Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of 
Future Overseas Planning Reports and Factors Affecting the Master
Planning Effort for the Military Buildup on Guam (17-SEP-08,	 
GAO-08-1005).							 
                                                                 
The Department of Defense (DOD) continues its efforts to reduce  
the number of troops permanently stationed overseas and 	 
consolidate overseas bases. The Senate and conference reports	 
accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction 	 
appropriation bill directed DOD to develop and GAO to monitor	 
DOD's overseas master plans and to provide annual assessments.	 
The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military	 
construction appropriation bill directed GAO to review DOD's	 
master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual reviews. 
This report examines (1) the changes and challenges described in 
the fiscal year 2009 master plans, the extent the plans address  
GAO's prior recommendations, and the plans' timeliness and (2)	 
the status of DOD's master planning efforts for the proposed	 
buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam. GAO	 
reviewed the plans and other relevant documents, and visited	 
three overseas combatant commands, various installations, and	 
Guam organizations.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-1005					        
    ACCNO:   A84220						        
  TITLE:     Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve the       
Timeliness of Future Overseas Planning Reports and Factors	 
Affecting the Master Planning Effort for the Military Buildup on 
Guam								 
     DATE:   09/17/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Armed forces abroad				 
	     Congressional committee reports			 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     International relations				 
	     Military bases					 
	     Military downsizing				 
	     Military facilities				 
	     Military facility construction			 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Military training					 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Guam						 

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GAO-08-1005

   

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

September 2008: 

Defense Infrastructure: 

Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of Future Overseas Planning 
Reports and Factors Affecting the Master Planning Effort for the 
Military Buildup on Guam: 

GAO-08-1005: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-1005, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) continues its efforts to reduce the 
number of troops permanently stationed overseas and consolidate 
overseas bases. The Senate and conference reports accompanying the 
fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD 
to develop and GAO to monitor DODï¿½s overseas master plans and to 
provide annual assessments. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal 
year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to 
review DODï¿½s master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual 
reviews. This report examines (1) the changes and challenges described 
in the fiscal year 2009 master plans, the extent the plans address 
GAOï¿½s prior recommendations, and the plansï¿½ timeliness and (2) the 
status of DODï¿½s master planning efforts for the proposed buildup of 
military forces and infrastructure on Guam. GAO reviewed the plans and 
other relevant documents, and visited three overseas combatant 
commands, various installations, and Guam organizations. 

What GAO Found: 

While the fiscal year 2009 master plans generally reflect recent 
changes in U.S. overseas basing strategies and the challenges DOD faces 
as well as address GAOï¿½s prior recommendations, DOD provided Congress 
the plans in May 2008, well after the February budget submission when 
the Senate and conference reports require DOD to issue the plans. This 
yearï¿½s plans contain information on current overseas basing strategies 
and infrastructure requirements and the challenges that DOD faces 
implementing the plans. The plans also generally address GAOï¿½s 
recommendations except that the U.S. Pacific Command plan does not 
provide an update of the Air Forceï¿½s training challenges in South 
Korea, despite GAOï¿½s prior recommendation that it should describe the 
challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and funding 
requirements. DOD officials said that since last year the South Korean 
government and the U.S. Air Force have taken several steps to address 
these training challenges. According to DOD officials, efforts to 
incorporate last-minute changes in basing plans and projects and the 
lengthy review and approval process have contributed to the fiscal year 
2009 plansï¿½ lateness. While the congressional requirement for the 
overseas master plans expired with the fiscal year 2009 plans, DOD said 
that it intends to provide Congress annual updates of its global 
defense posture through 2014 and that these updates would replace the 
master plans as DODï¿½s overseas planning report to Congress. Since DOD 
will continue to provide annually updated global defense posture 
reports, it has an opportunity to reexamine its timeline for producing 
future reports earlier to provide Congress with time for review. 

DOD has developed a basic framework for the military buildup on Guam 
but has not issued the congressionally required master plan that was 
initially due in December 2006, and which Congress later extended to 
September 2008. The Joint Guam Program Office, which is planning and 
managing the proposed military buildup, is coordinating the multi-
service development of a working-level plan for DOD that is to be 
submitted to Congress by the 2008 deadline. However, this is a onetime 
requirement, and DOD officials said that the plan will be a snapshot of 
the status of the planning process and will not be considered a 
comprehensive master plan for several reasons. First, while the 
required environmental impact statement and the resulting record of 
decision will influence many key decisions about the buildup of 
military forces and infrastructure on Guam, these documents are not 
expected to be completed until January 2010. Also, officials of the 
Joint Guam Program Office said that they expect to complete a 
comprehensive master plan within 90 days after these required documents 
are finalized. Second, plans for the detailed force composition of 
units relocating to Guam, associated facility requirements, and 
implications for other servicesï¿½ realignments on Guam continue to be 
refined. Third, additional time is needed to fully address the 
challenges related to funding uncertainties, operational requirements, 
and Guamï¿½s economic and infrastructure requirements. However, without a 
comprehensive master plan, Congress may have limited data on 
requirements on which to make informed appropriation decisions and to 
carry out its oversight responsibilities. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop the global defense posture reports 
earlier each year to coincide with the budget submissions and (2) 
provide Congress annual updates of the Guam working-level plan until a 
comprehensive master plan is finalized and provided to Congress. DOD 
agreed with the second recommendation and partially agreed with the 
first, which was clarified in response to comments. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1005]. For more 
information, contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Overseas Master Plans Generally Reflect Changes, Challenges, and Our 
Prior Recommendations, but Could Be More Timely: 

DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Buildup on Guam but Has 
Yet to Develop the Congressionally Required Master Plan: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: U.S. Pacific, European, Central, and Africa Commands' 
Proposed Areas of Responsibility on September 30, 2008: 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 17, 2008: 

Congressional Committees: 

In its ongoing global realignment of U.S. forces and installations, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) plans to reduce the number of troops 
permanently stationed overseas and consolidate overseas bases. 
Realigning the U.S. overseas posture involves closing obsolete and 
redundant bases, constructing new facilities costing billions of 
dollars, and ensuring that other needed infrastructure is in place to 
support realigned forces and missions. For example, the U.S.-Japan 
Defense Policy Review Initiative[Footnote 1] established a framework 
for U.S. force structure in Japan that relocates U.S. military units 
from Japan to other areas, including Guam. As a part of this 
initiative, DOD tentatively plans to move about 8,000 Marines and their 
estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by 2014. 

The Senate report and subsequent conference report accompanying the 
fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD 
to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans to ensure that 
infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each 
overseas regional command's area of responsibility[Footnote 2] 
reflected DOD's global realignment of U.S. forces and installations. 
[Footnote 3] The Senate report also directed us to provide assessment 
reports on these master plans each year to the congressional defense 
committees. Subsequently, the conference report accompanying the 2004 
military construction appropriation bill also directed the department 
to prepare comprehensive master plans with yearly updates through 
fiscal year 2009. In July 2006, the Senate report accompanying the 
fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD 
to submit a master plan for the military buildup in Guam by December 
29, 2006.[Footnote 4] This deadline was later extended to September 15, 
2008.[Footnote 5] The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 
military construction appropriation bill also directed us to review 
DOD's master planning effort for Guam as part of our annual review of 
the overseas master plans. DOD considers the master plan for Guam as 
separate from the overseas master plans because Guam is a U.S. 
territory. 

This is our fifth report responding to the requirements contained in 
the fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction appropriation bill 
report and our second report responding to the reporting requirements 
on the Guam military buildup contained in the fiscal year 2007 Senate 
military construction appropriation bill report.[Footnote 6] This 
report examines (1) the changes and challenges described in this year's 
overseas master plans, the extent to which they address our prior 
recommendations,[Footnote 7] and the plans' timeliness and (2) the 
status of DOD's master planning efforts for the proposed buildup of 
military forces and infrastructure on Guam. This report is our final 
report to fulfill the congressional mandates, which expired with DOD's 
May 2008 fiscal year 2009 report.[Footnote 8] 

In conducting our work, we visited three overseas regional combatant 
commands--U.S. Pacific Command, including U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. 
Forces Japan; U.S. European Command; and U.S. Central Command.[Footnote 
9] We observed selected installation and military construction projects 
and interviewed command officials to understand the challenges the 
commands face in implementing the master plans. After DOD issued its 
fiscal year 2009 plans, we reviewed them to determine how they had 
changed since last year, how they address the challenges to their 
implementation, and to what extent they addressed the congressional 
reporting requirements and responded to our prior recommendations. We 
assessed whether the fiscal year 2009 plans were in compliance with the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) most recent guidance on 
overseas master plans.[Footnote 10] We generally concluded that the 
master plans addressed the congressional reporting requirements if the 
plans included details on base categories (i.e., military population on 
main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security 
locations),[Footnote 11] host nation funding levels, facility 
requirements and costs, environmental remediation issues, and other 
challenges affecting implementation of the plans. To identify the 
challenges and determine the status of planning efforts for the 
proposed buildup on Guam, we met with the Governor of Guam, the Guam 
Delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, and officials from U.S. 
Pacific Command, Marine Forces Pacific, Third Marine Expeditionary 
Force, the Navy Joint Guam Program Office,[Footnote 12] the Guam 
legislature, the Mayors' Council of Guam, and various Guam community 
groups. At these meetings, we discussed the challenges to the military 
buildup, the planning framework for the military buildup, the schedule 
and development of the Guam master plan, and the status of the 
environmental impact study required by the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969.[Footnote 13] We visited Naval Base Guam; Andersen 
Air Force Base, Guam; and potential Marine Corps basing locations to 
directly observe existing installations and future military 
construction sites. We also analyzed available reports and documents 
that described ongoing and proposed military activities and the 
challenges that may affect DOD's development and implementation of a 
master plan for the proposed military buildup on Guam. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 through August 
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See 
appendix I for more information on our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

While the fiscal year 2009 overseas master plans generally reflect 
recent changes in U.S. basing strategies and the challenges DOD faces 
in their implementation, as well as address most of our prior 
recommendations, DOD provided the plans to Congress in May 2008, 3 
months after the February 2008 budget submission, even though both the 
Senate and conference reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 
military construction bill require DOD to issue the plans with the 
military construction budget submission. The master plans contain 
information on current defense basing strategies and infrastructure 
requirements overseas and the challenges that DOD faces in 
implementation of the plans. The plans also generally address our prior 
recommendations except that the U.S. Pacific Command plan does not 
provide details of training challenges for the Air Force in South 
Korea, despite our prior recommendation that it should describe these 
challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and funding 
requirements. DOD officials said that since last year the South Korean 
government and the U.S. Air Force have taken several steps to address 
these training challenges. However, DOD has submitted the plans to 
Congress after the annual budget submissions even though the 
congressional reporting requirement directed DOD to provide updates of 
the master plans with each yearly military construction budget 
submission. According to DOD officials, OSD's most recent efforts to 
incorporate last-minute changes in basing plans and projects 
contributed to providing Congress the fiscal year 2009 plans 3 months 
late. Further, overseas command officials commented that the lengthy 
review and approval process among the commands and OSD also contributed 
to the plans' lateness. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD said 
that it intends to replace the overseas master plans, which are no 
longer mandated, with annual updates of its global defense posture as 
the department's overseas planning report to Congress through 2014. 
Since the department will continue to report on its overseas planning 
to Congress, it has an opportunity to reexamine its timeline for 
producing these reports to provide them with the administration's 
annual budget submission to provide Congress with adequate time for 
review. 

DOD has developed a basic framework for the military buildup in Guam 
but has not issued its congressionally required comprehensive master 
plan that was initially due in December 2006, and which Congress later 
extended to September 2008. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command in 
coordination with the Joint Guam Program Office is developing a working-
level plan for DOD that is to be submitted to Congress by the 2008 
deadline. The plan will address the realignment of Marine Corps forces 
in the context of other DOD proposed actions on Guam, including the 
Navy's plan to enhance its infrastructure, logistics capabilities, and 
waterfront facilities and the Army's plan to place a ballistic missile 
defense task force on Guam. However, this is a onetime requirement, and 
DOD officials said that this plan will be a snapshot of the status of 
the planning process at that time and will not be considered a master 
plan for several reasons. First, the required environmental impact 
statement and resulting record of decision are not expected to be 
completed until December 2009 and January 2010, respectively.[Footnote 
14] DOD officials said that the results of these documents will 
influence many key decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of 
the military infrastructure development on Guam. According to Joint 
Guam Program Office officials, they expect to complete a comprehensive 
master plan within 90 days after the record of decision is finalized. 
Second, plans for the detailed force composition of units relocating to 
Guam, associated facility requirements, and implications for other 
services' realignments on Guam continue to be refined. Third, 
additional time is needed to fully address the challenges related to 
funding uncertainties, operational requirements, and Guam's economic 
and infrastructure requirements. Without a comprehensive master plan 
for Guam, Congress may have limited data on funding requirements on 
which to base its decisions about appropriations. 

We are recommending that DOD (1) initiate a process of developing its 
global defense posture updates earlier each year so that it can provide 
Congress the department's overseas planning report with the 
administration's annual budget submission and (2) provide Congress with 
annual updates of the Guam working-level plan until the department 
finalizes a comprehensive master plan. In written comments on a draft 
of this report, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to 
initiate a process of developing overseas master plans earlier each 
year so that it can provide Congress the master plans with the 
administration's annual budget submission, but noted that it plans to 
replace the master plans with annual updates of its global defense 
posture as DOD's overseas planning report to Congress. Since the Senate 
report accompanying the fiscal year 2009 military construction 
appropriation bill requires that these updates include data similar to 
those presented in prior master plans and explains that the timely 
filing of mandated reports is essential to the ability of the committee 
to exercise its oversight responsibilities,[Footnote 15] we continue to 
believe that our recommendation still has merit but have revised our 
recommendation to reflect DOD's approach since it meets the intent of 
our original recommendation. DOD agreed with our recommendation to 
provide Congress with annual updates of the Guam working-level plan 
until the department finalizes a comprehensive master plan for the 
military buildup on Guam. DOD's comments are discussed in more detail 
in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section and are reprinted in 
appendix II. 

Background: 

In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation that has been 
described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military 
forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. The realignment is to 
improve the U.S. military's flexibility to address conventional and 
terrorist threats worldwide. As part of this restructuring, DOD created 
new bases in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, downsized the U.S. 

presence in Germany, and realigned forces in South Korea and Japan. 

In 2004, the United States and Japan began a series of sustained 
security consultations aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan security 
alliance to better address the rapidly changing global security 
environment. The resulting U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative 
established a framework for the future of the U.S. force structure in 
Japan and is to facilitate a continuing presence for U.S. forces in the 
Pacific theater by relocating units to other areas, including Guam. As 
a result of this and other DOD realignments planned on Guam, the total 
military and related infrastructure buildup is estimated to increase 
Guam's current population of 171,000 by an estimated 25,000 active duty 
military personnel and dependents. The population could swell further 
because these estimates do not include DOD civilians, contractors, or 
transient personnel from a Navy aircraft carrier that is planned to 
conduct periodic visits to Guam in the future. The total cost of all 
services' realignments on Guam is estimated to be more than $13 
billion, although additional costs are anticipated for other DOD 
activities and the local Guam community. Realignment costs for the 
Marine Corps move from Okinawa are to be shared by the United States 
and Japan. 

Overseas Master Plans: 

DOD uses military construction appropriations to plan, design, 
construct, alter, and improve military facilities worldwide. The 
military construction budget submission for fiscal year 2009 includes 
approximately $24.4 billion for military construction and family 
housing, of which nearly $1.1 billion (4.7 percent) is designated for 
specific overseas locations. Most of these funds are to enhance and 
support enduring installations, rather than for new or emerging 
requirements outside existing basing structures.[Footnote 16] 

In 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed concern about 
the use of military construction budget authority for projects at bases 
that may become obsolete because of force realignments.[Footnote 17] 
Consequently, in Senate Report 108-82, the Senate Appropriations 
Committee directed DOD to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans 
for the changing infrastructure requirements at U.S. military 
facilities in each of its overseas regional commands. According to the 
Senate report, at a minimum, the plans were to identify precise 
facility requirements, the status of properties being returned to host 
nations, funding requirements, and the respective cost-sharing 
responsibilities of the United States and the host nations. The Senate 
report also directed DOD to provide a report to congressional defense 
committees on the plans' status and implementation with each yearly 
military construction budget request. The Senate report directed us to 
provide the congressional defense committees an annual assessment of 
the plans. Subsequently, the conference report accompanying the fiscal 
year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed that DOD 
update its overseas master plans annually through fiscal year 2009. 
[Footnote 18] 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics responded to these congressional reporting requirements and 
assigned the overseas regional combatant commands responsibility for 
preparing comprehensive master plans for their respective areas of 
responsibility. U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for DOD activities 
in East Asia and South Asia; U.S. European Command is responsible for 
DOD activities in Eastern and Western Europe; and U.S. Central Command 
is responsible for DOD activities in the Middle East and Central Asia. 
In February 2007, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to 
establish a new geographic combatant command to consolidate the 
responsibility for DOD activities in Africa that have been shared by 
U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Central Command 
(see fig. 1).[Footnote 19] U.S. Africa Command was officially 
established on October 1, 2007, with a goal to reach full operational 
capability as a separate, independent geographic combatant command by 
September 30, 2008. DOD officials said that U.S. Africa Command will 
issue a plan for its area of responsibility next year. 

Figure 1: U.S. Pacific, European, Central, and Africa Commands' 
Proposed Areas of Responsibility on September 30, 2008: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map depicting the geographical boundaries of each of 
the noted Commands. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

[End of figure] 

Master Planning Effort for Guam: 

In 2004, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Japanese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defense began a 
series of sustained security consultations aimed at strengthening the 
U.S.-Japan security alliance and addressing the changing global 
security environment. The resulting U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review 
Initiative established a framework for the future of the U.S. force 
structure in Japan designed to reduce the U.S. military's burden on 
Japanese communities and create a continuing presence for U.S. forces 
in the Pacific theater. The initiative's goal of moving about 8,000 
Marines and 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 is one of 
several current proposals to build up military forces and 
infrastructure on Guam. In addition to the initiative, the Navy plans 
to enhance its infrastructure, logistics capabilities, and waterfront 
facilities to support transient nuclear aircraft carriers, combat 
logistics force ships, submarines, surface combatants, and high-speed 
transport ships at the Naval Base Guam. The Air Force plans to develop 
a global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance strike hub at 
Andersen Air Force Base in Guam by hosting various types of aircraft, 
such as fighters, bombers, tankers, and Global Hawk systems, on a 
permanent and rotational basis. The Army plans to place a ballistic 
missile defense task force on Guam. 

U.S. Pacific Command was responsible for the initial planning for the 
movement of forces to Guam. In August 2006, OSD directed the Navy to 
establish the Joint Guam Program Office to facilitate, manage, and 
execute requirements associated with the rebasing of U.S. assets from 
Okinawa, Japan, to Guam. Specifically, the office was tasked to lead 
the coordinated planning efforts of all of DOD's components and other 
stakeholders to consolidate, optimize, and integrate the existing 
military infrastructure on Guam. In addition, the office is to 
integrate the operational support requirements; develop, program, and 
synchronize the services' respective realignment budgets; oversee 
military construction; and coordinate government and business 
activities. The office is also expected to work closely with Congress, 
U.S. agencies, the government of Guam, and the government of Japan to 
manage this effort and develop a master plan. 

As initiatives for expanding the U.S. military presence on Guam began 
to emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted the ambitiousness 
of the military construction program and the need for a well-developed 
master plan to efficiently use the available land and infrastructure. 
The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military 
construction appropriation bill directed DOD to submit a master plan 
for the military buildup in Guam by December 29, 2006.[Footnote 20] The 
Senate report also directed us to review DOD's master planning effort 
for Guam as part of our annual review of DOD's overseas master plans. 
The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2008 military 
construction appropriation bill extended the due date for the Guam 
master plan to September 15, 2008.[Footnote 21] 

Prior Reviews of the Overseas Master Plans and the Master Planning 
Effort for Guam: 

We previously reported that while DOD's overseas master plans generally 
exceeded the reporting requirements established by Congress, 
opportunities existed for the plans to provide more complete, clear, 
and consistent information and to present a more definitive picture of 
future requirements.[Footnote 22] In our 2007 report on DOD's overseas 
master plans, we suggested that Congress consider requiring the 
Secretary of Defense to ensure that the overseas master plans include 
information on residual value compensation[Footnote 23] and training 
limitations for U.S. Pacific Command, which are discussed later in this 
report.[Footnote 24] We also suggested that Congress consider requiring 
the Secretary of Defense to report periodically to the defense 
committees on the status of the department's planning efforts for Guam 
to help ensure the best application of federal funds and leveraging of 
options for supporting the military buildup until DOD finalizes a 
comprehensive master plan. In our May 2008 testimony on the Guam 
military buildup master planning effort, we reported that while DOD had 
established a framework for the military buildup on Guam, many key 
decisions remain and both DOD and the government of Guam faced 
significant challenges.[Footnote 25] We also reported that Guam's 
efforts to address infrastructure challenges caused by the buildup were 
in their initial stages and that existing uncertainties contributed to 
the difficulties in developing precise plans. 

Overseas Master Plans Generally Reflect Changes, Challenges, and Our 
Prior Recommendations, but Could Be More Timely: 

The fiscal year 2009 master plans generally reflect recent changes in 
the U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements and 
current challenges that DOD faces in implementation. The plans also 
reflect DOD's responses to the recommendations we made in our previous 
reports except that the U.S. Pacific Command plan does not provide the 
status of the Air Force's training challenges in South Korea, despite 
our prior recommendation that it should describe the challenges and 
their potential effects on infrastructure and funding requirements. DOD 
officials said that since last year South Korea and the U.S. Air Force 
have taken steps to address these training challenges. In addition, DOD 
has submitted the plans to Congress several months after the annual 
budget submissions even though the Senate and conference reports 
accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation 
bill directed DOD to provide updates of the master plans with its 
military construction budget submissions. Without timely access to the 
plans, the congressional defense committees may not have the 
information needed at the appropriate time to prepare the annual 
defense and military construction legislation and to carry out their 
oversight responsibilities. 

Plans Update the Evolution of Overseas Basing Strategies and 
Requirements: 

The fiscal year 2009 master plans incorporated recent changes 
associated with the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing 
strategies and requirements. Generally, major force structure 
realignments that were discussed in the fiscal year 2009 master plans 
had already been mentioned last year. However, for fiscal year 2009, 
several changes identified in the overseas master plans included 
updated information involving realignment initiatives in South Korea 
and Japan, DOD's efforts to establish missile defense sites in the 
Czech Republic and Poland, and the ongoing development of U.S. Africa 
Command. 

The U.S. Pacific Command plan discussed the progress of realignment 
initiatives, which will relocate military personnel and facilities in 
Japan and South Korea. Specifically, the command reported that the U.S.-
Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative has served as an effective 
framework to manage alliance transformation and realignments in Japan 
and that planning and execution efforts are ongoing to achieve one of 
the largest changes in recent history to U.S. force posture in the 
Pacific. Also, as part of the initiative, the command described the 
importance of relocating 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam and of 
consolidating the remaining U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa to 
reduce the impact on local communities. It also included information on 
U.S. Forces Japan's efforts to return to the government of Japan U.S. 
facilities and more than 14,000 acres of land on Japan and Okinawa. 
Also, U.S. Pacific Command updated the status of the U.S.-South Korea 
Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan,[Footnote 26] 
including its efforts to reduce major U.S. installations from 41 to 10 
(76 percent) in South Korea. The command also provided information 
regarding almost 3,000 acres of land acquisitions, including the 
expansion of Army Garrison Humphreys (formerly known as Camp Humphreys) 
and other sites. 

The U.S. European Command plan updated the network of forward operating 
sites and cooperative security locations in Eastern Europe. For 
example, the plan provided details on the mission, planned 
capabilities, equipment and aircraft, population, and facility 
requirements for Novo Selo Training Area in Bulgaria and Mihail 
Kogalniceanu Air Base in Romania. It also described recent efforts to 
proceed with formal negotiations with the governments of Poland and the 
Czech Republic on establishing missile defense sites and facility 
requirements to support this effort. For example, it identified over 
$284 million in facility requirements to support the ballistic missile 
defense program in the Czech Republic. U.S. European Command also 
explained the establishment of U.S. Africa Command and that its future 
mission is to conduct military-to-military programs, military- 
sponsored activities, and other operations. 

The U.S. Central Command plan reflected a long-term planning vision for 
the development of required infrastructure in the region to achieve its 
missions. The command also reported a need for an increase in both U.S. 
military construction and host nation support funding. For example, the 
command identified a goal of $1.7 billion in host nation funding, which 
it considered reasonable since the infrastructure may also be used by 
the host nation. Also, the command's plan provides detailed 
descriptions of each forward operating site by providing information on 
its mission (such as providing logistical support), the units it could 
host, and its role in the region (such as supporting the war against 
terrorism or strengthening capabilities for rapid and flexible response 
in the Central Asian states), as well as identifying the requirements 
for equipment and facilities at the site. 

Plans Generally Reflect Challenges: 

This year's master plans discuss a number of challenges, such as 
uncertainties with host nation relations and environmental concerns, 
which DOD faces in the implementation of the plans. They also provide 
more detailed descriptions of these challenges than prior years' plans. 

This Year's Plans Provided More Complete Descriptions of Host Nation 
Relations: 

All of the regional commands describe to varying degrees the status of 
recent negotiations and agreements with host nations in their fiscal 
year 2009 master plans. In our review of the overseas master plans in 
2005, we found that none of the commands fully explained the (1) status 
of or (2) challenges to finalizing host nation agreements and 
recommended that the commands briefly explain the status of 
negotiations with host nations to provide more complete and clearer 
plans. These agreements depend largely on the political environment and 
economic conditions in host nations and can affect the extent of host 
nation support--access to facilities or funding--to U.S. forces. 
Accordingly, the resulting agreements may increase or decrease U.S.- 
funded costs for future infrastructure changes. For example, this year: 

* The U.S. Pacific Command plan updates information on the results of 
the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative. The plan describes the 
planned arrival of the USS George Washington, a nuclear aircraft 
carrier, at Naval Base Yokosuka to replace the USS Kitty Hawk, a 
conventional aircraft carrier. The plan also describes how the funding 
for the Japanese Facilities Improvement Program, historically the 
source of major construction on U.S. facilities in Japan, has been 
decreasing. For example, the command noted that the funding for this 
program has decreased from an estimated $1 billion in 1993 to $242 
million. U.S. Forces Japan anticipates that the government of Japan 
will continue to reduce these funds because of Japan's commitment to 
provide several other forms of host nation support (i.e., utilities and 
Japanese labor force) and funding for the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy 
Review Initiative under which the Marine Corps forces are moving from 
Okinawa to Guam. Several DOD officials believe that these financial 
commitments and other constraints may result in U.S. facilities in 
Japan receiving less host nation support, which in turn would require 
more financial support from the U.S. government than in the past. In 
addition, the U.S. Pacific Command plan provided details on current 
realignment efforts regarding the delayed move from Yongsan Army 
Garrison in Seoul to Army Garrison Humphreys south of Seoul. Originally 
expected to be completed by December 2008, the plan stated that the 
move may not be completed until 2012. According to the plan, early 
challenges with land procurement and bilateral funding negotiations 
have now been overcome and the relocation is moving forward. The plan 
also recognized that any future constraints on host nation funding or 
U.S. military construction funds could further delay the Yongsan 
Relocation Plan. 

* The U.S. European Command plan provided a status of ongoing 
realignments in Europe. It also described the rationale for the 
realignments and listed the facilities returned to the host nations. 
Specifically, the plan provided information on efforts to return 
installations in Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Turkey, and 
several classified locations in Europe. It further reported that while 
supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Army Europe 
returned nearly 20,000 soldiers and their families, including parts of 
the 1st Infantry Division, back to the United States. U.S. Army Europe 
has also prepared three military communities in Wuerzburg, Hanau, and 
Dermstadt for return to the government of Germany. Also, the plan 
discussed the relocation of U.S. Army Europe headquarters from 
Heidelberg to Wiesbaden, Germany, to become the 7th Army deployable 
headquarters by fiscal year 2012. The plan also discussed the Army's 
efforts to keep U.S. Army Garrison Baumholder as an enduring base 
because without it the five other Army main operating bases (i.e., 
Grafenwoehr/Vilseck/Hohenfels complex, Stuttgart, Ansbach, 
Kaiserslautern, and Wiesbaden) in Germany would be filled beyond 
capacity. It also explained how U.S. European Command's transformation 
depends on host nation negotiations, political-military considerations, 
base realignment and closure in the United States, and fiscal 
limitations. 

* The U.S. Central Command plan discussed efforts to solicit 
contributions from host nations and to obtain the coordination and 
support that are needed from DOD, the Department of State, and host 
nations. It discussed the challenges of ongoing operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and the command's intention to sustain long-term access to 
locations across its area of responsibility. The plan described how 
ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have increased the basing 
footprint by using contingency construction funding, although the 
command expects to work with DOD and Congress to transition from using 
contingency funding to support its sites. For the future, the command 
will focus on transitioning from current contingency operations to 
developing plans for more a fixed posture, in terms of forces and 
infrastructure. 

Most of This Year's Plans Provided Descriptions of Environmental 
Challenges: 

Most of the commands addressed the extent of their environmental 
challenges in this year's master plans. In contrast, during our review 
of the overseas master plans in 2005, none of the commands identified 
environmental remediation and restoration issues. This year, U.S. 
Pacific Command provided information on the removal of underground 
storage tanks with host nation funding on U.S. installations in various 
locations in South Korea. Also, U.S. Forces Korea identified one base 
that was closed for which environmental information had been exchanged; 
however, the command was still in the process of returning the base to 
the government of South Korea. This year, U.S. European Command 
included information on the progress of the environmental cleanup of 
contaminated sites at Rhein Main Air Base, Germany. The command 
identified that some sites had been cleaned, others needed further 
investigation, but all investigations are expected to be completed at 
the earliest by the end of 2012. Because there were no environmental 
issues in the command's area of responsibility, according to a command 
official, U.S. Central Command did not report any environmental issues. 

Overseas Master Plans Generally Address Our Prior Recommendations: 

Over the years, OSD has modified its guidance for preparing the 
overseas master plans in an effort to address our prior recommendations 
related to the following topics: 

* Facility requirements and costs. This year, all of the regional 
commands identified their precise facility requirements and costs for 
fiscal years 2009 through 2014, and reported estimated facility 
sustainment and recapitalization costs for fiscal year 2009. 

* Base categories. This year, all of the commands categorized their 
installations into applicable base categories of main operating base, 
forward operating site, and cooperative security location, which 
provided users a clearer picture of the infrastructure plans and 
requirements at these sites. The commands also supplemented the 
information on base categories with detailed data on the installations' 
capabilities, overall mission, population, and types of equipment and 
facilities located at each site. 

* End state date. This year, all of the commands identified a common 
strategic end state date, which identifies the last fiscal year of the 
construction time frame and thus provides users a more complete and 
clearer basis for tracking progress in meeting the command 
infrastructure objectives for their areas of responsibility. 

* Host nation funding levels. This year, all of the commands reported 
host nation funding levels at the project level for fiscal year 2009 
and at the aggregate level for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, which 
provided users a better basis to determine the extent to which U.S. 
funding is needed for facility requirements.[Footnote 27] 

* Effects of other defense activities. This year, all of the commands 
described the effects of other defense activities on implementation of 
their master plans. For example, both U.S. European Command and U.S. 
Central Command described how the development of U.S. Africa Command 
would affect their commands and the increased need to coordinate 
efforts in the future. 

Until this year, the overseas master plans have not discussed residual 
value even though we have recommended that they should. In response to 
this recommendation, OSD and command officials stated that residual 
value could not be readily predicted and therefore should not be 
assumed in the master plans.[Footnote 28] These officials also reported 
that residual value is based on the reuse of property being turned over 
to the host nation, which is limited for most categories of military 
facilities and is often reduced by actual or anticipated environmental 
remediation costs. However, we have always maintained that since these 
issues vary by host nation and may not be clear to all users of the 
plans, OSD should require commands, at a minimum, to explain the issues 
with obtaining residual value in each host nation and report the 
implications for U.S. funding requirements. This year, U.S. European 
Command described the difficult and lengthy process to return and 
negotiate the value of facilities to address our prior recommendation. 
[Footnote 29] The command noted that attempting to forecast residual 
value would not be prudent fiscal planning because of the uncertainties 
in receiving residual value, such as the negotiated price to be paid. 
After we received the U.S. European Command plan, command officials 
provided data showing that the U.S. government has received 
approximately $656 million in residual value and payment-in-kind 
compensation since 1989. Payment-in-kind projects include installation 
of water, sewer, electrical, and communication lines, and quality of 
life projects, such as dormitories and neighborhood renovations. 

No Recognition of the Training Challenges in South Korea: 

While the overseas master plans have continued to evolve and have 
provided more comprehensive data every year since fiscal year 2006, the 
U.S. Pacific Command master plan does not describe the challenges the 
command faces in addressing the U.S. Air Force's training limitations 
in South Korea even though we have recommended that it should describe 
the challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and 
funding requirements. While DOD officials indicated that the Air 
Force's training conditions have improved on the Korean peninsula, this 
information was not provided in the U.S. Pacific Command's plan. 

For several years, the government of South Korea has attempted to 
relocate the Koon-Ni training range, which had served as the primary 
air-to-ground range for the Seventh Air Force. The air and ground range 
management of the Koon-Ni training range was transferred to the 
government of South Korea, which closed the range in August 2005. While 
there is an agreement with the government of South Korea to enable U.S. 
forces to train at other ranges, according to senior Air Force and U.S. 
Forces Korea officials, the other ranges do not provide electronic 
scoring capabilities necessary to meet the Air Force's air-to-surface 
training requirements and there is difficulty in obtaining access to 
these ranges. In technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD 
officials said that the South Korean government has increased the U.S. 
Air Force's access to air-to-ground training ranges and improved one 
training site. DOD also noted that newly agreed upon airspace 
management practices are expected to facilitate more training 
opportunities for U.S. Air Force pilots in South Korea. However, U.S. 
Pacific Command did not discuss the progress made in addressing these 
training challenges in its fiscal year 2009 overseas master plan. 

Though it omits the training challenges and progress in South Korea, 
the U.S. Pacific Command plan provides details on the training 
limitations in Japan. The plan discussed training limitations on 
carrier landing practice and the need for aircraft from Naval Air 
Facility Atsugi to train at Iwo Jima, Japan, which is considered a 
hardship due to the extra distance the aircraft need to fly to Iwo 
Jima. Currently, the United States and government of Japan are 
reviewing options that would provide the Naval Air Facility Atsugi 
access to closer training ranges. The plan also discusses how noise and 
land use sensitivities and maneuver area limitations in Okinawa require 
U.S. forces to deploy to other Pacific locations to supplement their 
training. It also describes efforts by U.S. Forces Japan and the 
government of Japan to engage in bilateral discussions to address these 
training shortfalls and explore solutions. 

Overseas Master Plans Generally Have Been Submitted to Congress Late: 

DOD has recently submitted the overseas master plans to Congress 
several months after the annual budget submissions even though the 
Senate and conference reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 
military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to provide 
updates of the master plans with each yearly military construction 
budget submission. Recently, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal 
year 2009 military construction appropriations bill expressed concern 
about DOD's frequent failure to comply with deadlines for submitting 
congressionally mandated reports.[Footnote 30] According to the Senate 
report, many of these mandated reports are planning documents, intended 
to demonstrate that DOD is adequately coordinating its many ongoing 
initiatives, such as the Global Defense Posture moves and the Grow the 
Force initiative.[Footnote 31] The Senate report further noted that 
these mandated reports are necessary to ensure proper congressional 
oversight and to inform congressional decisions related to DOD's budget 
requests. 

Congressional staff members have stressed to us the importance of DOD 
providing the defense committees the overseas master plans at the same 
time as the annual budget submission. The President generally submits 
the administration's budget submissions in February of each year. 
[Footnote 32] However, DOD provided the defense committees the fiscal 
year 2007 plans on April 27 and the fiscal year 2008 plans on March 28. 
This year, DOD submitted the plans to Congress in mid-May, 3 months 
after the fiscal 2009 military construction budget submission was 
provided to Congress. According to DOD officials, OSD's most recent 
efforts to incorporate last-minute changes in basing plans and projects 
contributed to providing Congress the plans months after the military 
construction budget submission. In addition, overseas command officials 
commented that the lengthy review and approval process among the 
commands and OSD has contributed to the plans' lateness. 

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD said that it intends to 
replace the overseas master plans with annual updates of its global 
defense posture as the department's overseas planning report to 
Congress. Because of continued concern over the possibility of changes 
to the global defense posture, the Senate report accompanying the 
fiscal year 2009 military construction appropriation bill extended the 
requirement for DOD to provide annually updated reports on the status 
of its global basing initiative to the Committees on Appropriations of 
both Houses of Congress.[Footnote 33] These global basing reports are 
to be submitted with the administration's budget submissions each year 
through fiscal year 2014 and should include, at a minimum, an overview 
of the current overseas basing strategy and an explanation of any 
changes to the strategy; the status of host nation negotiations; the 
cost to date of implementing the military construction elements of the 
strategy; an updated estimate of the cost to complete the construction 
program; and an updated timeline for implementing the strategy. The 
Senate report further noted that the timely filing of these reports is 
essential to the ability of the committee to exercise its oversight 
responsibilities, and it is therefore important that DOD adhere to the 
schedule and provide these reports at the same time as the annual 
budget submission. Since the department will continue to report on its 
overseas planning to Congress, DOD has an opportunity to reexamine its 
timeline for producing these reports and provide them to Congress with 
the administration's annual budget submission to provide Congress with 
adequate time for review. Without access to these reports on a timely 
basis, congressional committees may not have the information needed at 
the appropriate time to prepare the annual defense and military 
construction legislation and to carry out oversight responsibilities of 
DOD's global realignment of U.S. forces and installations overseas. 

DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Buildup on Guam but Has 
Yet to Develop the Congressionally Required Master Plan: 

DOD has established various planning and implementation documents that 
serve as a framework to guide the military realignment and buildup on 
Guam. However, the department has not issued a comprehensive master 
plan for the buildup that was initially due in December 2006, which 
Congress later extended to September 2008. While the Joint Guam Program 
Office is coordinating the development of a working-level plan for DOD 
that is to be submitted to Congress by the 2008 deadline, this is a 
onetime requirement, and DOD officials said that this plan will be a 
snapshot of the status of the planning process at the time of its 
completion and will not be considered a comprehensive master plan for 
several reasons. First, the results of the environmental impact 
statement and resulting record of decision on the proposed military 
buildup, which are expected to be completed by January 2010, will 
influence many key decisions about the military infrastructure 
development on Guam. Also, Joint Guam Program Office officials estimate 
that the office could complete a comprehensive master plan for Guam 
within 90 days once these documents are completed. Second, plans for 
the detailed force composition of units relocating to Guam, associated 
facility requirements, and implications for other services' 
realignments on Guam continue to be refined. Third, additional time is 
needed to fully address the challenges related to funding 
uncertainties, operational requirements, and Guam's economic and 
infrastructure requirements. 

DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Realignment and Buildup: 

DOD has established various planning and implementation documents that 
serve as a framework to guide the military realignment and buildup on 
Guam. Originally, the Marine Corps realignment was discussed in the 
U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative, which established the 
framework for the future of the U.S. force structure in Japan. The 
Japan Ministry of Defense reported that based on bilateral meetings in 
2005 and 2006, the government of Japan had decided to support the 
United States in its development of necessary facilities and 
infrastructure, including headquarters buildings, barracks, and family 
housing, to hasten the process of moving Marine Corps forces from 
Okinawa to Guam. In July 2006, U.S. Pacific Command developed the Guam 
Integrated Military Development Plan to provide an overview of the 
projected military population and infrastructure requirements.[Footnote 
34] The plan is based on a notional force structure that was used to 
generate land and facility requirements for basing, operations, 
logistics, training, and quality of life involving the Marine Corps, 
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Special Operations Forces in Guam. However, 
this plan is not considered a master plan for the military buildup and 
provides limited information on the expected effects of the military 
buildup on the local community and off-base infrastructure. 

The Joint Guam Program Office has completed its first phase of the Guam 
planning process and developed basic facility requirements with general 
cost estimates, mapping concepts, and land use plans with preferred 
alternatives. Through an analysis of available land on the island and 
DOD preliminary operational requirements, the joint office has 
identified alternative sites for the Marine Corps main encampment, 
family housing, and aviation operations and training and for the Navy 
transient aircraft carrier pier. However, the office has not identified 
its preferred sites for the ballistic missile defense task force and 
firing and nonfiring training ranges. According to Joint Guam Program 
Office officials, the second phase of planning is in progress and will 
include more details, including more specific information on the 
placement of buildings, roads, training facilities, and utilities 
systems. 

The Joint Guam Program Office is coordinating the multi-service 
development of a working-level plan for DOD that is expected to be 
submitted to congressional staff in September 2008. However, this is a 
onetime requirement, and DOD officials said that this working-level 
plan will not be considered a final comprehensive master plan. 
According to Joint Guam Program Office officials, the working-level 
plan will be a snapshot of the status of the planning process at the 
time of its completion. It is being developed to provide DOD components 
with an opportunity to review and provide input. Moreover, the plan 
will address the realignment of Marine Corps forces in the context of 
other DOD-proposed actions on Guam, including the Navy's plan to 
enhance its infrastructure, logistics capabilities, and waterfront 
facilities and the Army's plan to place a ballistic missile defense 
task force on Guam. 

Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision Are Needed to 
Make Key Decisions but Will Not Be Completed until 2010: 

Before the Joint Guam Program Office can finalize its Guam master plan 
and finalize key decisions, it will need to complete the environmental 
impact statement and the resulting record of decision required by the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.[Footnote 35] DOD officials 
said that the results of these documents will influence many key 
decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military 
infrastructure development on Guam. However, according to these 
officials, the environmental impact statement and record of decision 
are not expected to be completed until December 2009 and January 2010, 
respectively. Joint Guam Program Office officials stated that 
development of a comprehensive master plan for the military buildup on 
Guam depended on the completion date of the record of decision and 
estimated that the office could complete a master plan within 90 days 
once the record of decision is finalized. 

On March 7, 2007, the Navy issued a public notice of intent to prepare 
an environmental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,[Footnote 36] as implemented 
by the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations,[Footnote 37] and 
Executive Order 12114. The notice of intent in the Federal Register 
[Footnote 38] states that the environmental impact statement will: 

* Examine the potential environmental effects associated with 
relocating Marine Corps command, air, ground, and logistics units 
(which comprise approximately 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000 
dependents) from Okinawa to Guam. The environmental impact statement 
will examine potential effects from activities associated with Marine 
Corps units' relocation including operations, training, and 
infrastructure changes. 

* Examine the Navy's plan to enhance the infrastructure, logistic 
capabilities, and pier/waterfront facilities to support transient 
nuclear aircraft carrier berthing at Naval Base Guam. The environmental 
impact statement will examine potential effects of the waterfront 
improvements associated with the proposed transient berthing. 

* Evaluate placing a ballistic missile defense task force 
(approximately 630 soldiers and their estimated 950 dependents) in 
Guam. The environmental impact statement will examine potential effects 
from activities associated with the task force, including operations, 
training, and needed infrastructure changes. 

Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the regulations 
established by the Council on Environmental Quality, an environmental 
impact statement must include a purpose and need statement, a 
description of all reasonable project alternatives and their 
environmental effects (including a "no action" alternative), a 
description of the environment of the area to be affected or created by 
the alternatives being considered, and an analysis of the environmental 
impacts of the proposed action and each alternative.[Footnote 39] 
Further, accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and 
public scrutiny are essential to implementing the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. For example, federal agencies such as 
DOD are required to ensure the professional integrity, including 
scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses contained in the 
environmental impact statement. Additionally, after preparing a draft 
environmental impact statement, federal agencies such as DOD are 
required to obtain the comments of any federal agency that has 
jurisdiction by law or certain special expertise and request the 
comments of appropriate state and local agencies, Native American 
tribes, and any agency that has requested that it receive such 
statements. Following the final environmental impact statement, DOD 
will prepare a record of decision that will state what the decision is 
for the proposed military buildup on Guam; identify alternatives 
considered and specify those that are environmentally preferable; state 
whether all practicable mitigation measures were adopted, and if not, 
explain why; and commit to a monitoring and enforcement program to 
ensure implementation of mitigation measures. Until an agency issues a 
final environmental impact statement and record of decision, it 
generally may not take any action concerning the proposal that would 
either have adverse environmental effects or limit the choice of 
reasonable alternatives. 

DOD officials stated that performing these alternative site analyses 
and cumulative effects analyses may delay the completion of a 
comprehensive master plan and affect the construction schedule of the 
required military facilities and infrastructure. DOD will submit its 
fiscal year 2010 budget request to Congress for the first phase of 
military construction projects prior to the completion of the 
environmental impact statement. Thus, DOD may be asking Congress to 
fund the military construction projects without the benefit of a 
completed environmental impact statement or a final decision on the 
full extent of its facility and funding requirements. DOD officials 
said that this practice is consistent with the department's normal 
planning, programming, and budgeting procedures routinely used for 
large-scale construction projects. In such cases, construction projects 
are not awarded and funds are not expended until after the record of 
decision is completed. Joint Guam Program Office officials told us that 
immediately after the environmental impact statement and record of 
decision are completed, the department will commence construction of 
facilities in efforts to meet the 2014 goal of moving Marines and their 
dependents from Okinawa to Guam. However, some DOD and government of 
Guam officials believe that this is an ambitious schedule considering 
the possibility that the environmental impact statement could be 
delayed, the complexities of moving thousands of Marines and dependents 
from Okinawa to Guam, and the need to obtain funding from the United 
States and Japan to support military construction projects. 

Size and Makeup of Forces and Other Variables Are Not Yet Known: 

Although the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative identifies 
Marine Corps units to move to Guam, plans for the detailed force 
composition of units relocating to Guam, associated facility 
requirements, and implications for other services' realignments on Guam 
continue to be refined. The U.S.-Japan realignment roadmap states that 
approximately 8,000 Marines and their dependents will relocate to Guam. 
These units include the Third Marine Expeditionary Force's command 
element and its major subordinate command headquarters: the Third 
Marine Division Headquarters, Third Marine Logistics Group 
Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine 
Regiment Headquarters. The Marine Corps forces remaining on Okinawa 
will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements. 

Marine Corps officials said that the Corps was reviewing its Pacific 
force posture and associated requirements for training operations on 
Guam in light of DOD's plan to increase the number of Marines under the 
Grow the Force initiative. At this time, no decisions have been made on 
whether to deploy additional forces to Guam under this initiative. If 
such a decision is made, the government of Japan would have no 
commitment to support such additional forces on Guam. 

The type of missions to be supported from Guam is a key factor in the 
planning for infrastructure capabilities. The operational, housing, 
utilities, and installation support facilities needed on Guam depend on 
the type, size, frequency, and number of units; units may be permanent, 
rotational, or transient. Desired capabilities and force structure 
define the training and facility requirements, such as the number and 
size of airfield facilities, ranges, family housing units, barracks, 
and schools and the capacity of the installation support facilities 
needed to support operations and the military population. Accordingly, 
Joint Guam Program Office officials said that the master plan they were 
initiating will reflect efforts to build "flexible" infrastructure, 
such as site preparation and utilities, that may operate on Guam. 

DOD Has Not Yet Fully Addressed the Funding, Operational, and Local 
Infrastructure Challenges of Relocating to Guam: 

DOD faces several significant challenges associated with the military 
buildup on Guam, including addressing funding and operational 
challenges and community and infrastructure impacts, which could affect 
the development and implementation of its planning efforts. First, DOD 
has not identified all funding requirements and may encounter 
difficulties in obtaining funding given competing priorities within the 
department. Second, DOD officials need to address the operational and 
training limitations on Guam, such as for sealift and airlift 
capabilities, and training requirements for thousands of Marines. 
Third, the increase in military personnel and their dependents on Guam 
and the large number of construction workers needed to build the 
required military facilities will create challenges for Guam's 
community and civilian infrastructure. 

Funding Requirements Are Not Fully Identified: 

DOD officials have yet to fully identify the funding requirements to 
support the military buildup on Guam. The military services' 
realignments on Guam are estimated to cost over $13 billion; of that, 
the Marine Corps buildup is estimated to cost $10.3 billion. 
Additionally, the $13 billion estimate excludes the costs of all other 
defense organizations that will be needed to support the additional 
military personnel and dependents on Guam. For example, DOD agencies, 
including the Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Commissary 
Agency, will likely incur additional costs to execute their missions to 
help support the services' influx of personnel, missions, and equipment 
to Guam. 

Recently, Marine Forces Pacific officials estimated that the Marine 
Corps realignment on Guam alone will exceed $15 billion, which is 
significantly higher than the original $10.3 billion estimate. These 
additional operational costs include the cost of high-speed vessels 
(procurement and maintenance) to move Marines to and from Guam; 
training-related costs in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands; relocation costs for personnel, equipment, and material to 
Guam; costs of facility furnishings, such as furniture and office 
equipment; and real estate costs if additional land is required in Guam 
or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. These officials 
have also identified base operational and maintenance costs that will 
be funded with U.S. appropriations after the move to Guam but are 
currently reimbursed by the government of Japan through its host nation 
funding programs like the Japan Facility Improvement Program and 
special measures agreements that provide support for labor and utility 
services for Marine Corps bases in Okinawa. In addition, cost estimates 
for the relocation of forces to Guam do not include all costs 
associated with the development of several training ranges for the 
Marine Corps in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands--estimated to 
cost $2 billion. Also, the Marine Corps estimates that the strategic 
lift operating from Guam will cost an additional $88 million annually 
as compared with operations from Okinawa. 

Some uncertainties also exist in the cost-sharing arrangement with the 
government of Japan. The government of Japan is expected to contribute 
a total of $6.09 billion of which up to $2.8 billion would be in funds 
without reimbursement for the construction of operational and support 
infrastructure, such as barracks and office buildings. The government 
of Japan is also expected to provide the remainder, another $3.3 
billion, in loans and equity investments for installation support 
infrastructure, such as on-base power and water systems, and military 
family housing. Most of this $3.3 billion is planned to be recouped 
over time by the government of Japan in the form of service charges 
paid by the Marine Corps and in rents paid by U.S. servicemembers with 
their overseas housing allowances provided by DOD using funds 
appropriated by Congress. Also, according to DOD officials, several 
conditions must be met before the government of Japan contributes some 
or all of the $6.09 billion to the cost of the Marine Corps move. 
First, the government of Japan has stipulated that its funds will not 
be made available until it has reviewed and agreed to specific 
infrastructure plans for Guam. Second, failure or delay of any 
initiative outlined in the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative 
may affect another, because various planning variables need to fall 
into place in order for the initiatives to move forward. For example, 
according to DOD, the commencement of facility construction on Guam in 
fiscal year 2010 depends on the government of Japan showing progress in 
the construction of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma replacement 
facility. Finally, the government of Japan may encounter challenges in 
funding its share of the Marine Corps move considering Japan's other 
national priorities and its commitments associated with funding several 
other major realignments of U.S. forces in Japan under the U.S.-Japan 
Defense Policy Review Initiative. 

Operational and Training Challenges: 

DOD also has not fully addressed operational challenges, such as 
providing appropriate mobility support and training capabilities to 
meet Marine Corps requirements. According to Marine Forces Pacific 
officials, the Marine Corps in Guam will depend on strategic military 
sealift and airlift to reach destinations in Asia that will be farther 
away than was the case when the units were based in Okinawa. For 
example, in a contingency operation that requires sealift, the ships 
may have to deploy from Sasebo, Japan, or other locations to collect 
the Marines and their equipment on Guam and then go to the area where 
the contingency is taking place, potentially risking a delayed arrival 
at certain potential trouble spots since Guam is farther away from 
these locations than Okinawa. According to Marine Corps officials, 
amphibious shipping capability and airlift capacity are needed in Guam, 
which may include expanding existing staging facilities and systems 
support for both sealift and airlift. 

Existing training ranges and facilities on Guam are not sufficient to 
meet the training requirements of the projected Marine Corps force. A 
DOD analysis of training opportunities in Guam concluded that no ranges 
on Guam are suitable for the needs of the projected Marine Corps force 
because of inadequacy in size or lack of availability. U.S. Pacific 
Command is also in the process of conducting a training study that 
covers Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands to see what options are 
available for training in the region. Marine Forces Pacific officials 
stated that live-fire artillery training, amphibious landings, and 
tracked vehicle operations will be challenging because of the 
combination of factors associated with the limited size of training 
areas available and the environmental concerns on the Northern Mariana 
Islands. 

Increase in Military Presence Is Expected to Have Significant Impact on 
the Local Community and Public Infrastructure: 

The increase in military presence is expected to have a significant 
impact on Guam's community and public infrastructure; however, these 
potential effects have yet to be fully addressed. This undertaking is 
estimated to increase the current Guam population of approximately 
171,000 by an estimated 25,000 active duty military personnel and 
dependents (or 14.6 percent) to 196,000. The Guam population could also 
swell further because DOD's personnel estimates do not include defense 
civilians and contractors who are also likely to move to Guam to 
support DOD operations. DOD officials estimate that they will require 
500 defense civilians and contractors to support the Marine Corps base 
operations; however, they expect many of these jobs to be filled by 
military spouses or the local population. This estimate does not 
include personnel for other service realignments on Guam. 

DOD and government of Guam officials recognize that the increase in 
construction due to the military buildup will exceed local capacity and 
the availability of local workers. For example, DOD officials cite a 
July 2008 study that estimated the annual construction capacity to be 
approximately $1 billion to $1.5 billion and potentially $2.5 billion 
with improvements to the port and road networks compared with the 
estimated construction capacity of more than $3 billion per year needed 
by DOD to meet the planned fiscal year 2014 completion date. In 
addition, Guam currently faces a shortage of skilled construction 
workers. Preliminary analysis indicates that 15,000 to 20,000 
construction workers will be required to support the projected 
development on Guam. One estimate is that Guam may be able to meet only 
10 to 15 percent of the labor requirement locally. Nearby countries may 
have workers willing to come to Guam to take jobs to construct needed 
facilities, but these workers will have to enter the United States on 
temporary nonagricultural workers visas.[Footnote 40] Joint Guam 
Program Office officials cite the recently passed legislation that will 
increase the cap of temporary workers in Guam from 2009 until 2014 as 
addressing many of their concerns about temporary workers' visas. 
[Footnote 41] At the same time, the government of Guam reports that the 
influx of foreign workers would put a strain on local emergency care 
services, medical facilities, public utilities, transportation 
networks, and the availability of temporary housing.[Footnote 42] 

In addition, as we recently testified, DOD and government of Guam 
officials recognize that the island's infrastructure is inadequate to 
meet the increased demand due to the military buildup.[Footnote 43] For 
example: 

* Guam's commercial port has capacity constraints with pier berthing 
space, crane operations, and container storage locations. 

* Guam's two major highways are in poor condition and, when ordnance 
(ammunition and explosives) is unloaded from ships for Andersen Air 
Force Base now and for the Marine Corps in the future, the ordnance 
must be transported on one of these major roads that run through highly 
populated areas. 

* Guam's electrical system--the sole power provider on the island--is 
not reliable and has transmission problems resulting in brownouts and 
voltage and frequency fluctuations. The system may not be adequate to 
deliver the additional energy requirements associated with the military 
buildup. 

* Guam's water and wastewater treatment systems are near capacity and 
have a history of failure due to aged and deteriorated distribution 
lines. The military buildup may increase demand by at least 25 percent. 

* Guam's solid waste facilities face capacity and environmental 
challenges as they have reached the end of their useful life. 
Currently, the solid waste landfills in Guam have a number of 
unresolved issues related to discharge of pollutants and are near 
capacity. 

Government of Guam officials stated that Guam will require significant 
funding to address anticipated public infrastructure challenges; 
however, these officials have not identified sufficient resources 
necessary to support this buildup. In a recent congressional hearing, 
the Governor of Guam testified that the government of Guam will need 
$6.1 billion to address infrastructure upgrades, such as projects 
regarding the port expansion, road enhancements, power and water 
upgrades, education, and public health improvements.[Footnote 44] These 
costs are separate from and in addition to DOD's cost estimates of the 
military realignments on Guam. 

Conclusions: 

The evolution of U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and 
infrastructure requirements continues, as reflected in the fiscal year 
2009 overseas master plans, and many efforts to consolidate, realign, 
and shift the U.S. military presence globally are still under way and 
are years from completion. For the last 4 years, the overseas master 
plans have been an important means for keeping Congress informed of the 
challenges DOD faces and the costs associated with such efforts. 
However, DOD has submitted the plans to the congressional defense 
committees months after the annual budget submissions even though the 
congressional reporting requirement directs that updates of the plans 
be provided with each yearly budget submission. Recently, a 
congressional committee report expressed concern about the department's 
frequent failure to comply with deadlines for submitting mandated 
reports and reiterated the importance of receiving the reports in a 
timely manner.[Footnote 45] The timely filing of the department's 
mandated reports was seen as essential to supporting the committee's 
need for current information when making decisions related to DOD's 
budget requests and to permit the committee to effectively exercise its 
oversight responsibilities. Without having the mandated reports in a 
timely manner, Congress is likely to be missing up-to-date information 
needed for making funding decisions and carrying out its oversight 
responsibilities. Since DOD intends to replace the overseas master 
plans with annual updates of its global defense posture as DOD's 
overseas planning report to Congress, the department has an opportunity 
to reexamine its timeline for producing these reports to issue them 
with the administration's annual budget submission to provide Congress 
with adequate time for review. 

With respect to the military buildup on Guam, it is likely that it will 
be 2010 or later before DOD is able to complete a comprehensive master 
plan for the military buildup. A comprehensive master plan is important 
for Congress, as it helps to ensure that Congress has a complete 
picture of facility requirements and associated costs in order to make 
appropriate funding decisions and to assist DOD, federal departments 
and agencies, the government of Guam, and other organizations in 
addressing the challenges associated with the military buildup. At the 
same time, it is reasonable to expect that until DOD has the results of 
the environmental impact statement and record of decision required by 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, it will not be able to 
finalize a comprehensive master plan for the reasons that we stated in 
our report. Meanwhile, the Joint Guam Program Office is coordinating 
the multi-service development of a working-level plan for DOD that is 
to be submitted to Congress in September 2008. However, no requirement 
exists to report periodically on the status of DOD's planning efforts 
after this date. In our 2007 report, we suggested that Congress 
consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to report periodically to 
the defense committees on the status of the department's planning 
efforts for Guam to help ensure the best application of federal funds 
and leveraging of options for supporting the military buildup until DOD 
finalizes a comprehensive master plan.[Footnote 46] Because of the 
uncertainty in DOD's plans for the military buildup, we continue to 
believe that this approach has merit and that the defense committees 
would find annual updates of the Joint Guam Program Office's working- 
level plan for Guam useful to inform congressional decisions and ensure 
proper congressional oversight from September 2008 to the date on which 
the office completes its comprehensive master plan, currently expected 
no sooner than 2010. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To inform congressional decisions and ensure proper congressional 
oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the 
following two actions: 

* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics to initiate a process of developing global defense posture 
updates earlier each year so that DOD can provide the congressional 
defense committees the overseas planning report with the 
administration's annual budget submission. 

* Direct the Executive Director of the Joint Guam Program Office to 
provide the congressional defense committees with annual updates of the 
Guam working-level plan until a comprehensive master plan is finalized 
and submitted to Congress. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed 
with our recommendation to initiate a process of developing future 
overseas master plans earlier each year so that DOD can provide them to 
the congressional defense committees with the administration's annual 
budget submission, and agreed with our recommendation to provide the 
congressional defense committees with annual updates of the Guam 
working-level plan until a comprehensive master plan is finalized and 
submitted to Congress. While DOD partially agreed with the first 
recommendation, it also stated that it plans to replace the expired 
requirements for the overseas master plans with annual updates of its 
global defense posture as DOD's overseas planning report to Congress. 
DOD further commented that the report development process will support 
submission with the administration's annual budget request. Since the 
Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2009 military construction 
appropriation bill requires that these updates include data similar to 
those presented in prior master plans and explains that the timely 
filing of mandated reports is essential to the ability of the committee 
to exercise its oversight responsibilities,[Footnote 47] we believe 
that this effort to replace the overseas master plans with the global 
defense posture updates will meet the intent of our original 
recommendation. Therefore, we revised our recommendation to reflect 
that DOD plans to replace the master plans with annual updates of its 
global defense posture as the department's overseas planning report to 
Congress. 

DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided 
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report as 
appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps; the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; the Commander, 
U.S. European Command; the Commander, U.S. Central Command, and the 
Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will be made 
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call 
me at (202) 512-4523 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices 
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. The GAO staff members who made key contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Brian J. Lepore, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tim Johnson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Chet Edwards: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Zach Wamp: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the fiscal year 2009 overseas master 
plans have addressed changes since the last plans, the Department of 
Defense's (DOD) challenges, and our prior recommendations, and to 
examine their timeliness, we analyzed the overseas master plans and 
compared them to the reporting requirements in the congressional 
mandate and the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) guidance. We 
compared and contrasted the fiscal years 2008 and 2009 overseas master 
plans in order to identify improvements and updated challenges in the 
plans. We also assessed the quantity and quality of the data describing 
the base categories, host nation funding levels, facility requirements 
and costs, environmental remediation issues, and other issues affecting 
the implementation of the plans. To discuss the reporting requirements, 
host nation agreements and funding levels, U.S. funding levels and 
sources, environmental remediation and restoration issues, property 
returns, residual value, and training requirements, we met with 
officials from OSD; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Army Pacific; U.S. 
Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Forces Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; 
U.S. Forces Korea; U.S. Eighth Army; Seventh Air Force; U.S. Naval 
Forces Korea; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Far East District; U.S. 
Forces Japan; U.S. Army Japan; U.S. Air Forces Japan; U.S. Naval Forces 
Japan; U.S. Marine Forces Japan; Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
Far East, Japan; U.S. European Command; U.S. Army Europe; U.S. Naval 
Forces Europe; U.S. Air Force Europe; U.S. Central Command; and U.S. 
Special Operations Command. We also analyzed available reports, 
documents, policies, directives, international agreements, and guidance 
to keep abreast of ongoing changes in overseas defense basing 
strategies and requirements. To directly observe the condition of 
facilities and the status of selected construction projects, we visited 
and toured facilities at Garrison Wiesbaden and Garrison Grafenwoehr, 
Germany; Camp Schwab, Camp Zama, Yokosuka Naval Base, and Yokota Air 
Base, Japan; and Yongsan Army Garrison and Garrison Humphreys, South 
Korea. 

To determine the status of DOD's planning efforts for the Guam military 
buildup, we met with officials from OSD, the Air Force, the Navy, U.S. 
Pacific Command, and the Joint Guam Program Office. In general, we 
discussed the current planning framework for the military buildup, the 
schedule and development of a comprehensive master plan, and the status 
of the environmental impact study required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. In addition, we met with officials 
from U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; U.S. Marine 
Forces Japan; Third Marine Expeditionary Forces; U.S. Forces Japan; 
U.S. Army Pacific; and Pacific Air Forces to discuss the challenges and 
various factors that can affect U.S. infrastructure requirements and 
costs associated with the military buildup, to determine if funding 
requirements to accommodate the buildup have been identified, and to 
identify operational and training challenges associated with the 
buildup. We also visited Naval Base Guam; Andersen Air Force Base, 
Guam; and other military sites in Guam to directly observe the 
installations and future military construction sites. We analyzed 
available reports, documents, and international agreements to keep 
abreast of ongoing activities in Guam pertaining to challenges that may 
affect DOD's development and implementation of a comprehensive master 
plan for the military buildup. To identify the funding and local 
infrastructure challenges, we met with the Governor and his staff, Guam 
Delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, and representatives from 
the Guam legislature, the Mayors' Council of Guam, the Guam Chamber of 
Commerce, Guam's Civilian Military Task Force, and community groups on 
Guam. 

We met with U.S. Special Operations Command officials; however, its 
planning efforts were not specifically required for the overseas master 
plans in response to the congressional mandates. In addition, we did 
not include U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command in our 
analysis because these commands have significantly fewer facilities 
overseas than the other regional commands in the Pacific, Europe, and 
Central Asia. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 through August 
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 
	
September 15, 2008: 

Mr. Brian J. Lepore: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Lepore: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-08-1005, "Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve 
the Timeliness of Future Overseas Master Plans and Factors Affecting 
the Master Planning Effort for the Military Buildup on Guam", dated 
August 11, 2008 (GAO Code 351100). 

DoD's mandate to provide Overseas Master Plans (OMPs) was completed 
with the submission of the FY09 plans to Congress. The Department 
intends to provide updates on Global Defense Posture (GDP) 
implementation annually as requested by Congress. These GDP updates 
will replace the OMPs as DoD's overseas planning report to Congress. 
The report development process will support submission with the annual 
budget. 

The Department agrees that a comprehensive Master Plan for Guam buildup 
will not be complete until 2010, when the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) are scheduled for 
completion. The Department is developing a report for Congress on DoD's 
planning efforts for Guam. 

The Department's comments regarding the specific recommendations are 
outlined in the enclosure. Technical comments were provided separately 
by my staff. My point of contact for this matter is Mr. Rick Flansburg, 
(703) 571-9065, rick.flansburggosd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Wayne Arny: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment): 

Enclosure: As stated: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated August 11, 2008: 
GAO Code 351100 /GAO-08-1005: 

"Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of Future
Overseas Master Plans and Factors Affecting the Master Planning Effort 
for the Military Buildup on Guam" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics) to initiate a process of developing future overseas master 
plans earlier each year so that DoD can provide the congressional 
defense committees the plans with the administration's annual budget 
submission. (Page 36/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Partially concurs. The Congressional mandate for DoD to 
provide Overseas Master Plans (OMP) was completed with the submission 
of the FY09 plans to Congress. Global Defense Posture (GDP) updates are 
required annually through 2014. It is recommended that these GDP 
updates replace the OMPs as DoD's overseas planning report to Congress. 
The report development process will support submission with the annual 
budget. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to provide the congressional defense 
committees with annual updates of the Guam working-level plan until a 
comprehensive master plan is finalized and submitted to Congress. (Page 
36/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Concurs. A final comprehensive Master Plan for Guam 
buildup will not be complete until 2010, when the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) are scheduled for 
completion. The Conference Report on H.R. 3043, November 2007 directs 
the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on DoD's planning efforts 
for Guam. The Department is developing this report for Congress. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Mark Little, Assistant 
Director; Nelsie Alcoser; Mae Jones; Kate Lenane; Julia Matta; and 
Jamilah Moon made major contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Overseas Master Plans/Global Posture: 

Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and 
Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-947T]. Washington, 
D.C.: July 15, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD 
Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military 
Buildup on Guam. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
1015]. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2007. 

Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are 
Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture 
Restructuring. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-
852]. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006. 

DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-913R]. Washington, 
D.C.: August 22, 2006. 

Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing 
U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-680R]. Washington, D.C.: June 
27, 2005. 

Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs 
Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-609NI]. Washington, D.C.: July 
15, 2004. 

Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. 
Military Presence on Okinawa. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-66]. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 1998. 

Community Growth Bases: 

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help 
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-665]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 17, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road 
Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-602R]. Washington, D.C.: April 
1, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 
Personnel Growth. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
1007]. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. 

U.S. Insular Areas: 

Defense Logistics: Navy Needs to Develop and Implement a Plan to Ensure 
That Voyage Repairs Are Available to Ships Operating near Guam when 
Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-427]. 
Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military 
Buildup on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many Challenges Yet 
to Be Addressed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-
722T]. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2008. 

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Pending Legislation Would 
Apply U.S. Immigration Law to the CNMI with a Transition Period. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-466]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 28, 2008. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Accountability 
Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-119]. 
Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2006. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Multiple Factors Affect Federal Health Care 
Funding. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-75]. 
Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2005. 

Environmental Cleanup: Better Communication Needed for Dealing with 
Formerly Used Defense Sites in Guam. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-02-423]. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002. 

Compact of Free Association: Negotiations Should Address Aid 
Effectiveness and Accountability and Migrants' Impact on U.S. Areas. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-270T]. Washington, 
D.C.: December 6, 2001. 

Foreign Relations: Migration From Micronesian Nations Has Had 
Significant Impact on Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-02-40]. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Application of the U.S. Constitution. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/OGC-98-5]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 7, 1997. 

Insular Areas Update. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-184R]. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 1996. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Information on Fiscal Relations with the Federal 
Government. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-GGD-95-
71]. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 1995. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Development Strategy and Better Coordination Among 
U.S. Agencies Are Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-94-62]. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 1994. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] DOD officials refer to the results of the negotiations between the 
United States and Japan to realign U.S. forces in Japan as the U.S.- 
Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative. 

[2] In fulfilling this requirement, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense asked the overseas regional combatant commands to prepare 
comprehensive master plans for their areas of responsibility. 

[3] S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003) and H.R. Rep. No. 108-342, at 
17 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) 

[4] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006). 

[5] H.R. Rep. No.110-424, at 437 (2007) (Conf. Rep.) 

[6] See related GAO products at the end of this report. 

[7] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, 
but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the 
Military Buildup on Guam, GAO-07-1015 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 
2007); DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-913R] (Washington, 
D.C.: Aug. 22, 2006); Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive 
Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-680R] (Washington, 
D.C.: June 27, 2005); and Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting 
U.S. Infrastructure Costs Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive 
Master Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-
609NI] (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004). 

[8] Department of Defense, Comprehensive Master Plans at Department of 
Defense Overseas Facilities (Washington, D.C.: May 2008). This year, 
DOD submitted the overseas master plans to Congress on May 13, 2008, 
and made them available to us on May 20, 2008. 

[9] We did not include U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command 
in our review because they have significantly fewer facilities outside 
of the United States than the other regional commands. Also not 
included were U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, 
U.S. Joint Forces Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. These 
unified, functional commands have few facilities outside the United 
States and have not issued master plans for changing U.S. 
infrastructure overseas. 

[10] Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, Update of Overseas Master Plans (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 1, 2007). The congressional requirement for annual updates 
of the overseas master plans expired this year with DOD's fiscal year 
2009 plans. 

[11] Overseas master plans defined the base categories as the 
following: (1) main operating base, a facility outside the United 
States and U.S. territories with permanently stationed operating forces 
and robust infrastructure and characterized by command and control 
structures, enduring family support facilities, and strengthened force 
protection measures; (2) forward operating site, a scalable location 
outside the United States and U.S. territories intended for rotational 
use by operating forces with limited U.S. military support presence and 
possibly pre-positioned equipment; and (3) cooperative security 
location, a facility located outside the United States and U.S. 
territories with little or no permanent U.S. presence that is 
maintained with periodic service, contractor, or host nation support. 
Cooperative security locations provide contingency access, logistics 
support, and rotational use by operating forces and can be a focal 
point for security cooperation activities. 

[12] In August 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the 
Secretary of the Navy to establish the Joint Guam Program Office to 
plan and execute the military services' buildup on Guam. 

[13] The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to 
serve as an action-forcing device to ensure that the policies and goals 
defined in the National Environmental Policy Act are infused into the 
ongoing programs and actions of the federal government. Regulations for 
implementing the act established by the Council on Environmental 
Quality specify that to the fullest extent possible, agencies shall 
prepare draft environmental impact statements concurrently with and 
integrated with other environmental impact analyses and related surveys 
and studies required by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, the 
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the Endangered Species Act 
of 1973, and other environmental review laws and executive orders. See 
40 C.F.R. ï¿½ 1502.25. 

[14] Following the final environmental impact statement, DOD will 
prepare a record of decision that will state what the decision is for 
the proposed military buildup on Guam; identify alternatives considered 
and specify those that are environmentally preferable; state whether 
all practicable mitigation measures were adopted, and if not, explain 
why; and commit to a monitoring and enforcement program to ensure 
implementation of mitigation measures. 

[15] S. Rep. No. 110-428, at 10 (2008). 

[16] In our estimate for military construction and family housing for 
overseas locations, we included Guam and the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands. However, we excluded worldwide classified and 
unspecified appropriations from our total because these categories may 
include domestic military construction and family housing. 

[17] S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13 (2003). 

[18] H.R. Rep. No. 108-342, at 17 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) 

[19] U.S. Africa Command's area of responsibility will include the 
African continent and its island nations, with the exception of Egypt. 
Egypt will remain within U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility. 
These commands will have overlapping but distinct relationships with 
Egypt, which will be addressed under separate memorandums of agreement. 

[20] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006). 

[21] H.R. Rep. No. 110-424, at 437 (2007) (Conf. Rep.) 

[22] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015], 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-913R], [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-680R], and GAO-04-609NI. 

[23] Residual value compensation is funding paid by the host nation to 
the United States to compensate for the value of U.S.-funded 
improvements to the base. The amount of compensation is negotiated 
between the United States and the foreign country. 

[24] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015]. 

[25] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed 
Military Buildup on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many 
Challenges Yet to Be Addressed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-722T] (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2008). 

[26] With the provisions of the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan 
Relocation Plan, U.S. Forces Korea intends to strengthen its overall 
military effectiveness by consolidating installations north of Seoul, 
including the Yongsan Army Garrison located in Seoul, into two major 
hubs in the central and southern sections of South Korea. U.S. Forces 
Korea expects the consolidation and relocation of thousands of soldiers 
to increase readiness, efficiencies, and cost savings; enhance quality 
of life; provide a less-intrusive presence; and increase training 
opportunities. 

[27] During our review of the fiscal year 2009 master plans, we found 
that U.S. European Command had omitted $153 million in host nation 
funding for 17 projects. 

[28] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015]. 

[29] In U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility, there is no need 
for international agreements to provide for residual value because host 
nations generally provide replacement facilities. Arrangements vary by 
country in U.S. Central Command, where six host nations have agreements 
to allow for residual value negotiations and nine countries have no 
such agreements. 

[30] S. Rep. No. 110-428, at 12 (2008). 

[31] In January 2007, the President announced an initiative, referred 
to as Grow the Force, to increase the end strength in the Army by more 
than 74,000 by 2013 and in the Marine Corps by 27,000 personnel by 2011 
to enhance U.S. forces, reduce stress on deployable personnel, and 
provide necessary forces for success in the Global War on Terrorism. 

[32] The President is required to submit a budget for the following 
fiscal year to Congress on or after the first Monday in January but not 
later than the first Monday in February. See 31 U.S.C. ï¿½ 1105. 

[33] S. Rep. No. 110-428 at 10 (2008). 

[34] U.S. Pacific Command, Guam Integrated Military Development Plan 
(Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii: July 11, 2006). 

[35] National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. ï¿½ 4321-4347. 

[36] National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. ï¿½ 4321-4347. 

[37] 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-1508. 

[38] 72 Fed. Reg. 10186-7 (Mar. 7, 2007). 

[39] 40 C.F.R. ï¿½ 1502.13-1502.16. 

[40] This requirement would not apply to citizens from the freely 
associated states of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau who 
may enter the Under States, including Guam, to work without visas under 
the terms outlined in each country's compact of free association with 
the United States. 

[41] Pub. L. No. 110-229 ï¿½ 702 (2008). 

[42] Civilian Military Task Force, Planning for Military Growth: 
November 2007 Needs Assessment (Hagï¿½tï¿½a, Guam: November 2007). 

[43] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-722T]. 

[44] Governor of Guam statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources, The United States Military Buildup on 
Guam: Impact on the Civilian Community, Planning, and Response 
(Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2008). 

[45] S. Rep. No. 110-428, at 12 (2008). 

[46] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015]. 

[47] S. Rep. No. 110-428. 

[End of section] 

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