Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations  
of U.S. and UN Operations (13-JUN-07, GAO-07-998T).		 
                                                                 
As of June 2007, more than 100,000 military and civilian	 
personnel are engaged in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping	 
operations in 15 locations in Africa, Europe, Asia, the Americas,
and the Middle East. In 2006, the United States provided the UN  
with about $1 billion to support peacekeeping operations. Given  
that thousands of U.S. troops are intensively deployed in combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping operations	 
are an important element in maintaining a secure international	 
environment. As requested, this testimony discusses (1) the costs
of the current UN mission in Haiti compared with the estimated	 
cost of a hypothetical U.S. operation and (2) the strengths and  
limitations of the United States and the UN in leading peace	 
operations. This testimony is based on our prior report and	 
information we updated for this hearing. To estimate U.S. costs, 
we developed parameters for a U.S. mission similar to the UN	 
mission in Haiti, which the Joint Staff validated as reasonable. 
We then applied DOD's official cost estimating model. However, it
is uncertain whether the United States would implement an	 
operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-998T					        
    ACCNO:   A70668						        
  TITLE:     Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and      
Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations				 
     DATE:   06/13/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Cost analysis					 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International organizations			 
	     International relations				 
	     Peacekeeping					 
	     Peacekeeping forces				 
	     Police						 
	     United Nations military forces			 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     Haiti						 

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GAO-07-998T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background
     * [3]Estimated Costs for a U.S. Operation Are at Least Twice the

          * [4]Estimated U.S. Costs Are Higher in Major Categories
          * [5]Alternative Military Assumptions Generated Higher U.S. Cost

     * [6]U.S. and UN-Led Operations Each Have Strengths and Limitatio

          * [7]U.S. Military Has Elements Critical for Peacekeeping, but Fa
          * [8]UN Has Multinational Participation and Extensive Experience,

     * [9]Conclusion
     * [10]GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments

          * [11]Order by Mail or Phone

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Wednesday, June 13, 2007

PEACEKEEPING

Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN
Operations

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director
International Affairs and Trade

GAO-07-998T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of the work we
completed for this subcommittee on the cost of a United Nations (UN)
peacekeeping operation versus the cost of a similar U.S. operation. As of
May 2007, more than 100,000 military and civilian personnel are engaged in
UN peacekeeping operations in 15 locations in Africa, Europe, Asia, the
Americas, and the Middle East. In 2006, the United States provided the UN
with about $1 billion to support peacekeeping operations out of a total
peacekeeping budget of about $5.5 billion. Given that U.S. troops are
intensively deployed in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, UN
peacekeeping operations are a key element in maintaining a secure
international environment.

My testimony today focuses on (1) the costs of the current UN mission in
Haiti compared with the estimated cost of a hypothetical U.S. operation
and (2) the strengths and limitations of the United States and the UN in
leading peace operations. This testimony is based on our prior report^1
and information we updated for this hearing. We reviewed classified and
unclassified information, but we used only unclassified information in
this statement. We selected the UN mission in Haiti as a case study
because both the United States and the UN have conducted operations in
that country, thus providing comparative information on their two
approaches. However, it is uncertain whether the United States would
implement an operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN, given
operational, structural, and doctrinal differences. While the results of
the review cannot be generalized to other U.S. and UN operations, we
believe this report provides useful insights into the costs and
effectiveness of unilateral and multilateral peacekeeping missions.

To compare UN and U.S. costs to implement a comparable peacekeeping
operation, we obtained budget data for the first 14 months of the UN
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). We developed a scenario for a
U.S. operation in Haiti that used the same deployment schedule as the UN,
with the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel and
aircraft over the same period. Officials from the Joint Staff validated
this scenario as reasonable. We used DOD's Contingency Operation Support
Tool to estimate military costs. DOD requires that this model be used to
generate estimates for all U.S. contingency operations, and it is used as
the basis for the supplemental appropriation requests to Congress.^2 To
estimate civilian costs, we used historical data and formulas from the
Department of State. To assess the relative strengths and limitations of
U.S. and UN forces, we analyzed UN and U.S. reports, including information
on UN- and U.S.-led operations in Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan. We
interviewed officials from DOD and State to get their perspectives on the
strengths and limitations of UN- and U.S.-led operations. We conducted our
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

^1GAO, Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S.
Operations in Haiti, [12]GAO-06-331 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2006).

Summary

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it
would the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN mission
in Haiti. The UN budgeted $428 million for the first 14 months of the
mission, of which the United States was responsible for $116 million. A
similar U.S. operation would have cost an estimated $876 million.
Virtually the entire cost difference can be attributed to three major
elements: civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities.
First, the estimated cost of deploying U.S. civilian police is $217
million or about 8 times the $25 million budgeted by the UN for
international police officers. Compensation rates for U.S. police include
higher costs for salaries, special pay and training, whereas the UN pays
police a standard daily allowance. Second, we estimated that U.S. military
pay and support would cost $260 million, compared with $131 million in the
UN budget, and reflects higher salaries and higher standards for
equipment, ammunition, and rations. Third, U.S. facilities-related costs
would be twice those of the UN, reflecting the cost of posting U.S.
civilian personnel in a secure embassy compound. Several factors could
affect the estimated costs of a U.S. operation, including the mix of
reserve and active duty troops and the rate of troop deployment. When we
varied these factors--for example, by increasing the number of reserve
troops deployed--the estimated cost for a U.S. operation increased.

Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or
the UN should lead a peacekeeping operation. Each offers strengths and
limitations. Traditionally, the United States' strengths have included
rapid deployment, strong command and control, and well-trained and
equipped personnel. However, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
have reduced personnel and equipment readiness levels and resulted in
shortfalls for military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts. The
UN provides broad multinational support for its missions, with a UN
Security Council mandate and direction for its operations. The UN also has
access to international civil servants, police, and senior officials who
have nation-building experience and diverse language skills. Finally, the
UN has fostered a network of agencies and development banks to coordinate
international assistance with peacekeeping missions. However, the UN has
traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and
ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces.

^2Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations, 7000.14-R, vol.
12, Ch. 23, para. 2304.

Background

Both the UN and United States have a long history of conducting operations
to promote peace and stability. The UN has undertaken more than 60
peacekeeping missions since 1948 and states that it has negotiated more
than 170 settlements that have ended regional conflicts. As of June 2007,
15 UN peacekeeping operations were ongoing in Africa, Europe, the Middle
East, Asia, and the Americas.^3 As shown in figure 1, the number of
military troops and police in UN peacekeeping operations has steadily
increased from 29,140 personnel in 1996 to 83,071 in 2007, with a record
number of peacekeepers deployed around the world by March 2007. The United
States has led and participated in many peacekeeping operations, such as
in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans; as of April 2007, there were 310 U.S.
military and police serving in UN operations. In contrast to the
relatively few U.S. troops and police in UN operations, the United States
has about 146,000 troops in Iraq and about 25,000 in Afghanistan in
stability operations as of April 2007.

^3Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations as of June 2007 include missions in
Jerusalem, India/Pakistan, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Western Sahara,
Georgia, Kosovo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia,
Cote D'Ivoire, Haiti, Sudan, and Timor-Leste. Political missions supported
by DPKO include missions in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Burundi.

Figure 1: UN Military and Police Deployed to Peacekeeping Missions

The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping,
with payments of more than $1 billion in 2006. In total, the United States
pays 25 percent or more of the annual peacekeeping budget. (Figure 2
provides information about U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping.) The UN
annually assesses the United States about 26 percent of the UN
peacekeeping budget (including higher percentages before 2006). However,
U.S. legislation capped payments in 1995 at 25 percent, resulting in
arrears. Congress has lifted the cap for some years.^4 According to the
Department of State, the amount of U.S. arrears for UN peacekeeping since
2005 is $117 million. This amount reflects arrears as of June 2007. In
addition, the United States, as a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, approved many UN peacekeeping missions and activities prior to
2005. According to the Department of State, U.S. arrears for these
peacekeeping efforts total $505 million, but State does not have legal
authority to pay for them.

^4The cap level changed in 2001 due to legislation and remained at around
27 percent from 2001 to 2005. The cap returned to 25 percent in 2006.

Figure 2: U.S. Payments for UN Peacekeeping

Since 1993, the UN has maintained a nearly constant peacekeeping presence
in Haiti to help stabilize the country, combat crime, and support
elections (see figure 3). Since 1994, the United States has led two
military interventions and one humanitarian mission to help stabilize the
country. The primary task of the current UN mission in Haiti is to provide
a secure and stable environment, assist the transitional government with
Haiti's political processes, protect human rights, and support the Haitian
National Police. Authorization for the mission is set to expire in October
2007, but the UN Security Council has renewed MINUSTAH's mandate since
2004. UN reports cite MINUSTAH's role in attempting to create a relatively
stable security environment in most of the country. However, the overall
situation is still volatile and sporadic armed violence continues.

Figure 3: U.S. and UN Operations in Haiti

Note: Operations Uphold Democracy and Secure Tomorrow were military
interventions to provide security in Haiti and restore government control.
Operation New Horizons was a humanitarian mission to develop
infrastructure and provide medical and dental services.

The UN has spent about $891 million from the inception of MINUSTAH in 2004
to June 2006. For the UN's current fiscal year for peacekeeping, ending
June 30, 2007, the UN budgeted about $491 million. (See table 1 for
details on budgeted and actual UN expenditures for MINUSTAH.) The current
budget of $491 provides for 7,500 military personnel, 1,000 police in
formed units, 897 civilian police, and 1,771 civilian officials and staff.

Table 1: Budgeted and Actual UN Expenditures for MINUSTAH (U.S. Dollars)

Fiscal year of MINUSTAH operations     Budgeted by UN Expended by UN 
05/01/04 to 06/30/04                      $49,259,800    $34,556,100 
07/01/04 to 06/30/05                     $379,046,800   $377,235,300 
Total for first 14 months of operation   $428,306,600   $411,791,400 
07/01/05 to 06/30/06                     $516,488,500   $479,636,600 
07/01/06 to 06/30/07                     $490,636,200            N/A 
Total cost for MINUSTAH                $1,435,431,300   $891,428,000 

Source: GAO analysis of UN budgetary data.

Estimated Costs for a U.S. Operation Are at Least Twice the Cost of a Similar UN
Mission

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it
would the UN to conduct an operation similar to the UN mission in Haiti.
Virtually the entire difference is attributable to the higher cost of
civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. The difference
also reflects the additional cost of ensuring high U.S. standards for
training, troop welfare, and personnel security. If the United States were
to deploy a higher percentage of reserves rather than active duty troops,
deploy more quickly, or operate at a higher intensity, U.S. costs would be
higher.

Estimated U.S. Costs Are Higher in Major Categories

From May 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005--the first 14 months of MINUSTAH--the
UN budgeted costs for the operation totaled $428 million.^5 This budget
assumed a phased deployment of 6,700 military personnel, 750 police in
formed units, 872 civilian police officers, and 1,184 civilian
administrators and staff. It also included the cost of operational
support, equipment, facilities, and transportation.^6 Financial
responsibilities of the U.S. for MINUSTAH for the first 14 months were
about $116 million.

Using the same basic parameters of troop and staff deployment in Haiti for
14 months, we estimate that a comparable U.S. operation would cost about
$876 million, slightly more than twice as much as the UN. Table 2 details
the differences between the UN and a hypothetical U.S. operation in major
cost categories.

^5For a detailed discussion of the methodology used to construct the U.S.
operation cost estimate and alternate scenario cost estimates, see
appendix I of Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical
U.S. Operations in Haiti, [13]GAO-06-331 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21,
2006).

^6The UN cost estimate does not include the general overhead costs
incurred to support all peacekeeping missions, such as the costs of
running the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN headquarters
in New York and the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy. We likewise did
not include DOD overhead costs in the U.S. operation estimate.

Table 2: UN and U.S. Costs for a Peacekeeping Operation in Haiti (U.S.
dollars in millions)

                          Budgeted UN Estimated U.S.    Difference between UN 
Major cost categories         cost           cost budget and U.S. estimate 
Transportation                 $94           $100                      -$6 
Facilities and related         100            208                     -108 
costs                                                                      
Medical/health costs             5             22                      -17 
Military personnel pay         131            260                     -129 
and support                                                                
Civilian personnel              63             46                       17 
(non-police)                                                               
Civilian police                 25            217                     -192 
Miscellaneous                   10             23                      -13 
Total cost                    $428           $876                    -$448 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State Department cost data.

As table 2 illustrates, the costs for civilian police, military pay and
support, and facilities account for most of the difference between the two
operations. These differences are explained below.

           o Civilian police. The UN budgeted $25 million to deploy 872
           civilian officers for MINUSTAH, while we estimate that it would
           cost the United States $217 million to deploy the same number of
           civilian U.S. police officers. The UN provides a daily allowance
           for police and does not reimburse countries contributing police
           for the officers' salaries. U.S. costs, however, include salaries,
           special pay, benefits, equipment, and special training.
           o Military pay and support. The UN budgeted $131 million for pay
           and support of military troops, while we estimate it would cost
           the United States $260 million for the same number of soldiers.
           The UN costs are based on a monthly payment of up to $1,400 per
           soldier to contributing nations for basic pay and allowances,
           clothing, equipment, and ammunition. U.S. costs include pay and
           allowances for troops, as well as clothing, arms, protective gear,
           and rations. U.S. costs provide a higher standard of living for
           U.S. soldiers and higher standards for equipment, nutrition,
           health, and morale.
           o Facilities. The UN budgeted $100 million for facilities-related
           costs, while we estimate that the cost to the United States would
           be $208 million. The UN budget includes acquisition and
           construction of troop and civilian housing and equipment and
           supplies. U.S. facilities must meet State Department security
           standards, which include posting civilian staff within secure U.S.
           embassy or consulate compounds. Also, U.S. agencies with staff in
           these compounds would be required to contribute to State's Capital
           Security Cost-Sharing Program.^7
			  
			  Alternative Military Assumptions Generated Higher U.S. Cost Estimates

           According to U.S. experts, changes in the underlying planning
           factors significantly affect the estimated cost of a U.S.
           operation. Based on consultations with the joint staff officials
           and other experts, we analyzed how the cost of a U.S. operation
           would vary if we (1) changed the mix of active duty to reserve
           soldiers from 85 percent active to an entirely reserve force, (2)
           assumed U.S. forces would fully deploy within 60 rather than 180
           days, and (3) increased the intensity of the operation. As figure
           4 shows, each of these changes increased the estimated costs for a
           U.S. operation.
			  
^7The Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program was developed to accelerate
the building of 150 new secure embassies and consulates around the world
and to ensure that all agencies with overseas staff assign only the number
of staff needed to accomplish their overseas missions. Each agency's
assigned cost is based on its total overseas personnel. See Pub. L. No.
108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 2920, Div. B., sec. 629 (2004). See also GAO,
Embassy Construction: Proposed Cost-Sharing Program Could Speed
Construction and Reduce Staff Levels, but Some Agencies Have Concerns,
[20]GAO-05-32 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2004).
		
           Figure 4: Impact of Three Cost Factors on Base Estimate for a
           Hypothetical U.S. Operation

           Specifically, the changes resulted in these increases in each
           category:

           o By deploying an all reserve force, the estimated U.S. cost would
           increase by $477 million. The increase is because DOD must begin
           to pay full active duty military salaries to reservists when they
           are activated for an operation. Officials from the Joint Chiefs of
           Staff confirmed that this is one of a number of possible scenarios
           of a U.S. operation.
           o By fully deploying U.S. troops in 60 days, U.S. costs would
           increase by about $60 million due to additional military pay and
           support for all troops deployed during the operation's initial
           months. Joint Staff noted this as a possible U.S. option for
           Haiti.
           o DOD measures the intensity of a military operation, or
           operational tempo, on a scale from 1 to 3. The higher the number,
           the more heavily the forces use equipment and the higher the
           operations and maintenance costs. By increasing the operational
           tempo from 1.5, which is typical for peacekeeping, to 2, U.S.
           military costs would increase by $23 million due to increased
           expenses such as fuel.
			  
			  U.S. and UN-Led Operations Each Have Strengths and Limitations

           Cost is not the only factor in deciding whether the United States
           or the UN should lead a peace operation. The United States and the
           UN each have strengths and limitations that could affect the
           success of an operation. The traditional strengths of a U.S.-led
           operation stem from the well-established U.S. military
           infrastructure, which provides rapid deployment capabilities,
           unified command and control, and well trained and equipped
           personnel. However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to
           shortages in key personnel and strained troop and equipment
           readiness. Also, in some locations a U.S.-led force may not be
           perceived as being impartial. Among the strengths of a UN
           operation are its multinational participation and extensive
           experience in peace operations, but the UN has limitations in
           deploying a force, ensuring it is adequately equipped, and
           providing strong command and control.
			  
			  U.S. Military Has Elements Critical for Peacekeeping, but Faces
			  Shortages of Personnel and Equipment

           Traditionally, U.S. operations have benefited from the advantages
           of a strong and well-established military that has provided quick
           deployment, a unified command and control structure, and direct
           access to well-trained military personnel and equipment. For
           example, two U.S.-led peacekeeping efforts in Haiti were
           recognized as accomplishing their objectives rapidly and with
           minimal loss of life. In the 1994 mission in Haiti, the United
           States provided leadership to multinational forces and ensured
           adequate troops and resources were available to carry out the
           operation.

           The following strengths of the U.S. military have led to
           successful U.S. peacekeeping efforts.

           o Rapid deployment. According to a 2000 UN report, the first 6 to
           12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most
           critical for establishing a stable peace and a credible new
           operation; opportunities lost during this period are hard to
           regain. UN and U.S. officials have stated that a key strength of
           the U.S. military has been its ability to rapidly deploy in part
           because it has traditionally emphasized readiness of the forces as
           a major objective. DOD systematically measures the readiness of
           its forces and produces the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review to
           monitor its readiness posture. This has helped the United States
           rapidly deploy in past operations. For example, in 1994, the
           United States deployed an operation in Haiti within 60 days of the
           issuance of a UN Security Council Resolution. The 20,000-member
           force quickly established itself in 500 locations throughout Haiti
           and achieved its primary goals within 76 days.
           o Unified command and control. According to the UN, clear and
           cohesive command and control, including communications and
           intelligence are critical for effective operations. According to
           Joint Staff officials, operations in Haiti were effective because
           the United States used its cohesive command and control structure,
           a reliable communication system, and good field intelligence. With
           regard to intelligence, the United States can draw upon the
           extensive resources of the U.S. intelligence community, consisting
           of an array of agencies, departments, and offices throughout the
           U.S. government. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
           with more than 7,500 military and civilian employees worldwide,
           produces and manages foreign military intelligence for
           warfighters, defense policymakers, and force planners in support
           of U.S. military planning and operations. The Central Intelligence
           Agency and the U.S. Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, among
           other organizations, also provide intelligence support to U.S.
           military operations.
           o Tradition of well trained and equipped personnel. A key element
           of DOD's mission is to train and equip its personnel to a high
           standard and DOD spends considerable amounts to do so. As of 2006,
           DOD was spending more than $17 billion annually for military
           schools that offer nearly 30,000 military training courses to
           almost 3 million military personnel and DOD civilians. With regard
           to equipment, DOD spends billions every year to purchase and
           maintain equipment. Since fiscal year 2002, Congress has
           appropriated about $38 billion to the Army for the reset (repair,
           replacement, and modernization) of equipment that has been damaged
           or lost as a result of combat operations. In addition, DOD uses
           soldiers and contractors to repair vehicles and other equipment
           where the equipment is located.

           However, ongoing operations in Iraq have challenged U.S.
           capabilities in key areas. Specifically, current shortages of the
           critical personnel skills and equipment needed for operations are
           a limitation that could affect U.S. ability to lead a peacekeeping
           force. A second limitation of a U.S.-led force is perceived lack
           of impartiality in some locations.

           o Current shortages of critical skills and equipment. Our work has
           shown that ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
           challenged DOD's capabilities and created a continuing high demand
           for certain combat specialties, including military police,
           engineers, and civil affairs experts.^8 Many of these skills
           reside heavily in the reserve military component due to current
           force structuring practices. DOD policy restricts the duration of
           deployment and activation of reserve forces. As operations in Iraq
           and Afghanistan continue and the number of deployed reservists
           increases, it is likely to become increasingly difficult for DOD
           to identify reserve personnel in high-demand areas who are
           eligible to deploy. We reported that the Army National Guard and
           Army Reserve, for example, are already stretched to a point where
           their readiness for additional deployments, or homeland security
           crises, has been degraded.^9 In a January 2007 report, we stated
           that current operations are also taking a heavy toll on the
           condition and readiness of the military's equipment due to strain
           created by the high operational tempo and harsh environmental
           conditions of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.^10 
           o Perceived lack of impartiality. In some locations, a U.S.-led
           force may not be perceived by the local people and neighboring
           countries as an impartial and fair force. These two qualities,
           according to the UN and U.S. officials, are key to gaining the
           confidence and trust of the people. State and DOD officials stated
           that Lebanon is a good example. These officials considered several
           options for assisting Lebanon, following the 2006 hostilities with
           Israel, including a U.S.-led peace operation, a NATO-led one, or a
           modified UN operation. U.S. officials concluded that either a U.S.
           or a NATO-led operation would be perceived by some factions in
           Lebanon and by neighboring countries as a threat and a potentially
           hostile force. Thus, the UN operation was considered the most
           politically feasible option and the UN Security Council, with U.S.
           support, expanded the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon.
			  
^8GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight, [21]GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9,
2007).

^9GAO, Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force
Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for
High-Demand Support Forces, [22]GAO-06-962 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5,
2006).

^10GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Army's
Implementation of Its Equipment Reset Strategies, [23]GAO-07-439T
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007).

           UN Has Multinational Participation and Extensive Experience, but
			  Has Limitations in Rapidly and Effectively Deploying Its Initial Force

           The UN's strengths in peacekeeping are rooted in the multinational
           character of its operation as well as extensive experience with
           peacekeeping and related nation building. The UN has developed a
           structure for coordinating international organizations involved in
           nation building and has access to a pool of experienced and
           skilled international civil servants, including personnel with
           diverse language capabilities.

           o Multinational participation. As of May 2007, 115 countries had
           military troops or police serving in UN operations. According to
           State and DOD officials, this multinational character and the UN
           Security Council mandate provide international legitimacy and
           direction for its operation. MINUSTAH also demonstrates the
           multinational character of UN operations. During the first year,
           MINUSTAH was comprised of 7,624 military staff and police
           personnel from 41 countries, with the United States contributing
           29 military and police personnel.
           o Experienced peacekeeping officials. The UN has developed a cadre
           of senior officials who have gained experience with peacekeeping
           and nation-building activities over many missions. The
           international nature of the UN also provides access to a large
           pool of civil servants and security personnel with native language
           speaking abilities and translation skills. As of May 2007, almost
           5,700 international civil servants were deployed to UN
           peacekeeping missions with 12,400 local civilian staff and some
           2,000 UN volunteers supporting these operations.
           o Structure for coordinating international assistance. The UN has
           fostered a network of humanitarian agencies and development banks
           that UN peacekeeping missions can draw on to coordinate the
           extensive humanitarian and developmental activities related to
           operations with broad, integrated mandates that include nation
           building. In Haiti, for example, MINUSTAH has established a
           framework for coordination that is integral to the mission's
           organization. With UN sponsorship, official donors in this
           network, including the World Bank and the Inter-American
           Development Bank, have pledged over one billion dollars in
           development assistance.

           The UN has several limitations in leading peace operations. Three
           of these are the lack of capacity to deploy quickly, limits on its
           command and control of forces, and considerable variance in the
           training and equipment standards of its multinational force.

           o Limited ability to deploy rapidly. The UN has traditionally had
           difficulties in rapidly deploying the military and civilian
           positions needed for peacekeeping missions. According to the UN,
           the first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire are critical for
           establishing a stable peace presence. However, the UN does not
           have a standing army, a police force, or the needed equipment to
           deploy a force quickly. For example, during the first 12 weeks of
           MINUSTAH, only 30 percent of the authorized military troops and
           police in formed units were deployed by the UN to Haiti.
           o Limits on command and control. The UN also has limitations on
           the command and control of its peacekeeping forces. According to
           DOD officials, the participation of multiple nations diffuses the
           unity of command, as each troop contingent is under the command of
           its national authority. The UN force commander is not assured that
           an individual or contingents will follow his orders. Command and
           control is also an issue for disciplinary actions against UN
           peacekeeping troops involved in criminal, sexual, or other
           misconduct. The UN sets standards of behavior, including
           prohibiting peacekeeping troops from criminal activities and
           sexual exploitation. The involvement of peacekeeping personnel in
           these activities has been documented in several operations' and
           the UN had nearly 1,200 cases of alleged misconduct or crimes by
           peacekeepers in 2003 and 2004. However, troop-contributing
           countries are responsible for disciplinary actions against their
           own troops. According to the UN, there is widespread perception
           among international observers that peacekeeping personnel rarely
           if ever face disciplinary charges. The UN is taking several steps
           to address this problem, such as developing specific standards of
           behavior for all UN troops and a model memorandum of understanding
           on conduct for all troop contributing countries. However,
           individual countries are still responsible for discipline of their
           own troops.
           o Varying equipment and training levels. The equipment and
           training of military and police personnel provided to UN
           operations by contributing countries often varies. Developing
           nations are currently the largest contributors of personnel to UN
           peacekeeping operations. The UN states that, while many developing
           countries provide well-equipped troops with high professional
           standards, there are also situations in which the countries
           contributing troops cannot meet the equipment standards agreed to
           with the UN. The UN reports that some troops provided by
           contributing countries have arrived without rifles, helmets, or
           other necessary equipment. DOD officials stated that during
           previous operations in Haiti, the United States provided some
           equipment, provisions, and military supplies to UN troops that
           were deployed with insufficient equipment. Training levels vary
           widely by country with some troops having little previous training
           in peacekeeping operations. The United States, through the Global
           Peace Operations Initiative, is helping train troops from member
           UN nations that contribute to UN peacekeeping.
			  
			  Conclusion

           The costs, strengths, and limitations of the United States and the
           UN are important factors in considering who should lead a
           peacekeeping operation. A U.S. peacekeeping operation, as
           illustrated by the specific example in Haiti, is likely to be much
           more expensive than a UN operation. This one example cannot be
           generalized across all operations. However, many of the cost
           elements, such as police and military costs, are likely to be more
           expensive for a U.S.-led operation, regardless of location. The
           higher cost for a U.S. operation pays for a force that has
           traditionally deployed rapidly, operated effectively, and
           maintained high standards for equipment and training. However,
           combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past six years
           have strained U.S. troops, equipment, and readiness, limiting U.S.
           ability to lead a peacekeeping intervention. In some situations, a
           U.S.-led force would not be perceived as an impartial and fair
           force, further limiting its ability to conduct operations. The UN
           has certain strengths in leading a peacekeeping operation,
           including multinational participation and international
           legitimacy, access to international civil servants needed for
           peacebuilding activities, and a structure for coordinating
           international assistance. However, the UN has traditionally had
           difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring unified
           command and control over its peacekeeping forces.

           Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to
           answer any questions you or the members of the subcommittee may
           have.
			  
			  GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments

           For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Joseph A.
           Christoff at (202) 512-8979. Other key contributors to this
           statement were Tetsuo Miyabara, James Michels, Suzanne Perkins,
           Lynn Cothern, Mark Speight, Grace Lui, Charlie Perdue, and Kendall
           Schaefer.
			  
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[24]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-998T .

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For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [25]GAO-07-998T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
International Organizations, Human Rigths, and Oversight, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives

June 2007

PEACEKEEPING

Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN
Operations

As of June 2007, more than 100,000 military and civilian personnel are
engaged in UN peacekeeping operations in 15 locations in Africa, Europe,
Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East. In 2006, the United States
provided the UN with about $1 billion to support peacekeeping operations.
Given that thousands of U.S. troops are intensively deployed in combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping operations are an
important element in maintaining a secure international environment.

As requested, this testimony discusses (1) the costs of the current UN
mission in Haiti compared with the estimated cost of a hypothetical U.S.
operation and (2) the strengths and limitations of the United States and
the UN in leading peace operations.

This testimony is based on our prior report and information we updated for
this hearing. To estimate U.S. costs, we developed parameters for a U.S.
mission similar to the UN mission in Haiti, which the Joint Staff
validated as reasonable. We then applied DOD's official cost estimating
model. However, it is uncertain whether the United States would implement
an operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN.

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it
would the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN mission
in Haiti. The UN budgeted $428 million for the first 14 months of the
mission. A similar U.S. operation would have cost an estimated $876
million. Virtually the entire cost difference can be attributed to cost of
civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. First, civilian
police costs are less in a UN operation because the UN pays police a
standard daily allowance, while U.S. police are given salaries, special
pay, and training. Second, U.S. military pay and support reflect higher
salaries and higher standards for equipment, ammunition, and rations.
Third, U.S. facilities-related costs would be twice those of the UN and
reflect the cost of posting U.S. civilian personnel in a secure embassy
compound. When we varied specific factors, such as increasing the number
of reserve troops deployed, the estimated cost for a U.S. operation
increased.

Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or
the UN should lead a peacekeeping operation. Each offers strengths and
limitations. Traditionally, the United States' strengths have included
rapid deployment, strong command and control, and well-trained and
equipped personnel. However, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
have reduced personnel and equipment readiness levels and resulted in
shortfalls for military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts. The
UN provides broad multinational support for its missions, with a UN
Security Council mandate and direction for its operations. The UN also has
access to international civil servants, police, and senior officials who
have nation-building experience and diverse language skills. Finally, the
UN has fostered a network of agencies and development banks to coordinate
international assistance with peacekeeping missions. However, the UN has
traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and
ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces.

Cost Estimate for a U.S. Operation and UN MINUSTAH Budget

References

Visible links
  12. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-331
  13. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-331
  14. http://www.gao.gov/
  15. http://www.gao.gov/
  16. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  17. mailto:[email protected]
  18. mailto:[email protected]
  19. mailto:[email protected]
  20. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-32EUR
  21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP
  22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-962
  23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-439T
  24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-998T
  25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-998T
*** End of document. ***