be specifically 
prohibited from accessing system software. Justification and approval 
by appropriate entity officials for access to system software should be 
documented and retained. Appropriate entity officials should 
periodically review the use of privileged system software and utilities 
to ensure that access permissions correspond with position descriptions 
and job duties. Further, the use of sensitive/privileged accounts 
should be adequately monitored. Responsibilities for monitoring use 
should be clearly defined and understood by entity officials. 

Typically, access to operating system software is restricted to a few 
systems programmers whose job it is to modify the system, when needed, 
and intervene when the system will not operate properly. In addition, 
database administrators need access to the systemï¿½s database management 
system and a designated senior-level security administrator needs 
access to security software. However, application programmers and 
computer operators should not have access to system software, as this 
would be incompatible with their assigned responsibilities and could 
allow unauthorized actions to occur. (See section 3.4 for details on 
segregation of duties.) 

The number of personnel authorized to access the system will vary 
depending on the size and needs of the entity and, therefore, should be 
determined based on an analysis of the agencyï¿½s operations. For 
example, a large entity that must maintain operations on a 24-hour 
basis will need more operating systems analysts and programmers than a 
smaller entity that operates on a less intensive schedule. There may be 
a tendency for entities to authorize access to many individuals so that 
emergency operating problems can be handled promptly. However, 
management should balance the need for efficiency with the need for 
security. 

Because of the powerful capabilities at the disposal of those who have 
access to system software and related tools, use of the tools should be 
adequately controlled and monitored to identify any inappropriate or 
unusual behavior. Such behavior may indicate unauthorized access or an 
individual who is improperly exploiting access privileges. For example, 
greater than normal use of system software or use at odd hours may 
indicate that an individual is using the software to search for system 
weaknesses to exploit or to make unauthorized changes to system or 
application software or data. For monitoring to be effective in both 
detecting and deterring inappropriate use, personnel authorized to use 
system software should understand which uses are appropriate and which 
are not and also that their activities may be monitored. Such policies 
should be documented and distributed to all personnel. 

Policies and techniques should be implemented for using and monitoring 
the use of system tools and utilities. Some system utilities are used 
to perform system maintenance routines that are frequently required 
during normal processing operations. Other utilities aid the 
development and documentation of applications systems. These utilities 
can aid individuals who have fraudulent or malicious intentions in 
understanding how the programs or data in an application system operate 
and in how to make unauthorized modifications. 

Following is a listing of some utilities with their intended functions 
that could be misused without proper monitoring and control: 

* Flowcharters, transaction profile analyzers, execution path 
analyzers, and data dictionaries can be used to understand application 
systems. 

* Data manipulation utilities, data comparison utilities, and query 
facilities can be used to access and view data, with manipulation 
utilities also allowing data modification. 

* Online debugging facilities permit online changes to program object 
code leaving no audit trail and can activate programs at selected start 
points. 

* Library copiers can copy source code from a library into a program, 
text and online editors permit modification of program source code, and 
online coding facilities permit programs to be coded and compiled in an 
interactive mode. 

To prevent or detect the misuse of systems utilities, policies should 
be clearly documented regarding their use. In addition, the use of 
utilities should be monitored. Generally, system software contains a 
feature that provides for logging and reporting of its use. Such 
reports should identify when and by whom the software was used. It is 
important that this software operation work properly and that the 
reports are reviewed on a regular basis. 

The availability of standard usage data may assist the systems manager 
in identifying unusual activity. Some systems can be designed to 
compare standard usage data with actual use and report significant 
variances, thus making it easier for the system manager to identify 
unusual activity. When questionable activity is identified, it should 
be investigated. If improper activity is determined to have occurred, 
in accordance with security violation policies, the incident(s) should 
be documented, appropriate disciplinary action taken, and, when 
appropriate, higher-level management notified. Further, the possibility 
of damage or alteration to the system software, application software, 
and related data files should be investigated and corrective action 
taken if needed. Such action should include notifying the resource 
owner of the violation. 

In addition to controlling access to sensitive system resources, it is 
also important to control a number of other activities. First, default 
permissions and rights to system software and network devices should be 
changed during installation. Second, system libraries should be 
appropriately controlled. For example, the migration of system software 
from the testing environment to the production environment may be 
performed, after approval, by an independent library control group. 
Outdated versions of system software should be removed from the 
production environment to preclude their use. Some changes may be made 
specifically to correct security or integrity vulnerabilities, and 
using outdated versions allows the agencyï¿½s data and systems to remain 
exposed to these vulnerabilities. Third, access to authentication 
services and directories should also be appropriately controlled. 
Finally, access to mobile code[Footnote 68] (see next paragraph) should 
be appropriately controlled due to its potential to cause damage to the 
information system if used maliciously. 

Mobile code refers to programs (for example, script, macro, or other 
portable instruction) that can be shipped unchanged to a heterogeneous 
collection of platforms and executed with identical semantics. Being 
able to download files and electronic documents off the Internet is a 
useful function and a common practice today. Web pages serve as an 
electronic counterpart to paper documents; however, unlike paper 
documents, Web pages can entail active content that is capable of 
delivering digitally encoded multimedia information enlivened through 
embedded computer instructions. The popularity of the World Wide Web 
has spurred the trend toward active content. A dynamic weather map, a 
stock ticker, and live camera views or programmed broadcasts appearing 
on a Web page are common examples of the use of this technology. Like 
any technology, active content can provide a useful capability, but can 
also become a source of vulnerability for an attacker to exploit. 

Mobile code controls should include registration, approval, and control 
procedures to prevent the development, acquisition, or introduction of 
unacceptable mobile code within the information system. All mobile code 
or executable content employed should be registered unless otherwise 
approved by the authorizing official. Uploading of mobile code or 
executable content from one organizational information system to 
another should also be similarly authorized. 

Sensitive system resources may be further protected by partitioning 
applications, isolating security functions, and establishing a trusted 
communication path. First of all, through application partitioning, the 
information system physically or logically separates user interface 
services (for example, public Web pages) from information storage and 
management services (for example, database management). Separation may 
be accomplished through the use of different computers, different 
central processing units, different instances of the operating system, 
different network addresses, combinations of these methods, or other 
methods as appropriate. Secondly, it is desirable for the information 
system to isolate security functions from nonsecurity functions by 
means of partitions, domains, etc., including control of access to and 
integrity of the hardware, software, and firmware that perform those 
security functions. The information system maintains a separate 
execution domain (for example, address space) for each executing 
process. Thirdly, the information system should establish a trusted 
communication path between the user and the security functionality of 
the system. Technical experts may be needed to examine and test these 
controls. Finally, as appropriate, controls should be in place over 
information leakage through electromagnetic signals emanations. 

AC-4.2. Adequate media controls have been implemented: 

Media controls should be implemented to control unauthorized physical 
access to digital and printed media removed from the information system 
and during pick up, transport, and delivery to authorized users. Media 
should also be properly labeled to identify its sensitivity and 
distribution limitations. Finally, all sensitive information should be 
removed from media before its disposal or transfer to another use. 

As discussed in NIST SP 800-53, information system media includes both 
digital media (e.g., diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard 
drives, flash/thumb drives, compact disks, digital video disks) and non-
digital media (e.g., paper, microfilm). Media controls also apply to 
portable and mobile computing and communications devices with 
information storage capability (e.g., notebook computers, personal 
digital assistants, cellular telephones). 

NIST SP 800-53 also states that an organizational assessment of risk 
guides the selection of media and associated information contained on 
that media requiring restricted access. Organizations document in 
policy and procedures, the media requiring restricted access, 
individuals authorized to access the media, and the specific measures 
taken to restrict access. The rigor with which this control is applied 
is commensurate with the FIPS 199 security categorization of the 
information contained on the media. For example, fewer protection 
measures are needed for media containing information determined by the 
organization to be in the public domain, to be publicly releasable, or 
to have limited or no adverse impact on the organization or individuals 
if accessed by other than authorized personnel. In these situations, it 
is assumed that the physical access controls where the media resides 
provide adequate protection. 

One sensitive area is the storage of personally identifiable 
information on portable media. The ability to store and transport 
substantial volumes of data on portable devices creates an additional 
exposure to information confidentiality. The entity should have 
adequate controls in place over such portable media. OMB Memorandum M-
06-16 recommends federal agencies encrypt all data on mobile 
computers/devices which carry agency data unless the data is determined 
to be non-sensitive, in writing, by the agencyï¿½s Deputy Secretary or an 
individual they may designate in writing. 

In addition, as part of the risk assessment process, entities should 
identify information that is sensitive, including personally 
identifiable information. Entities should implement controls to 
adequately protect the confidentiality of such information, including 
any copies of such data. OMB Memorandum M-06-16 recommends federal 
agencies to log all computer-readable data extracts from databases 
holding sensitive information and verify each extract including 
sensitive data has been erased within 90 days or its use is still 
required. This OMB Memorandum provides additional guidance on controls 
over personally identifiable and other sensitive information. Also see 
AC-1.2 and AC-2.1. Automated marking and labeling of information helps 
to enforce information security access policy. Information system 
outputs should be marked using standard naming conventions to identify 
any special dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions. 
Similarly, information in storage, in process, and transmission should 
be appropriately labeled. Further, a means should be provided for the 
information system to ensure that the labels a user associates with 
information provided to the system are consistent with the information 
that the user is allowed to access. It is important that security 
parameters are exchanged between systems to authenticate services 
requested by another system. Security parameters include, for example, 
security labels and markings. Security parameters may be explicitly or 
implicitly associated with the information contained within the 
information system. 

The entity should have policies and procedures in place to remove 
sensitive information[Footnote 69] and software from computers, disks, 
and other equipment or media when they are disposed of or transferred 
to another use. Further, approved equipment and techniques should be 
used and periodically tested to ensure correct performance. If 
sensitive information is not fully cleared, it may be recovered and 
inappropriately used or disclosed by individuals who have access to the 
discarded or transferred equipment and media. The responsibility for 
clearing information should be clearly assigned. Also, standard forms 
or a log should be used to document that all discarded or transferred 
items are examined for sensitive information and that this information 
is cleared before the items are released. 

AC-4.3. Cryptographic controls are effectively used: 

Where appropriate, cryptographic tools help provide access control by 
rendering data unintelligible to unauthorized users and/or protecting 
the integrity of transmitted or stored data. In some casesï¿½especially 
those involving telecommunicationsï¿½it is not possible or practical to 
adequately restrict access through either physical or logical access 
controls. In these cases, cryptographic tools can be used to identify 
and authenticate users and help protect the integrity and 
confidentiality of data and computer programs, both while these data 
and programs are ï¿½inï¿½ the computer system and while they are being 
transmitted to another computer system or stored on removable media. 

As discussed in FIPS Pub 140-2, cryptographic-based security systems 
may be utilized in various computer and telecommunication applications 
(e.g., data storage, access control and personal identification, 
network communications, radio, facsimile, and video) and in various 
environments (e.g., centralized computer facilities, office 
environments, and hostile environments). The cryptographic services 
(e.g., encryption, authentication, digital signature, and key 
management) provided by a cryptographic module are based on many 
factors that are specific to the application and environment. The 
security level to which a cryptographic module is validated should be 
chosen to provide a level of security appropriate for the security 
requirements of the application and environment in which the module 
will be utilized and the security services that the module will 
provide. The security requirements for a particular security level 
include both the security requirements specific to that level and the 
security requirements that apply to all modules regardless of the 
level. 

Cryptography involves the use of algorithms (mathematical formulae) and 
combinations of keys (strings of bits) to do any or all of the 
following: 

* encrypt, or electronically scramble a message or file so that it is 
unintelligible to those who do not have the secret key needed to 
decrypt it, thus keeping the contents of the message or file 
confidential, 

* provide an electronic signature that can be used to determine if any 
changes have been made to the related file, thus ensuring the fileï¿½s 
integrity, and, 

* link a message or document to a specific individualï¿½s or groupï¿½s key, 
thus ensuring that the ï¿½signerï¿½ of the file can be identified. 

Cryptographic tools are especially valuable for any application that 
involves ï¿½paperlessï¿½ transactions or for which the users want to avoid 
relying on paper documents to substantiate data integrity and validity. 
Examples include: 

* electronic commerce, where purchase orders, receiving reports, and 
invoices are created, approved, and transmitted electronically; 

* travel administration, where travel orders and travel vouchers are 
created, approved, and transmitted electronically; and; 

* protection of documents or digital images, such as contracts, 
personnel records, or diagrams, which are stored on electronic media. 

Cryptographic tools may be linked to an individual application or 
implemented so that they can be used to sign or encrypt data associated 
with multiple applications. For example, the personal computers 
connected to a local area network may each be fitted with hardware 
and/or software that identifies and authenticates users and allows them 
to encrypt, sign, and authenticate the messages and files that they 
send or receive, regardless of the application that they are using. 

There are a number of technical issues to consider concerning 
cryptography. Some of the key considerations are listed here. 

* Are the cryptographic tools implemented in software or through the 
use of a hardware module? (Hardware modules are generally more secure.) 

* How is the data transmitted between the computerï¿½s memory and the 
cryptographic module, and is this path protected? 

* How strong, or complex, is the algorithm used to encrypt and sign 
data? 

* How are keys managed and distributed? 

* Does the agencyï¿½s use of cryptographic tools comply with related 
Federal Information Processing Standards issued by NIST? 

* Has the entity chosen cryptographic techniques that are appropriate 
to cost-effectively meet its defined control objectives? 

If the auditor encounters cryptographic tools and determines that their 
reliability is important to his or her understanding of the controls, 
they should obtain the most recent guidance available from OMB, NIST, 
and GAO, as well as technical assistance from an auditor experienced in 
assessing cryptographic tools. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
AC-4: 

AC-4 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
AC-15 Automated Marking; 
AC-16 Automated Labeling; 
IA-7 Cryptographic Module Authentication; 
MP-2 Media Access; 
MP-3 Media Labeling; 
MP-4 Media Storage; 
MP-5 Media Transport; 
MP-6 Media Sanitization and Disposal; 
PE-19 Information Leakage; 
SC-2 Application Partitioning; 
SC-3 Security Function Isolation; 
SC-4 Information Remnance; 
SC-8 Transmission Integrity; 
SC-9 Transmission Confidentiality; 
SC-11 Trusted Path; 
SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management; 
SC-13 Use of Cryptography; 
SC-16 Transmission of Security Parameters; 
SC-18 Mobile Code. 

Table 19. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AC-4: Adequately protect sensitive system resources: 

Control activity: AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is 
restricted and monitored. 
Control techniques: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview management and systems personnel regarding access 
restrictions. 

Control activity: AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is 
restricted and monitored. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.1.1. Access to sensitive/privileged accounts is restricted to 
individuals or processes having a legitimate need for the purposes of 
accomplishing a valid business purpose. 
Audit procedures: 
Identify and test who has access to sensitive/privileged accounts and 
determine the reason for that access. 

Control activity: AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is 
restricted and monitored. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.1.2. Use of sensitive/privileged accounts is adequately monitored. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if the use of sensitive and privileged accounts is monitored 
and evaluate its effectiveness. 

Control activity: AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is 
restricted and monitored. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.1.3. Logical access to utilities and tools is adequately 
controlled (for example, remote maintenance). 
Audit procedures: 
Determine the last time the access capabilities of system programmers 
were reviewed. Review security software settings to identify types of 
activity logged. Observe personnel accessing system software, such as 
sensitive utilities and note the controls encountered to gain access. 
Attempt to access the operating system and other system software. 
Select some application programmers and determine whether they are 
authorized access. 

Control activity: AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is 
restricted and monitored. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.1.4. System libraries are appropriately controlled. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if access to system libraries is adequately controlled. 

Control activity: AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is 
restricted and monitored. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.1.5. Passwords/authentication services and directories are 
appropriately controlled and encrypted when appropriate. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if password files and authentication services are adequately 
protected from unauthorized access. 

Control activity: AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is 
restricted and monitored. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.1.6. Mobile code is appropriately controlled. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview system administrator and determine if mobile code is 
adequately controlled. 

Control activity: AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is 
restricted and monitored. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.1.7. Where appropriate, access is restricted based on time and/or 
location. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if access is appropriately restricted based on time and/or 
location. 

Control activity: AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is 
restricted and monitored. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.1.8. The information system partitions or separates user 
functionality (including user interface services) from information 
system management functionality. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview officials and review related system documentation. Coordinate 
with vulnerability analysis. 

Control activity: AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is 
restricted and monitored. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.1.9. The information system isolates security functions from 
nonsecurity functions. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview officials and review related system documentation. Coordinate 
with vulnerability analysis. 

Control activity: AC-4.1. Access to sensitive system resources is 
restricted and monitored. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.1.10. The information system establishes a trusted communications 
path between the user and the security functionality of the system. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview officials with system and communication responsibilities and 
examine appropriate records such as developer design documents. 

Control activity: AC-4.2. Adequate media controls have been 
implemented. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.2.1. Only authorized users have access to printed and digital 
media removed from the information system. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview personnel and review procedures. Observe entity practices and 
review selected access logs. 

Control activity: AC-4.2. Adequate media controls have been 
implemented. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.2.2. The information system automatically identifies how 
information is to be used: 
* output is marked using standard naming conventions, and; 
* internal data in storage, process and transmission is labeled. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview appropriate personnel. For output, identify standard naming 
conventions and examine the system configuration. For internal data, 
examine the labeling mechanism and internal data for accurate labels. 
Test output and internal data for appropriate results. 

Control activity: AC-4.2. Adequate media controls have been 
implemented. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.2.3. The organization controls the pickup, transport, and delivery 
of information system media (paper and electronic) to authorized 
personnel. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview officials and review appropriate policy and procedures. 
Observe selected media transport practices and receipts. 

Control activity: AC-4.2. Adequate media controls have been 
implemented. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.2.4. Systems media is securely stored according to its 
sensitivity. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if media storage practices are adequate and comply with 
applicable requirements (for federal agencies, FIPS 199 security 
categories). 

Control activity: AC-4.2. Adequate media controls have been 
implemented. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.2.5. Security parameters are clearly associated with information 
exchanged between information systems. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if security parameters are clearly associated with 
information exchanged. 

Control activity: AC-4.2. Adequate media controls have been 
implemented. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.2.6. Approved equipment, techniques, and procedures are 
implemented to clear sensitive data from digital media before its 
disposal or release for reuse outside of the organization. 
Audit procedures: 
Review written procedures; interview personnel responsible for clearing 
data from digital media. For a selection of recently discarded or 
transferred items, examine documentation related to clearing of data 
and disposal of software. For selected items still in the agencyï¿½s 
possession, test to determine whether they have been appropriately 
sanitized. 

Control activity: AC-4.3. Cryptographic controls are effectively used. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.3.1. Cryptographic tools have been implemented to protect the 
integrity and confidentiality of sensitive and critical data and 
software programs. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if cryptographic tools are properly implemented. (See NIST 
standards for federal agencies) To evaluate the use of cryptographic 
tools, the auditor should obtain the assistance of a specialist. 

Control activity: AC-4.3. Cryptographic controls are effectively used. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.3.2. Encryption procedures are implemented in data communications 
where appropriate based on risk. 
Audit procedures: 
Capture passwords transmitted over the network and determine if they 
are encrypted; for federal system, determine if cryptographic 
authentication complies with FIPS 140-2. To evaluate cryptographic 
tools, the auditor should obtain the assistance of a specialist. 

Control activity: AC-4.3. Cryptographic controls are effectively used. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.3.3. For authentication to a cryptographic module, the information 
system employs appropriate authentication methods. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview appropriate officials and review supporting documentation. 
For federal agencies, compare the authentication process to FIPS 140-2 
requirements. 

Control activity: AC-4.3. Cryptographic controls are effectively used. 
Control techniques:
AC-4.3.4. The information system employs automated mechanisms with 
supporting procedures or manual procedures for cryptographic key 
establishment and key management. 
Audit procedures: 
Compare policy and practices to appropriate guidance, such as NIST 
guidance in SP 800-56 and SP 800-57 for cryptographic key establishment 
and management, respectively. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element AC-5. Implement an effective audit and monitoring 
capability: 

Audit and monitoring involves the regular collection, review, and 
analysis of auditable events for indications of inappropriate or 
unusual activity, and the appropriate investigation and reporting of 
such activity. Automated mechanisms may be used to integrate audit 
monitoring, analysis, and reporting into an overall process for 
investigation and response to suspicious activities. Audit and 
monitoring controls can help security professionals routinely assess 
computer security, perform investigations during and after an attack, 
and even recognize an ongoing attack. Audit and monitoring technologies 
include network and host-based intrusion detection systems, audit 
logging, security event correlation tools, and computer forensics. 
Network-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) capture or ï¿½sniffï¿½ and 
analyze network traffic in various parts of a network. On the other 
hand, host-based IDSs analyze activity on a particular computer or 
host. Both types of IDS have advantages and disadvantages. 

FISMA requires that each agency implement an information security 
program that includes procedures for detecting, reporting, and 
responding to security incidents. Further, OMB is to ensure the 
operation of a central federal information security incident center to: 

* provide timely technical assistance to system operators, 

* compile and analyze incident information, 

* inform system operators about threats and vulnerabilities, and; 

* consult with NIST, national security agencies, and other designated 
agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security. 

NIST issued two relevant special publications that provide additional 
information: 

* SP 800-94, Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 
(IDPS), and; 

* SP 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide. 

SP 800-61 discusses four steps in incident handling: 

* preparation, 

* detection and analysis, 

* containment, eradication, and recovery, and, 

* post-incident activity. 

An IDS detects inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activity aimed at 
disrupting the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a 
protected network and its computer systems. An IDS collects information 
on a network, analyzes the information on the basis of a preconfigured 
rule set, and then responds to the analysis. A description of the 
technologies, their effectiveness, and how they work is described in 
Technologies to Secure Federal Systems, GAO-04-467 (Washington, D.C.: 
March 2004). 

AC-5.1. An effective incident response program is documented and 
approved: 

An effective incident response program should be implemented. Control 
techniques include: 

* documented policies and procedures, including an incident response 
plan; 

* documented testing of the incident response plan; 

* a means of prompt centralized reporting; 

* active monitoring of alerts and advisories; 

* response team members with the necessary knowledge, skills, and 
abilities; 

* training on roles and responsibilities and periodic refresher 
training; 

* links to other relevant groups; 

* protection against denial of service attacks; and; 

* appropriate incident response assistance and consideration of 
computer forensics. 

OMB tasks NIST with coordinating activities governmentwide for agencies 
sharing information concerning common vulnerabilities and threats. 
Finally, Appendix III of OMB Circular A-130 directs the Department of 
Justice to provide appropriate guidance on pursuing legal remedies in 
the case of serious incidents. 

According to NIST, the two main benefits of an incident-handling 
capability are (1) containing and repairing damage from incidents and 
(2) preventing future damage. Other, less obvious, benefits of an 
incident-handling capability include: 

* improved threat data for use in the risk assessment and control 
selection process, 

* enhanced internal communication and organizational preparedness, and, 

* enhanced training and awareness programs by providing trainers with 
better information on usersï¿½ knowledge and providing real-life 
illustrations for classes. 

Also, according to NIST, the characteristics of a good incident-
handling capability include: 

* an understanding of the constituency being served, including computer 
users and program managers; 

* an educated constituency that trusts the incident-handling team; 

* a means of prompt centralized reporting, such as through a hotline; 

* a response team with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities, 
including technical expertise with the computer technology used by the 
agency, and the ability and willingness to respond when and where 
needed; and, 

* links to other groupsï¿½such as law enforcement agencies, response 
teams, or security groups external to the agencyï¿½and to the agencyï¿½s 
public relations office (in case the incident receives media 
attention). 

One aspect of incident response that can be especially problematic is 
gathering the evidence to pursue legal action. Incident response 
training and assistance is important for users of information systems 
to understand the proper handling and reporting of security incidents. 
Resources should be available to provide adequate computer forensics of 
security incidents. To gather evidence, an entity may need to allow an 
intruder or violator to continue his or her inappropriate activitiesï¿½a 
situation that puts the system and data at continued risk. However, 
fear of detection and prosecution can serve as a deterrent to future 
violations. 

The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (USï¿½CERT) was 
established in September 2003 to provide a national incident response 
capability. USï¿½CERT is a partnership of the Department of Homeland 
Security and the public and private sectors. Established to protect the 
nationï¿½s Internet infrastructure, US-CERT coordinates defense against 
and responses to cyber attacks across the nation. Specifically, it is 
responsible for analyzing and reducing cyber threats and 
vulnerabilities, disseminating cyber threat warning information, and 
coordinating incident response activities. 

As the nationï¿½s focal point for preventing, protecting against, and 
responding to cyber security vulnerabilities, USï¿½CERT interacts with 
all federal agencies, private industry, the research community, state 
and local governments, and others on a 24X7 basis to disseminate 
reasoned and actionable cyber security information. To provide security 
information to the public, USï¿½CERT: 

* integrates content contributed by numerous organizations from both 
the public and private sectors, 

* aggregates and analyzes the various types of data provided by 
contributing organizations, 

* serves as the focal point for promoting common and comprehensive 
analysis of security trends and risks, and, 

* maintains quality control standards and works to ensure technical 
accuracy as well as timeliness. 

Worldwide, there are more than 250 organizations that use the name CERT 
or a similar name and deal with cyber security response. USï¿½CERT and 
the CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon University work jointly 
on cyber security activities. When a cyber security problem warrants, 
US-CERT coordinates a response by working with computer security 
experts from public and private state and local incident response 
teams. See [hyperlink, http://www.us-cert.gov/aboutus.html]. 

In addition, the incident response program is affected by and should be 
responsive to the configuration of the entityï¿½s networks. For example, 
it can affect the placement of intrusion detection systems. 

Also, the network and related access controls can be designed to aid in 
containment of security breaches to limited areas of the network. Also, 
the incident response program should appropriately consider treatment 
of privacy information. Specifically, federal entities should comply 
with applicable statutes and the following OMB Memoranda: 

* M-06-15, Safeguarding Personally Identifiable Information (5/22/06); 

* M-06-16, Protection of Sensitive Agency Information (6/23/06); 

* M-06-19, Reporting Incidents Involving Personally Identifiable 
Information and Incorporating the Cost for Security in Agency 
Information Technology Investments (7/12/06); 

* OMB Reporting Instructions for the Federal Information Security 
Management Act and Agency Privacy Management (generally annual OMB 
memorandums); 

* Recommendations for Identity Theft Related Data Breach Notifications 
(9/20/06); 

* M-07-04, Use of Commercial Credit Monitoring Services Blanket 
Purchase Agreements (12/22/06). 

AC-5.2. Incidents are effectively identified and logged: 

Entity policies and procedures should establish criteria for the 
identification of significant system events that should be logged. 
Based on such criteria, the entity should identify significant system 
events. At a minimum, all such significant events,[Footnote 70] 
including access to and modification of sensitive or critical system 
resources, should be logged. However, to be effective: 

* this feature should be activated to log critical activity, maintain 
critical audit trails, and report unauthorized or unusual activity; 

* access to audit logs should be adequately controlled; and; 

* managers should review logs for unusual or suspicious activity and 
take appropriate action. 

Access control software should be used to maintain an audit trail of 
security access containing appropriate information for effective review 
to determine how, when, and by whom specific actions were taken. For 
example, time stamps of audit records should be generated using 
internal information system clocks that are synchronized systemwide. 
Such information is critical to monitoring compliance with security 
policies and when investigating security incidents. The settings of the 
access control software control the nature and extent of audit trail 
information provided. Typically, audit trails may include user ID, 
resource accessed, date, time, terminal location, and specific data 
modified. The information system should have the capability to 
determine whether or not a given individual took a particular action 
(non-repudiation). 

The completeness and value of the audit trails maintained will only be 
as good as the agencyï¿½s ability to thoroughly identify the critical 
processes and the related information that may be needed. Procedures 
for maintaining such audit trails should be based on: 

* the value or sensitivity of data and other resources affected; 

* the processing environment, for example, systems development, 
testing, or production; 

* technical feasibility; and; 

* legal and regulatory requirements. 

Audit trails, including automated logs, need to be retained for an 
appropriate period of time. Therefore, the entity needs to allocate 
sufficient audit record storage capacity and configure auditing to 
prevent the storage capacity from being exceeded. The information 
system should provide a warning when storage capacity reaches a certain 
level. If storage capacity is reached, the system should alert 
appropriate officials and take appropriate, predefined actions such as 
saving the oldest data offline, shutting down the system, overwriting 
the oldest audit records, or stop generating audit records. 

An effective intrusion detection system (IDS) should be implemented, 
including appropriate placement of intrusion-detection sensors and 
setting of incident thresholds. IDS security software generally 
provides a means of determining the source of a transaction or an 
attempted transaction and of monitoring usersï¿½ activities (audit 
trail). 

AC-5.3. Incidents are properly analyzed and appropriate actions taken: 

Because all of the audit trail and log information maintained is likely 
to be too voluminous to review on a routine basis, the IDS security 
software should be implemented to selectively identify unauthorized, 
unusual, and sensitive access activity, such as: 

* attempted unauthorized logical and physical access; 

* access trends and deviations from those trends; 

* access to sensitive data and resources; 

* highly-sensitive privileged access, such as the ability to override 
security controls; 

* access modifications made by security personnel; and; 

* unsuccessful attempts to logon to a system. 

Modern information systems may have an audit-reduction and report-
generation capability to automatically process audit records for events 
of interest based on selectable event criteria. The security software 
should be designed to report such activity and, in some cases, respond 
by actions such as: 

* disabling passwords, 

* terminating repeated failed attempts to access sensitive resources, 

* terminating processing, 

* shutting down terminals, 

* issuing warning or error messages, and, 

* writing audit trail records that would not normally be maintained. 

Once unauthorized, unusual, or sensitive access activity is identified, 
it should be reviewed and apparent or suspected violations 
investigated. If it is determined that a security violation has 
occurred, appropriate action should be taken to identify and remedy the 
control weaknesses that allowed the violation to occur, repair any 
damage that has been done, and determine and discipline the 
perpetrator. It is important that an entity have formal written 
procedures for reporting security violations or suspected violations to 
a central security management office so that multiple related incidents 
can be identified, other employees can be alerted to potential threats, 
and appropriate investigations can be performed. Such incidents might 
include multiple attacks by a common hacker or repeated infections with 
the same computer virus. 

Without prompt and appropriate responses to security incidents, 
violations could continue to occur and cause damage to an agencyï¿½s 
resources indefinitely. Further, violators will not be deterred from 
continuing inappropriate access activity, which could cause 
embarrassment to the entity and result in disclosure of confidential 
information and financial losses. 

An entity should have documented procedures in place for responding to 
security violations. These should include procedures and criteria for: 

* incident containment, eradication, and recovery, 

* documenting offenses, 

* determining the seriousness of violations, 

* reporting violations to higher levels of management, 

* investigating violations, 

* imposing disciplinary action for specific types of violations, 

* notifying the resource owner of the violation, 

* sharing incident and threat information with owners of connected 
systems, and, 

* reporting suspected criminal activity to law enforcement officials. 

Further, access control policies and techniques should be modified when 
violations, incidents, and related risk assessments indicate that such 
changes are appropriate. 

In addition, the frequency and magnitude of security violations and the 
corrective actions that have been taken should periodically be 
summarized and reported to senior management. Such a report can assist 
management in its overall management of risk by identifying the most 
attractive targets, trends in types of violations, cost of securing the 
agencyï¿½s operations, and any need for additional controls. 

Finally, since even the best incident response program may not catch 
increasingly sophisticated system intrusions, critical system resources 
should be periodically reviewed for integrity. For example, an 
organization may employ integrity verification applications on the 
information system to automatically look for evidence of information 
tampering, errors, and omissions. 

AC-5 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
AC-13 Supervision and Reviewï¿½Access Control; 
AT-5 Contacts with Security Groups and Associations; 
AU-2 Auditable Events; 
AU-3 Content of Audit Records; 
AU-4 Audit Storage Capacity; 
AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures; 
AU-6 Audit Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting; 
AU-7 Audit Reduction and Report Generation; 
AU-8 Time Stamps; 
AU-9 Protection of Audit Information; 
AU-11 Audit Record Retention; 
IR-1 Incident Response Policy and Procedures; 
IR-2 Incident Response Training; 
IR-3 Incident Response Testing and Exercises; 
IR-4 Incident Handling; 
IR-5 Incident Monitoring; 
IR-6 Incident Reporting; 
IR-7 Incident Response Assistance; 
SC-5 Denial Of Service Protection; 
SI-4 Information System Monitoring Tools and Techniques; 
SI-6 Security Functionality Verification. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
AC-5: 

Table 20. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AC-5: Implement an effective audit and monitoring 
capability: 

Control activity: 
AC-5.1. An effective incident response program is documented and 
approved. 
Control techniques: 
AC-5.1.1. An effective incident-response program has been implemented 
and include: 
* documented policies, procedures, and plans; 
* documented testing of the incident response plan and follow-up on 
findings; 
* a means of prompt centralized reporting; 
* active monitoring of alerts/advisories; 
* response team members with the necessary knowledge, skills, and 
abilities; 
* training on roles and responsibilities and periodic refresher 
training; 
* links to other relevant groups; 
* protection against denial-of-service attacks (see [hyperlink, 
http://icat.nist.gov]); 
* appropriate incident-response assistance; and; 
* consideration of computer forensics. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview security manager, response team members, and system users; 
review documentation supporting incident handling activities; compare 
practices to policies, procedures, and related guidance such as NIST SP 
800-61 that provides guidance on incident-handling and reporting. 
Determine qualifications of response team members; review training 
records; identify training in incident response roles and 
responsibilities. Identify the extent to which computer forensics is 
used and compare to applicable guidelines and industry best practices. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.2. Incidents are effectively identified and logged. 
Control techniques: 
AC-5.2.1. An effective intrusion detection system has been implemented, 
including appropriate placement of intrusion-detection sensors and 
incident thresholds. 
Audit procedures: 
Obtain the design and justification for the intrusion detection system; 
determine if the placement of sensors and incident thresholds is 
appropriate based on cost and risk. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.2. Incidents are effectively identified and logged. 
Control techniques: 
AC-5.2.2. An effective process has been established based on a risk 
assessment, to identify auditable events that will be logged. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview the security manager to determine the process for determining 
what actions are logged. Determine if security event correlation tools 
are used to identify anomalous network activity. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.2. Incidents are effectively identified and logged. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.2.3. All auditable events, including access to and modifications 
of sensitive or critical system resources, are logged. 
Audit procedures: 
Review security software settings to identify types of activity logged; 
compare to NIST guidance on auditable events. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.2. Incidents are effectively identified and logged. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.2.4. Audit records contain appropriate information for effective 
review including sufficient information to establish what events 
occurred, when the events occurred (for example, time stamps), the 
source of the events, and the outcome of the events. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if audit records/logs are reviewed and whether they contain 
appropriate information; see appropriate NIST guidance. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.2. Incidents are effectively identified and logged. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.2.5. Audit record storage capacity is adequate and configured to 
prevent such capacity from being exceeded. In the event of an audit 
failure or audit storage capacity being reached, the information system 
alerts officials and appropriate action is taken. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine the retention period for audit records and logs and whether 
it complies with applicable guidance. Determine if audit capacity is 
sufficient and what happens should it be exceeded. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.2. Incidents are effectively identified and logged. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.2.6. Audit records and tools are protected from unauthorized 
access, modification, and deletion. Audit records are effectively 
reviewed for unusual or suspicious activity or violations. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine how access to audit records/logs is controlled; review logs 
for suspicious activity and evidence of entity follow-up and 
appropriate corrective action. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.2. Incidents are effectively identified and logged. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.2.7. Audit records are retained long enough to provide support for 
after-the-fact investigations of security incidents and to meet 
regulatory and organizational information retention requirements. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if audit record retention (for example, logs etc.) meet legal 
requirements and entity policy for computer forensics. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.3. Incidents are properly analyzed and appropriate actions taken. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.3.1. Security violations and activities, including failed logon 
attempts, other failed access attempts, and sensitive activity, are 
reported and investigated. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures; review security violation 
reports; examine documentation showing reviews of questionable 
activities. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.3. Incidents are properly analyzed and appropriate actions taken. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.3.2. Security managers investigate security violations and 
suspicious activities and report results to appropriate supervisory and 
management personnel. 
Audit procedures: 
Test a selection of security violations to verify that follow-up 
investigations were performed and reported to appropriate supervisory 
and management personnel. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.3. Incidents are properly analyzed and appropriate actions taken. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.3.3. Appropriate disciplinary actions are taken. 
Audit procedures: 
For the sample in AC-5.3.2, determine what action was taken against the 
perpetrator. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.3. Incidents are properly analyzed and appropriate actions taken. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.3.4. Violations and incidents are analyzed, summarized, and 
reported to senior management and appropriate government authorities. 
Interview senior management and personnel responsible for summarizing 
violations; review any supporting documentation. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if automated tools are used to analyze network activity and 
whether it complies with security policy. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.3. Incidents are properly analyzed and appropriate actions taken. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.3.5. Alerts and advisories are issued to personnel when 
appropriate. 
Audit procedures: 
Identify recent alerts and advisories and determine if they are up-to-
date; interview entity personnel to determine what actions were taken. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.3. Incidents are properly analyzed and appropriate actions taken. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.3.6 Incident and threat information is shared with owners of 
connected systems. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if incident and threat data are shared with owners of 
connected systems; follow up with owners of connected systems to see if 
they received this information in a timely manner. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.3. Incidents are properly analyzed and appropriate actions taken. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.3.7. Access control policies and techniques are modified when 
violations, incidents, and related risk assessments indicate that such 
changes are appropriate. 
Audit procedures: 
Review policies and procedures and interview appropriate personnel; 
review any supporting documentation. 

Control activity: 
AC-5.3. Incidents are properly analyzed and appropriate actions taken. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.3.8. Critical system resources are periodically reviewed for 
integrity. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine how frequently alterations to critical system files are 
monitored (for example, integrity checkers, etc.). 

Control activity: 
AC-5.3. Incidents are properly analyzed and appropriate actions taken. 
Control techniques:
AC-5.3.9. Appropriate processes are applied to gather forensic evidence 
in support of investigations. 
Audit procedures: 
Review entity processes to gather forensic information and determine 
whether they are adequate. Discuss with appropriate entity management. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element AC-6. Establish adequate physical security controls: 

Adequate physical security controls should be established that are 
commensurate with the risks of physical damage or access. In evaluating 
the effectiveness of physical security controls, the auditor should 
consider the effectiveness of the agencyï¿½s policies and practices 
pertaining to both the overall facility and areas housing sensitive 
information technology components. Consequently, an entity should 
implement physical security controls in the following areas: 

* security planning and management (security management), 

* securing the perimeter of the facility (perimeter security), 

* controlling access into a facility (entry security), 

* controlling access within a facility (interior security), and, 

* protection from emerging physical security threats (emerging 
threats). 

Physical security controls restrict physical access to computer 
resources and protect them from intentional or unintentional loss or 
impairment. Computer resources to be protected include: 

* primary computer facilities, 

* cooling system facilities, 

* network devices such as routers and firewalls, 

* terminals used to access a computer, 

* microcomputers and mobile or portable systems, 

* devices that display or output information, 

* access to network connectivity, such as through ï¿½liveï¿½ network jacks, 

* computer file storage areas, and ? telecommunications equipment and 
transmission lines. 

In June 1995, the Department of Justice (DOJ) published minimum-
security standards for the protection of federal facilities. It 
identified and evaluated the various types of security measures that 
could be used to counter potential vulnerabilities. The standards cover 
perimeter security, entry security, interior security, and security 
planning. Because of the considerable differences among facilities and 
their security needs, physical holdings are divided into five security 
levels to determine which minimum standards are appropriate for which 
security levels.[Footnote 71] For federal agency facilities, 
appropriate criteria for physical safeguards in place for the overall 
facility are Justice standards unless the facility has adopted 
different standards. To illustrate, information technology resources 
may be housed in a facility that has been designated a national 
critical asset in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 7[Footnote 72] and therefore require physical security 
measures above those required by DOJ standards. For non-federal 
entities, appropriate criteria are equivalent guidance or the federal 
standards. 

Physical controls also include environmental controls, such as smoke 
detectors, fire alarms, extinguishers, and uninterruptible power 
supplies (see section 3.5, service continuity). 

In an IS controls audit being performed as part of a financial audit or 
data reliability assessment, the auditor should tailor the 
identification of control techniques and audit procedures related to 
the entityï¿½s physical security management program to the extent 
necessary to achieve the audit objectives, considering the IS controls 
identified by the auditor as significant to the audit objectives (e.g., 
internal control over financial reporting). Generally, this would 
include consideration of the overall design of the entityï¿½s physical 
security program at relevant facilities. 

AC-6.1. Establish a physical security management program based on risk: 

Risk management is the foundation of an effective physical security 
program. The approach to good security is fundamentally similar, 
regardless of the assets being protectedï¿½information systems, 
buildings, or critical infrastructure. Risk management principles for 
an effective security program are discussed in section 3.1. In 
addition, the testimonies Technologies to Secure Federal Buildings (GAO-
02-687T) and Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach (GAO-02-150T) 
elaborate on specific risk management steps that may be applied to the 
protection of any critical asset. 

The effectiveness of physical security controls depends on the 
effectiveness of the agencyï¿½s policies and practices pertaining to the 
overall facility and to areas housing sensitive information technology 
components, including: 

* granting and discontinuing access authorizations, 

* controlling badges, ID cards, smartcards, passkeys, and other entry 
devices, 

* controlling entry during and after normal business hours, 

* controlling the entry and removal of computer resources (for example, 
equipment and storage media) from the facility, 

* managing emergencies, 

* controlling reentry after emergencies, 

* establishing compensatory controls when restricting physical access 
is not feasible, as is often the case with telecommunications lines, 
and; 

* storing computer assets such as equipment and sensitive documents. 

In some instances an entity may not be able to fully control their 
physical security posture. For example, leased space in a building 
managed by another organization. In this case, the entity should 
consider compensating controls and ensure that contingency planning 
adequately considers their lack of control over physical security. 

As with any type of business activity, physical security should be 
monitored to ensure that controls are accomplishing their intended 
purpose. FISMA specifically requires that federal agencies periodically 
test and evaluate information security controls and techniques to 
ensure that they are effectively implemented. 

Visitors should be controlled. On occasion, persons other than 
regularly authorized personnel may be granted access to sensitive areas 
or facilities, such as employees from another facility, maintenance 
personnel, contractors, and the infrequent or unexpected visitor. None 
of these visitors should be granted unrestricted access.[Footnote 73] 
Controls should include: 

* preplanned appointments, 

* identification checks, 

* controlling the reception area, 

* logging in visitors, 

* escorting visitors while in sensitive areas, and, 

* periodically changing entry codes to prevent reentry by previous 
visitors who might have knowledge of the code. 

AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk: 

Perimeter security is the first line of defense against threats that 
can cause catastrophic damages to facilities and internal computer 
resources. Considerations for perimeter security include: 

* controlling vehicle and pedestrian traffic around the facility, 

* controlling employee and visitor parking, 

* monitoring the perimeter with closed circuit TV (CCTV), 

* providing emergency backup power supply, and, 

* extending perimeter barriers to prevent unauthorized access and 
reduce exposure to explosions. 

Perimeter security includes protective controls such as fencing around 
sensitive buildings, concrete and earthen and other barriers, 
appropriate gates and locks, exterior lighting, guard posts, security 
patrols, and detection and monitoring systems. 

AC-6.3. Establish adequate security at entrances and exits based on 
risk: 

Access to facilities should be limited to personnel having a legitimate 
need for access to perform their duties. Management should regularly 
review the list of persons authorized to have physical access to 
sensitive facilities, including contractors and other third parties. In 
addition, procedures should be implemented to terminate access 
privileges for terminated or separated employees or contractors. 

Physical security controls at entrances and exits vary, but may 
include: 

* manual door or cipher key locks, 

* magnetic door locks that require the use of electronic keycards, 

* biometrics authentication, 

* security guards, 

* photo IDs, 

* entry logs, and, 

* electronic and visual surveillance systems. 

Unissued keys or other entry devices should be secure. Issued keys or 
other entry devices should be regularly inventoried. 

AC-6.4. Establish adequate interior security based on risk: 

The effectiveness of physical security controls over sensitive and 
critical IT resources within a facility include consideration of 
whether the entity has: 

* identified all sensitive areasï¿½such as individual rooms or equipment, 
software and tape libraries, or telecommunication closets and 
linesï¿½that are susceptible to physical access, loss, or impairment; 

* identified all physical access points and threats to the sensitive 
areas; and; 

* developed cost-effective security controls over all physical access 
points and addressed all significant threats to sensitive areas. 

In addition, the entity should have controls to prevent or detect 
surreptitious entry into sensitive areas. For example, could 
unauthorized persons gain entry by: 

* observing lock combinations entered by authorized personnel? 

* obtaining unsecured keycards? 

* going over the top of a partition that stops at the underside of a 
suspended ceiling when the partition serves as a wall for a sensitive 
facility? 

* cutting a hole in a plasterboard wall in a location hidden by 
furniture? 

Many of the control techniques for interior security are similar to 
those for perimeter and entry security (for example, locks, 
surveillance systems, as well as using and controlling badges, ID 
cards, smartcards, passkey, and other entry devices). Additional 
considerations include: 

* logs and authorization for removal and return of tapes and other 
storage media to the library, 

* computer terminal locks, 

* controlled access to powerful consoles in data centers, and, 

* segregation of duties (discussed in section 3.4). 

AC-6.5. Adequately protect against emerging threats based on risk: 

In addition to traditional physical security considerations, it may be 
important to protect building environments from new threats such as 
airborne chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) attacks. Such 
protective measures may include the installation of early warning 
sensors, the location and securing of air intakes, and plans and 
procedures to mitigate the effect of a CBR release. The decisions 
concerning which protective measures should be implemented for any 
building should be based on several factors, including the perceived 
risk associated with the building and its tenants, engineering and 
architectural feasibility, and cost. 

Appropriate audit procedures related to emerging threats include: 

* Interview appropriate officials to identify the level of physical 
security controls needed for the facility. 

* Review the facility risk and independent assessments (for example, 
internal audit, internal office of physical security, outside 
consultants) to identify their assessment of risk and the adequacy of 
controls in place. 

* Observe and document the controls in place. Assess the organizationï¿½s 
preparations based on what the organization has stated it needs based 
on risk, including an evacuation plan for a possible CBR attack. 

* Identify any planned projects to enhance physical security controls 
in this area through discussions with physical security and building 
management/operations staff. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
AC-6: 

AC-6 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
PE-2 Physical Access Authorizations; 
PE-3 Physical Access Control; 
PE-4 Access Control for Transmission Medium; 
PE-5 Access Control Policy for Display Medium; 
PE-6 Monitoring Physical Access; 
PE-7 Visitor Control; 
PE-8 Access Records. 

Table 21. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AC-6: Establish adequate physical security controls: 

Control activity: 
AC-6.1. Establish an effective physical security management program 
based on risk. 
Audit procedures: 
Coordinate with sections SM-2 (assess and validate risks), SM-3 
(policies and procedures), SD-1 (segregation of duties), and CP-2 
(environmental controls). 

Control activity: 
AC-6.1. Establish an effective physical security management program 
based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.1.1. Use a risk management approach to identify the level of 
physical security needed for the facility and implement measures 
commensurate with the risks of physical damage or access. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview entity officials to discuss how their physical security 
program is organized and whether they use a risk management approach. 
Obtain and review any facility risk assessments performed by the entity 
or by independent entities. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.1. Establish an effective physical security management program 
based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.1.2. Facilities and areas housing sensitive and critical resources 
have been identified. The following generally constitute sensitive 
areas: computer rooms, tape libraries, telecommunication closets, 
mechanical/electrical rooms, cooling facilities and data transmission 
and power lines. 
Audit procedures: 
Review diagram of physical layout of the computer network, 
telecommunications, and cooling system facilities (for example, HVAC); 
Inspect these areas for physical access control weaknesses. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.1. Establish an effective physical security management program 
based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.1.3. All significant threats to the physical well-being of these 
resources have been identified and related risks determined. Interview 
agency officials. 
Audit procedures: 
Review risk analysis to ensure that it includes physical threats to 
employees and assets. Review any recent audit reports or other 
evaluations of the facilityï¿½s physical security. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.1. Establish an effective physical security management program 
based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.1.4. Establish law enforcement security liaisons that facilitate 
the accurate flow of timely security information between appropriate 
government agencies, provide procedures for the timely receipt and 
dissemination of threat information, and implement a standardized 
security/threat classifications and descriptions (for example, alert 
levels). 
Audit procedures: 
Check if the organization has established law enforcement security 
liaisons that facilitate the accurate flow of timely security 
information between appropriate government agencies. Review how the 
organization receives and disseminates security alerts. [Identify 
governmental agencies involved in the flow of security information and 
interview appropriate officials. Review procedures and nomenclature for 
threat information.] 

Control activity: 
AC-6.1. Establish an effective physical security management program 
based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.1.5. Conduct annual employee physical security awareness training. 
Coordinate this step with SM-4. 
Audit procedures: 
Review information (for example, individual training records, training 
program content) on security awareness training and its frequency. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.1. Establish an effective physical security management program 
based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.1.6. Security control procedures (for example, trusted 
vendors/suppliers, background checks, etc.) are established for non-
employees (contractors, custodial personnel). 
Audit procedures: 
Review security control procedures for scope and adequacy. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.1. Establish an effective physical security management program 
based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.1.7. Periodic monitoring and independent evaluations of the 
physical security program are conducted. Physical security incidents 
are effectively monitored and appropriate countermeasures are 
implemented. 
Audit procedures: 
Check if the agency evaluates its physical security program and 
controls. Obtain and review the agencyï¿½s most recent self assessments 
and compliance review report. Determine if security incidents are 
recorded, effectively analyzed, and result in appropriate 
countermeasures. Coordinate with SM-5: Monitor the effectiveness of the 
security program, and AC-5: Implement an effective audit and monitoring 
capability. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.1. Establish an effective physical security management program 
based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.1.8. When possible, do not co-locate high risk operations with non-
essential support organizations (for example, cafeteria, day care, 
banks, news media). If not possible, place appropriate security between 
such support organizations and critical facilities. 
Audit procedures: 
Identify co-located operations and their respective risk levels. 
Determine if the agency co-locates high risk operations with support 
operations and assess the security impact. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.1. Establish an effective physical security management program 
based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.1.9. Visitors, contractors, and maintenance personnel are 
authenticated through the use of preplanned appointments and 
identification checks. 
Audit procedures: 
Review appointment and verification procedures for visitors, 
contractors, and maintenance personnel. Compare actual practices to 
procedures. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.2.1. Control/restrict vehicle and pedestrian traffic around the 
facility based on the facilityï¿½s risk level. Specific measures include 
fences, gates, locks, guard posts, perimeter patrols and inspections. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if vehicle and pedestrian traffic around the facility is 
adequately controlled for the risk level. Inspect the perimeter for 
physical security and access control weaknesses. Assess the 
effectiveness of perimeter guard procedures and practices for 
controlling access to facility grounds. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.2.2. Control employee and visitor parking. For example, restrict 
access to facility parking and parking adjacent to the facility 
(including leases), use ID systems and procedures for authorized 
parking (for example, placard, decal, card key), have signs and 
arrangements for towing of unauthorized vehicles and adequate lighting 
for parking areas. 
Audit procedures: 
Observe parking area and related controls. Check if identification 
systems and procedures for authorized parking are in place. Determine 
what is done about unauthorized vehicles (e.g. towing). 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.2.3. Monitor the perimeter with closed circuit television (CCTV) 
including cameras with time lapse video recording and warning signs 
advising of 24 hour video surveillance. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect the facility surveillance camera system to assess its capacity 
and ability to assist in protecting the facilityï¿½s perimeter. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.2.4. Lighting is adequate for effective surveillance and 
evacuation operations. Emergency power backup exists for lighting (as 
well as for alarm and monitoring systems). 
Audit procedures: 
Observe perimeter and exterior building lighting to determine its 
adequacy. Also, determine if emergency power is available for security 
systems. Request test results. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.2.5. Extend perimeter barriers (for example, concrete, steel) and 
parking barriers, as needed, to prevent unauthorized access and reduce 
exposure to explosions. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if perimeter barriers are used and extended if appropriate. 
AC-6.3. Establish adequate security at entrances and exits based on 
risk. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.3.1. All employee access is authorized and credentials (for 
example, badges, identification cards, smart cards) are issued to allow 
access. 
Audit procedures: 
Observe and document all access control devices used to secure the 
facility. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.3.2. Access is limited to those individuals who routinely need 
access through the use of guards, identification badges, or entry 
devices such as key cards. 
Audit procedures: 
Observe entries to and exits from facilities during and after normal 
business hours. Obtain a list of employees and contractors with badged 
access and check the justification for such access. Check whether 
terminated employees/contractors have turned in their badge. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.3.3. Management conducts regular reviews of individuals with 
physical access to sensitive facilities to ensure such access is 
appropriate. 
Audit procedures: 
Review procedures used by management to ensure that individuals 
accessing sensitive facilities are adequately restricted. Evaluate 
support for physical access authorizations and determine 
appropriateness. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.3.4. Intrusion detection systems with central monitoring 
capability are used to control access outside of normal working hours 
(for example, nights and weekends). 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if an intrusion detection system is used and test its use for 
appropriate exterior and interior apertures. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.3.5. Visitor access logs are maintained and reviewed. 
Audit procedures: 
Compare entries in the log to a list of personnel authorized access. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.3.6. X-ray and magnetometer equipment is used to screen people, 
possessions, and packages. 
Audit procedures: 
Observe how this equipment is used and test its effectiveness. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.3.7. The entity controls information system-related items (i.e., 
hardware, firmware, software) entering and exiting the facility and 
maintains appropriate records of those items. 
Audit procedures: 
Review procedures and interview officials. Attempt to enter and exit 
the facility with information systems items at various entry points and 
times. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.3.8. Entry and exit points are monitored by using CCTV capability. 
Also, high security locks and alarm systems are required for all doors 
that are not guarded. 
Audit procedures: 
Observe use of these devices and test as appropriate. Inspect the 
building(s) for physical access control weaknesses. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.2. Establish adequate perimeter security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.3.9. Emergency exit and re-entry procedures ensure that only 
authorized personnel are allowed to reenter the facility after fire 
drills, etc. 
Audit procedures: 
Review written emergency procedures. Examine documentation supporting 
prior fire drills. Observe a fire drill. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.4. Establish adequate interior security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.4.1. An ID badge should generally be displayed at all times. [All 
individuals must display an ID at all times.] 
Audit procedures: 
Observe use of employee and visitor IDs. See what happens if you do not 
display your own ID. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.4. Establish adequate interior security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.4.2. Visitors such as vendors, contractors, and service personnel 
who need access to sensitive areas are prescreened, formally signed in, 
badged and escorted. Review visitor entry logs. 
Audit procedures: 
Observe entries to and exits from sensitive areas during and after 
normal business hours. Interview guards at facility entry. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.4. Establish adequate interior security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.4.3. Sensitive information technology and infrastructure resources 
are adequately secured (for example, using keys, alarm systems, 
security software and other access control devices), including: 
* the badging system, 
* computer room, master consoles, and tape libraries, 
* display and output devices, 
* data transmission lines, 
* power equipment and power cabling, 
* mobile or portable systems, and, 
* utility and mechanical areas (HVAC, elevator, water). 
Audit procedures: 
Interview officials. Walk through facilities and observe potential 
vulnerabilities and security controls [measures] used to protect 
sensitive information technology resources. Observe entries to and 
exits from sensitive areas during and after normal business hours. 
Review security software features and settings. Evaluate the badging 
system: who has access to the badging system and how it is protected; 
how is physical control is maintained over unissued and visitor badges. 
Test the controls. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.4. Establish adequate interior security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.4.4. Management conducts regular reviews of individuals with 
physical access to sensitive areas to ensure such access is 
appropriate. 
Audit procedures: 
Review procedures used by management to ensure that individuals 
accessing sensitive areas are adequately restricted. Determine if there 
is a periodic (e.g. annual) auditing and reconciliation of ID cards. 
Evaluate support for physical access authorizations and determine 
appropriateness. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.4. Establish adequate interior security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.4.5. As appropriate, physical access logs to sensitive areas are 
maintained and routinely reviewed. 
Audit procedures: 
Compare entries in the logs to a list of personnel authorized access. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.4. Establish adequate interior security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.4.6. Unissued keys, badges, or other entry devices are secured. 
Issued keys or other entry devices are regularly inventoried. 
Audit procedures:
Observe practices for safeguarding keys, badges, and other devices. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.4. Establish adequate interior security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.4.7. Entry codes are changed periodically. 
Audit procedures:
Review documentation of entry code changes. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.4. Establish adequate interior security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.4.8. All deposits and withdrawals of storage media from the 
library are authorized and logged. 
Audit procedures: 
Review procedures for the removal and return of storage media to and 
from the library. Select from the log some returns and withdrawals, 
verify the physical existence of the tape or other media, and determine 
whether proper authorization was obtained for the movement. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.4. Establish adequate interior security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.4.9. Documents/equipment are appropriately stored and are subject 
to maintenance and accountability procedures. 
Audit procedures: 
Examine and verify maintenance and accountability procedures for 
storage of documents and equipment. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.4. Establish adequate interior security based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.4.10. Critical systems have emergency power supplies (for example, 
all alarm systems, monitoring devices, entry control systems, exit 
lighting, communication systems). 
Audit procedures: 
Verify that critical systems, (e.g., alarm systems, monitoring devices, 
entry control systems, exit lighting, and communication systems) have 
emergency power supplies. Identify back up systems and procedures and 
determine the frequency of testing. Review testing results. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.5. Adequately protect against emerging threats, based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.5.1. Appropriate plans have been developed and controls 
implemented based on a risk assessment such as a shelter in place plan 
and/or evacuation plan for a potential CBR attack. [A plan is in place 
and tested to respond to emerging threats such as a CBR attack (e.g. an 
appropriate shelter in place and/or evacuation plan.) 
Audit procedures: 
Interview officials, review planning documents, and related test 
results. Observe and document the controls in place to mitigate 
emerging threats. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.5. Adequately protect against emerging threats, based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.5.2. Outdoor areas such as air intakes, HVAC return air grilles, 
and roofs have been secured by restricting public access and relocating 
or protecting critical entry points (for example, air intake vents, 
protective grills, etc.) 
Audit procedures: 
Observe location of these devices and identify security measures that 
have been implemented. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.5. Adequately protect against emerging threats, based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.5.3. All outdoor air intakes are monitored by CCTV, security 
lighting, and/or intrusion detection sensors. 
Audit procedures: 
Verify the existence of these controls. 

Control activity: 
AC-6.5. Adequately protect against emerging threats, based on risk. 
Control techniques: 
AC-6.5.4. The ventilation and air filtration system has been evaluated 
for vulnerabilities to CBR agents and remedial action taken based on 
cost and risks. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview officials and review the results of any evaluations. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

3.3. Configuration Management (CM): 

Configuration management (CM) involves the identification and 
management of security features for all hardware, software, and 
firmware components of an information system at a given point and 
systematically controls changes to that configuration during the 
systemï¿½s life cycle. At an entitywide level, management develops 
security policies that establish the agencyï¿½s configuration management 
process and may establish the configuration settings for the 
organization. Policy enforcement applications can be used to help 
administrators define and perform centralized monitoring and 
enforcement of an agencyï¿½s security policies. These tools examine 
desktop and server configurations that define authorized access to 
specified devices and they compare these settings against a baseline 
policy. At a system level, network management provides system 
administrators with the ability to control and monitor a computer 
network from a central location. Network management systems obtain 
status data from network components, enable network managers to make 
configuration changes, and alert them of problems. For each critical 
control point, at each system sublevel (for example, network, operating 
systems, and infrastructure applications), the entity should have 
configuration management controls to ensure that only authorized 
changes are made to such critical components. At a business process 
application level, all applications and changes to those applications 
should go through a formal, documented systems development process that 
identifies all changes to the baseline configuration. Also, procedures 
should ensure that no unauthorized software is installed. 

In some instances, the entity may not have an effective entitywide 
configuration management process, but may nonetheless have 
configuration management controls at the systems and business process 
application level. Therefore, evaluation of configuration controls at 
all levels is important to determine whether they are effective. 

FISMA requires each federal agency to determine minimally acceptable 
system configuration requirements and ensure compliance with them. 
Systems with secure configurations have less vulnerability and are 
better able to thwart network attacks. In response to both FISMA and 
the Cyber Security Research and Development Act, NIST developed a 
central repository for information technology security configuration 
checklists:[hyperlink, http://checklists.nist.gov]. Typically, 
checklists are created by information technology vendors for their own 
products; however, checklists are also created by other entities such 
as consortia, academia, and government agencies. Security configuration 
checklists are a series of instructions for configuring a product to a 
particular operational environment. Some examples of the types of 
devices and software for which security checklists are intended are as 
follows: 

* general purpose operating systems; 

* common desktop applications such as e-mail clients, Web browsers, 
word processing, personal firewalls, and antivirus software; 

* infrastructure devices such as routers, firewalls, virtual private 
network (VPN) gateways, intrusion detection systems (IDS), wireless 
access points (WAP), and telecom systems; 

* application servers such as domain name system (DNS) servers, dynamic 
host configuration protocol (DHCP) servers, Web servers, simple mail 
transfer protocol (SMTP) servers, file transfer protocol (FTP) servers, 
and database servers; 

* other network devices such as mobile devices, scanners, printers, 
copiers, and fax appliances. 

Industry best practices, NIST, and DOD guidance[Footnote 74] all 
recognize the importance of configuration management when developing 
and maintaining a system or network. Through configuration management, 
the composition of a system is formally defined and tracked to ensure 
that an unauthorized change is not introduced. Changes to an 
information system can have a significant impact on the security of the 
system. Documenting information system changes and assessing the 
potential impact on the security of the system on an ongoing basis is 
an essential aspect of maintaining the security posture. An effective 
entity configuration management and control policy and associated 
procedures are essential to ensuring adequate consideration of the 
potential security impact of specific changes to an information system. 
Configuration management and control procedures are critical to 
establishing an initial baseline of hardware, software, and firmware 
components for the entity and subsequently controlling and maintaining 
an accurate inventory of any changes to the system. 

An effective configuration management process consists of four primary 
concepts, each of which should be described in a configuration 
management plan and implemented according to the plan. The four are: 

* configuration identification: procedures for identifying, 
documenting, and assigning unique identifiers (for example, serial 
number and name) to a systemï¿½s hardware and software component parts 
and subparts, generally referred to as configuration items; 

* configuration control: procedures for evaluating and deciding whether 
to approve changes to a systemï¿½s baseline configuration; decision 
makers such as a configuration control board evaluate proposed changes 
on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks, and decide whether to 
permit a change; 

* configuration status accounting: procedures for documenting and 
reporting on the status of configuration items as a system evolves. 
Documentation, such as historical change lists and original designs or 
drawings, are generated and kept in a library, thereby allowing 
entities to continuously know the state of a systemï¿½s configuration and 
be in a position to make informed decisions about changing the 
configuration; 

* configuration auditing: procedures for determining alignment between 
the actual system and the documentation describing it, thereby ensuring 
that the documentation used to support decision making is complete and 
correct. Configuration audits are performed when a significant system 
change is introduced and help to ensure that only authorized changes 
are being made and that systems are operating securely and as intended. 

Establishing controls over the modification of information system 
components and related documentation helps to ensure that only 
authorized systems and related program modifications are implemented. 
This is accomplished by instituting policies, procedures, and 
techniques that help make sure all hardware, software, and firmware 
programs and program modifications are properly authorized, tested, and 
approved, and that access to and distribution of computer assets is 
carefully controlled. Without proper controls, there is a risk that 
security features could be inadvertently or deliberately omitted or 
turned off or that processing irregularities or malicious code could be 
introduced. For example, 

* a knowledgeable programmer could modify program code to provide a 
means of bypassing controls to gain access to sensitive data; 

* the wrong version of a program could be implemented, thereby 
perpetuating outdated or erroneous processing that is assumed to have 
been updated; or; 

* a virus could be introduced, inadvertently or on purpose, that 
disrupts processing. 

Effective configuration management prevents unauthorized changes to 
information system resources (for example, software programs and 
hardware configurations) and provides reasonable assurance that systems 
are configured and operating securely and as intended. 

The absence of effective system-level configuration management is a 
serious risk that jeopardizes an agencyï¿½s ability to support current 
and potential requirements. Without effective configuration management, 
users do not have adequate assurance that the system and network will 
perform as intended and to the extent needed to support their missions. 

Assessing controls over configuration management involves evaluating 
the agencyï¿½s success in performing each of the critical elements listed 
in table 22. Also, NIST SP 800-100 provides guidance in related 
configuration management programmatic areas of capital planning and 
investment control, and security services and product acquisition. This 
publication discusses practices designed to help security managers 
identify funding needs to secure systems and provide strategies for 
obtaining the necessary funding. In addition, it provides guidance to 
entities in applying risk management principles to assist in the 
identification and mitigation of risks associated with security 
services acquisitions. 

Table 22. Critical Elements for Configuration Management: 

Number: CM-1. 
Description: Develop and document CM policies, plans, and procedures ; 

Number: CM-2. 
Description: Maintain current configuration identification information; 

Number: CM-3. 
Description: Properly authorize, test, approve, and track all 
configuration changes; 

Number: CM-4. 
Description: Routinely monitor the configuration; 

CM-5. 
Description: Update software on a timely basis to protect against known 
vulnerabilities; 

Number: CM-6. 
Description: Appropriately document and approve emergency changes to 
the configuration. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element CM-1. Develop and document CM policies, plans, and 
procedures: 

Configuration management policies, plans, and procedures should be 
developed, documented, and implemented at the entitywide, system, and 
application levels to ensure an effective configuration management 
process. Such procedures should cover employee roles and 
responsibilities, change control and system documentation requirements, 
establishment of a decision-making structure, and configuration 
management training. CM should be a key part of an agencyï¿½s Systems 
Development Life Cycle (SDLC) methodology.[Footnote 75] 

An effective entitywide SDLC methodology details the procedures that 
are to be followed when systems and applications are being designed and 
developed, as well as when they are subsequently modified. The SDLC 
should provide a structured approach for identifying and documenting 
needed changes to computerized operations; assessing the costs and 
benefits of various options, including the feasibility of using off-the-
shelf software; and designing, developing, testing, and approving new 
systems and system modifications. It is especially important that, for 
new systems being developed or for major enhancements to existing 
systems, SDLC require approving design features at key points during 
the design and development process. For the methodology to be properly 
applied, it should be sufficiently documented to provide staff with 
clear and consistent guidance. Also, personnel involved in designing, 
developing, and implementing new systems and system modifications 
should be appropriately trained. This includes program staff who 
initiate requests for modifications and staff involved in designing, 
programming, testing, and approving changes. NIST SP 800-64, dated 
October 2003, identifies security considerations in the information 
system development life cycle. In addition, NIST SP 800-27 provides 
guidance on engineering principles for designing security into 
information systems. 

Configuration management policies and procedures should describe the 
configuration management process and address purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, compliance, and implementation of security controls. 
Security controls include the following. 

* A baseline configuration of the information system and an inventory 
of the systemï¿½s constituent components. 

* A process to document and control changes to the system. 

* Monitoring system changes and analysis of their impact to determine 
the effect of the changes. 

* Access restrictions over changes to the system and auditing of the 
enforcement actions. 

* Configuring the security settings of information technology products 
to the most restrictive mode consistent with operational requirements. 

* Configuring the information system to provide only essential 
capabilities and specifically prohibiting or restricting the use of 
unnecessary or dangerous functions, ports, protocols, and services. 

Good configuration management provides strict control over the 
implementation of system changes and thus minimizes corruption to 
information systems. 

Also, CM policies should address the introduction of software developed 
outside of the entityï¿½s normal software development process, including 
commercial or other software acquired by individual users. 

Configuration management plans should address configuration management 
in terms of the following:[Footnote 76] 

* responsibilities and authorities for accomplishing the planned 
activities (who); 

* activities to be performed (what); 

* required coordination of configuration management activities with 
other activities (when); 

* tools and physical and human resources required for the execution of 
the plan as well as how the plan will be kept current (how). 

The CM plan should describe the allocation of responsibilities and 
authorities for CM activities to entities and individuals within the 
project structure. Organizational units may consist of a vendor and 
customer, a prime contractor and subcontractors, or different groups 
within one entity. The name of the organizational unit or job title to 
perform this activity is provided for each activity listed within CM 
activities. A matrix that relates these entities to CM functions, 
activities, and tasks is useful for documenting CM activities. CM 
activities identify all functions and tasks required to mange the 
configuration as specified in the scope of the CM plan. CM activities 
are traditionally grouped into four functions: configuration 
identification, configuration control, configuration status accounting, 
and configuration audits and reviews. 

Configuration management procedures should describe the configuration 
management system used to maintain and change controlled work products. 
A configuration management system includes the storage media, the 
procedures, and the tools for accessing the configuration system. The 
procedures should describe how configuration items are stored and 
retrieved; shared between control levels; recovered; protected by 
access controls; and stored, updated, and retrieved. Configuration 
management plans should be integrated at all levels. 

CM-1 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
CM-1 Configuration Management Policy and Procedures. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CM-1: 

Table 23. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CM-1: Develop and document CM policies, plans, and 
procedures: 

Control activities: 
CM-1.1. CM policies, plans and procedures have been developed, 
documented, and implemented. 
Control techniques: 
CM-1.1.1. An effective configuration management process is documented 
and implemented, including: 
* a CM plan that identifies roles, responsibilities, procedures, and 
documentation requirements; 
* guidance that is appropriate for personnel with varying levels of 
skill and experience; 
* trained personnel who are familiar with the organizationï¿½s 
configuration management process; 
* permitting only essential capabilities and restricting the use of 
dangerous functions, ports, protocols, and services; 
* regular review and approval of configuration changes by management 
(for example, Configuration Control Board); 
* a formal SDLC methodology that includes system-level security 
engineering principles to be considered in the design, development, and 
operation of an information system. 
* appropriate systems documentation. 
Audit procedures: 
Review CM policies, plans, and procedures to identify roles, 
responsibilities, procedures, and documentation requirements. Determine 
if a CCB exists and is operating effectively. Interview staff and 
review training records. Interview hardware and software managers to 
identify the currency and completeness of CM policies, plans, 
procedures, and documentation. Review CM documentation and test whether 
recent changes are incorporated. Review the SDLC methodology and ensure 
that security is adequately considered throughout the life cycle. 
Review a selection of system documentation to verify that the SDLC 
methodology was followed and complies with appropriate guidance, such 
as NIST SP 800-64 and SP 800-27. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element CM-2. Maintain current configuration identification 
information: 

Configuration identification activities involve identifying, naming, 
and describing the physical and functional characteristics of a 
controlled item (for example, specifications, design, IP address, code, 
data element, architectural artifacts, and documents). The CM plan 
should describe how each configuration item and its versions are 
uniquely named. It should also describe the activities performed to 
define, track, store, manage, and retrieve configuration items. 
Configuration items should be associated with development and 
production baselines. 

The entity should maintain current configuration information in a 
formal configuration baseline that contains the configuration 
information formally designated at a specific time during a productï¿½s 
or product componentï¿½s life. Configuration baselines, plus approved 
changes from those baselines, constitute the current configuration 
information. There should be a current and comprehensive baseline 
inventory of hardware, software, and firmware, and it should be 
routinely validated for accuracy. Backup copies of the inventory should 
be maintained and adequately protected. There should also be 
information system diagrams and documentation on the set up of routers, 
switches, guards, firewalls, and any other devices facilitating 
connections to other systems. FISMA requires federal agency compliance 
with system configuration guidelines, as determined by the agency. In 
addition, OMB Memorandum M-07-11 [Footnote 77] requires agencies that 
upgrade to the Microsoft Vistaï¿½ operating system to adopt the security 
configurations developed by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS). 

CM-2 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
CM-2 Baseline Configuration; 
CM-6 Configuration Settings; 
CM-8 Information System Component Inventory; 
SA-5 Information System Documentation. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CM-2: 

Table 24. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CM-2: Maintain current configuration identification 
information: 

Control activities: 
CM-2.1. Current configuration identification information is maintained. 
Control techniques: 
CM-2.1.1. A current and comprehensive baseline inventory of hardware, 
software, and firmware is documented, backed up, and protected. 
Information system documentation describes security controls in 
sufficient detail to permit analysis and testing of controls. 
Audit procedures: 
Request an inventory of all computer assets and determine if the 
inventory is accurate, complete, and whether duplicate copies are 
adequately protected. Sample items in the inventory and trace to the 
asset and verify that the configuration (model, settings, etc.) is 
accurate. Sample assets at the entity and verify that they are 
accurately recorded in the inventory. 

Control activities: 
CM-2.1. Current configuration identification information is maintained. 
Control techniques: 
CM-2.1.2. Configuration settings optimize the systemï¿½s security 
features. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if key component security settings conform with NIST SP 800-
70 and vendor recommendations. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element CM-3. Properly authorize, test, approve, track, and 
control all configuration changes: 

An entity should properly control all configuration changes; not only 
changes made by internal developers but also changes made by external 
developers or contractors (see SM-7 for activities performed by 
external third parties). This includes a wide range of activities 
starting with the establishment of a formal change management process. 
Management should authorize and approve all configuration changes. Test 
plan standards should be developed for all levels of testing and test 
plans should be documented and approved by all responsible parties. 
Testing should be comprehensive and appropriately consider security and 
impacts on interfacing systems. An audit trail should be made to 
clearly document and track the configuration changes. 

Authorizations for system and application software modifications should 
be documented and maintained. Policies and procedures should be in 
place that detail who can authorize a modification and how these 
authorizations are to be documented. Generally, the application users 
have the primary responsibility for authorizing system changes; 
however, users should be required to discuss their proposed changes 
with systems developers to confirm that the change is feasible and cost 
effective. For this reason, an entity may require a senior systems 
developer to co-authorize a change. The use of standardized change 
request forms helps ensure that requests are clearly communicated and 
that approvals are documented. Authorization documentation should be 
maintained for at least as long as a system is in operation in case 
questions arise regarding why or when system modifications were made. 
Authorization documents may be maintained in either paper or electronic 
form as long as their integrity is protected. 

Configuration control activities involve activities that request, 
evaluate, approve, disapprove, or implement changes to baseline 
configuration items. Changes encompass both error correction and 
enhancements. The configuration management plan should identify each 
level of decision making (for example, CCB[Footnote 78]) and its level 
of authority for approving proposed system and application changes and 
its management of development and production baselines. 

The configuration status accounting process records and reports the 
status of configuration items. The following are minimum data elements 
to be tracked for a configuration item: (1) its initial approved 
version, (2) the status of requested changes, and (3) the 
implementation status of approved changes. The level of detail and 
specific data required may vary according to the information needs of 
the project and the customer. 

A disciplined process for testing and approving new and modified 
systems before their implementation is essential to make sure systems 
hardware and related programs operate as intended and that no 
unauthorized changes are introduced. Test plans should appropriately 
consider security. The extent of testing varies depending on the type 
of modification. For new systems being developed or major system 
enhancements, testing will be extensive, generally progressing through 
a series of test stages that include (1) testing individual program 
modules (unit testing), (2) testing groups of modules that must work 
together (integration testing), and (3) testing an entire system 
(system testing). Minor modifications may require less extensive 
testing; however, changes should still be carefully controlled and 
approved since relatively minor program code changes, if performed 
incorrectly, can have a significant impact on security and overall data 
reliability. 

Once a change has been authorized, it should be implemented, written 
into the program code, and tested in a disciplined manner. Because 
testing is an iterative process that is generally performed at several 
levels, it is important that the entity adhere to a formal set of 
configuration management procedures or standards for prioritizing, 
scheduling, testing, and approving changes. These procedures should be 
described in the agencyï¿½s configuration management plan and should 
include requirements for: 

* ranking and scheduling configuration changes so that authorized 
change requests are not lost and are implemented efficiently and in 
accordance with user needs; 

* preparing detailed specifications for the configuration change, which 
are approved by an individual responsible for supervising programming 
activities to confirm that the specifications correspond to the userï¿½s 
authorized requirements; 

* developing a detailed test plan for each modification that defines 
the levels and types of tests to be performed; 

* defining responsibilities for each person involved in testing and 
approving software (for example, systems analysts, programmers, quality 
assurance staff, auditors, library control personnel, and usersï¿½who 
should participate in testing and approve test results before 
implementation), including determining that testing is performed by 
parties independent of development; 

* developing related configuration changes to system documentation, 
including hardware documentation, operating procedures, and user 
procedures; 

* supervisory review and documented approvals by appropriate personnel, 
including programming supervisors, database administrators, and other 
technical personnel before and after testing; 

* maintaining controlled libraries of software in different stages of 
development to ensure that programs being developed or tested are not 
interchanged with each other or with production software; 

* documenting configuration/software changes so that they can be traced 
from authorization to the final approved code and facilitating ï¿½trace-
backï¿½ of code to design specifications and functional requirements by 
system testers; and; 

* obtaining final user acceptance only after testing is successfully 
completed and reviewed by the user. 

To ensure that approved software programs are protected from 
unauthorized changes or impairment and that different versions are not 
misidentified, copies should be maintained in carefully controlled 
libraries. Further, adequately controlled software libraries help 
ensure that there is (1) a copy of the official approved version of a 
program available in case the integrity of an installed version is 
called into question and (2) a permanent historical record of old 
program versions. 

Separate libraries should be established for programs being developed 
or modified, programs being tested by users, and programs approved for 
use (production programs). Access to these libraries should be limited 
and movement of programs and data among them should be controlled. 

Inadequately controlled software libraries increase the risk that 
unauthorized changes could be made either inadvertently or deliberately 
for fraudulent or malicious purposes. In addition, inadequate controls 
over programs being developed or modified could make it difficult to 
determine which version of the program is the most recent. Such an 
environment can result in inefficiencies and could lead to 
interruptions of service and monetary losses. For example, 

* an unauthorized program could be substituted for the authorized 
version; 

* test programs could be labeled as production programs; 

* two programmers could inadvertently access and work on the same test 
program version simultaneously, making it difficult or impossible to 
merge their work; or; 

* unauthorized changes to either test or production programs could be 
made and remain undetected. 

Copies of software programs should be maintained in libraries where 
they are labeled, dated, inventoried, and organized in a way that 
diminishes the risk that programs will be misidentified or lost. 
Library management software provides an automated means of inventorying 
software (ensuring that differing versions are not accidentally 
misidentified) and maintaining a record of software changes. 
Specifically, such software can be used to: 

* produce audit trails of program changes and maintain version number 
control, 

* record and report program changes made, 

* automatically number program versions, 

* identify creation date information, 

* maintain copies of previous versions, and; 

* control concurrent updates so that multiple programmers are prevented 
from making changes to the same program in an uncontrolled manner. 

The movement of programs and data among libraries should be controlled 
by an entity group or person that is independent of both the user and 
the programming staff. This group should be responsible for: 

* moving programs from development/maintenance to user testing and from 
user testing to production; 

* supplying data from the production library for testing and creating 
test data; and; 

* controlling different program versions, especially when more than one 
change is being performed on a program concurrently. 

Before transferring a tested program from the user test library to the 
production library, the independent library control group should (1) 
generate a report that shows all changed source code (lines added, 
changed, and deleted) and (2) compare this report to the user request 
to ensure that only approved changes were made. 

Many federal agencies have data processing operations that involve 
multiple locations and require a coordinated effort for effective and 
controlled distribution and implementation of new or revised software. 
For example, an entity may have a central software design, development, 
and maintenance activity, but have two or more regional data processing 
centers running the same software. Once a modified software program has 
been approved for use, the change should be communicated to all 
affected parties and distributed and implemented in a way that leaves 
no doubt about when it is to begin affecting processing. To accomplish 
these objectives, an entity should have and follow established 
procedures for announcing approved changes and their implementation 
dates and for making the revised software available to those who need 
to begin using it. 

Source code programs (the code created by programmers) are compiled 
into object or production code programs that are machine-readable and 
become the versions that are actually used during data processing. 
Source code programs should be closely controlled at a central location 
and compiled into production programs before being distributed. Source 
code should not be distributed to other locations. This helps protect 
the source code from unauthorized changes and increases the integrity 
of the object or production code, which is much more difficult for 
programmers to change without access to the source code. Inadequately 
controlling software distribution and implementation increases the risk 
that data could be improperly processed due to: 

* implementation of unapproved and possibly malicious software, 

* continued use of outdated versions of software, and; 

* inconsistent implementation dates resulting in inconsistent 
processing of similar data at different locations. 

With independent processing sites, each site is responsible for 
implementing the correct version of the software at the predetermined 
date and time and maintaining the documentation authorizing such 
implementation. Conversely, implementing new software through one or 
more central computers or servers minimizes the risk that the software 
will be inconsistently implemented. 

The use of public domain and personal software should be restricted. It 
is important that an entity have clear policies regarding the use of 
personal and public domain software by employees at work. Allowing 
employees to use their own software or even diskettes for data storage 
that have been used elsewhere increases the risk of introducing 
viruses. It also increases the risk of violating copyright laws and 
making bad decisions based on incorrect information produced by 
erroneous software. As mentioned in section CM-5, virus identification 
software can help contain damage from viruses that may be introduced 
from unauthorized use of public domain, from personal software, or from 
corrupted diskettes. 

CM-3 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
CM-3 Configuration Change Control; 
SA-2 Allocation of Resources; 
SA-3 Life Cycle Support; 
SA-4 Acquisitions; 
SA-8 Security Engineering Principles; 
SA-10 Developer Configuration Management; 
SA-11 Developer Security Testing. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CM-3: 

Table 25. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CM-3: Properly authorize, test, approve, and track all 
configuration changes: 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Audit procedures: 
Where appropriate, these audit procedures should be applied to both 
internal and external developers and coordinated with section SM-7. 
(Ensure that activities performed by external third parties are 
adequately secure.) 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques: 
CM-3.1.1. An appropriate formal change management process is 
documented. 
Audit procedures: 
Review the change management methodology for appropriateness. Review 
system documentation to verify that the change management methodology 
was followed. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques: 
CM-3.1.2. Configuration changes are authorized by management. 
Configuration management actions are recorded in sufficient detail so 
that the content and status of each configuration item is known and 
previous versions can be recovered. 
Audit procedures: 
Examine a selection of CM and software change request forms for 
approvals and sufficiency of detail. Interview CM management and 
software development staff. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques: 
CM-3.1.3. Relevant stakeholders have access to and knowledge of the 
configuration status of the configuration items. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview users and ensure that they have ready access to software 
change requests, test reports, and configuration items associated with 
the various baselines being managed. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques: 
CM-3.1.4. Detailed specifications are prepared by the programmer and 
reviewed by a programming supervisor for system and application 
software changes. 
Audit procedures: 
For the software change requests selected for control activity CM-
3.1.2: 
* review specifications and related documentation for evidence of 
supervisory review. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques: 
CM-3.1.5. Test plan standards have been developed for all levels of 
testing that define responsibilities for each party (for example, 
users, system analysts, programmers, auditors, quality assurance, 
library control). 
Audit procedures: 
Review test plan standards. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques: 
CM-3.1.6. Test plans are documented and approved that define 
responsibilities for each party involved (for example, users, systems 
analysts, programmers, auditors, quality assurance, library control). 
Audit procedures: 
For the software change requests selected for control activity CM-
3.1.2: 
* review test plans; 
* compare test documentation with related test plans; 
* analyze test failures to determine if they indicate ineffective 
software testing; 
* review test transactions and data; 
* review test results; 
* review documentation for appropriate supervisory or management 
reviews; 
* verify user acceptance; and; 
* review updated documentation. Determine whether operational systems 
experience a high number of system failures (for example, bends) and, 
if so, whether they indicate inadequate testing before implementation. 
Examine a selection of program changes to determine whether they were 
approved by management prior to being moved to production. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques: 
CM-3.1.7. Test plans include appropriate consideration of security. 
Audit procedures: 
For the software change requests selected for control activity CM-
3.1.2: 
* review test plans; 
* compare test documentation with related test plans; 
* analyze test failures to determine if they indicate ineffective 
software testing; 
* review test transactions and data; 
* review test results; 
* review documentation for appropriate supervisory or management 
reviews; 
* verify user acceptance; and; 
* review updated documentation. Determine whether operational systems 
experience a high number of system failures (for example, bends) and, 
if so, whether they indicate inadequate testing before implementation. 
Examine a selection of program changes to determine whether they were 
approved by management prior to being moved to production. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques: 
CM-3.1.8. Unit, integration, and system testing are performed and 
approved in accordance with the test plan and apply a sufficient range 
of valid and invalid conditions. 
Audit procedures: 
For the software change requests selected for control activity CM-
3.1.2: 
* review test plans; 
* compare test documentation with related test plans; 
* analyze test failures to determine if they indicate ineffective 
software testing; 
* review test transactions and data; 
* review test results; 
* review documentation for appropriate supervisory or management 
reviews; 
* verify user acceptance; and; 
* review updated documentation. Determine whether operational systems 
experience a high number of system failures (for example, bends) and, 
if so, whether they indicate inadequate testing before implementation. 
Examine a selection of program changes to determine whether they were 
approved by management prior to being moved to production. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques: 
CM-3.1.9. A comprehensive set of test transactions and data is 
developed that represents the various activities and conditions that 
will be encountered in processing. 
Audit procedures: 
For the software change requests selected for control activity CM-
3.1.2: 
* review test plans; 
* compare test documentation with related test plans; 
* analyze test failures to determine if they indicate ineffective 
software testing; 
* review test transactions and data; 
* review test results; 
* review documentation for appropriate supervisory or management 
reviews; 
* verify user acceptance; and; 
* review updated documentation. Determine whether operational systems 
experience a high number of system failures (for example, bends) and, 
if so, whether they indicate inadequate testing before implementation. 
Examine a selection of program changes to determine whether they were 
approved by management prior to being moved to production. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques: 
CM-3.1.10. Live data are not used in testing of program changes, except 
to build test data files. 
Audit procedures: 
For the software change requests selected for control activity CM-
3.1.2: 
* review test plans; 
* compare test documentation with related test plans; 
* analyze test failures to determine if they indicate ineffective 
software testing; 
* review test transactions and data; 
* review test results; 
* review documentation for appropriate supervisory or management 
reviews; 
* verify user acceptance; and; 
* review updated documentation. Determine whether operational systems 
experience a high number of system failures (for example, bends) and, 
if so, whether they indicate inadequate testing before implementation. 
Examine a selection of program changes to determine whether they were 
approved by management prior to being moved to production. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques: 
CM-3.1.11. Test results are documented and appropriate responsive 
actions are taken based on the results. 
Audit procedures: 
For the software change requests selected for control activity CM-
3.1.2: 
* review test plans; 
* compare test documentation with related test plans; 
* analyze test failures to determine if they indicate ineffective 
software testing; 
* review test transactions and data; 
* review test results; 
* review documentation for appropriate supervisory or management 
reviews; 
* verify user acceptance; and; 
* review updated documentation. Determine whether operational systems 
experience a high number of system failures (for example, bends) and, 
if so, whether they indicate inadequate testing before implementation. 
Examine a selection of program changes to determine whether they were 
approved by management prior to being moved to production. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques:
CM-3.1.12. Program changes are moved into production only when approved 
by management and by persons independent of the programmer. 
Audit procedures: 
For the software change requests selected for control activity CM-
3.1.2: 
* review test plans; 
* compare test documentation with related test plans; 
* analyze test failures to determine if they indicate ineffective 
software testing; 
* review test transactions and data; 
* review test results; 
* review documentation for appropriate supervisory or management 
reviews; 
* verify user acceptance; and; 
* review updated documentation. Determine whether operational systems 
experience a high number of system failures (for example, bends) and, 
if so, whether they indicate inadequate testing before implementation. 
Examine a selection of program changes to determine whether they were 
approved by management prior to being moved to production. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques:
CM-3.1.13. Standardized procedures are used to distribute new software 
for implementation. 
Audit procedures: 
Examine procedures for distributing new software. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques:
CM-3.1.14. Appropriate tools (for example, library mgt.software and 
manual techniques) are used to: 
* produce audit trails of program changes, 
* maintain program version numbers, 
* record and report program changes, 
* maintain creation/date information for production modules, 
* maintain copies of previous versions, and, 
* control concurrent updates. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures. Interview personnel 
responsible for appropriate tools and library control. Examine a 
selection of programs maintained in the library and assess compliance 
with prescribed procedures. Determine whether documentation is 
maintained on program changes, program version numbers, creation/date 
information, and copies of prior versions. Review procedures for 
controlling concurrent updates. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques:
CM-3.1.15. Configuration/software changes are documented so that they 
can be traced from authorization to the final approved code and they 
facilitate ï¿½trace-backï¿½ of code to design specifications and functional 
requirements by system testers.
Audit procedures: 
For the software change requests selected for control activity CM-
3.1.2: 
* trace changes from authorization to the final approved code; and, 
* trace changes back from code to design specifications and functional 
requirements. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques:
CM-3.1.16. Program development and maintenance, testing, and production 
programs are maintained separately (for example, libraries) and 
movement between these areas is appropriately controlled, including 
appropriate consideration of segregation of duties (see the Segregation 
of Duties control area. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures and interview library control 
personnel. Examine libraries in use. Test access to program libraries 
by examining security system parameters. Review program changes 
procedures for adherence to appropriate segregation of duties between 
application programming and movement of programs into production. For a 
selection of program changes, examine related documentation to verify 
that (1) procedures for authorizing movement among libraries were 
followed and (2) before and after images were compared. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques:
CM-3.1.17. Access to all programs, including production code, source 
code, and extra program copies, are adequately protected. 
Audit procedures: 
For critical software production programs, determine whether access 
control software rules are clearly defined. Test access to program 
libraries by examining security system parameters. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques:
CM-3.1.18. Configuration changes to network devices (for example, 
routers and firewalls) are properly controlled and documented. 
Audit procedures: 
Review a sample of configuration settings to key devices and determine 
if configuration changes are adequately controlled and documented. 

Control activities: 
CM-3.1. All configuration changes are properly managed (authorized, 
tested, approved, and tracked). 
Control techniques:
CM-3.1.19. Clear policies restricting the use of personal and public 
domain software and prohibiting violations of software licensing 
agreements have been developed and are enforced. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures. Interview users and data 
processing staff. Review and test management enforcement process. 

Source GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element CM-4. Routinely monitor the configuration: 

Current configuration information should be routinely monitored for 
accuracy. Monitoring should address the current baseline and 
operational configuration of the hardware, software, and firmware that 
comprise the information system. Information technology products should 
comply with applicable standards and the vendorsï¿½ good security 
practices. The entity should have the capability to monitor and test 
that it is functioning as intended. Also, networks should be 
appropriately configured and monitored to adequately protect access 
paths between information systems. 

Monitoring, sometimes called configuration audits, should be 
periodically conducted to determine the extent to which the actual 
configuration item reflects the required physical and functional 
characteristics originally specified by requirements. The configuration 
plan should identify the frequency of configuration audits. A 
configuration audit should be performed on a configuration item before 
its release and it should be routinely tested thereafter. Configuration 
audits establish that the functional and performance requirements 
defined in the configuration documentation have been achieved by the 
design and that the design has been accurately documented in the 
configuration document. The purpose and benefits of the process include 
the following: 

* Ensures that the product design provides the agreed-to performance 
capabilities; 

* Validates the integrity of the configuration documentation; 

* Verifies the consistency between a product and its configuration 
documentation; 

* Determines that an adequate process is in place to provide continuing 
control of the configuration; 

* Provides confidence in establishing a product baseline; 

* Ensures a known configuration as the basis for operation and 
maintenance instructions, and training. Security settings for network 
devices, operating systems, and infrastructure applications need to be 
monitored periodically to ensure that they have not been altered and 
that they are set in the most restrictive mode consistent with the 
information system operational requirements. NIST SP 800-70 provides 
guidance on configuration settings (for example, checklists) for 
information technology products. 

A process and related procedures needs to be established to document 
the results from monitoring configuration items and ensure that 
discrepancies are properly corrected. For example, network and host 
environments should be scanned on a regular basis to determine whether 
patches have been effectively applied. A formal process with central 
management helps to ensure patch compliance with the network 
configuration. Audit results need to be recorded indicating: 

* each discrete requirement, 
* method of verification, 
* verification procedures, 
* verification results, and; 
* corrective actions. 

CM-4 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
CM-4 Monitoring Configuration Changes; 
CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change; 
SI-7 Software and Information Integrity. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CM-4: 

Table 26. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CM-4: Routinely monitor the configuration: 

Control activities: 
CM-4.1. The configuration is routinely audited and verified. 
Control techniques: 
CM-4.1.1. Routinely validate that the current configuration information 
is accurate, up-to-date, and working as intended for networks, 
operating systems, and infrastructure applications. 
Audit procedures: 
Identify the standards and procedures used to audit and verify the 
system configuration. Determine when and how often the configuration is 
verified and audited. Review a sample of the configuration 
verifications and audits for compliance with applicable standards. 
Verify that vendor-supplied system software is still supported by the 
vendor. Evaluate adequacy of the configuration audits based on the 
results of the IS control audit tests performed. 

Control activities: 
CM-4.1. The configuration is routinely audited and verified. 
Control techniques: 
CM-4.1.2. The verification and validation criteria for the 
configuration audit is appropriate and specifies how the configuration 
item will be evaluated in terms of correctness, consistency, necessity, 
completeness, and performance. 
Audit procedures: 
Review evaluation criteria for the release. Identify all configuration 
items, deviations and waivers, and the status of tests. Determine if 
configuration items have gaps in the documentation or if there are 
defects in the change management process. 

Control activities: 
CM-4.1. The configuration is routinely audited and verified. 
Control techniques: 
CM-4.1.3. Confirm compliance with applicable configuration management 
policy, plans, standards, and procedures. 
Audit procedures: 
Compare configuration policy, plans, standards, and procedures with 
observations. 

Control activities: 
CM-4.1. The configuration is routinely audited and verified. 
Control techniques: 
CM-4.1.4. The information system periodically verifies the correct 
operation of security functionsï¿½on system start up and restart, on 
command by user with appropriate privilegeï¿½(providing system audit 
trail documentation) and takes appropriate action (for example, 
notifies system administrator, shuts the system down, restarts the 
system) when anomalies are discovered. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview officials and review related system documentation. Observe or 
test this system capability to determine that procedures are followed 
and related system documentation is generated and reviewed by entity 
security staff. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element CM-5. Update software on a timely basis to protect 
against known vulnerabilities: 

Software should be scanned and updated frequently to guard against 
known vulnerabilities. In addition to periodically looking for software 
vulnerabilities and fixing them, security software should be kept 
current by establishing effective programs for patch management, virus 
protection, and other emerging threats. Also, software releases should 
be adequately controlled to prevent the use of noncurrent software. 

Vulnerability scanning: 

Using appropriate vulnerability scanning tools and techniques, entity 
management should scan for vulnerabilities in the information system or 
when significant new vulnerabilities affecting the system are 
identified and reported. Audit procedures include review of the 
scanning methodology and related results to ensure that significant 
vulnerabilities are remediated in a timely manner. (See section SM-5.1, 
table 9, for a description of vulnerability scanning.) 

Patch management[Footnote 79]: 

Patch management is a critical process used to help alleviate many of 
the challenges involved with securing computing systems from attack. A 
component of configuration management, it includes acquiring, testing, 
applying, and monitoring patches to a computer system. Flaws in 
software code that could cause a program to malfunction generally 
result from programming errors that occur during software development. 
The increasing complexity and size of software programs contribute to 
the growth in software flaws. While most flaws do not create security 
vulnerabilities, the potential for these errors reflects the difficulty 
and complexity involved in delivering trustworthy code. 

The federal government has taken several steps to address security 
vulnerabilities that affect agency systems, including efforts to 
improve patch management. Specific actions include (1) requiring 
agencies to annually report on their patch management practices as part 
of their implementation of FISMA, (2) identifying vulnerability 
remediation as a critical area of focus in the Presidentï¿½s National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and (3) creating USï¿½CERT. 

* FISMA permanently authorized and strengthened the information 
security program, evaluation, and reporting requirements established 
for federal agencies in prior legislation.[Footnote 80] In accordance 
with OMBï¿½s reporting instructions for FISMA implementation, maintaining 
up-to-date patches is part of FISMAï¿½s system configuration management 
requirements. 

* The Presidentï¿½s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, issued on 
February 14, 2003, identifies priorities, actions, and responsibilities 
for the federal government as well as for state and local governments 
and the private sector. This strategy identifies the reduction and 
remediation of software vulnerabilities as a critical area of focus. 

* The US-CERT is intended to aggregate and disseminate cybersecurity 
information to improve warning and response to incidents, increase 
coordination of response information, reduce vulnerabilities, and 
enhance prevention and protection. Services include notification of 
software vulnerabilities and information on applicable patches. 

Common patch management practices in security-related literature from 
several groups, including NIST, Microsoft, patch management software 
vendors, and other computer security experts include the following 
elements: 

* centralized patch management support and clearly assigned 
responsibilities; 

* senior executive support and assurance that appropriate patches are 
deployed; 

* standardized patch management policies, procedures, and tools; 

* skills, knowledge, and training to perform patch management 
responsibilities; 

* current technology inventory of all hardware, software, and services 
that are used; 

* risk assessment based on the criticality of the vulnerability and 
importance of the system; 

* thorough testing before the patch is applied in a production 
environment; 

* monitoring through network and host vulnerability scanning; and; 

* timely notification of relevant vulnerabilities and distribution of 
critical patches. 

Virus protection: 

Protecting information systems from malicious computer viruses and 
worms[Footnote 81] is a serious challenge. Computer attack tools and 
techniques are becoming increasingly sophisticated; viruses are 
spreading faster as a result of the increasing connectivity of todayï¿½s 
networks; commercial-off-the-shelf products can be easily exploited for 
attack by all their users; and there is no ï¿½silver bulletï¿½ solution 
such as firewalls or encryption to protect systems. To combat viruses 
and worms specifically, entities should take steps such as ensuring 
that security personnel are adequately trained to respond to early 
warnings of attacks and keeping antivirus programs up-to-date. 
Strengthening intrusion detection capabilities and effective patch 
management programs also help. 

According to NIST, the information system (including servers, 
workstations, and mobile computing devices) should implement malicious 
code protection that includes a capability for automatic updates. Virus 
definitions should be kept up-to-date. Virus-scanning software should 
be provided at critical entry points, such as remote-access servers and 
at each desktop system on the network. Anti-viral mechanisms should be 
used to detect and eradicate viruses in incoming and outgoing e-mail 
and attachments. 

Emerging threats: 

Entities are facing a set of emerging cybersecurity threats that are 
the result of changing sources of attack, increasingly sophisticated 
social engineering techniques designed to trick the unsuspecting user 
into divulging sensitive information, new modes of covert compromise, 
and the blending of once distinct attacks into more complex and 
damaging exploits. Advances in antispam measures have caused spammers 
to increase the sophistication of their techniques to bypass detection; 
the frequency and sophistication of phishing[Footnote 82] attacks have 
likewise increased, and spyware[Footnote 83] has proven to be difficult 
to detect and remove. 

The risks that entities face are significant. Spam consumes employee 
and technical resources and can be used as a delivery mechanism for 
malware[Footnote 84] and other cyberthreats. Entities and their 
employees can be victims of phishing scams, and spyware puts the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of entity systems at 
serious risk. Other emerging threats include the increased 
sophistication of worms, viruses, and other malware, and the increased 
attack capabilities of blended threats and botnets.[Footnote 85] 

The transition to the new Internet protocol version 6 (IPv6) creates 
new security risks. The Internet protocol provides the addressing 
mechanism that defines how and where information moves across 
interconnected networks. The key characteristics of IPv6 are designed 
to increase address space, promote flexibility and functionality, and 
enhance security. However, as IPv6-capable software and devices 
accumulate in entity networks, they could be abused by attackers if not 
managed properly. Specifically, some existing firewalls and intrusion 
detection systems do not provide IPv6 detection or filtering 
capability, and malicious users might be able to send IPv6 traffic 
through these security devices undetected. Configuration management can 
mitigate this threat by tightening firewalls to deny direct outbound 
connections and tuning intrusion detection systems to detect IPv6 
traffic. 

Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies may also cause damage 
to the information system if used maliciously. To mitigate this threat, 
the entity should establish usage restrictions and implementation 
guidance for VoIP and document, monitor, and control the use of VoIP. 
NIST SP 800-58 provides guidance on security considerations for VOIP 
technologies employed in information systems. 

An effective security program can assist in entity efforts to mitigate 
and respond to these emerging cybersecurity threats. First of all, the 
risks of emerging cybersecurity threats should be addressed as part of 
required entitywide information security programs, which include 
performing periodic assessments of risk. Secondly, security controls 
commensurate with the identified risk should be implemented. Thirdly, 
ensuring security awareness training for entity personnel is critical. 
Comprehensive procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to 
security incidents should be implemented. An effective security 
program, related control techniques, and proposed audit procedures are 
discussed in the security management section of FISCAM. 

As part of the entity security program, effective configuration of 
layered security (Defense-in-Depth) mitigates the risks from individual 
cybersecurity threats. Layered security implemented within an agencyï¿½s 
security architecture includes the use of strong passwords, patch 
management, antivirus software, firewalls, software security settings, 
backup files, vulnerability assessments, and intrusion detection 
systems. Figure 5 depicts an example of how entities can use layered 
security controls to mitigate the risks of individual cybersecurity 
threats. 

Figure 5. Layered Security Mitigates the Risk of Individual 
Cybersecurity Threats: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of how layered security mitigates the 
risk of individual cybersecurity threats. 

The following information is depicted: 

Current individual threats: 
Internet: 
* Virus; 
* Spam; 
* Worm; 
* Spyware; 
* Phishing. 

Network controls: 
Intrusion detection system:
* Firewall; 
* E-mail spam filter; 
* E-mail antivirus. 

Workstation controls: 
* Personal firewalls; 
* Desktop antivirus; 
* Workstation configuration. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: Excerpt from GAO, Cybersecurity Issues Threaten Federal 
Information Systems, GAO-05-231 (Washington, D.C.: May 2005). 

[End of figure] 

Noncurrent software: 

Procedures should ensure that only current software releases are 
installed in information systems. Noncurrent software may be vulnerable 
to malicious code such as viruses and worms. 

As mentioned previously under CM-3, many federal agencies have data 
processing operations that involve multiple locations and require a 
coordinated effort for effective and controlled distribution and 
implementation of new or revised software. This can include virus 
protection software and operating system patches. Once a modified 
software program has been approved for use, the change should be 
communicated to all affected parties and distributed and implemented in 
a way that leaves no doubt about when it is to begin affecting 
processing. Inadequately controlling virus software distribution and 
system patches increases the risk that data could be improperly 
processed or lose its confidentiality due to computer viruses and 
hackers breaking into the database. 

Software usage: 

Policies and procedures should be implemented to reasonably assure that 
the entity complies with software usage restrictions. In addition, the 
entity should have policies and procedures implemented that address the 
installation of software by users and procedures to determine that such 
policies and procedures are adhered to. 

CM-5 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning; 
SA-6 Software Usage Restrictions; 
SA-7 User Installed Software; 
SC-19 Voice Over Internet Protocol; 
SI-2 Flaw Remediation; 
SI-3 Malicious Code Protection; 
SI-5 Security Alerts and Advisories; 
SI-8 Spam Protection. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CM-5: 

Table 27. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CM-5: Update software on a timely basis to protect 
against known vulnerabilities: 

Control activities: 
CM-5.1. Software is promptly updated to protect against known 
vulnerabilities. 
Control techniques: 
CM-5.1.1. Information systems are scanned periodically to detect known 
vulnerabilities. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview entity officials. Identify the criteria and methodology used 
for scanning, tools used, frequency, recent scanning results, and 
related corrective actions. Coordinate this work with the AC section. 

Control activities: 
CM-5.1. Software is promptly updated to protect against known 
vulnerabilities. 
Control techniques: 
CM-5.1.2. An effective patch management process is documented and 
implemented, including: 
* identification of systems affected by recently announced software 
vulnerabilities; 
* prioritization of patches based on system configuration and risk; 
* appropriate installation of patches on a timely basis, including 
testing for effectiveness and potential side effects on the agencyï¿½s 
systems; and; 
* verification that patches, service packs, and hotfixes were 
appropriately installed on affected systems. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures. Interview users and data 
processing staff. 

Control activities: 
CM-5.1. Software is promptly updated to protect against known 
vulnerabilities. 
Control techniques: 
CM-5.1.3. Software is up-to-date; the latest versions of software 
patches are installed. 
Audit procedures: 
Compare vendor recommended patches to those installed on the system. If 
patches are not up-to-date, determine why they have not been installed. 

Control activities: 
CM-5.1. Software is promptly updated to protect against known 
vulnerabilities. 
Control techniques: 
CM-5.1.4. An effective virus, spam, and spyware protection process is 
documented and implemented, including: 
* appropriate policies and procedures; 
* effective protection software is installed that identifies and 
isolates suspected viruses, spam, and spyware; and; 
* virus, spam, and spyware definitions are up-to-date. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures. Interview users and data 
processing staff. Verify that actual software is installed and up-to-
date. 

Control activities: 
CM-5.1. Software is promptly updated to protect against known 
vulnerabilities. 
Control techniques: 
CM-5.1.5. The entity: (1) establishes usage restrictions and 
implementation guidance for IPv6 technology based on the potential to 
cause damage to the information system if used maliciously and (2) 
documents, monitors, and controls the use of IPv6 within the 
information system. Appropriate organizational officials authorize the 
use of IPv6. 
Audit procedures: 
Review policies and procedures for IPv6. Determine if known security 
vulnerabilities are mitigated by appropriate protective measures. 

Control activities: 
CM-5.1. Software is promptly updated to protect against known 
vulnerabilities. 
Control techniques: 
CM-5.1.6. The entity: (1) establishes usage restrictions and 
implementation guidance for VoIP technologies based on the potential to 
cause damage to the information system if used maliciously and (2) 
documents, monitors, and controls the use of VoIP within the 
information system. Appropriate organizational officials authorize the 
use of VoIP. 
Audit procedures: 
Review policies and procedures for VoIP. Determine if security 
considerations in NIST SP 800-58 are used in the information system. 

Control activities: 
CM-5.1. Software is promptly updated to protect against known 
vulnerabilities. 
Control techniques: 
CM-5.1.7. Noncurrent software releases are adequately secure, given the 
risk. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures. Interview users and data 
processing staff. 

Control activities: 
CM-5.1. Software is promptly updated to protect against known 
vulnerabilities. 
Control techniques: 
CM-5.1.8. Appropriate software usage controls (software restrictions, 
user-installed software) are implemented and exceptions are identified. 
Audit procedures: 
Assess the adequacy of software usage controls. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element CM-6. Appropriately document and approve emergency 
changes to the configuration: 

Emergency changes to the information system should be documented and 
approved by appropriate entity officials, either before the change or 
after the fact. In addition, appropriate personnel should be notified 
to provide analysis and follow-up. 

It is not uncommon for program changes to be needed on an emergency 
basis to keep a system operating. Some applications, such as payroll 
processing, are performed in cycles that must be completed by a 
deadline. Other systems must be continuously available so that the 
operations they support are not interrupted. In these cases, the risk 
of missing a deadline or disrupting operations may pose a greater risk 
than that of temporarily suspending program change controls. However, 
because of the increased risk that errors or other unauthorized 
modifications could be implemented, emergency changes should be kept to 
a minimum. 

It is important that an entity follow established procedures to perform 
emergency software changes and reduce the risk of suspending or 
abbreviating normal controls. Generally, emergency procedures should 
specify: 

* when emergency software changes are warranted, 

* who may authorize emergency changes, 

* how emergency changes are to be documented, and, 

* within what period after implementation the change must be tested and 
approved. 

Making emergency changes often involves using sensitive system 
utilities or access methods that grant much broader access than would 
normally be needed. It is important that such access is strictly 
controlled and that their use be promptly reviewed. 

Shortly after an emergency change is made, the usual configuration 
management controls should be applied retroactively. That is, the 
change should be subjected to the same review, testing, and approval 
process that applies to scheduled changes. In addition, logs of 
emergency changes and related documentation should be periodically 
reviewed by data center management or security administrators to 
determine whether all such changes have been tested and have received 
final approval. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CM-6: 

Table 28. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CM-6: Appropriately document and approve emergency 
changes to the configuration: 

Control activities: 
CM-6.1. Adequate procedures for emergency changes are documented and 
implemented. 
Control techniques: 
CM-6.1.1. Appropriately document and implement procedures for emergency 
changes. 
Audit procedures: 
Review procedures. 

Control activities: 
CM-6.2. Emergency changes to the configuration are documented and 
approved. 
Control techniques: 
CM-6.2.1. Appropriately document and approve emergency changes to the 
configuration and notify appropriate personnel for analysis and follow-
up. 
Audit procedures: 
For a selection of emergency changes recorded in the emergency change 
log, review related documentation and approval. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

3.4. Segregation of Duties (SD): 

Effective segregation of duties starts with effective entitywide 
policies and procedures that are implemented at the system and 
application levels. Work responsibilities should be segregated so that 
one individual does not control all critical stages of a process. For 
example, while users may authorize program changes, programmers should 
not be allowed to do so because they are not the owners of the system 
and do not have the responsibility to see that the system meets user 
needs. Similarly, one computer programmer should not be allowed to 
independently write, test, and approve program changes. Often, 
segregation of duties is achieved by splitting responsibilities between 
two or more organizational groups. Dividing duties this way diminishes 
the likelihood that errors and wrongful acts will go undetected because 
the activities of one group or individual will serve as a check on the 
activities of the other. 

Inadequately segregated duties, conversely, increase the risk that 
erroneous or fraudulent transactions could be processed, that improper 
program changes could be implemented, and that computer resources could 
be damaged or destroyed. For example: 

* An individual who is independently responsible for authorizing, 
processing, and reviewing payroll transactions could inappropriately 
increase payments to selected individuals without detection. 

* A computer programmer responsible for authorizing, writing, testing, 
and distributing program modifications could either inadvertently or 
deliberately implement computer programs that did not process 
transactions in accordance with managementï¿½s policies or that included 
malicious code. 

The extent to which duties are segregated depends on the size of the 
entity and the risk associated with its facilities and activities. A 
large entity will have more flexibility in separating key duties than 
will a small entity that must depend on only a few individuals to 
perform its operations. These smaller entities may rely more 
extensively on supervisory review to control activities. Similarly, 
activities that involve extremely large dollar transactions or are 
otherwise inherently risky should be divided among several individuals 
and be subject to relatively extensive supervisory review. 

Key areas of concern during a general controls review involve the 
segregation of duties among major operating and programming activities, 
including duties performed by users, application programmers, and data 
center staff. For example, where possible, the following types of 
activities should be separated: development versus production, security 
versus audit, accounts payable versus accounts receivable, and 
encryption key management versus the changing of keys. Entitywide 
policies outlining the responsibilities of groups and related 
individuals pertaining to incompatible activities should be documented, 
communicated, and enforced. 

Because of the nature of computer operations, segregation of duties 
alone will not ensure that personnel perform only authorized 
activities, especially computer operators. Preventing or detecting 
unauthorized or erroneous personnel actions requires effective 
supervision and review by management and formal operating procedures. 

Determining whether duties are adequately segregated and that the 
activities of personnel are adequately controlled involves assessing 
the agencyï¿½s efforts in performing each of the critical elements listed 
in table 29. 

SD Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
AC-5 Separation of Duties; 
PS-2 Position Categorization; 
PS-6 Access Agreements. 

Table 29. Critical Elements for Segregation of Duties: 

Number: SD-1. 
Description: Segregate incompatible duties and establish related 
policies. 

Number: SD-2. 
Description: Control personnel activities through formal operating 
procedures, supervision, and review. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element SD-1. Segregate incompatible duties and establish 
related policies: 

The first steps in determining if duties are appropriately segregated 
are to analyze the agencyï¿½s operations, identify incompatible duties, 
and assign these duties to different organizational units or 
individuals. Federal internal control standards specify that key duties 
and responsibilities for authorizing, processing, recording, and 
reviewing transactions should be separated. This concept can also be 
applied to the authorization, testing, and review of computer program 
changes. 

Segregating duties begins by establishing independent organizational 
groups with defined functions, such as a payroll unit responsible for 
preparing payroll transaction input and a data processing unit 
responsible for processing input prepared by other units. Functions and 
related tasks performed by each unit should be documented for the unit 
and written in job descriptions and should be clearly communicated to 
personnel assigned the responsibilities. 

Both physical and logical access controls can be used to enforce many 
entity policies regarding segregation of duties and should be based on 
organizational and individual job responsibilities. (Access control is 
discussed in detail in section 3.2.) For example, logical access 
controls can preclude computer programmers from using applications 
software or accessing computerized data associated with applications. 
Similarly, physical access controls, such as key cards and a security 
guard, can be used to prevent unauthorized individuals from entering a 
data processing center. 

SD-1.1. Incompatible duties have been identified and policies 
implemented to segregate these duties: 

Management should have analyzed operations and identified incompatible 
duties that are then segregated through policies and organizational 
divisions. Although incompatible duties may vary from one entity to 
another, the following functions are generally performed by different 
individuals: information security management, systems design, 
applications programming, systems programming, quality assurance and 
testing, library management/ change management, computer operations, 
production control and scheduling, data security, data administration, 
network administration, and configuration management. A brief 
description of these functions follows. 

Information security management includes the personnel who direct or 
manage the activities and staff of the information security department 
and its various organizational components. 

Systems design is the function of identifying and understanding user 
information needs and translating them into a requirements document 
that is used to build a system. 

Applications programming involves the development and maintenance of 
programs for specific applications, such as payroll, inventory control, 
accounting, and mission support systems. 

Systems programming involves the development and maintenance of 
programs that form the system software, such as operating systems, 
utilities, compilers, and security software. 

Quality assurance/testing involves the review and testing of newly-
developed systems and modifications to determine whether they function 
as specified and perform in accordance with functional specifications. 
Testing may also determine whether appropriate procedures, controls, 
and documentation have been developed and implemented before approval 
is granted to place the system into operation. 

Library management/change management is the control over program and 
data files that are either kept on-line or are on tapes and disks that 
are loaded onto the computer as needed. Software programs are generally 
used to assist in management of these files. This function also is 
often responsible for controlling documentation related to system 
software, application programs, and computer operations. 

Computer operations involves performing the various tasks to operate 
the computer and peripheral equipment, including providing the tape, 
disk, or paper resources as requested by the applications systems. 

Production control and scheduling involves monitoring the information 
into, through, and as it leaves the computer operations area, and for 
determining the succession of programs to be run on the computer. 
Often, an automated scheduling package is used in this task. An entity 
may have a separate data control group that is responsible for seeing 
that all data necessary for processing are present and that all output 
is complete and distributed properly. This group is usually also 
responsible for reconciling record counts and control totals submitted 
by users with similar counts and totals generated during processing. 

The data security function in an IT department involves the development 
and administration of an agencyï¿½s information security program. This 
includes development of security policies, procedures, and guidelines 
and the establishment and maintenance of a security awareness and 
education program for employees. This function is also concerned with 
the adequacy of access controls and service continuity procedures. 

Data administration involves planning for and administering the data 
used throughout the entity. This function is concerned with 
identifying, cataloging, controlling, and coordinating the information 
needs of the entity. Database administration is a narrower function 
concerned with the technical aspects of installing, maintaining, and 
using an agencyï¿½s databases and database management systems. 

Network administration involves maintaining a secure and reliable on-
line communications network and serving as liaison with user 
departments to resolve network needs and problems. 

Configuration management involves controlling and documenting changes 
made to a systemï¿½s hardware, software, firmware, and documentation 
throughout the development and operational life of the system. 

The following include examples of restrictions that are generally 
addressed in policies about segregating duties and are achieved through 
organizational divisions and access controls: 

* Application users should not have access to operating systems or 
applications software. 

* Programmers should not be responsible for moving programs into 
production or have access to production libraries or data. ? Access to 
operating system documentation should be restricted to authorized 
systems programming personnel. 

* Access to applications system documentation should be restricted to 
authorized applications programming personnel. 

* Access to production software libraries should be restricted to 
library management personnel. 

* Persons other than computer operators should not set up or operate 
the production computer. 

* Only usersï¿½not computer staffï¿½should be responsible for transaction 
origination or correction and for initiating changes to application 
files. 

* Computer operators should not have access to program libraries or 
data files. 

Some steps involved in processing a transaction also need to be 
separated among different individuals. For example, the following 
combinations of functions should not be performed by a single 
individual: 

* Data entry and verification of data. 

* Data entry and its reconciliation to output. 

* Input of transactions for incompatible processing functions (for 
example, input of vendor invoices and purchasing and receiving 
information). 

* Data entry and supervisory authorization functions (for example, 
authorizing a rejected transaction to continue processing that exceeds 
some limit requiring a supervisorï¿½s review and approval). 

Organizations with limited resources to segregate duties should have 
compensating controls, such as supervisory review of transactions 
performed. 

SD-1.2. Job descriptions have been documented: 

Documented job descriptions should exist that clearly describe employee 
duties and prohibited activities. These should include responsibilities 
that may be assumed during emergency situations. The documented job 
descriptions should match employeesï¿½ assigned duties. Also, they should 
include definitions of the technical knowledge, skills, and abilities 
required for successful performance in the relevant position, and 
should be useful for hiring, promoting, and performance evaluation 
purposes. In addition, the organization should assign a risk 
designation to all positions and establish screening criteria for 
individuals filling those positions. 

SD-1.3. Employees understand their duties and responsibilities: 

Employees and their supervisors should understand their 
responsibilities and the activities that are prohibited. Ultimate 
responsibility for this rests with senior managers. They should provide 
the resources and training so that employees understand their 
responsibilities and ensure that segregation-of-duties principles are 
established, enforced, and institutionalized within the organization. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SD-1: 

Table 30. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element SD-1: Segregate incompatible duties and establish 
related policies: 

Control activities: 
SD-1.1. Incompatible duties have been identified and policies 
implemented to segregate these duties. 
Control techniques: 
SD-1.1.1. Policies and procedures for segregating duties exist and are 
up-to-date. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures. Interview selected management 
and information security personnel regarding segregation of duties. 

Control activities: 
SD-1.1. Incompatible duties have been identified and policies 
implemented to segregate these duties. 
Control techniques: 
SD-1.1.2. Distinct system support functions are performed by different 
individuals, including the following: 
* information security management; 
* systems design; 
* applications programming; 
* systems programming; 
* quality assurance/testing; 
* library management/change management; 
* computer operations; 
* production control and scheduling; 
* data control; 
* data security; 
* data administration; 
* network administration; 
* configuration management. 
Audit procedures: 
Review an entity organization chart showing information security 
functions and assigned personnel. Interview selected personnel and 
determine whether functions are appropriately segregated. Determine 
whether the chart is current and each function is staffed by different 
individuals. Review relevant alternate or back up assignments and 
determine whether the proper segregation of duties is maintained. 
Observe activities of personnel to determine the nature and extent of 
the compliance with the intended segregation of duties. 

Control activities: 
SD-1.1. Incompatible duties have been identified and policies 
implemented to segregate these duties. 
Control techniques: 
SD-1.1.3. No individual has complete control over incompatible 
transaction processing functions. Specifically, the following 
combination of functions are not performed by a single individual: 
* data entry and verification of data; 
* data entry and its reconciliation to output; 
* input of transactions for incompatible processing functions (for 
example, input of vendor invoices and purchasing and receiving 
information); 
* data entry and supervisory authorization functions (for example, 
authorizing a rejected transaction to continue processing that exceeds 
some limit requiring a supervisorï¿½s review and approval). 
Audit procedures: 
Review the organizational chart and interview personnel to determine 
that assignments do not result in a single person being responsible for 
the indicated combinations of functions. Observe activities of 
personnel to determine the nature and extent of the compliance with the 
intended segregation of duties. 

Control activities: 
SD-1.1. Incompatible duties have been identified and policies 
implemented to segregate these duties. 
Control techniques: 
SD-1.1.4. Organizations with limited resources to segregate duties have 
compensating controls, such as supervisory review of transactions 
performed. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview management, observe activities, and test transactions. Note: 
Perform this in conjunction with SD-2.2. 

Control activities: 
SD-1.1. Incompatible duties have been identified and policies 
implemented to segregate these duties. 
Control techniques:
SD-1.1.5. Data processing personnel are not users of information 
systems. They and security managers do not initiate, input, or correct 
transactions. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine through interview and observation whether data processing 
personnel and security managers are prohibited from these activities. 

Control activities: 
SD-1.1. Incompatible duties have been identified and policies 
implemented to segregate these duties. 
Control techniques:
SD-1.1.6. Day-to-day operating procedures for the data center are 
adequately documented and prohibited actions are identified. 
Audit procedures: 
Review the adequacy of documented operating procedures for the data 
center. 

Control activities: 
SD-1.1. Incompatible duties have been identified and policies 
implemented to segregate these duties. 
Control techniques:
SD-1.1.7. Access controls enforce segregation of duties. 
Audit procedures: 
Audit procedures are found in section AC-3.1, but this item is listed 
here as a reminder. Logical and physical access controls should enforce 
segregation of duties. 

Control activities: 
SD-1.2. Job descriptions have been documented. 
Control techniques:
SD-1.2.1. Documented job descriptions accurately reflect assigned 
duties and responsibilities and segregation of duty principles. 
Audit procedures: 
Review job descriptions for several positions in organizational units 
and for user security administrators. Determine whether duties are 
clearly described and prohibited activities are addressed. Review the 
effective dates of the position descriptions and determine whether they 
are current. Compare these descriptions with the current 
responsibilities and duties of the incumbents in these positions to 
determine the accuracy of these statements. 

Control activities: 
SD-1.2. Job descriptions have been documented. 
Control techniques:
SD-1.2.2. Documented job descriptions include definitions of the 
technical knowledge, skills, and abilities required for successful 
performance in the relevant position and can be used for hiring, 
promoting, and performance evaluation purposes. 
Audit procedures: 
Review job descriptions and interview management personnel. 

Control activities: 
SD-1.3. Employees understand their duties and responsibilities. 
Control techniques:
SD-1.3.1. All employees fully understand their duties and 
responsibilities and carry out those responsibilities in accordance to 
their job descriptions. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview personnel filling positions for the selected job descriptions 
(see SD-1.2). Determine if the descriptions match their understanding 
of their duties and responsibilities and whether additional duties are 
undertaken that are not listed in their job descriptions. 

Control activities: 
SD-1.3. Employees understand their duties and responsibilities. 
Control techniques:
SD-1.3.2. Senior management is responsible for providing adequate 
resources and training to ensure that segregation of duty principles 
are understood and established, enforced, and institutionalized within 
the organization. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine from interviewing personnel whether senior management has 
provided adequate resources and training to establish, enforce, and 
institutionalize the principles of segregation of duties. 

Control activities: 
SD-1.3. Employees understand their duties and responsibilities. 
Control techniques: 
SD-1.3.3. Responsibilities for restricting access by job positions in 
key operating and programming activities are clearly defined, 
understood, and followed. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview management personnel in these activities. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element SD-2. Control personnel activities through formal 
operating procedures, supervision, and review: 

Control over personnel activities requires formal operating procedures 
and active supervision and review of these activities. This is 
especially relevant for computer operators and system administrators. 
Some information system officials have extensive access rights in order 
to keep the systems running efficiently so their activities need to be 
monitored closely. Inadequacies in this area could allow mistakes to 
occur and go undetected and facilitate unauthorized use of the 
computer. 

SD-2.1. Formal procedures guide personnel in performing their duties: 

Detailed, written instructions should be followed to guide personnel in 
performing their duties. These instructions are especially important 
for computer operators. For example, computer operator instruction 
manuals should provide guidance on system start up and shut down 
procedures, emergency procedures, system and job status reporting, and 
operator-prohibited activities. Application-specific manuals (commonly 
called run manuals) should provide additional instructions for 
operators specific to each application, such as instructions on job 
setup, console and error messages, job checkpoints, and restart and 
recovery steps after system failures. Operators should be prevented 
from overriding file label or equipment error messages. 

SD-2.2. Active supervision and review are provided for all personnel: 

Supervision and review of personnel computer systems activities help 
make certain that these activities are performed in accordance with 
prescribed procedures, that mistakes are corrected, and that the 
computer is used only for authorized purposes. To aid in this 
oversight, all user activities on the computer system should be 
recorded on activity logs, which serve as an audit trail. Supervisors 
should routinely review these activity logs for incompatible actions 
and investigate any abnormalities. 

Periodic management reviews of computer systems activities are 
essential to ensure that employees are performing their duties in 
accordance with established policies and to identify the need to update 
policies when operational processes change. In particular, management 
should periodically review activities that cannot be controlled by 
physical or logical access controls. Such activities are typically 
controlled instead by supervisory oversight and documentation showing 
approvals and authorizations. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
SD-2: 

Table 31. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element SD-2: Control personnel activities through formal 
operating procedures, supervision, and review: 

Control activities: 
SD-2.1. Formal procedures guide personnel in performing their duties. 
Control techniques: 
SD-2.1.1. Detailed, written instructions exist and are followed for the 
performance of work. 
Audit procedures: 
Review manuals. Interview supervisors and personnel. Observe processing 
activities. 

Control activities: 
SD-2.1. Formal procedures guide personnel in performing their duties. 
Control techniques: 
SD-2.1.2. Instruction manuals provide guidance on system operation. 
Audit procedures: 
Review manuals. Interview supervisors and personnel. Observe processing 
activities. 

Control activities: 
SD-2.1. Formal procedures guide personnel in performing their duties. 
Control techniques: 
SD-2.1.3. Application run manuals provide instruction on operating 
specific applications. 
Audit procedures: 
Review manuals. Interview supervisors and personnel. Observe processing 
activities. 

Control activities: 
SD-2.2. Active supervision and review are provided for all personnel.
Control techniques: 
SD-2.2.1. Personnel are provided adequate supervision and review, 
including each shift for computer operations. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview supervisors and personnel. Observe processing activities. 

Control activities: 
SD-2.2. Active supervision and review are provided for all personnel.
Control techniques: 
SD-2.2.2. Access authorizations are periodically reviewed for 
incompatible functions. 
Audit procedures: 
Review sample of access authorizations for incompatible functions and 
evidence of supervisory review. 

Control activities: 
SD-2.2. Active supervision and review are provided for all personnel.
Control techniques: 
SD-2.2.3. Management reviews are performed to determine that control 
techniques for segregating incompatible duties are functioning as 
intended and that the control techniques in place are maintaining risks 
within acceptable levels (for example, periodic risk assessments). 
Audit procedures: 
Determine which reviews are conducted to assess the adequacy of duty 
segregation. Obtain and review results of such reviews. Note: This 
audit step should be performed in conjunction with audit steps in 
critical elements SM-2 (Periodically assess and validate risks) and SM-
5 (Monitor the effectiveness of the security program). 

Control activities: 
SD-2.2. Active supervision and review are provided for all personnel.
Control techniques: 
SD-2.2.4. Staff performance is monitored on a periodic basis and 
controlled to ensure that objectives laid out in job descriptions are 
carried out. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview management and subordinate personnel. Select documents or 
actions requiring supervisory review and approval for evidence of such 
performance (for example, approval of input of transactions, software 
changes). 

Control activities: 
SD-2.2. Active supervision and review are provided for all personnel.
Control techniques: 
SD-2.2.5. Supervisors routinely review user activity logs for 
incompatible actions and investigate any abnormalities. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview supervisors and review user activity logs for incompatible 
actions. Check for evidence of supervisory review. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

3.5. Contingency Planning (CP): 

Losing the capability to process, retrieve, and protect electronically 
maintained information can significantly affect an agencyï¿½s ability to 
accomplish its mission. If contingency planning controls are 
inadequate, even relatively minor interruptions can result in lost or 
incorrectly processed data, which can cause financial losses, expensive 
recovery efforts, and inaccurate or incomplete information. For some 
operations, such as those involving health care or safety, system 
interruptions could even result in injuries or loss of life. 

Given these severe implications, it is critical that an entity have in 
place (1) procedures for protecting information resources and 
minimizing the risk of unplanned interruptions and (2) a plan to 
recover critical operations should interruptions occur. Such plans 
should consider the activities performed at general support facilities, 
such as data processing centers and telecommunications facilities, as 
well as those performed by users of specific applications. To determine 
whether recovery plans will work as intended, they should be tested 
periodically in disaster-simulation exercises. FISMA requires that each 
federal agency implement an information security program that includes 
ï¿½plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for 
information systems that support the operations and assets of the 
agency.ï¿½ 

Although often referred to as disaster recovery or contingency plans, 
controls to ensure service continuity should address the entire range 
of potential disruptions. These may include relatively minor 
interruptions, such as temporary power failures, as well as major 
disasters, such as fires, natural disasters, and terrorism, that would 
require reestablishing operations at a remote location; it might also 
include errors, such as writing over a file. If controls are 
inadequate, even relatively minor interruptions can result in lost or 
incorrectly processed data. 

To mitigate service interruptions, it is essential that the related 
controls be understood and supported by management and staff throughout 
the entity. Senior management commitment is especially important to 
ensuring that adequate resources are devoted to emergency planning, 
training, and related testing. Also, the involvement of data and 
process owners is integral to contingency planning, as they have first-
hand knowledge of their data and processes and of the impact of a loss 
of availability. In addition, all staff with contingency planning 
responsibilities, such as those responsible for backing up files, 
should be fully aware of the risks of not fulfilling those duties. 

Assessing contingency planning controls involves evaluating the 
agencyï¿½s performance in each of the critical elements listed in table 
32. 

Table 32. Critical Elements for Contingency Planning: 

Number: CP-1. 
Description: Assess the criticality and sensitivity of computerized 
operations and identify supporting resources. 

Number: CP-2. 
Description: Take steps to prevent and minimize potential damage and 
interruption. 

Number: CP-3. 
Description: Develop and document a comprehensive contingency plan. 

Number: CP-4. 
Description: Periodically test the contingency plan and adjust it as 
appropriate. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element CP-1. Assess the criticality and sensitivity of 
computerized operations and identify supporting resources: 

At most entities, the continuity of certain automated operations is 
more important than for other operations, and it is not cost effective 
to provide the same level of continuity for all operations. For this 
reason, it is important that management analyze data and operations to 
determine which are the most critical and what resources are needed to 
recover and support them. This is the first step in determining which 
resources merit the greatest protection and what contingency plans need 
to be made. 

As explained in SM-2, FISMA required NIST to develop standards and 
guidelines for agencies to use in categorizing federal information and 
information systems so agencies can provide the appropriate level of 
information security according to a range of risks. This information is 
useful in assessing risks and the criticality and sensitivity of 
computerized operations, and in identifying supporting resources. It is 
also very important to link this information to the agencyï¿½s mission 
and critical business processes. 

According to NIST, the definition of an organizationï¿½s critical mission 
or business functions is often called a business plan, and it is used 
to support contingency planning.[Footnote 86] Part of business planning 
involves the development of a business continuity plan that focuses on 
sustaining an organizationï¿½s business functions during and after a 
disruption. A business continuity plan can be written for a specific 
business process or it may address all key business processes. Because 
there is an inherent relationship between an IT system and the business 
process it supports, there should be coordination between each plan, 
and ultimately an entity may use a suite of plans for its IT systems, 
business processes, and the facility.[Footnote 87] In addition, a 
business impact analysis should be conducted to (1) identify critical 
information technology resources, (2) identify outage impact and 
allowable outage times, and (3) develop recovery priorities. The 
purpose of the business impact analysis is to correlate specific system 
components with the critical services that they provide and, based on 
that information, to characterize the consequences if system components 
were to be disrupted. 

CP-1.1. Critical data and operations are identified and prioritized: 

The criticality and sensitivity of various data and operations should 
be determined and prioritized based on security categorizations and an 
overall risk assessment of the agencyï¿½s operations. As discussed in 
section 3.1, Entitywide Security Management Program, such a risk 
assessment should serve as the foundation of an agencyï¿½s security plan. 
Factors to be considered include the importance and sensitivity of the 
data and other organizational assets handled or protected by the 
individual operations, and the cost of not restoring data or operations 
promptly. For example, a 1-day interruption of major tax or fee-
collection systems or a loss of related data could significantly slow 
or halt receipt of revenues, diminish controls over millions of dollars 
in receipts, and reduce public trust. Conversely, a system that 
monitors employee training could be out of service for perhaps as much 
as several months without serious consequences. Further, sensitive 
data, such as personal information on individuals or information 
related to contract negotiations, may require special protection during 
a suspension of normal service, even if such information is not needed 
on a daily basis to carry out critical operations. 

Generally, critical data and operations should be identified and ranked 
by those personnel involved in the agencyï¿½s business or program 
operations. For example, managers should predict the negative effects 
of lost data and interrupted operations and determine how long specific 
operations can be suspended or postponed. However, it is also important 
to obtain senior managementï¿½s agreement with such determinations, as 
well as concurrence from affected groups. 

The prioritized listing of critical information resources and 
operations should be periodically reviewed to determine whether current 
conditions are reflected in it. Such reviews should occur whenever 
there is a significant change in the agencyï¿½s mission and operations or 
in the location or design of the systems that support these operations. 

CP-1.2. Resources supporting critical operations are identified and 
analyzed: 

Once critical data and operations have been determined, the minimum 
resources needed to support them should be identified and their roles 
analyzed. The resources to be considered include computer resources, 
such as hardware, software, and data files; networks, including 
components such as routers and firewalls; supplies, including paper 
stock and preprinted forms; telecommunications services; and any other 
resources that are necessary to the operation, such as people, office 
facilities and supplies, and noncomputerized records. For example, an 
analysis should be performed to identify the maximum number of disk 
drives needed at one time and the specific requirements for 
telecommunications lines and devices. 

Because essential resources are likely to be held or managed by a 
variety of groups within an entity, it is important that program and 
information security support staff work together to identify the 
resources needed for critical operations. 

CP-1.3. Emergency processing priorities are established: 

In conjunction with identifying and ranking critical functions, the 
entity should develop a plan for restoring critical operations. The 
plan should clearly identify the order in which various aspects of 
processing should be restored, who is responsible, and what supporting 
equipment or other resources will be needed. A carefully developed 
processing restoration plan can help employees immediately begin the 
restoration process and make the most efficient use of limited computer 
resources during an emergency. Both system users and information 
security support staff should be involved in determining emergency 
processing priorities. (See critical element CP-3 for additional 
information on contingency planning.) 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CP-1: 

Table 33. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CP-1: Assess the criticality and sensitivity of 
computerized operations and identify supporting resources: 

Control activities: 
CP-1.1. Critical data and operations are identified and prioritized. 
Control techniques: 
CP-1.1.1. The entity categorizes information systems in accordance with 
appropriate guidance, such as FIPS 199, and documents the results in 
the system security plan. CP-1.1.2 A list of critical operations and 
data has been documented that: 
* identifies primary mission or business functions, 
* prioritizes data and operations, 
* is approved by senior program managers, and; 
* reflects current conditions including system interdependencies and 
technologies. 
Audit procedures: 
Review the policies and methodology used to categorize systems and 
create the critical operations list. This list should identify each 
system and its criticality in supporting the agencyï¿½s primary mission 
or business functions. Review how systems are categorized and the 
critical operations list. Determine if the justifications have been 
documented and that they (1) prioritize data and operations by primary 
mission or business functions; (2) are approved by senior management; 
and (3) reflect current operating conditions, including key system 
interdependencies. Determine if technology supporting critical 
operations is identified and appropriately considered in processing 
priorities. Interview program, information technology, and security 
administration officials. Determine their input and assessment of the 
reasonableness of priorities established. 

Control activities: 
CP-1.2. Resources supporting critical operations are identified and 
analyzed. 
Control techniques: 
CP-1.2.1. Resources supporting critical operations and functions have 
been identified and documented. Types of resources identified should 
include: 
* computer hardware, 
* computer software, 
* computer supplies, 
* network components, 
* system documentation, 
* telecommunications, 
* office facilities and supplies, and; 
* human resources. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview program and security administration officials responsible for 
developing the critical operations listing. Review documentation 
supporting the critical operations listing to verify that the following 
resources have been identified for each critical operation: 
* computer hardware and software, 
* computer supplies, 
* network components, 
* system documentation, 
* telecommunications, 
* office facilities and supplies, and, 
* human resources. Appropriate documentation may include contingency-
related plans in NIST SP 800-34. 

Control activities: 
CP-1.2. Resources supporting critical operations are identified and 
analyzed. 
Control techniques:
CP-1.2.2. Critical information technology resources have been analyzed 
to determine their impact on operations if a given resource were 
disrupted or damaged. This analysis should evaluate the impact of the 
outages over time and across related resources and dependent systems. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if a current business impact analysis has been conducted that 
identifies critical information technology resources, disruption 
impacts, allowed outage times, and recovery priorities. 

Control activities: 
CP-1.3. Emergency processing priorities are established. 
Control techniques:
CP-1.3.1. Emergency processing priorities have been documented and 
approved by appropriate program and data processing managers. 
Audit procedures: 
Review related policies, plans, and procedures for emergency processing 
and ensure: 
* recovery priorities have been developed, 
* management has approved priorities, and, 
* priorities are documented. Request a copy of the continuity of 
operations plan. Interview program and security administration 
officials to determine whether they are aware of all policies and 
procedures for emergency processing priorities and maintain copies of 
the continuity of operations plan. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element CP-2. Take steps to prevent and minimize potential 
damage and interruption: 

There are a number of steps that an entity should take to prevent or 
minimize the damage to automated operations that can occur from 
unexpected events. These can be categorized as: 

* routinely duplicating or backing up data files, computer programs, 
and critical documents with off-site storage; 

* arranging for remote backup facilities that can be used if the 
agencyï¿½s usual facilities are damaged beyond use; 

* establishing an information system recovery and reconstitution 
capability so that the information system can be recovered and 
reconstituted to its original state after a disruption or failure; 

* installing environmental controls, such as fire-suppression systems 
or backup power supplies; and; 

* ensuring that staff and other system users understand their 
responsibilities during emergencies. 

Such steps, especially implementing thorough backup procedures and 
installing environmental controls, are generally inexpensive ways to 
prevent relatively minor problems from becoming costly disasters. In 
particular, an entity should maintain an ability to restore data files, 
which may be impossible to recreate if lost. In addition, effective 
maintenance, problem management, and change management for hardware 
equipment will help prevent unexpected interruptions. 

In an IS controls audit being performed as part of a financial audit or 
data reliability assessment, the auditor should tailor the 
identification of control techniques and audit procedures related to 
environmental controls (CP-2.2) and hardware maintenance (CP-2.4) to 
achieve the audit objectives, considering the IS controls identified by 
the auditor as significant to the audit objectives (e.g., internal 
control over financial reporting). 

CP-2.1. Data and program backup procedures have been implemented: 

Routinely copying data files and software and storing these files at a 
secure, remote location are usually the most cost-effective actions 
that an entity can take to mitigate service interruptions. Although 
equipment can often be readily replaced, the cost could be significant 
and reconstructing computerized data files and replacing software can 
be extremely costly and time consuming. And, data files cannot always 
be reconstructed. In addition to the direct costs of reconstructing 
files and obtaining software, the related service interruptions could 
lead to significant financial losses. 

A program should be in place for regularly backing up computer files, 
including master files, transaction files, application programs, system 
software, and database software, and for storing these backup copies 
securely at an off-site location. Choosing a location depends on the 
particular needs of the entity, but in general, the location should be 
far enough away from the primary location that it will be protected 
from events such as fires, storms, electrical power outages, and 
terrorism that may occur to the primary location. In addition, it 
should be protected from unauthorized access and from environmental 
hazards. 

The frequency with which files should be backed up depends on the 
volume and timing of transactions that modify the data files. 
Generally, backing up files on a daily basis is adequate. However, if a 
system accounts for thousands of transactions per day, it may be 
appropriate to back up files several times a day. Conversely, if only a 
few transactions are recorded every week, then weekly backing up of 
files may be adequate. 

File back up procedures should be designed so that a recent copy is 
always available. For example, new data file versions should be 
received at the off-site storage location before the disks or tapes 
containing prior versions are returned to the data center for reuse. 

Generally, data center personnel are responsible for routinely backing 
up files. However, if critical data are routinely maintained on 
computers that are not under the control of data center personnel, then 
responsibility for backing up this information should be clearly 
defined. 

In addition to data files and software programs, copies of any other 
information and supplies that may be needed to maintain operations 
should be maintained at a remote location. Examples of such documents 
are system and application documentation, unique preprinted computer 
paper, and essential legal files. Although a review of computer-related 
controls focuses on electronically maintained data, it is important 
that critical paper documents also be copied and stored remotely so 
that they are available when needed to support automated operations. 

CP-2.2. Adequate environmental controls have been implemented: 

Environmental controls prevent or mitigate potential damage to 
facilities and interruptions in service. Examples of environmental 
controls include: 

* fire extinguishers and fire-suppression systems; 

* fire alarms; 

* smoke detectors; 

* water detectors; 

* emergency lighting; 

* redundancy in air cooling systems; 

* backup power supplies; 

* existence of shut-off valves and procedures for any building plumbing 
lines that may endanger processing facilities; 

* processing facilities built with fire-resistant materials and 
designed to reduce the spread of fire; and; 

* policies prohibiting eating, drinking, and smoking within computer 
facilities. 

Environmental controls can diminish the losses from some interruptions 
such as fires or prevent incidents by detecting potential problems 
early, such as water leaks or smoke, so that they can be remedied. 
Also, uninterruptible or backup power supplies can carry a facility 
through a short power outage or provide time to back up data and 
perform orderly shut-down procedures during extended power outages. 

CP-2.3. Staff have been trained to respond to emergencies: 

Staff should be trained in and aware of their responsibilities in 
preventing, mitigating, and responding to emergency situations. For 
example, information security support staff should receive periodic 
training in emergency fire, water, and alarm incident procedures, as 
well as in their responsibilities in starting up and running an 
alternate data processing site. Also, if outside users are critical to 
the agencyï¿½s operations, they should be informed of the steps they may 
have to take as a result of an emergency. 

Generally, information on emergency procedures and responsibilities can 
be provided through training sessions and by distributing written 
policies and procedures. Training sessions should be held at least once 
a year and whenever changes to emergency plans are made. Further, if 
staff could be required to relocate or significantly alter their 
commuting routine in order to operate an alternate site in an 
emergency, it is advisable for an entity to incorporate into the 
contingency plan steps for arranging lodging and meals or any other 
facilities or services that may be needed to accommodate essential 
personnel. 

CP-2.4. Effective hardware maintenance, problem management, and change 
management help prevent unexpected interruptions: 

Unexpected service interruptions can occur from hardware equipment 
failures or from changing equipment without adequate advance 
notification to system users. To prevent such occurrences requires an 
effective program for maintenance, problem management, and change 
management for hardware equipment. 

Routine periodic hardware maintenance should be scheduled and performed 
to help reduce the possibility and impact of equipment failures. Vendor-
supplied specifications normally prescribe the frequency and type of 
preventive maintenance to be performed. Such maintenance should be 
scheduled in a manner to minimize the impact on overall operations and 
on critical or sensitive applications. Specifically, peak workload 
periods should be avoided. All maintenance performed should be 
documented, especially any unscheduled maintenance that could be 
analyzed to identify problem areas warranting additional action for a 
more permanent solution. Flexibility should be designed into the data 
processing operations to accommodate the required preventive 
maintenance and reasonably expected unscheduled maintenance. For 
critical or sensitive applications that require a high level of system 
availability, the acquisition and use of spare or backup hardware may 
be appropriate. 

Effective problem management requires tracking service performance and 
documenting problems encountered. Goals should be established by senior 
management on the availability of data processing and on-line service. 
Records should be maintained on the actual performance in meeting 
service schedules. Problems and delays encountered, the reasons for the 
problems or delays, and the elapsed time for resolution should be 
recorded and analyzed to identify any recurring pattern or trend. 
Senior management should periodically review and compare the service 
performance achieved with the goals and survey user departments to see 
if usersï¿½ needs are being met. 

Changes to hardware equipment and related software should be scheduled 
to minimize the impact on operations and users and allow for adequate 
testing to demonstrate that they will work as expected. Advance 
notification should be given to users so that service is not 
unexpectedly interrupted. 

CP-2 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
CP-3 Contingency Training; 
CP-6 Alternative Storage Site; 
CP-7 Alternate Processing Site; 
CP-9 Information System Backup; 
CP-10 Information System Recovery and Reconstitution; 
MA-2 Controlled Maintenance; 
MA-3 Maintenance Tools; 
MA-5 Maintenance Personnel; 
MA-6 Timely Maintenance; 
PE-9 Power Equipment and Power Cabling; 
PE-10 Emergency Shutoff; 
PE-11 Emergency Power; 
PE-12 Emergency Lighting; 
PE-13 Fire Protection; 
PE-14 Temperature and Humidity Controls; 
PE-15 Water Damage Protection; 
PE-16 Delivery and Removal; 
PE-17 Alternate Work Site; 
PE-18 Location of Information System Components; 
SA-5 Information System Documentation. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CP-2: 

Table 34. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CP-2: Take steps to prevent and minimize potential 
damage and interruption: 

Control activities: 
CP-2.1. Information system back up and recovery procedures have been 
implemented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.1.1. Backup files are created on a prescribed basis and rotated 
off-site often enough to avoid disruption if current files are lost or 
damaged. 
Audit procedures: 
Review written policies and procedures for backing up and transporting 
files. Determine how often files are backed up and rotated off site, 
retention periods, and security involved in transport. Compare 
inventory records with the files maintained off-site and determine the 
age of these files. For a selection of critical files, locate and 
examine the backup files. Verify that backup files can be used to 
recreate current reports. Determine whether backup files are created 
and rotated off-site as prescribed and are sent before prior versions 
are returned. Determine if the technology is implemented in such a 
manner as to provide appropriate availability, including consideration 
of backup procedures, system configuration, redundancy, environmental 
controls, staff training, and routine maintenance. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.1. Information system back up and recovery procedures have been 
implemented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.1.2. System and application documentation is maintained at the off-
site storage location. 
Audit procedures: 
Locate and examine documentation. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.1. Information system back up and recovery procedures have been 
implemented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.1.3. The backup storage site is: 
* geographically removed from the primary site (for example, not 
subject to the same hazards), and, 
* protected by environmental controls and physical access controls. 
Audit procedures: 
Examine the backup storage site. Determine if there are accessibility 
problems between the storage and processing sites in the event of an 
area wide disaster. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.1. Information system back up and recovery procedures have been 
implemented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.1.4. The information system back up and recovery procedures 
adequately provide for recovery and reconstitution to the systemï¿½s 
original state after a disruption or failure including: 
* system parameters are reset; 
* patches are reinstalled; 
* configuration settings are reestablished; 
* system documentation and operating procedures are available; 
* application and system software is reinstalled; 
* information from the most recent backup is available; and; 
* the system is fully tested. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview entity officials and determine whether comprehensive 
procedures and mechanisms exist to fully restore the information 
security to its original state. Determine if this recovery capability 
has been tested and, if so, review the test plan and test results. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.2. Adequate environmental controls have been implemented. 
Audit procedures: 
These procedures should be performed in conjunction with Section AC-6 
regarding physical access controls. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.2. Adequate environmental controls have been implemented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.2.1. Fire detection and suppression devices have been installed 
and are working, for example, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and 
sprinkler systems. 
CP-2.2.2. Controls have been implemented to mitigate other disasters, 
such as floods, earthquakes, terrorism, etc. 
CP-2.2.3. Redundancy exists in critical systems (for example, power and 
air cooling systems) 
CP-2.2.4. Building plumbing lines do not endanger the computer facility 
or, at a minimum, shut-off valves and procedures exist and are known. 
CP-2.2.5. An uninterruptible power supply or backup generator has been 
provided so that power will be adequate for orderly shut down. 
CP-2.2.6. Humidity, temperature, and voltage are controlled within 
acceptable levels. 
CP-2.2.7. Emergency lighting activates in the event of a power outage 
and covers emergency exits and evacuation routes. 
CP-2.2.8. A master power switch or emergency shut-off switch is present 
and appropriately located. 
Audit procedures: 
Examine the agencyï¿½s facilities. Interview site managers. Observe that 
operations staff are aware of the locations of fire alarms, fire 
extinguishers, regular and auxiliary electrical power switches, water 
shut-off valves, breathing apparatus, and other devices that they may 
be expected to use in an emergency. Also, observe that emergency 
lighting works and that power and other cabling is protected. Observe 
the operation, location, maintenance, and access to the air cooling 
systems. Determine whether humidity, temperature, and voltage are 
appropriately controlled. Observe whether water can enter through the 
computer room ceiling or whether pipes are running through the facility 
and that there are water detectors on the floor. Determine whether the 
activation of heat and smoke detectors will notify the fire department. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.2. Adequate environmental controls have been implemented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.2.9. Environmental controls are periodically tested at least 
annually for federal agencies Review test policies. 
Audit procedures: 
Review documentation supporting recent tests of environmental controls. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.2. Adequate environmental controls have been implemented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.2.10. Eating, drinking, and other behavior that may damage 
computer equipment is prohibited. 
Audit procedures: 
Review policies and procedures regarding employee behavior. Observe 
employee behavior. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.3. Staff have been trained to respond to emergencies. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.3.1. Operational and support personnel have received training and 
understand their emergency roles and responsibilities. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview security personnel and appropriate operational and support 
staff and ensure that they understand their roles and responsibilities. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.3. Staff have been trained to respond to emergencies. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.3.2. Personnel receive periodic environmental controls training 
including emergency fire, water, and alarm incident procedures. 
Audit procedures: 
Review training records and training course documentation. Determine 
whether all personnel have received up-to-date training and that the 
scope of the training is adequate. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.3. Staff have been trained to respond to emergencies. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.3.3. Emergency response procedures are documented. 
Audit procedures: 
Review emergency response procedures for completeness and determine 
whether roles and responsibilities are clearly defined. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.3. Staff have been trained to respond to emergencies. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.3.4. Emergency procedures are periodically tested. Review test 
policies. 
Audit procedures: 
Review test documentation. Interview operational and data center staff. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.4. Effective hardware maintenance, problem management, and change 
management help prevent unexpected interruptions. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.4.1. Policies and procedures exist and are up-to-date. 
Audit procedures: 
Review policies and procedures. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.4. Effective hardware maintenance, problem management, and change 
management help prevent unexpected interruptions. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.4.2. Routine periodic hardware preventive maintenance is scheduled 
and performed in accordance with vendor specifications and in a manner 
that minimizes the impact on operations. 
CP-2.4.3. Regular and unscheduled maintenance performed is documented. 
CP-2.4.4. Flexibility exists in the data processing operations to 
accommodate regular and a reasonable amount of unscheduled maintenance. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview information security, data processing, and user management. 
Review maintenance documentation. Determine when maintenance is 
performed, if it is in accordance with vendor specifications, and if 
there is minimal impact on system availability. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.4. Effective hardware maintenance, problem management, and change 
management help prevent unexpected interruptions. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.4.5. Spare or backup hardware is used to provide a high level of 
system availability for critical and sensitive applications. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview information security and data center management. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.4. Effective hardware maintenance, problem management, and change 
management help prevent unexpected interruptions. 
Control techniques: 
CP-2.4.6. Goals are established by senior management on the 
availability of data processing and on-line services. 
CP-2.4.7. Records are maintained on the actual performance in meeting 
service schedules. 
CP-2.4.8. Problems and delays encountered, the reason, and the elapsed 
time for resolution are recorded and analyzed to identify recurring 
patterns or trends. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview senior management, information security management, data 
processing management, and user management. Review supporting 
documentation, including system performance metrics. 

Control activities: 
CP-2.4. Effective hardware maintenance, problem management, and change 
management help prevent unexpected interruptions. 
Control techniques:
CP-2.4.9. Senior management periodically reviews and compares the 
service performance achieved with the goals and surveys of user 
departments to see if their needs are being met. 
CP-2.4.10. Changes of hardware equipment and related software are 
scheduled to minimize the impact on operations and users, thus allowing 
for adequate testing. 
CP-2.4.11. Advance notification of hardware changes is given to users 
so that service is not unexpectedly interrupted. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview senior management, information security management, data 
processing management, and user management. Review supporting 
documentation such as user surveys, service goals, metrics measuring 
system availability, service schedules, and test plans. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element CP-3. Develop and document a comprehensive contingency 
plan: 

A contingency plan or suite of related plans should be developed for 
restoring critical applications; this includes arrangements for 
alternative processing facilities in case the usual facilities are 
significantly damaged or cannot be accessed. Agency/entity-level 
policies and procedures define the contingency planning process and 
documentation requirements. Furthermore, an entitywide plan should 
identify critical systems, applications, and any subordinate or related 
plans. It is important that these plans be clearly documented, 
communicated to affected staff, and updated to reflect current 
operations. Testing the plan is addressed in critical element CP-4. In 
addition, the plan should address entity systems maintained by a 
contractor or other entity (e.g., through service level agreements). 

According to NIST, contingency planning represents a broad scope of 
activities designed to sustain and recover critical IT services 
following an emergency. IT contingency planning fits into a much 
broader emergency preparedness environment that includes organizational 
and business process continuity and recovery planning. Ultimately, an 
organization may use a suite of plans to properly prepare response, 
recovery, and continuity activities for disruptions affecting the 
organizationï¿½s IT systems, business processes, and the facility. 
Because there is an inherent relationship between an IT system and the 
business process it supports, there should be coordination between each 
plan during development and updates to ensure that recovery strategies 
and supporting resources neither negate each other nor duplicate 
efforts. 

The NIST SP 800-34, Contingency Planning Guide for Information 
Technology Systems, discusses the types of contingency plans that an 
organization might use and how they relate to each other. Since there 
is no standard definition for these plans, they may vary from 
organization to organization. To provide a common basis of 
understanding for IT contingency planning, NIST developed the 
descriptions shown in the table below. 

Table 35: Types of Contingency-Related Plans: 

Plan: Business Continuity Plan (BCP); 
Purpose: Provide procedures for sustaining essential business 
operations while recovering from a significant disruption; 
Scope: Addresses business processes; IT addressed based only on its 
support for business process. 

Plan: Business Recovery (or Resumption) Plan (BRP); 
Purpose: Provide procedures for recovering business operations 
immediately following a disaster; 
Scope: Addresses business processes; not IT-focused; IT addressed based 
only on its support for business process. 

Plan: Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP); 
Purpose: Provide procedures and capabilities to sustain an 
organizationï¿½s essential, strategic functions at an alternate site for 
up to 30 days; 
Scope: Addresses the subset of an organizationï¿½s missions that are 
deemed most critical; usually written at headquarters level; not IT-
focused. 

Plan: Continuity of Support Plan/IT Contingency Plan; 
Purpose: Provide procedures and capabilities for recovering a major 
application or general support system; 
Scope: Same as IT contingency plan; addresses IT system disruptions; 
not business process focused. 

Plan: Crisis Communications Plan; 
Purpose: Provides procedures for disseminating status reports to 
personnel and the public; 
Scope: Addresses communications with personnel and the public; not IT 
focused. 

Plan: Cyber Incident Response Plan; 
Purpose: Provide strategies to detect, respond to, and limit 
consequences of malicious cyber incident; 
Scope: Focuses on information security responses to incidents affecting 
systems and/or networks. 

Plan: Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP); 
Purpose: Provide detailed procedures to facilitate recovery of 
capabilities at an alternate site; 
Scope: Often IT-focused; limited to major disruptions with long-term 
effects. 

Plan: Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP); 
Purpose: Provide coordinated procedures for minimizing loss of life or 
injury and protecting property damage in response to a physical threat; 
Scope: Focuses on personnel and property particular to the specific 
facility; not business process or IT system functionality based. 

Source: NIST Contingency Planning Guide for Information Technology 
Systems (SP 800-34). 

[End of table] 

In addition, NIST addresses technical contingency planning 
considerations and solutions for specific information technology 
platforms: (1) desktop computers and portable systems, (2) servers, (3) 
Web sites, (4) local area networks, (5) wide area networks, (6) 
distributed systems, and (7) mainframe systems. 

Note that incident handling can be considered that portion of 
contingency planning that responds to malicious technical threats. An 
incident response capability is addressed in critical element AC-5.1. 

CP-3.1. An up-to-date contingency plan is documented: 

Contingency plans should be documented, agreed on by both users and 
information security departments, and communicated to affected staff. 
FISMA requires that each federal agency develop, document, and 
implement an agencywide information security program that includes 
plans to ensure continuity of operations for information systems. 

The plan should reflect the risks and operational priorities that the 
entity has identified. It should be designed so that the costs of 
contingency planning do not exceed the costs associated with the risks 
that the plan is intended to reduce. The plan should also be detailed 
enough so that its success does not depend on the knowledge or 
expertise of one or two individuals. It should identify and provide 
information on: 

* supporting resources that will be needed; 

* roles and responsibilities of those who will be involved in recovery 
activities; 

* arrangements for an off-site disaster recovery location and travel 
and lodging for necessary personnel, if needed; 

* off-site storage location for backup files; and; 

* procedures for restoring critical applications and their order in the 
restoration process. (See section CP-1.3 for additional information on 
emergency processing priorities.) 

Multiple copies of the contingency plan should be available, with some 
stored at off-site locations to make sure they are not destroyed by the 
same events that made the primary data processing facilities 
unavailable. 

CP-3.2. Arrangements have been made for alternate data processing, 
storage, and telecommunications facilities: 

Depending on the degree of service continuity needed, choices for 
alternative facilities will range from an equipped site ready for 
immediate backup service, referred to as a ï¿½hot site,ï¿½ to an unequipped 
site that will take some time to prepare for operations, referred to as 
a ï¿½cold site.ï¿½ In addition, various types of services can be 
prearranged with vendors. These include making arrangements with 
suppliers of computer hardware and telecommunications services as well 
as with suppliers of business forms and other office supplies. 

As with all emergency preparations, costs and risks should be 
considered in deciding what type of alternate site is needed. However, 
it should be geographically removed from the original site so that it 
is protected from the same events. In addition, the site should have 
ready access to the basic utilities needed to resume operations, such 
as electricity, water, and telecommunications services. In some cases, 
two or more entities may share the same alternate site in order to 
reduce the cost. However, this may cause problems if two or more 
entities need the site at the same time. 

Whatever options are determined to be the most appropriate, the entity 
should have a formal agreement or contract detailing the emergency 
arrangements. Further, the arrangements should be periodically reviewed 
to determine whether they remain adequate to meet the agencyï¿½s needs. 

CP-3 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
CP-2 Contingency Plan; 
CP-5 Contingency Plan Update; 
CP-8 Telecommunications Services. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CP-3: 

Table 36. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CP-3: Develop and document a comprehensive contingency 
plan: 

Control activities: 
CP-3.1. An up-to-date contingency plan is documented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-3.1.1. A contingency plan has been documented that: 
* is based on clearly defined contingency planning policy; 
* reflects current conditions, including system interdependencies; 
* has been approved by key affected groups, including senior 
management, information security and data center management, and 
program managers; 
* clearly assigns responsibilities for recovery; 
* includes detailed instructions for restoring operations (both 
operating system and critical applications); 
* identifies the alternate processing facility and the back up storage 
facility; 
* includes procedures to follow when the data/service center is unable 
to receive or transmit data; 
* identifies critical data files; 
* is detailed enough to be understood by all entity managers; 
* includes computer and telecommunications hardware compatible with the 
agencyï¿½s needs; 
* includes necessary contact numbers; 
* includes appropriate system-recovery instructions; 
* has been distributed to all appropriate personnel; and; 
* has been coordinated with related plans and activities. 
Audit procedures: 
Review contingency planning policy and determine if it documents the 
agencyï¿½s overall contingency objectives and establishes the 
organizational framework and responsibilities for contingency planning. 
Obtain contingency plans (see NIST SP 800-34) and compare their 
provisions with the most recent risk assessment and with a current 
description of automated operations. Compare the contingency plans to 
security-related plans, facility-level plans, and agency/entity-level 
plans such as those in NIST contingency planning guidance. Determine if 
the contingency plans include: 
* appropriate consideration of the technology, including alternative 
processing requirements, 
* recovery of the security infrastructure, and, 
* interdependencies with other systems (i.e., other component, federal, 
state, or local agencies) that could affect the contingency operations. 

Control activities: 
CP-3.1. An up-to-date contingency plan is documented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-3.1.2. Contingency plans are reevaluated before proposed changes to 
the information system are approved to determine if major modifications 
have security ramifications that require operational changes in order 
to maintain adequate risk mitigation. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview senior management, information security management, and 
program managers. 

Control activities: 
CP-3.1. An up-to-date contingency plan is documented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-3.1.3. Procedures allow facility access in support of restoration of 
lost information under the contingency plans in the event of an 
emergency. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine whether emergency and temporary access authorizations are 
properly approved, documented, controlled, communicated, and 
automatically terminated after a predetermined period. These procedures 
should be performed in conjunction with Section AC-3.1.8 and AC-6.1.8 
regarding access controls. 

Control activities: 
CP-3.1. An up-to-date contingency plan is documented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-3.1.4. The plan provides for backup personnel so that it can be 
implemented independent of specific individuals. 
Audit procedures: 
Review the contingency plan. 

Control activities: 
CP-3.1. An up-to-date contingency plan is documented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-3.1.5. User departments have developed adequate manual/peripheral 
processing procedures for use until operations are restored. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview senior management, information security management, and 
program managers. 

Control activities: 
CP-3.1. An up-to-date contingency plan is documented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-3.1.6. Several copies of the current contingency plan are securely 
stored off-site at different locations. 
Audit procedures: 
Observe copies of the contingency and related plans held off-site. 

Control activities: 
CP-3.1. An up-to-date contingency plan is documented. 
Control techniques: 
CP-3.1.7. The contingency plan is periodically reassessed and revised 
as appropriate. At a minimum, the plan is reassessed when there are 
significant changes in entity mission, organization, business 
processes, and IT infrastructure (e.g. hardware, software, personnel). 
Audit procedures: 
Review the plan and any documentation supporting recent plan 
reassessments. 

Control activities: 
CP-3.2. Arrangements have been made for alternate data processing, 
storage, and telecommunications facilities. 
Control techniques: 
CP-3.2.1. Contracts or interagency agreements have been established for 
backup processing facilities that: 
* are in a state of readiness commensurate with the risks of 
interrupted operations, 
* have sufficient processing and storage capacity, and, 
* are likely to be available for use. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview officials and review contracts and agreements including 
processing priorities for the backup site. Determine if the back up 
site is properly configured and ready to be used as an operational 
site. 

Control activities: 
CP-3.2. Arrangements have been made for alternate data processing, 
storage, and telecommunications facilities. 
Control techniques:
CP-3.2.2. Alternate network and telecommunication services have been 
arranged. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview officials and review contracts and agreements including the 
priority of service provisions for the backup service provider. 
Determine if the backup service provides separate failure points and is 
geographically removed from the primary provider. 

Control activities: 
CP-3.2. Arrangements have been made for alternate data processing, 
storage, and telecommunications facilities. 
Control techniques: 
CP-3.2.3. Arrangements are planned for travel, lodging, and protection 
of necessary personnel, if needed. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview officials and review the plan. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element CP-4. Periodically test the contingency plan and 
adjust it as appropriate: 

Testing contingency plans is essential to determining whether they will 
function as intended in an emergency situation. According to OMB, 
federal managers have reported that testing revealed important 
weaknesses in their plans, such as backup facilities that could not 
adequately replicate critical operations as anticipated. Through the 
testing process, these plans were substantially improved.[Footnote 88] 

The most useful scenarios involve simulating a disaster situation to 
test overall service continuity. Such an event would include testing 
whether the alternative data processing site will function as intended 
and whether critical computer data and programs recovered from off-site 
storage are accessible and current. In executing the plan, managers 
will be able to identify weaknesses and make changes accordingly. 
Moreover, tests will assess how well employees have been trained to 
carry out their roles and responsibilities in a disaster situation. 

CP-4.1. The plan is periodically tested: 

The frequency of contingency plan testing will vary depending on the 
criticality of the agencyï¿½s operations. Generally, contingency plans 
for very critical functions should be fully tested about once every 
year or two, whenever significant changes to the plan have been made, 
or when significant turnover of key people has occurred. It is 
important for top management to assess the risks of contingency plan 
problems and develop and document a policy on the frequency and extent 
of such testing. 

CP-4.2. Test results are analyzed and the contingency plan is adjusted 
accordingly: 

Contingency test results provide an important measure of the 
feasibility of the contingency plan. As such, they should be reported 
to top management so that the need for modification and additional 
testing can be determined and so that top management is aware of the 
risks of continuing operations with an inadequate contingency plan. Any 
testing of contingency plans is likely to identify weaknesses in the 
plan, and it is important that the plan and related supporting 
activities, such as training, be revised to address these weaknesses. 
Otherwise, the benefits of the testing will be mostly lost. 

Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for Critical Element 
CP-4: 

CP-4 Related NIST SP-800-53 Controls: 
CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing and Exercises; 
CP-5 Contingency Plan Update. 

Table 37. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element CP-4: Periodically test the contingency plan and 
adjust it as appropriate: 

Control activities: 
CP-4.1. The plan is periodically tested. 
Control techniques: 
CP-4.1.1. The contingency plan is periodically tested under conditions 
that simulate a disaster. Disaster scenarios tested may be rotated 
periodically. Typically, contingency plans are tested annually or as 
soon as possible after a significant change to the environment that 
would alter the assessed risk. 
Audit procedures: 
Review testing policies and methodology used to select disaster 
scenarios. Determine when and how often contingency plans are tested. 
Determine if technology is appropriately considered in periodic tests 
of the contingency plan and resulting adjustments to the plan. Review 
test results. Observe a disaster recovery test. 

Control activities: 
CP-4.2. Test results are analyzed and the contingency plan is adjusted 
accordingly. 
Control techniques: 
CP-4.2.1. Test results are documented and a report, such as a lessons 
learned report, is developed and provided to senior management. Review 
final test report. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview senior managers to determine if they are aware of the test 
results. 

Control activities: 
CP-4.2. Test results are analyzed and the contingency plan is adjusted 
accordingly. 
Control techniques: 
CP-4.2.2. The contingency plan and related agreements and preparations 
are adjusted to correct any deficiencies identified during testing. 
Audit procedures: 
Review any documentation supporting contingency plan adjustments. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of chapter] 

Chapter 4. Evaluating and Testing Business Process Application 
Controls: 

4.0 Overview: 

Business processes are the principal functions used by the entity to 
accomplish its mission. Examples of typical business processes in 
government entities include: 

* Mission-related processes, typically at the program or sub-program 
level, such as education, public health, law enforcement, or income 
security; 

* Financial management processes, such as collections, disbursements, 
or payroll; and; 

* Other support processes, such as human resources, or property 
management, and security. 

A business process application is a combination of hardware and 
software that is used to process business information in support of a 
specific business process. 

Business process application level controls, commonly referred to as 
ï¿½application level controlsï¿½ or ï¿½application controlsï¿½, are those 
controls over the completeness, accuracy, validity and confidentiality 
of transactions and data during application processing. The 
effectiveness of application level controls is dependent on the 
effectiveness of entitywide and system level general controls. 
Weaknesses in entitywide and system level general controls can result 
in unauthorized changes to business process applications and data that 
can circumvent or impair the effectiveness of application level 
controls. 

If entitywide and system level controls are relevant to the audit 
objectives, the auditor should coordinate the planning and testing of 
such controls with application level controls. For example, if a data 
management system is a critical control point, the auditor would 
coordinate the planning of testing of the entitywide, system, and 
application level controls associated with the data management system. 

In this chapter, application level controls are divided into the 
following four control categories, which are described in more detail 
below: 

(1) Application level general controls; 

(2) Business Process controls; 

(3) Interface controls; and 

(4) Data Management System controls. 

The auditor should assess the effectiveness of controls in each of the 
four control categories to the extent they are significant to the audit 
objectives. 

Application level general controls (referred to herein as ï¿½application 
securityï¿½ or AS)consist of general controls operating at the business 
process application level, including those related to security 
management, access controls, configuration management, segregation of 
duties, and contingency planning. In this chapter, the general control 
activities discussed in Chapter 3, as well as related suggested control 
techniques and audit procedures, are tailored to the business process 
application level. 

Business Process (BP) controls are the automated and/or manual controls 
applied to business transaction flows. They relate to the completeness, 
accuracy, validity and confidentiality of transactions and data during 
application processing. They typically cover the structure, policies, 
and procedures that operate at a detailed business process (cycle or 
transaction) level and operate over individual transactions or 
activities across business processes. Specific control areas of 
business process controls are: 

* Transaction Data Input relates to controls over data that enter the 
application (e.g., data validation and edit checks). 

* Transaction Data Processing relates to controls over data integrity 
within the application (e.g., review of transaction processing logs). 

* Transaction Data Output relates to controls over data output and 
distribution (e.g., output reconciliation and review). 

* Master Data Setup and Maintenance relates to controls over master 
data, the key information that is relatively constant and shared 
between multiple functions or applications (e.g., vendor file). 

Interface controls (IN)consist of those controls over the a) timely, 
accurate, and complete processing of information between applications 
and other feeder and receiving systems on an on-going basis, and b) 
complete and accurate migration of clean data during conversion. 

Data management system (DA) controls are relevant to most business 
process applications because applications frequently utilize the 
features of a data management system to enter, store, retrieve or 
process information, including detailed, sensitive information such as 
financial transactions, customer names, and social security numbers. 
Data management systems include database management systems, 
specialized data transport/communications software (often called 
middleware), data warehouse software, and data extraction/reporting 
software. Data management system controls enforce user 
authentication/authorization, availability of system privileges, data 
access privileges, application processing hosted within the data 
management systems, and segregation of duties. Chapter 3 addresses 
general controls over data management systems as part of system level 
controls. This chapter discusses their use within the application 
level. 

For each of the four application control categories, this chapter 
identifies several critical elements--tasks that are essential for 
establishing adequate controls within the category. For each critical 
element, there is a discussion of the associated objectives, risks, and 
control activities, as well as potential control techniques and 
suggested audit procedures. For each critical element, the auditor 
should make a summary determination as to the effectiveness of the 
entityï¿½s related controls in achieving the critical element. If the 
controls for one or more of each categoryï¿½s critical elements are 
ineffective, then the controls for the entire category are not likely 
to be effective. The auditor should use professional judgment in making 
such determinations. 

To facilitate the auditorsï¿½ evaluation, tables identifying commonly 
used control techniques and related suggested audit procedures are 
included after the discussion of each critical element. These tables 
can be used for both the preliminary evaluation and the more detailed 
evaluation and testing of controls. For the preliminary evaluation, the 
auditor can use the tables to guide and document preliminary inquiries 
and observations. For the more detailed evaluation and testing, the 
auditor can use the suggested audit procedures in developing and 
carrying out a testing plan. Such a testing plan would include more 
extensive inquiries; observation of control procedures; inspection of 
application configurations, design documents, policies and written 
procedures; and tests of key control techniques, which may include 
using audit or system software auditing tools. 

The discussion of control elements and control techniques apply to all 
application environments, which include mainframe, client-server, 
integrated enterprise resource planning (ERP)[Footnote 89] and web 
environments. The nature of evidence obtained by the auditor will be 
different based on the environment. Auditorsï¿½ knowledge of the business 
processes and application level security in different environments is, 
therefore, critical to identifying and testing business process 
application level controls. 

As noted earlier, the effectiveness of application level controls is 
dependent on the effectiveness of entitywide and system level general 
controls. Weaknesses in entitywide and system level general controls 
can result in unauthorized changes to business process applications and 
data (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) that can circumvent 
or impair the effectiveness of business process application controls. 
More specifically, 

* Weaknesses in security management can result in inadequate assessment 
of and response to information security risks related to the business 
process applications and the systems on which they depend, as well as 
significantly increase the risk that application level and other 
controls are not consistently applied in accordance with managementï¿½s 
policies. 

* Weaknesses in access controls can result in unauthorized access to 
and modifications of; 
- applications, including the operation of the related controls, 
- application data, including after the control(s) were applied, 
and/or, 
- system components, which can lead to unauthorized changes to data and 
applications. 

* Weaknesses in configuration management can result in unauthorized 
modifications or additions to the applications and to system 
components, leading to unauthorized access to data and applications. 

* Weaknesses in segregation of duties can result in unauthorized access 
to applications, application data, and/or system components. In 
addition, such weaknesses can allow fraudulent transactions and control 
overrides to occur. 

* Weaknesses in contingency planning can result in unavailability of 
applications and/or loss of application data. 

The following table illustrates the relationship between business 
process application level controls and general controls at the 
entitywide and system level. 

Table 38. General and Application Control Categories Applicable at 
Different Levels of Audit: 

General Controls: 

Control Categories: Security Management: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Access Controls: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Configuration Management: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Segregation of Duties: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Contingency Planning: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Applicable; 
System Level, Network: Applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Business Process Application Controls: 

Control Categories: Business Process Controls: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Not applicable; 
System Level, Network: Not applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Not applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Not applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Interfaces: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Not applicable; 
System Level, Network: Not applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Not applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Not applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Control Categories: Data Management Systems: 
Entitywide/Component Level: Not applicable; 
System Level, Network: Not applicable; 
System Level, Operating Systems: Not applicable; 
System Level, Infrastructure Applications: Not applicable; 
Business Process Application Level: Applicable. 

Source: GAO. 

[Ed of table] 

4.0.1 The Auditorï¿½s Consideration of Business Process Control 
Objectives: 

The overall objectives of business process application level controls 
are to provide reasonable assurance about the completeness, accuracy, 
validity and confidentiality of transactions and data during 
application processing. Each specific business process control 
technique is designed to achieve one or more of these objectives. The 
effectiveness of business process controls depends on whether all of 
these overall objectives are achieved. Each objective is described in 
more detail below. 

Completeness (C) controls should provide reasonable assurance that all 
transactions that occurred are input into the system, accepted for 
processing, processed once and only once by the system, and properly 
included in output. Completeness controls include the following key 
elements: 

* transactions are completely input, 

* valid transactions are accepted by the system, 

* duplicate postings are rejected by the system, 

* rejected transactions are identified, corrected and re-processed; 
and; 

* all transactions accepted by the system are processed completely. 

The most common completeness controls in applications are batch totals, 
sequence checking, matching, duplicate checking, reconciliations, 
control totals and exception reporting. 

Accuracy (A) controls should provide reasonable assurance that 
transactions are properly recorded, with the correct amount/data, and 
on a timely basis (in the proper period); key data elements input for 
transactions are accurate; and data elements are processed accurately 
by applications that produce reliable results; and output is accurate. 

Accuracy control techniques include programmed edit checks (e.g., 
validations, reasonableness checks, dependency checks, existence 
checks, format checks, mathematical accuracy, range checks, etc.), 
batch totals and check digit verification. 

Validity (V) controls should provide reasonable assurance (1) that all 
recorded transactions actually occurred (are real), relate to the 
organization, and were properly approved in accordance with 
managementï¿½s authorization; and (2) that output contains only valid 
data. A transaction is valid when it has been authorized (for example, 
buying from a particular supplier) and when the master data relating to 
that transaction is reliable (for example, the name, bank account and 
other details on that supplier). Validity includes the concept of 
authenticity. Examples of validity controls are one-for-one checking 
and matching. 

Confidentiality (CF) controls should provide reasonable assurance that 
application data and reports and other output are protected against 
unauthorized access. Examples of confidentiality controls include 
restricted physical and logical access to sensitive business process 
applications, data files, transactions, and output, and adequate 
segregation of duties. Confidentiality also includes restricted access 
to data reporting/extraction tools as well as copies or extractions of 
data files. 

The completeness, accuracy, and validity controls relate to the overall 
integrity objective. The availability objective is addressed as part of 
application level general controls in AS-5. 

4.0.2 Steps in Assessing Business Process Application Level Controls: 

The assessment of business process application level controls is 
incorporated into the audit approach discussed in Chapter 2. This 
section provides supplemental implementation guidance with respect to 
planning the assessment of business process application level controls 
and should be applied in conjunction with Chapter 2. Consistent with 
Chapter 2, the assessment of business process application level 
controls includes the following steps: 

* Plan the information system controls audit; 

* Perform information system controls audit tests; 

* Report audit results. 

4.0.3 Plan the Information System Controls Audit of Business Process 
Application Level Controls: 

Although planning continues throughout the audit, the objectives of the 
initial planning phase are to identify significant issues, assess risk, 
and design efficient and effective audit procedures. To accomplish 
this, the auditor performs the following steps, which are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2: 

* Understand the overall audit objectives and related scope of the 
business process application control assessment; 

* Understand the entityï¿½s operations and key business processes; 

* Obtain a general understanding of the structure of the entityï¿½s 
networks; 

* Identify key areas of audit interest (files, applications, systems, 
locations); 

* Assess information system risk on a preliminary basis; 

* Identify critical control points; 

* Obtain a preliminary understanding of business process application 
level controls; 

* Perform other audit planning procedures The following discussion 
provides additional audit considerations for certain of these steps, as 
they apply to application level controls. 

4.0.3.A Understand the overall audit objectives and related scope of 
the business process application control assessment: 

The auditor should obtain an understanding of the objectives of the 
application control assessment. The nature, timing and extent of the 
auditorï¿½s procedures to assess the effectiveness of application 
controls vary depending upon the audit objectives. 

The audit objectives for an application control assessment could 
include: 

* Assessment as part of a broad assessment of information system 
controls (including entitywide, system, and application level 
controls), either as part of a financial statement or performance 
audit, or as a standalone assessment; 

* A comprehensive assessment of application level controls related to a 
specific application or applications, with or without an assessment of 
related entitywide and system level controls; 

* An assessment of specific aspects of application level controls, such 
as: 

a. Evaluating the efficiency of business process applications; 

b. Assessing business process application level controls for 
applications under development; 

c. Assessing selected business application level control categories, 
such as business process controls or application level general 
controls; 

d. Assessing conversion of data to a new application; or, 

e. Assessing access controls to assess whether access granted is 
appropriately identified, evaluated, and approved. 

As noted in Chapter 2, if achieving the audit objectives does not 
require an overall conclusion on IS controls or relates only to certain 
components or a subset of controls, the auditorï¿½s assessment would not 
necessarily identify all significant IS control weaknesses that may 
exist. Consequently, if the audit objectives only relate to a subset of 
controls, such as only business process controls for a specific 
application, the auditor should evaluate the potential limitations of 
the auditorï¿½s work on the auditorï¿½s report and the needs and 
expectations of users. The auditor may determine that, because the 
limitations are so significant, the auditor will (1) communicate the 
limitations to the management of the audited entity, those charged with 
governance, and/or those requesting the audit, and (2) clearly report 
such limitations on the conclusions in the audit report. For example, 
in reporting on an audit limited to business process controls within a 
business process application, the auditor may determine that it is 
appropriate to clearly report that the scope of the assessment was 
limited to those business process controls and that, consequently, 
additional information system control weaknesses may exist that could 
impact the effectiveness of IS controls related to the application and 
to the entity as a whole. 

4.0.3.B Understand the entityï¿½s operations and key business processes: 

Understanding the entity's operations and business processes includes 
understanding how business process applications are used to support key 
business processes, as it tends to vary from entity to entity. The 
auditor should obtain and review documentation, such as design 
documents, blueprints, business process procedures, user manuals, etc., 
and inquire of knowledgeable personnel to obtain a general 
understanding of each significant business process application that is 
relevant to the audit objectives. This includes a detailed 
understanding of: 

* business rules (e.g. removing all transactions that fail edits or 
only selected ones based on established criteria), 

* transaction flows (detailed study of the entityï¿½s internal controls 
over a particular category of events that identifies all key procedures 
and controls relating to the processing of transactions), and, 

* application and software module interaction (transactions leave one 
system for processing by another, e.g. payroll time card interfaces 
with pay rate file to determine salary information). 

Obtaining this understanding is essential to assessing information 
system risk, understanding application controls, and developing 
relevant audit procedures. 

The concept of materiality/significance, discussed in Chapter 2, can 
help the auditor determine which applications are significant, or key, 
to the audit objectives. 

4.0.3.C Obtain a general understanding of the structure of the entityï¿½s 
networks: 

The auditor should obtain an understanding of the specific networks and 
systems that are used to support the key business process applications. 
Information obtained during this step is important to: 

(1) Assist in the identification of the critical control points (see 
Chapter 2) over which entitywide and system level controls need to be 
effective for the related application level controls to be effective. 
Based on the results of audit procedures, the auditor may modify the 
listing of critical control points, or identify additional critical 
control points. In the testing phase, the auditor assesses entitywide 
and system level controls (as outlined in Chapter 3) over each critical 
control point identified, unless not part of the objectives of the 
audit. 

(2) Provide a foundation for understanding where application level 
general controls are applied. For example, application level general 
controls may be applied as part of the application itself, through 
access control software, data management systems, ERP systems, and/or 
in conjunction with operating system and network security. Obtaining 
such an understanding is important to identify those controls that are 
necessary to reasonably assure that unauthorized access to key 
applications and data files are prevented or detected. 

4.0.3.D Identify key areas of audit interest (files, applications, 
systems, locations): 

Based on the audit objectives and the auditorï¿½s understanding of the 
business processes and networks, the auditor should identify key areas 
of audit interest, including: 

* key business process applications and where each key business process 
application is processed, 

* key data files used by each key business application, and, 

* relevant general controls at the entitywide and system levels, upon 
which application level controls depend. Chapter 2 provides additional 
information on identifying key areas of audit interest. 

4.0.3.E Assess information system risk on a preliminary basis: 

Based on the auditorï¿½s understanding obtained in the previous steps, 
the auditor should assess, on a preliminary basis, the nature and 
extent of IS risk related to the key applications. The auditor may 
classify security risks according to the definitions explained in 
Chapter 2. 

Chapter 2 provides a description of risk factors that are relevant to 
an assessment of IS risk, including nature of the hardware and software 
used, the configuration of the network, and the entityï¿½s IT strategy. 
The auditor should evaluate such risk factors in relation to the 
specific key business process applications. For example, Internet 
accessible applications, and applications that provide access to 
assets, such as payment or inventory systems, generally present a 
higher degree of risk. 

4.0.3.F Identify critical control points: 

As discussed in Chapter 2, the auditor should identify and document 
critical control points in the entityï¿½s information systems and key 
applications, based on the auditorï¿½s understanding of such systems and 
applications, key areas of audit interest, and IS risk. Based on 
information obtained during audit planning, the auditor identifies 
critical control points related to the entityï¿½s key applications 
(applications that are significant to the audit objectives and key 
areas of audit interest). Critical control points at the application 
level (in addition to critical control points at the system levels) are 
those points, which if compromised, could significantly affect the 
integrity, confidentiality, or availability of key business process 
applications or related data. Critical control points at the business 
process application level typically include application level general 
controls, and interface controls among several applications. Typical 
critical control points also include network components where business 
process application level controls are applied. As the audit testing 
proceeds and the auditor gains a better understanding of the 
applications, application functionality, controls within and outside 
each application, control weaknesses, and related risks, the auditor 
should reassess and reconsider the critical control points. 

4.0.3.G Obtain a preliminary understanding of application controls: 

Within each key business process application, the auditor should obtain 
an understanding of the particular types of application level controls 
that are significant to the audit objectives. If the audit objectives 
relate to a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of 
application controls within one or more applications, the auditor 
should obtain an understanding of controls implemented by the entity to 
achieve each of the critical elements for each key application. If the 
assessment of application controls is performed in connection with a 
financial audit, the auditor should assess the effectiveness of those 
controls that are identified by the financial auditor (controls 
identified in the Specific Control Evaluation (SCE) Worksheet in 
federal financial audits) and other related controls upon which the 
effectiveness of these controls depend. The responsibility to identify 
financial reporting controls rests primarily with the financial 
auditor, but the information systems auditor should be consulted in 
this process. Financial reporting controls generally contain both 
computer-related (those whose effectiveness depends on computer 
processing) and non-computer-related controls. Computer-related 
controls include: general controls, application controls, and user 
controls. The SCE Worksheet is more fully discussed in section 395 H of 
the Financial Audit Manual (FAM). 

The auditor should obtain a preliminary understanding of business 
process application controls in each of the following control 
categories to the extent they are significant to the audit objectives: 

* Application level general controls; 

* Business Process; 

* Interface controls; and; 

* Data management systems. Frequently each type of control occurs 
within a business process and such controls are interdependent. The 
auditor should consider the interaction between each of these types of 
controls. For example, interface and data management controls are inter 
linked since many of the feeder systems reside on some type of data 
management system whose controls must be effective to ensure the 
integrity of the data it maintains, including social security numbers, 
vendor names, and other sensitive information. Further, interface and 
business process controls are linked in that controls should be 
established that ensure the timely, accurate and complete processing of 
information between the feeder and receiving systems and the mainline 
business processes they support. 

To document the auditorï¿½s understanding, the auditor may complete the 
control tables in Appendices II and III on a preliminary basis. The 
auditor generally should review available application documentation 
that explains processing of data within the application. The auditor 
generally should inspect any narratives, flowcharts, and documentation 
related to system and application, including error reporting. 

As part of this step, the auditor should determine whether application 
level controls are effectively designed. In considering whether 
controls are effectively designed, the auditor considers the type of 
control. The effectiveness of business process application controls, 
and the nature, timing, and extent of assessment procedures, depend on 
the nature of the control. 

As discussed in Chapter 1, information system (IS) controls consist of 
those internal controls that are dependent on information systems 
processing and include general controls (entitywide, system, and 
business process application levels), business process application 
controls (input, processing, output, master file, interface, and data 
management system controls), and user controls (controls performed by 
people interacting with information systems). General and business 
process application controls are always IS controls. A user control is 
an IS control if its effectiveness depends on information systems 
processing or the reliability (accuracy, completeness, and validity) of 
information processed by information systems. Conversely, a user 
control is not an IS control if its effectiveness does not depend on 
information systems processing or the reliability of information 
processed by information systems. 

Application controls can be automated or manual. The auditor will find 
that most business processes will have a combination of automated and 
manual controls that balance resource requirements and risk mitigation. 
Also, management may use manual controls as effective monitoring 
controls. It is important to understand how these types of controls 
inter-relate when assessing application controls. The auditor should 
evaluate the adequacy of controls, both automated and manual, to 
determine whether or not management has appropriately mitigated risks 
and achieved its control objectives. 

Automated business process controls can provide a higher level of 
consistency in application, and can also be timelier in preventing an 
undesired outcome. Automated controls have greater consistency because 
once designed and implemented, they will continue to operate as 
designed, assuming the presence of effective general controls (at all 
levels). Automated controls can also be designed to block a transaction 
from proceeding through the process, making them timelier in preventing 
an undesired outcome. For example, a vendor invoice can be blocked for 
payment automatically if the goods or services are not received or if 
the payment exceeds a specific threshold and requires additional review 
and approval. Manual controls, such as the review of reports or 
payments over a certain amount, could effectively detect an invoice 
payment without goods receipt, or a high-dollar payment, but may not 
occur in time to stop the payment. 

The operating effectiveness of an automated application control during 
the audit period also depends on the operating effectiveness of related 
general controls (at the entitywide, system and applications levels). 
For example, effective general controls are necessary to prevent or 
detect management overrides or other unauthorized changes to computer 
applications or data that could preclude or impair the operation of the 
automated control. 

Automated controls can be further subdivided into: 

* Inherent Controls are those that have been hard coded and built into 
the application logic and cannot be changed by end users. The self-
balancing capability provided by some applications is an example of an 
inherent control (e.g., in a financial application, the transaction 
will not post until debits = credits. 

* Configurable Controls are those that have been designed into the 
system during application implementation and address the features most 
commonly associated with options available to guide end users through 
their assigned tasks. Workflow to approve purchase requisition and 
purchase orders, commitments not to exceed obligations, and dollar 
value threshold to process transactions are examples of configurable 
controls. 

ERP systems by design are Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) 
compliant, which means that they can be configured to prepare reports 
based upon standard rules or ï¿½taxonomies.ï¿½ The auditor should 
understand the nature and extent of any XBRL use and evaluate the 
controls surrounding such reporting processes. 

Automated controls cannot contemplate and reasonably forecast the 
outcome of every type of uncertainty, nor can it prevent or detect 
every possible error or intentional misuse of application 
functionality. For example, well-designed segregation of duty controls 
could be compromised by collusion. Manual controls, therefore, may be 
used either in situations where ideal controls, such as complete 
segregation of duties, can't be implemented to prevent something from 
occurring, or when manual controls offer an effective, cost-effective 
control option. 

Manual controls (sometimes referred to as user controls) require human 
involvement, usually by way of approval of a critical step in a 
business process (example: signed purchase requisition) or reviewing 
for exceptions and compliance by reviewing system output. Generally, 
the auditor considers and tests manual controls along with automated 
controls. Testing only one type of application control may lead to 
incorrect assessment of key controls management may be relying on. 

When the effectiveness of a manual control that is significant to the 
audit objectives depends on the reliability of computer-processed 
information, it is considered an IS control and, the auditor should 
assess the effectiveness of relevant general (at the entitywide, 
system, and application levels) and business process application, 
controls over the reliability of the information used. Also, the 
effectiveness of manual controls is dependent on how consistently and 
effectively the control is applied. The auditor considers the following 
when reviewing manual controls: 

* The competence of the individuals performing control activities 
(reviewing the reports or other documents). They should have an 
adequate level of business knowledge and technical expertise and be 
familiar with the entity's operations. 

* The authority of the individuals performing the reviews to take 
corrective action. They should be adequately positioned within the 
entity to act effectively. 

* The objectivity of the individuals performing the reviews. The 
individuals should be independent of those who perform the work, both 
functionally (that is, there should be adequate segregation of duties) 
and motivationally (for example, a review would be less effective if 
the reviewer's compensation is based on operating results being 
reviewed). 

* The nature and quality of the information reviewed by management. 

* The frequency and timeliness of performance of reviews. 

* The extent of follow-up performed by management. 

* The extent to which controls can be tested (i.e., the auditor's 
ability to corroborate management's responses to inquiries). 

In addition to automated and manual controls performed prior to or 
during transaction processing, monitoring controls may be applied by 
management after the processing has taken place. Their objective is to 
identify any errors that have not been prevented or detected by other 
controls. Examples of monitoring controls include: 

* Review of a report of revenue with overall knowledge of the volume of 
goods shipped. 

* Monitoring of capital expenditures via a quarterly report that 
analyzes expenditures by department with comparisons to budgeted 
levels. 

* Monitoring of budget versus actual program cost. 

4.0.3.H Perform other audit planning procedures: 

As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, the auditor should address 
the following issues during the planning phase that could affect the 
application control audit: 

* relevant laws and regulations; 

* staffing and other resources needed to perform the audit; 

* multi-year planning; 

* communication to management officials concerning the planning and 
performance of the audit, and to others as applicable; 

* use of service organizations; 

* using the work of others; and; 

* preparation of an audit plan. 

4.0.4 Perform Information System Controls Audit Tests of Business 
Process Application Level Controls: 

The auditorï¿½s assessment of application controls has two main aspects: 
testing the effectiveness of controls, and evaluating the results of 
testing. The process of testing and evaluation are planned and scoped 
during the planning phase, as discussed in Chapter 2. As the auditor 
obtains additional information during control testing, the auditor 
should periodically reassess the audit plan and consider whether 
changes are appropriate. 

The auditor should perform the following procedures as part of testing 
and evaluating the effectiveness of application level controls: 

* Understand information systems relevant to the audit objectives, 
building on identification of key areas of audit interest and critical 
control points. 

* Determine which IS control techniques are relevant to the audit 
objectives. The control categories, critical elements, and control 
activities in Chapters 3 and 4 are generally relevant to all audits. 
However, if the auditor is not performing a comprehensive audit, for 
example, an application review, then there may be no need to assess 
controls in Chapter 3. 

* For each relevant IS control technique, determine whether it is 
suitably designed to achieve the critical activity and has been 
implemented -- placed in operation (if not done earlier); 

* Perform tests to determine whether such control techniques are 
operating effectively; 

* Identify potential weaknesses in IS controls (weaknesses in design or 
operating effectiveness); and; 

* For each potential weakness, consider the impact of compensating 
controls or other factors that mitigate or reduce the risks related to 
the potential weakness. 

The auditor considers the following in designing the tests of 
application level controls: 

* The nature of the control; 

* The significance of the control in achieving the control 
objective(s); 

* The risk of the control not being properly applied. [also see FAM 
340]; 

* All of the key controls that management is relying on to address the 
risks for a specific business process or a sub-process, which may 
include automated and manual controls; 

* The key controls outside the application under audit, as the business 
process may involve other applications for a downstream or upstream sub-
process; and; 

* The strength or weakness of the entitywide and system level controls. 
The depth of the testing is based on the level of risk of the entity 
under review and the audit objectives. In the absence of effective 
general controls, the auditor may conclude that business process 
application level controls are not likely to be effective. 

4.0.5 Report Audit Results: 

As a final step of the audit of application level controls, the auditor 
should conclude on the individual aggregate aggregate effect of 
identified application control weaknesses on the audit objectives and 
report the results of the audit. Such conclusions generally should 
include the effect of any weaknesses on the entityï¿½s ability to achieve 
each of the critical elements in Chapters 3 and 4, and on the risk of 
unauthorized access to key systems or files. The auditorï¿½s conclusions 
should be based upon the potential interdependencies of application 
controls (i.e., controls which effectiveness depends on the 
effectiveness of other controls). 

Prior to developing an audit report, it is generally appropriate to 
communicate identified weaknesses to management to obtain their 
concurrence with the facts and to understand whether there are 
additional factors that are relevant to the auditorï¿½s evaluation of the 
effect of the weaknesses. Communication of identified weaknesses to 
management typically includes the following information: 

* Nature and extent of risks; 

* Control Objectives; 

* Control Activity; 

* Findings (including condition, criteria, and where possible, cause 
and effect), and; 

* Recommendations Chapter 2 provides additional guidance on reporting 
audit results. 

4.1. Application Level General Controls (AS): 

Application level general controls consist of general controls 
operating at the business process application level, including those 
related to security management, access controls, configuration 
management, segregation of duties, and contingency planning. In this 
chapter, the general control activities discussed in Chapter 3, as well 
as related suggested control techniques and audit procedures, are 
tailored to the application level. Understanding business processes or 
events is necessary to determine the role of application level general 
controls in the assessment of business process application controls. 

Chapter 3 addresses controls at the entitywide and system levels, such 
as those related to networks, servers, general support systems and 
databases that support one or more business and financial systems. 
Additional security considerations specific to applications are 
discussed in this section. 

Application level general controls are dependent on general controls 
operating at the entitywide and system levels. The application is 
generally a subset of the infrastructure that includes one or more 
operating systems, networks, portals, LDAPs, and data management 
systems. For example, the system level access controls discussed in 
Chapter 3 apply to the users of the application. In addition, 
applications themselves require another level of access requirements 
that restrict users to application functionality that aligns with the 
userï¿½s role in the organization. The objective of application level 
general controls is to help entity management assure the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information assets, and 
provide reasonable assurance that application resources and data are 
protected against unauthorized: 
ï¿½ Modification, 
- Disclosure, 
ï¿½ Loss, and, 
ï¿½ Impairment. 

Weaknesses in application level general controls can result in 
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
destruction of applications and application data. Consequently, 
weaknesses in application level general controls can affect the 
achievement of all of the control objectives (completeness, accuracy, 
validity, and confidentiality) related to applications data. Therefore, 
the control activities in the control tables for application level 
general controls do not contain reference to specific control 
objectives. 

The evaluation of application level general controls is comprised of 
critical elements in the following areas: Security Management, Access 
Control, Configuration Management, Segregation of Duties and 
Contingency Planning. Application-specific technical knowledge is 
essential to assess the application level general controls. The 
critical elements for application level general controls are: 

* AS-1 - Implement effective application security management; 

* AS-2 - Implement effective application access controls; 

* AS-3 - Implement effective application configuration management; 

* AS-4 - Segregate application user access to conflicting transactions 
and activities and monitor segregation; 

* AS-5 - Implement effective application contingency planning. 

The related NIST SP 800-53 controls are identified in Chapter 3. 

Critical Element AS-1. Implement effective application security 
management. 

Effective application security management provides a foundation for 
entity management to obtain reasonable assurance that the application 
is effectively secure. Application security management provides a 
framework for managing risk, developing security policies, assigning 
responsibilities, and monitoring the adequacy of the entityï¿½s 
application-related controls. Without effective security management 
over the application, there is an increased risk that entity 
management, IT staff, and application owners and users will not 
properly assess risk and will, consequently, implement inappropriate 
and/or inadequate information security over the application. Consistent 
with security management at the entitywide and system levels, 
application security management includes the following key components, 
which are discussed in more detail below: 

* Establish an application security plan; 
* Periodically assess and validate application security risks; 
* Document and implement application security policies and procedures; 
* Ensure that application owners and users are aware of application 
security policies and procedures; 
* Monitor the effectiveness of the security program; 
* Effectively remediate information security weaknesses; 
* Implement effective security-related personnel policies; 
* Adequately secure, document and monitor external third party 
activities. 

Establish an application security plan: 

An application security plan serves as a roadmap during the entire 
security development and maintenance lifecycle of the application, and 
is therefore critical to the auditor in gaining a high-level 
understanding of the entityï¿½s application security. The lack of a 
comprehensive, documented security design increases the risk of 
inappropriate system access and compromised data confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. Risks of not having a security program at 
the application level include the following: 

* The process to gather design requirements may be compromised without 
clear guidelines on approval and sign off procedures for security 
roles. 

* Ongoing requirements for business process owners to provide 
authorization specifications to the security design team (e.g., field-
level security, role testing, etc.) may be compromised without a 
guideline to drive the joint-effort process. 

* Security roles could be defined inappropriately resulting in users 
being granted excessive or unauthorized access. 

For federal systems, NIST Special Publication 800-18, Guide for 
Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems, provides 
guidance on documenting information system security controls. The 
general guidance in SP 800-18 is augmented by SP 800-53 with 
recommendations for information and rationale to be included in the 
system security plan. 

Periodically assess and validate application security risks: 

Chapter 3 (SM-2) discusses comprehensive risk assessment, and provides 
guidance on risk assessment. The guidance includes requirements 
contained in various regulatory requirements, such as FISMA, FMFIA and 
OMB Circular A-130, and standards developed by NIST.[Footnote 90] Risk 
assessments should consider risks to data confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability, and the range of risks that an entityï¿½s systems and 
data may be subject to, including those posed by internal and external 
users. The Security Management section of Chapter 3 addresses the 
entitywide and system level security risk assessments. Risk assessments 
also should be conducted for applications, and documented in the 
security plan, as discussed in NIST SP 800-18. 

Document and implement application security policies and procedures: 

Based on the application security plan, the entity should document and 
implement specific policies and procedures that govern the operation of 
application controls. Policies and procedures should address all 
business process application level controls, be documented and reflect 
current application configurations. 

In defining policies and procedures for application controls, the 
following should also be considered: 

* High risk business processes ï¿½ Procurement, Asset Management, 
Treasury, etc. 

* Functionality that should not be widely distributed - For example, 
limiting vendor master data maintenance to a few users is critical to 
ensure master data integrity and reliable transaction processing. 

* Segregating master data and transactional data (Contrary to master 
data, transactional data result from a single event, and often use 
several field values of the master data.) ï¿½ For example, combining 
vendor creation and payment authorization could result in payments to 
unauthorized vendors. 

* Cross-business unit access - Should be limited to users who have a 
specific business need. 

Implement effective security awareness and other security-related 
personnel policies: 

It is important that application owners and users are aware of and 
understand the application security policies and procedures so that 
they may be properly implemented. Improper implementation could result 
in ineffective controls and increased information security risks. 
Awareness programs should be coordinated with the entitywide training 
program to reasonably assure that the training is appropriate and 
consistent for all applications. 

Monitor the effectiveness of the security program: 

Policies and procedures for monitoring application security should be 
integrated with monitoring performed as part of the entitywide 
information security program. Changes related to people, processes, and 
technology, often make policies and procedures inadequate. Periodic 
management evaluation not only identifies the need to change the 
policies and procedures, when appropriate, but also demonstrates 
management's commitment to an application security plan that is 
appropriate to the agencyï¿½s mission. The basic components of an 
effective monitoring program are discussed in Chapter 3 (Critical 
element SM-5), which provides guidelines for monitoring the policies 
and procedures relevant to application security. Management should have 
an adequate plan for monitoring policy effectiveness, and should test 
and document application security controls on a regular basis. 

Management should consider ways to effectively coordinate monitoring 
efforts with work performed to comply with applicable laws and 
regulations and should consider them in developing an application 
security monitoring assessment plan. Examples of such requirements for 
federal entities include: FISMA, OMB Circular A-130 and OMB Circular A-
123. FISMA requires that security of all major systems is tested by 
management annually, which would include applications. The depth and 
breadth of the testing may vary based on the following factors: 

* The potential risk and magnitude of harm to the application or data; 

* The criticality of the application to the agencyï¿½s mission; 

* The relative comprehensiveness of the prior yearï¿½s review; and; 

* The adequacy and successful implementation of corrective actions for 
weaknesses identified in previous assessments. 

OMB Circular A-130 requires that Federal agencies assess and test the 
security of major applications at least once every 3 years, as part of 
the certification and accreditation (C&A) process; sooner if 
significant modifications have occurred or where the risk and magnitude 
of harm are high. 

OMB Circular A-123 requires agencies and individual Federal managers to 
take systematic and proactive measures to (i) develop and implement 
appropriate, cost-effective internal control for results-oriented 
management; (ii) assess the adequacy of internal control in Federal 
programs and operations; (iii) separately assess and document internal 
control over financial reporting consistent with the process defined in 
Appendix A; (iv) identify needed improvements; (v) take corresponding 
corrective action; and (vi) report annually on internal control through 
management assurance statements. The implementation guidance for OMB 
Circular A-123 includes requirements that are wholly consistent with 
this manual. 

The entity should take into consideration the statutory and regulatory 
requirements in its assessment of the effectiveness of application 
security policies and procedures, and testing of application security 
controls. Management should: 

* develop and document the assessment plan of application security 
policies and procedures; 

* test and document application security controls specific to each 
application; and; 

* ensure that the frequency and scope of testing are commensurate with 
the criticality of the application to the agencyï¿½s mission and risk. 

Effectively remediate information security weaknesses: 

Managementï¿½s commitment to application security is also demonstrated in 
having an effective mechanism to address weaknesses and deficiencies 
identified. When weaknesses or deficiencies are identified in 
application security, management should assess the risk associated with 
the weakness or deficiency, and develop a corrective action plan (for 
federal agencies. OMB refers to these as Plans of Actions and 
Milestones (POAMs)). The action plan should include testing 
requirements of corrective actions, milestones, monitoring of 
activities related to the action plan, modification to policies and 
procedures (if required) and implementation of the corrective action. 
Such action plans should be coordinated with the entitywide corrective 
action plan process. 

Implement effective security-related personnel policies: 

Entitywide security-related personnel policies and procedures (see 
critical element SM-6) should be properly implemented with respect to 
the application. For example, controls should be in place to reasonably 
assure that (1) application users are appropriately trained, and (2) 
risks related to confidentiality, integrity, and availability are 
considered in approving user access (e.g., security clearances) and in 
applying personnel policies. 

Adequately secure, document, and monitor external third party 
activities: 

An agency may allow external third parties access to their systems for 
various purposes. Chapter 3 discussed policies and procedures regarding 
the system access granted to third party providers (e.g. service 
bureaus, contractors, system development, security management), 
including the requirement to have appropriate controls over outsourced 
software development. Third party provider access to applications often 
extends beyond the software development. It is likely that entities 
have vendors, business partners and contractors not only querying the 
applications, but also transacting with the agency, using agency 
applications, or connecting to the agencyï¿½s applications via their own 
systems. In addition, public web sites are sometimes used to transact 
with the agency. 

The impact of an external third party provider accessing the agencyï¿½s 
applications is directly related to the magnitude of the system or 
direct access the provider is granted. This is determined by the 
entityï¿½s agreement with the provider. The entity should, however, 
require the providers to be subject to the same compliance requirements 
as the agency, and have the ability to monitor such compliance. 
Appropriate policies and procedures should exist for monitoring third 
party performance to determine whether activities performed by these 
external third parties are compliant with the agencyï¿½s policies, 
procedures, privacy requirements, agreements or contracts.[Footnote 91] 

Table 39. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AS-1: Implement effective application security 
management: 

Control activities: 
AS-1.1 A comprehensive application security plan is in place. 
Control techniques: 
AS-1.1.1 A comprehensive application security plan has been developed 
and documented. Topics covered include: 
* Application identification and description; 
* Application risk level; 
* Application owner; 
* Person responsible for the security of the application; 
* Application interconnections/information sharing; 
* A description of all of the controls in place or planned, including 
how the controls are implemented or planned to be implemented and 
special considerations; 
* Approach and procedures regarding security design and upgrade 
process; 
* Process for developing security roles; 
* General security administration policies, including ongoing security 
role maintenance and development; 
* Identification of sensitive transactions in each functional module; 
* Identification of high risk segregation of duty cases; 
* Roles and responsibilities of the security organization supporting 
the system with consideration to segregation of duties; 
* Security testing procedures; 
* Coordination with entitywide security policies; 
* Procedures for emergency access to the production system, including 
access to update programs in production, direct updates to the 
database, and modification of the system change option; 
* System parameter settings, compliant with entitywide agency policies; 
* Access control procedures regarding the use of system delivered 
critical user IDs; 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect the application security plan to determine whether it 
adequately addresses all of the relevant topics. 

Control activities: 
AS-1.1 A comprehensive application security plan is in place. 
Control techniques: 
AS-1.1.2 Sensitive accounts are identified for each business process or 
sub-process, and appropriate security access privileges are defined and 
assigned. 
Audit procedures: 
Review the entityï¿½s identification of sensitive transactions for the 
business process being audited for appropriateness and completeness. 
Observe and inspect procedures for identifying and assigning sensitive 
activities. Inspect authorizations for sensitive activities. 

Control activities: 
AS-1.1 A comprehensive application security plan is in place. 
Control techniques: 
AS-1.1.3 Access privileges are developed to prevent users from 
executing incompatible transactions within the application via menus or 
screens. 
Audit procedures: 
Through inquiry and inspection, determine whether the application 
security plan includes plans to identify segregation of duty conflicts 
in each of the business processes under assessment (master data and 
transaction data; data entry and reconciliation), and addresses 
controls to mitigate risks of allowing segregation of duty conflicts in 
a userï¿½s role. 

Control activities: 
AS-1.2 Application security risk assessments and supporting activities 
are periodically performed; 
Control techniques: 
AS-1.2.1 Security risks are assessed for the applications and 
supporting systems on a periodic basis or whenever applications or 
supporting systems significantly change. The risk assessments and 
validation, and related management approvals, are documented and 
maintained. The risk assessments are appropriately incorporated into 
the application security plan. 
Audit procedures: 
Obtain the most recent security risk assessment for each application 
under assessment. Inspect the risk assessments to determine if the risk 
assessments are up-to-date, appropriately documented, approved by 
management, and supported by testing. Consider compliance with FISMA, 
OMB, NIST, and other requirements/ guidance and whether technology and 
business processes are appropriately considered in the risk assessment. 
Obtain and inspect the relevant application security plan(s) to 
determine whether the risk assessments are appropriately incorporated 
into the application security plan. 

Control activities: 
AS-1.3 Policies and procedures are established to control and 
periodically assess access to the application. 
Control techniques: 
AS-1.3.1 Business process owners accept risks and approve the policies 
and procedures. AS-1.3.2 Policies and Procedures are: 
* documented; 
* appropriately consider business process security needs; 
* appropriately consider segregation of application user activity from 
the system administrator activity. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine through interview with entity management whether policies and 
procedures have been established to review access to the application. 
Review policies and procedures to determine whether they have 
appropriately considered (1) business security needs and (2) 
segregation of application user activity from system administrator 
activity. 

Control activities: 
AS 1.4 Application owners and users are aware of application security 
policies; 
Control techniques: 
AS-1.4.1 The entity has an effective process to communicate application 
security policies to application owners and users and reasonably assure 
that they have an appropriate awareness of such policies. 
Audit procedures: 
Obtain an understanding of how application owners and users are made 
aware of application security policies and assess the adequacy of the 
process. Interview selected application owners and users concerning 
their awareness of application security policies. 

Control activities: 
AS-1.5 Management periodically assesses the appropriateness of 
application security policies and procedures, and compliance with them. 
Control techniques: 
AS-1.5.1 An application security policy and procedure test plan is 
developed and documented. 
Audit procedures: 
Inquire of management, and inspect testing policies and procedures. 

Control activities: 
AS-1.5 Management periodically assesses the appropriateness of 
application security policies and procedures, and compliance with them. 
Control techniques:
AS-1.5.2 Security controls related to each major application are tested 
at least annually. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect the overall testing strategy, a sample of test plans and 
related testing results. Determine if the scope of testing complies 
with OMB Circular A-123 Revised (federal entities) and other 
appropriate guidance. Determine if C&A testing is performed that 
complies with FISMA and NIST requirements. 

Control activities: 
AS-1.5 Management periodically assesses the appropriateness of 
application security policies and procedures, and compliance with them. 
Control techniques:
AS-1.5.3 The frequency and scope of testing is commensurate with the 
risk and criticality of the application to the agencyï¿½s mission. 
Audit procedures: 
Based upon the application test plan, assess whether the frequency and 
scope of testing is appropriate, given the risk and critically of the 
application. 

Control activities: 
AS-1.5 Management periodically assesses the appropriateness of 
application security policies and procedures, and compliance with them. 
Control techniques:
AS-1.5.4 Compliance, and a report on the state of compliance, is part 
of the entityï¿½s security program. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine through inquiry and inspection if the application security 
plan is incorporated into the entity's security program. 

Control activities:
AS-1.6 Management effectively remediates information security 
weaknesses. 
Control techniques:
AS-1.6.1 Management has a process in place to correct deficiencies. 
Audit procedures: 
Inquire of management and inspect security polices and procedures, 
including assessment and resolution plan. 

Control activities:
AS-1.6 Management effectively remediates information security 
weaknesses. 
Control techniques:
AS-1.6.2 Management initiates prompt action to correct deficiencies. 
Action plans and milestones are documented and complete. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect recent FMFIA/A-123 and POA&M (or equivalent) reports for 
reasonableness of corrective actions (nature and timing). Determine 
whether application security control deficiencies (identified by the 
audit, by management testing, and by others) are included in the plans 
of action and milestones (or equivalent). and determine the status of 
corrective actions. 

Control activities:
AS-1.6 Management effectively remediates information security 
weaknesses. 
Control techniques:
AS-1.6.3 Deficiencies are analyzed by application (analysis may be 
extended to downstream, upstream, and other related applications), and 
appropriate corrective actions are applied. 
Audit procedures: 
Evaluate the scope and appropriateness of planned corrective actions 
through inquiry of management and inspection of evidence. 

Control activities:
AS-1.6 Management effectively remediates information security 
weaknesses. 
Control techniques:
AS-1.6.4 Corrective actions are tested after they have been implemented 
and monitored on a continuing basis. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect documentation to determine if implemented corrective actions 
have been tested and monitored periodically. 

Control activities:
AS-1.7 Implement effective security-related personnel policies; 
Control techniques:
AS-1.7.1 Personnel policies related to the application appropriately 
address security and application owners and users have adequate 
training and experience. 
Audit procedures: 
Review personnel policies for appropriateness and consistency with 
entitywide policies. Assess the adequacy of training and expertise for 
application owners and users. 

Control activities:
AS-1.8 External third party provider activities are secure, documented, 
and monitored; 
Control techniques:
AS-1.8.1 Policies and procedures concerning activities of third party 
providers are developed and include provisions for: 
* Application compliance with agencyï¿½s security requirements, and; 
* Monitoring of compliance with regulatory requirements; 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect policies and procedures pertaining to external parties for the 
application under assessment. Inspect documentation to determine 
whether the external third party providerï¿½s need to access the 
application is appropriately defined and documented. 

Control activities:
AS-1.8 External third party provider activities are secure, documented, 
and monitored; 
Control techniques: 
AS-1.8.2 A process is in place to monitor third party provider 
compliance to the agencyï¿½s regulatory requirements; 
Audit procedures: 
Inquire of management regarding procedures used to monitor third party 
providers. Inspect external reports (SAS 70) or other documentation 
supporting the results of compliance monitoring. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element AS-2. Implement effective application access controls: 

Effective application access controls should be implemented at the 
application level to provide reasonable assurance that only authorized 
personnel have access to the application and only for authorized 
purposes. Without effective application access controls, persons may 
obtain unauthorized or inappropriate access to applications and 
application data. 

Application access controls include the following: 

* Adequately protect information system boundaries. 

* Implement effective identification and authentication mechanisms. 

* Implement effective authorization controls. 

* Adequately protect sensitive system resources. 

* Implement an effective access audit and monitoring capability. 

* Establish adequate physical security controls. 

Adequately protect application boundaries: 

Application boundaries control logical connectivity to and from 
applications through controlled interfaces (e.g., gateways, routers, 
firewalls, encryption). In defining the application, the entity creates 
the boundaries for the application. Once defined, the entity should 
design appropriate controls over the flow of information across the 
application boundary. In complex applications, there may boundaries 
within the application. The security plan for the application should 
identify system boundaries and IS controls implemented to protect the 
security of such boundaries. Application boundaries are more sensitive 
where the connectivity is to lower risk systems or to systems or users 
external to the entity. 

Implement effective identification and authentication mechanisms: 

The entity should have application security policies and procedures in 
place concerning user identification and authentication. Management 
should have created an environment where all users have their own 
unique IDs and passwords, or other mechanisms, such as tokens and 
biometrics to access any part of the information system and 
applications that allow them to execute functional responsibilities. 
Identification and authentication policy and management are discussed 
in Chapter 3, Critical Element AC-2. In addition, it is important to 
understand the mechanisms used to assign access privileges for 
applications under assessment. An evaluation of identification and 
authentication controls includes consideration of the following 
factors: 

* How do the users access the application? 
a. Are users required to enter user name/ID and password? 
b. Do all users have an individual and unique ID that would allow the 
user's activities to be recorded and reviewed? 
c. Are users required to enter/use other authenticating information, 
such as tokens or biometrics? 
d. Are users required to enter a separate ID and password for each 
application? 
e. Does the application require the user to enter a password? 
f. What are the password parameters (i.e. length, character 
requirements, etc)? 
g. How often does the application require the user to change the 
password? 
h. Are there any instances of users having multiple IDs and passwords? 
i. Are there any instances of users sharing IDs or passwords? 

* What other IDs and passwords does the user have to enter before 
accessing the sign-in screen for the application? 
a. Does the user enter a network ID and password? 
b. Does the user enter a terminal emulation ID and password? 

The knowledge of the application security design and function enables 
the auditor to assess the effectiveness of the security controls over 
the other levels of authentication, especially when weaknesses are 
identified at the application security layer, as those weaknesses may 
be mitigated by stronger controls at other levels. 

Implement effective authorization controls: 

The following procedures discussed in Chapter 3 are equally applicable 
at the application level: 

* The owner identifies the nature and extent of access that should be 
available for each user; 

* The owner approves user access to the application and data; 

* Access is permitted at the file, record, or field level; and; 

* Owners and security managers periodically monitor user access. 

Security administration procedures should provide tactical guidance on 
the day-to-day operations of creating, assigning, monitoring, updating, 
and revoking end-user access to the application. End-users should be 
assigned authorizations sufficient, but not excessive, to perform their 
duties in the application: Access should be limited to individuals with 
a valid business purpose (least privilege). The users should be granted 
the level of access by virtue of the position they hold within the 
organization. This will generally require user to have both: 

* Functional access (for example, accounts payable) based on the role 
from which their position derives; and; 

* Organizational access (for example, account payable supervisor) based 
on the specific needs of their position. 

Sensitive transactions and segregation of duty conflicts defined by the 
process and data owners (discussed in AS-1) should be used as a 
baseline reference by security administration. In an integrated 
application environment, the importance of comprehensive identification 
of sensitive transactions and segregation of duty needs and conflicts 
is heightened, compared with entities having multiple applications for 
business processes. Entities lose the inherent segregation in 
integrated applicationsï¿½since more of the process is performed in the 
same application, the opportunities for access throughout the process 
are greater. For example, in an entity with separate purchasing and 
accounts payable applications, adequate segregation of duties might be 
accomplished by only allowing access to one of the applications, 
whereas in an integrated application, these applications may be 
combined. Transaction-level restricted access, which is critical in 
integrated applications, may be less critical in non-integrated 
systems. 

However, in an integrated environment, the entire business process 
cycle may be performed in the same application and a user may have the 
ability to perform more than one key activity in the cycle. Therefore, 
restricted access (access to a sensitive business transaction) and 
segregation of duty conflicts (access to two or more transactions that 
are sensitive in combination) should be considered carefully. 

An integrated application environment also generally means that more 
business units of the entity are using the same application. Therefore, 
business unit access restrictions are also necessary. Management should 
have an adequate understanding of the business processes and determine 
whether users should have access to more than their individual business 
unit. For example, a property manager should not have access to change 
asset records or maintenance schedules for entities other than his/her 
own. 

Sensitive transactions or activities in an application are determined 
by the nature and use of the data processed by the application. Factors 
that determine the sensitivity include the mission critical elements of 
the application, pervasive use of the data or activity, confidentiality 
and privacy of data, and activities performed or supported by the 
application. 

The key element in assigning access to sensitive transactions or 
activities to an application user is the alignment of user access to 
job responsibility. This has a dual purpose: one, the proper alignment 
ensures that the user has accountability for proper execution of the 
transactions and accuracy of the related data, and two, the expertise 
and skills of the user match the business process underlying the 
transaction or activity. For example journal voucher entry is made by a 
General Accounting Account Analyst of Finance Department, and not by a 
Procurement manager. 

Adequately protect sensitive application resources: 

Access to sensitive application resources should be restricted to 
individuals or processes that have a legitimate need for this access 
for the purposes of accomplishing a valid business purpose. Sensitive 
application resources include password files, access authorizations to 
read or modify applications, and sensitive application functions such 
as application security administration. The entity should identify and 
adequately protect sensitive application resources. In some cases, 
sensitive data may need to be encrypted. 

Implement an effective audit and monitoring capability: 

Audit and monitoring involves the regular collection, review, and 
analysis of indications of inappropriate or unauthorized access to the 
application. Automated controls may be used to identify and report such 
incidents. An understanding of manual control activities surrounding 
access to the application is important. The following questions can 
help the auditor gain insight into managementï¿½s controls: 

* Does management maintain and review a current list of authorized 
users? 

* Does management periodically review the user list to ensure that only 
authorized individuals have access, and that the access provided to 
each user is appropriate? 

* Does management monitor access within the application (i.e. 
unauthorized access attempts, unusual activity etc.)? Does the 
application generate reports to identify unauthorized access attempts? 
Are security logs created and reviewed? 

* Is public access (non agency employees) permitted to the application? 
Is access permitted via the Internet? If so, how is this access 
controlled? 

* Is the application configured to allow for segregation of duties? If 
so, does the application identify the users who performed activities 
that were in conflict? Are the transactions/logs reviewed by the 
business owners? 

* Has a procedure been created and placed in operation that requires a 
complete user recertification on a periodic basis? 

* Is the security administration monitored? When suspicious activities 
are identified, how does management investigate them? 

Establish adequate physical security controls: 

Appropriate physical controls, integrated with related entitywide and 
system level physical security, should be in place to protect 
resources, where applicable, at the application level. Resources to be 
protected at the application level include controls over removable 
media (e.g., tape files), workstations containing sensitive application 
data, and physical inputs (e.g., check stock) and outputs (e.g., 
physical checks or other sensitive documents). The entity should 
identify application resources that are sensitive to physical access 
and implement adequate physical security over such resources. 

Table 40. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element AS-2: Implement effective application access controls: 

Control activities: 
AS-2.1 Application boundaries are adequately protected. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.1.1 Application boundaries are identified in security plans. 
Application boundaries are adequately secure. 
Audit procedures: 
Review security plans for proper identification of application 
boundaries. Evaluate the effectiveness of controls over application 
boundaries. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.2 Application users are appropriately identified and 
authenticated. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.2 Identification and authentication is unique to each user. All 
approved users should enter their user ID (unique) and password (or 
other authentication) to gain access to the application. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect pertinent policies and procedures, and NIST guidance for 
authenticating user IDs. Through inquiry, observation or inspection, 
determine the method of user authentication used (password, token, 
biometrics, etc.). If a password system is used, gain an understanding 
of the specific information and evaluate its appropriateness, including 
application security authentication parameters, via inspection of 
system reports or observation of the system, including appropriate 
testing. See AC-2 for more information on criteria for evaluating 
password policies. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.3 Security policies and procedures appropriately address ID and 
password management. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.3.1 The agency has formal procedures and processes for granting 
users access to the application. The agencyï¿½s IT security policies and 
procedures contain guidance for: 
* Assigning passwords; 
* Changing and resetting passwords; and; 
* Handling lost or compromised passwords. 
Audit procedures: 
Through inquiry, observation, and inspection, understand and assess 
procedures used by the agency for application password management: 
* Procedures for initial password assignment, including the password 
parameters; 
* Procedures for password changes, including initial password change; 
* Procedures for handling lost passwords (password resetting); and; 
* Procedures for handling password compromise. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.3 Security policies and procedures appropriately address ID and 
password management. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.3.2 The application locks the userï¿½s account after a pre-
determined number of attempts to log-on with an invalid password. The 
application may automatically reset the user account after a specific 
time period (an hour or a day), or may require an administrator to 
reset the account. If the user is away from his/her workspace for a 
preset amount of time, or the user's session is inactive, the 
application automatically logs off the userï¿½s account. 
Audit procedures: 
After obtaining an understanding of the user authentication process, 
inspect and/or observe the following: 
* Whether access to the application is permitted only after the user 
enters their user ID and password. 
* Observe a user executing invalid logins and describe the actions 
taken. Either 1) inspect system security settings, or 2) observe an 
idle user workspace to determine whether the application logs the user 
off after an elapsed period of idle time. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.3 Security policies and procedures appropriately address ID and 
password management. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.3.3 Each application user has only one user ID. 
Audit procedures: 
Through observation and inspection, determine whether each user has 
one, and only one, user ID to access the application. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.3 Security policies and procedures appropriately address ID and 
password management. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.3.4 Multiple log-ons are controlled and monitored. 
Audit procedures: 
Through inquiry, observation or inspection, determine whether the 
application allows multiple log-ons by the same user. If so, understand 
and document monitoring procedures that reasonably assure that multiple 
log-ons are not used to allow application access to an unauthorized 
user, or to violate effective segregation of duties. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.4 Access to the application is restricted to authorized users. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.4.1 Before a user obtains a user account and password for the 
application, the userï¿½s level of access has been authorized by a 
manager and the application administrator. 
Audit procedures: 
Review policies and procedures. From a sample of user accounts 
determine whether the user level of access was authorized by 
appropriate entity management. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.4 Access to the application is restricted to authorized users. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.4.2 Owners periodically review access to ensure continued 
appropriateness. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview security administrators and inspect evidence of the 
effectiveness of periodic review of access by owners. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.4 Access to the application is restricted to authorized users. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.4.3 Access is limited to individuals with a valid business purpose 
(least privilege). 
Audit procedures: 
Interview owners and inspect documentation, to determine whether 
appropriate procedures are in place to remove or modify application 
access, as needed. Through inquiry, observation, and inspection, 
determine how an unauthorized user is identified, and whether access is 
removed promptly and how. Based on the sample of users in AS-2.4.1 
above, determine whether the user access is appropriate to the business 
need. If the users did not execute the transaction or activity within 
the expected time frame, processes should be in place to evaluate the 
continued need for access, and modify access accordingly. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.5 Public access is controlled. (Based on an agencyï¿½s business 
mission, the agency may allow the public to have access to the 
application.) 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.5.1 The agency implements a security plan and process for 1) 
identification and authorization of users; 2) access controls for 
limited user privileges; 3) use of digital signatures; 4) prohibition 
of direct access by the public to production data; and 5) compliance 
with FISMA and NIST requirements. 
Audit procedures: 
Obtain an understanding of the following controls through inquiry of 
the application owner, inspection of source documents, and/or 
observation of the following: 
* Identification and authentication; 
* Access controls for limiting user privileges(read, write, modify, 
delete); 
* Use of digital signatures; 
* Prohibition of direct access by the public to live databases and 
restricted/sensitive records; and Legal considerations (i.e., privacy 
laws, FISMA, NIST, etc.). 

Control activities: 
AS-2.6 User access to sensitive transactions or activities is 
appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.6.1 Owners have identified sensitive transactions or activities 
for the business process. 
Audit procedures: 
Inquire of responsible personnel and inspect pertinent policies and 
procedures covering segregation of application duties. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.6 User access to sensitive transactions or activities is 
appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.6.2 Owners authorize users to have access to sensitive 
transactions or activities. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine whether the process owners have identified a list of 
sensitive transactions or activities for their area. Inspect the user 
administration procedures to determine whether they include a 
requirement for the process owner to approve access to transactions or 
activities in their area of responsibility. Through inquiry and 
inspection, determine whether user access is authorized by process 
owners. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.6 User access to sensitive transactions or activities is 
appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.6.3 Security Administrators review application user access 
authorizations for access to sensitive transactions and discuss any 
questionable authorizations with owners. 
Audit procedures: 
Select a sample of user access request forms or other authorization 
documents [can use same sample selected in AS-2.4.1 and AS-2.4.3] and 
inspect them to determine whether the process owners have approved user 
access to appropriate transactions or activities. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.6 User access to sensitive transactions or activities is 
appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.6.4 Owners periodically review access to sensitive transactions 
and activities to ensure continued appropriateness. Inactive accounts 
and accounts for terminated individuals are disabled or removed in a 
timely manner. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview security administrators and inspect user access authorization 
procedures to determine whether access to sensitive transactions 
require approval by the process owner. Review security software 
parameters and review system-generated list of inactive logon IDs, and 
determine why access for these users has not been terminated. Obtain a 
list of recently terminated employees and, for a selection, determine 
whether system access was promptly terminated. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.6 User access to sensitive transactions or activities is 
appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.6.5 Access to sensitive transactions is limited to individuals 
with a valid business purpose (least privilege). 
Audit procedures: 
Interview owners and inspect documentation, to determine whether 
appropriate procedures are in place to remove or modify application 
access, as needed. Through inquiry, observations, and inspection, 
determine how an unauthorized user is identified, and whether access is 
removed promptly and how. Obtain a list of users with access to 
identified sensitive transactions for the business process under 
assessment. Inspect the list to determine whether the number of users 
having access to sensitive transactions/ activities is appropriate to 
the business need. If the users did not execute the transaction or 
activity within the expected time frame, processes should be in place 
to evaluate the continued need for access, and modify access 
accordingly. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.7 Sensitive application resources are adequately protected. 
Control techniques: 
As-2.7.1 The entity identifies sensitive application resources. Access 
to sensitive application resources is restricted to appropriate users. 
Sensitive application data is encrypted, where appropriate. 
Audit procedures: 
Evaluate the completeness of sensitive application resources 
identified. Assess the adequacy of IS controls over sensitive 
application resources. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.8 An effective access audit and monitoring program is in place, 
documented, and approved. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.8.1 Policies and procedures are established to reasonably assure 
that application security audit and monitoring is effective. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect documented policies and procedures for application security 
administration for each application in scope Determine whether the 
monitoring program has built-in procedures to identify inappropriate 
user assignments. Through inquiry and inspection, determine whether 
monitoring procedures are performed on a regular basis. Determine 
whether the exceptions are handled appropriately and in a timely 
manner. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.9 Application security violations are identified in a timely 
manner. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.9.1 Logging and other parameters are appropriately set up to 
notify of security violations as they occur. 
Audit procedures: 
Observe and inspect application logging and other parameters that 
identify security violations and exceptions. (For example, parameter 
set up indicates whether or not users can logon to an application more 
than once) 

Control activities: 
AS-2.10 Exceptions and violations are properly analyzed and appropriate 
actions taken. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.10.1 Reportable exceptions and violations are identified and 
logged. Exception reports are generated and reviewed by security 
administration. If an exception occurs, specific action is taken based 
upon the nature of exception. 
Audit procedures: 
Observe and inspect managementï¿½s monitoring of security violations, 
such as unauthorized user access. Inspect reports that identify 
security violations. Through inquiry and inspection, note managementï¿½s 
action taken. Inspect reports of authorized segregation of duty 
conflicts sensitive process access; Assess business level authorization 
and monitoring, if applicable. 

Control activities: 
AS-2.11 Physical security controls over application resources are 
adequate. 
Control techniques: 
AS-2.11.1 Physical controls are integrated with entitywide and system-
level controls. Application resources sensitive to physical access are 
identified and appropriate physical security is placed over them. 
Audit procedures: 
Review the appropriateness of the entityï¿½s identification of 
application resources sensitive to physical access. Assess the adequacy 
of physical security over sensitive application resources. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element AS-3 ï¿½ Implement effective application configuration 
management: 

Entities need to proactively manage changes to system environments, 
application functionality and business processes to reasonably assure 
financial data and process integrity. To do this, entities should 
restrict and monitor access to program modifications and changes to 
configurable objects in the production environment. Configuration 
Management (CM) discusses changes to baseline configuration of 
applications, using the concepts of identification, control, status 
reporting and auditing of configuration. Most application configuration 
changes are managed using a staging process. The staging process allows 
the entity to develop and unit test changes to an application within 
the development environment, transport the changes into a Quality 
Assurance environment for further system and user acceptance testing 
and, when the tests have been completed and the changes are approved, 
transport the changes into the production environment. 

Control over business process applications modifications and 
configurable objects is an extension of Configuration Management 
controls in Chapter 3 that addresses an organizationï¿½s change 
management process and should be coordinated with audit procedures 
applied to that general control category. This chapter includes changes 
to application functionality that do not go through the staging 
process, but take place directly in the production environment of the 
application as changes become necessary throughout the normal course of 
business. 

Effective application configuration management, consistent with Section 
3.3 Configuration Management (CM), includes the following steps: 

1. Develop and document CM policies, plans, and procedures. 

2. Maintain current configuration identification information. 

3. Properly authorize, test, approve, and track all configuration 
changes, including: 

* Documented system development life cycle methodology (SDLC); 

* Adequate authorization of change requests that are documented and 
maintained; 

* Appropriate authorization for the user to change the configuration; 

* Adequate control of program changes through testing to final 
approval; 

* Adequate control of software libraries; and; 

* Appropriate segregation of duties over the userï¿½s access to 
reasonably assure that critical program function integrity is not 
affected; 

4. Routinely monitor the configuration. 

5. Update systems in a timely manner to protect against known 
vulnerabilities. 

6. Appropriately document, test , and approve emergency changes to the 
configuration. 

In addition, NIST SP 800-100 provides guidance in assessing related 
configuration management programmatic areas of capital planning and 
investment control, and security services and product acquisition. This 
publication discusses practices designed to help security management 
identify funding needs to secure systems and provide strategies for 
obtaining the necessary funding. Also, it provides guidance to entities 
in applying risk management principles to assist in the identification 
and mitigation of risks associated with security services acquisitions. 

Table 41. Control Techniques and suggested audit procedures for AS-3 - 
Implement Effective Application Configuration Management: 

Control activities: 
AS-3.1 Policies and procedures are designed to reasonably assure that 
changes to application functionality in production are authorized and 
appropriate, and unauthorized changes are detected and reported 
promptly. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.1.1 Appropriate policies and procedures are established for 
application configuration management. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect documented policies and procedures related to application 
change control procedures. Through inquiry and inspection, identify key 
transactions that provide user access to change application 
functionality. Inspect transaction reports of changes made to the 
application. For a sample of changes, inspect documentation of the 
changes made, including the validity, reasons, authorization, and the 
user authority. Note the handling of exceptions. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.2 Current configuration information is maintained. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.2.1 The entity maintains information on the current configuration 
of the application. 
Audit procedures: 
Review the entityï¿½s configuration management information. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.3 A system development life cycle methodology has been 
implemented. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.3.1 A SDLC methodology has been developed that: 
* provides a structured approach consistent with generally accepted 
concepts and practices, including active user involvement throughout 
the process; 
* is sufficiently documented to provide guidance to staff with varying 
levels of skill and experience; 
* provides a means of controlling changes in requirements that occur 
over the system life, and; 
* includes documentation requirements. 
Audit procedures: 
Review SDLC methodology. Review system documentation to verify that 
SDLC methodology was followed. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.4 Authorizations for changes are documented and maintained. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.4.1 change request forms are used to document requests and related 
projects. 
Audit procedures: 
Identify recent software modification and determine whether change 
request forms were used. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.4 Authorizations for changes are documented and maintained. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.4.2 Change requests must be approved by both system users and IT 
staff. 
Audit procedures: 
Examine a selection of software change request forms for approval. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.5 Changes are controlled as programs progress through testing to 
final approval. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.5.1 Test plan standards have been developed for all levels of 
testing that define responsibilities for each party (e.g., users, 
system analysis, programmers, auditors, quality assurance, library 
control). 
Audit procedures: 
Review test plan standards. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.5 Changes are controlled as programs progress through testing to 
final approval. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.5.2 Detailed system specifications are prepared by the programmer 
and reviewed by a programming supervisor. 
AS-3.5.3 Software changes are documented so that hey can be traced from 
authorization to the final approved code. 
AS-3.5.4 Test plans are documented and approved that define 
responsibilities for each party involved. 
AS-3.5.5 Unit, integration, and system testing are performed and 
approved: 
* in accordance with the test plan and; 
* applying a sufficient range of valid and invalid conditions. 
Audit procedures: 
Examine a selection of recent software changes and: 
* review specifications; 
* trace changes from code to design specifications; 
* review test plans; 
* compare test documentation with related test plans; 
* analyze test failures to determine if they indicate ineffective 
software testing; 
* review test transactions and data; 
* review test results; 
* verify user acceptance; and; 
* review updated documentation. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.5 Changes are controlled as programs progress through testing to 
final approval. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.5.6 A comprehensive set of test transactions and data is developed 
that represents the various activities and conditions that will be 
encountered in processing. 
AS-3.5.7 Test results are reviewed and documented. 
AS-3.5.8 Program changes are moved into production only upon documented 
approval from users and system development management. 
AS-3.5.9 Documentation is updated when a new or modified system is 
implemented. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine whether operational systems experience a high number of 
abends and if so, whether they indicate inadequate testing prior to 
timplementation. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.6 Access to program libraries is restricted. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.6.1 Separate libraries are maintained for program development and 
maintenance, testing, and production programs. 
AS-3.6.2 Source code is maintained in a separate library. 
AS-3.6.3 Access to all programs, including production code, source 
code, and extra program copies are protected by access control software 
and operating system features. 
Audit procedures: 
Examine libraries in use. Verify source code exists for a selection of 
production code modules by (1) comparing compile dates, (2) recompiling 
the source modules, and (3) comparing the resulting module size to 
production load module size. For critical software production programs, 
determine whether access control software rules are clearly defined. 
Test access to program libraries by examining security system 
parameters. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.7 Movement of programs and data among libraries is controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.7.1 A group independent of the user and programmers control 
movement of programs and data among libraries. Before and after images 
of program code are maintained and compared to ensure that only 
approved changes are made. 
Audit procedures: 
Review pertinent policies and procedures. For a selection of program 
changes, examine related documentation to verify that: 
* procedures for authorizing movement among libraries were followed, 
and; 
* before and after images were compared. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.8 Access to application activities/transactions is controlled via 
user roles (access privileges). 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.8.1 User accounts are assigned to a role in the application. Roles 
are designed and approved by management to provide appropriate access 
and prevent an unauthorized user from executing critical transactions 
in production that change application functionality. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect system reports and identify users who have access to 
configuration transactions. For a sample of users identified above, 
inspect user authorization forms to determine whether the user's access 
was authorized. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.9 Access to all application programs/codes and tables are 
controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.9.1 Changes to application programs, codes and tables are either 
restricted or denied in the production environment. All changes are 
made using the approved change control process. User access to the 
application programs, codes, and tables is provided only for emergency 
user IDs. 
Audit procedures: 
Through inquiry and inspection, identify key programs and tables for 
the application. Inspect system reports of users with access to the key 
programs, codes and tables. Select a sample of users that have access 
to the identified programs and tables. Inspect documentation supporting 
how the access was provided. Note exceptions. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.10 Access to administration (system) transactions that provide 
access to table maintenance and program execution is limited to key 
users. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.10.1 Security design includes consideration for sensitive 
administration (system) transactions and restricted user access to 
these transactions. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect policies and procedures regarding restricted access to system 
administration transactions. Through inquiry and inspection, identify 
the system administration transactions. Inspect system reports of user 
access to these transactions. Select a sample of users with 
administration access and inspect documentation to determine whether 
access was authorized. Select a sample of system administration 
transactions executed by the system users and inspect resulting changes 
to the system elements, such as the program code or table. Inspect 
critical or privileged IDs (e.g., fire call ID) to determine if 
activity is logged. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.11 Access and changes to programs and data are monitored. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.11.1 Procedures are established to reasonably assure that key 
program and table changes are monitored by a responsible individual who 
does not have the change authority. The procedures provide the details 
of reports/logs to run, specific valuation criteria and frequency of 
the assessment. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect documented procedures related to monitoring change control. 
Select a sample of reports or logs that are reviewed, and inspect to 
note evidence of monitoring compliance. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.12 Changes are assessed periodically. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.12.1 Periodic assessment of compliance with change management 
process, and changes to configurable objects and programs. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect evidence of documented assessments performed. Determine who 
performed the assessment and note the exception handling procedures. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.13 Applications are updated on a timely manner to protect against 
known vulnerabilities. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.13.1 The entity follows an effective process to identify 
vulnerabilities in applications and update them. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine whether vendor supplied updates have been implemented. Assess 
managementï¿½s process for identifying vulnerabilities and updating 
applications. 

Control activities: 
AS-3.14 Emergency application changes are properly documented, tested, 
and approved. 
Control techniques: 
AS-3.14.1 The entity follows an effective process to properly document, 
test, and approve emergency changes. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect evidence of proper documentation, testing, and approval of 
emergency changes. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element ï¿½ AS-4: Segregate user access to conflicting 
transactions and activities and monitor segregation: 

Effective segregation of duties is designed to prevent the possibility 
that a single person could be responsible for diverse and critical 
functions in such a way that errors or misappropriations could occur 
and not be detected in a timely manner, in the normal course of 
business processes. Although segregation of duties alone will not 
adequately assure that only authorized activities occur, inadequate 
segregation of duties increases the risk that erroneous or fraudulent 
transactions could be processed, improper program changes implemented, 
and computer resources damaged or destroyed. As discussed in AS-1, the 
security plan should address the organization-wide policy on 
segregation of duties (segregation of duty) and management should 
organize the user departments to achieve adequate segregation of 
duties. As part of this process, most organizations adopt segregation 
of duties control matrices as a guideline of the job responsibilities 
that should not be combined. It is important for the auditor to assess 
the relationship among various job functions, responsibilities and 
authorities in assessing adequate segregation of duties. The auditor 
starts this assessment with the review of the control matrices defined 
by management. Several automated tools are available to dynamically 
manage segregation of duty conflicts within an application. Appropriate 
business rules are critical to the effective implementation of these 
tools. 

Entity management should consider the organization structure and roles 
in determining the appropriate controls for the relevant environment. 
For example, an organization may not have all the positions described 
in the segregation of duties matrix, or one person may be responsible 
for more than one of the roles described. Based on the organizational 
resource limitation and risk management, certain levels of segregation 
of duty conflicts may be allowed by management for a select role or 
users. If so, management should have appropriate compensating controls 
in place to mitigate the risks of allowing the conflicts. 

Appropriate segregation of duties often presents difficulties in 
smaller organizations. Even entities or locations that have only a few 
employees, however, can usually divide their responsibilities to 
achieve the necessary checks and balances. More often than not, the 
auditor will encounter situations where a few to substantial number of 
users may have access to activities with segregation of duty conflicts. 
Management generally mitigates the risks of allowing the segregation of 
duty conflicts by adding compensatory controls, such as approval of 
transactions before they are entered in the application or review of 
the posted transactions or reports as direct oversight and close 
monitoring of the incompatible activities. Typically, a combination of 
access and monitoring controls is necessary for design and operational 
effectiveness. 

Compensating controls are internal controls that are intended to reduce 
the risk of an existing or potential control weakness when duties 
cannot be appropriately segregated. Compensating controls for 
segregation of duties conflicts generally include additional monitoring 
and supervision of the activities performed by the individual 
possessing conflicting responsibilities, and may include an additional 
level of required approval. The segregation of duty conflicts are 
mitigated to reduce or eliminate business risks through the 
identification of compensating controls. 

Effective segregation of duties, consistent with Section 3.4, 
Segregation of Duties (SD), includes the following steps: 

* Segregate user access to conflicting transactions and activities; 

* Monitor user access to conflicting transactions and activities 
through formal operating procedures, supervision, and review. 

Table 42. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element AS-4 - Segregate user access to conflicting 
transactions and activities and monitor segregation: 

Control activities: 
AS-4.1 Incompatible activities and transactions are identified. 
Control techniques: 
AS-4.1.1 Owners have identified incompatible activities and 
transactions, and documented them on a segregation of duty matrix. 
Owners have appropriately considered risk acceptance when allowing 
segregation of duty conflicts in user roles. 
Audit procedures: 
Through inquiry of management and inspection of policies and 
procedures, understand how management identifies incompatible 
activities and transactions. Inspect list of segregation of duty 
conflicts to determine whether management has identified the 
segregation of duty conflicts appropriate for the business process and 
considered risk acceptance when allowing the conflicts. 

Control activities: 
AS-4.2 Application controls prevent users from performing incompatible 
duties. 
Control techniques: 
AS-4.2.1 Users are prevented by the application from executing 
incompatible transactions, as authorized by the business owners. 
Audit procedures: 
Through inquiry, observation, and inspection, determine how the 
application segregates users from performing incompatible duties. 
Obtain and inspect a listing of users with access to the application. 
For a sample of users (can use same sample selected in AS-2.4.1, AS-
2.4.3 & AS-2.6.3), inspect documentation to determine whether access to 
menus/ screens corresponds with the user's defined duties. Evaluate 
whether their duties and access is appropriate to prevent employees 
from performing incompatible duties. Specifically, perform the 
following steps: 
* Obtain a system-generated user listing for the application (and other 
applications, if applicable); 
* For a selected sample of users, inspect their access profiles to 
determine whether access is appropriate (e.g., users have update 
access); and; 
* For the selected sample of users, inspect their access profiles to 
determine if any of the users have access to menus with conflicting 
duties. 

Control activities: 
AS-4.3.3 There is effective segregation of duties between the security 
administration function of the application and the user functions. 
Control techniques: 
AS-4.3.1 The profiles for security administrators do not have 
privileges to input and/or approve transactions. 
Audit procedures: 
Based on the inspection of user profiles, determine if: 
* individuals with security administration functions have access to 
input, process, or approve transactions; 
* security administrators have access to more than application security 
administration functions; and; 
* security administrators are prevented from accessing production data. 

Control activities: 
AS-4.4 User access to transactions or activities that have segregation 
of duties conflicts is appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AS-4.4.1 Owners authorize users to have access to transactions or 
activities that cause segregation of duty conflicts only when supported 
by a business need. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect user administration policy to determine whether owner approval 
is required to access transactions or activities in their area of 
responsibility. Obtain and inspect a system report of users with 
conflicting responsibilities within the application. Obtain a sample of 
user access request forms (electronic documents/workflow, if 
applicable) and verify that the owners have approved user access to 
appropriate transactions or activities. 

Control activities: 
AS-4.4 User access to transactions or activities that have segregation 
of duties conflicts is appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AS-4.4.2 Security Administrators review application user access 
authorizations for segregation of duties conflicts and discuss any 
questionable authorizations with owners. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview security administrators and observe and inspect relevant 
procedures and documentation. If the security administrator's review is 
documented on the request form, inspect a sample of forms to note 
evidence of the security administrator's review. 

Control activities: 
AS-4.4 User access to transactions or activities that have segregation 
of duties conflicts is appropriately controlled. 
Control techniques: 
AS-4.4.3 Owners periodically review access to identify unauthorized 
segregation of duties conflicts and determine whether any authorized 
segregation of duties conflicts remain appropriate. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview owners and inspect documentation; determine whether 
appropriate procedures are in place to identify and remove or modify 
access, as needed. 

Control activities: 
AS-4.5 Effective monitoring controls are in place to mitigate 
segregation of duty risks. 
Control techniques: 
AS-4.5.1 Process Owner has identified the segregation of duty conflicts 
that can exist, and the roles and users with conflicts. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect documentation of roles and users with conflicts. 

Control activities: 
AS-4.5 Effective monitoring controls are in place to mitigate 
segregation of duty risks. 
Control techniques: 
AS-4.5.2 Documented monitoring controls are in place that specifically 
address the conflict that the control mitigates. 
Audit procedures: 
Identify segregation of duty conflicts (including those that were 
intentionally established by the entity) and review documentation to 
determine whether: 
* monitoring controls adequately mitigate the risks created by the 
segregation of duty conflict; and; 
* monitoring controls are effective. This can be achieved by inspecting 
the evidence collected by management. 

Control activities: 
AS-4.5 Effective monitoring controls are in place to mitigate 
segregation of duty risks. 
Control techniques: 
AS-4.5.3 Management has documented evidence of monitoring of control 
effectiveness. 
Audit procedures: 
Review evidence of monitoring of control effectiveness. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element ï¿½ AS-5: Implement effective application contingency 
planning: 

Chapter 3 addresses Contingency Planning at an entitywide and system 
level and is focused on the total information resources of an entity. 
Audit steps for the following section should be performed in 
conjunction with Chapter 3, which provides a more in-depth discussion 
of contingency planning issues. FISMA requires that each federal agency 
implement an information security program that includes ï¿½plans and 
procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems 
that support the operation and assets of the agency.ï¿½ As shown in 
Chapter 3, an entity should: 

* Assess the criticality and sensitivity of computerized operations and 
identify supporting resources; 

* Take steps to prevent and minimize potential damage and interruption; 

* Develop and document a comprehensive contingency plan; 

* Periodically test the contingency plan and adjust it as appropriate. 

OMB Circular A-130, Appendix III, requires contingency plans for major 
applications, and NIST provides relevant guidance in Special 
Publication 800-34, Contingency Planning Guide for Information 
Technology Systems.[Footnote 92] 

Assess the criticality and sensitivity of the application: 

A key step in the contingency planning process is to conduct a Business 
Impact Analysis (BIA) for the application under focus.[Footnote 93] The 
NIST contingency planning guide presents a three-step BIA process, 
which is discussed in Chapter 3 at the entitywide level. Following this 
process, staff conducting the BIA should, first, determine the critical 
functions performed by the application and then identify the specific 
IT resources required to perform the functions. Invariably, critical IT 
resources, in part, can include hardware and network components and 
telecommunication connections, as well as key application data and 
programs which should be backed up regularly. Second, staff should 
identify disruption impacts and allowable outage times for the 
application. And, third, staff should develop recovery priorities that 
will help determine recovery strategies. The NIST guide provides a 
range of recovery strategy considerations, including alternate sites of 
varying operational readiness, reciprocal agreements with other 
organizations, and service level agreements with equipment vendors. 

Take steps to prevent and minimize potential damage and interruption: 

The entity should implement policies and procedures to prevent or 
minimize potential damage and interruption to critical systems, 
including appropriate backup of application programs and data. Such 
policies and procedures should be incorporated into the entityï¿½s 
entitywide contingency planning efforts. 

Develop and document an application contingency plan: 

A key step following the BIA, is to develop the application contingency 
plan (which NIST refers to as an IT contingency plan) and incorporate 
it into related plans. The NIST guide provides a discussion of various 
related types of plans, but recognizes that universally accepted 
definitions are not available, and the scope and purpose of a plan at 
an organization may vary from the definition provided in the NIST 
guide. The application contingency plan is focused on one application 
and may address recovery procedures at an alternative site. However, it 
probably will not address the recovery of a major processing facility 
supporting multiple applications, nor the continuity or recovery of 
business functions relying on multiple applications. Therefore, an 
entityï¿½s Disaster Recovery Plan for a major processing facility may 
cover multiple applications and establish recovery priorities by 
application. Likewise, an entityï¿½s business functions involving 
multiple applications may have Business Continuity and Recovery Plans 
that incorporate multiple contingency plans for applications. It is 
important that an application contingency plan be incorporated into 
broader-scoped, related plans so that the application receives proper 
priority among multiple applications. The application contingency plan 
should also include time-based implementation procedures so that 
recovery activities are performed in a logical sequence and reflect the 
applicationï¿½s allowable outage times to avoid significant impacts. 
Contingency plans should include consideration of alternate work sites. 

No application contingency plan could be activated without the 
availability of key data and programs. Therefore, application data 
should be backed up regularly and current programs should be copied and 
available for use. Both should be safeguarded, stored offsite, and be 
retrievable when recovery actions are implemented. The NIST guide 
provides a discussion of backup methods and considerations. 

The entity should prevent and minimize potential damage and 
interruption. Chapter 3 includes a discussion of steps as the 
entitywide and system levels. In addition, for applications, the entity 
should maintain appropriate backup of applications and application 
data. Also, it is important that restarts process data completely and 
accurately. Further, when an application contingency plan has been 
activated, responsible contingency personnel should reasonably assure 
that effective controls will restrict and monitor user access to 
application data and programs during the contingency operation. If 
adequate preparations have not been made or proper procedures are not 
followed, the contingency plan activation could result in an 
operational application with vulnerabilities that might allow 
unauthorized access to data and programs. As examples, access control 
software may not be started or allow default passwords, outdated 
software lacking up to date patches and containing known weaknesses may 
be activated, and logging of auditable events may not occur. 

The control environment for the contingency operation should be similar 
to the normal operation. In particular, access controls as specified in 
the previous section AS-2 should be operating. That is, contingency 
operations should provide for effective user identification and 
authentication, proper authorization to perform sensitive transactions, 
and a continuing audit and monitoring capability. 

Periodically test the contingency plan and adjust it as appropriate: 

Testing the application contingency plan is essential to ensure it will 
function as intended when activated for an emergency. Testing can 
reveal important weaknesses. Testing the contingency plan and making 
adjustments as needed helps ensure the application will work when the 
contingency plan is implemented for an actual emergency. The NIST 
contingency planning guide recommends the following areas to be 
addressed in a contingency test: 

* System recovery on an alternate platform from backup media; 

* Coordination among recovery teams; 

* Internal and external connectivity; 

* System performance using alternate equipment; 

* Restoration of normal operations; 

* Notification procedures. 

NISTï¿½s Handbook on Computer Security[Footnote 94] discusses various 
degrees of contingency plan tests that could range from 1) a simple 
accuracy review to determine that key personnel contacts are still 
employed by the entity to 2) disaster simulations. On disaster 
simulations, this Handbook states the following: ï¿½These tests provide 
valuable information about flaws in the contingency plan and provide 
practice for a real emergency. While they can be expensive, these tests 
can also provide critical information that can be used to ensure the 
continuity of important functions. In general, the more critical the 
functions and the resources addressed in the contingency plan, the more 
cost-beneficial it is to perform a disaster simulation.ï¿½ 

The NIST contingency planning guide states that test results and 
lessons learned should be documented and reviewed. The guide further 
states that, to be effective, the plan should be maintained in a ready 
state that accurately reflects the system, requirements, procedures, 
organizational structure, and policies and, therefore, the plan should 
be reviewed and updated regularly, at least annually or whenever 
significant changes occur. 

Table 43. Control Techniques And Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element AS-5 ï¿½ Maintain an effective contingency planning 
program: 

Control activities: 
AS-5.1 Assess the criticality and sensitivity of the application 
through a Business Impact Analysis (BIA) or equivalent. 
Control techniques: 
AS-5.1.1 Determine the critical functions performed by the application 
and identify the IT resources, including key data and programs, 
required to perform them. 
AS-5.1.2 Identify the disruption impacts and allowable outage times for 
the application. 
AS-5.1.3 Develop recovery priorities that will help determine recovery 
strategies. 
Audit procedures: 
Review the policies and methodology, and the BIA (if conducted) used to 
determine the applicationï¿½s critical functions and supporting IT 
resources, the outage impacts and allowable outage times, and the 
recovery priorities. Interview program, information technology, and 
security administration officials. Determine their input and assessment 
of the reasonableness of the results. 

Control activities: 
AS-5.2 Take steps to prevent and minimize potential damage and 
interruption. 
Control techniques: 
AS-5.2.1 Backup files of key application data are created on a 
prescribed basis. 
Audit procedures: 
Review written policies and procedures for backing up and storing 
application data and programs. 

Control activities: 
AS-5.2 Take steps to prevent and minimize potential damage and 
interruption. 
Control techniques: 
AS-5.2.2 Current application programs are copied and available for use. 
Audit procedures: 
Examine the backup storage site. 

Control activities: 
AS-5.2 Take steps to prevent and minimize potential damage and 
interruption. 
Control techniques: 
AS-5.2.3 Backup files of application data and programs are securely 
stored offsite and retrievable for contingency plan implementation. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview program and information technology officials and determine 
their assessment of the adequacy of backup policy and procedures. 

Control activities: 
AS-5.3 Develop and document an application Contingency Plan. 
Control techniques: 
AS-5.3.1 Develop a time-based application Contingency Plan. 
Audit procedures: 
Review the application contingency plan and broader scoped related 
plans. 

Control activities: 
AS-5.3 Develop and document an application Contingency Plan. 
Control techniques: 
AS-5.3.2 Incorporate the application Contingency Plan into related 
plans, such as the Disaster Recovery, Business Continuity, and Business 
Resumption Plans. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine whether the broader-scoped plans have incorporated the 
application contingency plan. Compare the plan with guidance provided 
in NIST SP 800-34. Interview program, information technology, and 
security administration officials and determine their input and 
assessment of the reasonableness of the plan. 

Control activities: 
AS-5.3 Develop and document an application Contingency Plan. 
Control techniques: 
AS-5.3.3 Contingency operations provide for an effective control 
environment by restricting and monitoring user access to application 
data and programs, including: 
* Users are identified and authenticated; 
* Users are properly authorized before being able to perform sensitive 
transactions; 
* Audit and monitoring capabilities are operating. 
Audit procedures: 
Interview program, information technology, and security administration 
officials. Determine their assessment for providing an effective 
control environment during contingency operations. Review the 
contingency plan and any test results for control related issues. 

Control activities:
AS-5.4 Periodically test the application contingency plan and adjust it 
as appropriate. 
Control techniques: 
AS-5.5.1 The application contingency plan is periodically tested and 
test conditions include disaster simulations. 
Audit procedures: 
Review policies on testing. Determine when and how often contingency 
plans are tested. 

Control activities:
AS-5.4 Periodically test the application contingency plan and adjust it 
as appropriate. 
Control techniques: 
AS-5.5.2 The following areas are included in the contingency test: 
* System recovery on an alternate platform from backup media; 
* Coordination among recovery teams; 
* Internal and external connectivity; 
* System performance using alternate equipment; 
* Restoration of normal operations; 
* Notification procedures. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine if technology is appropriately considered in periodic tests 
of the contingency plan and resultant adjustments to the plan. Review 
test results. Observe a disaster recovery test. 

Control activities:
AS-5.4 Periodically test the application contingency plan and adjust it 
as appropriate. 
Control techniques: 
AS-5.5.3 Test results are documented and a report, such as a lessons-
learned report, is developed and provided to senior management. 
Audit procedures: 
Review the final test report. Interview senior management to determine 
whether they are aware of the test results. 

Control activities:
AS-5.4 Periodically test the application contingency plan and adjust it 
as appropriate. 
Control techniques: 
AS-5.5.4 The contingency plan and related agreements and preparations 
are adjusted to correct any deficiencies identified during testing. 
Audit procedures: 
Review any documentation supporting contingency plan adjustments. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

4.2. Business Process Controls (BP): 

Business Process controls are the automated and/or manual controls 
applied to business transaction flows and relate to the completeness, 
accuracy, validity and confidentiality of transactions and data during 
application processing. They typically cover the structure, policies, 
and procedures that operate at a detailed business process (cycle or 
transaction) level and operate over individual transactions or 
activities across business processes. Specific types of business 
process controls are: 

* Transaction Data Input relates to controls over data that enter the 
application (e.g., data validation and edit checks). 

* Transaction Data Processing relates to controls over data integrity 
within the application (e.g., review of transaction processing logs). 

* Transaction Data Output relates to controls over data output and 
distribution (e.g., output reconciliation and review). 

* Master Data Setup and Maintenance relates to controls over master 
data, the key information that is relatively constant and shared 
between multiple functions or applications (e.g., vendor file). 

The particular control techniques employed by an entity will depend on 
the context of the business process and its associated risks and 
objectives. Business process controls may be manual or automated. 
Automated controls are system-based, and may be used to control such 
things as the correctness or accuracy of data, such as edits and 
validations. Manual controls are procedures that require human 
intervention, such as the approval of a transaction, and are typically 
used to assure the reasonableness or propriety of transactions. 
Automated and manual controls can be preventive or detective. Automated 
controls can keep invalid data from being processed, and they can 
report transactions that fail to meet reasonableness criteria. Manual 
controls performed prior to input can identify problems before data is 
processed, while monitoring controls performed after processing can 
identify errors. 

In many entities, the core business processes span across multiple 
applications. Some of the applications are themselves complex, 
integrated systems. Ideally, applications are interfaced seamlessly for 
the information to flow across these applications to complete a 
business process. Furthermore, functional areas may expand outside of 
the organization to include external ï¿½partnersï¿½ as part of a larger 
vendor/contract management or personnel management, wherein partner 
applications are often interfaced with entity systems. This expansion 
of the environment to include external systems adds to the risks or 
challenges faced by the organization. If not properly controlled, these 
interfaces with external ï¿½partnersï¿½ can affect the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information and information systems. 

At a high level, execution of a business process involves data input, 
processing and data output. However, the characteristics of data types 
(master or standing data and transaction data), and the complexity of 
the interfaced systems and the underlying data management systems, 
require the auditor to consider these in evaluating the completeness, 
accuracy, validity and confidentiality of data. 

Master Data vs. Transaction Data: 

Every business process employs master data, or referential data that 
provides the basis for ongoing business activities, e.g., customers, 
vendors, and employees. The data that are generated as a result of 
these activities are called transaction data, and represent the result 
of the activity in the form of documents or postings, such as purchase 
orders and obligations. 

Examples of master data are: 

* Organizational structure; 
* G/L Account Structure; 
* Vendor Master; 
* Employee Master. 

Financially focused master data generally has the following 
characteristics: 

* Relatively stable over time; even if the data records change, the 
overall volume of growth is limited. Example: chart of accounts, fixed 
assets, and vendors. 

* Occur only once per object in the application. Example: assets are 
used by almost every organizational unit, but there is only one master 
record per asset. 

* Everything else depends on them, e.g. inventory balances cannot be 
loaded without the organizational structure, G/L accounts, and material 
master being loaded. Therefore, master data should be loaded prior to 
processing business transactions. 

Business Process Control Objectives: 

As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the overall 
objectives of business process application level controls are to 
reasonably assure completeness, accuracy, validity and confidentiality 
of transactions and data during application processing. In particular, 
each specific business process control technique is designed to achieve 
one or more of these objectives. The effectiveness of business process 
controls depends on whether all of these overall objectives are 
achieved by the application level controls. Each objective is described 
in more detail below. 

Completeness (C) controls should provide reasonable assurance that all 
transactions that occurred are input into the system, accepted for 
processing, processed once and only once by the system, and properly 
included in output. Completeness controls include the following key 
elements: 

* transactions are completely input; 

* valid transactions are accepted by the system; 

* duplicate postings are rejected by the system; 

* rejected transactions are identified, corrected and re-processed; 
and; 

* all transactions accepted by the system are processed completely. 

The most common completeness controls in applications are batch totals, 
sequence checking, matching, duplicate checking, reconciliations, 
control totals and exception reporting. 

Accuracy (A) controls should provide reasonable assurance that 
transactions are properly recorded, with the correct amount/data, and 
on a timely basis (in the proper period); key data elements input for 
transactions are accurate; and data elements are processed accurately 
by applications that produce reliable results; and output is accurate. 

Accuracy control techniques include programmed edit checks (e.g., 
validations, reasonableness checks, dependency checks, existence 
checks, format checks, mathematical accuracy, range checks, etc.), 
batch totals and check digit verification. 

Validity (V) controls should provide reasonable assurance (1)that all 
recorded transactions actually occurred (are real), relate to the 
organization, and were properly approved in accordance with 
managementï¿½s authorization; and (2) that output contains only valid 
data. A transaction is valid when it has been authorized (for example, 
buying from a particular supplier) and when the master data relating to 
that transaction is reliable (for example, the name, bank account and 
other details on that supplier). Validity includes the concept of 
authenticity. Examples of validity controls are one-for-one checking 
and matching. 

Confidentiality (CF) controls should provide reasonable assurance that 
application data and reports and other output are protected against 
unauthorized access. Examples of confidentiality controls include 
restricted physical and logical access to sensitive business process 
applications, data files, transactions, and output, and adequate 
segregation of duties. Confidentiality also includes restricted access 
to data reporting/extraction tools as well as copies or extractions of 
data files. 

NIST Guidance: 

For federal systems, NIST SP 800-53 includes the following controls 
related to business process controls: 
SI-9 Information Input Restrictions; 
SI-10 Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity; 
SI-11 Error Handling; 
SI-12 Information Output Handling and Retention. 

This section presents more detailed control objectives that should be 
achieved to reasonably assure that transaction data is complete, 
accurate, valid and confidential. Also, this section is organized to 
address the four principal types of business process controls: input, 
processing, output, and master files. 

Business Process Control Critical Elements: 

Business Process Controls have the following four critical elements: 
BP-1 Transaction Data Input is complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential (Transaction data input controls); 
BP-2 Transaction Data Processing is complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential (Transaction data processing controls); 
BP-3 Transaction Data Output is complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential (Transaction data output controls); 
BP-4 Master data setup and maintenance is adequately controlled. 

BP-1 Transaction Data Input is complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential (Transaction Data Input Controls): 

The entity should implement procedures to reasonably assure that (1) 
all data input is done in a controlled manner, (2) data input into the 
application is complete, accurate, and valid, (3) any incorrect 
information is identified, rejected, and corrected for subsequent 
processing, and (4) the confidentiality of data is adequately 
protected. Inadequate input controls can result in incomplete, 
inaccurate, and/or invalid records in the application data or 
unauthorized disclosure of application data. 

Applications can accept input manually (application users enter data), 
or via automated input. The automated input may be interfaces that use 
batch processing or are integrated real-time with internal and external 
systems. To the extent that data input is obtained from other 
applications, the auditorï¿½s assessment of input controls should be 
coordinated with data interface controls discussed in section 4.3 of 
this chapter. 

For federal systems, NIST SP 800-53 [SI-10] establishes the following 
objectives for input controls: 

* checks for accuracy, completeness, validity, and authenticity of 
information are accomplished as close to the point of origin as 
possible. 

* rules for checking the valid syntax of information system inputs 
(e.g., character set, length, numerical range, acceptable values) are 
in place to verify that inputs match specified definitions for format 
and content. 

* inputs passed to interpreters are prescreened to prevent the content 
from being unintentionally interpreted as commands. 

Also, SI-10 states that the extent to which the information system is 
able to check the accuracy, completeness, validity, and authenticity of 
information is guided by organizational policy and operational 
requirements. 

Data input for processing should have all key fields completed and be 
validated and edited. Error handling procedures should facilitate 
timely resubmission of corrected data, including real-time on-line 
edits and validations. These controls may be configured within the 
system settings, or added on as a customization. Where applicable, the 
auditor may also process a controlled group of live data and test for 
expected results. Preventive controls generally allow for higher 
reliance and the most efficient testing. 

In addition, controls should be in place to reasonably assure that 
access to data input is adequately controlled. Procedures should be 
implemented to control access to application input routines and 
physical input media (blank and completed). The assessment of such 
controls should be coordinated with Critical Element AS-2 Implement 
effective application access controls. 

For federal systems, NIST SP 800-53 includes three controls relevant to 
transaction data input: 
SI-9 Information Input Restrictions; 
SI-10 Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity; 
SI-11 Error Handling. 

Data input controls are comprised of the following control activities: 

* Implement an effective transaction data strategy and design; 

* Establish input preparation (approval and review) policies and 
procedures; 

* Build data validations and edit checks into the application; 

* Implement effective auditing and monitoring capability. 

Implement an effective transaction data strategy and design: 

The entity should have an appropriate data strategy and design (how the 
data are organized into structures to facilitate retrieval while 
minimizing redundancy). The design of transaction data elements is a 
critical factor in helping to assure the quality of data as well as its 
interrelationship with other data elements. Data standards [Footnote 
95] should be defined and maintained, but may vary depending upon the 
specific requirements of the entity, including regulatory requirements, 
and database- or application-based standards. 

A clearly defined data strategy minimizes data redundancies fundamental 
to an efficient, effective transaction processing function. Poor data 
quality may lead to a failure of system controls, process 
inefficiencies, and inaccurate management reporting. Erroneous or 
missing elements of critical data in the transaction file can produce 
discrepancies within the process cycle. 

Characteristics of erroneous transaction file data elements include, 
but are not limited to, duplicate transactions recorded or processed, 
and improper coding to departments, business units or accounts. They 
also include unpopulated data fields and data formatting 
inconsistencies, as described for the master file. 

Establish Input Preparation (approval and review) Policies and 
Procedures: 

The entity should have policies and procedures in place to reasonably 
assure that all authorized source documents and input files are 
complete and accurate, properly accounted for, and transmitted in a 
timely manner for input to the computer system. Among these, management 
should establish procedures to reasonably assure that all inputs into 
the application have been processed and accounted for; and any missing 
or unaccounted for source documents or input transactions have been 
identified and investigated. Finally, procedures should be established 
to reasonably assure that all source documents (paper or electronic 
form) have been entered and accepted to create a valid transaction. 
Automatic input from other applications should be integrated either 
through an interface (external applications) or configuration (cross-
modular within the same application). Interface controls are addressed 
in section 4.3, below. 

For federal systems, NIST SP 800-53 [SI-9] establishes a control 
objective that the organization restricts the capability to input 
information to the information system to authorized personnel. 
Restrictions on personnel authorized to input information to the 
information system may extend beyond the typical access controls 
employed by the system and include limitations based on specific 
operational/project responsibilities. 

Build Data Validation and Edits within the Application: 

Input data should be validated and edited to provide reasonable 
assurance that erroneous data are prevented or detected before 
processing. In many cases, application owners and programmers will 
build application input edits directly into the application to limit 
the number of errors that are input into the application. Edits are 
used to help assure that data are complete, accurate, valid, and 
recorded in the proper format. Edits can include programming to 
identify and correct invalid field lengths or characters, missing data, 
incorrect data, or erroneous dates. The auditor should obtain an 
understanding of the application input edits to assess their adequacy 
and to determine the edits that will be tested. 

Implement Effective Auditing and Monitoring Capability: 

As part of the data input process, data entry errors may occur. These 
errors can occur during manual or automated entry of data. Management 
should have procedures to identify and correct any errors that occur 
during the data entry process. Error handling procedures during data 
entry should reasonably assure that errors and irregularities are 
detected, reported, and corrected. Managementï¿½s audit and monitoring 
capability should include: 

* user error logs to provide timely follow-up and correction of 
unresolved data errors and irregularities, and; 

* an established monitoring process to assure the effectiveness of 
error handling procedures. 

For federal systems, NIST SP 800-53 [SI-11] states that the information 
system identifies and handles error conditions in an expeditious manner 
without providing information that could be exploited by adversaries. 
The structure and content of error messages are carefully considered by 
the organization. Error messages are revealed only to authorized 
personnel. Error messages generated by the information system provide 
timely and useful information without revealing potentially harmful 
information that could be used by adversaries. Sensitive information 
(e.g., account numbers, social security numbers, and credit card 
numbers) are not listed in error logs or associated administrative 
messages. The extent to which the information system is able to 
identify and handle error conditions is guided by organizational policy 
and operational requirements. 

Table 44. Control Techniques And Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element BP-1 - Transaction Data Input is complete, accurate, 
valid, and confidential: 

Control activity: 
BP-1.1 A transaction data strategy is properly defined, documented, and 
appropriate. 
Control Object: 
C,A,V,CF; 
Control techniques: 
BP-1.1.1 Data management procedures exist that include transaction data 
strategy, data design, data definitions, data quality standards, 
ownership and monitoring procedures. Data strategy should be unique to 
each data type. 
Audit procedures: 
Inquire of management and inspect documented policies and procedures 
related to data strategy. Inspect transaction data strategy. 

Control activity: 
BP-1.2 Source documentation and input file data collection and input 
preparation and entry is effectively controlled. 
Control Object: 
C,V,CF; 
Control techniques: 
BP-1.2.1 Procedures are established to provide reasonable assurance 
that all inputs into the application have been authorized, accepted for 
processing, and accounted for; and any missing or unaccounted for 
source documents or input files have been identified and investigated. 
Such procedures may include one or more of the following: 
* batch totals; 
* sequence checking; 
* reconciliations; 
* control totals. 
Audit procedures: 
Through inquiry, observation, and inspection, obtain an understanding 
of policies and procedures related to source document and input file 
collection and preparation, and determine whether the procedures are 
documented and properly designed. Observe and inspect input preparation 
policies and procedures and relevant controls, noting procedures taken 
when exceptions are identified. Inspect a selection of reports (a 
sample is not required, but the auditor could elect to choose one) used 
by management to determine whether the necessary inputs are accepted 
for processing, and inquire of review procedures used. Inquire as to 
how source documents and input files are tracked and maintained and 
inspect relevant documentation. 

Control activity: 
BP-1.3 Access to data input is adequately controlled; 
Control Object: 
C,A,V,CF; 
Control techniques: 
BP-1.3.1 Procedures are implemented to control access to application 
input routines and physical input media (blank and completed). 
Audit procedures: 
Review procedures over control of data input to determine whether they 
are adequate. Coordinate this step with AS-2. 

Control activity: 
BP-1.4 Input data are approved; 
Control Object:
A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-1.4.1 Documented approval procedures exist to validate input data 
before entering the system. Approval procedures are followed for data 
input. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect documented procedures for approval of input data. Inspect a 
selection of source documents (a sample is not required, but auditor 
could elect to choose one) and input files and determine whether the 
source data were approved for input. 

Control activity: 
BP-1.5 Input data are validated and edited to provide reasonable 
assurance that erroneous data are detected before processing. 
Control Object:
A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-1.5.1 Appropriate edits are used to reasonably assure that data are 
valid and recorded in the proper format, including: 
* authorization or approval codes; 
* field format controls; 
* required field controls; 
* limit and reasonableness controls; 
* valid combination of related data field values; 
* range checks; 
* mathematical accuracy; 
* master file matching; 
* duplicate processing controls; and; 
* balancing controls. 
Audit procedures: 
Through inquiry, observation, and inspection, understand edits used to 
reasonably assure that input data is accurate, valid, and in the proper 
format prior to being accepted by the application. The edits and 
procedures should address both manual and automated input processes. 
Identify the key data input screens. Consider such factors as known 
errors and the frequency of use. If available, use analytical reports 
to support reasoning for screen selection. For the key manual input 
layouts identified, perform the following steps as applicable: 
* Observe an authorized data entry clerk inputting transactions, noting 
edits and validations for the various transaction entries. 
* Observe key transaction fields to determine whether they have 
adequate edit/validation controls over data input. 
* Obtain screen prints of appropriate scenarios and document the 
result. 
For key automated inputs, observe and inspect data validation 
processes, completion controls, and exception reports in place. Inquire 
of management regarding procedures used to reject and resubmit data for 
processing, and procedures to provide reasonable assurance that data is 
not processed multiple times. Note: audit procedures apply only to the 
current environment at the time of test. Supplemental audit procedures 
would need to be applied at other points during the year to obtain 
evidence that the control was operating effectively.) 

Control activity: 
BP-1.5 Input data are validated and edited to provide reasonable 
assurance that erroneous data are detected before processing. 
Control Object:
A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-1.5.2 Edit and validation overrides are restricted to authorized 
personnel. Procedures exist to monitor, in a timely manner, overrides 
applied to transactions. 
Audit procedures: 
Observe and inspect existing procedures for reviewer overrides or 
bypassing data validation and error routines. If an override log 
exists, observe and inspect to determining whether adequate review and 
follow up of overrides is performed. Inspect a selection of overrides 
for evidence of proper approval. (Note: use of overrides is not by 
itself indicative of inadequate controls. However, the auditor needs to 
examine why the overrides are being used and controls in place to 
minimize risks from these actions). 

Control activity: 
BP-1.5 Input data are validated and edited to provide reasonable 
assurance that erroneous data are detected before processing. 
Control Object:
A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-1.5.3 Table maintenance procedures include edit and validation 
controls to help assure that only valid changes are made to data 
tables. 
Audit procedures: 
Through inquiry, observation, and inspection, obtain an understanding 
of table maintenance procedures relative to data edits and validation. 
Observe an authorized person attempting to make invalid changes to 
tables, and confirm edits and validations are performed on changes. 

Control activity: 
BP-1.6 Input values to data fields that do not fall within the 
tolerances or parameters determined by the management result in an 
input warning or error. 
Control Object:
A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-1.6.1 Parameters and tolerances are configured and error conditions 
and messages are defined. (These restrictions can be configured based 
on limits on transaction amounts or based on the nature of 
transactions) If a workflow is used so that documents can be released 
only by personnel with appropriate approval authority, then these 
requirements should be appropriately designed in the system. Management 
regularly reviews the restrictions placed on data input and validates 
that they are accurate and appropriate. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect configuration of parameters and tolerance levels defined by the 
entity to identify whether the application accepts the data with 
warning or rejects the data, if the conditions are not met. Inspect 
management review procedures, if the application accepts user data, 
with a warning. Inspect the workflow rules and validate that the 
releasing authority is at an appropriate level. Inspect evidence of 
management's regular review of relevant tolerances and parameters, and 
any correctional activities taken. 

Control activity: 
BP-1.7 Error handling procedures during data origination and entry 
reasonably assure that errors and irregularities are detected, 
reported, and corrected. 
Control Object: 
C,A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-1.7.1 Procedures are established to reasonably assure that all 
inputs into the application have been accepted for processing and 
accounted for; and any missing or unaccounted for source documents or 
input files have been identified and investigated. The procedures 
specifically require the exceptions to be resolved within a specific 
time period. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect documented procedures related to data entry error handling 
procedures. Inquire of management to determine which key management 
reports are used to monitor input errors. Select a sample of input 
error reports and inspect to note evidence of management review. As 
applicable, inspect subsequent data input reports to note where data 
was corrected and resubmitted for processing. 

Control activity: 
BP-1.8 Errors are investigated and resubmitted for processing promptly 
and accurately. 
Control Object: 
C,A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-1.8.1 Data input errors are identified in suspense or error reports 
and resolved or resubmitted in a timely manner (within the period 
specified in the procedures). 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect a sample of recent suspense or error reports (can use sample 
selected in BP-1.7.1 provided information included will satisfy audit 
objectives for both audit procedures) and note whether suspense items 
are being corrected in a timely manner. Inspect the open items and note 
management's reasons for not correcting them in a timely manner. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

BP-2 Transaction Data Processing is complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential (Transaction Data Processing Controls): 

Transaction data processing controls address the completeness, 
accuracy, validity, and confidentiality of data as the data get 
processed within the application. Data processing controls are employed 
following input, or during batch processing or on-line user processing 
within the application. 

Once the initial data are entered in the system and accepted for 
processing, the processing of the data should be controlled by a series 
of activities within the system. These activities are designed by 
management and are either programmed or configured into the 
application. The processing steps are different for each process 
(purchasing versus invoice processing) and control requirements differ 
to mitigate the risks inherent to the applicable process. An effective 
assessment of data processing controls includes an understanding of the 
process steps and dataflow in a process cycle, the controls imbedded in 
the application, and the manual controls that are common across 
processes or specific to each process. 

Some applications may allow user-defined processing, whereby the user 
may establish or modify processing. This frequently occurs in 
applications based on spreadsheets and report writer/data extraction 
tools. Entities should establish clear policies and procedures 
concerning user-defined processing. In addition, the entity should have 
adequate controls over the accuracy, completeness and validity of 
information processed in applications with user-defined processing. 

Audit trails and security reports should be monitored on a regular 
basis to help assure that transactions are processing as intended. The 
effectiveness of such procedures depends on the level of security 
reporting and problem analysis tools available in the application. 
Controls over the processing of data should preclude or detect the 
erroneous or unauthorized addition, removal, or alteration of data 
during processing. 

Interface controls relate to the integrity of data as they move from 
one system to another. Interface controls are addressed separately in 
Section 4.3 below. 

For federal systems, as noted in BP-1 above, NIST SP 800-53 includes 
three controls relevant to data processing: 
SI-9 Information Input Restrictions; 
SI-10 Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity; 
SI-11 Error Handling. 

Formal Transaction Processing Procedures: 

Formal procedures should be established for data processing to help 
assure that data are processed completely and accurately, that data 
retains its validity, and that appropriate data confidentiality is 
maintained during processing. Related controls include the following: 

* Transaction or table logs provide an audit trail and the ability to 
compare transactions to source documents. Audit trails or processing 
logs are often used within applications to track the pertinent 
information related to application transactions, both manual and 
automated. The processing logs should also be used to identify those 
transactions that did not process completely or correctly within the 
application. The log should document the errors identified during 
application processing, and should contain enough information for the 
systems personnel to identify the exact transactions that failed, and 
the application users that will need to be contacted to correct the 
posting (if the error can not be corrected by the systems personnel). 
Processing logs typically contain such information as date and time of 
error, responsible user (if applicable), codes describing the type of 
error encountered, and the corrective action that has occurred to 
assure correct processing of the transaction. 

* An automated process exists that allows one or more of the following: 
capturing transaction data in correct accounts; unique documentation; 
tolerances in processing data; periodic review and reconciliation of 
subsidiary or clearing accounts (e.g., clearing Goods Received accounts 
against Invoice Received accounts through two- and three-way matching 
process); prevention of direct posting to reconciliation accounts; and 
workflow to initiate the approval process. 

* Efficient transaction entry that eliminates unnecessary duplication 
of data entry. Where appropriate, data needed by the systems are 
entered only once and other parts of the system are automatically 
updated consistent with the timing requirements of each process cycle. 

* Managers should provide review and authorization for transactions 
that are rejected and should be rerun. 

Effective auditing and monitoring capability: 

During data processing, transactions may not be processed completely or 
accurately as a result of errors or inconsistencies in data, system 
interruptions, communication failures, or other events. In addition, 
valid data may be corrupted or data may lose its confidentiality. To 
identify these instances, a monitoring capability should be 
implemented. The monitoring function should reasonably assure that data 
are accurately processed through the application and that processing 
procedures determine data to be added, or altered during processing. No 
data should be lost during the process. Controls may include: 

* If the application is ï¿½runï¿½ on a regular schedule to process data, 
either manually or automatically, there are documented procedures 
explaining how this is performed, including controls in place to 
reasonably assure that all processing was completed. 

* A processing log is maintained and is reviewed on a regular basis for 
unusual or unauthorized activity. 

* The processing log, or another log or report, is used to document any 
errors or problems encountered during processing. Types of information 
that should be considered for retention are descriptions of any errors 
encountered, dates identified, any codes associated with errors, any 
corrective action taken, date and times corrected. 

* Controls to reasonably assure that the correct generation/cycle of 
files is used for processing. This may include the generation of backup 
files from processing to be used for disaster recovery. 

* Adequate audit trails are generated during processing. These audit 
trails should be logs or reports that contain information about each 
transaction. Data that should be included are who initiated each of the 
transactions, the date and time of the transactions, and the location 
of the transaction origination (terminal or IP address as an example). 

Table 45. Control Techniques And Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element BP-2 Transaction Data Processing is complete, 
accurate, valid, and confidential: 

Control activity: 
BP2.1 Application functionality is designed to process input data, with 
minimal manual intervention. 
Control Object: 
C,A,V,CF; 
Control techniques: 
BP-2.1.1 Application processing of input data is automated and 
standardized. Design documentation supporting the processing design 
exists for validation and change control purposes. The version of 
application, data and files to be processed are appropriate and 
current. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect configuration and/or design documentation noting automatic and 
manual processing of transaction and information flow. Verify that 
proper versions of application, data and file are used. 

Control activity: 
BP-2.2 Processing errors are identified, logged and resolved. 
Control Object: 
C,A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-2.2.1 System entries use transaction logs to reasonably assure that 
all transactions are properly processed and identify the transactions 
that were not completely processed. 
BP-2.2.2 Procedures are in place to identify and review the incomplete 
execution of transactions, analyze and take appropriate action. 
BP-2.2.3 Procedures exist to monitor, in a timely manner, overrides 
applied to transaction processing. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect a selection of application, transaction and error logs, noting 
whether all transactions were properly processed and missing or 
duplicate transactions were identified, including reruns and restarts. 
Inspect selected incomplete transactions and validate that management 
has adequately investigated and corrected the errors or omissions. 
Conduct a test with controlled group of live data and analyze the 
results with the expected values. Follow up with any exceptions. 
Observe and inspect existing procedures for reviewer overrides or 
bypassing data processing routines. If an override log exists, observe 
and inspect to determining whether adequate review and follow up of 
overrides is performed. Inspect a selection of overrides for evidence 
of proper approval. (Note: use of overrides is not by itself indicative 
of inadequate controls. However, the auditor needs to examine why the 
overrides are being used and controls in place to minimize risks from 
these actions). 

Control activity: 
BP-2.3 Transactions are executed in accordance with the pre-determined 
parameters and tolerances, specific to entityï¿½s risk management. 
Control Object: 
A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-2.3.1 Document processing and posting conditions (parameters and 
tolerances) are configured, including system errors and actions, if the 
are conditions are not met. 
BP-2.3.2 Management regularly reviews the restrictions to validate the 
accuracy and appropriateness. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect configuration of parameters and tolerances levels defined by 
the entity to identify whether the application processes the data with 
warning or rejects the data, if the conditions are not met. Inspect 
management review procedures, noting management action when the 
application processes data or rejects it. In both cases, management 
should clearly analyze the impact on the downstream transactions. 

Control activity: 
BP-2.4 Transactions are valid and are unique (not duplicated). 
Control Object: 
A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-2.4.1 The application performs on-line edit and validation checks 
against data being processed. 
BP-2.4.2 The system produces warning or error messages. 
BP-2.4.3 Transactions with errors are rejected or suspended from 
processing until the error is corrected. 
BP-2.4.4 The application communicates the processing error to the Users 
either on-line (if on-line entry) or via an exception report. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect design document to identify key data validation and edit 
checks. Inspect configuration to verify that the identified edit and 
validations checks are appropriately set, and transactions are 
rejected/suspended when data/processing errors occur. Also verify that 
warning and error messages are designed when the processing is 
incomplete. Inspect the error communication methodology. 

Control activity: 
BP-2.5 The transactions appropriately authorized. 
Control Object: 
A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-2.5.1 Transactions are matched with managementï¿½s general or specific 
authorizations. 
Audit procedures:
Review the adequacy of controls over authorization of transactions. 

Control activity: 
BP-2.6 Data from subsidiary ledgers are in balance with the general 
ledger (step applicable to financial-related audits only). 
Control Object: 
C,A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-2.6.1 Periodic reconciliation is performed and exceptions are 
appropriately handled. 
Audit procedures:
Inspect periodic procedures to determine whether reconciliations are 
performed and documented with evidence. For a selection of 
reconciliations, examine supporting evidence for adequacy. Through 
inquiry, observations, and inspection, determine if the system is 
configured to auto balance, where possible. 

Control activity: 
BP-2.7 User-defined processing is adequately controlled. 
Control Object: 
C, A, V, CF; 
Control techniques: 
BP-2.7.1 Appropriate policies and procedures over user-defined 
processing are implemented. 
BP-2.7.2 Controls over user-defined processing are adequate. 
Audit procedures:
Review policies and procedures over user-defined processing. Assess the 
operating effectiveness of user-defined processing. 

Control activity: 
BP-2.8 As appropriate, the confidentiality of transaction data during 
processing is adequately controlled; 
Control Object:
CF; 
Control techniques: 
BP-2.8.1 Management implements adequate controls to protect the 
confidentiality of data during processing, as appropriate. 
Audit procedures:
Assess the adequacy of management controls over confidentiality during 
processing. Coordinate this step with Critical Element AS-2 Implement 
effective application access controls. 

Control activity: 
BP-2.9 An adequate audit and monitoring capability is implemented. 
Control Object:
C,A; 
Control techniques: 
BP-2.9.1 Management has procedures in place to reconcile the data input 
with the data processed by the application. 
BP-2.9.2 Monitoring procedures should provide details of data to be 
added/modified during the processing, and expected result. System audit 
logs should be reviewed for exception. 
BP-2.9.3 Management maintains a process log and the log is reviewed for 
unusual or unauthorized activity. 
Audit procedures:
Inspect procedures regarding reconciliation of transactions. Inspect 
operations activity at selected times and check for evidence that 
reconciliations are being performed. Inspect the processing log and 
note whether the unusual or unauthorized activity was followed up 
properly and promptly. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

BP-3 Transaction data output is complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential (Transaction Data Output Controls): 

Like input and processing controls, transaction data output controls 
are used to reasonably assure that transaction data is complete, 
accurate, valid, and confidential. In addition, output controls are 
aimed at the correct and timely distribution of any output produced. 
Output can be in hardcopy form, in the form of files used as input to 
other systems, or information available for online viewing. 

Formal procedures should be established for data processing to help 
assure that data are processed completely and accurately, that data 
retains its validity, and that appropriate data confidentiality is 
maintained during processing. 

Formal procedures should be established for data processing to help 
assure that data are processed completely and accurately, that data 
retains its validity, and that appropriate data confidentiality is 
maintained during processing, output control totals are accurate and 
are being verified, and the resulting information is distributed in a 
timely and consistent manner to the appropriate end users. Controls 
include: 

* An overall reporting process that identifies specific output that 
will be generated, the form and content of the reporting, sensitivity 
of information and selectivity of user. 
- Output is delivered to the appropriate end user. 
- Output is restricted from unauthorized access. 
- Record retention and backup schedules for output data should be 
established. 

* Data integrity through reconciliation of the output to the input and 
processing data. 
- Documented procedures explain the methods for the proper 
balancing/reconciliation and error correcting of output should exist. 
There should be adequate separation of duties for the 
balancing/reconciliation process. 
- Output is reviewed for general acceptability and completeness, 
including any control totals. There should be either error reports or a 
log kept of output errors. These should contain information such as a 
description of problems/errors and the date identified, as well as any 
corrective action taken. 

In addition, controls should be in place to reasonably assure that 
access to data output is adequately controlled. Procedures should be 
implemented to control access to output data and physical output media 
(blank and completed). The assessment of such controls should be 
coordinated with Critical Element AS-2 Implement effective application 
access controls. 

For federal systems, as noted in BP-1 above, NIST SP 800-53 includes 
three controls relevant to data output controls: 
SI-9 Information Input Restrictions; 
SI-10 Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity; 
SI-11 Error Handling. 

In addition, NIST SP 800-53 [SI-12] states that the organization 
handles and retains output from the information system in accordance 
with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, 
regulations, standards, and operational requirements. 

Implementing a reporting strategy: 

One of the key elements of output controls is having an overall 
reporting strategy. The strategy helps to reasonably assure that 
content and availability of reports is consistent with end usersï¿½ 
needs, that end users are aware of the sensitivity and confidentiality 
of data, and that an ï¿½ownerï¿½ has been defined for all report output. 
The strategy also provides a basis for policies and procedures that 
govern preferred report methods (hardcopy vs. soft, standard vs. 
custom), report generation and distribution, and any review and or 
approvals. 

The strategy should specifically consider: 

* Compliance with laws and regulations; 

* Sensitivity of data; 

* Levels of reporting segregation of duties; 

* Consolidation/processing of reporting from a 3rd party; 

* Reporting tools utilized; 

* Business needs/functionality of reports; and; 

* Non-standard output items. 

The strategy should adequately consider the confidentiality of all 
types of output. For example, the entity should have adequate security 
over output queues, particularly for sensitive information. 
Inadequately secured output queues can lead to unauthorized disclosure 
of information. Similarly, access to output screens should be 
adequately controlled. 

Another significant area for output controls relates to data that is 
routinely or episodically transferred to other systems, such as data 
supporting a management reporting system. If controls over such other 
systems are not adequate and consistent with the risk level of the 
data, such data may be subject to unauthorized across. For example, 
personnel data transferred to a management reporting system should have 
adequate controls to achieve the confidentiality and integrity 
objectives. 

Establishing security and controls over report generation and 
distribution: 

Controls over report generation and distribution should include the 
following: 

* Reports should be reviewed for reasonableness and accuracy prior to 
distribution. 

* Output distribution should be controlled so that output is provided 
to authorized recipients only and on a timely basis. 

* Report retention should be adequate based on internal needs and 
regulatory requirements. For example, application output may be stored 
to back-up tapes (or kept as hard copy documentation) and rotated to an 
offsite storage facility. 

* Output reports comply with applicable laws and regulations, including 
the type of clearance required to view the output reports. 

* User access to reports is controlled based on the userï¿½s business 
need to view the report and the sensitivity of information contained in 
the report. 

* Data output to management reporting or other copies of output files 
are adequately controlled. 

Table 46. Control Techniques And Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element BP-3 Transaction data output is complete, accurate, 
valid, and confidential: 

Control activity: 
BP-3.1 Outputs are appropriately defined by the management (form, 
sensitivity of data, user selectivity, confidentiality, etc); 
Control Object: 
C,A,V,CF; 
Control techniques: 
BP-3.1.1 Management has developed a reporting strategy that includes 
the following: 
* content and availability that are consistent with end usersï¿½ needs; 
* sensitivity and confidentiality of data; 
* appropriate user access to output data. 
Audit procedures: 
Inquire of management about a reporting strategy or policy. Obtain a 
copy of any formal reporting strategy or policy. Assess the adequacy of 
the strategy and related policies. 

Control activity: 
BP-3.2 Output generation and distribution are aligned with the 
reporting strategy; 
Control Object: 
C,A,V,CF; 
Control techniques: 
BP-3.2.1 Management has procedures in place to reasonably assure that 
content and availability of output and data are consistent with end 
usersï¿½ needs, sensitivity, laws and regulations, and confidentiality of 
data and valid user access. 
BP-3.2.2 Management has procedures in place to monitor replication of 
output data used in management reports or other communications within 
or outside the entity. 
BP-3.2.3 User access to output data is aligned with the user's role and 
confidentiality/sensitivity of information. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect management procedures for defining and assigning 
output/reports. Select key output/reports in the area of audit scope 
and verify the user access to the output/reports. Inquire of management 
on the use of data output. Inspect selected management reports or other 
communication to verify the accurate replication of data. Verify that 
the user received appropriate authorization to use the data. Review 
user access to selected output data and assess the appropriateness of 
access. 

Control activity: 
BP-3.3 System generated outputs/reports are reviewed to reasonably 
assure the integrity of production data and transaction processing; 
Control Object: 
C,A,V; 
Control techniques: 
BP-3.3.1 Management has identified key reports to track processing 
results. 
BP-3.3.2 Management has documented procedures to review processed 
results, where applicable. 
BP-3.3.3 Procedures are in place to review critical output data or 
control reports on a timely basis. 
Audit procedures: 
Inquire of user management and personnel to determine the key reports 
used to track processing results. Obtain and inspect reports identified 
by management in the above test to determine whether the reports exist 
and are reviewed on a timely basis. 

Control activity: 
BP-3.4 Output/reports are in compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations; 
Control Object: 
C,A,V,CF; 
Control techniques: 
BP-3.4.1 Output reports for compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations are accurate, complete Inspect a sample of output/reports 
for compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
Audit procedures: 
Identify laws and regulations that are to be complied with and verify 
that the reports are in compliance. 

Control activity: 
BP-3.5 Access to output/reports and output files is based on business 
need and is limited to authorized users; 
Control Object: 
CF; 
Control techniques: 
BP-3.5.1 Access to reports is restricted to those users with a 
legitimate business need for the information. 
BP-3.5.2 Users should have appropriate authorization for accessing 
reports, including the appropriate level of security clearance, where 
applicable. 
Audit procedures: 
Select output/reports and output files from the audit area and inspect 
application access (if the output can be accessed on-line or other 
electronic form) or inspect distribution to determine whether the user 
has appropriate level of security clearance and is authorized to 
access. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

BP-4 Master Data Setup and Maintenance is Adequately Controlled: 

Master data are the key information that is constant and shared with 
multiple functions, such as a customer master record, which contains 
the customer number, shipping address, billing address, key contact and 
payment terms. Most applications use the following two types of master 
data: 

Configurable master data or business rules are defined in an 
application module and used by end users, but cannot be changed 
directly in production. Purchase order release procedures (requiring 
approval) and payment terms are examples of business rules. 

Business master data are master data created in production based upon 
the criteria designed to capture essential standing data, for example, 
customer and vendor master data. 

Master data are, usually, entered once and are shared among various 
application modules. Also, common data fields that are used from origin 
may be used by the application several times over a period of time 
until the master data is no longer valid because of termination of a 
contractual agreement or data owner decision. 

Three key control areas specific to master data controls are the 
controls related to design and configuration of master data 
(preventive), the procedures external to the system (detective and 
preventive), and the monitoring of master data design compliance 
(detective). Master data is also subject to access controls (activities 
to create and maintain master data are controlled by access privileges) 
discussed in AS-2. 

The three key steps in master file setup and maintenance are: 

* Implementing an effective design of master data elements; 

* Establishing master data maintenance procedures, including approval, 
review, and adequate support for changes to master data; 

* Implementing an effective auditing and monitoring capability. 

Implementing an effective design of master data elements: 

Master data elements should be designed to minimize the risk of 
erroneous master data. The effectiveness of master data design can be 
affected by the following: 

* Centralized versus decentralized maintenance ï¿½ centralized master 
data maintenance provides a greater control over creation and change of 
master data. It could, however, delay the process. Since most 
applications provide field or functional level access, it is possible 
for key data to be centrally maintained and functional specific data 
maintained by a unit. For example, vendor master data can be segmented 
into purchasing data and finance data, separately maintained by 
purchasing and finance departments, respectively. 

* Partial edit ï¿½ Master data maintenance may be controlled by rules 
that can be configured to prevent changes to certain areas of data, or 
key fields within a record. 

* Numbering ï¿½ System-assigned internal numbering is generally 
considered to be lower risk than external numbering, however, 
management can choose to use external numbering (to match numbers from 
an external system) and can choose naming conventions appropriate to 
its use. Adequate procedures should be in place to reasonably assure 
compliance with managementï¿½s policy on numbering/naming conventions. 

* Ownership ï¿½ Ownership should be clearly identified. 

Establishing master data maintenance procedures, including approval, 
review, and adequate support for changes to master data: 

As discussed earlier, master data are much more static than transaction 
data, which may be created and updated on a daily basis by a wide range 
of users. Master data maintenance, therefore, should be the domain of 
fewer users than those responsible for updating transaction data. 

Because Master Data serves as the basis for transaction processing, it 
is critical that controls exist over the integrity and quality of the 
data. An erroneous Master Data record will compromise the integrity of 
whatever transactions use the field values stored in the master data. 
Characteristics of erroneous master data elements include, but are not 
limited to, duplicate names, invalid records, duplicate addresses, 
improper address formats, incomplete or inaccurate address information, 
unpopulated data fields and other data formatting inconsistencies 
between the business rules and the data sets. 

Because it is foundational in nature and may have a broad impact on 
transactional data, master data should be carefully controlled through 
reviews and approval by designated data owners. To reasonably assure an 
appropriate level of control, a combination of automated, preventive 
controls and manual, detective controls is recommended. 

Controls over master data include controls related to: 

* changes to the configuration of the master file; 

* validity of all master file records; 

* completeness and validity of master file data; 

* consistency of master data among modules, and; 

* approval of changes to master file data. 

Implementing an effective auditing and monitoring capability: 

As part of the control of master data, the organization should have an 
effective auditing and monitoring capability which allows changes to 
master data records to be recorded and reviewed where necessary. This 
monitoring may be done either as part of ongoing activities or through 
separate ï¿½master data auditsï¿½. In either case, the most important 
factor supporting the capability is that activity is properly captured 
and maintained by an automated logging mechanism. 

Depending on the level of risk associated with the data, the type and 
frequency of monitoring may vary. Ideally, monitoring should be built 
into the normal, recurring responsibilities of the data owner. Because 
audits take place after the fact, problems often will be identified 
more quickly by ongoing monitoring routines. 

Ongoing monitoring may include obtaining approval prior to changes, or 
verifying the accuracy of changes on a real-time basis. 

For federal systems, NIST SP 800-53 includes the following controls 
related to master data setup and maintenance: 
SI-9 Information Input Restrictions; 
SI-10 Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity; 
SI-11 Error Handling. 

Table 47. Control Techniques And Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element BP-4 Master Data Setup and Maintenance is Adequately 
Controlled: 

Control activity: 
BP-4.1 Master data are appropriately designed. 
Control techniques: 
BP-4.1.1 An entry is required in all key fields, such as address and 
account number. 
BP-4.1.2 Null values or invalid values are not accepted in the required 
fields. 
BP-4.1.3 For financial applications, account assignments (asset, 
liability, income and expense) are accurately defined. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect master data configuration for required field values. Observe 
user input of invalid values, or blank values, and note any exceptions. 
Inspect master data configuration for account groups and assignments. 

Control activity: 
BP-4.2 Changes to master data configuration are appropriately 
controlled. 
Control techniques: 
BP-4.2.1 Policies and procedures are established for master data 
configuration management, which include change rules that identify data 
fields that are excluded from changes (for example, master data 
number). 
Audit procedures: 
Review the master data polices and procedures for change management. 

Control activity: 
BP-4.2 Changes to master data configuration are appropriately 
controlled. 
Control techniques: 
BP-4.2.2 Changes to the master data design are approved by appropriate 
personnel. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect a sample of change requests and verify that appropriate 
approvals are obtained. Inspect master data configuration for change 
rules, if the rules are configured. If the change rules are automatic, 
then the user should be prevented from making unauthorized 
configuration changes. 

Control activity: 
BP-4.2 Changes to master data configuration are appropriately 
controlled. 
Control techniques: 
BP-4.2.3 Changes to the master data records should be limited to non-
key fields. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect a sample of master data change reports and verify that changes 
are limited to management-defined non-key fields. 

Control activity: 
BP-4.3 Only valid master records exist. 
Control techniques: 
BP-4.3.1 Master data is reviewed on a regular basis, duplicates are 
identified and removed or blocked, and unused data is identified and 
blocked. 
BP-4.3.2 Automatic application controls (duplicate checks, system 
warnings) are configured to prevent and/or identify potential duplicate 
master records. 
Audit procedures: 
Inquire of management regarding their master data review procedures. 
Inspect policies and procedures on master data review, including 
duplicate master data entry and resolution, and unused master records. 
Inspect evidence of the most recent management review and action. 
Inspect list of accounts/records blocked for posting or use. Inspect 
duplicate master record report and management's use of it. Inspect 
application configuration for automatic controls and determine whether 
the controls prevent erroneous processing or simply warn of potential 
errors. 

Control activity: 
BP-4.4 Master data are complete and valid. 
Control techniques: 
BP-4.4.1 Policies and procedures for master data maintenance are 
documented and include: 
* approval requirements; 
* data quality criteria; 
* data owner; 
* supporting documents; 
* backup procedures in the event of a disaster or data corruption 
error; 
* Archival policies. 
BP-4.4.2 The master data maintenance process includes a formal 
create/change request from the requestor and approval from the data 
owner. 
BP-4.4.3 Segregation of duties conflicts are considered and resolved 
before providing access to master data transactions. 
BP-4.4.4 Edit reports are reviewed by appropriate data owners on a 
periodic basis to review new master data and changes made to existing 
master data. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect master data maintenance policies and procedures for 
appropriateness. Select a sample of master data created or changed, and 
inspect relevant documentation, noting appropriate approvals and 
compliance with policies and procedures. Obtain system report of users 
with master data maintenance access. For a sample of users with 
conflicting responsibilities, inspect user profiles noting evidence of 
segregation of duty consideration and review when conflicts are noted. 
Inquire of responsible personnel and inspect policies and procedures 
covering master data maintenance. Inspect procedures for identifying, 
segregation of duty exceptions, and review compliance. Inspect evidence 
of proper review of edit reports by owners. 

Control activity: 
BP-4.5 Master data are consistent among modules. 
Control techniques: 
BP-4.5.1 Periodic review and reconciliation procedures are in place to 
ensure that master data are consistent between different application 
modules. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect evidence of management reconciliation and review for 
effectiveness. Through inquiry and inspection, determine whether the 
frequency of management reconciliation of master data is appropriate. 

Control activity: 
BP-4.6 Master data additions, deletions, and changes are properly 
managed and monitored by data owners. 
Control techniques: 
BP-4.6.1 Master data policies and procedures require data owner's to be 
responsible for the creation, deletion, and change of master data and 
also changes to data characteristics. 
BP-4.6.2 Data owners monitor master data design changes, and approve 
and monitor creation, deletion and changes to master data on a regular 
basis. 
Audit procedures: 
Review policies and procedures and inquire of data owner concerning 
application of specific monitoring procedures. Obtain and inspect 
evidence of monitoring by data owners, including related reports. 
Inquire of management regarding ongoing monitoring of master data 
changes. Obtain and inspect evidence of management review of master 
data design changes, and determine whether changes are approved and 
reviewed. 

Control activity: 
BP-4.7 As appropriate, the confidentiality of master data is adequately 
controlled. 
Control techniques: 
BP-4.7.1 Management implements adequate controls to protect the 
confidentiality of master data, as appropriate. 
Audit procedures: 
Assess the adequacy of management controls over confidentiality of 
master data. Coordinate this step with Critical Element AS-2 Implement 
effective application access controls. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

4.3. Interface Controls (IN): 

Interface controls consist of those controls over the a) timely, 
accurate, and complete processing of information between applications 
and other feeder and receiving systems on an on-going basis, and b) 
complete and accurate migration of clean data during conversion. 

Interfaces [Footnote 96] result in the structured exchange of data 
between two computer applications, referred to in this section as the 
source and target systems or applications. These applications may 
reside on the same or different computer systems that may or may not 
reside in the same physical environment. Interfaces are periodic and 
recurring in nature. Interface controls may be performed manually or 
automated, scheduled or event-driven, electronically or on paper. One 
interface transfers one business data object and is one-directional; 
e.g. vendor master outbound, sales order inbound, etc. Interfaces are 
never bi-directional, even if technically there may be handshaking, 
back-and-forth reconciliation, etc. 

This section focuses on the scope of and controls for interfaces, 
governing specifically the extraction, transformation, and loading of 
data between two applications. The data input, validation, and output 
controls within an application are addressed in the preceding business 
process control sections. 

The interface process, including conversions, can be broken down into 
the following seven separate components: 

1. Interface strategy ï¿½ A documented strategy is developed to keep data 
synchronized between source and target application. The strategy should 
include an explanation of each interface, the interface method chosen 
(manual or batch, etc.), the data fields being interfaced, the controls 
to reasonably assure that the data is interfaced completely and 
accurately, timing requirements, definition of responsibilities, on-
going system balancing requirements, and security requirements. 

2. Data Export/Extraction ï¿½The information needs of the target 
application (key information fields, ID fields and cross-reference 
fields) should be fully understood and documented. If the information 
needs are not fully understood, all relevant data may not be extracted. 
In addition, appropriate procedures/should be in place concerning the 
format, quality, cut-off, and audit trails related to source data. 
a. The format of the source data should be checked to reasonably assure 
that the information is available, accurate and at the appropriate 
level of detail. If the source data quality is poor, the data may not 
be able to be interfaced. 
b. Data processing should be cut-off as of a specific time to 
reasonably assure that the data is extracted for the proper period. 
c. Sufficient audit trails should exist for the source application, 
such that once the data is extracted, the original audit trail remains. 
For instance, invoices can be traced back to the applicable purchase 
order in the source system. 

3. Data Mapping/Translation ï¿½ Data mapping and translation is the 
process of converting source data from the source application format to 
the target application format. If the data is not entered in the target 
application in exactly the same way as it is expected, target 
application edit and validation checks may be rendered ineffective. 

4. Data Import ï¿½ Data import is the process of loading source data into 
the target application. Appropriate controls, such as database indicies 
that enforce uniqueness, should be in place to prevent duplicate 
processing. 

5. Error Handling and Reconciliation procedures ï¿½ The procedures 
developed to reasonably assure that all transactions are accounted for 
and that all errors are identified, isolated, analyzed, and corrected 
in a timely manner. 

6. Job definition, Scheduling and Event Triggering ï¿½ Due to business 
requirements, it may be necessary to initiate an interface daily, 
weekly, monthly, or after a triggering event. ï¿½Triggering eventsï¿½ are 
used to start interface processing based on specific criteria, such as 
date/time or completion of another event. Interfaces may run across 
multiple platforms. Therefore, interface jobs may need to be scheduled 
across platforms. Visibility of these jobs may be necessary in a single 
location by the system operators. Restart and recovery procedures 
should exist. 

7. Data Handling ï¿½ Interfaced data should be able to be retrieved to re-
execute the interface, if needed. Controls should be established to 
support the confidentiality and proper handling of sensitive data. 
Access to interface data and processes should be properly restricted. 

The objectives of interface controls are to: 

* Implement an effective interface strategy and design; 

* Implement effective interface processing procedures, including; 
- interfaces are processed completely, accurately and only once in the 
proper period. 
- interface errors are rejected, isolated and corrected in a timely 
manner. 
- access to interface data and processes are properly restricted. Data 
is reliable and obtained only from authorized sources. 

For federal systems, NIST SP 800-53 includes the following controls 
related to interface: 
SI-9 Information Input Restrictions; 
SI-10 Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity; 
SI-11 Error Handling. 

Critical Elements: 

The critical elements for interface controls are: 
IN-1 Implement an effective interface strategy and design; 
IN-2 Implement effective interface processing procedures. 

Because weaknesses in interface controls can affect the achievement of 
all of the control objectives (completeness, accuracy, validity, and 
confidentiality) related to applications data, the control activities 
in the control tables for interface controls do not contain reference 
to specific control objectives. 

Critical Element IN-1: Implement an effective interface strategy and 
design: 

The purpose of an interface strategy is to describe, at a high level, 
how the interfaces are implemented between two applications. The 
interface strategy is the basis for the interface design and scope. The 
interface strategy includes an explanation of each interface, the 
interface method chosen (manual or batch, etc.), the data fields being 
interfaced, the controls to reasonably assure that the data is 
interfaced completely and accurately, timing requirements, assignment 
of responsibilities, on-going system balancing requirements, and 
security requirements. Interface design uses guidelines set by the 
strategy and provides specific information for each of the 
characteristics defined in the strategy. 

Table 48. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element IN-1: Implement an effective interface strategy and 
design: 

Control activities: 
IN-1.1 An interface strategy is developed for each interface used in 
the application. 
Control techniques: 
IN-1.1.1 An interface strategy exists for each interface that includes 
the interface method, data fields being interfaced, controls to 
reasonably ensure a complete and accurate interface, schedule, 
assignment of responsibilities, system balancing requirements and 
security requirements. 
Audit procedures: 
Obtain a list of all interfaces to and from the application audited. 
Inspect the interface strategy document noting the details of each 
interface and determine whether it contains appropriate information. 

Control activities: 
IN-1.2 An interface design is developed for each interface used in the 
application that includes appropriate detailed specifications. 
Control techniques: 
IN-1.2.1 An interface design exists for each interface and includes 
appropriate specifications based on the business requirements, 
including: 
* validations and edits; 
* ownership of the interface process; 
* error correction and communication methods. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect interface design documents of each interface and determine 
whether it contains appropriate information. 

Control activities: 
IN-1.2 An interface design is developed for each interface used in the 
application that includes appropriate detailed specifications. 
Control techniques: 
IN-1.2.2 Mapping tables are used to convert data from the source system 
to the target system. Controls are in place to reasonably assure that 
mapping tables are only changed when authorized and that historical 
data on mappings is retained with the previous mapping table. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine whether the interfaces use mapping tables. Verify that 
controls over mapping tables will be established. 

Control activities: 
IN-1.2 An interface design is developed for each interface used in the 
application that includes appropriate detailed specifications. 
Control techniques: 
IN-1.2.3 If mapping tables are not used, appropriate edits and 
validations are present in the source system. 
Audit procedures: 
Verify whether the appropriate edits and validations are implemented in 
the source systems. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Critical Element IN-2: Implement effective interface processing 
procedures Because there may be several methods that are used to 
transfer data from one system to another, the auditor should understand 
the procedures that are used for each interface, including: 

* Who is the owner of the interface? Who initiates the process? 

* How is the data transferred from the source application? 

* How often are the interface programs run? 

* How does the target system get the notification of an interface? 

* Where are the errors corrected - in the source or target system? 

Controls surrounding interface processing should reasonably assure that 
data is transferred from the source system to target system completely, 
accurately, and timely. The processing routines should include 
balancing by ensuring the opening balance control totals plus processed 
transactions equal the closing balance of control totals. Both the 
applications (source and target) are typically designed with controls 
so that data are controlled by the use of control totals, record 
counts, batching run totals, or other data logging techniques. These 
types of controls are commonly referred to as balancing controls. 
Records or data produced by one application may be used in another 
application and may have dependencies that are based upon the 
sequential processing of data. The entity should have effective 
procedures to reconcile control information between the source and 
target applications. 

During interface processing, all data may not be processed completely 
or accurately as a result of errors or inconsistencies in data, system 
interruptions, communication failures, or other events. To identify 
these instances, a monitoring capability should be implemented. The 
objective of the monitoring function is to reasonably assure that data 
are accurately processed through the interface and that no data are 
added, lost, or altered during processing. Control techniques include: 

* If the interface is ï¿½runï¿½ on a regular schedule to process data, 
either manually or automatically, documented procedures explain how 
this is performed, including controls in place to reasonably assure 
that all processing was completed. 

* An interface processing log is maintained and reviewed for unusual or 
unauthorized activity. 

* The interface processing log, or another log or report, is used to 
document any errors or problems encountered during processing. Types of 
information that should be considered for logging are descriptions of 
any errors encountered, dates identified, any codes associated with 
errors, any corrective action taken, date and times corrected. 

* Procedures are in place to use the correct generation/cycle of files 
for processing. This may include the generation of backup files from 
processing to be used for disaster recovery. 

* Audit trails are generated during processing. These audit trails 
should be logs or reports that contain information about each 
interface. Data that should be included are who initiated each of the 
interfaces, the data and time of the run, the source system, and the 
results. 

* Procedures are implemented to identify and correct any errors that 
occur during the interface run. Error handling procedures during data 
entry should reasonably assure that errors and irregularities are 
detected, reported, and corrected. Errors should be corrected in the 
source system and reprocessed through the next run. Management should 
have procedures in place to reasonably assure that error logs are used 
to timely follow-up on and correct unresolved data errors and 
irregularities. 

Table 49. Control Techniques And Suggested Audit Procedures For 
Critical Element Critical Element Critical Element IN-2: Implement 
effective interface processing procedures: 

Control activities: 
IN-2.1 Procedures are in place to reasonably assure that the interfaces 
are processed accurately, completely and timely. 
Control techniques: 
IN-2.1.1 Procedures include a complete list of interfaces to be run, 
the timing of the interface processing, how it is processed and how it 
is reconciled. If system interconnections are used, procedures should 
address requirements for an Interconnection Security Agreement and 
Memorandum of Understanding. Timing for processing of the interface has 
been determined and is followed. A positive acknowledgement scheme is 
used to ensure that files sent from a source system are received by the 
target system (i.e., a "handshake" between the systems so that files 
are not skipped or lost). 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect documentation of interface processing procedures and, if 
applicable, Interconnection Service Agreements and Memorandums of 
Understanding. Observe interface processing into the application. 
Determine whether data and files from interface activities are 
processed according to the stated policies and in the proper accounting 
period. Determine whether all files sent from the source system are 
received and acknowledged by the target system. 

Control activities: 
IN-2.2 Ownership for interface processing is appropriately assigned. 
Control techniques: 
IN-2.2.1 Responsibility for processing the interface and correcting any 
errors has been assigned to a user from the source and to a user of the 
target system. Actual processing may involve a technical person, if the 
interface is processed via an electronic media, such as a tape. 
Audit procedures: 
Identify which users are assigned responsibility for the interfaces. 
Evaluate whether an appropriate level of resources has been assigned to 
maintain interfaces. 

Control activities: 
IN-2.2 Ownership for interface processing is appropriately assigned. 
Control techniques: 
IN-2.2.2 The files generated by an application interface (both source 
and target) are properly secured from unauthorized access and/or 
modifications. 
Audit procedures: 
Assess whether appropriate security is in place for all access points 
to the interface data are secure from unauthorized use. Identify 
individuals that will be responsible for providing security surrounding 
the interfaces. 

Control activities: 
IN-2.2 Ownership for interface processing is appropriately assigned. 
Control techniques: 
IN-2.2.3 Users who are processing interfaces are able to monitor the 
status of interfaces. 
Audit procedures: 
Assess whether proper access is assigned to the appropriate individuals 
for the monitoring of the interface status and that such individuals 
have access to appropriate information to monitor the status of the 
interface. 

Control activities: 
IN-2.3 The interfaced data is reconciled between the source and target 
application to ensure that the data transfer is complete and accurate. 
Control techniques: 
IN-2.3.1 Reconciliations are performed between source and target 
applications to ensure that the interface is complete and accurate. 
Control totals agree between the source and target systems. Reports 
reconcile data interfaced between the two systems and provide adequate 
information to reconcile each transaction processed. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect reports or other documents used to reconcile interface 
processing between source and target applications and review their 
content and frequency for appropriateness. 

Control activities: 
IN-2.4 Errors during interface processing are identified by balancing 
processes and promptly investigated, corrected and resubmitted for 
processing. 
Control techniques: 
IN-2.4.1 Management maintains a log for interface processing. The log 
accounts for errors and exceptions, as well. Exception/error reports 
are produced, reviewed, and resolved by management on a regular basis, 
including correction and resubmission, as appropriate. 
Audit procedures: 
Through inquiry of management and review of logs, determine whether 
errors are properly handled. Assess the appropriateness of the 
frequency that exception reports are reviewed (daily, weekly, etc). 
Inspect evidence of such reviews having been performed. 

Control activities: 
IN-2.5 Rejected interface data is isolated, analyzed and corrected in a 
timely manner. 
Control techniques: 
IN-2.5.1 Error and correction facilities are utilized to track and 
correct errors in interface data. 
Audit procedures: 
Assess the adequacy of procedures in place to properly correct any 
rejected transactions. Inquire about procedures applied with 
individuals responsible for identifying and correcting errors and 
inspect evidence that rejected data is properly processed timely basis. 

Control activities: 
IN-2.5 Rejected interface data is isolated, analyzed and corrected in a 
timely manner. 
Control techniques: 
IN-2.5.2 A mechanism is used to notify users when data is rejected (for 
example, an e-mail message may be sent to the user). These messages 
should repeat daily until they are corrected. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine whether error messages are generated and promptly reviewed 
for all rejected data and are maintained until corrected. 

Control activities: 
IN-2.5 Rejected interface data is isolated, analyzed and corrected in a 
timely manner. 
Control techniques: 
In-2.5.3 Audit trails are used to identify and follow-up on interface 
errors. The corrections to interface errors are included in the audit 
trail. 
Audit procedures: 
Determine whether appropriate audit trails are generated, reviewed and 
maintained. 

Control activities: 
IN-2.6 Data files are not processed more than once. 
Control techniques: 
IN-2.6.1 Interfaces files are automatically archived or deleted from 
the production environment after processing. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect a sample of archived interface documents and verify the date 
and time of processing. Observe the interfaces that are in process and 
inspect evidence that they were not processed before in the same 
period. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

4.4 Data Management System Controls (DA): 

Applications that support business processes typically generate, 
accumulate, process, store, communicate and display data. Applications 
which handle significant volumes of data often employ data management 
systems to perform certain data processing functions within an 
application. Data management systems use specialized software which may 
operate on specialized hardware. Data management systems include 
database management systems, specialized data transport/communications 
software (often called middleware), cryptography used in conjunction 
with data integrity controls, data warehouse software and data 
reporting/data extraction software. Many of the data input and 
processing controls, such as edit checks, existence checks and 
thresholds described in previous sections are implemented in functions 
of data management systems. These types of controls implemented in data 
management systems are often referred to as business rules. 

When assessing the effectiveness of application controls, the auditor 
should evaluate functions of data management systems specific to the 
business processes under review, in addition to the general controls 
described in Chapter 3. When auditors are evaluating application 
security plans and independently assessing risk, consideration of the 
risk inherent to the data management system ï¿½layerï¿½ in the application 
architecture is important. Necessarily, multiple access paths must 
exist into the data and the business rules that reside in the data 
management system layer to facilitate the operation and administration 
of the application. In most large scale and/or high performance 
applications, various components of data management systems reside on 
different servers which often employ various operating systems and 
hardware technologies. The auditor should obtain an understanding of 
the interconnected combination of data management technologies and 
appropriately consider related risks. 

Understanding the logical design and physical architecture of the data 
management components of the application is necessary for the auditor 
to adequately assess risk. In addition to supporting the data storage 
and retrieval functions, it is typical for applications to employ data 
management systems to support operational aspects of the application, 
such as the management of transient user session state data, session 
specific security information, transactional audit logs and other 
ï¿½behind the scenesï¿½ functions that are essential to the applicationï¿½s 
operation. Controls associated with these types of functions can be 
critical to the security of the application. 

The following highlights certain key concepts the auditor considers 
when assessing controls over a data management systems, including 
database management systems, middleware, cryptography, data warehouse, 
and data reporting/data extraction software. 

Key Concepts - Database Management Systems: 

Authentication/Authorization: 

Controls in a data management system should include consideration of 
the access paths to the data management system. The access paths should 
be clearly documented and updated as changes are made. Generally access 
to a data management system can be obtained in three ways, via: 

* Directly, via the database management system; 

* Through access paths facilitated by the application; or; 

* Through the operating system(s) underlying the database management 
system. 

Data management systems have built in privileged accounts that are used 
to administer and maintain the data management system. The auditor's 
objective is to determine whether appropriate controls are in place for 
securing these privileged accounts. Such controls include, but are not 
limited to: 

* Strong password usage or other authentication controls; 

* Highly restrictive assignment of personnel to these accounts; 

* Enforcement of unique accounts for each administrator; and; 

* Effective monitoring of privileged account use. 

In addition to privileged accounts, the auditor should obtain an 
understanding of the role the data management system plays in 
authentication and authorization for the application. The data 
management system will also contain user accounts related to the 
application. 

Generally, there are two methods of authentication using a data 
management system. In the first scenario, the application uses a 
generic ID to authenticate to the database on behalf of end-users. 
These generic IDs should have their access privileges carefully scoped 
to only provide access to what the highest level of end-user is 
permitted to access. There should be a limited number of generic IDs 
within the database supported by well-documented and carefully 
monitored control procedures. In the second scenario, the application 
passes the user ID to the database and uses accounts assigned to each 
end-user to authenticate to the database. Depending upon the size of 
the application, there could be a large number of user accounts stored 
within the database management system. In either case, the auditor 
should review the account and password policies relevant to the 
database management system. 

There may be situations where authentication to the data management 
system is done through the operating system. The auditor should, in 
such instances, coordinate testing of general controls related to the 
operating system. 

There are two major types of database management systems in use, 
hierarchical and relational databases. Hierarchical databases, such as 
IBMï¿½s IMS, have a heritage near the beginning of computer systems; 
however they are still used in some modern applications. Each different 
hierarchical database product is proprietary in design and 
implementation. If achieving audit objectives involving hierarchical 
databases is a requirement, staff with knowledge of the specific 
database product will be necessary. Relational databases (such as 
Oracle, DB2, and SQL-Server) share a common design based on relational 
algebra and a common data access method, called the Structured Query 
Language (SQL). While there are differences in the implementation of 
the different relational database products, they are similar enough 
that staff should be able to perform audit work in most relational 
database systems with a common skill set. The discussion in this 
chapter will focus on relational database systems. 

SQL Commands: 

There are two categories of commands available through SQL, data 
definition language statements (DDL) and data manipulation language 
statements (DML). DDL statements are used to define and alter the 
structures or objects that contain and support access to data. DDL 
statements are used to create, alter and delete objects such as tables 
and indices. DML statements are used to retrieve, add, change and 
delete data in existing database objects. Application end-users would 
not typically need to use DDL statements. 

System, Role, Object Privileges: 

A user privilege is a right to execute a particular type of Structured 
Query Language (SQL) server statement, or a right to access another 
user's object. As discussed below, there are two types of data 
management system privileges: system and object. Roles are created by 
users (usually administrators), and are used to group together 
privileges or other roles. They are a means of facilitating the 
granting of multiple privileges or roles to users. 

System privileges relate to the ability of the user within the database 
to interact with the database itself using DDL statements and the 
ability to execute special functions. They include: CREATE, ALTER, 
DROP, CONNECT, and AUDIT, among many others. The auditor should examine 
the privileges granted to the users within the database. Typically 
administrator level accounts have extended system privileges while 
general user accounts should have limited access to system privileges. 

Object privileges (through DML statements) allow the user to have 
access to the data within an object or allow the user to execute a 
stored program. These include SELECT, INSERT, DELETE, etc. Each type of 
object has different privileges associated with it. Examples of 
database objects include the following: 

* Tables - A data structure containing a collection of rows (or 
records) that have associated columns (or fields). It is the logical 
equivalent of a database file. 

* Index - A database object that provides access to data in the rows of 
a table, based on key values. Indexes provide quick access to data and 
can enforce uniqueness on the rows in a table. 

* Triggers - A special form of a stored procedure that is carried out 
automatically when data in a specified table is modified. Triggers are 
often created to enforce referential integrity or consistency among 
logically related data in different tables. 

* Stored procedure ï¿½ A precompiled collection of SQL or other 
statements and optional control-of-flow statements stored under a name 
and processed as a unit. Stored procedures are stored within a 
database, can be executed with one call from an application, and enable 
user-declared variables, conditional execution, and other powerful 
programming features. 

* Views - A virtual table generated by a query whose definition is 
stored in the database. For example, a view might be defined as 
containing three out of five available columns in a table, created to 
limit access to certain information. Views can be treated as tables for 
most database operations, including Select queries, and under some 
circumstances, Update, Insert, and Delete queries. Any operations 
performed on views actually affect the data in the table or tables on 
which the view is based. 

The auditor should identify the objects within the data management 
system. The privileges that a user account has for each object should 
be reviewed. These privileges should be granted based on the 
functionality of the account. 

A role groups several privileges and roles, so that they can be granted 
to and revoked from users simultaneously. A role should be enabled for 
a user before it can be used by the user. Predefined roles exist that 
can be leveraged, such as the data base administrator (e.g., DBA) role. 
The auditor should review the privileges granted to each role, and then 
analyze the role(s) granted to each user. Roles that grant high level 
access, or permit direct manipulation of data in the database are very 
sensitive. The auditor should evaluate controls over the use of such 
roles. 

Stored Procedures: 

Stored procedures are programs that are compiled and stored in the data 
management system. These programs can be executed directly by a user or 
they can be called by other programs. Most data management systems are 
prepackaged with stored procedures that provide a structured and 
controlled method of administering the database. For example, when the 
administrator creates a user, the database management system uses a 
stored procedure to perform the steps necessary to create that account. 
In addition custom stored procedures can be created to support 
additional functionality. The auditor should review stored procedures 
that interact with sensitive data within the database management system 
or provide access to the operating system. 

Key Concepts ï¿½ Middleware: 

Modern business applications frequently have user interface, data 
processing and data storage components hosted on different computer 
systems, often using different operating systems. Tying the components 
together is often accomplished through the use of specialized data 
transport/communications software commonly known as middleware. A 
popular example of this type of software is IBMï¿½s MQSeries. Middleware 
is used to connect applications together in varying architectures 
including interconnected systems and interfaced systems (as described 
in 4.3). 

Middleware provides robust and potentially secure communications 
between application components through layers of functions across a 
series of host computer and network technologies. In modern application 
architectures, the ï¿½behind the scenesï¿½ processing and storage of 
information may be designed to trust upstream application components, 
such as user interfaces, due to the data security and data integrity 
services provided by the middleware. Middleware can be used to 
communicate both data and commands between systems using different 
operating systems. The communication links are often facilitated by 
channels created by the middleware. The channels can be configured so 
that they provide data security for the information flowing across the 
network, typically using cryptography, and data integrity through error 
detection and correction facilities. Middleware can also be an 
important aspect of an applicationï¿½s continuity of operations, by being 
configured to support multiple data paths to eliminate single points of 
failure across networks. 

Middleware Controls: 

Middleware components can be found on many components in a network of 
computers used to support business applications. The location and 
function of these components should be well documented. Middleware 
carries not only data and system commands; it also typically 
facilitates the establishment of sessions between application 
components, often some level of application component logging onto a 
ï¿½back-endï¿½ host and database management system. An applicationï¿½s 
controls often rely on the encrypted transmission of information 
between components. This protection may be a function of the 
implementation of middleware, sometimes in conjunction with how the 
channels are configured across the network. As with other data 
management systems, auditors should identify the staff with 
administrative access privileges to middleware and verify that 
appropriate controls are in place. 

Key Concepts ï¿½ Cryptography: 

Modern business applications commonly employ one or more controls that 
rely on cryptographic services. Auditors should identify where these 
controls are deployed and verify that the technical implementations are 
appropriate and effective operational procedures are in place and being 
followed. The mere existence of cryptography provides no assurance that 
data controls are actually in place and effective. Due to the exacting 
nature of verifying the effectiveness of cryptographic controls, a 
detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this audit guidance. When it 
is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of cryptographic controls to 
achieve audit objectives, the auditor should obtain the services of 
adequately qualified specialists. 

Key Concepts ï¿½ Data Warehouse, Data Reporting and Data Extraction 
Software: 

Increasingly, modern business applications are parts of larger business 
management information architectures. This is certainly the case with 
ERP environments, but also is the result of interconnected and 
interfaced systems that supply information used for purposes beyond the 
applicationï¿½s primary business function. A common element in these 
combined business management information architectures is the data 
warehouse, which may be populated with both financial and non-financial 
business information. The data warehouse is often a separate data 
store, not operationally part of the entityï¿½s transactional systems. 
The reasons behind having this separate copy of business information 
can be multifold: separating the information eliminates potential 
performance issues associated with trying to use live transactional 
data for reporting; also the structure of the information in diverse 
business applications may be technically or logically incompatible with 
efficient information retrieval. When the auditor encounters a data 
warehouse, important questions related to audit objectives and system 
boundaries need to be addressed. Unless the data warehouse itself is 
the subject of the audit, the relevance to the audit objectives and 
potential risks created by the data warehouse need to be identified and 
evaluated. Since a data warehouse may represent a copy of information 
from other systems that are part of the audit, any data confidentiality 
concerns will likely need consideration. Additionally, the auditor may 
need to functionally understand how the entity uses the data warehouse. 
In a financial audit, the auditor may find that financial statements 
may be prepared, in part, from the data warehouse instead of directly 
from the general ledger. 

A data warehouse typically exists to facilitate analysis and reporting 
from a large quantity of data. Supporting the efficient use of a data 
warehouse will often be specialized data reporting and data extraction 
software tools. The existence of these tools and data warehouses 
creates the potential for many different access paths to data. 
Depending on the control requirements of the data warehouse and the 
information it stores, the auditor may need to identify controls over 
how the data is populated, maintained, and accessed by both users and 
administrators. The software systems involved are often specialized and 
effective reviews may require the services of qualified specialists. 

Segregation of Duties: 

Since data management systems are supported by one or more operating 
systems, the auditor should obtain an understanding of the role of the 
data management system administrators. There should be a distinct 
segregation between the data management system administrator and the 
operating system administrator. The operating system administrator may 
need access to the data management system, but should have limited 
access. Likewise, the data management system administrator may need 
access to the underlying operating system, but should have only the 
access necessary to manage the data management system functionality. 

The auditor should also evaluate the segregation between the data 
management system administrator and personnel in charge of reviewing 
audit and transaction logs. The data management system administrator 
should not have access to the audit logs within the data management 
system. These logs should be reviewed by a security administrator. 

There should also be a separation between the functional aspects of the 
data management system environments. Data management system access 
should be consistent with the functional separation of duties within 
the application environment. Users that are developers should have 
access to the development environment only, and consequently only the 
development data management system. Users that require access to 
production should only have access to the production data management 
system. 

Control Activities: 

Control activities for data management system controls are: 
DA-1.1 Implement an effective data management system strategy; 
DA-1.2 Identify and respond to specific system or user security events 
within the data management system and its related components; 
DA-1.3 Properly control specialized data management processes. 

Because weaknesses in data management controls can affect the 
achievement of all of the control objectives (completeness, accuracy, 
validity, and confidentiality) related to applications data, the 
control activities in the control tables for interface controls do not 
contain reference to specific control objectives. 

Table 50. Control Techniques and Suggested Audit Procedures for 
Critical Element DA-1 - Implement an effective data management system 
strategy and design: 

Control activities: 
DA-1.1 Implement an effective data management system strategy and 
design, consistent with the control requirements of the application and 
data. The strategy addresses key concepts including: 
* database management; 
* middleware; 
* cryptography; 
* data warehouse, and; 
* data reporting/data extraction. 
Control techniques: 
DA-1.1.1 The physical and logical (in terms of connectivity) location 
of the data storage and retrieval functions are appropriate. 
DA-1.1.2 The production data management system is effectively separated 
from non-production systems (such as testing and development) and other 
production systems with lesser control requirements. 
DA-1.1.3 The database schema is consistent with access control 
requirements such that the organization of data and database-hosted 
functions correspond to the access limitations that need to be imposed 
on different groups of users. 
Audit procedures: 
Inspect documentation of the design of the data management system(s) 
associated with the application. Assess whether the data management 
system is properly designed. Determine whether the design is properly 
implemented. Verify that all access paths to data and sensitive data 
management system administrative functions have been identified and are 
adequately controlled. 

Control activities: 
DA-1.2 Detective controls are implemented in a manner that effectively 
supports requirements to identify and react to specific system or user 
activity within the data management system and its related components. 
Control techniques: 
DA-1.2.1 Logging and monitoring controls are in place at the data 
management system level which effectively satisfy requirements to 
accurately identify historical system activity and data access; 
DA-1.2.2 Real-time or near real-time controls are in place to detect 
abnormal activity and security events. 
Audit procedures: 
Identify the security events that are logged and determine whether 
logging is adequate. Assess the adequacy of controls to monitor the 
audit logs. Assess the adequacy of controls to detect abnormal 
activity. 

Control activities: 
DA-1.3 Control of specialized data management processes used to 
facilitate interoperability between applications and/or functions not 
integrated into the applications (such as ad-hoc reporting) are 
consistent with control requirements for the application, data and 
other systems that may be affected. 
Control techniques: 
DA-1.3.1 Data accuracy and completeness controls are in place and 
effective to correct and/or detect data anomalies. 
DA-1.3.2 The configuration of system connectivity that facilitates 
application to application and application to non-integrated functions 
is controlled to limit access appropriately. 
Audit procedures: 
Identify and obtain an understanding of specialized data management 
processes used to facilitate interoperability. Understand how system 
interconnectivity is controlled with respect to data management 
systems. Assess the adequacy of controls over specialized management 
processes. Note: These procedures should be closely coordinated with 
tests of general controls related to the data management systems. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of chapter] 

Appendix I - Information System Controls Audit Planning Checklist: 

The auditor should obtain and document a preliminary understanding of 
the design of the entityï¿½s information system (IS) controls, including: 

* Understanding the entityï¿½s operations and key business processes; 

* Obtaining a general understanding of the structure of the entityï¿½s 
networks; 

* Obtaining a preliminary understanding of IS controls. 

In addition to this checklist, the auditor should obtain information 
from relevant reports and other documents concerning IS that are issued 
by or about the entity. 

To facilitate this process, the following checklist has been developed 
as a guide for the auditor to collect preliminary information from the 
entity at the start of the audit. This checklist is intended as a 
starting point for collecting relevant IS control information. The 
information request can be tailored to the type of audit being 
performed. For example, an audit of application controls could be 
limited to the information needs listed in Sections I, II, and IV. The 
extent of the information requested from the entity will vary depending 
on whether this is a first year or follow-up review of IS controls. 
Also, as a result of the auditorï¿½s initial review and analysis of the 
information collected in this process, additional detailed information 
may need to be subsequently requested from the entity. The checklist is 
organized to request information on the entityï¿½s: 

* organization and key systems/applications; 
* prior audit reports/documents; 
* IS general controls, and; 
* IS business process application level controls. 

I. Organization and Key Systems/Applications Understanding the entityï¿½s 
organization is a key to planning and performing the audit in 
accordance with applicable audit standards and requirements. Further, 
it helps to identify, respond to, and resolve problems early in the 
audit. Relevant information includes organizational structure, 
locations, use of contractors, key applications and IS platforms used 
to support them. 

Document: 
1. Entityï¿½s overall organizational chart with functional description of 
key components. 

Document: 
2. Organizational charts that include functional description for 
security and IT components. Note: It is critical that the 
organizational relationships between management, information security, 
physical security, and computer operations are discernable. 

Document: 
3. Name and functional description of relevant major applications, 
including functional owner, operating platform (including locations), 
operating system and version, and database management system and 
version. Note: FISMA requires agencies to maintain an inventory of all 
major systems. 

Document: 
4. Name and functional description of relevant operating environments 
(e.g., general support systems (GSS)), including locations. 

Document: 
5. List of contractors/third parties or other governmental entities 
that process information and/or operate systems for or on behalf of the 
entity. 

6. Significant changes in the IT environment or significant 
applications implemented within the recent past (e.g., within 2 years) 
or planned within the near future (e.g., 2 years) 

II. Prior Audit Reports/Documents: 

The auditor generally gathers planning information through different 
methods, including previous audits, management reviews, and other 
documents. These reports often provide invaluable information on the 
effectiveness of IS controls and provides clues to areas of particular 
risk. Of specific interest are those reports/documents dealing with the 
IS control environment, including GSS and major applications. Relevant 
information in this area includes the following. 

Document: 
1. Internal or third party information system reviews, audits, or 
specialized testing (e.g., penetration tests, disaster recovery 
testing) performed during the last 2 years (e.g., IG, GAO, SAS 70 
reports). 

Document: 
2. The entityï¿½s prior FISMA or equivalent entity reports on IS. 
Workpaper Reference: 

Document: 
3. The entityï¿½s annual performance and accountability report or 
equivalent reports (e.g., reports prepared under the Federal Financial 
Management Improvement Act of 1996, Federal Managers Financial 
Integrity Act of 1982, Government Management and Reform Act and 
Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002). 

Document: 
4. Other reports by management, including privacy impact assessments 
and vulnerability assessments. 

Document: 
5. Consultant reports on IS controls. 

III. IS General Controls: 

General controls are the policies and procedures that apply to all or a 
large segment of an agencyï¿½s information systems and help ensure their 
proper operation. General controls are applied at the entitywide, 
system, and business process application levels. The effectiveness of 
general controls at the entitywide and system levels is a significant 
factor in determining the effectiveness of business process application 
controls at the application level. General controls include security 
management, access controls, configuration management, segregation of 
duties, and contingency planning. 

III.1 IS General Controls ï¿½ Security Management: 

Security management provides a framework and continuing cycle of 
activity for managing risk, developing security policies, assigning 
responsibilities, and monitoring the adequacy of the agencyï¿½s computer-
related controls. The program should reflect the agencyï¿½s consideration 
of the following critical elements for security management ï¿½ 
established security management program, periodic risk assessments, 
documented security policies and procedures, established security 
awareness training, and periodic management testing and evaluation of 
major systems. Other elements include implementing effective security-
related personnel policies and ensuring that activities performed by 
external third parties are adequately secure. Relevant information for 
this control category includes the following. 

Document: 
1. Documentation of entityï¿½s security management program approved by 
OMB. 

Document: 
2. Documented risk assessments for relevant systems (e.g., GSS and 
major applications). 

Document: 
3. Certification and accreditation documentation or equivalent for 
relevant systems (e.g., GSS and major applications being reviewed). 

Document: 
4. Documented security plans for relevant systems (e.g., GSS and major 
applications being reviewed). 

Document: 
5. Agency performance measures and compliance metrics for monitoring 
the security processes. 

Document: 
6. Managementï¿½s plans of actions and milestones or their equivalent, 
that identify corrective actions planned to address known IS weaknesses 
and status of prior year security findings. 

Document: 
7. Entitywide policies and procedures governing: 
* security management program, structure, and responsibilities, 
including system inventories; 
* risk assessment; 
* security awareness training for employees, contractors, third parties 
(including those in sensitive security and data processing position) 
and security-related personnel policies (including personnel hiring, 
reference and background checks, and job transfers and terminations); 
* performance of periodic tests and evaluations of IS controls and 
monitoring to ensure compliance with established policies and 
procedures (including copies of tests and evaluations performed (if not 
included under Section II ï¿½Prior Audit Reports/ Documentsï¿½); 
* security weakness remediation, and; 
* security requirements and monitoring activities of third-party 
providers supporting specific application(s). 

III.2 IS General Controls ï¿½ Access Controls: 

A basic management objective for any organization is to protect the 
resources that support its critical operations from unauthorized 
access. Organizations accomplish this objective by designing and 
implementing controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect 
unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, information, and 
facilities. Inadequate access controls diminish the reliability of 
computerized information and increase the risk of unauthorized 
disclosure, modification, and destruction of sensitive information and 
disruption of service. Access controls include those related to 
protecting system boundaries, user identification and authentication, 
authorization, protecting sensitive system resources, audit and 
monitoring, and physical security. Relevant information for this 
control category includes the following. 

Document: 
1. High-level network schematic which identifies external network 
connections, inter- and intra-agency connections, contractor sites, and 
other external organizations. 

Document: 
2. Network schematic of all GSS (by site) that includes components such 
as: 
* internet presence; 
* firewalls, routers, and switches; 
* domain name servers; 
* intrusion detection systems; 
* critical systems, such as web and email servers, file transfer 
systems, etc. 
* network management systems; 
* connectivity with other entity sites and other external 
organizations; 
* remote access ï¿½ virtual private networks and dial-in, and; 
* wireless connections. 

Document: 
3. Inventory of mid-level systems (Unix, Windows-based, etc.) 
supporting applications relevant to the audit. 
* operating systems/versions, 
* security software/versions, 
* list of systems/applications supported, and, 
* data set naming conventions for the operating system, system 
configuration, utility software, applications, and security software. 
* documentation of basic security configuration settings, i.e. Windows-
based, Unix, etc. 

Document: 
4. Inventory of mainframe systems including: 
* operating systems/versions, 
* security software/versions, 
* IP addresses, 
* description and use of each LPAR configuration(production & non 
production), including list of user applications and software installed 
on each LPAR and description of any test or development activity in 
each LPAR. 
* data set naming conventions for the operating system, system 
configuration, utility software, applications, and security software, 
* identity of Exits and SVCs, including load library and module name, 
and, 
* documentation of basic security configuration settings, i.e. RACF, 
Top Secret, or ACF2. 

Document: 
5. Entitywide policies and procedures for: 
* system boundaries, 
* controlling remote access to agency information, including use of 
remote devices, 
* governing user and system identification and authentication, 
* requesting, approving, and periodically reviewing user access 
authorization, 
* restricting access to sensitive system resources (including system 
utilities, system software, and privileged accounts), 
* protecting digital and sensitive media, including portable media, 
* applying cryptography methods, if used, 
* monitoring mainframe, mid-level servers, and network systems for 
incidents, including management response and reporting on unusual 
activities, intrusion attempts, and actual intrusions, and, 
* controlling physical security, including those concerning the 
granting and controlling of physical access to the data center and 
other IT sensitive areas. 

Document: 
6. Physical diagram of computer network and data center and other 
sensitive IT areas. 

III.3 IS General Controls ï¿½ Configuration Management: 

Configuration management involves the identification and management of 
security features for all hardware and software components of an 
information system at a given point and systematically controls changes 
to that configuration during the systemï¿½s life cycle. By implementing 
configuration management, organizations can ensure that only authorized 
applications and software programs are placed into production through 
establishing and maintaining baseline configurations and monitoring 
changes to these configurations. Configuration management includes: 

* overall policies and procedures, 
* maintaining current configurations, 
* authorizing, testing, and approving configuration changes, 
* monitoring the configuration, updating software on a timely basis, 
and; 
* documenting and controlling emergency changes. 

Relevant information for this control category includes the following. 

Document: 
1. Entitywide policies and procedures for: 
* configuration management, including the approval and testing of 
scheduled and emergency changes, and monitoring procedures to ensure 
compliance, 
* maintaining current configuration information, 
* authorizing, testing, approving, and tracking all configuration 
changes, 
* monitoring/auditing the configuration, 
* patch management, vulnerability scanning, virus protection, emerging 
threats, and user installed software, and, 
* emergency changes. 

Document: 
2. Copy of System Development Life Cycle Methodology (SDLC). 

Document: 
3. Technical configuration standards for workstations, servers, related 
network components, mobile devices, mainframes, operating systems, and 
security software. 

Document: 
4. Description of configuration management software. 

III. 4 IS General Controls- Segregation of Duties: 

Segregation of duties refers to the policies, procedures, and 
organizational structures that help ensure that no single individual 
can independently control all key aspects of a process or computer-
related operation and thereby gain unauthorized access to assets or 
records. Often, organizations achieve segregation of duties by dividing 
responsibilities among two or more individuals or organizational 
groups. This diminishes the likelihood that errors and wrongful acts 
will go undetected, because the activities of one individual or group 
will serve as a check on the activities of the other. Effective 
segregation of duties includes segregating incompatible duties, 
maintaining formal operating procedures, supervision, and review. 
Relevant information for this control category includes the following. 

Document: 
1. Entitywide policies and procedures for ï¿½ segregating duties. ï¿½ 
periodically reviewing access authorizations. 

Document: 
2. Management reviews conducted to determine that control techniques 
for segregating incompatible duties are functioning as intended. 

III.5 IS General Controls ï¿½ Contingency Planning: 

Contingency planning is critical to ensuring that when unexpected 
events occur, key operations continue without interruption or are 
promptly resumed and that critical and sensitive data are protected. 
Critical elements for contingency planning include: assessing the 
critical and sensitive computer activities and identifying supporting 
resources, taking steps to minimize damage and interruption, developing 
and documenting a comprehensive contingency plan, and periodically 
testing the contingency plan and adjusting it as needed. Relevant 
information for this control category includes the following. 

Document: 
1. Entitywide policies and procedures for: 
* assessing the availability needs of entity systems, 
* backing-up data, programs, and software, and, 
* environmental controls, including emergency power, fire/smoke 
detection and response, hardware maintenance and problem management, 
alternate work sites, etc. 

Document: 
2. Documented contingency plan(s) and recent test results. 

IV. IS Business Process Application Level Controls: 

Business process application level controls are those controls over the 
completeness, accuracy, validity and confidentiality of transactions 
and data during application processing. The effectiveness of 
application level controls is dependent on the effectiveness of 
entitywide and system level general controls. Weaknesses in entitywide 
and system level general controls can result in unauthorized changes to 
business process applications and data that can circumvent or impair 
the effectiveness of application level controls. Application level 
controls are divided into the following four areas: application level 
general controls, business process controls, interface controls, and 
data management system controls. Relevant application specific 
information for this control category includes the following. 

Document: 
1. Certification and accreditation, or equivalent, documentation for 
relevant systems. 

Document: 
2. Documented security plans for relevant applications. 

Document: 
3. Documented risk assessments for relevant applications. 

Document: 
4. High-level schematic of application boundaries that identifies 
controlled interfaces (e.g., gateways, routers, firewalls, encryption), 
to include: 
* internet presence, 
* firewalls, routers, and switches, 
* domain name servers, 
* intrusion detection systems, 
* critical systems, such as web and email servers, file transfer 
systems, etc. 
* network management systems, 
* connectivity with other entity sites and other external 
organizations, 
* remote access ï¿½ virtual private networks and dial-in, and, 

Document: 
5. Inventory of mid-level systems (Unix, Windows, etc.) supporting 
applications being reviewed. 
* operating systems/versions, 
* security software/versions, 
* list of systems/applications supported, 
* data set naming conventions for the operating system, system 
configuration, utility software, applications, and security software, 
and, 
* documentation of basic security configuration settings, i.e. Windows-
based, Unix. 

Document: 
6. Inventory of mainframe systems supporting applications being 
reviewed, including: 
* operating system/versions, 
* security software/versions, 
* IP addresses, 
* description of each LPAR configuration, including list of user 
applications and software installed on each LPAR, 
* data set naming conventions for the operating system, system 
configuration, utility software, applications, and security software, 
* identity of Exits and SVCs, including load library and module name, 
* documentation of basic security configuration settings, i.e. RACF, 
Top Secret, or ACF2. 

Document: 
7. Documented test and evaluation covering relevant applications. 

Document: 
8. Corrective action plan for identified IS application control 
weaknesses, including listing of weaknesses corrected. 

Document: 
9. Segregation of duties control matrices for job 
functions/responsibilities. 

Document: 
10. Application contingency plan and related disaster recovery, 
business continuity, and business resumption plans, including test 
results. 

Document: 
11. Documentation on data validation and edit checks, including 
auditing and monitoring processes. 

Document: 
12. Documentation describing interface strategy between applications, 
including both manual and automated methods. 

Document: 
13. Documentation describing data management system used, including 
access paths to this system, privileged accounts, and authentication 
and authorization processes. 

Document: 
14. Policies and procedures for relevant application(s) being reviewed 
that govern: 
* operation of application controls, 
* security and awareness training for employees and contractors, 
* granting user application access, 
* hiring, including reference and background checks, and job transfers 
and terminations, 
* security requirements and monitoring activities of third-party 
providers supporting relevant applications, 
* application user identification and authentication at the application 
level, 
* requesting and granting user access authorization to relevant 
applications, 
* collection, review, and analysis of access activities for 
unauthorized or inappropriate access to relevant applications, 
* configuration management process at the application level, including 
the approval and testing of scheduled and emergency application program 
changes and procedures to ensure compliance, 
* backing-up relevant application data and programs, 
* approval and review of data input, and, 
* master file data configuration management and maintenance. 

Document: 
15. Documentation describing system output, format of the output, and 
controls over the output. 

[End of appendix] 

Appendix II - Tables for Summarizing Work Performed in Evaluating and 
Testing General and Business Process Application Controls: 

These tables are provided for the auditor's use in performing the 
audit. They are a consolidation of the tables of critical elements, 
control activities, control techniques, and related suggested audit 
procedures that are included after the discussion of each critical 
element. To reduce documentation and allow the tables to be tailored to 
individual audits, the tables will be available in electronic form from 
GAO's World Wide Web server when the final FISCAM is issued. Our 
Internet address is: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

These tables can be used as a guide during initial interviews and to 
document the preliminary assessment of controls. As the audit 
progresses, the auditor can continue to use the electronic version of 
the tables to document controls evaluated and tested, test procedures 
performed, conclusions, and supporting work paper references. 

Note: For purposes of the Exposure Draft, only the first page is to 
provide for illustration. The table will ultimately be populated with 
the information in .the Control Techniques and Suggested Audit 
Procedures tables in Chapters 3 and 4. 

General Controls: 

Table 3. Security Management: 

Critical element and control activity: 
SM-1. A security management program has been established. 
SM-1.1. A security management program is developed, documented, 
approved, and implemented. 
Control technique: 
SM-1.1.1. An entitywide security management program has been developed, 
documented, and implemented. It covers all major facilities and 
operations, has been approved by senior management and key affected 
parties, covers the key elements of a security management program: 
* periodic risk assessments; 
* adequate policies and procedures; 
* appropriate subordinate information security plans; 
* security awareness training; 
* management testing and evaluation; 
* remedial action process; 
Audit procedure: 
Review documentation supporting the entitywide security management 
program and discuss with key information security management and staff. 
Determine whether the program: 
* adequately covers the key elements of a security management program; 
* is adequately documented, and; 
* has been properly approved. 
Determine whether all key elements of the program are implemented. 
Consider audit evidence obtained during the course of the audit.
Entitywide level conclusion/reference: 
System level conclusion/reference: 
Application level conclusion/reference: 
Overall conclusion/reference: 

[End of appendix] 

Appendix III - Tables for Assessing the Effectiveness of General and 
Business Process Application Controls: 

The tables in this appendix are provided for the auditorï¿½s use in 
recording the control effectiveness for each critical element in each 
control category, as well as formulating an overall assessment of each 
control category. Judging control effectiveness should be based on the 
results of audit work performed and assessments of control 
effectiveness for specific control techniques, as summarized in 
Appendix II. After completing Appendix III, the auditor should prepare 
a narrative summarizing the control effectiveness for general and 
business process controls. The general control narrative should also 
state whether or not audit work should be conducted to determine the 
reliability of business process controls at the application level. To 
reduce documentation and allow the tables to be tailored to individual 
audits, the tables will be available in electronic form from GAO's 
World Wide Web server when the final FISCAM is issued. Our Internet 
address is: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

General Controls: 

Security Management: 

Critical elements: SM-1. Establish a security management program; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: SM-2. Periodically assess and validate risks; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: SM-3. Document security control policies and 
procedures; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: SM-4. Implement effective security awareness of 
other security-related personnel policies; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: SM-5. Monitor the effectiveness of the security 
program; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: SM-6. Effectively remediate information security 
weaknesses; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: SM-7. Ensure that activities performed by external 
third parties are adequately secure; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of security management; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

[End of table] 

Access Control: 

Critical elements: AC-1. Adequately protect information system 
boundaries; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AC-2. Implement effective identification and 
authentication mechanisms; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AC-3. Implement effective authorization controls; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AC-4. Adequately protect sensitive system resources; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AC-5. Implement an effective audit and monitoring 
capability; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AC-6. Establish adequate physical security controls; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of access controls; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

[End of table] 

Configuration Management: 

Critical elements: CM-1. Develop and document CM policies, plans, and 
procedures; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: CM-2. Maintain current configuration identification 
information; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: CM-3. Properly authorize, test, approve, and track 
all configuration changes; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: CM-4. Routinely monitor the configuration; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: CM-5. Update the software on a timely basis to 
protect against known vulnerabilities; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: CM-6. Appropriately document and approve emergency 
changes to the configuration; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of configuration management. 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

[End of table] 

Segregation of Duties: 

Critical elements: SD-1. Segregate incompatible duties and establish 
related policies; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: SD-2. Control personnel activities through formal 
operating procedures, supervision, and review 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of segregation of duties; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

[End of table] 

Contingency Planning: 

Critical elements: CP-1. Assess the criticality and sensitivity of 
computerized operations and identify supporting resources; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: CP-2. Take steps to prevent and minimize potential 
damage and interruption; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: CP-3. Develop and document a comprehensive 
contingency plan; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: CP-4. Periodically test the contingency plan and 
adjust it as appropriate; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of contingency planning; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

[End of table] 

Business Process Application Level Controls: 

Application Level General Controls: 

Critical elements: AS-1. Implement effective application security 
management; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-1.1. Establish an application security plan; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-1.2. Periodically assess and validate application 
security risks; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-1.3. Document and implement application security 
policies and procedures; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-1.4. Implement effective security awareness and 
other security-related personnel policies; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-1.5. Monitor the effectiveness of the security 
program; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-1.6 Effectively remediate information security 
weaknesses; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-1.7. Implement effective security-related 
personnel policies; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-1.8. Adequately secure, document, and monitor 
external third party activities; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of application security 
management; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-2. Implement effective application access 
controls; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-2.1. Adequately protect application boundaries; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-2.2. Implement effective identification and 
authentication mechanisms; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-2.3. Implement effective authorization controls; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-2.4. Adequately protect sensitive system 
resources; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-2.5. Implement an effective access audit and 
monitoring capability; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-2.6. Establish adequate physical security 
controls; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of access controls; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-3. Implement effective configuration management; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-3.1 Develop and document CM policies, plans, and 
procedures; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-3.2. Maintain current configuration 
identification information; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-3.3. Properly authorize, test, approve, and track 
all configuration changes; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-3.4. Routinely monitor the configuration; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-3.5. Update systems in a timely manner to protect 
against known vulnerabilities; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-3.6. Appropriately document and approve emergency 
changes to the configuration; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of configuration management; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-4. Segregate user access to conflicting 
transactions and activities and monitor segregation; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-4.1. Segregate user access to conflicting 
transactions and activities; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-4.2. Monitor user access to conflicting 
transactions and activities through formal operating procedures, 
supervision, and review; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of segregation of duties; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-5. Implement effective application contingency 
planning; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-5.1. Assess the criticality and sensitivity of 
computerized operations and identify supporting resources; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-5.2. Take steps to prevent and minimize potential 
damage and interruption; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-5.3. Develop and document a comprehensive 
contingency plan; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: AS-5.4. Periodically test the contingency plan and 
adjust it as appropriate; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of contingency planning; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

[End of table] 

Business Process Controls: 

Critical elements: BP-1 Transaction data input is complete, accurate, 
valid, and confidential; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BD-1.1. Transaction data strategy is properly 
defined, documented, and appropriate; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-1.2. Source documentation and input file data 
collection and input preparation and entry is effectively controlled; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-1.3. Access to data input is adequately 
controlled; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-1.4. Input data are approved; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-1.5. Input data are validated and edited to 
provide reasonable assurance that erroneous data are detected before 
processing; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-1.6. Input values to data fields that do not fall 
within the tolerances or parameters determined by the management result 
in an input warning or error; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-1.7. Error handling procedures during data 
origination and entry reasonably assure that errors and irregularities 
are detected, reported, and corrected; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-1.8. Errors are investigated and resubmitted for 
processing promptly and accurately; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of transaction data input 
controls; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-2. Transaction data processing is complete, 
accurate, valid, and confidential; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-2.1. Application functionality is designed to 
process input data, with minimal manual intervention; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-2.2. Processing errors are identified, logged and 
resolved; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-2.3 Transactions are executed in accordance with 
predetermined parameters and tolerances, specific to entityï¿½s risk 
management; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-2.4. Transactions are valid and unique (not 
duplicated); 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-2.5 The transactions are appropriately 
authorized; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-2.6. Data from subsidiary ledgers are in balance 
with the general ledger; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-2.7. User-defined processing is adequately 
controlled; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-2.8. As appropriate, the confidentiality of 
transaction data during processing is adequately controlled; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-2.9. An adequate audit and monitoring capability 
is implemented; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of transaction data processing 
controls; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-3. Transaction data output is complete, accurate, 
valid, and confidential; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-3.1. Outputs are appropriately defined by the 
management (output form, sensitivity of data, user selectivity, 
confidentiality, etc.)
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-3.2. Output generation and distribution are 
aligned with the reporting strategy; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-3.3. System generated outputs/reports are 
reviewed to reasonable assure the integrity of production data and 
transaction processing; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-3.4. Output/reports are in compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-3.5. Access to output/reports and output files is 
based on business need and is limited to authorized users; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of data output controls; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-4. Master data setup and maintenance is 
adequately controlled; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-4.1. Master data are appropriately designed; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-4.2 Changes to master data configuration are 
appropriately controlled; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-4.3. Only valid master records exist; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-4.4. Master data are complete and valid; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-4.5. Master data are consistent among modules; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-4.6. Master data additions, deletions, and 
changes are properly managed and monitored by data owners; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: BP-4.7. As appropriate, the confidentiality of 
master data is adequately controlled; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of master data setup and 
maintenance; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

[End of table] 

Interface Controls: 

Critical elements: IN-1. Implement an effective interface strategy and 
design; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: IN-1.1. An interface strategy is developed for each 
interface used in the application; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: IN-1.2. An interface design is developed for each 
interface used in the application that includes appropriate detailed 
specifications; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of interface strategy and design; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: IN-2. Implement effective interface processing 
procedures
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: IN-2.1. Procedures are in place to reasonably assure 
that the interfaces are processed accurately, completely, and timely; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: IN-2.2. Ownership for interface processing is 
appropriately assigned; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: IN-2.3. The interfaced data is reconciled between 
the source and target application to ensure that the data transfer is 
compete and accurate; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: IN-2.4. Errors during interface processing are 
identified by balancing processing and promptly investigated, 
corrected, and resubmitted for processing; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: IN-2.5. Rejected interface data is isolated, 
analyzed, and corrected in a timely manner; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: IN-2.6. Data files are not processed more than once; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of interface controls; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

[End of table] 

Data Management System Controls: 

Critical elements: DA-1. Implement an effective data management system 
strategy and design; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: DA-1.1 Implement an effective data management system 
strategy and design, consistent with the control requirements of the 
application and data; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: DA-1.2. Detective controls are implemented in a 
manner that effectively supports requirements to identify and react to 
specific system or user activity within the data management system and 
its related components; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: DA-1.3. Control of specialized data management 
processes used to facilitate interoperability between applications 
and/or functions not integrated into applications (such as ad-hoc 
reporting) are consistent with control requirements for the 
application, data and other systems that may be affected; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

Critical elements: Overall assessment of data management system 
strategy and design; 
Are controls effective? Yes, No, Partially: 
Comments on control effectiveness: 
Work paper references: 

[End of table] 

Assessment(s) on control effectiveness involving cross-cutting controls 
issues: 

Note: In assessing the effectiveness of general and business process 
application controls, the auditor may find situations where weaknesses 
identified solely in a specific control category (e.g., contingency 
planning) may not reach the level that would justify concluding 
controls to be ineffective for that particular category. However, when 
the auditor considers control weaknesses identified in separate control 
categories collectively, it may justify concluding controls to be 
ineffective (cross-cutting). For example, the auditor may have 
identified weaknesses indicating that the entity did not have a 
complete inventory of all major systems (security management), the 
system configuration baseline was incomplete (configuration 
management), and all critical systems/activities for contingency 
planning may not have been identified. In assessing these weaknesses 
solely in the context of their respective control categories, the 
auditor may have concluded that they did not reach the threshold to 
assess each of these respective control categories as ineffective. 
However, when the auditor assessed the weaknesses collectively, the 
auditor may conclude controls to be ineffective since an incomplete 
inventory of systems could significantly hamper the entityï¿½s ability to 
ensure that current and complete security settings are installed on all 
systems and that contingency plans address each system in the event of 
operational disruptions. 

The space above is provided to document those assessments that are not 
control category specific but are made from a collectively assessment 
of weaknesses identified in separate control categories. 

[End of appendix] 

Appendix IV - Mapping of FISCAM to SP 800-53: 

In table below, FISCAM is mapped to NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-
53. To assist auditors, the individual FISCAM general and business 
process control activities are referenced to related NIST 800-53 
controls. 

FISCAM Controls: General Controls, Security Management: 

SM-1. Establish a security management; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
PL-2 System Security Plan program; 
PL-3 System Security Plan Update; 
PL-6 Security-Related Activity Planning; 
SA-2 Allocation of Resources. 

SM-2. Periodically assess and validate risks; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
CA-4 Security Certification; 
CA-6 Security Accreditation; 
RA-2 Security Categorization; 
RA-3 Risk Assessment; 
RA-4 Risk Assessment Update. 

SM-3. Document security control policies; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
See first control for each family and procedures (e.g., AC-1, AT-1). 

SM-4. Implement effective security awareness and other security-related 
personnel policies; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls:
AT-2 Security Awareness; 
AT-3 Security Training; 
AT-4 Security Training Records; 
PL-4 Rules of Behavior; 
PS-1 Personnel Security Policy awareness and other security-related and 
Procedures personnel policies (continued); 
PS-2 Position Categorization; 
PS-3 Personnel Screening; 
PS-4 Personnel Termination; 
PS-5 Personnel Transfer; 
PS-6 Access Agreements; 
PS-7 Third-Party Personnel Security; 
PS-8 Personnel Sanctions. 

SM-5. Monitor effectiveness of the security program; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls:
CA-2 Security Assessments; 
CA-7 Continuous Monitoring; 
PL-5 Privacy Impact Assessment; 
RA-5 Vulnerability Assessment. 

SM-6. Effectively remediate information security weaknesses; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls:
CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones. 

SM-7. Ensure that activities performed by external parties third 
parties are adequately secure; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls:
AC-20 Use of External Information Systems; 
MA-4 Remote Maintenance; 
PS-7 Third-Party Personnel Security; 
SA-9 External Information System Services. 

FISCAM Controls: Access Controls: 

AC-1 Adequately protect information system boundaries; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement; 
AC-8 System Use Notification; 
AC-9 Previous Logon Notification; 
AC-11 Session Lock; 
AC-12 Session Termination; 
AC-17 Remote Access; 
AC-18 Wireless Access Restrictions; 
AC-19 Access Control for Portable and Mobile Devices; 
CA-3 Information System Connections; 
SC-7 Boundary Protection; 
SC-10 Network Disconnect; 

AC-2. Implement effective identification and authentication mechanisms; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
AC-7 Unsuccessful login attempts; 
AC-10 Concurrent Session Control; 
AC-14 Permitted Actions Without Identification and Authentication; 
AU-10 Non-Repudiation; 
IA-2 User Identification and Authentication; 
IA-3 Device Identification and Authentication; 
IA-4 Identified Management; 
IA-5 Authentication Management; 
IA-6 Authentication Feedback; 
SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates; 
SC-20 Secure Name/Address and Resolution Service (Authoritative 
Source); 
SC-21 Secure Name Address Resolution Service; 
SC-22 Architecture and Provisioning for Name/Address Resolution 
Service; 
SC-23 Session Authenticity. 

AC-3. Implement effective authorization controls; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
AC-2 Account Management; 
AC-3 Access Enforcement; 
AC-6 Least Privilege; 
CM-7 Least Functionality; 
SC-6 Resource Priority; 
SC-14 Public Access Protections; 
SC-15 Collaborative Computing. 

AC-4. Adequately protect sensitive system resources; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
AC-15 Automated Markings; 
AC-16 Automated Labeling; 
IA-7 Cryptographic Module Authentication; 
MP-2 Media Access; 
MP-3 Media Labeling; 
MP-4 Media Storage; 
MP-5 Media Transport; 
MP-6 Media Sanitation and Disposal; 
PE-19 Information Leakage; 
SC-2 Application Partitioning; 
SC-3 Security Function Isolation; 
SC-4 Information Remnance; 
SC-8 Transmission Integrity; 
SC-9 Transmission Confidentiality; 
SC-11 Trusted Path; 
SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management; 
SC-13 Use of Cryptography; 
SC-16 Transmission of Security Parameters SC-18 Mobile Code. 

AC-5. Implement an effective audit and monitoring capability; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
AC-13 Supervision and Review ï¿½ Access Control; 
AT-5 Contacts with Security Groups and Associations; 
AU-2 Auditable Events AU-3 Content of Audit Records; 
AU-4 Audit Storage Capacity; 
AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures; 
AU-6 Audit Reduction and Report Generation; 
AU-7 Audit Reduction and Report Generation; 
AU-8 Time Stamps; 
AU-9 Protection of Audit Information; 
AU-11 Audit Record Retention; 
IR-1 Incident Response Policy; 
IR-2 Incident Response Training; 
IR-3 Incident Response Testing; 
IR-4 Incident Handling; 
IR-5 Incident Monitoring; 
IR-6 Incident Reporting; 
IR-7 Incident Response Assistance; 
SC-5 Denial of Service Protection; 
SI-4 Information System Monitoring Tools and Techniques; 
SI-6 Security Functionality Verification. 

AC-6 Establish adequate physical security controls; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
PE-2 Physical Access Authorization; 
PE-3 Physical Access Control; 
PE-4 Access Control for Transmission Medium; 
PE-5 Access Control Policy for Display Medium; 
PE-6 Monitoring Physical Access; 
PE-7 Visitor Control; 
PE-8 Access Records. 

FISCAM Controls: Configuration Management: 

CM-1. Develop and document CM policies, plans, and procedures; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
CM-1 Configuration Management Policy and Procedures. 

CM-2. Maintain current configuration identification information; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
CM-2 Baseline Configuration; 
CM-6 Configuration Settings; 
CM-8 Information System Component Inventory; 
SA-5 Information System Documentation. 

CM-3. Properly authorize, test, approve, track and control all 
configuration changes; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
CM-3 Configuration Change Control; 
SA-2 Allocation Resources; 
SA-3 Life Cycle Support; 
SA-4 Acquisitions; 
SA-8 Security Engineering Principles; 
SA-10 Developer Configuration management; 
SA-11 Developer Security Testing. 

CM-4. Routinely monitor the configuration; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
CM-4 Monitoring configuration Changes; 
CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change; 
SI-7 Software and Information Integrity. 

CM-5. Update software on a timely basis to protect against known 
vulnerabilities; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning; 
SA-6 Software Usage Restrictions; 
SA-7 User Installed Software; 
SC-19 Voice Over Internet Protocol; 
SI-2 Flaw Remediation; 
SI-3 Malicious Code Protection; 
SI-5 Security Alerts and Advisories; 
SI-8 Spam Protection. 

CM-6 Appropriately document and approve emergency changes to the 
configuration. 

FISCAM Controls: Segregation of Duties: 

SD-1 Segregate incompatible duties and establish related policies; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
AC-5 Separation of Duties; 
PS-2 Position Categorization; 
PS-6 Access Agreements. 

SD-2 Control personnel activities through formal operating procedures, 
supervision, and review; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
AC-5 Separation of Duties; 
PS-2 Position Categorization; 
PS-6 Access Agreements 

FISCAM Controls: Contingency Planning: 

CP-1 Assess the criticality and sensitivity of computerized operations 
and identify supporting resources. 

CP-2. Take steps to prevent and minimize potential damage and 
interruption; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
CP-3 Contingency Training; 
CP-6 Alternate Storage Site; 
CP-7 Alternate Processing Site; 
CP-9 Information System Backup; 
CP-10 Information System Recovery and Backup; 
MA-2 Controlled Maintenance; 
MA-3 Maintenance Tools; 
MA-5 Maintenance Personnel; 
MA-6 Timely Maintenance; 
PE-9 Power Equipment and Power Cabling; 
PE-10 Emergency Shutoff; 
PE-11 Emergency Power; 
PE-12 Emergency Lighting; 
PE-13 Fire Protection; 
PE-14 Temperature and Humidity Controls; 
PE-15 Water Damage Protection; 
PE-16 Delivery and Removal; 
PE-17 Alternate Work Site; 
PE-18 Location of Information System Documentation; 
SA-5 Information System Documentation. 

CP-3. Develop and document a comprehensive contingency plan; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
CP-2 Contingency Plan; 
CP-5 Contingency Plan Update; 
CP-8 Telecommunications services. 

CP-4. Periodically test the contingency plan and adjust it as 
appropriate; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing and Exercise; 
CP-5 Contingency Plan Update. 

FISCAM Controls: Business Process Application Level Controls: 

Application Level General Controls: 

AS-1. Implement effective application security management; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
The related NIST SP 800-53 application level general controls are 
identified under related General Controls above. 

AS-2. Implement effective application access controls. 

AS-3. Implement effective application configuration management. 

AS-4. Segregate application user access to conflicting transactions and 
activities and monitor segregation. 

AS-5. Implement effective application contingency planning. 

FISCAM Controls: Business Process Controls: 

BP-1. Transaction data input is complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
SI-9 Information Input Restrictions; 
SI-10 Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity; 
SI-11 Error Handling. 

BP-2. Transaction data processing is complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
SI-9 Information Input Restrictions; 
SI-10 Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity; 
SI-11 Error Handling. 

BP-3. Transaction data output is complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
SI-9 Information Input Restrictions; 
SI-10 Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity; 
SI-11 Error Handling; 
SI-12 Information Output Handling and Retention. 

BP-4. Master data setup and maintenance is adequately controlled; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
SI-9 Information Input Restrictions; 
SI-10 Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity; 
SI-11 Error Handling. 

FISCAM Controls: Interface controls: 

IN-1 Implement an effective interface strategy and design; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
SI-9 Information input Restrictions; 
SI-10 Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity; 
SI-11 Error Handling. 

IN-2 Implement effective interface processing procedures; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 
SI-9 Information input Restrictions; 
SI-10 Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity; 
SI-11 Error Handling. 

FISCAM Controls: Data management controls: 

DA-1. Implement an effective data management system strategy and 
design; 
Related NIST 800-53 Controls: 

[End of table] 

[End of appendix] 

Appendix V - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities Needed to Perform 
Information System Controls Audits: 

Information system (IS) controls audits require a broad range of 
technical skills. A key component of planning is determining the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform the IS audit. Such 
needs are then compared with the audit teamï¿½s current knowledge, 
skills, and abilities to identify any expertise that must be acquired. 
Any expertise gap can be filled through hiring, training, contracting, 
or staff sharing. The knowledge, skills, and abilities described in 
this appendix are not intended to be prescriptive, but to provide a 
framework to assist the auditor in determining the audit resources 
needed to effectively perform audit procedures in an IS audit. In 
addition, when contracting for IS audit services, this framework may be 
used as resource to identify the specific knowledge, skills, and 
abilities that will be needed to perform the contracting services 
requested. 

Generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS) state that the 
ï¿½staff assigned to conduct an audit or attestation engagement under 
GAGAS must collectively possess the technical knowledge, skills, and 
experience necessary to be competent for the type of work being 
performed before beginning work on that assignment.ï¿½ The standards 
further require that if the work involves a review of information 
systems, the staff assigned to the GAGAS audit engagement should 
collectively possess knowledge of information technology. 

[Footnote 97]These skills are often described in terms of knowledge, 
skills, and abilities (KSAs). KSAs are typically used in job position 
descriptions and job announcements to describe the attributes required 
for those in particular jobs. These terms are defined as follows: 

Knowledgeï¿½the foundation upon which skills and abilities are built. 
Knowledge is an organized body of information, facts, principles, or 
procedures that, if applied, make adequate performance of a job 
possible. An example is knowledge of tools and techniques used to 
establish logical access control over an information system. 

Skillï¿½the proficient manual, verbal, or mental manipulation of people, 
ideas, or things. A skill is demonstrable and implies a degree of 
proficiency. For example, a person may be skilled in operating a 
personal computer to prepare electronic spreadsheets or in using a 
software product to conduct an automated review of the integrity of an 
operating system. 

Abilityï¿½the power to perform a job function while applying or using the 
essential knowledge. Abilities are evidenced through activities or 
behaviors required to do a job. An example is the ability to apply 
knowledge about logical access controls to evaluate the adequacy of an 
organizationï¿½s implementation of such controls. 

A staff memberï¿½s knowledge, skills, and abilities can be categorized in 
accordance with FISCAM audit areas. Table 1 includes an overview of the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities that a team typically needs to 
effectively perform an IS audit. It assumes a level of proficiency in 
performing basic auditing tasks, such as interviewing, gathering and 
documenting evidence, communicating both orally and in writing, and 
managing projects. It focuses on attributes associated specifically 
with IS auditing. Although each staff member assigned to such an audit 
need not have all these attributes, the audit team must collectively 
possess the KSAï¿½s necessary to perform the audit, including adequately 
planning the audit, assessing the effectiveness of IS controls, testing 
IS controls, determining the effect of the results of testing on the 
audit objectives, developing findings and recommendations, and 
reporting the results. Audit resources may be supplemented from outside 
the organization through partnering or engaging consultants. 

Table 1. Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for IS Security Audit Areas 
by FISCAM Objective: 

FISCAM objective: Security Management; 
Associated knowledge, skills, and abilities: 
* Knowledge of the legislative requirements for an entityï¿½s information 
security management program; 
* Knowledge of the sensitivity of data and the risk management process 
through risk assessment and risk mitigation; 
* Knowledge of the risks associated with a deficient information 
security management program; 
* Knowledge of the key elements of a good information security 
management program; 
* Ability to analyze and evaluate an entityï¿½s security policies and 
procedures and identify their strengths and weaknesses; 
* Ability to analyze and evaluate the entityï¿½s security management 
program and identify the strengthens and weaknesses, including: 
- security management program, structure, and responsibilities, 
including system inventories; 
- risk assessment; 
- security awareness training for employees, contractors, third parties 
(including those in sensitive security and data processing position) 
and security-related personnel policies (including personnel hiring, 
including reference and background checks, and job transfers and 
terminations); 
- performance of periodic tests and evaluations of IS controls and 
monitoring to ensure compliance with established policies and 
procedures (including copies of tests and evaluations performed), and; 
- security requirements and monitoring activities of third-party 
providers supporting specific application(s). 

FISCAM objective: Access Control; 
Associated knowledge, skills, and abilities: 
* Knowledge across platforms of the access paths into computer systems 
and of the functions of associated hardware and software that provides 
an access path; 
* Knowledge of access level privileges granted to users and the 
technology used to provide and control them; 
* Knowledge of the procedures, tools, and techniques that provide for 
good physical, technical, and administrative controls over access; 
* Knowledge of the risks associated with inadequate access controls; 
* Skills to perform vulnerability assessments of the entityï¿½s 
applications and supporting computer systems; 
* Ability to analyze and evaluate the entityï¿½s access controls and 
identify the strengthens and weaknesses, including: 
- system boundaries; 
- controlling remote access to agency information, including use of 
remote devices; 
- user and system identification and authentication; 
- requesting, approving, and periodically reviewing user access 
authorization; 
- restricting access to sensitive system resources (including system 
utilities, system software, and privileged accounts); 
- protecting digital and sensitive media, including portable media; 
- applying cryptography methods, if used; 
- monitoring mainframe, mid-level servers, and network systems for 
incidents, including management response and reporting on unusual 
activities, intrusion attempts, and actual intrusions, and; 
- controlling physical security, including granting and controlling of 
physical access to the data center and other IT sensitive areas. 

FISCAM objective: Configuration Management; 
Associated knowledge, skills, and abilities: 
* Knowledge of the concept of configuration management and the System 
Development Life Cycle (SDLC) process; 
* Knowledge of baseline configuration management procedures, tools, and 
techniques that provide control over application and system software, 
and computer security settings; 
* Knowledge of the risks associated with the modification, including 
emergency changes, of application and system software, and computer 
security settings; 
* Knowledge of the risks associated with inadequate procedures for 
updating software to protect against known vulnerabilities; 
* Ability to analyze and evaluate the entityï¿½s configuration management 
and identify the strengths and weaknesses, including: 
- configuration management policies, including the approval and testing 
of scheduled and emergency changes, and monitoring procedures to ensure 
compliance, 
- maintaining current configuration information, 
- authorizing, testing, approving, and tracking all configuration 
changes, 
- monitoring/auditing the configuration, 
- patch management, vulnerability scanning, virus protection, emerging 
threats, and user installed software, and, 
- emergency changes. 

FISCAM objective: Segregation of Duties; 
Associated knowledge, skills, and abilities: 
* Knowledge of the different functions involved with information 
systems and data processing and incompatible duties associated with 
these functions; 
* Knowledge of the risks associated with inadequate segregation of 
duties; 
* Ability to analyze and evaluate the entityï¿½s organizational structure 
and segregation of duties (including periodic review of access 
authorizations) and identify the strengths and weaknesses. 

FISCAM objective: Contingency Planning; 
Associated knowledge, skills, and abilities:
* Knowledge of the procedures, tools, and techniques that provide for 
contingency planning and business continuity; 
* Knowledge of the risks that exist when measures are not taken to 
provide for contingency planning and business continuity; 
* Ability to analyze and evaluate an entityï¿½s contingency planning 
program and contingency plans for business continuity and identify the 
strengths and weaknesses, including: 
- assessing the availability needs of entity systems; 
- backing-up data, programs, and software, and; 
- environmental controls, including emergency power, fire/smoke 
detection and response, hardware maintenance and problem management, 
alternate work sites, etc. 

FISCAM objective: Business Process Controls; 
Associated knowledge, skills, and abilities:
* Knowledge about the practices, procedures, and techniques that 
provide for the completeness, accuracy, validity, and confidentiality 
of application data; 
* Knowledge of typical applications in each business process 
transaction cycle; 
* Skills to use a generalized audit software package to conduct data 
analyses and tests of application data, and to plan, extract, and 
evaluate data samples; 
* Ability to analyze and evaluate the entityï¿½s application controls and 
identify the strengths and weaknesses. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Auditors performing tasks in two of the above FISCAM areasï¿½Access 
Controls and Configuration Managementï¿½require additional specialized 
technical skills. Such technical specialists should have skills in one 
or more of the categories listed in table 2. 

Table 2. KSAs for Information Security Technical Specialists: 

Specialist: Network analyst; 
Skills: 
* Advanced knowledge of network hardware and software; 
* Understanding of data communication protocols; 
* Ability to evaluate the configuration of routers, firewalls, and 
intrusion detection systems; 
* Ability to perform external and internal vulnerability tests with 
manual and automated tools; 
* Knowledge of the operating systems used by servers. 

Specialist: Windows/Novell analyst; 
Skills: 
* Detailed understanding of microcomputer and network architectures; 
* Ability to evaluate the configuration of servers and the major 
applications hosted on servers; 
* Ability to perform internal vulnerability tests with manual and 
automated tools. 

Specialist: Unix analyst; 
Skills: 
* Detailed understanding of the primary variants of the Unix 
architectures; 
* Ability to evaluate the configuration of servers and the major 
applications hosted on servers; 
* Ability to perform internal vulnerability tests with manual and 
automated tools. 

Specialist: Database analyst; 
Skills: 
* Understanding of the control functions of the major database 
management systems; 
* Understanding of the control considerations of the typical 
application designs that use database systems; 
* Ability to evaluate the configuration of major database software 
products. 

Specialist: Mainframe system software analyst; 
Skills: 
* Detailed understanding of the design and function of the major 
components of the operating system; 
* Ability to develop or modify tools necessary to extract and analyze 
control information from mainframe computers; 
* Ability to use audit software tools; 
* Ability to analyze modifications to system software components. 

Specialist: Mainframe access control analyst; 
Skills: 
* Detailed understanding of auditing access control security software 
such as ACF2, Top Secret, and RACF; 
* Ability to analyze mainframe audit log data; 
* Ability to develop or modify tools to extract and analyze access 
control information. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

As table 2 shows, some activities require a high degree of IT 
knowledge, skills, and abilities, while others involve more basic 
auditing tasks (interviewing, gathering background information, and 
documenting the IT security environment). Audit management may 
therefore want to organize staff that have highly specialized technical 
skills into a separate group that has access to special-purpose 
computer hardware and software. A group of this kind can focus on more 
technical issues, while other groups within the organization can 
perform the less technical work. 

[End of appendix] 

Appendix VI - Scope of an Information System Controls Audit in Support 
of a Financial Audit: 

This appendix provides a framework for assessing the effectiveness of 
information system controls audits in support of financial statement 
audits. Given the prevalence of the use of information systems to 
process financial information, performing a financial audit generally 
includes an assessment of the effectiveness of information system 
controls. The information system controls audit should be performed as 
an integral part of the financial audit. 

This appendix is intended to assist (1) financial auditors in 
communicating audit requirements to IS control specialists, and (2) 
financial auditors and IS control specialists in understanding how an 
assessment of the effectiveness of IS controls integrates with 
financial audit requirements. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Presidentï¿½s Council 
on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) Financial Audit Manual (FAM) 
presents a methodology for performing financial statement audits of 
federal entities in accordance with professional standards. Chapter 2 
(and related steps in Chapter 4) of the FISCAM describe a methodology 
for performing the IS controls audit in the context of an audit 
performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards (GAGAS). This appendix discusses how the audit steps 
described in Chapter 2 of the FISCAM (and related steps in Chapter 4) 
provide more specific guidance concerning the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of information systems controls in support of the audit 
steps in the FAM. For financial audits performed in accordance with the 
FAM, the steps in the FISCAM should be performed in coordination with 
the related steps in the FAM. The flowchart of steps in assessing IS 
controls in a financial statement audit, appearing in FAM 295 J, is 
presented at the end of this appendix. 

The following table presents a summary of the relationship between 
selected FAM steps and related FISCAM steps. 

Audit Planning: 

FAM Step(s): 
220 Understand the Entityï¿½s Operations; 
235 Identify Significant Line Items, Accounts, Assertions, and RSSI; 
240 Identify Significant Cycles, Accounting Applications, And Financial 
Management Systems; 
Related FISCAM Step(s): 
2.1.1 Planning the Information System Controls Auditï¿½Overview; 
2.1.2 Understand the Overall Audit Objectives and Related Scope of the 
Information System Controls Audit; 
2.1.3 Understand the Entityï¿½s Operations and Key Business Processes; 
2.1.4 Obtain a General Understanding of the Structure of the Entityï¿½s 
Networks; 
2.1.5 Identify Key Areas of Audit Interest (files, applications, 
systems, locations). 

FAM Step(s): 
260 Identify Risk Factors; 
Related FISCAM Step(s): 
2.1.6 Assess Information system Risk on a Preliminary Basis. 

FAM Step(s): 
270 Determine Likelihood of Effective IT System Controls 
Related FISCAM Step(s): 
2.1.7 Identify Critical Control Points (for example, external access 
points to networks); 
2.1.8 Obtain a Preliminary Understanding of Information System 
Controls. 

FAM Step(s): 
Miscellaneous FAM planning sections; 
Related FISCAM Step(s): 
2.1.9 Perform Other Audit Planning Procedures. 

Internal Control Testing: 

FAM Step(s): 
310 Overview of the Internal Control Phase; 
320 Understand Information Systems; 
330 Identify Control Objectives; 
340 Identify and Understand Relevant Control Activities; 
350 Determine the Nature, Timing, and Extent of Control Tests And Of 
Tests For Systemsï¿½ Compliance With FFMIA Requirements; 
360 Perform Nonsampling Control Tests And Tests For Systemsï¿½ Compliance 
With FFMIA Requirements, including 360.03-.09--Test IT System Controls; 
Related FISCAM Step(s): 
2.2 Perform Information System Controls Audit Tests: 
* Understand Information Systems Relevant to the Audit Objectives; 
* Identify IS Control Techniques Relevant to the Audit Objectives; 
* Test IT System Controls. 

Reporting The Results Of The Is Controls Audit: 
FAM Step(s): 
370 Assess Controls On A Preliminary Basis; 
580 Draft Reports ï¿½ Internal Control; 
Related FISCAM Step(s): 
2.3 Report Audit Results. 

Audit Planning: 

IS Audit Resources: 

As discussed in FAM Section 110.27, the audit team should possess 
sufficient knowledge of IS controls to determine the effect of IT on 
the audit, to understand IS controls, and to consult with an IS 
controls specialist [Footnote 98] to design and test IS controls. 
Specialized IS audit skills generally are needed in situations where: 

* the entityï¿½s systems, automated controls, or the manner in which they 
are used in conducting the entityï¿½s business are complex; 

* significant changes have been made to existing systems or new systems 
have been implemented; 

* data are extensively shared among systems; 

* the entity participates in electronic commerce; 

* the entity uses emerging technologies; or; 

* significant audit evidence is available only in electronic form. 

In some cases, the financial auditor may consult with IS controls 
specialists within the audit organization or use outside contractors to 
provide these skills. However, per AU 311.22, the financial auditor 
should have sufficient knowledge to communicate the objectives of the 
specialistsï¿½ work, to evaluate whether the specified procedures will 
meet the audit objectives, and to evaluate the results of the 
procedures as they relate to the nature, extent, and timing of further 
planned audit procedures. 

Appendix V of the FISCAM provides a framework to assist the auditor in 
determining the audit resources needed to effectively perform an IS 
controls audit. In addition, when contracting for IS systems audit 
services, this framework may be used as a resource to identify the 
specific knowledge, skills, and abilities that will be needed to 
perform the contracting services requested. Section 2.1.9.C ï¿½ï¿½Audit 
Resourcesï¿½ï¿½ in Chapter 2 provides additional information on the use of 
IS controls specialists in a GAGAS audit. 

The following sections discuss IT-related FAM steps and the related 
FISCAM steps. 

Understand the Entity's Operations, Identify Significant Line Items, 
Accounts, Assertions, and RSSI, and Identify Significant Cycles, 
Accounting Applications, and Financial Management Systems: 

FAM 220.01 states that the auditor must obtain an understanding of the 
entity and its environment, including internal control to assess the 
risk of material misstatement of the financial statements, whether due 
to error or fraud, and to design the nature, extent, and timing of 
further audit procedures. The following IT-related FAM sections discuss 
obtaining an understanding of the entityï¿½s operations and information 
systems: 

* 220.04--the auditor should identify significant external and internal 
factors that affect the entityï¿½s operations as part of understanding 
the entity and its environment for purposes of planning the audit, 
including the IT structure and the extent to which IT processing is 
performed externally such as through cross-servicing agreements. 

* 220.07--the auditor should develop and document a high-level 
understanding of the entityï¿½s use of IS controls and how IT affects the 
generation of financial statement information and supplementary 
information. An IS controls specialist may assist the auditor in 
understanding the entityï¿½s use of IS controls. Appendix I of the FISCAM 
may be used to document this understanding. 

* 235.01--the auditor should identify significant line items and 
accounts in the financial statements and significant related financial 
statement assertions. 

* 240.08--once the auditor identifies significant accounting 
applications, the auditor should determine which information systems 
are involved in those applications. 

* 240.09--the auditor should obtain sufficient knowledge of the 
information systems relevant to financial reporting to understand the 
accounting processing from initiation of a transaction to its inclusion 
in the financial statements, including electronic means used to 
transmit, process, maintain, and access information (see AU 319.49, SAS 
No. 94). 

The following FISCAM sections (Chapter 2) provide more specific 
guidance on how the auditor obtains an understanding of the entityï¿½s IT 
operations and information systems: 

* Planning the information system controls auditï¿½overview ï¿½ 2.1.1; 

* Understand the entityï¿½s operations and key business processes - 
2.1.3; 

* Obtain a general understanding of the structure of the entityï¿½s 
networks ï¿½ 2.1.4; 

* Identify key areas of audit interest (files, applications, systems, 
locations) ï¿½ 2.1.5. 

More specifically, based on the audit objectives and the auditorï¿½s 
understanding of the business processes and networks, the auditorï¿½s 
identification of key areas of audit interest includes: 

* key business process applications and where each key business process 
application is processed; 

* key data files used by each key business application, and; 

* relevant general controls at the entitywide and system levels, upon 
which application level controls depend. 

These FISCAM sections include information related to the IS controls 
audit that should be included in audit documentation. Such information 
should be summarized, as appropriate, in the entity profile or an 
equivalent document, as discussed in FAM Section 290.04. However, the 
auditor generally should document internal control separately as 
discussed below and in FAM 390. 

Identify Risk Factors: 

FAM Section 260.09 states that the auditor should (1) identify 
conditions that significantly increase inherent, fraud, and control 
risk (based on identified control environment, risk assessment, 
communication, or monitoring weaknesses) and (2) conclude whether any 
identified control risks preclude the effectiveness of specific control 
activities in significant applications. The auditor should identify 
specific inherent risks, fraud risks, and control environment, risk 
assessment, communication, and monitoring weaknesses based on 
information obtained in the planning phase, primarily from 
understanding the entityï¿½s operations, including significant IT 
processing performed outside the entity and preliminary analytical 
procedures. SAS No. 70 reports, which are discussed further in FAM 310 
and in Appendix VII, may be prepared by service auditors for 
organizations performing significant IT processing for the entity. The 
auditor may find these reports useful for performing risk assessments 
and planning other audit procedures. The auditor should update the risk 
assessment throughout the audit. 

FAM Section 260.22 states that IS controls do not affect the audit 
objectives for an account or a cycle. However, IS controls can 
introduce inherent risk factors not present in a manual accounting 
system. The FAM section states that the auditor should assess the 
overall impact of IS processing on inherent risk. The impact of these 
factors typically will be pervasive in nature. An IS controls 
specialist may assist the auditor in considering these factors and 
making this assessment. 

FAM Section 260.56 states that IS controls affect the effectiveness of 
control activities, the control environment, risk assessment, 
communication, and monitoring. For example, controls that normally 
would be performed by separate individuals in manual systems may be 
concentrated in one computer application and pose a potential 
segregation-of-duties issue. See SAS No. 109.57-63 for further 
discussion of the effect of IT on internal control. 

FAM Section 260.57 provides several IS factors, discussed in Chapter 2 
of the FISCAM, that the auditor should evaluate in making an overall 
assessment of the control environment, risk assessment, communication, 
and monitoring. 

The FISCAM section 2.1.6 entitled ï¿½ï¿½Assess Information System Risk on a 
Preliminary Basisï¿½ provides more specific guidance on how the auditor 
identifies IS risk (inherent and the control environment, risk 
assessment, communication, and monitoring components of internal 
control). Also, the FISCAM section 2.1.9.B entitled ï¿½ï¿½Consideration of 
the Risk of Fraudï¿½ï¿½ provides more specific guidance concerning 
identification of the risk of fraud arising from IT, including 
coordination between the financial auditor and the IS controls 
specialist. In addition, the FISCAM section 2.5.1 ï¿½Additional IS Risk 
Factorsï¿½ provides more risk factors for the auditor to consider. 
Further, FISCAM Appendix VII provides more information on the use of 
SAS 70 reports. 

These FISCAM sections include information that should be included in 
audit documentation. In addition, such information should be 
summarized, as appropriate, in the GRA or equivalent document as 
discussed in FAM Section 290, including: 

* the assessments of overall inherent risk and the risk factors 
considered in the assessment, and; 

* the assessments of the overall effectiveness of the control 
environment, risk assessment, communication, and monitoring, including 
whether an ineffective control environment precludes the effectiveness 
of specific control activities. 

Determine Likelihood of Effective IS Controls: 

As discussed in FAM 270, information system (IS) controls consist of 
those internal controls that are dependent on information systems 
processing and include general, business process application, and user 
controls. IS controls consist of those internal controls that are 
dependent on information systems processing and include general 
controls (entitywide, system, and business process application levels), 
business process application controls (input, processing, output, 
master file, interface, and data management system controls), and user 
controls (controls performed by people interacting with information 
systems). General and business process application controls are always 
IS controls. A user control is an IS control if its effectiveness 
depends on information systems processing or the reliability (accuracy, 
completeness, and validity) of information processed by information 
systems. Conversely, a user control is not an IS control if its 
effectiveness does not depend on information systems processing or the 
reliability of information processed by information systems. 

In the financial audit planning phase, the auditor, with the assistance 
of an IS control specialist should determine whether IS controls are 
likely to be effective and should therefore be considered in the 
internal control phase. The auditor may coordinate work done to meet 
the provisions of FISMA with work done as part of the financial 
statement audit. 

The procedures performed to determine the likelihood of effective IS 
controls build on those procedures performed while understanding the 
entityï¿½s operations and assessing the effects of IS controls on 
inherent risk and the control environment, risk assessment, 
communication, and monitoring. Under SAS No. 109, the auditor should 
sufficiently understand each of the five components of internal control-
control environment, risk assessment, information and communication, 
monitoring, and control activities-to assess the risk of material 
misstatement. This understanding should include relevant IS aspects. 

As discussed in FAM 260.06, the auditor evaluates and tests the 
following types of controls in a financial statement audit: 

* financial reporting controls, 

* compliance controls, and, 

* certain operations controls (to the extent described in FAM 275). 

For each of the specific controls to be evaluated and tested, as 
documented in the SCE Form or equivalent, the auditor should 
distinguish which are IS controls. In addition, based on such IS 
controls and the audit planning procedures (particularly the 
identification of critical control points), the auditor should identify 
those other IS controls (general and business process application 
controls) upon which the effectiveness of the controls in the SCE 
depend. These other IS controls also need to be effective for the 
specific controls in the SCE to be effective. FISCAM Appendices II and 
III can be used to document such controls. 

IS controls can be classified into three types: 

* general controls ï¿½ GAGAS defines information systems general controls 
as the policies and procedures that apply to all or a large segment of 
an entityï¿½s information systems. General controls help ensure the 
proper operation of information systems by creating the environment for 
proper operation of application controls. General controls include 
security management, logical and physical access, configuration 
management, segregation of duties, and contingency planning. 

* business process application controls ï¿½GAGAS defines application 
controls, sometimes referred to as business process controls, as those 
controls that are incorporated directly into computer applications to 
help ensure the validity, completeness, accuracy, and confidentiality 
of transactions and data during application processing. Application 
controls include controls over input, processing, output, master data, 
application interfaces, and data management system interfaces. 

* user controls ï¿½ portions of controls that are performed by people 
interacting with IS controls. The effectiveness of user controls 
typically depend on the accuracy of the information produced by the IS 
controls. 

An IS controls specialist generally should review and concur with the 
auditorï¿½s identification of IS controls. 

Testing of technical IS controls should be performed by an IS controls 
specialist as described in FAM 360. The audit team may work with the IS 
controls specialist by testing user controls and application controls 
involving manual follow-up. 

FAM Section 270.05 states that early in the auditï¿½s planning phase, the 
auditor and the IS controls specialist should understand the design of 
each of the three types of IS controls (general, business process 
application level, and user controls) to the extent necessary to 
tentatively conclude whether these controls are likely to be effective. 

If they are likely to be effective, the auditor should consider 
specific IS controls in determining whether control objectives are 
achieved in the internal control phase. As discussed in SAS No. 109.54, 
evaluating the design of a control involves considering whether the 
control, individually or in combination with other controls, is capable 
of effectively preventing, detecting, and correcting material 
misstatements. 

If IS controls are not likely to be effective, the auditor, with the 
assistance of the IS controls specialist, should obtain a sufficient 
understanding of control risks arising from IS controls to: 

* identify types of potential misstatements, 

* consider factors that affect the risks of material misstatement, 

* design tests of controls and substantive procedures, and, 

* develop appropriate findings. 

Also, in the internal control phase, the auditor generally should focus 
on the effectiveness of manual controls in achieving control 
objectives, including manual controls that may mitigate weaknesses in 
IS controls. If IS controls are not likely to be effective due to poor 
general controls and if manual controls do not achieve the control 
objectives, the auditor should identify and evaluate any specific IS 
controls that are designed to achieve the control objectives to develop 
recommendations for improving internal controls. 

As discussed in SAS No. 109.117-.120, in some circumstances, such as 
where a significant amount of information is electronically initiated, 
recorded, processed, and reported, it may not be practical or possible 
to restrict detection risk to an acceptable level by performing only 
substantive tests for one or more financial statement assertions. In 
such circumstances, the auditor should test IS controls to obtain 
evidential matter about the effectiveness of both the design and 
operation of controls to reduce the assessed level of the risk of 
material misstatement. 

The following FISCAM sections provide more specific guidance on how the 
auditor determines the likelihood of effective IS controls: 

* Identify critical control points (for example, external access points 
to networks) ï¿½ 2.1.7; 

* Obtain a preliminary understanding of information system controls ï¿½ 
2.1.8. 

These FISCAM sections include information that should be included in 
audit documentation. In addition to this audit documentation, as 
discussed in FAM Section 290, the auditor should document tentative 
conclusions on the likelihood that IT controls and any compensating 
controls such as manual controls, reviews, or reconciliations are 
operating effectively. 

Other Audit Planning Procedures: 

The FISCAM section 2.1.9 provides additional information concerning the 
following planning steps in the IS controls audit that should be 
coordinated with the financial audit. 

* Relevant laws and regulationsï¿½this section provides more specific 
guidance on how the auditor identifies significant IT related 
provisions of laws and regulations and should be performed in 
coordination with FAM Section 245. 

* Consideration of the risk of fraudï¿½as discussed above, this section 
provides more specific guidance on how the auditor identifies the risk 
of fraud arising from IT, including coordination between the financial 
auditor and the IS controls specialist, and should be performed in 
coordination with FAM Section 260. 

* Audit Resourcesï¿½as discussed above, this section provides more 
specific guidance on how the auditor identifies the knowledge, skills, 
and abilities needed to perform an IS controls audit and the auditorï¿½s 
responsibilities and procedures for using the work of an IS controls 
specialist, and should be performed in coordination with FAM Section 
110. 

* Multiyear testing plansï¿½this section provides more specific guidance 
on how the auditor establishes a multiyear testing plan for IS 
controls, and should be performed in coordination with FAM Section 
395G. 

* Communication with entity management and those charged with 
governanceï¿½this section provides more specific guidance on 
communicating relevant IT-related information with entity management 
and those charged with governance, and should be performed in 
coordination with FAM Section 215. 

* Service organizationsï¿½this section provides more specific guidance on 
the auditorï¿½s consideration of IS controls, significant to the IS 
audit, that are performed by a service organization. This issue is 
discussed further in Appendix VII ï¿½Entityï¿½s Use of Service 
Organizationsï¿½. This section should be performed in coordination with 
FAM 310. 

* Using the work of othersï¿½this section provides more specific guidance 
on how the auditor prepares uses the work of others in performing the 
IS controls audit, and should be performed in coordination with FAM 
section 650. 

* Audit planï¿½this section provides more specific guidance on how the 
auditor prepares an audit plan and strategy for performing the IS 
controls audit, and should be performed in coordination with FAM 
section 290. 

Also the FISCAM provides more specific guidance on how the auditor 
documents the planning of the IS controls audit, and should be 
performed in coordination with FAM Section 290. 

Internal Control Testing: 

Overview: 

In general, FAM Section 300 describes the methodology for assessing the 
effectiveness of internal control in a financial audit. FAM Section 310 
summarizes the methodology. Specifically, Section 310 states that, in 
the internal control phase, the auditor should gain an understanding of 
internal control and obtain evidence about the effectiveness of 
internal control to (1) assess control risk, (2) determine the nature, 
timing, and extent of control, compliance, and substantive testing, and 
(3) form an opinion or report on internal control over financial 
reporting and compliance. Control risk should be assessed separately 
for each significant financial statement assertion in each significant 
cycle/accounting application (including RSSI). 

The auditor of federal financial statements must evaluate and test 
certain controls. AU 319 permits the auditor to assess control risk at 
a high (maximum) level and forgo evaluation and testing of financial 
reporting controls if the auditor believes evaluating their 
effectiveness would be inefficient. However, because OMB audit guidance 
requires the auditor to perform sufficient tests of internal controls 
that have been properly designed and placed in operation to support a 
low assessed level of control risk, the auditor in a federal financial 
audit may not elect to forgo control tests solely because it is more 
efficient to extend compliance and substantive audit procedures. 

The following are the types of controls tested in a financial audit: 

* financial reporting controls (including certain safeguarding and 
budget controls) for each significant assertion in each significant 
cycle/accounting application (identified in section 240), 

* compliance controls for each significant provision of laws and 
regulations (identified in section 245), including budget controls for 
each relevant budget restriction (identified in section 250), and, 

* operations controls for each operations control (1) relied on in 
performing financial audit procedures or (2) selected for testing by 
the audit team. (see section 275). 

The auditor is not required to test controls that have not been 
properly designed and implemented (placed in operation). Thus, internal 
controls that are not effective in design do not need to be tested. If 
the auditor determined in a prior year that controls in a particular 
accounting application were ineffective and if management indicates 
that controls have not improved, the auditor need not test them. 

On the other hand, if controls have been determined to be effective in 
design and implemented (placed in operation), the auditor of federal 
financial statements must perform sufficient tests of their 
effectiveness to support a low assessed level of control risk. In such 
cases, the auditor may consider using a rotation approach to testing 
controls over the various accounting applications, as described in FAM 
Section 395 G (and in the FISCAM section 2.1.9.D ï¿½Multiyear Testing 
Plansï¿½). If the auditor expects to disclaim an opinion because of scope 
limitations or inadequate controls, the auditor may limit internal 
control work to updating the understanding of controls and whether they 
have been placed in operation. The auditor may do this by inquiring as 
to whether previously identified control weaknesses have been 
corrected. In the year the auditor expects to issue an opinion on the 
financial statements, the auditor needs a basis of sufficient work on 
internal control. 

In the internal control phase of a financial audit, the auditor should 
perform and document the following procedures: 

* Understand the entity's information systems for financial reporting, 
compliance with laws and regulations, and relevant operations (see FAM 
Section 320). 

* Identify control objectives (see FAM Section 330). 

* Identify and understand relevant control activities that effectively 
achieve the control objectives (see FAM Section 340). 

* Determine the nature, timing, and extent of control testing (see FAM 
Section 350). 

* Perform control tests that do not involve sampling (nonsampling 
control tests - see section 360).1 (Sampling control tests, if 
necessary, are performed in the testing phase, as discussed in FAM 
Section 450.) 

* On a preliminary basis, based on the evidence obtained, assess (1) 
the effectiveness of financial reporting, compliance, and relevant 
operations controls and (2) control and combined risk (see FAM Section 
370). (Combined risk, which includes inherent and control risk, is 
discussed in FAM paragraph 370.09). 

As discussed in FAM Section 310.10, in gaining an understanding of an 
entityï¿½s internal control, including internal control related to IT and 
other business processing performed outside the entity, the auditor 
should obtain evidence about the design of relevant controls and 
whether they have been placed in operation. In obtaining evidence about 
whether controls have been placed in operation, the auditor should 
determine whether the entity is using them, rather than merely having 
them written in a manual, for example. This differs from determining a 
controlï¿½s operating effectiveness, which is concerned with how the 
control was applied, the consistency with which it was applied, and by 
whom. Gaining an understanding of the design of internal control does 
not require that the auditor obtain evidence about operating 
effectiveness. 

As discussed in FAM Section 310.11, the auditor should obtain an 
understanding of internal control for IT and other business processing 
performed outside the entity under a service agreement or other 
contract arrangements for assessing risk and planning other audit 
procedures. The auditor may obtain this understanding by performing 
work directly at the service organization or by using SAS No. 70 
reports that include these internal controls as discussed in AU 324.06-
.21. 

For each potential weakness, consider the impact of compensating 
controls or other factors that mitigate or reduce the risks related to 
potential weaknesses. 

The following sections summarize FAM audit steps related to the testing 
of information system controls. The auditor should coordinate these 
steps with the related FISCAM steps. 

Understand Information Systems: 

FAM Section 320 states that the auditor may use an IS controls 
specialist to assist in understanding and documenting the IT aspects of 
these systems. The auditor should document the understanding of these 
systems in cycle memorandums, or other equivalent narratives, and 
generally should prepare or obtain related flow charts. FAM 340 and 350 
discuss identifying and documenting controls that are designed to 
mitigate the risk of material misstatement. 

Walk-throughs are important for understanding the transaction process 
and for determining appropriate audit procedures. The auditor should 
perform walk-throughs for all significant accounting applications. Walk-
throughs of budget, accounting, compliance, and operations systems 
provide evidence about the functioning of such systems. The auditor 
should document these walk-throughs. The auditor should incorporate the 
IT aspects of each system into the audit documentation and may include 
additional flow charts, narratives, and checklists. 

FAM Section 320 continues that the auditor should obtain an 
understanding of and should document the following for each significant 
cycle and accounting application (including those dealing with RSSI): 
* The manner in which transactions are initiated; 

* The nature and type of records, journals, ledgers, and source 
documents, and the accounts involved; 

* The processing involved from the initiation of transactions to their 
inclusion in the financial statements, including the nature of computer 
files and the manner in which they are accessed, updated, and deleted; 
and; 

* The process used to prepare the entity's financial statements and 
budget information, including significant accounting estimates, 
disclosures, and computerized processing. 

FAM Section 320.03 states that for each significant cycle and 
accounting application identified for significant line items and 
assertions in FAM 240 (including those dealing with RSSI) the auditor 
should obtain an understanding of and should document, among other 
things, processes used to prepare the entityï¿½s financial statements and 
budget information, including significant accounting estimates, 
disclosures, and IT processing. These processes include: 

* Procedures used to enter transaction totals into the general ledger; 

* procedures used to initiate, authorize, record, and process journal 
entries in the general ledger; 

* procedures used to record recurring and nonrecurring adjustments to 
the financial statements; 

* procedures used to combine and consolidate general ledger data; and; 

* closing process, including manual and automated procedures, for 
preparing the financial statements and related disclosures. 

The FISCAM section entitled ï¿½Understand Information Systems Relevant to 
the Audit Objectivesï¿½ included in section 2.2 provides more specific 
guidance on how the auditor obtains an understanding of information 
systems. This FISCAM section includes information that should be 
included in audit documentation. As discussed in FAM Section 320, the 
auditor must document the understanding gained of each component of 
internal control, including the information system. The auditor should 
prepare sufficient documentation to clearly describe the accounting 
system. For each significant cycle, the auditor should prepare a cycle 
memorandum or equivalent. Also, the auditor generally should prepare an 
illustrative flowchart of the cycle and component accounting 
application(s). Flowcharts provide a good mechanism to document the 
process and the flow of transactions through the system. 

However, the auditor should avoid extreme detail, which makes the 
charts confusing and hard to follow. Complex systems, particularly 
those involving IT, may be difficult to understand without a flowchart. 
To the extent required as described above, the auditor should use the 
following documents or equivalents to document. 

Identify Relevant Control Objectives: 

FAM Section 330 discusses the identification of control objectives. In 
a financial audit, the auditor should identify control objectives for 
each type of control that if achieved, would provide the entity with 
reasonable assurance that individual and aggregate misstatements 
(whether caused by error or fraud), losses, or noncompliance material 
to the financial statements would be prevented or detected. For 
Required Supplementary Stewardship Information (RSSI), the Statement of 
Social Insurance, and nonmonetary information in the financial 
statements, such as physical units of heritage assets, the objectives 
would relate to controls that would provide reasonable assurance that 
misstatements, losses, or noncompliance that would be considered 
material by users of the information would be prevented or detected. As 
noted above, control objectives in a financial audit involve: 

* financial reporting controls, including safeguarding controls and 
segregation-of-duties controls, 

* compliance controls, 

* budget controls, and, 

* relevant operations controls. 

As discussed in FAM Section 495A.21, if the reliability of internally-
generated data used in the substantive analytical procedures is 
dependent on the effectiveness of IS controls, the auditor should 
perform additional procedures before relying on the data. The auditor 
should test, as appropriate, (1) the relevant general controls and the 
specific business process application level controls over the data 
and/or (2) the data in the report. 

The FISCAM section "Identify IS Control Techniques That are Relevant to 
the Audit Objectives" included in section 2.2 provides more specific 
guidance on how the auditor identifies relevant IS control activities. 
This FISCAM section includes information that should be included in 
audit documentation. In addition to such documentation, as discussed in 
FAM Sections 390 and 395H, the auditor documents relevant control 
objectives in the SCE form or equivalent documentation. Based on such 
controls and the audit planning procedures (particularly the 
identification of critical control points), the auditor should identify 
those other IS controls (general, business process application, 
interface, and data management system controls) upon which the controls 
in the SCE depend. FISCAM Appendices II and III can be used to document 
such controls. 

Identify Relevant Control Activities: 

As discussed in FAM Section 340, the auditor identifies and understands 
relevant control activities. For each control objective, based on 
discussions with entity personnel and the results of other procedures 
performed, the auditor should identify the control activities designed 
to achieve the specific control objective. The auditor may indicate 
these controls in the auditorï¿½s informal notes and/or interview write-
ups for use in the following procedures, but the auditor need not 
formally document them on the SCE worksheet at this time. The auditor 
should first screen the activities to identify those that are effective 
and efficient to test. An IS controls specialist may assist the auditor 
in identifying and understanding IT controls. As discussed in FAM 350, 
the auditor should use walk-throughs to confirm that the entity has 
implemented these controls identified for further audit procedures. 
These walk-throughs are in addition to those performed earlier to 
understand the transaction processing. As discussed in FAM 270, in 
determining whether control objectives are achieved, the auditor should 
consider both manual and IS controls, if likely to be effective. 

FAM Section 340.05 states that the auditor also should evaluate the 
appropriateness of the specified criteria used to identify items in a 
management or exception report. For example, IT input controls (such as 
the matching of vendor invoices with receiving reports and purchase 
orders) that require exact matches of data from different sources 
before a transaction is accepted for processing may be more effective 
than controls that accept transactions that fall within a broader range 
of values. On the other hand, controls based on exception reports that 
are limited to selected information or use more selective criteria may 
be more effective than lengthy reports that contain excessive 
information. 

The FISCAM section ï¿½Identify IS Control Techniques That are Relevant to 
the Audit Objectivesï¿½ provides more specific guidance on how the 
auditor identifies relevant IS controls. 

The FISCAM is organized in a hierarchical structure to assist the 
auditor in performing the IS controls audit. Chapter 3 (general 
controls) and Chapter 4 (business process application level controls) 
contain several control categories, which are groupings of related 
controls pertaining to similar types of risk. For each control 
category, the manual identifies critical elementsï¿½tasks that are 
essential for establishing adequate controls within the category. For 
each critical element, there is a discussion of the associated 
objectives, risks, and control activities, as well as related potential 
control techniques and suggested audit procedures. This hierarchical 
structure facilitates the auditorï¿½s audit planning and the auditorï¿½s 
analysis of identified control weaknesses. 

Because control activities are generally necessary to achieve the 
critical elements, they are generally relevant to a GAGAS audit unless 
the related control category is not relevant, the audit scope is 
limited, or the auditor determines that, due to significant IS control 
weaknesses, it is not necessary to assess the effectiveness of all 
relevant IS controls. Within each relevant control activity, the 
auditor should identify control techniques implemented by the entity 
and determine whether the control techniques, as designed, are 
sufficient to achieve the control activity, considering IS audit risk 
and the audit objectives. The auditor may be able to determine whether 
control techniques are sufficient to achieve a particular control 
activity without evaluating and testing all of the control techniques. 
Also, depending on IS audit risk and the audit objectives, the nature 
and extent of control techniques necessary to achieve a particular 
control objective will vary. 

If sufficient, the auditor should determine whether the control 
techniques are implemented (placed in operation) and are operating 
effectively. Also, the auditor should evaluate the nature and extent of 
testing performed by the entity. Such information can assist in 
identifying key controls and in assessing risk, but the auditor should 
not rely on testing performed by the entity in lieu of appropriate 
auditor testing. If the control techniques implemented by the entity, 
as designed, are not sufficient to address the control activity, or the 
control techniques are not effectively implemented as designed, the 
auditor should determine the effect on IS controls and the audit 
objectives. 

This FISCAM section includes information that should be included in 
audit documentation. In addition to this documentation, as discussed in 
FAM Sections 390 and 395H, the auditor documents relevant controls in 
the SCE form or equivalent documentation. Based on such controls and 
the audit planning procedures (particularly the identification of 
critical control points), the auditor should identify those other IS 
controls (general, business process application, interface, and data 
management system controls) upon which the controls in the SCE depend. 
FISCAM Appendices II and III can be used to document such controls. 

Determine the Nature, Timing, and Extent of Control Tests: 

FAM Section 350 discusses determining the nature, extent, and timing of 
control tests and compliance with FFMIA. FAM Section 350.01 states that 
for each control objective, the auditor should: 

* identify specific relevant control activities to test (FAM 350.06-
.08), 

* perform walk-throughs to determine whether those controls have been 
placed in operation (FAM 350.09), 

* document these control activities in the SCE worksheet or equivalent 
(FAM 350.10), 

* determine the nature of control tests (FAM 350.11-.18), 

* determine the extent of control tests (FAM 350.19-.20), and, 

* determine the timing of control tests (FAM 350.21). 

As discussed in FAM Section 350, for each control objective identified 
in FAM 330, the auditor should identify the control activity, or 
combination of control activities, that is likely to (1) achieve the 
control objective and (2) improve the efficiency of control tests. In 
doing this, the auditor should consider (1) the extent of any inherent 
risk and control environment, risk assessment, communication, or 
monitoring weaknesses, including those related to IS controls (as 
documented in the ARA and/or audit strategy document, or equivalent 
(see FAM 260)), and (2) the tentative determination of the likelihood 
that IS controls will be effective, as determined in the planning phase 
(see FAM 270). The auditor generally should test only the control 
activities necessary to achieve the objective. 

If, in any phase of the audit, the auditor determines that control 
activities selected for testing are, in fact, ineffective in design or 
operation, the auditor should discontinue the specific control 
evaluation of the related control objectives and should report the 
identified weaknesses in internal control as discussed in FAM 580. This 
would include situations where the control activities are not effective 
in design or operation due to ineffective IS controls. If the entityï¿½s 
management does not agree with the auditorï¿½s conclusion that effective 
control activities do not exist or are unlikely to exist, the auditor 
may need to perform procedures sufficient to support that conclusion. 

As discussed in FAM Section 350.10, the auditor should document the 
control activities to be tested on the SCE worksheet or equivalent (see 
an illustration in FAM 395 H). The auditor generally should test other 
components of internal control by observation and inquiry in the 
planning phase (see FAM 260.09). The auditor may list (and evaluate) 
controls that satisfy more than one control objective only once and 
refer to these controls, when applicable, on subsequent occasions. For 
each control to be tested, the auditor should determine whether the 
control is an IS control. An IS controls specialist generally should 
review and concur with the auditorï¿½s identification of IS controls. 

For every IS control identified above and included in the SCE form or 
equivalent document, based upon IS controls audit planning, the IS 
controls specialist should identify the general controls (entitywide, 
and system levels) and business process application level controls upon 
which the IS controls depend. Such systems and business process 
application level controls would principally relate to the critical 
control points. For example, if the IS control is the review of an 
exception report, the auditor should identify and test the business 
process application controls directly related to the production of the 
exception report, as well as the general and other business process 
application controls upon which the reliability of the information in 
the exception report depends, including the proper functioning of the 
business process application that generated the exception report and 
the reliability of the data used to generate the exception report. In 
addition, the auditor should test the effectiveness of the user control 
(i.e., management review and followup on the items in the exception 
report). 

Test Information System Controls: 

FAM Section 360 discusses tests of application controls and user 
controls. As discussed in FAM Section 360.10, the auditor, with IS 
controls specialist assistance, generally should perform tests of those 
application controls and user controls necessary to achieve the control 
objectives where the entitywide, system, and application-level general 
controls were determined to be effective. 

FAM 360.01 states that the auditor should design and conduct tests of 
control activities that are effective in design to determine their 
effectiveness in operation. (See FAM 380.02 if control activities are 
not effective in design during the entire audit period.) The auditor 
generally should: 

* request IS controls specialist assistance and test IS controls (FAM 
360.03-.10), 

* perform nonsampling control tests (the auditor generally should 
perform sampling control tests in the testing phase, as discussed in 
FAM 450), (FAM 360.11-.13), and; 

* evaluate the results of nonsampling control tests (FAM 360.14-.15). 

If the auditor identifies IS controls for testing, the auditor, with IS 
controls specialist assistance, should evaluate the effectiveness of 
relevant: 

* general controls at the entitywide and system level; 

* general controls at the business process application level; and; 

* specific business process controls, interface controls, data 
management system controls and/or user controls, unless the IS controls 
that achieve the control objectives are general controls. 

If controls are not effective, see FAM 360.07 and FAM 360.09. It is 
generally more efficient for the auditor to test IS controls on a 
tiered basis, starting with the general controls at the entitywide and 
system levels, followed by the general controls at the business process 
application level, and concluding with tests of business process 
application, interface, and data management system controls at the 
business process application level. Such a testing strategy may be used 
because ineffective IS controls at each tier generally preclude 
effective controls at the subsequent tier. 

The auditor, with IS controls specialist assistance, should determine 
whether relevant entitywide and system level general controls are 
effectively designed, implemented, and operating effectively by: 

* identifying applicable general controls; 

* determining how those controls function, and whether they have been 
placed in operation; and; 

* evaluating and testing the effectiveness of the identified controls. 
The auditor and the IS controls specialist generally should use 
knowledge obtained in the planning phase. 

The auditor, with assistance from the IS controls specialist, should 
document the understanding of general controls and should conclude 
whether such controls are effectively designed, placed in operation, 
and, for those controls tested, operating as intended. 

Tests of General Controls at the Entitywide and System Levels: 

The auditor may test general controls through a combination of 
procedures, including observation, inquiry, inspection (which includes 
a review of documentation on systems and procedures), and reperformance 
using appropriate test software. Although sampling is generally not 
used to test general controls, the auditor may use sampling to test 
certain controls, such as those involving approvals. 

If general controls are not effectively designed and operating as 
intended, the auditor will generally be unable to obtain satisfaction 
that application controls are effective. In such instances, the auditor 
should (1) determine and document the nature and extent of risks 
resulting from ineffective general controls and (2) identify and test 
any manual controls that achieve the control objectives that the IS 
controls in the SCE or equivalent document were to achieve. 

However, if manual controls do not achieve the control objectives, the 
auditor, with IS controls specialist assistance, should determine 
whether any specific IS controls are designed to achieve the 
objectives. If not, the auditor should develop appropriate findings 
principally to provide recommendations to improve internal control. If 
specific IS controls are designed to achieve the objectives, but are in 
fact ineffective because of poor general controls, testing would 
typically not be necessary, except to support findings. 

Tests of General Controls at the Business Process Application Level: 

If the auditor reaches a favorable conclusion on general controls at 
the entitywide and system levels, the IS controls specialist should 
evaluate and test the effectiveness of general controls for those 
business process applications within which business process application 
controls or user controls are to be tested. 

If general controls are not operating effectively within the 
application, application controls and user controls generally will be 
ineffective. In such instances, the IS controls specialist should 
discuss the nature and extent of risks resulting from ineffective 
general controls with the audit team. The auditor should determine 
whether to proceed with the evaluation of application controls and user 
controls. 

Tests of Business Process Application Controls and User Controls: 

The auditor, with IS controls specialist assistance, generally should 
perform tests of those business process application controls (business 
process controls, interface controls, and data management system 
controls), and user controls necessary to achieve the control 
objectives where the entitywide, system, and application-level general 
controls were determined to be effective. 

As discussed in FAM Section 360.13, the auditor should test segregation 
of duties in the situations described in FAM 330.08. The auditor may 
use the following procedures to test segregation-of-duties controls: 

a. Identify the assets to be controlled through the segregation of 
duties. 

b. Identify the individuals who have authorized access (direct or 
indirect) to the assets. Direct access exists when the individual is 
authorized to handle the assets directly (such as during the processing 
of cash receipts). Indirect access exists when the individual is 
authorized to prepare documents that cause the release or transfer of 
assets (such as preparing the necessary forms to request a cash 
disbursement or transfer of inventory). 

c. For each individual with authorized access to assets, determine 
whether there are sufficient asset access controls. Asset access 
controls are those controls that are designed to provide assurance that 
actions taken by individuals with authorized access to assets are 
reviewed and approved by other individuals. For example, an approval of 
an invoice for payment generally provides asset access controls 
(relating to cash) over those individuals authorized to prepare 
supporting documentation for the transaction. If IS controls provide 
access to assets, the auditor should design tests of IS controls to 
identify (1) individuals (including IT personnel) who may use the 
computer to obtain access and (2) asset access controls over such 
individuals. 

d. For individuals with authorized access to assets over which asset 
access controls are insufficient, determine whether such individuals 
can affect any recording of transactions in the accounting records. If 
so, segregation of duties is insufficient, unless such access to 
accounting records is controlled. For example, the person who processes 
cash receipts may also be able to record entries in the accounting 
records. 

Such a person may be in a position to manipulate the accounting records 
to conceal a shortage in the cash account, unless another individual 
reviews all accounting entries made (and those that should have been 
made) by that person. In an IT accounting system, access to assets 
frequently provides access to records. For example, generation of a 
check may automatically record a related accounting entry. In such 
circumstances, a lack of asset access controls would result in 
inadequate segregation of duties, and the auditor should determine 
whether other controls would mitigate the effects of this lack of asset 
access control. 

The FISCAM section ï¿½Test Information System Controlsï¿½ included in 
section 2.2 provides more specific guidance on how the auditor tests 
relevant IS control techniques. This FISCAM section includes 
information that should be included in audit documentation. In 
addition, FISCAM Chapters 3 and 4 provide general controls and business 
process application level controls consistent with GAGAS categories. In 
addition, Appendices II and III may be used to document the results of 
the IS controls audit tests. 

As discussed in FAM Section 390, the auditor should document the 
evaluation of specific control activities in the SCE worksheet or 
equivalent. The auditor should document control tests in the control 
test audit plan (formerly referred to as the audit program) and in 
accompanying documents. The auditor should also document any IT system 
control tests as discussed in FAM 370.05. FAM 395 H presents an example 
of a completed SCE worksheet documents. FISCAM Appendices II and III 
can be used to document such controls. 

Reporting The Results Of The Is Controls Audit: 

FAM Sections 370 and 580 discuss the auditorï¿½s assessment of the 
effectiveness of IS controls based on internal control tests performed. 
As discussed in FAM Section 370.03, based on the procedures performed, 
the auditor and IS controls specialist should discuss conclusions on 
the effectiveness of IS controls and reach agreement. The auditor 
should (1) incorporate the conclusions into the audit documentation for 
each IS control tested and (2) perform tests of application controls 
(principally manual follow-up of exceptions) or user controls 
identified by the IS controls specialist for the audit team to test. 

If the auditor and the IS controls specialist determine that IS 
controls are effective, the auditor may also ask the IS controls 
specialist to identify any IS controls within the applications tested 
that were not previously identified by the auditor using the above 
procedures. For example, such IS controls might achieve control 
objectives not otherwise achieved through manual controls or might be 
more efficient or effective to test than manual controls. The IS 
controls specialist may assist the auditor in determining the 
efficiency and effectiveness of searching for and testing additional IS 
controls. The auditor should document these decisions, including a 
description of the expected scope of the IS controls specialistï¿½s work. 

The auditor and the IS controls specialist should work together to 
document the procedures for evaluating and testing the effectiveness of 
IS controls and the results of this work. 

The FISCAM section 2.3 ï¿½Report Audit Resultsï¿½ provides more specific 
guidance on how the auditor evaluates the results of tests of IS 
controls within the context of a financial audit. More specifically, 
the section discusses the auditorï¿½s considerations for determining 
whether IS control weaknesses are material weaknesses, significant 
deficiencies, and significant deficiencies for purposes of FFMIA 
reporting. 

Steps in Assessing Information System Controls: 

As discussed in FAM 270, the following flowcharts illustrate steps the 
auditor and the IS controls specialist generally follow in assessing IS 
controls in a financial statement audit. However, the audit team may 
decide to test the effectiveness of the general controls even if they 
are not likely to be effective (see fig. 6) or review business process 
application controls even though general controls are not effective 
(see fig. 7), in order to make recommendations on how to fix weak 
controls. 

Figure 6: Steps in Assessing IT Systems Controls in a Financial 
Statement Audit: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a chart of the steps in assessing it systems controls in 
a financial statement audit, as follows: 

1) Identify significant applications and key processing locations [A]; 
2) Obtain background information; Appendix I in FISCAM, "Information 
System Controls Audit Planning Checklist" may be used; [B]; 
3) Obtain overview of each significant application and design of 
related business process application controls [A]; (Consider: Business 
process controls [input, processing, output, and master data]; 
Interface controls; Data management system controls);[B]; 
4) Perform preliminary assessment of design of relevant IS controls
(based primarily on inquiry with limited observation and walk-through 
procedures) (Appendices II and III in FISCAM may be used to document 
design of general controls); [B]; 
- Consider: Security management; Logical and physical access controls; 
Configuration management; Segregation of duties; Contingency Planning; 
[B]; 
- Develop approach that assesses control risk as high (maximum for all 
IS related controls); approach cannot rely on any related IS controls; 
[A]; 
- Indicate on SCE Form that all IS controls are ineffective;[A]; 
- Perform revised substantive tests; [A]; 
- Develop findings; [A]; 
- Report results; [A]; 
- Stop. 

5) Are controls likely to be effective? 
If yes: 
6) Perform detail tests of relevant General Controls (entitywide, 
system, and business process application levels); Appendices II and III 
in FISCAM may be used to document tests of general controls; Use 
practice ais for technical areas; [B]; 
If no: 
- Develop approach that assesses control risk as high (maximum for all 
IS related controls); approach cannot rely on any related IS controls; 
[A]; 
- Indicate on SCE Form that all IS controls are ineffective;[A]; 
- Perform revised substantive tests; [A]; 
- Develop findings; [A]; 
- Report results; [A]; 
- Stop. 

7) Are general controls effective: 
If yes: 
Audit; 
If no: 
- Develop approach that assesses control risk as high (maximum for all 
IS related controls); approach cannot rely on any related IS controls; 
[A]; 
- Indicate on SCE Form that all IS controls are ineffective;[A]; 
- Perform revised substantive tests; [A]; 
- Develop findings; [A]; 
- Report results; [A]; 
- Stop. 

[A] Usually done by auditor in consultation with IS controls 
specialist. 

[B] Usually done by IS controls specialist in consultation with 
auditor. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 7: Steps for Each Significant Application in Assessing 
Information System Controls in a Financial Statement Audit: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a chart of the Steps for each significant application in 
assessing information system controls in a financial statement audit, 
as follows: 

Audit: 
1) Identify on SCE form the IS controls that are the basis of control 
risk assessment[A]; 
2) Perform detail tests of those IS controls and related business 
process application controls on which their effectiveness depends[B]; 
Appendices II and III in FISCAM may be used to document tests of 
business process application controls[B]; Consider: Business process 
controls (input, processing, output, master data), Interface controls, 
Data management system controls[B]; 
3) Are these IS controls operating effectively? 
If yes: 
4) Do not change control risk assessment[A]; 
5) Perform planned substantive testing[A]; 
- Develop findings[A]; 
- Report results[A]; 
- Stop. 
If no: 
- Change control risk assessment and related substantive testing[A]; 
- Perform revised substantive tests[A]; 
- Develop findings[A]; 
- Report results[A]; 
- Stop. 

[A] Usually done by auditor in consultation with IS controls 
specialist. 

[B] Usually done by IS controls specialist in consultation with 
auditor. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

[End of appendix] 

Appendix VII - Entityï¿½s Use of Service Organizations: 

Many entities use outside service organizations to support business 
processes. Service organizations provide services ranging from 
performing a specific task (e.g., payroll processing) to replacing 
entire business units or functions of an entity. To determine the 
significance of the functions performed by service organizations to the 
audit objectives, auditors should obtain information about (1) services 
performed by the service organizations, (2) the related service 
organization controls, and (3) their effects on the audit objectives. 

If an organization uses a service organization, information and 
information processing are subjected to controls that may be physically 
and operationally removed from the user organization. Consequently, an 
entityï¿½s internal control may include controls that are not directly 
administered by the user organization, but rather by the service 
organization. For this reason, to obtain an understanding of IS 
controls, the auditor of the user organization (the user auditor) 
should gain an understanding of controls at the service organization 
that may affect the user organizationï¿½s business processes. This 
understanding may be gained in several ways, including discussions with 
management and/or obtaining a service auditorï¿½s report. In addition, 
FISMA requirements specifically apply to information systems used or 
operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or other 
organization on behalf of the entity. 

During the planning stage of the audit, the user auditor should 
determine the significance of the service organizationï¿½s controls to 
the user organizationï¿½s internal control and to the audit objectives. 
Factors that may affect the significance to the audit of a service 
organizationï¿½s controls include the following: 

* The nature and materiality/significance of the transactions or 
information affected by the service organization 

* The degree of interaction between internal control at the user 
organization and the service organizationï¿½s controls. The degree of 
interaction refers to the extent to which a user organization is able 
to and elects to implement effective controls over the processing 
performed by the service organization. 

With respect to financial audits, a service organizationï¿½s services are 
part of an entityï¿½s information system, and therefore significant to 
the user organizationï¿½s internal control, if they affect any of the 
following: 

* The classes of transactions in the entityï¿½s operations that are 
significant to the financial statements; 

* The procedures, both automated and manual, by which the entityï¿½s 
transactions are initiated, recorded, processed, and reported, from 
their occurrence to their inclusion in the financial statements; 

* The related accounting records (whether electronic or manual), 
supporting information, and specific accounts in the financial 
statements involved in initiating, recording, processing, and reporting 
the entityï¿½s transactions; 

* How the entityï¿½s information system captures other events and 
conditions that are significant to the financial statements; 

* The financial reporting process used to prepare the entityï¿½s 
financial statements, including significant accounting estimates and 
disclosures. 

If the user auditor determines that the service organizationï¿½s controls 
are significant to the user organizationï¿½s internal control, and within 
the context of the audit objectives, the user auditor should gain a 
sufficient understanding of those controls to assess risk and plan the 
audit. Such controls include (1) user controls and (2) other controls 
implemented by the user entity to monitor the effectiveness of the 
design and operation of controls related to the information processed 
by the service organization. Such monitoring controls could include: 

* contractual security requirements, 
* service level agreements,
* receipt and analysis of service organization reports, 
* additional testing requested of the service auditor or performed by 
the user entity, and; 
* other user entity controls. 

If the service organizationï¿½s controls are significant to the user 
organizationï¿½s internal control and within the context of the audit 
objectives, inadequate monitoring controls prevent entity management 
from having reasonable assurance that controls over the information 
processed and/or maintained by the service organization are designed 
and operating effectively. 

Sources of information include analysis of user controls implemented by 
the user entity and interviews of appropriate entity personnel. Also, 
the auditor may review any service auditor reports. The service 
organization may hire an independent auditor (referred to as the 
service auditor) to provide a report (referred to as the SAS 70 report) 
on the internal controls at the service provider. Each user 
organization and its auditor may use this report to assess the internal 
control policies and procedures at the service organization as part of 
the overall evaluation of the internal control at the user 
organization. If additional information about service bureau controls 
is still needed, the auditor may contact the service organization, 
through the user entity, for additional information. 

The user auditor should obtain a sufficient understanding of internal 
control to evaluate the effectiveness of the design of controls 
relevant to the audit objectives and determine whether they have been 
implemented. In some instances, the user entity may have effective 
controls over the service organization. In such cases, evidence about 
the operating effectiveness of internal control can be obtained from 
the user entity. However, in other cases, the controls are applied only 
at the service organization. 

For internal control that is significant within the context of the 
audit objectives, auditors should assess whether internal control has 
been properly designed and implemented. Based on the user auditorï¿½s 
understanding of the design effectiveness and implementation of 
internal control, the auditor should assess risks relevant to the audit 
objectives. In a financial statement audit, the auditor should identify 
and assess the risk of material misstatement at the financial statement 
level and at the relevant assertion level related to classes of 
transactions, account balances, and disclosures. 

In a performance audit, for those internal controls that are deemed 
significant within the context of the audit objectives, auditors should 
plan to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to support their 
assessment about the operating effectiveness of those controls, 
including tests of such controls. In a financial audit, the auditor 
should perform tests of the operating effectiveness of controls when 
the auditorï¿½s risk assessment includes an expectation of the operating 
effectiveness of controls or when substantive procedures alone do not 
provide sufficient appropriate audit evidence at the relevant assertion 
level. For federal financial audits, OMB requires auditors of federal 
financial statements to test those controls that are effectively 
designed. 

To obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence about the operating 
effectiveness of service organization controls, the auditor may 
determine that it is appropriate to use a service auditorï¿½s report. In 
such instances, the auditor should determine whether the service 
auditorï¿½s report is sufficient to meet the audit objectives. For 
financial audits, the auditorï¿½s considerations are discussed at AU 543 
(Part of Audit Performed by Other Independent Auditors). In some 
instances, the user auditor may determine that it is necessary and 
appropriate to supplement the service auditor report by discussing it 
with the service auditor, by requesting the service auditor to perform 
agreed-upon procedures, or by performing procedures at the service 
organization. In addition, in some instances, the user auditor may 
request the service auditor to perform tests of data maintained by the 
service organizations. Any such requests of the service auditor should 
be coordinated through the user and service organizations. 

A service auditor may provide a service organization with one of two 
types of SAS 70 reports: 

* Type 1 is a report on the design and implementation of controls 
(placed in operation) at a service organization, but does not include 
testing of the operating effectiveness of controls. This information, 
in conjunction with other information about a user organizationï¿½s 
internal control, may assist the user auditor in obtaining an 
understanding of the user organizationï¿½s internal control. A type 1 
report is not intended to provide a basis for the auditor to reduce the 
assessment of risk, because it does not include control testing to 
determine whether the controls are operating effectively. 

* Type 2 is a report on the design and implementation of controls 
(placed in operation) and on their operating effectiveness. In a type 2 
engagement, the service auditor performs the procedures required for a 
type 1 engagement and also performs tests of specific controls to 
evaluate their operating effectiveness in achieving the specified 
control objectives. The service auditor issues a report that includes 
the type 1 report opinions and refers the reader to a description of 
tests of operative effectiveness performed by a service auditor. The 
report states whether, in the opinion of the service auditor, the 
controls tested were operating with sufficient effectiveness to provide 
reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that the related control 
objectives were achieved during the period specified. If a service 
organizationï¿½s controls that affect a user organizationï¿½s financial 
statements are operating with sufficient effectiveness to achieve the 
related control objectives, a user auditor may be able to use the type 
2 report as evidence of control effectiveness, reduce their assessment 
of risk for certain financial statement assertions affected by the 
service organizationï¿½s service, and reduce the extent of substantive 
procedures performed for those assertions. 

The nature, timing, and extent of the tests of operating effectiveness 
are also affected by the period covered by the report. Tests of 
operating effectiveness may provide evidence that will enable the 
service auditor to report on the entire period covered by the report. 
To be useful to user auditors, the report ordinarily should cover the 
reporting period of the user organization. If it does not cover the 
entire reporting period, the user auditor should evaluate the related 
effect on the user auditorï¿½s risk assessment and, for the period not 
covered by the service auditor report(s), should evaluate the adequacy 
of evidence about the operating effective of controls. 

The service organization is responsible for identifying the internal 
controls that may be relevant to a user organizationï¿½s internal control 
(description of controls). The service auditor is responsible for 
determining whether the description provides sufficient information for 
user auditors to obtain an understanding of those aspects of the 
service organizationï¿½s controls that would have an effect on the user 
organizationï¿½s internal control. Also, the service auditor may identify 
certain controls that the service organization assumes would be 
implemented by the user organization. 

In OMB Circular A-123, Appendix A, OMB stated that an agency can 
leverage SAS 70 reports during the assessment. Management must 
determine if a Type II SAS 70 report exists and consider whether it is 
sufficient in scope. Agency management should look at the scope of the 
SAS 70 report in the context of the overall internal control assessment 
when considering the nature and type of other assessment activities 
needed outside of the SAS 70 process. A Type II SAS 70 report is 
required to be prepared by all federal entities that cross-service 
other federal entities per OMB Memorandum M-04-11, Service Organization 
Audits. In addition, the ï¿½Implementation Guide for OMB Circular A-123, 
Managementï¿½s Responsibility for Internal Control Appendix A, Internal 
Control over Financial Reporting,ï¿½ issued by the Chief Financial 
Officerï¿½s Council (July 2005) provides guidance for considering service 
organization controls as part of the annual A-123 assessment. 

FISMA applies to both (1) information collected or maintained by or on 
behalf of an agency and (2) information systems used or operated by an 
agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf 
of an agency. As discussed in OMB Memoranda, as part of FISMA, agency 
management is responsible for ensuring that contractors (and others 
covered by FISMA) meet FISMA requirements, including annual testing. 
SAS 70 reports may provide sufficient evidence of contractor 
compliance. However, it may not address all of the FISMA control 
objectives and it may not ensure the specific systems that support the 
government or contract activity are actually reviewed. 

Therefore, in determining whether SAS 70 reports provide sufficient 
evidence of contractor system FISMA compliance, it is the agencyï¿½s 
responsibility to ensure: 

* The scope of the SAS 70 audit was sufficient, and fully addressed the 
specific contractor system requiring FISMA review. 

* The audit encompassed all controls and requirements of law, OMB 
policy and NIST guidance. 

In addition, NIST SP 800-47 discusses additional steps agency 
management should implement with respect to contractors, such as an 
Interconnection Security Agreement (ISA) and a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU). The ISA specifies the technical and security 
requirements of the interconnection, and the MOU defines the 
responsibilities of the participating organizations. 

SAS 70 reports do not include contingency planning controls, as 
auditing standards (AU 324) do not apply to internal control 
deficiencies that affect processing in future periods. However, service 
auditors can be requested to perform procedures to test the 
effectiveness of contingency planning controls and report the results 
of such testing to service organization management, who may in turn 
disclose the information and plans to correct deficiencies in the 
section of the SAS 70 report titled ï¿½Other Information Provided by the 
Service Organization.ï¿½ 

The FISCAM can be used as a basis for performing a SAS 70 audit, using 
the control objectives discussed in Chapter 1. 

[End of appendix] 

Appendix VIII - Application of FISCAM to Single Audits[Footnote 99]: 

The FISCAM can be used to assess information system controls over 
compliance requirements and financial reporting in connection with a 
single audit. The following provides a brief introduction to single 
audit requirements and how the FISCAM relates to such requirements. See 
the Single Audit Act, as amended, OMB Circular A-133, the Compliance 
Supplement, and the AICPA Audit Guide: Government Auditing Standards 
and Circular A-133 Audits for additional information. 

Single audits include opinions on the entityï¿½s financial statements, 
the schedule of expenditures of federal awards, and the entityï¿½s 
compliance with laws, regulations, and the provisions of contracts or 
grant agreements pertaining to federal awards that may have a direct 
and material effect on each of its major programs (referred to as 
compliance requirements). Government Auditing Standards (ï¿½yellow bookï¿½) 
require certain audit procedures relating to internal controls over 
financial reporting in relation to the audit of the financial 
statements and the schedule of expenditures. In addition, auditors 
performing a single audit should obtain evidence about the 
effectiveness of internal control over the compliance requirements of 
major Federal programs. 

In assessing internal control over compliance requirements and 
financial reporting, the auditor should evaluate whether the each of 
the specific control techniques that are significant to compliance and 
financial reporting is an information systems (IS) control. An IS 
controls specialist generally should review and concur with the audit 
teamï¿½s identification of IS controls, particularly with respect to 
whether all IS controls were properly identified as such. 

As discussed in Chapter 1, IS controls consist of those internal 
controls that are dependent on information systems processing and 
include general controls (entitywide, system, and business process 
application levels), business process application controls (input, 
processing, output, master file, interface, and data management system 
controls), and user controls [Footnote 100] (controls performed by 
people interacting with information systems). General and business 
process application controls are always IS controls. A user control is 
an IS control if its effectiveness depends on information systems 
processing or the reliability (accuracy, completeness, and validity) of 
information processed by information systems. Conversely, a user 
control is not an IS control if its effectiveness does not depend on 
information systems processing or the reliability of information 
processed by information systems. 

The FISCAM can be used to determine whether IS controls are (1) 
appropriately designed and implemented (placed in operation), and (2) 
operating effectively. 

As discussed in Chapter 2, the auditor should identify and document the 
other entitywide, system, and business process level IS controls upon 
which the effectiveness of each significant IS control technique 
depends. These other IS controls will principally relate to the 
entitywide level controls and to each of the critical control points 
(including control dependencies) at the system and business process 
application levels. For example, if the IS control is the review of an 
exception report, the auditor should identify and test the business 
process application controls directly related to the production of the 
exception report, as well as the general and other business process 
application controls upon which the reliability of the information in 
the exception report depends, including the proper functioning of the 
business process application that generated the exception report and 
the reliability of the data used to generate the exception report. In 
addition, the auditor should test the effectiveness of the user control 
(i.e., management review and followup on the items in the exception 
report). 

The following sections address the audit procedures that should be 
applied in a single audit with respect to controls over (1) compliance 
requirements and (2) financial reporting. 

Internal Control over Compliance Requirements: 

To evaluate internal control over compliance requirements for major 
programs, the auditor should: 

* plan the audit and testing of internal control to support a low 
assessed level of control risk for the assertions relevant to the 
compliance requirements for each major program, and; 

* unless internal controls are ineffective in design, perform testing 
of the operating effectiveness of internal controls as planned to 
support a low assessed level of control risk for the assertions 
relevant to the compliance requirements for each major program. 

When internal control over compliance requirements for a major program 
is ineffective in preventing or detecting noncompliance (either in 
design or operation), the auditor should report a significant 
deficiency (including whether any such condition is a material 
weakness), assess the related control risk at the maximum, and 
determine whether to apply further audit procedures to test compliance 
based on ineffective internal control. 

In planning and performing a single audit, the auditor should: 

* Identify the major programs subject to the single audit. 

* Identify systems that process data for major programs. 

* Determine the types of compliance requirements that are relevant to 
the audit (see A-133 and the Compliance Supplement). 

* For each relevant type of compliance requirement, determine/identify 
the relevant control objectives (see the Compliance Supplement). 

* For each relevant control objective, identify the internal control 
technique(s) designed/implemented by the entity to achieve the 
objective. 

* Determine whether such control techniques are effectively designed to 
achieve the related control objective(s) and if so, whether they are 
placed in operation (implemented), including related IS controls upon 
which the effectiveness of the control technique depends. The auditor 
can use the FISCAM to assess the effectiveness of the design of IS 
control techniques and whether they have been implemented (placed in 
operation). 

* For each control that is effectively designed and implemented (placed 
in operation), the auditor should determine whether it is effectively 
operating. The auditor can use the FISCAM to determine whether IS 
controls are effectively operating. As discussed in Chapter 2, for each 
IS control technique, the auditor should test the effectiveness of: 
- the specific IS control technique, and; 
- the business process application and general controls upon which the 
effectiveness of specific IS control depends. 

When the auditor assesses control risk below the maximum level, the 
auditor should obtain sufficient evidential matter to support that 
assessed level of control risk. The type of evidential matter, its 
source, its timeliness, and the existence of other evidential matter 
related to the conclusions to which it leads all bear on the degree of 
assurance the evidential matter provides. 

Based on the tests of controls, the auditor should draw conclusions on 
the assessed level of control risk. The auditor should also consider 
the impact on the assessment of internal controls of any exceptions 
noted as part of the audit procedures applied to test conformance with 
compliance requirements. The assessment of the effectiveness of 
internal control over compliance in preventing or detecting 
noncompliance is determined in relation to each individual type of 
compliance requirement for each major program or to an audit objective 
identified in the Compliance Supplement (e.g., controls over 
requirements for eligibility). 

The auditor should determine whether any deficiencies in IS controls 
represent material weaknesses or significant deficiencies. The 
following definitions are provided in the draft reports on A-133 
provided by the AICPA[Footnote 101]: 

* A control deficiency in an entityï¿½s internal control over compliance 
exists when the design or operation of a control does not allow 
management or employees, in the normal course of performing their 
assigned functions, to prevent or detect noncompliance with a type of 
compliance requirement of a federal program on a timely basis. 

* A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or combination of 
control deficiencies, that adversely affects the entityï¿½s ability to 
administer a federal program such that there is more than a remote 
likelihood that noncompliance with a type of compliance requirement of 
a federal program that is more than inconsequential will not be 
prevented or detected by the entityï¿½s internal control. 

* A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or combination of 
significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood 
that material noncompliance with a type of compliance requirement of a 
federal program will not be prevented or detected by the entityï¿½s 
internal control. 

The objectives of internal control pertaining to the compliance 
requirements for Federal programs are as follows: 

(1) Transactions are properly recorded and accounted for to: 
(i) Permit the preparation of reliable financial statements and Federal 
reports; 
(ii) Maintain accountability over assets; and; 
(iii) Demonstrate compliance with laws, regulations, and other 
compliance requirements; 

(2) Transactions are executed in compliance with: 
(i) Laws, regulations, and the provisions of contracts or grant 
agreements that could have a direct and material effect on a Federal 
program; and; 
(ii) Any other laws and regulations that are identified in the 
compliance supplements; and; 

(3) Funds, property, and other assets are safeguarded against loss from 
unauthorized use or disposition. 

Part 6 of the Compliance Supplement is designed to assist non-Federal 
entities and their auditors in complying with these requirements by 
describing, for each type of compliance requirement, the objectives of 
internal control, and certain characteristics of internal control that, 
when present and operating effectively, may ensure compliance with 
program requirements. Part 6 cautions that the categorizations used in 
the Supplement may not necessarily reflect how an entity considers and 
implements internal control. Also, Part 6 was not designed as a 
checklist of required internal control characteristics. Non-Federal 
entities could have adequate internal control even though some or all 
of the characteristics included in Part 6 are not present. Further, non-
Federal entities could have other appropriate internal controls 
operating effectively that have not been included in Part 6. Non-
Federal entities and their auditors should exercise judgment in 
determining the most appropriate and cost effective internal control in 
a given environment or circumstance to provide reasonable assurance for 
compliance with Federal program requirements. 

The characteristics of internal control in Part 6 of the Compliance 
Supplement are presented in the context of the components of internal 
control discussed in Internal Control-Integrated Framework (COSO 
Report), published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission. These components are consistent with the Standards 
for Internal Control in the Federal Government (Green Book). [Footnote 
102] Part 6 describes characteristics of internal control relating to 
each of the five components of internal control that should reasonably 
assure compliance with the requirements of Federal laws, regulations, 
and program compliance requirements. 

Internal Control over Financial Reporting: 

In addition, the auditor should gather evidence about internal controls 
over financial reporting, including information system controls, as 
part of the financial audits of the financial statements and schedule 
of expenditures of federal awards. The auditor may use evidence 
gathered in connection with the testing of controls over compliance 
discussed above. 

GAGAS financial audit standards require the auditor to obtain an 
understanding of internal control over financial reporting sufficient 
to assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements 
whether due to error or fraud, and to design the nature, timing, and 
extent of further audit procedures. This includes performing risk 
assessment procedures to evaluate the design of controls relevant to an 
audit of financial statements and to determine whether they have been 
implemented. In obtaining this understanding, the auditor considers how 
an entityï¿½s use of information technology (IT) and manual procedures 
affect controls relevant to the audit. The FISCAM can be used to assist 
the auditor in obtaining an understanding of internal controls relevant 
to the financial statements and schedule of expenditures of federal 
awards. 

In addition, when the auditor has determined that it is not possible or 
practicable to reduce the detection risk at the relevant assertion 
level to an acceptably low level with audit evidence obtained only from 
substantive procedures, the auditor should perform tests of controls to 
obtain audit evidence about their operating effectiveness. For example, 
the auditor may find it impossible to design effective substantive 
procedures that by themselves provide sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence at the relevant assertion level when an entity conducts its 
business using information technology (IT) and no documentation of 
transactions is produced or maintained, other than through the IT 
system. 

Specifically, as discussed in Chapter 2, for those internal controls 
over financial reporting that the auditor (1) has determined are 
suitably designed and implemented (2) plans to test whether they are 
operating effectively, and (3) has determined to be IS controls (as 
defined above), the auditor should test the effectiveness of: 

* the specific IS control, and; 

* the business process application and general controls upon which the 
effectiveness of specific IS control depends. 

The FISCAM can be used to assess the effectiveness of the design and 
operation of information system controls as part of the financial 
audits of the financial statements and schedule of expenditures of 
federal awards. 

[End of appendix] 

Appendix IX - Application of FISCAM to FISMA: 

The FISCAM may be used as a basis for the independent evaluation of a 
federal agencyï¿½s information security program required by the Federal 
Information Security Management Act (FISMA). A FISMA evaluation does 
not require an audit or the use of the FISCAM. Also, this guidance may 
be used to perform FISMA evaluations that are not based on GAGAS 
audits. For FISMA evaluations not performed as GAGAS audits, auditor 
judgment can be used to determine the appropriate level of 
documentation. This section provides guidance on how the FISCAM can be 
used as the basis for a FISMA evaluation. 

Background: 

FISMA requires that each year each agency shall have performed an 
independent evaluation of the information security program and 
practices of that agency to determine the effectiveness of such program 
and practices (see Appendix X ï¿½ FISMA legislation). Each evaluation 
shall include: 

* testing of the effectiveness of information security policies, 
procedures, and practices of a representative subset of the agencyï¿½s 
information systems; 

* an assessment (made on the basis of the results of the testing) of 
compliance with the requirements of FISMA; and related information 
security policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines; and; 

* separate presentations, as appropriate, regarding information 
security relating to national security systems. 

The independent annual evaluation for non-national security systems is 
to be performed (1) for each agency with an Inspector General appointed 
under the Inspector General Act of 1978, by the Inspector General or an 
independent external auditor, as determined by the Inspector General of 
the agency; or (2) for those agencies without an inspector general, by 
an independent external auditor engaged by the head of the agency. For 
each agency operating or exercising control of a national security 
system, that portion of the evaluation required by this section 
directly relating to a national security system shall be performed (1) 
only by an entity designated by the agency head; and (2) in such a 
manner as to ensure appropriate protection for information associated 
with any information security vulnerability in such system commensurate 
with the risk and in accordance with all applicable laws. 

The annual independent evaluation section may be based in whole or in 
part on an audit, evaluation, or report relating to programs or 
practices of the applicable agency. Each year, the head of each agency 
shall submit to the Director of OMB the results of the evaluation. To 
the extent an evaluation directly relates to a national security 
system, the evaluation results submitted to the Director of OMB shall 
contain only a summary and assessment of that portion of the evaluation 
directly relating to a national security system. Agencies and auditors 
shall take appropriate steps to ensure the protection of information 
which, if disclosed, may adversely affect information security. Such 
protections shall be commensurate with risk and comply with all 
applicable laws and regulations. 

Scope of Evaluation Procedures: 

As noted above, the independent evaluation shall include testing the 
effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and 
practices for a representative subset of agency information systems. 
The concept of a representative subset was intended to provide the 
auditor (the party performing the independent evaluation) with a 
reasonable basis for their evaluation. The auditor should select the 
subset of systems for testing with the expectation that it would be 
representative of all of the entityï¿½s systems covered by FISMA, in all 
significant respects. Using professional judgment, the auditor should 
identify a sufficient scope of systems testing to constitute a 
representative subset of the entityï¿½s systems. The auditor may 
supplement systems tested for other purposes (e.g., financial audits) 
with additional systems necessary to obtain a representative subset. 
The auditor also may select a representative subset of systems for 
FISMA and supplement it with additional systems necessary to perform 
the financial audit or other audits. In planning the information 
security testing for FISMA, the auditor should perform the following 
steps to identify a representative subset of agency systems: 

* Understand the agencyï¿½s systems ï¿½ The auditor should obtain a 
sufficient understanding of the entityï¿½s systems (including the use of 
contractors and others to process information and/or to operate systems 
for or on behalf of the entity) to plan the evaluation so that it 
incorporates a representative subset of entity systems. The IS audit 
planning phase discussed in Chapter 2 provides a framework for 
understanding the entityï¿½s systems. 

* Consider other information security testing ï¿½ The auditor should 
identify information security testing that has been or will be 
performed during the fiscal year for which the evaluation is being 
performed. The auditorï¿½s evaluation should incorporate the results of 
this testing and should, to the extent possible, use such testing as a 
basis for the evaluation. For example, testing associated with the 
entityï¿½s financial audit can be used to support the independent 
evaluation. The evaluation can consider the results of multiple 
evaluations. In considering testing performed by parties other than the 
auditor, the auditor should consider the competence, independence, and 
objectivity of the other parties. (see below) 

In determining a representative subset of agency systems, the auditor 
should consider the risk level of the systems, as presented in NIST 
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 199, 
entitled ï¿½Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information 
and Information Systemsï¿½. The auditor generally should test some 
component of high risk systems annually. In addition, a mix of moderate 
and low risk, major general support systems and major applications 
generally should be tested annually to ensure adequate coverage of all 
systems are performed over time. A representative subset generally 
would include a combination of: 

* systems at different risk levels (high, moderate, and low); 

* both general support systems and major application systems; 

* different types of applications (e.g., financial management, 
operations) operated by the agency; 

* major processing locations; 

* general and business process controls, including all of the control 
areas; 

* contractor and other non-entity systems that are covered by FISMA 
requirements. The auditor should consider related IS controls to be 
significant to the user organizationï¿½s internal control and follow the 
procedures discussed in Appendix VII ï¿½Entityï¿½s Use of Service 
Organizations.ï¿½) 

In determining the specific systems to be tested in the current 
evaluation period, the auditor may consider recent testing performed as 
part of a multi-year testing strategy. Also, evidence of continuing 
material weaknesses or significant deficiencies may reduce the extent 
of testing necessary to reasonably conclude that information security 
is ineffective; however, the auditor should consider the benefits of 
testing to identify additional weaknesses that the agency can begin to 
address. 

FISMA requires that an independent evaluation be performed. This means 
that the auditor should be independent of the entity in fact and in 
appearance. In addition, if the auditor would like to use the work of 
other parties as a basis for the auditorï¿½s evaluation, the auditor 
should consider the independence and objectivity of the persons 
performing the testing on behalf of the agency. If such other parties 
are considered independent, the auditor may determine that the work of 
the other parties can be used as support for the evaluation without 
retesting. The less independent or objective the other partiesï¿½ work 
is, the less the auditor can use the work of the other party without 
retesting the other partiesï¿½ work. If the other parties are not 
independent, the auditor should not use such work as a substitute for 
their own testing. Although GAGAS is not required to be applied in the 
FISMA evaluation, such standards provide guidance on considering 
independence that is consistent with other discussions of independence 
in professional literature. Also, the auditor may elect to perform the 
FISMA evaluation using GAGAS. 

Evaluating the Results of Testing: 

The FISCAM was designed as a risk-based methodology to assess the 
effectiveness of an entityï¿½s information system controls. It can also 
be used to assess to provide a reasonable basis for determining whether 
information security is effective, and identifying information security 
strengths and weaknesses as a basis for that determination. The FISCAM 
control activities are consistent with and have been mapped to the NIST 
guidance (see Appendix IV). 

The Reporting phase discussed in Chapter 2 describes how to evaluate 
the results of the tests of controls and conclude as to their 
effectiveness In evaluating the results of the testing, the auditor 
should determine whether any weaknesses identified, individually or 
collectively, represent significant deficiencies as that term is used 
in FISMA (see ï¿½Related Reporting Responsibilitiesï¿½ in Chapter 2 for 
further information.) FISMA requires agencies to report any significant 
deficiencies 1) as material weaknesses under FMFIA, or 2) as instances 
of a lack of substantial compliance under FFMIA, if related to 
financial management systems. Also, the auditor should determine 
whether the significant deficiencies collectively result in ineffective 
information security controls. 

OMB defines a FISMA significant deficiency as ï¿½a weakness in an 
agencyï¿½s overall information systems security program or management 
control structure, or within one or more information systems which 
significantly restricts the capability of the agency to carry out its 
mission or compromises the security of its information, information 
systems, personnel, or other resources, operations, or assets. In this 
context, the risk is great enough that the agency head and outside 
agencies must be notified and immediate or near-immediate corrective 
action must be taken.ï¿½ 

The following points provide guidance in applying the FISCAM to 
determine whether there is a FISMA significant deficiency: 

* ineffective controls over any one of the nine control areas represent 
a FISMA significant deficiency, 

* ineffective controls over one or more critical elements represent a 
FISMA significant deficiency unless, based upon the facts and 
circumstances, the auditor believes that other factors sufficiently 
mitigate the effect of the control weaknesses, and, 

* individual weaknesses or any combination of weaknesses that meet the 
above definition represent FISMA significant deficiencies. 

Consistent with the IS audit methodology described in Chapter 2, for 
each FISCAM critical element, the auditor should make a summary 
determination as to the effectiveness of the entityï¿½s related controls 
based on the representative subset, considering entitywide, system, and 
business process application levels collectively. If the controls for 
one or more of each control areaï¿½s critical elements are ineffective, 
then the controls for the entire control area are not likely to be 
effective. The auditor should use professional judgment in making such 
determinations. 

Also, the auditor should evaluate the risk that the aggregate 
combination of weaknesses could result in unauthorized access to key 
systems or files. For example, a series of weaknesses might result in 
an individual having the ability to gain unauthorized external access 
to agency systems, escalate their privileges to obtain root access to 
critical network nodes, and consequently to key systems or files. 

Further, in evaluating the results of the tests performed, the auditor 
should consider several factors, including: 

* The likelihood that an individual could obtain unauthorized access to 
or perform unauthorized or inappropriate activities on key entity 
systems or files that could affect the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the agencyï¿½s information and information systems. This 
might include (1) the ability to obtain root access to system(s) that 
house key information or system resources (including supporting 
systems), thereby enabling an individual to read, add, delete, or 
modify data either directly or through the introduction of unauthorized 
software; (2) the ability to directly access and modify file(s) related 
to key areas of audit interest: or (3) the ability to assign 
unauthorized application user rights, thereby being enabled to enter 
unauthorized transactions or perform unauthorized activities. 

* The nature of unauthorized access that could be obtained (e.g., 
limited to system or application programmers or system administrators; 
authorized system users; or anyone through unauthorized external access 
through the Internet). 

* The likelihood that other controls, including application controls, 
would prevent or detect such unauthorized access. Generally, if the 
effectiveness of such other controls depends on computer processed 
information, it is unlikely that they could effectively prevent or 
detect such access, unless the identified weaknesses could not 
reasonably result in the ability to compromise such other controls. 

* The risk that management could override controls (such as through 
excessive access rights). 

Although rare, the entity may have overall compensating controls or 
other factors that would mitigate or reduce the risks arising from 
control weaknesses. For example, manual reviews of support for all 
disbursements could mitigate information security risks related to a 
disbursement system. The auditor should determine whether there are any 
such compensating controls or other factors. If present, the auditor 
should document such controls or factors, test them appropriately to 
determine whether they effectively mitigate the identified information 
security weaknesses, and draw conclusions about the nature and extent 
of the risks that remain after considering such controls or factors. 

If there are no significant deficiencies, the auditor may conclude that 
information security controls are effective for the subset tested. If 
there are one or more FISMA significant deficiencies, and therefore 
FMFIA material weaknesses, the auditor should determine whether the 
weaknesses, in the aggregate, are severe or pervasive, such that 
information security is ineffective. For example, an agency has 
effective controls over all of the FISCAM control areas, except for 
contingency planning, for which the agency has not adequately tested 
their contingency plans for all of the tested systems. The auditor 
might conclude that this FISMA significant deficiency is not 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to render information security 
ineffective. In such instances, the auditor may conclude that 
information security controls are effective, except for the FISMA 
significant deficiencies. In making this determination, the auditor 
should consider whether an ï¿½except forï¿½ conclusion would be misleading 
to a reasonable person reading the evaluation results. If there are one 
or more FISMA significant deficiencies and the auditor determines that 
an ï¿½except forï¿½ conclusion is inappropriate, the auditor should deem 
information security to be ineffective. 

In addition to reporting on the effectiveness of information security 
controls, the auditor should determine whether information used in 
management reports or used to support FISMA reporting to OMB is 
consistent with the results of the testing performed. More 
specifically, for each system tested, the auditor should compare the 
results of testing with related information included in management and 
FISMA reports. For example, the auditor should compare evidence 
obtained about a systemï¿½s certification and accreditation with 
information included in management and FISMA reports to determine 
whether such reporting was accurate (e.g., whether a certification and 
accreditation was completed). If, in this circumstance, a certification 
and accreditation was complete and was reported as such in management 
and FISMA reports, but the auditorï¿½s testing revealed that it was not 
properly performed, the auditor should consider this deficiency in 
their evaluation of the results of testing and determine whether there 
are systemic reasons for the deficiency. 

To meet the requirements of FISMA, the auditor should report on their 
annual independent evaluation of the effectiveness of information 
security for the representative subset of systems. Such report should 
include: 

* The overall conclusion on their assessment of effectiveness of 
information security controls, based on testing performed, 

* The significant deficiencies identified, and, 

* A general discussion of the nature and extent of testing performed. 

Such report should be in addition to other OMB reporting requirements. 

However, as discussed above, (1) such reporting directly related to a 
national security system shall contain only a summary and assessment of 
that portion of the evaluation directly relating to a national security 
system, and (2) agencies and auditors shall take appropriate steps to 
ensure the protection of information which, if disclosed, may adversely 
affect information security. 

For additional guidance on performing FISMA evaluations, refer to the 
PCIE FISMA Framework. 

[End of appendix] 

Appendix X - Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 
(FISMA): 

P.L. 107-347, Title III, sec. 301-305, December 17, 2002. 

Title III--Information Security: 

Sec. 301. Information Security. 

(a) Short Title.--This title may be cited as the "Federal Information 
Security Management Act of 2002". 

(b) Information Security.-- 
(1) In general.-- Chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following new subchapter: 

Subchapter III--Information Security: 

Sec. 3541. Purposes: 

The purposes of this subchapter are to-- 
(1) provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of 
information security controls over information resources that support 
Federal operations and assets; 
(2) recognize the highly networked nature of the current Federal 
computing environment and provide effective governmentwide management 
and oversight of the related information security risks, including 
coordination of information security efforts throughout the civilian, 
national security, and law enforcement communities; 
(3) provide for development and maintenance of minimum controls 
required to protect Federal information and information systems; 
(4) provide a mechanism for improved oversight of Federal agency 
information security programs; 
(5) acknowledge that commercially developed information security 
products offer advanced, dynamic, robust, and effective information 
security solutions, reflecting market solutions for the protection of 
critical information infrastructures important to the national defense 
and economic security of the nation that are designed, built, and 
operated by the private sector; and; 
(6) recognize that the selection of specific technical hardware and 
software information security solutions should be left to individual 
agencies from among commercially developed products. 

Sec. 3542. Definitions: 

(a) In General.--Except as provided under subsection (b), the 
definitions under section 3502 shall apply to this subchapter. 

(b) Additional Definitions.--As used in this subchapter: 
(1) The term 'information security' means protecting information and 
information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide: 
(A) integrity, which means guarding against improper information 
modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information 
nonrepudiation and authenticity; 
(B) confidentiality, which means preserving authorized restrictions on 
access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy 
and proprietary information; and; 
(C) availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to 
and use of information. 
(2)(A) The term 'national security system' means any information system 
(including any telecommunications system) used or operated by an agency 
or by a contractor of an agency, or other organization on behalf of an 
agency: 
(i) the function, operation, or use of which: 
(I) involves intelligence activities; 
(II) involves cryptologic activities related to national security; 
(III) involves command and control of military forces; 
(IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons 
system; or; 
(V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the direct fulfillment 
of military or intelligence missions; or; 
(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for 
information that have been specifically authorized under criteria 
established by an Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept 
classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. 
(B) Subparagraph (A)(i)(V) does not include a system that is to be used 
for routine administrative and business applications (including 
payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management applications). 

(3) The term 'information technology' has the meaning given that term 
in section 11101 of title 40. "Sec. 3543. Authority and functions of 
the Director: 
(a) In General.--The Director shall oversee agency information security 
policies and practices, including: 
(1) developing and overseeing the implementation of policies, 
principles, standards, and guidelines on information security, 
including through ensuring timely agency adoption of and compliance 
with standards promulgated under section 11331 of title 40; 
(2) requiring agencies, consistent with the standards promulgated under 
such section 11331 and the requirements of this subchapter, to identify 
and provide information security protections commensurate with the risk 
and magnitude of the harm resulting from the unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of: 
(A) information collected or maintained by or on behalf of an agency; 
or; 
(B) information systems used or operated by an agency or by a 
contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency; 
(3) coordinating the development of standards and guidelines under 
section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act 
(15 U.S.C. 278g-3) with agencies and offices operating or exercising 
control of national security systems (including the National Security 
Agency) to assure, to the maximum extent feasible, that such standards 
and guidelines are complementary with standards and guidelines 
developed for national security systems; 
(4) overseeing agency compliance with the requirements of this 
subchapter, including through any authorized action under section 11303 
of title 40, to enforce accountability for compliance with such 
requirements; 
(5) reviewing at least annually, and approving or disapproving, agency 
information security programs required under section 3544(b); 
(6) coordinating information security policies and procedures with 
related information resources management policies and procedures; 
(7) overseeing the operation of the Federal information security 
incident center required under section 3546; and; 
(8) reporting to Congress no later than March 1 of each year on agency 
compliance with the requirements of this subchapter, including: 
(A) a summary of the findings of evaluations required by section 3545; 
(B) an assessment of the development, promulgation, and adoption of, 
and compliance with, standards developed under section 20 of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) 
and promulgated under section 11331 of title 40; 
(C) significant deficiencies in agency information security practices; 
(D) planned remedial action to address such deficiencies; and; 
(E) a summary of, and the views of the Director on, the report prepared 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology under section 
20(d)(10) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 
U.S.C. 278g-3). 

(b) National Security Systems.--Except for the authorities described in 
paragraphs (4) and (8) of subsection (a), the authorities of the 
Director under this section shall not apply to national security 
systems. 

(c) Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency Systems.--(1) 
The authorities of the Director described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of 
subsection (a) shall be delegated to the Secretary of Defense in the 
case of systems described in paragraph (2) and to the Director of 
Central Intelligence in the case of systems described in paragraph (3). 

(2) The systems described in this paragraph are systems that are 
operated by the Department of Defense, a contractor of the Department 
of Defense, or another entity on behalf of the Department of Defense 
that processes any information the unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of which would 
have a debilitating impact on the mission of the Department of Defense. 

(3) The systems described in this paragraph are systems that are 
operated by the Central Intelligence Agency, a contractor of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, or another entity on behalf of the Central 
Intelligence Agency that processes any information the unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of 
which would have a debilitating impact on the mission of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. 

Sec. 3544. Federal agency responsibilities: 

(a) In General.--The head of each agency shall: 
(1) be responsible for: 

(A) providing information security protections commensurate with the 
risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of: 
(i) information collected or maintained by or on behalf of the agency; 
and; 
(ii) information systems used or operated by an agency or by a 
contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency; 
(B) complying with the requirements of this subchapter and related 
policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines, including: 
(i) information security standards promulgated under section 11331 of 
title 40; and; 
(ii) information security standards and guidelines for national 
security systems issued in accordance with law and as directed by the 
President; and; 

(C) ensuring that information security management processes are 
integrated with agency strategic and operational planning processes; 
(2) ensure that senior agency officials provide information security 
for the information and information systems that support the operations 
and assets under their control, including through: 
(A) assessing the risk and magnitude of the harm that could result from 
the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
destruction of such information or information systems; 
(B) determining the levels of information security appropriate to 
protect such information and information systems in accordance with 
standards promulgated under section 11331 of title 40, for information 
security classifications and related requirements; 
(C) implementing policies and procedures to cost-effectively reduce 
risks to an acceptable level; and; 
(D) periodically testing and evaluating information security controls 
and techniques to ensure that they are effectively implemented; 

(3) delegate to the agency Chief Information Officer established under 
section 3506 (or comparable official in an agency not covered by such 
section) the authority to ensure compliance with the requirements 
imposed on the agency under this subchapter, including: 
(A) designating a senior agency information security officer who shall: 
(i) carry out the Chief Information Officer's responsibilities under 
this section; 
(ii) possess professional qualifications, including training and 
experience, required to administer the functions described under this 
section; 
(iii) have information security duties as that official's primary duty; 
and; 
(iv) head an office with the mission and resources to assist in 
ensuring agency compliance with this section; 

(B) developing and maintaining an agencywide information security 
program as required by subsection (b); 

(C) developing and maintaining information security policies, 
procedures, and control techniques to address all applicable 
requirements, including those issued under section 3543 of this title, 
and section 11331 of title 40; 

(D) training and overseeing personnel with significant responsibilities 
for information security with respect to such responsibilities; and; 

(E) assisting senior agency officials concerning their responsibilities 
under paragraph (2); 

(4) ensure that the agency has trained personnel sufficient to assist 
the agency in complying with the requirements of this subchapter and 
related policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines; and; 

(5) ensure that the agency Chief Information Officer, in coordination 
with other senior agency officials, reports annually to the agency head 
on the effectiveness of the agency information security program, 
including progress of remedial actions. 

(b) Agency Program.--Each agency shall develop, document, and implement 
an agencywide information security program, approved by the Director 
under section 3543(a)(5), to provide information security for the 
information and information systems that support the operations and 
assets of the agency, including those provided or managed by another 
agency, contractor, or other source, that includes: 

(1) periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of the harm that 
could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction of information and information systems 
that support the operations and assets of the agency; 

(2) policies and procedures that: 

(A) are based on the risk assessments required by paragraph (1); 

(B) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable 
level; 

(C) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life 
cycle of each agency information system; and; 

(D) ensure compliance with: 
(i) the requirements of this subchapter; 
(ii) policies and procedures as may be prescribed by the Director, and 
information security standards promulgated under section 11331 of title 
40; 
(iii) minimally acceptable system configuration requirements, as 
determined by the agency; and; 
(iv) any other applicable requirements, including standards and 
guidelines for national security systems issued in accordance with law 
and as directed by the President; 

(3) subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for 
networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems, as 
appropriate; 

(4) security awareness training to inform personnel, including 
contractors and other users of information systems that support the 
operations and assets of the agency, of: 

(A) information security risks associated with their activities; and; 
(B) their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and 
procedures designed to reduce these risks; 

(5) periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information 
security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a 
frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, of which such 
testing: 

(A) shall include testing of management, operational, and technical 
controls of every information system identified in the inventory 
required under section 3505(c); and; 

(B) may include testing relied on in a evaluation under section 3545; 

(6) a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting 
remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security 
policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; 

(7) procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security 
incidents, consistent with standards and guidelines issued pursuant to 
section 3546(b), including: 

(A) mitigating risks associated with such incidents before substantial 
damage is done; 

(B) notifying and consulting with the Federal information security 
incident center referred to in section 3546; and; 

(C) notifying and consulting with, as appropriate: 
(i) law enforcement agencies and relevant Offices of Inspector General; 
(ii) an office designated by the President for any incident involving a 
national security system; and; 
(iii) any other agency or office, in accordance with law or as directed 
by the President; and; 

(8) plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for 
information systems that support the operations and assets of the 
agency. 

(c) Agency Reporting. Each agency shall: 

(1) report annually to the Director, the Committees on Government 
Reform and Science of the House of Representatives, the Committees on 
Governmental Affairs and Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 
Senate, the appropriate authorization and appropriations committees of 
Congress, and the Comptroller General on the adequacy and effectiveness 
of information security policies, procedures, and practices, and 
compliance with the requirements of this subchapter, including 
compliance with each requirement of subsection (b); 

(2) address the adequacy and effectiveness of information security 
policies, procedures, and practices in plans and reports relating to: 

(A) annual agency budgets; 

(B) information resources management under subchapter 1 of this 
chapter; 

(C) information technology management under subtitle III of title 40; 

(D) program performance under sections 1105 and 1115 through 1119 of 
title 31, and sections 2801 and 2805 of title 39; 

(E) financial management under chapter 9 of title 31, and the Chief 
Financial Officers Act of 1990 (31 U.S.C. 501 note; Public Law 101-576) 
(and the amendments made by that Act); 

(F) financial management systems under the Federal Financial Management 
Improvement Act (31 U.S.C. 3512 note); and; 

(G) internal accounting and administrative controls under section 3512 
of title 31, (known as the 'Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act'); 
and "(3) report any significant deficiency in a policy, procedure, or 
practice identified under paragraph (1) or (2): 

(A) as a material weakness in reporting under section 3512 of title 31; 
and; 

(B) if relating to financial management systems, as an instance of a 
lack of substantial compliance under the Federal Financial Management 
Improvement Act (31 U.S.C. 3512 note). 

(d) Performance Plan. (1) In addition to the requirements of subsection 
(c), each agency, in consultation with the Director, shall include as 
part of the performance plan required under section 1115 of title 31 a 
description of: 

(A) the time periods, and; 

(B) the resources, including budget, staffing, and training, that are 
necessary to implement the program required under subsection (b). 

(2) The description under paragraph (1) shall be based on the risk 
assessments required under subsection (b)(2)(1). 

(e) Public Notice and Comment. Each agency shall provide the public 
with timely notice and opportunities for comment on proposed 
information security policies and procedures to the extent that such 
policies and procedures affect communication with the public. 

Sec. 3545. Annual independent evaluation: 

(a) In General. (1) Each year each agency shall have performed an 
independent evaluation of the information security program and 
practices of that agency to determine the effectiveness of such program 
and practices. 

(2) Each evaluation under this section shall include: 

(A) testing of the effectiveness of information security policies, 
procedures, and practices of a representative subset of the agency's 
information systems; 

(B) an assessment (made on the basis of the results of the testing) of 
compliance with: 
(i) the requirements of this subchapter; and; 

(ii) related information security policies, procedures, standards, and 
guidelines; and; 

(C) separate presentations, as appropriate, regarding information 
security relating to national security systems. 

(b) Independent Auditor. Subject to subsection (c): 

(1) for each agency with an Inspector General appointed under the 
Inspector General Act of 1978, the annual evaluation required by this 
section shall be performed by the Inspector General or by an 
independent external auditor, as determined by the Inspector General of 
the agency; and; 

(2) for each agency to which paragraph (1) does not apply, the head of 
the agency shall engage an independent external auditor to perform the 
evaluation. 

(c) National Security Systems. For each agency operating or exercising 
control of a national security system, that portion of the evaluation 
required by this section directly relating to a national security 
system shall be performed; 

(1) only by an entity designated by the agency head; and; 

(2) in such a manner as to ensure appropriate protection for 
information associated with any information security vulnerability in 
such system commensurate with the risk and in accordance with all 
applicable laws. 

(d) Existing Evaluations. The evaluation required by this section may 
be based in whole or in part on an audit, evaluation, or report 
relating to programs or practices of the applicable agency. 

(e) Agency Reporting. (1) Each year, not later than such date 
established by the Director, the head of each agency shall submit to 
the Director the results of the evaluation required under this section. 

(2) To the extent an evaluation required under this section directly 
relates to a national security system, the evaluation results submitted 
to the Director shall contain only a summary and assessment of that 
portion of the evaluation directly relating to a national security 
system. 

(f) Protection of Information. Agencies and evaluators shall take 
appropriate steps to ensure the protection of information which, if 
disclosed, may adversely affect information security. Such protections 
shall be commensurate with the risk and comply with all applicable laws 
and regulations. 

(g) OMB Reports to Congress. (1) The Director shall summarize the 
results of the evaluations conducted under this section in the report 
to Congress required under section 3543(a)(8). 

(2) The Director's report to Congress under this subsection shall 
summarize information regarding information security relating to 
national security systems in such a manner as to ensure appropriate 
protection for information associated with any information security 
vulnerability in such system commensurate with the risk and in 
accordance with all applicable laws. 

(3) Evaluations and any other descriptions of information systems under 
the authority and control of the Director of Central Intelligence or of 
National Foreign Intelligence Programs systems under the authority and 
control of the Secretary of Defense shall be made available to Congress 
only through the appropriate oversight committees of Congress, in 
accordance with applicable laws. 

(h) Comptroller General. The Comptroller General shall periodically 
evaluate and report to Congress on: 
(1) the adequacy and effectiveness of agency information security 
policies and practices; and; 

(2) implementation of the requirements of this subchapter. 

Sec. 3546. Federal information security incident center: 

(a) In General. The Director shall ensure the operation of a central 
Federal information security incident center to: 

(1) provide timely technical assistance to operators of agency 
information systems regarding security incidents, including guidance on 
detecting and handling information security incidents; 

(2) compile and analyze information about incidents that threaten 
information security; 

(3) inform operators of agency information systems about current and 
potential information security threats, and vulnerabilities; and; 

(4) consult with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
agencies or offices operating or exercising control of national 
security systems (including the National Security Agency), and such 
other agencies or offices in accordance with law and as directed by the 
President regarding information security incidents and related matters. 

(b) National Security Systems.--Each agency operating or exercising 
control of a national security system shall share information about 
information security incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities with the 
Federal information security incident center to the extent consistent 
with standards and guidelines for national security systems, issued in 
accordance with law and as directed by the President. 

Sec. 3547. National security systems: 

The head of each agency operating or exercising control of a national 
security system shall be responsible for ensuring that the agency: 

(1) provides information security protections commensurate with the 
risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from the unauthorized access, 
use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the 
information contained in such system; 

2) implements information security policies and practices as required 
by standards and guidelines for national security systems, issued in 
accordance with law and as directed by the President; and; 

(3) complies with the requirements of this subchapter. 

Sec. 3548. Authorization of appropriations: 

There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of 
this subchapter such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 
2003 through 2007. 

Sec. 3549. Effect on existing law: 

Nothing in this subchapter, section 11331 of title 40, or section 20 of 
the National Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) may be 
construed as affecting the authority of the President, the Office of 
Management and Budget or the Director thereof, the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, or the head of any agency, with respect to 
the authorized use or disclosure of information, including with regard 
to the protection of personal privacy under section 552a of title 5, 
the disclosure of information under section 552 of title 5, the 
management and disposition of records under chapters 29, 31, or 33 of 
title 44, the management of information resources under subchapter I of 
chapter 35 of this title, or the disclosure of information to the 
Congress or the Comptroller General of the United States. While this 
subchapter is in effect, subchapter II of this chapter shall not 
apply." 

(2) Clerical amendment. The table of sections at the beginning of such 
chapter 35 is amended by adding at the end the following: 

"Subchapter III--Information Security 

Sec. 

3541. Purposes. 

3542. Definitions. 

3543. Authority and functions of the Director. 

3544. Federal agency responsibilities. 

3545. Annual independent evaluation. 

3546. Federal information security incident center. 

3547. National security systems. 

3548. Authorization of appropriations. 

3549. Effect on existing law." 

(c) Information Security Responsibilities of Certain Agencies. 

(1) National security responsibilities. 

(A) Nothing in this Act (including any amendment made by this Act) 
shall supersede any authority of the Secretary of Defense, the Director 
of Central Intelligence, or other agency head, as authorized by law and 
as directed by the President, with regard to the operation, control, or 
management of national security systems, as defined by section 
3542(b)(2) of title 44, United States Code. 

(B) Section 2224 of title 10, United States Code, is amended: 

(i) in subsection (b), by striking (b) Objectives and Minimum 
Requirements. (1) and inserting (b) Objectives of the Program; 

(ii) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (2); and (iii) in 
subsection (c), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting ", 
including through compliance with subchapter III of chapter 35 of title 
44" after "infrastructure". 

(2) Atomic energy act of 1954. Nothing in this Act shall supersede any 
requirement made by or under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
2011 et seq.). Restricted data or formerly restricted data shall be 
handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in 
conformity with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.). 

Sec. 302. Management Of Information Technology: 

(a) In General. Section 11331 of title 40, United States Code, is 
amended to read as follows: 

Sec. 11331. Responsibilities for Federal information systems standards: 

(a) Standards and Guidelines. 
(1) Authority to prescribe.-- Except as provided under paragraph (2), 
the Secretary of Commerce shall, on the basis of standards and 
guidelines developed by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 20(a) of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-
3(a)), prescribe standards and guidelines pertaining to Federal 
information systems. 

(2) National security systems.-- Standards and guidelines for national 
security systems (as defined under this section) shall be developed, 
prescribed, enforced, and overseen as otherwise authorized by law and 
as directed by the President. 

(b) Mandatory Requirements: 

(1) Authority to make mandatory.-- Except as provided under paragraph 
(2), the Secretary shall make standards prescribed under subsection 
(a)(1) compulsory and binding to the extent determined necessary by the 
Secretary to improve the efficiency of operation or security of Federal 
information systems. 

(2) Required mandatory standards. (A) Standards prescribed under 
subsection (a)(1) shall include information security standards that: 

(i) provide minimum information security requirements as determined 
under section 20(b) of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3(b)); and; 

(ii) are otherwise necessary to improve the security of Federal 
information and information systems. 

(B) Information security standards described in subparagraph (A) shall 
be compulsory and binding. 

(c) Authority to Disapprove or Modify. The President may disapprove or 
modify the standards and guidelines referred to in subsection (a)(1) if 
the President determines such action to be in the public interest. The 
President's authority to disapprove or modify such standards and 
guidelines may not be delegated. Notice of such disapproval or 
modification shall be published promptly in the Federal Register. Upon 
receiving notice of such disapproval or modification, the Secretary of 
Commerce shall immediately rescind or modify such standards or 
guidelines as directed by the President. 

(d) Exercise of Authority. To ensure fiscal and policy consistency, the 
Secretary shall exercise the authority conferred by this section 
subject to direction by the President and in coordination with the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget. 

(e) Application of More Stringent Standards. The head of an executive 
agency may employ standards for the cost-effective information security 
for information systems within or under the supervision of that agency 
that are more stringent than the standards the Secretary prescribes 
under this section if the more stringent standards: 

(1) contain at least the applicable standards made compulsory and 
binding by the Secretary; and; 

(2) are otherwise consistent with policies and guidelines issued under 
section 3543 of title 44. 

(f) Decisions on Promulgation of Standards. The decision by the 
Secretary regarding the promulgation of any standard under this section 
shall occur not later than 6 months after the submission of the 
proposed standard to the Secretary by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, as provided under section 20 of the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3). 

(g) Definitions. In this section: 

(1) Federal information system. The term 'Federal information system' 
means an information system used or operated by an executive agency, by 
a contractor of an executive agency, or by another organization on 
behalf of an executive agency. 

(2) Information security. The term 'information security' has the 
meaning given that term in section 3542(b)(1) of title 44. 

(3) National security system. The term 'national security system' has 
the meaning given that term in section 3542(b)(2) of title 44." 

(b) Clerical Amendment. The item relating to section 11331 in the table 
of sections at the beginning of chapter 113 of such title is amended to 
read as follows: 

"11331. Responsibilities for Federal information systems standards." 

Sec. 303. National Institute Of Standards And Technology. 

Section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act 
(15 U.S.C. 278g-3), is amended by striking the text and inserting the 
following: 

(a) In General. The Institute shall: 

(1) have the mission of developing standards, guidelines, and 
associated methods and techniques for information systems; 

(2) develop standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, 
for information systems used or operated by an agency or by a 
contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency, 
other than national security systems (as defined in section 3542(b)(2) 
of title 44, United States Code); and; 

(3) develop standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, 
for providing adequate information security for all agency operations 
and assets, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to 
national security systems. 

(b) Minimum Requirements for Standards and Guidelines. The standards 
and guidelines required by subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum: 

(1)(A) standards to be used by all agencies to categorize all 
information and information systems collected or maintained by or on 
behalf of each agency based on the objectives of providing appropriate 
levels of information security according to a range of risk levels; 

(B) guidelines recommending the types of information and information 
systems to be included in each such category; and; 

(C) minimum information security requirements for information and 
information systems in each such category; 

(2) a definition of and guidelines concerning detection and handling of 
information security incidents; and; 

(3) guidelines developed in conjunction with the Department of Defense, 
including the National Security Agency, for identifying an information 
system as a national security system consistent with applicable 
requirements for national security systems, issued in accordance with 
law and as directed by the President. 

(c) Development of Standards and Guidelines. In developing standards 
and guidelines required by subsections (a) and (b), the Institute 
shall: 

(1) consult with other agencies and offices and the private sector 
(including the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the 
Departments of Defense and Energy, the National Security Agency, the 
General Accounting Office, and the Secretary of Homeland Security) to 
assure: 

(A) use of appropriate information security policies, procedures, and 
techniques, in order to improve information security and avoid 
unnecessary and costly duplication of effort; and; 

(B) that such standards and guidelines are complementary with standards 
and guidelines employed for the protection of national security systems 
and information contained in such systems; 

(2) provide the public with an opportunity to comment on proposed 
standards and guidelines; 

(3) submit to the Secretary of Commerce for promulgation under section 
11331 of title 40, United States Code: 

(A) standards, as required under subsection (b)(1)(A), no later than 12 
months after the date of the enactment of this section; and; 

(B) minimum information security requirements for each category, as 
required under subsection (b)(1)(C), no later than 36 months after the 
date of the enactment of this section; 

(4) issue guidelines as required under subsection (b)(1)(B), no later 
than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this section; 

(5) to the maximum extent practicable, ensure that such standards and 
guidelines do not require the use or procurement of specific products, 
including any specific hardware or software; 

(6) to the maximum extent practicable, ensure that such standards and 
guidelines provide for sufficient flexibility to permit alternative 
solutions to provide equivalent levels of protection for identified 
information security risks; and; 

(7) to the maximum extent practicable, use flexible, performance-based 
standards and guidelines that permit the use of off-the-shelf 
commercially developed information security products. 

(d) Information Security Functions. The Institute shall: 

(1) submit standards developed pursuant to subsection (a), along with 
recommendations as to the extent to which these should be made 
compulsory and binding, to the Secretary of Commerce for promulgation 
under section 11331 of title 40, United States Code; 

(2) provide technical assistance to agencies, upon request, regarding: 
(A) compliance with the standards and guidelines developed under 
subsection (a); 

(B) detecting and handling information security incidents; and; 

(C) information security policies, procedures, and practices; 

(3) conduct research, as needed, to determine the nature and extent of 
information security vulnerabilities and techniques for providing cost-
effective information security; 

(4) develop and periodically revise performance indicators and measures 
for agency information security policies and practices; 

(5) evaluate private sector information security policies and practices 
and commercially available information technologies to assess potential 
application by agencies to strengthen information security; 

(6) assist the private sector, upon request, in using and applying the 
results of activities under this section; 

(7) evaluate security policies and practices developed for national 
security systems to assess potential application by agencies to 
strengthen information security; 

(8) periodically assess the effectiveness of standards and guidelines 
developed under this section and undertake revisions as appropriate; 

(9) solicit and consider the recommendations of the Information 
Security and Privacy Advisory Board, established by section 21, 
regarding standards and guidelines developed under subsection (a) and 
submit such recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce with such 
standards submitted to the Secretary; and; 

(10) prepare an annual public report on activities undertaken in the 
previous year, and planned for the coming year, to carry out 
responsibilities under this section. 

(e) Definitions. As used in this section:( 

1) the term 'agency' has the same meaning as provided in section 
3502(1) of title 44, United States Code; 

(2) the term 'information security' has the same meaning as provided in 
section 3542(b)(1) of such title; 

(3) the term 'information system' has the same meaning as provided in 
section 3502(8) of such title; 

(4) the term 'information technology' has the same meaning as provided 
in section 11101 of title 40, United States Code; and; 

(5) the term 'national security system' has the same meaning as 
provided in section 3542(b)(2) of title 44, United States Code. 

(f) Authorization of Appropriations. There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary of Commerce $20,000,000 for each of 
fiscal years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 to enable the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology to carry out the provisions of 
this section." 

Sec. 304. Information Security And Privacy Advisory Board. 

Section 21 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act 
(15 U.S.C. 278g-4), is amended: 

(1) in subsection (a), by striking "Computer System Security and 
Privacy Advisory Board" and inserting "Information Security and Privacy 
Advisory Board"; 

(2) in subsection (a)(1), by striking "computer or telecommunications" 
and inserting "information technology"; 

(3) in subsection (a)(2): 

(A) by striking "computer or telecommunications technology" and 
inserting "information technology"; and; 

(B) by striking "computer or telecommunications equipment" and 
inserting "information technology"; 

(4) in subsection (a)(3):( 

(A) by striking "computer systems" and inserting "information system"; 
and; 

(B) by striking "computer systems security" and inserting "information 
security"; 

(5) in subsection (b)(1) by striking "computer systems security" and 
inserting "information security"; 

(6) in subsection (b) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the 
following: 

(2) to advise the Institute, the Secretary of Commerce, and the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget on information security 
and privacy issues pertaining to Federal Government information 
systems, including through review of proposed standards and guidelines 
developed under section 20; and; 

(7) in subsection (b)(3) by inserting "annually" after "report"; 

(8) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection: 

(f) The Board shall hold meetings at such locations and at such time 
and place as determined by a majority of the Board;" 

(9) by redesignating subsections (f) and (g) as subsections (g) and 
(h), respectively; and; 

(10) by striking subsection (h), as redesignated by paragraph (9), and 
inserting the following: 

(h) As used in this section, the terms 'information system' and 
'information technology' have the meanings given in section 20." 

Sec. 305. Technical And Conforming Amendments. 

(a) Computer Security Act. Section 11332 of title 40, United States 
Code, and the item relating to that section in the table of sections 
for chapter 113 of such title, are repealed. 

(b) Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2001. The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398) is amended by striking section 1062 (44 
U.S.C. 3531 note). 

(c) Paperwork Reduction Act. (1) Section 3504(g) of title 44, United 
States Code, is amended: 

(A) by adding "and" at the end of paragraph (1); 

(B) in paragraph (2): 
(i) by striking "sections 11331 and 11332(b) and (c) of title 40" and 
inserting "section 11331 of title 40 and subchapter II of this 
chapter"; and (ii) by striking "; and" and inserting a period; and; 

(C) by striking paragraph (3). 

(2) Section 3505 of such title is amended by adding at the end: 

(c) Inventory of Major Information Systems. (1) The head of each agency 
shall develop and maintain an inventory of major information systems 
(including major national security systems) operated by or under the 
control of such agency. 

(2) The identification of information systems in an inventory under 
this subsection shall include an identification of the interfaces 
between each such system and all other systems or networks, including 
those not operated by or under the control of the agency. 

(3) Such inventory shall be: 

(A) updated at least annually; 

(B) made available to the Comptroller General; and; 

(C) used to support information resources management, including: 

(i) preparation and maintenance of the inventory of information 
resources under section 3506(b)(4); 

(ii) information technology planning, budgeting, acquisition, and 
management under section 3506(h), subtitle III of title 40, and related 
laws and guidance; 

(iii) monitoring, testing, and evaluation of information security 
controls under subchapter II; 

(iv) preparation of the index of major information systems required 
under section 552(g) of title 5, United States Code; and; 

(v) preparation of information system inventories required for records 
management under chapters 21, 29, 31, and 33. 

(4) The Director shall issue guidance for and oversee the 
implementation of the requirements of this subsection." 

(3) Section 3506(g) of such title is amended: 

(A) by adding "and" at the end of paragraph (1); 

(B) in paragraph (2): 

(i) by striking "section 11332 of title 40" and inserting "subchapter 
II of this chapter"; and; 

(ii) by striking "; and" and inserting a period; and; 

(C) by striking paragraph (3). 

[End of appendix] 

Appendix XI - Information System Controls Audit Documentation: 

This appendix summarizes the audit documentation that should be 
prepared by the auditor in connection with the IS controls audit, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. 

Planning Phase: 

The auditor should document the following information developed in the 
planning phase: 

* Objectives of the IS controls audit and, if it is part of a broader 
audit, a description of how such objectives support the overall audit 
objectives. 

* The scope of the IS controls audit. 

* The auditorï¿½s understanding of the entityï¿½s operations and key 
business processes, including, to the extent relevant to the audit 
objectives, the following: 
- The significance and nature of the programs and functions supported 
by information systems; 
- Key business processes relevant to the audit objectives, including 
business rules, transaction flows, and application and software module 
interaction; 
- Significant general support systems and major applications that 
support each key process; 
- Background information request, if used; 
- Significant internal and external factors that could affect the IS 
controls audit objectives; 
- Detailed organization chart, particularly the IT and the IS 
components; 
- Significant changes in the IT environment/architecture or significant 
applications implemented within the past 2 years or planned within the 
next 2 years; and; 
- The entityï¿½s reliance on third parties to provide IT services (e.g., 
in-house, remote connectivity, remote processing). 

* A general understanding of the structure of the entityï¿½s or 
componentï¿½s networks as a basis for planning the IS controls audit, 
including high-level and detailed network schematics relevant to the 
audit objectives. 

* Key areas of audit interest, including relevant general support 
systems and major applications and files. This includes (1) the 
operational locations of each key system or file, (2) significant 
components of the associated hardware and software (e.g., firewalls, 
routers, hosts, operating systems), (3) other significant systems or 
system-level resources that support the key areas of audit interest, 
and (4) prior audit problems reported. Also, the auditor should 
document all access paths in and out of the key areas of audit 
interest. 

* Factors that significantly increase or decrease IS risk and their 
potential impact on the effectiveness of information system controls. 
For each risk identified, the auditor should document the nature and 
extent of the risk; the conditions that gave rise to that risk; and the 
specific information or operations affected (if not pervasive). 

* Preliminary assessment of IS risks related to the key areas of audit 
interest and the basis for the assessed risk. For each risk identified, 
the auditor should document the nature and extent of the risk; the 
conditions that gave rise to that risk; and the specific information or 
operations affected (if not pervasive). The auditor should also 
document other considerations that may mitigate the effects of 
identified risks. 

* Critical control points. 

* A preliminary understanding of the entityï¿½s IS controls, including 
the organization, staffing, responsibilities, authorities, and 
resources of the entityï¿½s security management function. The auditor 
should include the following information in the documentation of their 
preliminary understanding of the design of IS controls, to the extent 
relevant to the audit objectives: 
- Identification of entitywide level controls (and appropriate system 
level controls) designed to achieve the control activities for each 
critical element within each general control area and a determination 
of whether they are designed effectively and implemented (placed in 
operation), including identification of control activities for which 
there are no or ineffective controls at the entitywide level and the 
related risks; 
- Identification of business process level controls for key 
applications identified as key areas of audit interest, determination 
of where those controls are implemented (placed in operation) within 
the entityï¿½s systems, and the auditorï¿½s conclusion about whether the 
controls are designed effectively, including identification of control 
activities for which there are no or ineffective controls and the 
related risks and the potential impact of any identified design 
weaknesses on the completeness, accuracy, validity, and confidentiality 
of application data; 
- Any internal or third-party information systems reviews, audits, or 
specialized systems testing (e.g., penetration tests, disaster recovery 
tests, and application-specific tests) performed during the last year; 
- Managementï¿½s plans of action and milestones, or their equivalent, 
that identify corrective actions planned to address known IS control 
weaknesses; 
- Status of the prior yearsï¿½ audit findings; 
- Documentation for any significant computer security related incidents 
identified and reported for the last year; 
- Documented security plans; 
- Documented risk assessments for relevant systems (e.g., general 
support systems and major applications); 
- System certification and accreditation documentation or equivalent 
for relevant systems; 
- Documented business continuity of operations plans and disaster 
recovery plans; and; 
- A description of the entityï¿½s use of third-party IT services. 

* Relevant laws and regulations and their relation to the audit 
objectives. 

* Description of the auditorï¿½s procedures to consider the risk of 
fraud, any fraud risk factors that the auditor believes could affect 
the audit objectives, and planned audit procedures to detect any fraud 
significant to the audit objectives. 

* Audit resources planned. 

* Current multiyear testing plans. 

* Documentation of communications with entity management. 

* If IS controls are performed by service organizations, conclusions 
whether such controls are significant to the audit objectives and any 
audit procedures performed with respect to such controls (e.g., review 
of service auditor reports). 

* If the auditor plans to use the work of others, conclusions 
concerning the planned use of the work of others and any audit 
procedures performed with respect to using the work of others. 

* Audit plan that adequately describes the objectives, scope, and 
methodology of the audit. 

* Any decision to reduce testing of IS controls due to the 
identification of significant IS control weaknesses. 

Testing Phase: 

The auditor should document the following information developed in the 
testing phase: 

* An understanding of the information systems that are relevant to the 
audit objectives. 

* IS control objectives and activities relevant to the audit 
objectives. 

* By level (e.g., entitywide, system, business process application) and 
system sublevel (e.g., network, operating system, infrastructure 
applications), a description of control techniques used by the entity 
to achieve the relevant control activities. 

* By level and sublevel, specific tests performed, including: 
- related documentation that describes the nature, timing, and extent 
of the tests; 
- evidence of the effective operation of the control techniques or lack 
thereof (e.g., memos describing procedures and results, output of tools 
and related analysis); 
- if a control activity is not achieved, any compensating controls or 
other factors and the basis for determining whether they are effective; 
- the auditorï¿½s conclusions about the effectiveness of the entityï¿½s IS 
controls in achieving the control activity; and; 
- for each weakness, whether the weakness is a material weakness, 
significant deficiency, or just a deficiency, as well as the criteria, 
condition, cause, and effect if necessary to achieve the audit 
objectives. 

Reporting Phase: 

The auditor should document the following information developed in the 
reporting phase: 

* The auditorï¿½s conclusion about the effectiveness of IS controls (in 
relation to the IS controls audit objectives) in achieving the critical 
elements and the relevant control activities and the basis for the 
conclusion, including the factors that the auditor considered in making 
the determination. 

* If part of a broader audit, the impact of any identified IS control 
weaknesses on the overall audit objectives. 

* Copies of any reports or written communications issued in connection 
with the audit, including entity management comments related to such 
reports and communications. 

* For financial audits and attestation engagements, the auditorï¿½s 
determination of whether identified weaknesses represent material 
weaknesses or significant deficiencies, and the basis for the auditorï¿½s 
conclusions. 

* Other documentation required by the audit organizationï¿½s policies and 
procedures, including quality assurance processes. 

* Results of procedures to detect any fraud significant to the audit 
objectives and the impact on the audit. 

* Results of audit follow-up procedures to determine whether agency 
corrective actions have been implemented, based on risk and a cost 
benefit analysis, to sufficiently remediate previously reported IS 
control weaknesses. 

* As appropriate, the auditorï¿½s considerations and determinations 
concerning FMFIA, FFMIA, and other reporting responsibilities. 

[End of appendix] 

Appendix XII - Glossary: 

The definitions in this glossary are drawn from various sources, 
including this manual and the materials in the bibliography. In 
addition, certain definitions were developed by project staff and 
contractors. 

Acceptance testing: 
Final testing by users to decide whether to accept a new system. 

Access control: 
The process of granting or denying specific requests: 1) for obtaining 
and using information and related information processing services; and 
2) to enter specific physical facilities (e.g., Federal buildings, 
military establishments, and border crossing entrances). 

Access control list (ACL): 
A register of: 1) users (including groups, machines, and processes) who 
have been given permission to use a particular system resource, and 2) 
the types of access they have been permitted. 

Access control software: 
(CA-ACF2, RACF, CA-Top Secret); This type of software, which is 
external to the operating system, provides a means of specifying who 
has access to a system, which has access to specific resources, and 
what capabilities authorized users are granted. Access control software 
can generally be implemented in different modes that provide varying 
degrees of protection such as denying access for which the user is not 
expressly authorized, allowing access which is not expressly authorized 
but providing a warning, or allowing access to all resources without 
warning regardless of authority. 

Access method: 
The technique used for selecting records in a file for processing, 
retrieval, or storage. 

Access path: 
Sequence of hardware and software components significant to access 
control. Any component capable of enforcing access restrictions or any 
component that could be used to bypass an access restriction should be 
considered part of the access path. The access path can also be defined 
as the path through which a user request travels, including the 
telecommunications software, transaction processing software, 
application program, etc. 

Access path diagram: 
Network schematic that identifies the users of the system, the type of 
device from which they can access the system, the software used to 
access the system, the resource they may access, the system on which 
these resources reside, and the modes of operation and 
telecommunication paths. 

Access privileges: 
Precise statements that define the extent to which an individual can 
access computer systems and use or modify the programs and data on a 
system, and under what circumstances this access will be allowed. 

Access rights: 
Also called permissions or privileges, these are the rights granted to 
users by the administrator or supervisor. Access rights determine the 
actions users can perform (e.g., read, write, execute, create and 
delete) on files in shared volumes or file shares on the server. 

Accountability: 
The security goal that generates the requirement for actions of an 
entity to be traced uniquely to that entity. This supports non-
repudiation, deterrence, fault isolation, intrusion detection and 
prevention, and after-action recovery and legal action. 

Account Management: 
Involves (1) the process of requesting, establishing, issuing, and 
closing user accounts; (2) tracking users and their respective access 
authorizations; and (3) managing these functions. 

Accreditation: 
The official management decision given by a senior agency official to 
authorize operation of an information system and to explicitly accept 
the risk to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or 
reputation), agency assets, or individuals, based on the implementation 
of an agreed-upon set of security controls. 

Accreditation boundary: 
All components of an information system to be accredited by an 
authorizing official and excludes separately accredited systems, to 
which the information system is connected. 

Accuracy: 
See Accuracy Control. 

Accuracy control: 
Controls that are designed to provide reasonable assurance that 
transactions are properly recorded, with correct amount/data, and on a 
timely basis (in the proper period); key data elements input for 
transactions are accurate; data elements are processed accurately by 
applications that produce reliable results; and output is accurate. 

Adequate security: 
Security commensurate with the risk and the magnitude of harm resulting 
from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of 
information. 

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES): 
The Advanced Encryption Standard specifies a U.S. Government-approved 
cryptographic algorithm that can be used to protect electronic data. 
The AES algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can encrypt 
(encipher) and decrypt (decipher) information. 

Alternate work site: 
Entity authorized work at home or at geographically convenient 
satellite offices (e.g., telecommuting). 

Application controls: 
Application controls, sometimes referred to as business controls, are 
incorporated directly into computer applications to help ensure the 
validity, completeness, accuracy, and confidentiality of data during 
application processing and reporting. 

Application level general controls: 
Controls consist of general controls operating at the business process 
application level, including those related to security management, 
access controls, configuration management, segregation of duties, and 
contingency planning. 

Application System: 
The use of information resources to satisfy a specific set of user 
requirements. Performs a certain type of work, including specific 
functions such as payroll, inventory control, accounting, and mission 
support. Depending on the work for which it was designed, an 
application system can manipulate text, numbers, graphics, or a 
combination of these elements. 

Application programmer: 
A person who develops and maintains application programs, as opposed to 
system programmers who develop and maintain the operating system and 
system utilities. 

Application programs: 
See application system. 

Assertion: 
Financial statement assertions are management representations that are 
embodied in financial statement components. The assertions can be 
either explicit or implicit and can be classified into the following 
broad categories: existence or occurrence (an entityï¿½s assets or 
liabilities exist at a given date and recorded transactions have 
occurred during a given period; completeness (all transactions and 
accounts that should be presented in the financial statements are 
included; rights and obligations (assets are the rights of the entity 
and liabilities are the obligations of the entity at a given date; 
valuation or allocation (asset, liability, revenue, and expense 
components have been included in the financial statements at 
appropriate amounts; and presentation and disclosure (the particular 
components of the financial statements are properly classified, 
described, and disclosed). 

Attack: 
Attempt to gain unauthorized access to an information systemï¿½s 
services, resources, or information, or the attempt to compromise an 
information systemï¿½s integrity, availability, or confidentiality. 

Audit logging: 
Recording of user activity in a system or application initiated by the 
user (e.g., access to a file, record, or field, use of modem). Further, 
it may record any attempts to log on (successful or unsuccessful) to a 
system and record log on ID, date and time of each log on. 

Audit plan: 
A high level description of the audit work to be performed in a certain 
period of time (ordinarily a year). It includes the areas to be 
audited, the type of work planned, the high level objectives and scope 
of the work, and topics such as budget, resource allocation, schedule 
dates, type of report and its intended audience and other general 
aspects of the work. 

Auditable event: 
A system activity identified by the agencyï¿½s audit monitoring system 
that may be indicative of a violation of security policy. The activity 
may range from simple browsing to attempts to plant a Trojan horse or 
gain unauthorized access privilege. 

Audit risk: 
For financial statement audits, the risk that the auditor may 
unknowingly fail to appropriately modify the audit opinion on financial 
statements that are materially misstated. In a performance audit, the 
risk that the auditorï¿½s findings, conclusions, recommendations, or 
assurance may be improper or incomplete. 

Audit strategy: 
Plan for assessing organizational activities based on an understanding 
of the entityï¿½s business processes and related risk assessments. 

Audit trail: 
A record showing who has accessed an Information Technology (IT) system 
and what operations the user has performed during a given period. 

Authentication: 
Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a 
prerequisite to allowing access to resources in an information system. 

Authenticity: 
The property of being genuine and being able to be verifies and 
trusted; confidence in the validity of a transmission, a message, or 
message originator. See authentication. 

Authorization: 
The official management decision given by a senior agency official to 
authorize operation of an information system and to explicitly accept 
the risk to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or 
reputation), agency assets, or individuals, based on the implementation 
of an agreed-upon set of security controls. 

Authorizing official: 
Official with the authority to formally assume responsibility for 
operating an information system at an acceptable level of risk to 
agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), 
agency assets, or individuals. 

Availability: 
Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. 

Backdoor: 
An undocumented way to gain access to a program, data, or an entire 
computer system, often known only to the programmer who created it. 
Backdoors can be handy when the standard way of getting information is 
unavailable, but they usually constitute a security risk. 

Backup: 
Any duplicate of a primary resource function, such as a copy of a 
computer program or data file. This standby is used in case of loss or 
failure of the primary resource. 

Backup procedures: 
A regular maintenance procedure that copies all new or altered files to 
a backup storage medium, such as a tape drive. 

Baseline configuration: 
Current inventory of all entity hardware, software, and firmware plus 
approved changes from the baseline. 

Biometric: A physical or behavioral characteristic of a human being. 

Boundary: 
Software, hardware, or physical barrier that limits access to a system 
or part of a system. 

Boundary Protection: 
Monitoring and control of communications at the external boundary 
between information systems completely under the management and control 
of the organization, and at key internal boundaries between information 
systems completely under the management and control of the 
organization, to prevent and detect malicious and other unauthorized 
communication, employing controlled interfaces (e.g., proxies, 
gateways, routers, firewalls, encrypted tunnels). 

Browsing: 
The act of electronically perusing files and records without 
authorization. 

Business Impact Analysis (BIA): 
An analysis of an information technology (IT) systemï¿½s requirements, 
processes, and interdependencies used to characterize system 
contingency requirements and priorities in the event of a significant 
disruption. 

Business process: 
Processes that are the primary functions that the entity performs in 
accomplishing its mission. Examples include, financial management 
processes, such as collections, disbursements, or payroll; and mission-
related processes, typically at the program or subprogram level, such 
as education, public health, law enforcement, or income security. 

Business process application: 
A computer program designed to help perform a business function such as 
payroll, inventory control, accounting, and mission support. Depending 
on the work for which it was designed, an application can manipulate 
text, numbers, graphics, or a combination of these elements. 

Business process application controls: 
Controls directly related to individual computerized applications. They 
help ensure that transactions are complete, accurate, valid, and 
confidential. These controls include programmed control techniques, 
such as automated edits, and manual follow-up of computer generated 
reports, such as reviews of reports identifying rejected or unusual 
items. 

Business process application level: 
Controls at the business process application level consist of policies, 
procedures for controlling specific processes. For example, the 
entityï¿½s configuration management should reasonably ensure that all 
changes to application systems are fully tested and authorized. 

Business process controls (FISCAM): 
These controls are the automated and/or manual controls applied to 
business transaction flows. They relate to the completeness, accuracy, 
validity and confidentiality of transactions and data during 
application processing. 

Bypass label processing (BLP): 
The technique of reading a computer file while bypassing the internal 
file/data set label. This process could result in bypassing security 
access controls. 

CAAT: 
See computer-assisted audit technique. 

CD-ROM: 
See compact disk-read only memory. 

Central processing unit (CPU): 
The computational and control unit of a computer; the device that 
interprets and executes instructions. 

Certificate: 
A digital representation of information which at least 1) identifies 
the certification authority issuing it, 2) names or identifies its 
subscriber, 3) contains the subscriber's public key, 4) identifies its 
operational period, and 5) is digitally signed by the certification 
authority issuing it. 

Certificate Authority (CA): 
A trusted third party that serves authentication infrastructures or 
organizations and registers entities and issues them certificates. 

Certificate Management: 
Process whereby certificates (as defined above) are generated, stored, 
protected, transferred, loaded, used, and destroyed. 

Certification: 
A comprehensive assessment of the management, operational, and 
technical security controls in an information system, made in support 
of security accreditation, to determine the extent to which the 
controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and 
producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security 
requirements for the system. 

Certification and Accreditation: 
A comprehensive assessment of the management, operational, and 
technical security controls in an information system, made in support 
of security accreditation, to determine the extent to which the 
controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and 
producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security 
requirements for the system. Accreditation is the official management 
decision given by a senior agency official to authorize operation of an 
information system and to explicitly accept the risk to agency 
operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency 
assets, or individuals, based on the implementation of an agreed-upon 
set of security controls. 

Certification Authority: 
A trusted entity that issues and revokes public key certificates. 

Checkpoint: 
The process of saving the current state of a program and its data, 
including intermediate results, to disk or other nonvolatile storage, 
so that, if interrupted, the program could be restarted at the point at 
which the last checkpoint occurred. 

Chief Information Officer: 
Agency official responsible for ensuring agency compliance with, and 
prompt, efficient, and effective implementation of, information 
policies and information resources management responsibilities, 
including information security and the management of information 
technology. 

Cipher key lock: 
A lock with a key pad-like device that requires the manual entry of a 
predetermined code for entry. 

Cipher text: 
Data output from the Cipher or input to the Inverse Cipher. Data in its 
encrypted form. 

Code: 
Instructions written in a computer programming language. (See object 
code and source code.) 

Cold site: 
An IS backup facility that has the necessary electrical and physical 
components of a computer facility, but does not have the computer 
equipment in place. The site is ready to receive the necessary 
replacement computer equipment in the event that the user has to move 
from their main computing location to an alternative site. 

Collaborative computing: 
Applications and technology (e.g., white boarding, group conferencing) 
that allow two or more individuals to share information real time in an 
inter- or intra-enterprise environment. 

Command: 
A job control statement or a message, sent to the computer system, that 
initiates a processing task. 

Compact disc-read only memory (CD-ROM): 
Compact Disc (CD)-Read Only Memory (ROM) is a form of optical, rather 
than magnetic, storage. CD-ROM devices are generally read only. 

Compensating control: 
An internal control that reduces the risk of an existing or potential 
control weakness that could result in errors or omissions. 

Compiler: 
A program that reads the statements in a human-readable programming 
language and translates them into a machine-readable executable 
program. 

Completeness control: 
Controls that ensure entity management that all transactions that 
occurred are entered into the system, accepted for processing, and 
processed once and only once by the system and are properly included in 
output. 

Component: 
A single resource with defined characteristics, such as a terminal or 
printer. These components are also defined by their relationship to 
other components. 

Computer-assisted audit technique (CAAT): 
Any automated audit technique, such as generalized audit software, test 
data generators, computerized audit programs, and special audit 
utilities. 

Computer facility: 
A site or location with computer hardware where information processing 
is performed or where data from such sites are stored. 

Computer operations: 
The function responsible for operating the computer and peripheral 
equipment, including providing the tape, disk, or paper resources as 
requested by the application systems. 

Computer processing location: 
See computer facility. 

Computer resource: 
See resource. 

Computer room: 
Room within a facility that houses computers and/or telecommunication 
devices. 

Computer security: 
Measures and controls that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of IS assets including hardware, software, firmware, and 
information being processed, stored, and communicated. 

Computer system: 
A complete computer installation, including peripherals, in which all 
the components are designed to work with each other. 

Computer-related controls: 
Computer-related controls help ensure the reliability, confidentiality, 
and availability of automated information. They include both general 
controls, which apply to all or a large segment of an entityï¿½s 
information systems, and application controls, which apply to 
individual applications. 

Computing environment: 
Workstation or server (host) and its operating system, peripherals, and 
applications. 

Confidentiality: 
Preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including 
means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information. 

Confidentiality control: 
Controls that are designed to provide reasonable assurance that 
application data and reports and other output are protected against 
unauthorized access. 

Configuration auditing: 
Procedures for determining alignment between the actual system and the 
documentation describing it, thereby ensuring that the documentation 
used to support decision making is complete and correct. 

Configuration control: 
Process for controlling modifications to hardware, firmware, software, 
and documentation to ensure the information system is protected against 
improper modifications prior to, during, and after system 
implementation. 

Configuration control board: 
Evaluates and approves or disapproves proposed changes to configuration 
items and ensures implementation of approved changes. 

Configuration identification: 
Procedures for identifying, documenting, and assigning unique 
identifiers (for example, serial numbers and name) to a systemï¿½s 
hardware and software component parts and subparts generally referred 
to as configuration items. 

Configuration settings: 
Information system parameters that provide only essential capabilities 
and specifically prohibit or restrict the use of unnecessary functions, 
ports, protocols, and services. 

Configuration status accounting: 
A procedure for documenting and reporting on the status of 
configuration items as a system evolves. Documentation, such as 
historical change lists and original designs or drawings, are generated 
and kept in a library, thereby allowing entities to continuously know 
the state of a systemï¿½s configuration and be in a position to make 
informed decisions about changing the configuration. 

Configuration management: 
The control and documentation of changes made to a systemï¿½s hardware, 
software, and documentation throughout the development and operational 
life of the system. 

Console: 
Traditionally, a control unit such as a terminal through which a user 
communicates with a computer. In the mainframe environment, a console 
is the operatorï¿½s station. 

Contingency plan: 
Management policy and procedures designed to maintain or restore 
business operations, including computer operations, possibly at an 
alternate location, in the event of emergencies, system failure, or 
disaster. 

Contingency planning: 
See contingency plan. 

Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP): 
A predetermined set of instructions or procedures that describe how an 
organizationï¿½s essential functions will be sustained for up to 30 days 
as a result of a disaster event before returning to normal operations. 

Control activities: 
Descriptions of individual control requirements for each critical 
control element (e.g., implement effective authorization controls, 
adequately protect sensitive system resources). 

Control categories: 
Groupings of related controls pertaining to similar types of risk. 
Control categories include security management, access controls, 
configuration management, segregation of duties, and contingency 
planning. 

Control deficiency: 
In financial audits, a control deficiency in an entityï¿½s internal 
control over financial reporting exists when the design or operation of 
a control does not allow management or employees, in the normal course 
of performing their assigned functions, to prevent or detect 
misstatements on a timely basis. Control deficiency In single audits, a 
control deficiency in an entityï¿½s internal control over compliance 
exists when the design or operation of a control does not allow 
management or employees, in the normal course of performing their 
assigned functions, to prevent or detect noncompliance with a type of 
compliance requirement of a federal program on a timely manner. 

Control dependency: 
Exists when the effectiveness of an internal control is dependent on 
the effectiveness of other internal controls. 

Control environment: 
The control environment is an important component of an entityï¿½s 
internal control structure. It sets the ï¿½tone at the topï¿½ and can 
influence the effectiveness of specific control techniques. Factors 
that influence the control environment include managementï¿½s philosophy 
and operating style, the entityï¿½s organizational structure, methods of 
assigning authority and responsibility, managementï¿½s control methods 
for monitoring and following up on performance, the effectiveness of 
the Inspector Generalï¿½s and internal audits, personnel policies and 
practices, and influences external to the entity. 

Control objectives: 
The intent of the specific control to effectively secure specific 
general support or business activities. 

Control risk: 
In a financial statement audit, the risk that a material misstatement 
that could occur in an assertion will not be prevented, or detected and 
corrected on a timely basis by the entityï¿½s internal control structure. 

Control techniques: 

The specific control implemented by the entity to secure a specific 
general support system or business process activity. 

Controlled Interface: 
Mechanism that facilitates the adjudication of different interconnected 
system security policies (e.g., controlling the flow of information 
into or out of an interconnected system). 

Countermeasures: 
Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that reduce 
the vulnerability of an information system. Synonymous with security 
controls and safeguards. 

CPU: 
See central processing unit. 

Critical control point: 
System control points that, if compromised, could allow an individual 
to gain unauthorized access to or perform unauthorized or inappropriate 
activities on entity systems or data, which could lead directly or 
indirectly to unauthorized access or modifications to the key areas of 
audit interest. 

Cryptography: 
The science of coding messages so they cannot be read by any person 
other than the intended recipient. Ordinary textï¿½or plain textï¿½and 
other data are transformed into coded form by encryption and translated 
back to plain text or data by decryption. 

Data: 
Facts and information that can be communicated and manipulated. Data 
access method See access method. 

Data administration: 
The function that plans for and administers the data used throughout 
the entity. This function is concerned with identifying, cataloging, 
controlling, and coordinating the information needs of the entity. 

Database: 
A collection of related information about a subject organized in a 
useful manner that provides a base or foundation for procedures, such 
as retrieving information, drawing conclusions, or making decisions. 
Any collection of information that serves these purposes qualifies as a 
database, even if the information is not stored on a computer. 

Database administrator (DBA): 
The individual responsible for both the design of the database, 
including the structure and contents, and the access capabilities of 
application programs and users to the database. Additional 
responsibilities include operation, performance, integrity, and 
security of the database. 

Database management: 
Tasks related to creating, maintaining, organizing, and retrieving 
information from a database. 

Database management system (DBMS): 
(DB2, IMS, IDMS) A software product that aids in controlling and using 
the data needed by application programs. DBMSs organize data in a 
database, manage all requests for database actionsï¿½such as queries or 
updates from usersï¿½and permit centralized control of security and data 
integrity. 

Data center: 
See computer facility. 

Data communications: 
The transfer of information from one computer to another through a 
communications medium, such as telephone lines, microwave relay, 
satellite link, or physical cable. 

Data communications systems: 
See data communications. 

Data design: 
Organization of data into structures to facilitate retrieval while 
minimizing redundancy. The design of transaction data elements is a 
critical factor in helping assure the quality of data as well as its 
interrelationship with other data elements. 

Data definition: 
Identification of all fields in the database, how they are formatted, 
how they are combined into different types of records, and how the 
record types are interrelated. 

Data file: 
See file. 

Data management systems: 
Applications which handle significant volumes of data often employ data 
management system to perform certain data processing functions within 
an application. Data management systems include database management 
systems, specialized data transport/communications software (often 
called middleware, cryptography used in conjunction with data integrity 
controls, data warehouse software and data reporting/data extraction 
software. 

Data owner: 
See owner. 

Data processing: 
The computerized preparation of documents and the flow of data 
contained in these documents through the major steps of recording, 
classifying, and summarizing. 

Data processing center: 
See computer facility. 

Data quality standard: 
Requirements to ensure the state of completeness, validity, 
consistency, timeliness and accuracy that makes data appropriate for a 
specific use. Data security See security management function. 

Data strategy: 
Plan used to identify data needed to support business processes. A 
clearly defined data strategy minimizes data redundancies fundamental 
to an efficient, effective transaction processing function. 

Data validation: 
Checking transaction data for any errors or omissions that can be 
detected by examining the data. 

Data warehouse: 
A generic term for a system used to store, retrieve, and manage large 
amounts of data. A database, often remote, that contains recent 
snapshots of corporate data that can be used for analysis without 
slowing down day-to-day operations of the production database. 

DBA: 
See database administrator. 

DBMS: 
See database management system. 

Debug: 
With software, to detect, locate, and correct logical or syntactical 
errors in a computer program. 

Decryption: 
The process of changing ciphertext using a cryptographic algorithm and 
key. 

Defense-in-depth: 
A commonly accepted ï¿½best practiceï¿½ for implementing computer security 
controls in todayï¿½s networked environments. Integrates people, 
operations, and technology capabilities to protect information systems 
across multiple layers. 

Delete access: 
This level of access provides the ability to erase or remove data or 
programs. 

Denial of Service (DOS): 
The prevention of authorized access to resources or the delaying of 
time-critical operations. (Time-critical may be milliseconds or it may 
be hours, depending upon the service provided.) 

Denial of Service (DOS) Attack: 
An assault on a service from a single source that floods it with so 
many requests that it becomes overwhelmed and is either stopped 
completely or operates at a significantly reduced rate. 

Detection risk: 
The risk that the auditor will not detect a material misstatement that 
exists in an assertion. 

Dial-up access: 
A means of connecting to another computer, or a network similar to the 
Internet, over a telecommunications line using a modem-equipped 
computer. 

Dial-back: 
Used as a control over dial-up telecommunications lines. The 
telecommunications link established through dial-up into the computer 
from a remote location is interrupted so the computer can dial back to 
the caller. The link is permitted only if the caller is from a valid 
phone number or telecommunications channel. 

Digital Certificate: 
A certificate identifying a public key to its subscriber, corresponding 
to a private key held by that subscriber. It is a unique code that 
typically is used to allow the authenticity and integrity of 
communicated data to be verified. 

Digital signature: 
Cryptographic process used to assure message originator authenticity, 
integrity, and nonrepudiation. 

Direct access: 
An access method for finding an individual item on a storage device and 
accessing it directly, without having to access all preceding records. 

Disaster recovery plan: 
A written plan for processing critical applications in the event of a 
major hardware or software failure or destruction of facilities. 

Diskette: 
A removable and widely-used data storage medium that uses a 
magnetically coated flexible disk of Mylar enclosed in a plastic case. 

DNS (domain name system): 
A hierarchical database that is distributed across the Internet that 
allows names to be resolved into IP addresses (and vice versa) to 
locate services such as web and e-mail servers. 

DSS: 
See decision support system. 

Download: 
Process of transferring data from a central computer to a personal 
computer or workstation. 

Edit controls: 
Detects errors in the input portion of information that is sent to the 
computer for processing. The controls may be manual or automated and 
allow the user to edit data errors before processing. 

Electronic signature: 
A symbol generated through electronic means that can be used to (1) 
identify the sender of information and (2) ensure the integrity of the 
critical information received from the sender. An electronic signature 
may represent either an individual or an entity. Adequate electronic 
signatures are (1) unique to the signer, (2) under the signerï¿½s sole 
control, (3) capable of being verified, and (4) linked to the data in 
such a manner that, if data are changed, the signature is invalidated 
upon verification. Traditional user identification code/password 
techniques do not meet these criteria. 

Embedded Audit Module: 
Integral part of an application system that is designed to identify and 
report specific transactions or other information based on pre-
determined criteria. Identification of reportable items occurs as part 
of real-time processing. Reporting may be real-time online, or may use 
store and forward methods. Also known as integrated test facility or 
continuous auditing module. 

Encryption: 
Encryption is the conversion of data into a form, called a cipher text, 
which cannot be easily understood by unauthorized people. 

Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP): 
Commercial software that integrates all the information flowing through 
the entity. ERP systems contain functional modules (e.g., financial, 
accounting, human resources, supply chain, and customer information) 
that are integrated within the core system or interfaced to external 
systems. 

Entity or component level: 
Controls at the entity or component level consist of the entitywide or 
componentwide processes designed to achieve the control activities. 
They are focused on how the entity or component manages IS related to 
each general control activity. 

Entitywide information security program: 
An entitywide information security program is the foundation of a 
security control structure and a reflection of senior managementï¿½s 
commitment to addressing security risks. The security management 
program establishes a framework and continuous cycle of activity for 
assessing risk, developing and implementing effective security 
procedures, and monitoring the effectiveness of these procedures. 

Entry points: 
Access points to the entityï¿½s information systems. This may include 
remote access through dial-up, wireless devices, or the Internet 

Environmental controls: 
This subset of physical access controls prevents or mitigates damage to 
facilities and interruptions in service. Smoke detectors, fire alarms 
and extinguishers, and uninterruptible power supplies are some examples 
of environmental controls. 

Execute access: 
This level of access provides the ability to execute a program. 

Exit: 
A predefined or in-house written routine that receives controls at a 
predefined point in processing. These routines provide an entity with 
the flexibility to customize processing, but also create the 
opportunity to bypass security controls. 

Field: 
A location in a record in which a particular type of data are stored. 
In a database, the smallest unit of data that can be named. A string of 
fields is a concatenated field or record. 

File: 
A collection of records stored in computerized form. 

Financial management system: 
Financial information systems and the financial portions of mixed 
systems (systems that support both financial and nonfinancial 
functions) that are necessary to support financial management. 

Firewall: 
Hardware and software components that protect one set of system 
resources (e.g., computers, networks) from attack by outside network 
users (e.g., Internet users) by blocking and checking all incoming 
network traffic. Firewalls permit authorized users to access and 
transmit privileged information and deny access to unauthorized users. 

Firmware: 
Program recorded in permanent or semi permanent computer memory. 

FISMA: 
Enacted into law as Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002 (PL 107-
347; December 17, 2002), FISMA authorized and strengthened information 
security program, evaluation, and reporting requirements. 

FMFIA: 
The objective of the Federal Managersï¿½ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 
(FMFIA) is to provide reasonable assurance that (1) obligations and 
costs are in compliance with applicable law, (2) funds, property, and 
other assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, or 
misappropriation, and (3) revenues and expenditures applicable to 
agency operations are properly recorded and accounted for to permit the 
preparation of accounts and reliable financial and statistical reports 
and to maintain accountability over the assets. 

Flowchart: 
A diagram of the movement of transactions, computer functions, media, 
and/or operations within a system. The processing flow is represented 
by arrows between symbolic shapes for operation, device, data file, 
etc. to depict the system or program. 

Fraud: 
Fraud is a type of illegal act involving the obtaining of something of 
value through willful misrepresentation. 

FTP (file transfer protocol): 
A protocol used to transfer files over a TCP/IP network (Internet, 
UNIX, etc.) 

GAGAS: 
Also referred to as the Yellow Book. IT provides standards and guidance 
for use by government auditors to ensure that they maintain competence, 
integrity, objectivity, and independence in planning, conducting, and 
reporting their work, and are to be followed by auditors and audit 
organizations when required by law regulation, contract, agreement, or 
policy. 

Gateway: 
In networks, a computer that connects two dissimilar local area 
networks, or connects a local area network to a wide area network, 
minicomputer, or mainframe. A gateway may perform network protocol 
conversion and bandwidth conversion. 

General controls: 
General controls are the structure, policies, and procedures that apply 
to an entityï¿½s overall computer operations. They include an entitywide 
security program, access controls, application development and change 
controls, segregation of duties, system software controls, and service 
continuity controls. 

General support system: 
An interconnected set of information resources under the same direct 
management control that shares common functionality. Normally, the 
purpose of a general support system is to provide processing or 
communications support. 

Hacker: 
A person who attempts to enter a system without authorization from a 
remote location. 

Hardware: 
The physical components of IT, including the computers, peripheral 
devices such as printers, disks, and scanners, and cables, switches, 
and other elements of the telecommunications infrastructure. 

Hashing: 
Value computed on data to detect error or manipulation. 

Hot site: 
A fully operational off-site data processing facility equipped with 
both hardware and system software to be used in the event of a 
disaster. 

HTTP (hyper text transfer protocol): 
A communication protocol used to connect to servers on the World Wide 
Web. Its primary function is to establish a connection with a web 
server and transmit HTML pages to the client browser. 

HTTPS (hyper text transfer protocol secure): 
A protocol for accessing a secure web server, whereby all data 
transferred is encrypted. 

Hub: 
A common connection point for devices in a network, hubs commonly is 
used to connect segments of a LAN. A hub contains multiple ports. When 
a packet arrives at one port, it is copied to the other ports so that 
all segments of the LAN can see all packets. 

Identification: 
The process of verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, 
usually as a prerequisite for granting access to resources in an IT 
system. 

IDS: 
See intrusion detection system. 

IEEE: 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers)--Pronounced I-triple-
E, IEEE is an organization composed of engineers, scientists and 
students. The IEEE is best known for developing standards for the 
computer and electronics industry. 

Implementation: 
The process of making a system operational in the organization. 

Incident: 
Assessed occurrence having actual or potentially adverse effects on an 
IS. 

Incident response program: 
A process that involves detecting a problem, determining its cause, 
minimizing the damage it causes, resolving the problem, and documenting 
each step of the response for future reference. 

Incompatible duties: 
When work responsibilities are not segregated so that one individual 
controls critical stages of a process incompatible duties exist. For 
example, while users may authorize program changes, programmers should 
not be allowed to do so because they are not the owners of the system 
and do not have the responsibility to see that the system meets user 
needs. Similarly, one computer programmer should not be allowed to 
independently write, test, and approve program changes. 

Information: 
The meaning of data. Data are facts; they become information when they 
are seen in context and convey meaning. 

Information resource owner: 
See owner. 

Information Security: 
The protection of information and information systems from unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in 
order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 

Information System: 
A discrete set of information resources organized for the collection, 
processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of 
information. 

Information system boundaries: 
Logical or physical boundaries around information resources and 
implementing measures to prevent unauthorized information exchange 
across the boundary in either direction. Firewall devices represent the 
most common boundary protection technology at the network level. 

Information Security: 
Protecting information and information systems from unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction to 
provides integrity, confidentiality, and availability. 

Information System (IS) Control: 
As defined in GAGAS, information system (IS) controls consist of those 
internal controls that are dependent on information systems processing 
and include general controls and application controls. 

Information System Owner (or Program Manager): 
Official responsible for the overall procurement, development, 
integration, modification, or operation and maintenance of an 
information system. 

Information systems management: 
The function that directs or manages the activities and staff of the IS 
department and its various organizational components. 

Information Type: 
A specific category of information (e.g., privacy, medical, 
proprietary, financial, investigative, contractor sensitive, security 
management) defined by an organization or in some instances, by a 
specific law, executive order, directive, policy, or regulation. 

Infrastructure application: 
Include software that is used to assist in performing systems 
operations, including management of network devices. These applications 
include database, e-mail, browsers, plug-ins, utilities, and 
applications not directly related to business processes. 

Input: 
Any information entered into a computer, or the process of entering 
data into the computer. 

Integration testing: 
Testing to determine if related information system components perform 
to specifications. 

Integrity: 
Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and 
includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity. This 
involves ensuring that transmitted or stored data are not altered by 
unauthorized persons in a way that is not detectable by authorized 
users. 

Interface: 
A connection between two devices, applications, or networks or a 
boundary across which two systems communicate. Interface may also refer 
to the portion of a program that interacts with the user. 

Interface controls: 
Controls used to provide reasonable assurance that data used by 
applications that is input from legacy systems is reliable, valid, 
complete, and properly converted from the legacy application into the 
applications they support. 

Interface design: 
Uses guidelines set by the strategy and provides specific information 
for each of the characteristics defined in the strategy. See Interface 
Strategy. 

Interface strategy: 
Describes at the highest level how the interfaces are implemented 
between two applications, The interface strategy includes an 
explanation of each interface, the interface method chosen (manual or 
batch, etc.), the data fields being interfaced, the controls to 
reasonably assure that the data is interfaced completely and 
accurately, timing requirements, assignment of responsibilities, on-
going system balancing requirements, and security requirements. 

Internal control (also referred to as internal control structure): 
A process, affected by agency management and other personnel, designed 
to provide reasonable assurance that (1) operations, including the use 
of agency resources, are effective and efficient; (2) financial 
reporting, including reports on budget execution, financial statements, 
and other reports for internal and external use, are reliable; and (3) 
applicable laws and regulations are followed. Internal control also 
includes the safeguarding of agency assets against unauthorized 
acquisition, use, or disposition. Internal control consists of 5 
interrelated components that form an integrated process that can react 
to changing circumstances and conditions within the agency. These 
components include the control environment, risk assessment, control 
activities, information and communication, and monitoring. 

Internet: 
When capitalized, the term ï¿½Internetï¿½ refers to the collection of 
networks and gateways that use the transmission control 
protocol/Internet protocol suite of protocols. 

Internet protocol: 
Standard protocol for transmission of data from source to destinations 
in packet-switched communications networks and interconnected systems 
of such networks. 

Intrusion: 
Any intentional violation of the security policy of a system. 

Intrusion Detection System (IDS): 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) inspects network activity to 
identify suspicious patterns that may indicate a network or system 
attack from someone attempting to break into or compromise a system 

Intranet: 
A private network that uses the infrastructure and standards of the 
Internet and World Wide Web, but is isolated from the public Internet 
by firewall barriers. 

Inventory: 
FISMA requires that each agency develop, maintain, and annually update 
an inventory of major information systems operated by the agency or 
under its control. The inventory must include identification of the 
interfaces between agency systems and all other systems or networks, 
including interfaces not controlled by the agency. 

Job: 
A set of data that completely defines a unit of work for a computer. A 
job usually includes programs, linkages, files, and instructions to the 
operating system. 

Key: 
A long stream of seemingly random bits used with cryptographic 
algorithms. The keys must be known or guessed to forge a digital 
signature or decrypt an encrypted message. 

Key area of audit interest: 
Those areas which are critical to achieving the audit objectives (e.g., 
general support and business process application systems and files or 
components thereof). 

LAN: 
See local area network. 

Label: 
See security label. 

Least Privilege: 
Principle requiring that each subject be granted the most restrictive 
set of privileges needed for the performance of authorized tasks. 
Application of this principle limits the damage that can result from 
accident, error, or unauthorized use of an IS. 

Legacy system: 
A computer system consisting of older applications and hardware that 
was developed to solve a specific business problem. Many legacy systems 
do not conform to current standards, but are still in use because they 
solve the problem and replacing them would be too expensive. 

Library: 
In computer terms, a library is a collection of similar files, such as 
data sets contained on tape and/or disks, stored together in a common 
area. Typical uses are to store a group of source programs or a group 
of load modules. In a library, each program is called a member. 
Libraries are also called partitioned data sets (PDS). Library can also 
be used to refer to the physical site where magnetic media, such as a 
magnetic tape, is stored. These sites are usually referred to as tape 
libraries. 

Library control/management: 
The function responsible for controlling program and data files that 
are either kept on-line or on tapes and disks that are loaded onto the 
computer as needed. 

Library copier: 
Software that can copy source code from a library into a program. 

Library management software: 
Software that provides an automated means of inventorying software, 
ensuring that differing versions are not accidentally misidentified, 
and maintaining a record of software changes. 

Local area network (LAN): 
A group of computers and other devices dispersed over a relatively 
limited area and connected by a communications link that enables a 
device to interact with any other on the network. Local area networks 
(LAN) commonly include microcomputers and shared (often expensive) 
resources such as laser printers and large hard disks. Most modern LANs 
can support a wide variety of computers and other devices. Separate 
LANs can be connected to form larger networks. 

Log: 
With respect to computer systems, to record an event or transaction. 

Log on: 
The process of establishing a connection with, or gaining access to, a 
computer system or peripheral device. 

Logging file: 
See log. 

Logical access control: 
The use of computer hardware and software to prevent or detect 
unauthorized access. For example, users may be required to input user 
identification numbers (ID), passwords, or other identifiers that are 
linked to predetermined access privileges. 

Logical security: 
See logical access control. 

Mainframe computer: 
A multi-user computer designed to meet the computing needs of a large 
organization. The term came to be used to refer generally to the large 
central computers developed in the late 1950s and 1960s to meet the 
accounting and information management needs of large organizations. 

Maintenance: 
Altering programs after they have been in use for a while. Maintenance 
programming may be performed to add features, correct errors that were 
not discovered during testing, or update key variables (such as the 
inflation rate) that change over time. 

Major application: 
OMB Circular A-130 defines a major application as an application that 
requires special attention due to the risk and magnitude of the harm 
resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to, or 
modification of, information in the application. 

Malicious code: 
Software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process that 
will have adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of an information system. A virus, worm, Trojan horse, or 
other code-based entity that infects a host. 

Management controls: 
The organization, policies, and procedures used to provide reasonable 
assurance that (1) programs achieve their intended result, (2) 
resources are used that are consistent with the organizationï¿½s mission, 
(3) programs and resources are protected from waste, fraud, and 
mismanagement, (4) laws and regulations are followed, and (5) reliable 
and timely information is obtained, maintained, reported, and used for 
decision making. 

Master console: 
In MVS environments, the master console provides the principal means of 
communicating with the system. Other multiple console support (MCS) 
consoles often serve specialized functions, but can have master 
authority to enter all MVS commands. 

Master data: 
Referential data that provides the basis for ongoing business 
activities, e.g., customers, vendors, and employees. 

Master data controls: 
Controls over master data, the key information that is relatively 
constant and shared between multiple functions or applications (e.g., 
vendors, customers, employeeï¿½s data, and vendor files). 

Master data design: 
Layout of key data requirements to ensure integrity and utility of data 
information. Data integrity requirements include, for example, 
requiring an entry in all key fields, such as address and account 
number and not accepting invalid values in the required fields. 

Master file: 
In a computer, the most currently accurate and authoritative permanent 
or semi-permanent computerized record of information maintained over an 
extended period. 

Material weaknessï¿½A-123: 
A material weakness is a reportable condition in which the design or 
operation of the internal controls does not reduce to a relatively low 
level the risk that losses, noncompliance, or misstatements in amounts 
that would be material in relation to the principal statements or to a 
performance measure or aggregation of related performance measures may 
occur and not be detected within a timely period by employees in the 
normal course of their assigned duties. 

Material weaknessï¿½A-123: 
Control deficiency or combination of control deficiencies that in 
managementï¿½s judgement should be communicated because they represent 
significant weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control 
that could adversely affect the organizationï¿½s ability to meet its 
internal control objectives. 

Material weakness ï¿½ financial reporting: 
A significant deficiency or combination of significant deficiencies 
that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material 
misstatement of the financial statements will not be prevented or 
detected. 

Material weakness ï¿½ single audit compliance: 
A significant deficiency or combination of significant deficiencies, 
that result in more than a remote likelihood that material 
noncompliance with a type of compliance requirement of a federal 
program will not be prevented or detected by the entityï¿½s internal 
control. 

Materiality: 
An auditing concept regarding the relative importance of an amount or 
item. An item is considered not to be material when it is not 
significant enough to influence decisions or have an effect on the 
financial statements. 

Media controls: 
Controls implemented to prevent unauthorized physical access to digital 
(e.g., diskettes, flash/thumb drives, compact disks) and printed media 
(e.g., paper, microfilm) removed from information system and during 
pick-up, transport, and delivery to authorized users. 

Merge access: 
This level of access provides the ability to combine data from two 
separate sources. 

Microcomputer: 
Any computer with its arithmetic logic unit and control unit contained 
in one integrated circuit, called a microprocessor. 

Microprocessor: 
An integrated circuit device that contains the miniaturized circuitry 
to perform arithmetic, logic, and control operations (i.e. contains the 
entire CPU on a single chip). 

Middleware: 
Another term for an application programmer interface (API). It refers 
to the interfaces that allow programmers to access lower- or higher-
level services by providing an intermediary layer that includes 
function calls to the services. 

Migration: 
A change from an older hardware platform, operating system, or software 
version to a newer one. 

Mobile code: 
Software programs or parts of programs obtained from remote information 
systems, transmitted across a network, and executed on a local 
information system without explicit installation or execution by the 
recipient. 

Mobile computing: 
Ability to use technology that is not physically connected, or in 
remote or mobile (non static) environments. Requires that the mobile 
computing activity be connected wirelessly to and through the internet 
or to and through a private network. This connection ties the mobile 
device to centrally located information and/or application software 
through the use of battery powered, portable, and wireless computing 
and communication devices. This includes devices like laptops with 
wireless LAN or wireless WAN technology, smart mobile phones, wearable 
computers and Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs). 

Modem: 
Short for modulator-demodulator. A device that allows digital signals 
to be transmitted and received over analog telephone lines. This type 
of device makes it possible to link a digital computer to the analog 
telephone system. It also determines the speed at which information can 
be transmitted and received. 

Multiyear testing plan: 
Where IS audits are performed on a regular basis the auditor may 
develop a multiyear audit plan. Such a plan will cover relevant key 
agency applications, systems, and processing centers. These strategic 
plans should cover no more than 3-year period and include the schedule 
and scope of assessments to be performed during the period and the 
rationale for planned approach. 

Naming conventions: 
Standards for naming computer resources, such as data files, program 
libraries, individual programs, and applications. 

Network: 
A group of computers and associated devices that are connected by 
communications facilities. A network can involve permanent connections, 
such as cables, or temporary connections made through telephone or 
other communications links. A network can be as small as a local area 
network consisting of a few computers, printers, and other devices, or 
it can consist of many small and large computers distributed over a 
vast geographic area. 

Network administration: 
The function responsible for maintaining secure and reliable network 
operations. This function serves as a liaison with user departments to 
resolve network needs and problems. 

Network architecture: 
The underlying structure of a computer network, including hardware, 
functional layers, interfaces, and protocols (rules) used to establish 
communications and ensure the reliable transfer of information. Because 
a computer network is a mixture of hardware and software, network 
architectures are designed to provide both philosophical and physical 
standards for enabling computers and other devices to manage the 
complexities of establishing communications links and transferring 
information without conflict. Various network architectures exist, 
among them the internationally accepted seven-layer open systems 
interconnection model and International Business Machine (IBM) Systems 
Network Architecture. Both the open systems interconnection model and 
the Systems Network Architecture organize network functions in layers, 
each layer dedicated to a particular aspect of communication or 
transmission and each requiring protocols that define how functions are 
carried out. The ultimate objective of these and other network 
architectures is the creation of communications standards that will 
enable computers of many kinds to exchange information freely. 

Network component: 
Devices that support a network including, workstations, servers, 
switches, and routers. 

Network scanning: 
Procedure for identifying active hosts on a network, either for the 
purpose of attacking them or for network security assessment. Scanning 
procedures, such as ping sweeps and port scans, return information 
about which IP addresses map to live hosts that are active on the 
Internet and what services they offer. Another scanning method, inverse 
mapping, returns information about what IP addresses do not map to live 
hosts; this enables an attacker to make assumptions about viable 
addresses. 

Network session: 
A connection between two network component peers. This provides the 
capability of bundling of resources needed for an instance of a 
service. 

NIST: 
Under FISMA Act of 2002, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) develops computer security prototypes, tests, 
standards, and procedures to protect sensitive information from 
unauthorized access or modification. Focus areas include cryptographic 
technology and applications, advanced authentication, public key 
infrastructure, internetworking security, criteria and assurance, and 
security management and support. 

Node: 
In a local area network, a connection point that can create, receive, 
or repeat a message. Nodes include repeaters, file servers, and shared 
peripherals. In common usage, however, the term node is synonymous with 
workstation. 

Nonrepudiation: 
The ability to prevent senders from denying that they have sent 
messages and receivers from denying that they have received messages. 

Object code: 
The machine code generated by a source code language processor such as 
an assembler or compiler. A file of object code may be immediately 
executable or it may require linking with other object code files, 
e.g., libraries, to produce a complete executable program. 

Object privilege: 
Allows the user to have access to the data within an object or allow 
the user to execute a stored program. These include: Select, Insert, 
Delete, etc. Each type of object has different privileges associated 
with it. 

Off-the-shelf software: 
Software that is marketed as a commercial product, unlike custom 
programs that are privately developed for a specific client. 

Online: 
A processing term that categorizes operations that are activated and 
ready for use. If a resource is online, it is capable of communicating 
with or being controlled by a computer. For example, a printer is 
online when it can be used for printing. An application is classified 
as online when users interact with the system as their information is 
being processed, as opposed to batch processing. 

Online editors: 
See online program development software. 

Online program development software: 
(TSO, ROSCOE, VOLLIE, ICCF, ISPF) Software that permits programs to be 
coded and compiled in an interactive mode. 

Operating system: 
The software that controls the execution of other computer programs, 
schedules tasks, allocates storage, manages the interface to peripheral 
hardware, and presents a default interface to the user when no 
application program is running. 

Operational controls: 
Relate to managing the entityï¿½s business and include policies and 
procedures to carry out organizational objectives, such as planning, 
productivity, programmatic, quality, economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness objectives. Management uses these controls to provide 
reasonable assurance that the entity (1) meets its goals, (2) maintains 
quality standards, and (3) does what management directs it to do. 

Output: 
Data/information produced by computer processing, such as graphic 
display on a terminal or hard copy. 

Output devices: 
Peripheral equipment, such as a printer or tape drive, that provides 
the results of processing in a form that can be used outside the 
system. 

Override: 
Decision made by agency management or operation staff to bypass 
established control(s) to allow a transaction or transactions that 
would otherwise be rejected by the system controls to be processed. 

Owner: 
Manager or director who has responsibility for a computer resource, 
such as a data file or application program. 

Packet: 
Data unit that is routed from source to destination in a packet-
switched network. A packet contains both routing information and data. 
Transmission control protocol/Internet protocol (TCP/IP) is such a 
packet-switched network. 

Packet Filtering: 
Controlling access to a network by analyzing the attributes of the 
incoming and outgoing packets and either letting them pass, or denying 
them, based on a list of rules. 

Parameter: 
A value that is given to a variable. Parameters provide a means of 
customizing programs. 

Partitioning: 
Process of physically or logically separating different functions such 
as applications, security and communication activities. Separation may 
be accomplished by using different computers, different central 
processing units, different instances of the operating systems, 
different network addresses, or combinations of these methods. 

Password: 
A confidential character string used to authenticate an identity or 
prevent unauthorized access. 

Password Cracker: 
Specialized security checker that tests userï¿½s passwords, searching for 
passwords that are easy to guess by repeatedly trying words from 
specially crafted dictionaries. Failing that, many password crackers 
can brute force all possible combinations in a relatively short period 
of time with current desktop computer hardware. 

Patch: 
Patches are additional pieces of code that have been developed to 
address specific problems or flaws in existing software. 
Vulnerabilities are flaws that can be exploited, enabling unauthorized 
access to IT systems or enabling users to have access to greater 
privileges than authorized. 

Penetration testing: 
Security testing in which evaluators attempt to circumvent the security 
features of a system based on their understanding of the system design 
and implementation. 

Peripheral: 
A hardware unit that is connected to and controlled by a computer, but 
that is external to the CPU. These devices provide input, output, or 
storage capabilities when used in conjunction with a computer. 

Personally identifiable information: 
Refers to any information about an individual maintained by an agency, 
including any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an 
individualï¿½s identity, such as their name, social security number, date 
of birth, or biometric records, and any other information which is 
linked or linkable to an individual. 

Personnel controls: 
This type of control involves screening individuals prior to their 
authorization to access computer resources. Such screening should be 
commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm the individual 
could cause. 

Personnel security: 
See personnel controls. 

Physical access control: 
This type of control involves restricting physical access to computer 
resources and protecting these resources from intentional or 
unintentional loss or impairment. 

Physical security: 
See physical access control. 

Plain text: 
Data input to the Cipher or output from the Inverse Cipher. 

Plans of Action and Milestones: 
A document that identifies tasks needing to be accomplished. It details 
resources required to accomplish the elements of the plan, any 
milestones in meeting the tasks, and scheduled completion dates for the 
milestones. 

Platform: 
The foundation technology of a computer system. Typically, a specific 
combination of hardware and operating system. 

Privacy Impact Assessment: 
An analysis of how information is handled: (1) to ensure handling 
conforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements 
regarding privacy; (2) to determine the risks and effects of 
collecting, maintaining, and disseminating information in identifiable 
form in an electronic information system; and (3) to examine and 
evaluate protections and alternative processes for handling information 
to mitigate potential privacy risks. 

Privileged account: 
Individuals who have access to set ï¿½access rightsï¿½ for users on a given 
system. Sometimes referred to as system or network administrative 
accounts. 

Privileged User: 
Individual who has access to system control, monitoring, or 
administration functions (e.g., system administrator, system security 
officer, maintainers, system programmers, etc.) 

Process: 
Systematic sequences of operations to produce a specified result. This 
includes all functions performed within a computer such as editing, 
calculating, summarizing, categorizing, and updating. 

Processing: 
The execution of program instructions by the computerï¿½s CPU. 

Production control and scheduling: 
The function responsible for monitoring the information into, through, 
and as it leaves the computer operations area and for determining the 
succession of programs to be run on the computer. Often, an automated 
scheduling package is used in this task. 

Production environment: 
The system environment where the agency performs its operational 
information processing activities. 

Production programs: 
Programs that are being used and executed to support authorized 
organizational operations. Such programs are distinguished from ï¿½testï¿½ 
programs that are being developed or modified, but have not yet been 
authorized for use by management. 

Profile: 
A set of rules that describe the nature and extent of access to 
available resources for a user or a group of users with similar duties, 
such as accounts payable clerks. (See standard profile and user 
profile.) 

Program: 
A set of related instructions that, when followed and executed by a 
computer, perform operations or tasks. Application programs, user 
programs, system programs, source programs, and object programs are all 
software programs. 

Program library: 
See library. 

Programmer: 
A person who designs, codes, tests, debugs, and documents computer 
programs. 

Proprietary: 
Privately owned, based on trade secrets, privately developed 
technology, or specifications that the owner refuses to divulge, which 
prevents others from duplicating a product or program unless an 
explicit license is purchased. 

Protocol: 
In data communications and networking, a standard that specifies the 
format of data as well as the rules to be followed when performing 
specific functions, such as establishing a connection and exchanging 
data. 

Public access controls: 
A subset of access controls that apply when an agency application 
promotes or permits public access. These controls protect the integrity 
of the application and public confidence in the application and include 
segregating the information made directly available to the public from 
official agency records. 

Public domain software: 
Software that has been distributed with an explicit notification from 
the programï¿½s author that the work has been released for unconditional 
use, including for-profit distribution or modification by any party 
under any circumstances. 

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): 
A set of policies, processes, server platforms, software and 
workstations used for the purpose of administering certificates and 
public-private key pairs, including the ability to issue, maintain, and 
revoke public key certificates. 

Quality assurance: 
The function that reviews software project activities and tests 
software products throughout the software life cycle to determine if 
(1) the software project is adhering to its established plans, 
standards, and procedures and (2) the software meets the functional 
specifications defined by the user. 

Query: 
The process of extracting data from a database and presenting it for 
use. 

Read access: 
This level of access provides the ability to look at and copy data or a 
software program. 

Real-time system: 
A computer and/or a software system that reacts to events before they 
become obsolete. This type of system is generally interactive and 
updates files as transactions are processed. 

Record: 
A unit of related data fields. The group of data fields that can be 
accessed by a program and contains the complete set of information on a 
particular item. 

Reliability: 
The capability of hardware or software to perform as the user expects 
and to do so consistently, without failures or erratic behavior. 

Remote access: 
The process of communicating with a computer located in another place 
over a communications link. 

Remote job entry (RJE): 
With respect to computer systems with locations geographically separate 
from the main computer center, submitting batch processing jobs via a 
data communications link. 

Remote Maintenance: 
Maintenance activities conducted by individuals communicating external 
to an information system security perimeter. 

Reportable condition ï¿½ A 123: 
Reportable conditions include matters coming to the auditorï¿½s attention 
that, in the auditorï¿½s judgment, should be communicated because they 
represent significant deficiencies in the design or operation of 
internal controls, which could adversely affect the entityï¿½s ability to 
meet its internal control objectives. 

Repudiation: 
The denial by one of the parties to a transaction or participation in 
all or part of that transaction or of the content of communications 
related to that transaction. 

Residual risk: 
Portion of risk remaining after security measures have been applied. 

Resource: 
Something that is needed to support computer operations, including 
hardware, software, data, telecommunications services, computer 
supplies such as paper stock and preprinted forms, and other resources 
such as people, office facilities, and noncomputerized records. 

Risk: 
The level of impact on agency operations (including mission, functions, 
image, or reputation), agency assets, or individuals resulting from the 
operation of an information system given the potential impact of a 
threat and the likelihood of that threat occurring. 

Risk analysis: 
The process of identifying the risks to system security and determining 
the likelihood of occurrence, the resulting impact, and the additional 
safeguards that mitigate this impact. Part of risk management and 
synonymous with risk assessment. 

Risk assessment: 
The identification and analysis of possible risks in meeting the 
agencyï¿½s objectives that forms a basis for managing the risks 
identified and implementing deterrents. 

Risk management: 
A management approach designed to reduce risks inherent in systems 
development and operations. 

Router: 
An intermediary device on a communications network that expedites 
message delivery. As part of a LAN, a router receives transmitted 
messages and forwards them to their destination over the most efficient 
available route. 

Run: 
A popular, idiomatic expression for program execution. 

Run manual: 
A manual that provides application-specific operating instructions, 
such as instructions on job setup, console and error messages, job 
checkpoints, and restart and recovery steps after system failures. 

Safeguards: 
Protective measures prescribed to meet the security requirements (i.e., 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability) specified for an 
information system. Safeguards may include security features, 
management constraints, personnel security, and security of physical 
structures, areas, and devices. Synonymous with security controls and 
countermeasures. 

Sanitization: 
Process to remove information from media such that information recovery 
is not possible. It includes removing all labels, markings, and 
activity logs. 

SAS 70: 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 70: Service Organizations, commonly 
abbreviated as SAS 70, is an auditing statement issued by the Auditing 
Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), officially titled ï¿½Reports on the Processing of 
Transactions by Service Organizationsï¿½. SAS 70 defines the professional 
standards used by a service auditor to assess the internal controls of 
a service organization and issue a service auditorï¿½s report. Service 
organizations are typically entities that provide outsourcing services 
that impact the control environment of their customers. 

SDLC methodology: 
See system development life cycle methodology. 

Security: 
The protection of computer facilities, computer systems, and data 
stored on computer systems or transmitted via computer networks from 
loss, misuse, or unauthorized access. Computer security, as defined by 
Appendix III to OMB Circular A-130, involves the use of management, 
personnel, operational, and technical controls to ensure that systems 
and applications operate effectively and provide confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. 

Security administrator: 
Person who is responsible for managing the security program for 
computer facilities, computer systems, and/or data that are stored on 
computer systems or transmitted via computer networks. 

Security Category: 
The characterization of information or an information system based on 
an assessment of the potential impact that a loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of such information or information system 
would have on organizational operations, organizational assets, or 
individuals. 

Security Controls: 
The management, operational, and technical controls (i.e., safeguards 
or countermeasures) prescribed for an information system to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its 
information. 

Security Label: 
Explicit or implicit marking of a data structure or output media 
associated with an information system representing the FIPS 199 
security category, or distribution limitations or handling caveats of 
the information contained therein. 

Security management function: 
The function responsible for the development and administration of an 
entityï¿½s information security program. This includes assessing risks, 
implementing appropriate security policies and related controls, 
establishing a security awareness and education program for employees, 
and monitoring and evaluating policy and control effectiveness. 

Security Objective: 
Confidentiality, integrity, or availability. 

Security plan: 
A written plan that clearly describes the entityï¿½s security program and 
policies and procedures that support it. The plan and related policies 
should cover all major systems and facilities and should outline the 
duties of those who are responsible for overseeing security (the 
security management function) as well as those who own, use, or rely on 
the entityï¿½s computer resources. 

Security policy: 
The set of management statements that documents an organizationï¿½s 
philosophy of protecting its computing and information assets. The set 
of security rules enforced by the systemï¿½s security features. 

Security profile: 
See profile. 

Security requirements: 
Requirements levied on an information system that are derived from 
laws, executive orders, directives, policies, instructions, 
regulations, or organizational (mission) needs to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information being 
processed, stored, or transmitted. 

Security software: 
See access control software. 

Segregation/separation of duties: 
A basic control that prevents or detects errors and irregularities by 
assigning responsibility for initiating transactions, recording 
transactions and custody of assets to separate individuals. Commonly 
used in large IT organizations so that no single person is in a 
position to introduce fraudulent or malicious code without detection. 

Sensitive information: 
Any information that an agency has determined requires heightened 
protection from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction [e.g., by using specific access controls] 
because of the nature of the information (e.g., personal information 
required to be protected by the Privacy Act, proprietary commercial 
information, information critical to law enforcement activities, and 
information that has or may be determined to be exempt from public 
release under the Freedom of Information Act). 

Sensitivity accounts: 
See privileged account. 

Server: 
A computer running administrative software that controls access to all 
or part of the network and its resources, such as disk drives or 
printers. A computer acting as a server makes resources available to 
computers acting as workstations on the network. 

Service: 
Refers to customer or product-related business functions such as file 
transfer protocol (FTP), hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), and 
mainframe supervisor calls. Each system provides a set of services. For 
example, a computer network calls its users to send packets to 
specified destinations and a database system responds to queries. 

Service auditor: 
An independent auditor hired by the service organization to provide a 
report on internal controls at the service provider. See Service 
Organization. 

Service Bureau: 
A computer facility that provides data processing services to clients 
on a continual basis. 

Service organization: 
Outside organizations used to support business processes. Service 
organizations provide services ranging from performing a specific task 
(e.g., payroll processing) to replacing entire business units or 
functions of an entity. 

Significant deficiency ï¿½ FISMA: 
A weakness in an agencyï¿½s overall information systems security program 
or management control structure, or within one or more information 
systems, that significantly restricts the capability of the agency to 
carry out its mission or compromises the security of its information, 
information systems, personnel, or other resources, operations, or 
assets. 

Significant deficiency ï¿½ A-123: 
OMB Circular A-123 uses the same definition for significant deficiency 
as financial reporting (See Significant Deficiency ï¿½ Financial 
Reporting), but continues to refer to it as a reportable condition. 

Significant Deficiency ï¿½ financial reporting: 
A deficiency in internal control, or combination of deficiencies, that 
adversely affects the entityï¿½s ability to initiate, authorize, record, 
process, or report financial data reliably in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles such that there is more than a remote 
likelihood that a misstatement of the entityï¿½s financial statements 
that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or detected. 

Significant deficiency ï¿½ single audit compliance: 
A control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that 
adversely affects the entityï¿½s ability to administer a federal program 
such that there is more than a remote likelihood that noncompliance 
with a type of compliance requirement of a federal program that is more 
than inconsequential will not be prevented or detected by the entityï¿½s 
internal control. 

Simultaneous peripheral operations online (SPOOL): 
In the mainframe environment, a component of system software that 
controls the transfer of data between computer storage areas with 
different speed capabilities. Usually, an intermediate device, such as 
a buffer, exists between the transfer source and the destination (e.g., 
a printer). 

Single audit: 
The single audit is intended to provide a cost-effective audit for 
nonfederal entities in that one audit is conducted in lieu of multiple 
audits of individual programs. Such audits are performed in accordance 
with the Single Audit Act of 1984 (with amendment in 1996) and OMB 
Circular A-133 (Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit 
Organizations) to ensure that federal funds to nonfederal entities are 
expended properly. 

Smart card: 
A credit card-sized token that contains a microprocessor and memory 
circuits for authenticating a user of computer, banking, or 
transportation services. 

SMTP (Simple Mail Transport Protocol): 
The standard e-mail protocol on the Internet. 

Sniffer: 
Synonymous with packet sniffer. A program that intercepts routed data 
and examines each packet in search of specified information, such as 
passwords transmitted in clear text. 

Social engineering: 
A method used by hackers to obtain passwords for unauthorized access. 
For example, a hacker may call an authorized user of a computer system 
and pose as a network administrator to gain access. 

Software: 
A computer program or programs, in contrast to the physical environment 
on which programs run (hardware). 

Source code: 
Human-readable program statements written in a high-level or assembly 
language, as opposed to object code, which is derived from source code 
and designed to be machine-readable. 

Spyware: 
Software that is secretly or surreptitiously installed into an 
information system to gather information on individuals or 
organizations without their knowledge. 

Standard: 
In computing, a set of detailed technical guidelines used as a means of 
establishing uniformity in an area of hardware or software development. 

Standard profile: 
A set of rules that describe the nature and extent of access to each 
resource that is available to a group of users with similar duties, 
such as accounts payable clerks. 

Supervisor call (SVC): 
A supervisor call instruction interrupts a program being executed and 
passes control to the supervisor so that it can perform a specific 
service indicated by the instruction. 

Switch: 
A device that forwards packets between LAN devices or segments. LANs 
that use switches are called switched LANs. 

System: 
See information system. 

System administrator: 
The person responsible for administering use of a multi-user computer 
system, communications system, or both. 

System analyst: 
A person who designs systems. 

System designer: 
See system analyst. 

System developer: 
See programmer. 

System development life cycle (SDLC) methodology: 
The policies and procedures that govern software development and 
modification as a software product goes through each phase of its life 
cycle. 

System level: 
Controls consist of processes for managing specific system resources 
related to either a general support system or business process 
application systems. Three sublevels include network, operating system, 
and infrastructure. 

System management facility: 
An IBM control program that provides the means for gathering and 
recording information that can be used to evaluate the extent of 
computer system usage. 

System privilege: 
Ability of the user within the database to interact with the database 
itself. They include: CREATE, ALTER, DROP, CONNECT, and AUDIT, among 
many others. 

System programmer: 
A person who develops and maintains system software. 

System security plan: 
Formal document that provides an overview of the security requirements 
for the information system and describes the security controls in place 
or planned for meeting those requirements. 

System software: 
The set of computer programs and related routines designed to operate 
and control the processing activities of computer equipment. It 
includes the operating system and utility programs and is distinguished 
from application software. 

System testing: 
Testing to determine that the results generated by the enterpriseï¿½s 
information systems and their components are accurate and the systems 
perform to specifications. 

System utilities: 
Software used to perform system maintenance routines that are 
frequently required during normal processing operations. Some of the 
utilities have powerful features that will allow a user to access and 
view or modify data or program code. 

TCP (transmission control protocol): 
A connection-based Internet protocol that supports reliable data 
transfer connections. Packet data is verified using checksums and 
retransmitted if it is missing or corrupted. The application plays no 
part in validating the transfer. 

TCP/IP protocol: 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) A set of 
communications protocols that encompasses media access, packet 
transport, session communications, file transfer, electronic mail, 
terminal emulation, remote file access and network management. TCP/IP 
provides the basis for the Internet. 

Technical controls: 
See logical access control. 

Telecommunications: 
A general term for the electronic transmission of information of any 
type, such as data, television pictures, sound, or facsimiles, over any 
medium, such as telephone lines, microwave relay, satellite link, or 
physical cable. 

Teleprocessing monitor: 
In the mainframe environment, a component of the operating system that 
provides support for online terminal access to application programs. 
This type of software can be used to restrict access to online 
applications and may provide an interface to security software to 
restrict access to certain functions within the application. 

Terminal: 
A device consisting of a video adapter, a monitor, and a keyboard. 

Test facility: 
A processing environment that is isolated from the production 
environment and dedicated to testing and validating systems and/or 
their components. 

Those charged with governance: 
Are those responsible for overseeing the strategic direction of the 
entity and the entityï¿½s fulfillment of its obligations related to 
accountability. This includes overseeing the financial reporting 
process, subject matter, or program under audit including related 
internal controls. 

Threat: 
Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact agency 
operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency 
assets, or individuals through an information system via unauthorized 
access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or 
denial of service. 

Token: 
In authentication systems, some type of physical device (such as a card 
with a magnetic strip or a smart card) that must be in the individualï¿½s 
possession in order to gain access. The token itself is not sufficient; 
the user must also be able to supply something memorized, such as a 
personal identification number (PIN). 

Transaction: 
A discrete activity captured by a computer system, such as the entry of 
a customer order or an update of an inventory item. In financial 
systems, a transaction generally represents a business event that can 
be measured in money and entered in accounting records. 

Transaction data: 
The finite data pertaining to a given event occurring in a business 
process. The result of this process is in the form of documents or 
postings, such as purchase orders and obligations. 

Transaction data input: 
Relates to controls over data that enter the application (e.g., data 
validation and edit checks). 

Transaction data output: 
Relates to controls over data output and distribution (e.g., output 
reconciliation and review). 

Transaction data processing: 
Relates to controls over data integrity within the application (e.g., 
review of transaction processing logs). 

Transaction file: 
A group of one or more computerized records containing current business 
activity and processed with an associated master file. Transaction 
files are sometimes accumulated during the day and processed in batch 
production overnight or during off-peak processing periods. 

Trusted communication Path: 
A mechanism by which a user (through an input device) can communicate 
directly with the security functions of the information system with the 
necessary confidence to support the system security policy. This 
mechanism can only be activated by the user or the security functions 
of the information system and cannot be imitated by untrusted software. 

Uninterruptible power supply (UPS): 
Provides short-term backup power from batteries for a computer system 
when the electrical power fails or drops to an unacceptable voltage 
level. 

Unit testing: 
Testing individual program modules to determine if they perform to 
specifications. 

UNIX: 
A multitasking operating system originally designed for scientific 
purposes that have subsequently become a standard for midrange computer 
systems with the traditional terminal/host architecture. UNIX is also a 
major server operating system in the client/server environment. 

Update access: 
This access level includes the ability to change data or a software 
program. 

Upload: 
The process of transferring a copy of a file from a local computer to a 
remote computer by means of a modem or network. 

User: 
The person who uses a computer system and its application programs to 
perform tasks. 

User auditor: 
The auditor of the user organization. 

User control: 
Portions of controls that are performed by people interacting with IS 
controls. The effectiveness of user controls typically depend on the 
accuracy of the information produced by the IS controls. 

User-defined processing: 
The user is allowed to establish or modify processing steps. This 
frequently occurs in application based spreadsheets and report 
writer/data extraction tools. 

User identification (ID): 
A unique identifier assigned to each authorized computer user. 

User privilege: 
Right to execute a particular type of Microsoft SQL server statement, 
or a right to access another userï¿½s object. 

User profile: 
A set of rules that describes the nature and extent of access to each 
resource that is available to each user. 

Utility program: 
Generally considered to be system software designed to perform a 
particular function (e.g., an editor or debugger) or system maintenance 
(e.g., file backup and recovery). 

Validation: 
The process of evaluating a system or component during or at the end of 
the development process to determine whether it satisfies specified 
requirements. 

Validity: 
See Validity Control. 

Validity Control: 
Controls designed to provide reasonable assurance (1) that all recorded 
transactions actually occurred (are real), relate to the entity, and 
were properly approved in accordance with managementï¿½s authorization, 
and (2) that output contains only valid data. 

Virtual Private Network (VPN): 
Protected IS link utilizing tunneling, security controls (see 
information assurance), and end-point address translation giving the 
impression of a dedicated line. 

Virus: 
A program that ï¿½infectsï¿½ computer files, usually executable programs, 
by inserting a copy of itself into the file. These copies are usually 
executed when the ï¿½infectedï¿½ file is loaded into memory, allowing the 
virus to infect other files. Unlike the computer worm, a virus requires 
human involvement (usually unwitting) to propagate. 

Vulnerability: 
Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal 
controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a 
threat source. 

Vulnerability Assessment: 
Formal description and evaluation of the vulnerabilities in an 
information system. 

Vulnerability scanning: 
Type of network security testing that among others enumerates the 
network structure and determines the set of active hosts and associated 
software and verifies that software (e.g., operating system and major 
applications) is up-to-date with security patches and software version. 

Wide area network (WAN): 
A group of computers and other devices dispersed over a wide 
geographical area that is connected by communications links. 

WAN: 
See wide area network. 

War Dialer: 
Software packages that sequentially dial telephone numbers, recording 
any numbers that answer. 

Web application: 
Is an application that is accessed via web over a network such as the 
Internet or an intranet. The ability to update and maintain Web 
applications without distributing and installing software on 
potentially thousands of client computers is a key reason for their 
popularity. 

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP): 
The Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) security protocol for wireless local 
area networks (LANs) uses encryption to provide similar security to 
that of a wired LAN. WEP is defined in the IEEE 802.11b standard. 

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA): 
The Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) security protocol was designed to 
improve upon the security features of WEP for wireless communications. 
It is defined in IEEEï¿½s 802.11i standard. 

Workstation: 
A microcomputer or terminal connected to a network. Workstation can 
also refer to a powerful, stand-alone computer that has considerable 
calculating or graphics capability. 

World Wide Web (WWW): 
A sub-network of the Internet through which information is exchanged by 
text, graphics, audio and video. 

Worm: 
An independent computer program that reproduces by copying itself from 
one system to another across a network. Unlike computer viruses, worms 
do not require human involvement to propagate. 

[End of appendix] 

Appendix XIII ï¿½ Bibliography: 

Committee on National Security Systems, National Information Assurance 
(IA) Glossary, CNSS Instruction No. 4009 (Ft. Meade, Maryland: Revised 
Draft 2005). 

Information System Audit and Control Association (ISACA), Glossary of 
Terms, [hyperlink, http://www.isaca.org/glossary.htm]. 

Office of Management and Budget, Security of Federal Automated 
Resources, Circular A-130, Appendix III, (Washington, D.C.: November 
2000). 

Office of Management and Budget, Management Responsibility for Internal 
Control, Circular A-123, Appendix A, (Washington, D.C. July 2005). 

Office of Management and Budget, Designation of Senior Agency Officials 
for Privacy, Memorandum M-05-08 (Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2005). 

Office of Management and Budget, Safeguarding Personally Identifiable 
Information, Memorandum M-0615 (Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2006). 

Office of Management and Budget, Protection of Sensitive Agency 
Information, Memorandum M-06-16 (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006). 

Office of Management and Budget, Reporting Incidents Involving 
Personally Identifiable Information and Incorporating the Cost for 
Security in Agency Information Technology Investments, Memorandum M-06-
19 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2006). 

Office of Management and Budget, FY 2006 Reporting Instructions for the 
Federal Information Security Management Act and Agency Privacy 
Management, Memorandum M-06-20 (Washington, D.C. July 17, 2006). 

Office of Management and Budget, Use of Commercial Credit Monitoring 
Services Blanket Purchase Agreements, Memorandum M-07-04 (Washington, 
D.C.: December 22, 2006). 

Office of Management and Budget, Implementation of Commonly Accepted 
Security Configurations for Window Operating Systems, (Washington, 
D.C.: March 22, 2007). 

Office of Management and Budget, Safeguarding Against and Responding to 
the Breach of Personally identifiable Information, Memorandum M-07-16 
(Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2007). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Federal 
Information Processing Standards 140-2, (Washington, D.C.: May 2001). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Advance Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information 
Processing Standards 197, (Washington, D.C.: November 2001). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal 
Information and Information Systems, Federal Information Processing 
Standards 199, (Washington, D.C.: February 2004). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and 
Information Systems, Federal Information Processing Standards 200, 
(Washington, D.C.: March 2006). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees 
and Contractors, Federal Information Processing Standards 201, 
(Washington, D.C.: March 2006). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, (Washington, 
D.C.: April 2006). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Introduction to Computer Security, Special Publication 800-
12, (Washington, D.C.: October 1995). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Information Technology Security Training Requirements: A 
Role-Performance-Based Model, Special Publication 800-16, (Washington, 
D.C.: April 1998). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information 
Systems, Special Publication 800-18, (Washington, D.C.: February 2006). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal 
Government, Special Publication 800-21, (Washington, D.C.): December 
2005). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Engineering Principles for Information Technology Security, 
Special Publication 800-27, (Washington, D.C.: June 2004). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, 
Special Publication 800-30, (Washington, D.C.: July 2002). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Introduction to Public Key Technology and the Federal PKI 
Infrastructure, Special Publication 800-32, (Washington D.C.: February 
2001). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Contingency Planning Guide for Information Technology 
Systems, Special Publication 800-34, (Washington, D.C.: June 2002). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Guide to Information Technology Security Services, Special 
Publication 800-35, (Washington, D.C.: October 2003). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Guide for Security Certification and Accreditation of 
Federal Information Systems, Special Publication 800-37, (Washington, 
D.C.: May 2004). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Creating a Patch and Vulnerability Management Program, 
Special Publication 800-40, (Washington, D.C.: November 2005). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Guideline on Network Security, Special Publication 800-42, 
(Washington, D.C.: November 2002). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Security for Telecommuting and Broadband Communications, 
Special Publication 800-46, (Washington, D.C.: August 2002). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Security Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology 
Systems, Special Publication 800-47, (Washington, D.C.: August 2002). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and 
Training Program, Special Publication 800-50, (Washington, D.C.: 
October 2003). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information, 
Special Publication 800-53. (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Security Metrics Guide for Information Technology Systems, 
Special Publication 800-55, (Washington, D.C.: July 2003). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Established Schemes Using 
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, Special Publication 800-56, 
(Washington, D.C.: March 2006). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Security Considerations for Voice over IP Systems, Special 
Publication 800-58, (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Recommendation for Key Management, Special Publication 800-
57, (Washington, D.C.: August 2005). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information 
System Security Categories, Special Publication 800-60, (Washington, 
D.C.: June 2004). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, Special 
Publication 800-61, (Washington, D.C.: January 2004). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Electronic Authentication Guidelines, Special Publication 
800-63, (Washington, D.C.: April 2006). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Security Considerations in the Information System 
Development Life Cycle, Special Publication 800-64, (Washington, D.C.: 
June 2004). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Security Configuration Checklists Program for IT Products, 
Special Publication 800-70, (Washington, D.C.: May 2005). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification, Special 
Publication 800-73, (Washington, D.C.: March 2006). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Biometric Data Specifications for Personal Identity 
Verification, Special Publication 800-76, (Washington, D.C.: January 
2007). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal 
Identity Verification, Special Publication 800-78, (Washington, D.C.: 
August 2007). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems, 
Special Publication 800-94, (Washington, D.C.: February 2007). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Establishing Wireless Robust Security Networks, Special 
Publication 800-97, (Washington, D.C.: February 2007). 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers, 
Special Publication 800-100, (Washington, D.C.: March 2007). 

U.S. Department of Justice, Vulnerability Assessment of Federal 
Facilities, (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 1995). 

U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Information Security 
Management, Learning from Leading Organizations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-98-68] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 1998). 

U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-01.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

U.S. General Accounting Office, Key Elements of a Risk Management 
Approach, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-150T] 
(Washington, D.C.: October 2001). 

U.S. General Accounting Office, Technologies to Secure Federal 
Buildings, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-687T] 
(Washington, D.C.: April 2002). 

U.S. General Accounting Office, Assessing the Reliability of Computer-
Processed Data, (Washington, D.C. October 2002). 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Information System 
Controls Audit Manual, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-12.19.6]. (Washington, D.C.: January 1999). 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Government Auditing Standards, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-162G] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2007). 

[End of appendix] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Information system (IS) controls consist of those internal controls 
that are dependent on information systems processing and include 
general controls (entitywide, system, and business process application 
levels), business process application controls (input, processing, 
output, master file, interface, and data management system controls), 
and user controls1 (controls performed by people interacting with 
information systems). 

[2] GAO, Government Auditing Standards, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-162G] (Washington, D.C.: July 
2007). 

[3] GAO, Government Auditing Standards, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-162G] (Washington, D.C.: July 
2007). 

[4] The GAO/PCIE Financial Audit Manual (FAM) provides a framework for 
performing IS control audits performed as part of a financial audit. 
This framework is summarized in Appendix VI. The FAM is a joint effort 
between GAO and the Presidentï¿½s Council on Integrity and Efficiency 
(PCIE) to provide a methodology for performing financial audits that 
meets professional standards. It can be viewed or downloaded at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gaopcie/]. 

[5] In addition, GAO guidance, ï¿½Assessing the Reliability of Computer-
Processed Dataï¿½ (Washington, DC; October 2002) can be used to assist 
the auditor in determining the use of IS control audits in assessing 
data reliability in a performance audit. 

[6] User controls are portions of controls that are performed by people 
interacting with IS controls. The effectiveness of user controls 
typically depend on the accuracy of the information produced by the IS 
controls. 

[7] The Financial Audit Manual is a joint effort between GAO and the 
Presidentï¿½s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) to provide a 
methodology for performing financial audits that meets professional 
standards. It can be viewed or downloaded at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gaopcie/]. 

[8] The Security Content Automation Program (SCAP) is a joint program 
of the National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA), and NIST. SCAP is designed as a free, public repository 
of tools to be used for automating technical control compliance 
activities, vulnerability checking, and security measurement. Such 
tools can provide additional criteria. See [hyperlink, 
http://nvd.nist.gov/scap/scap.cfm]. 

[9] GAGAS paragraph 7.04 states that ï¿½the concept of significance 
assists auditors throughout a performance audit, including when 
deciding the type and extent of audit work to perform, when evaluating 
results of audit work, and when developing the report and related 
findings and conclusions. Significance is defined as the relative 
importance of a matter within the context in which it is being 
considered, including quantitative and qualitative factors. Such 
factors include the magnitude of the matter in relation to the subject 
matter of the audit, the nature and effect of the matter, the relevance 
of the matter, the needs and interests of an objective third party with 
knowledge of the relevant information, and the impact of the matter to 
the audited program or activity. Professional judgment assists auditors 
when evaluating the significance of matters within the context of the 
audit objectives.ï¿½ 

[10] There is a section of GAGAS entitled ï¿½Information Systems 
Controlsï¿½ (paras. 7.23-7.27). 

[11] OMB uses the terms ï¿½general supportï¿½ and ï¿½applicationï¿½ systems to 
describe the two types of entity systems. As defined in OMB Circular A-
130, a general support system is an interconnected set of information 
resources under the same direct management control that share common 
functionality. It normally includes hardware, software, information, 
data, applications, communications, and people. The term ï¿½applicationï¿½ 
means the use of information resources (information and information 
technology) to satisfy a specific set of user requirements. 

[12] A feeder system is a system that provides information or data to 
support the main application. For example, in a payroll system the time 
and attendance system is the feeder system for the main application. 

[13] Nonrepudiation is assurance that the sender of information is 
provided with proof of delivery and the recipient is provided with 
proof of the senderï¿½s identity, so neither can later deny having 
processed the information. Nonrepudiation may not be necessary to 
evaluate integrity to meet an audit objective. 

[14] Authenticity is the property of being genuine and being able to be 
verified and trusted; confidence in the validity of a transmission, a 
message, or message originator. Authenticity may not be necessary to 
evaluate integrity to meet an audit objective. 

[15] Inherent risk is the likelihood that a loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability could occur that would materially/ 
significantly affect the audit objectives (e.g., for a financial audit, 
a material misstatement), assuming that there are no related internal 
controls. 

[16] Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
describes the five standards of internal control as: control 
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and 
communications, and monitoring. The specific IS controls assessed in an 
IS controls audit are part of the control activities component. 

[17] These risk levels are discussed further in National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, Standards for Security Categorization of 
Federal Information and Information Systems, Federal Information 
Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 199 (December 2003). 

[18] Adverse effects on individuals may include, for example, loss of 
the privacy to which individuals are entitled under law. 

[19] ERP systems consist of functional modules that support business 
requirements such as human resources, financials, or inventory control. 
The modules can be used individually or in conjunction with other 
modules as needed. The individual modules contain the business process 
necessary to complete their intended function. 

[20] Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996, 31 U.S.C. 
3512 note. 

[21] Federal Managersï¿½ Financial Integrity Act of 19828 (FMFIA) 31 
U.S.C. 3512 (c), (d). 

[22] OMB, Management of Federal Information Resources (Washington, 
D.C.: November 28, 2000). 

[23] OMB, Managementï¿½s Responsibility for Internal Control (Washington, 
D.C.: December 21, 2004). 

[24] Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA), Pub. L. 104-191, 42 U.S.C. 1320d, et seq. (ï¿½ 68 FR 8334 
(2/20/03), HIPAA Security Standards and ï¿½ 67 FR 53182 (Aug. 14, 2002), 
HIPAA Privacy Standards. 

[25] Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Pub. L. 106-102 (Nov. 12, 1999), see, e.g., 
Title V, Privacy. 

[26] Requirements for information security for Medicare Administrative 
Contractors, Sec. 912, Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-173 (Dec. 8, 2003), 117 Stat. 
2387. 

[27] Chief Privacy Officer, sec. 522, Transportation, Treasury, 
Independent Agencies, and General Government Appropriations Act, 2005, 
Div. H, Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. 108-447 (Dec. 8, 
2004), Cong. Rec. (Nov. 19, 2004), p. H10359. 

[28] OMB, Designation of Senior Agency Officials for Privacy, 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2005). 

[29] OMB, Reporting Incidents Involving Personally Identifiable 
Information and Incorporating the Cost for Security in Agency 
Information Technology Investments (Washington, DC: July 12, 2006). 

[30] OMB, Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach of 
Personally Identifiable Information, M 07-16 (Washington, D.C.: May 22, 
2007) 

[31] Intergovernmental Information security Audit Forum, Information 
Systems Security Auditing: Legal and Reporting Considerations (Sept. 
11, 2003) [hyperlink, http://www.nasact.org/IISAF/legal.html] 

[32] Fraud is a type of illegal act involving the obtaining of 
something of value through willful misrepresentation. 

[33] The terms ï¿½materialï¿½ and ï¿½significantï¿½ are synonymous under 
generally accepted government auditing standards. In the AICPA 
standards, ï¿½materialï¿½ is used in relation to audits of financial 
statements. ï¿½Significantï¿½ is used in relation to performance audits 
performed under GAGAS. 

[34] Separation of duties so that no one individual controls all 
critical stages of a work process. Also see section 3.4 and the 
definition in the glossary. 

[35] Is a voluntary private sector organization dedicated to improving 
the quality of financial reporting through business ethics, effective 
internal controls, and corporate governance. 

[36] The first category of business process controls is defined as 
general controls operating at the business process application level. 

[37] The term ï¿½more than remoteï¿½ used in the definitions for 
significant deficiency and material weakness means ï¿½at least reasonably 
possible.ï¿½ The following definitions apply: (1) Remoteï¿½The chance of 
the future events occurring is slight. (2) Reasonably possibleï¿½The 
chance of the future events or their occurrence is more than remote but 
less than likely. (3) Probableï¿½The future events are likely to occur. 

[38] The phrase ï¿½more than inconsequentialï¿½ as used in the definition 
of significant deficiency describes the magnitude of potential 
misstatement that could occur as a result of a significant deficiency 
and serves as a threshold for evaluating whether a control deficiency 
or combination of control deficiencies is a significant deficiency. A 
misstatement is ï¿½inconsequentialï¿½ if a reasonable person would 
conclude, after considering the possibility of further undetected 
misstatements, that the misstatement, either individually or when 
aggregated with other misstatements, would clearly be immaterial to the 
financial statements. If a reasonable person would not reach such a 
conclusion regarding a particular misstatement, that misstatement is 
more than inconsequential. 

[39] Intergovernmental Information Security Audit Forum (Sept. 11, 
2003); see [hyperlink, http://www.nasact.org]. 

[40] The U.S. Government Standard General Ledger (SGL) provides a 
uniform chart of accounts and pro forma transactions used to 
standardize federal agenciesï¿½ financial information accumulation and 
processing throughout the year, enhance financial control, and support 
budget and external reporting, including financial statement 
preparation. 

[41] Editing in this context is inspecting a data field or element to 
verify the accuracy of its content. 

[42] NIST, An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook, 
Special Publication (SP) 800-12, October 1995. 

[43] GAO, Executive Guide: Information security Management, Learning 
from Leading Organizations, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-98-68] (Washington, D.C.: May 1998). 

[44] Executive Guide: Information Security Management, Learning from 
Leading Organizations [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-98-68], May 1998. 

[45] Personally identifiable information refers to any information 
about an individual maintained by an agency, including any information 
that can be used to distinguish or trace an individualï¿½s identity, such 
as their name, social security number, date and place of birth, or 
biometric records, and any other information which is linked or 
linkable to an individual. 

[46] The act describes a ï¿½recordï¿½ as any item, collection, or grouping 
of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency and 
contains his or her name or another personal identifier. It also 
identifies ï¿½system of recordsï¿½ as a group of records under the control 
of any agency retrieved by the name of the individual or by an 
individual identifier. 

[47] A system of records notice is a notice in the Federal Register 
identifying, among other things, the type of data collected, the types 
of individuals about whom information is collected, the intended 
ï¿½routineï¿½ uses of data, and procedures that individuals can use to 
review and correct personal information. 

[48] According to FY 2006 Reporting Instructions for the Federal 
Information Security Management Act and Agency Privacy Management, OMB 
Memorandum M-06-20, July 17, 2006, a privacy impact assessment or a 
system of records notice is current if that document satisfies the 
applicable requirements and subsequent substantial changes have not 
been made to the system. 

[49] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-60, Volume I: Guide for Mapping 
Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories 
(June 2004). 

[50] Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-
00-21.3.1; November 1999). 

[51] OMBï¿½s Circular A-130 requires that agencies review security 
controls and re-authorize system usage (i.e., certification and 
accreditation) at least every three years or more frequently if changes 
occur. 

[52] Assessments performed relying on reviews of system documentation 
such as hardware and software security settings and use of software 
features that are inherent to the application under review. 

[53] Network ï¿½sniffersï¿½ (software that can intercept and log traffic 
passing over a network) can identify the transmission of passwords or 
sensitive information in clear text. 

[54] SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) provides remote 
administration of network devices. 

[55] Office of Management and Budget, Managementï¿½s Responsibility for 
Internal Control, OMB Circular No. A-123 (Washington, D.C.: December 
2004). 

[56] The FAR was established to codify uniform policies for acquisition 
of supplies and services by executive agencies. The FAR appears in the 
Code of Federal Regulations at 48 CFR Chapter 1. 

[57] As used herein, users include those given any level of authorized 
access to computer resources, including business process application 
users, system administrators, etc. 

[58] A computer program designed to help perform a business function 
such as payroll, inventory control, accounting, and mission support. 
Depending on the work for which it was designed, an application can 
manipulate text, numbers, graphics, or a combination of these elements. 

[59] Steganography is a technique that hides the existence of a message 
(for example, by embedding it within another message) and may be used 
where encryption is not permitted or to hide information in an 
encrypted file in case the encrypted file is deciphered. Other uses 
include digital watermarking and fingerprinting of audio and video 
files. 

[60] Infrastructure applications include databases, e-mail, browsers, 
plug-ins, utilities, and other applications. 

[61] OMB, Protection of Sensitive Agency Information (Washington, D.C.: 
June 23, 2006). 

[62] The optional cryptographic confidentiality algorithm specified by 
IEEE 802.11 used to provide data confidentiality that is subjectively 
equivalent to the confidentiality of a wired local area network (LAN) 
medium that does not employ cryptographic techniques to enhance 
confidentiality. 

[63] Access privileges granted to a user, program, or process. 

[64] The term ï¿½super userï¿½ denotes the highest level of user privilege 
and can allow unlimited access to a system's file and set up. 

[65] OMB Memorandum M-04-26, Personal Use Policies and ï¿½File Sharingï¿½ 
Technology, (Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2004). 

[66] Identity-based access is based on the identities of users and 
information system resources. Role-based access is based on users' 
roles/responsibilities. Rule-based access is based on user or resource 
attributes and a predetermined rule set. 

[67] See NIST Special Publications (SP) 800-10 and 800-41 for 
information on configuring firewalls and filtering common protocols to 
minimize vulnerabilities from Internet services. SP 800-10, from 1994, 
contains basic information that is still applicable, but SP 800-41 
updates the earlier document and covers Internet protocol packet 
filtering and more recent policy recommendations. 

[68] Mobile code is a software program or parts of programs obtained 
from remote information systems, transmitted across a network, and 
executed on a local information system without explicit installation or 
execution by the recipient. Examples of mobile code include scripts 
(JavaScript, VBScript), Java applets, Active X controls, and macros 
embedded within Office documents. 

[69] The process of removing sensitive information from computer media 
is often referred to as sanitization. It includes removing all labels, 
markings, and activity logs. NIST SP 800-36 provides guidance on 
appropriate sanitization equipment, techniques, and procedures. 

[70] The checklists and configuration guides at [hyperlink, 
http://csrc.nist.gov/pcig/cig.html] provide recommended lists of 
auditable events. 

[71] Department of Justice, Vulnerability Assessment of Federal 
Facilities, (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 1995). 

[72] Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection (Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2003). 

[73] Also see Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, Policy for a 
Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, 
(Washington, D.C.: August 27, 2004); and NIST Federal Information 
Processing Standard Publication (FIPS PUB) 201-1, Personal Identity 
Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, (Washington, 
D.C.: March 2006). 

[74] See, for example, IEEE Standard 1200-1998, SEI CMMI (ver. 1.1), 
NIST SP 800-64, and Military Handbook 61A(SE). 

[75] A Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC) methodology consists of 
the policies and procedures that govern software development and 
modification as a software product goes through each phase of its life 
cycle. 

[76] Based on IEEE Standard for Software Configuration Management Plans 
(IEEE Std. 828-1998), the Institute of Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers, June 25, 1998. 

[77] OMB, Implementation of Commonly Accepted Security Configurations 
for Windows Operating Systems (Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2007). 

[78] A configuration control board evaluates and approves or 
disapproves proposed changes to configuration items and ensures 
implementation of approved changes. 

[79] Patch management is the process of applying software patches to 
correct flaws. A patch is a piece of software code that is inserted 
into a program to temporarily fix a defect. Patches are developed and 
released by software vendors when vulnerabilities are discovered. 

[80] Title X, Subtitle Gï¿½Government Information Security Reform, Floyd 
D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, P.L. 
106-398, October 30, 2000. 

[81] Worms propagate through networks; viruses destroy files and 
replicate by manipulating files. 

[82] Phishing is tricking individuals into disclosing sensitive 
personal information through deceptive computer-based means. 

[83] Spyware is software that is secretly or surreptitiously installed 
into an information system to gather information on individuals or 
organizations without their knowledge; a type of malicious code. 

[84] Malware (malicious software) is defined as programs that are 
designed to carry out annoying or harmful actions. They often 
masquerade as useful programs or are embedded into useful programs so 
that users are induced into activating them. Malware can include 
viruses, worms, and spyware (GAO-05-231). 

[85] Botnets are compromised computers that can be remotely controlled 
by attackers to automatically launch attacks. Bots (short for robots) 
have become a key automation tool to speed the infection of vulnerable 
systems [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-231]. 

[86] NIST, An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook, 
Special Publication (SP) 800-12, October 1995. 

[87] NIST, Contingency Planning Guide for Information Technology 
Systems, Special Publication (SP) 800-34, June 2002. 

[88] Observations of Agency Computer Security Practices and 
Implementation of OMB Bulletin No.90-08: Guidance for Preparation of 
Security Plans for Federal Computer Systems that Contain Sensitive 
Information, February 1993. OMB Bulletin 90-08 was superseded by NIST 
Special Publication (SP) 800-18, dated December 1998, Guide for 
Developing Security Plans for Information Technology Systems. [OMB 
Circular A-130, Appendix III, directs NIST to update and expand 
security planning guidance.] 

[89] An enterprise resource planning (ERP) system is a commercial 
software package that integrates all the information flowing through 
the entity. ERP systems contain functional modules (e.g., financial, 
accounting, human resources, and supply chain and customer information) 
that are integrated within the core system or interfaced to external 
systems. 

[90] In addition, agency-specific requirements should be addressed. 

[91] See GAO, Information Security: Improving Oversight of Access to 
Federal Systems and Data by Contractors Can Reduce Risk, (Washington, 
D.C.: April 2005). 

[92] In addition, this Circular requires and the NIST guide recommends 
a plan for general support systems. 

[93] NIST defines Business Impact Analysis (BIA) as follows: An 
analysis of an information technology (IT) systemï¿½s requirements, 
processes, and interdependencies used to characterize system 
contingency requirements and priorities in the event of a significant 
disruption. 

[94] Special Publication 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security: 
The NIST Handbook. 

[95] Data standards are designed to enable systems to easily 
interoperate and transfer information. Standard definitions for data 
elements are intended to ensure that users of all entity systems define 
the same data in the same way and have a common understanding of their 
meaning. 

[96] In contrast, system interconnections refer to the direct 
connection of two or more IT systems for the purpose of sharing data 
and other information resources. 

[97] Government Auditing Standards: July 2007 Revision [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-731G], paragraph 3.43. 

[98] The IS control specialist is a person with technical expertise in 
information technology systems, general controls, business process 
applications and controls, and information security. 

[99] The single audit is intended to provide a cost-effective audit for 
nonfederal entities in that one audit is conducted in lieu of multiple 
audits of individual programs. Such audits are performed in accordance 
with the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996 and OMB Circular A-133 
(Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations) to 
determine whether federal funds to nonfederal entities are expended 
properly. 

[100] User controls are portions of controls that are performed by 
people interacting with IS controls. The effectiveness of user controls 
typically depend on the accuracy of the information produced by the IS 
controls. 

[101] The definitions currently in Circular A-133, based on superseded 
GAGAS, are as follows: Reportable conditions involve matters coming to 
the auditorï¿½s attention relating to significant deficiencies in the 
design or operation of the internal control over compliance that, in 
the auditorï¿½s judgment, could adversely affect the entityï¿½s ability to 
administer a major federal program in accordance with the applicable 
requirements of laws, regulations, contracts, and grants. A material 
weakness is a reportable condition in which the design or operation of 
one or more of the internal control components does not reduce to a 
relatively low level the risk that noncompliance with the applicable 
requirements of laws, regulations, contracts, and grants caused by 
error or fraud that would be material in relation to a major federal 
program being audited may occur and not be detected within a timely 
period by employees in the normal course of performing their assigned 
functions. 

[102] Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1], 
November 1999. 

*** End of document. ***