Department of Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges in Creating
an Effective Acquisition Organization (07-JUN-07, GAO-07-948T).
In fiscal year 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
obligated $15.6 billion to support its broad and complex
acquisition portfolio. Since it was tasked with integrating 22
separate federal agencies and organizations into one
cabinet-level department, DHS has been working to create an
integrated acquisition organization while addressing its ongoing
mission requirements and responding to natural disasters and
other emergencies. Due to the enormity of this challenge, GAO
designated the establishment of the department and its
transformation as high-risk in January 2003. This testimony
discusses DHS's (1) challenges to creating an integrated
acquisition function; (2) investment review process; and (3)
reliance on contracting for critical needs. This testimony is
based primarily on prior GAO reports and testimonies.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-948T
ACCNO: A70429
TITLE: Department of Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges in
Creating an Effective Acquisition Organization
DATE: 06/07/2007
SUBJECT: Accountability
Contract administration
Contract oversight
Contractors
Federal agency reorganization
Federal procurement
Homeland security
Investment planning
Monitoring
Procurement planning
Procurement policy
Procurement practices
Program evaluation
Service contracts
Executive agency oversight
Investment management
GAO High Risk Series
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GAO-07-948T
* [1]Summary
* [2]DHS Faces Challenges in Establishing an Integrated Acquisiti
* [3]Acquisition Function Is Not Integrated
* [4]Efforts to Address Acquisition Workforce Staffing
* [5]CPO Has Established an Acquisition Oversight Program
* [6]DHS Investment Review Process Needs Improvement
* [7]DHS Reliance on Contracting For Critical Services Requires E
* [8]Interagency Contracting Needs to be Carefully Managed
* [9]Use of System Integrator Poses Management Challenges
* [10]Enhanced Oversight Required for Service Contracts
* [11]Conclusion
* [12]Contacts and Acknowledgments
* [13]GAO's Mission
* [14]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [15]Order by Mail or Phone
* [16]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [17]Congressional Relations
* [18]Public Affairs
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT
Thursday, June 7, 2007
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ongoing Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition Organization
Statement of John P. Hutton, Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
GAO-07-948T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) acquisition organization. As you know, DHS is the result
of one of the biggest mergers in the U.S. government and, as such,
involves a variety of transformational efforts, one of which is to design
and implement the necessary management structure and processes for
acquiring goods and services. DHS `s acquisition needs range from
increasingly sophisticated screening equipment for air passenger security
to upgrading the Coast Guard's offshore fleet of surface and air assets.
In fiscal year 2006, the department reported that it obligated $15.6
billion for goods and services to support its broad and complex
acquisition portfolio. DHS has been working to develop an integrated
acquisition organization while addressing its ongoing mission requirements
and responding to emergencies, including Gulf Coast recovery from
Hurricane Katrina, which caused more damage than any other natural
disaster in the history of the United States. Due to the enormity of
challenges facing the department--and concern that failure to effectively
address DHS's management and program challenges would seriously compromise
our homeland security--we designated the establishment of the department
and its transformation as high-risk.1
My testimony today focuses on accountability and management of DHS
acquisitions. Specifically, the department's (1) challenges in creating an
integrated acquisition function; (2) need for improvements in its
investment review process; and (3) reliance on contracting for critical
services. This statement is based primarily on GAO reports and testimonies
performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Summary
DHS has recognized the need to improve acquisition outcomes and taken some
positive steps, but continues to lack clear accountability for the
outcomes of acquisition dollars spent. A common theme in our work on
acquisition management is DHS's struggle to provide adequate support for
its mission components and resources for departmentwide oversight. DHS has
not yet accomplished its goal of integrating the acquisition function
across the department. The structure of DHS's acquisition function creates
ambiguity about who is accountable for acquisition decisions because it
depends on a system of dual accountability and cooperation and
collaboration between the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) and the
component heads. In addition, our work and the work of the DHS Inspector
General has found acquisition workforce challenges across the department.
The CPO has established a departmentwide program to improve oversight.
However, we continue to be concerned that the CPO may not have sufficient
authority to effectively oversee the department's acquisitions.
1GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [19]GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2003).
In 2003, in an effort to address the need for successful outcomes in its
major programs--in terms of cost, schedule, and performance--DHS put in
place an investment review process. While this process adopts many
acquisition best practices, it does not include critical reviews and has
been under revision since 2005. Concerns have been raised about how the
investment review process has been used to oversee the department's
largest acquisitions. DHS's performance and accountability report states
that changes to the process will be made by the first quarter of fiscal
year 2008.
To obtain necessary expertise to carry out its mission, DHS has had to
contract extensively for a broad range of services and major acquisitions.
The growing complexity of contracting for technically difficult and
sophisticated services increases challenges in terms of setting
appropriate requirements and effectively overseeing contractor
performance. However, DHS has been challenged to provide the appropriate
level of oversight and management attention to its contracting for
services and major systems.
DHS Faces Challenges in Establishing an Integrated Acquisition Function
The structure of DHS's acquisition function creates ambiguity about who is
accountable for acquisition decisions. A common theme in our work on DHS's
acquisition management has been the department's struggle from the outset
to provide adequate support for its mission components and resources for
departmentwide oversight.2 Of the 22 components that initially joined DHS
from other agencies, 7 came with their own procurement support. In January
2004, a year after the department was created, an eighth office, the
Office of Procurement Operations, was created to provide support to a
variety of DHS entities. To improve oversight, in December 2005, CPO
established a departmentwide acquisition oversight program, designed to
provide comprehensive insight into each component's acquisitions and
disseminate successful acquisition management approaches throughout DHS.
Acquisition Function Is Not Integrated
DHS has set a goal of integrating the acquisition function more broadly
across the department. Prior GAO work has shown that to implement
acquisition effectively across a large federal organization requires an
integrated structure with standardized policies and processes, the
appropriate placement of the acquisition function within the department,
leadership that fosters good acquisition practices, and a general
framework that delineates the key phases along the path for a major
acquisition. An effective acquisition organization has in place
knowledgeable personnel who work together to meet cost, quality, and
timeliness goals while adhering to guidelines and standards for federal
acquisition. DHS, however, relies on dual accountability and collaboration
between the CPO and the heads of DHS's components.
The October 2004 management directive for its acquisition line of
business--the department's principal guidance for leading, governing,
integrating, and managing the acquisition function--allows managers from
each component organization to commit resources to training, development,
and certification of acquisition professionals.3 It also highlights the
CPO's broad authority, including management, administration, and oversight
of departmentwide acquisition. However, we have reported that the
directive may not achieve its goal of creating an integrated acquisition
organization because it creates unclear working relationships between the
CPO and the heads of DHS components. For example, some of the duties
delegated to the CPO have also been given to the heads of DHS's
components, such as recruiting and selecting key acquisition officials at
the components, and providing appropriate resources to support the CPO's
initiatives. Accountability for acquisitions is further complicated
because, according to DHS, the Coast Guard and Secret Service were
exempted from its acquisition management directive because of DHS's
interpretation of the Homeland Security Act. We have questioned this
exemption, and recently CPO officials have told us that they are working
to revise the directive to make it clear that the Coast Guard and Secret
Service are not exempt. Furthermore, for major investments--those
exceeding $50 million--accountability, visibility, and oversight is shared
among the CPO, the Chief Financial Officer, the Chief Information Officer,
and other senior management.4 Recently, the DHS Inspector General's 2007
semiannual report stated an integrated acquisition system still does not
exist, but noted that that the atmosphere for collaboration between DHS
and its component agencies on acquisition matters has improved.
2GAO, Contract Management: INS Contracting Weaknesses Need Attention from
the Department of Homeland Security, [20]GAO-03-799 (Washington, D.C.:
July 25, 2003); Transportation Security Administration: High-Level
Attention Needed to Strengthen Acquisition Function, [21]GAO-04-544
(Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004); and Homeland Security: Successes and
Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Create an Effective Acquisition
Organization, [22]GAO-05-179 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2005).
3DHS Management Directive 0003, Acquisition Line of Business Integration
and Management, October 2004.
Efforts to Address Acquisition Workforce Staffing
In addition, our work and the work of the DHS Inspector General has found
acquisition workforce challenges across the department. In 2005, we
reported on disparities in the staffing levels and workload among the
component procurement offices. We recommended that DHS conduct a
departmentwide assessment of the number of contracting staff, and if a
workload imbalance were to be found, take steps to correct it by
realigning resources. In 2006, DHS reported significant progress in
providing staff for the component contracting offices, though much work
remained to fill the positions with qualified, trained acquisition
professionals. DHS has established a goal of aligning procurement staffing
levels with contract spending at its various components by the last
quarter of fiscal year 2009.
Staffing of the CPO Office also has been a concern, but recent progress
has been made. According to CPO officials, their small staff faces the
competing demands of providing acquisition support for urgent needs at the
component level and conducting oversight. For example, CPO staff assisted
the Federal Emergency Management Agency in contracting for the response to
Gulf Coast hurricanes Katrina and Rita. As a result, they needed to focus
their efforts on procurement execution rather than oversight. In 2005, we
recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security provide the CPO with
sufficient resources to effectively oversee the department's
acquisitions.5 In 2006, we reported that the Secretary had supported an
increase of 25 positions for the CPO to improve acquisition management and
oversight. DHS stated that these additional personnel will significantly
contribute to continuing improvement in the DHS acquisition and
contracting enterprise. To follow-up on some of these efforts, we plan to
conduct additional work on DHS acquisition workforce issues in the near
future.
4DHS Management Directive 1400, Investment Review Process, May 2003.
CPO Has Established an Acquisition Oversight Program
Our prior work has shown that in a highly functioning acquisition
organization, the CPO is in a position to oversee compliance by
implementing strong oversight mechanisms. Accordingly, in December 2005,
the CPO established a departmentwide acquisition oversight program,
designed to provide comprehensive insight into each component's
acquisition programs and disseminate successful acquisition management
approaches throughout DHS.6 The program is based in part on elements
essential to an effective, efficient, and accountable acquisition process:
organizational alignment and leadership, policies and processes, financial
accountability, acquisition workforce, and knowledge management and
information systems. The program includes four recurring reviews, as shown
in table 1.
5 [23]GAO-05-179
6DHS Management Directive 0784, Acquisition Oversight Program, December
2005.
Table 1: DHS Acquisition Oversight Program
Review Purpose
Self assessment The head of contracting for each component
assesses the component's staff, processes, and
programs.
Acquisition planning Each component's contracting activity annually
reviews reviews its programs and assesses acquisition
planning.
Operational status reviews The CPO and the head of contracting for each
component assess, on a quarterly basis, the
status of the acquisition function.
On-site reviews These reviews, conducted triennially, assess
each component's contracting activity,
strategic capability to support DHS' mission,
and compliance with acquisition regulations,
policies, and guiding principles.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
In September 2006, we reported that the CPO's limited staff resources had
delayed the oversight program's implementation, but the program is well
under way, and DHS plans to implement the full program in fiscal year
2007. Recently, the CPO has made progress in increasing staff to
authorized levels, and as part of the department's fiscal year 2008
appropriation request, the CPO is seeking three additional staff, for a
total of 13 oversight positions for this program. We plan to report on the
program later this month.
While this program is a positive step, we have reported that the CPO lacks
the authority needed to ensure the department's components comply with its
procurement policies and procedures such as the acquisition oversight
program. We reported in September 2006 that the CPO's ability to
effectively oversee the department's acquisitions and manage risks is
limited, and we continue to believe that the CPO's lack of authority to
achieve the department's acquisition goals is of concern.
DHS Investment Review Process Needs Improvement
In 2003, DHS put in place an investment review process to help protect its
major, complex investments. The investment review process is intended to
reduce risk associated with these investments and increase the chances for
successful outcomes in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. In March
2005, we reported that in establishing this process, DHS has adopted a
number of acquisition best practices that, if applied consistently, could
help increase the chance for successful outcomes. However, we noted that
incorporating additional program reviews and knowledge deliverables into
the process could better position DHS to make well-informed decisions on
its major, complex investments. Specifically, we noted that the process
did not include two critical management reviews that would help ensure
that (1) resources match customer needs prior to beginning a major
acquisition and (2) program designs perform as expected before moving to
production. We also noted that the review process did not fully address
how program managers are to conduct effective contractor tracking and
oversight.7 The investment review process is still under revision, and the
department's performance and accountability report for fiscal year 2006
stated that DHS will incorporate changes to the process by the first
quarter of fiscal year 2008.
Our best practices work shows that successful investments reduce risk by
ensuring that high levels of knowledge are achieved at these key points of
development. We have found that investments that were not reviewed at the
appropriate points faced problems--such as redesign--that resulted in cost
increases and schedule delays. Concerns have been raised about the
effectiveness of the review process for large investments at DHS. For
example, in November 2006, the DHS Inspector General reported on the
Customs and Border Protection's Secure Border Initiative program, noting
that the department's existing investment oversight processes were
sidelined in the urgent pursuit of SBInet's aggressive schedule.8 The
department's investment review board and joint requirements council
provide for deliberative processes to obtain the counsel of functional
stakeholders. However, the DHS Inspector General reported that for SBInet,
these prescribed processes were bypassed and key decisions about the scope
of the program and the acquisition strategy were made without rigorous
review and analysis or transparency. The department has since announced
plans to complete these reviews to ensure the program is on the right
track.9
7 [24]GAO-05-179 .
8In November 2005, DHS established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a
multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and
reducing illegal immigration. One element of SBI is SBInet, the program
responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system.
9Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, Risk
Management Advisory for the SBInet Program Initiation, OIG-07-07
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2006).
DHS Reliance on Contracting For Critical Services Requires Enhanced Management
Attention
To quickly get the department up and running and to obtain necessary
expertise, DHS has relied extensively on other agencies' and its own
contracts for a broad range of mission-related services and complex
acquisitions. Governmentwide, increasing reliance on contractors has been
a longstanding concern. Recently, in 2006, government, industry and
academic participants in a GAO forum on federal acquisition challenges and
opportunities noted that many agencies rely extensively on contractors to
carry out their basic missions. The growing complexity of contracting for
technically difficult and sophisticated services increases challenges in
terms of setting appropriate requirements and effectively monitoring
contractor performance.10 With the increased reliance on contractors comes
the need for an appropriate level of oversight and management attention to
its contracting for services and major systems.
Interagency Contracting Needs to be Carefully Managed
Our work to date has found that DHS faces challenges in managing services
acquisitions through interagency contracting--a process by which agencies
can use another agency's contracting services or existing contracts often
for a fee.11 In 2005, DHS spent over $6.5 billion on interagency
contracts. We found that DHS did not systematically monitor or assess its
use of interagency contracts to determine whether this method provides
good outcomes for the department.
Although interagency contracts can provide the advantages of timeliness
and efficiency, use of these types of vehicles can also pose risks if they
are not properly managed. GAO designated management of interagency
contracting a governmentwide high risk area in 2005. A number of factors
can make these types of contracts high risk, including their use by some
agencies that have limited expertise with this contracting method and
their contribution to a much more complex procurement environment in which
accountability has not always been clearly established. In an interagency
contracting arrangement, both the agency that holds and the agency that
makes purchases against the contract share responsibility for properly
managing the use of the contract. However, these shared responsibilities
often have not been well defined. As a result, our work and that of some
agency inspectors general has found cases in which interagency contracting
has not been well managed to ensure that the government is getting good
value.
10GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Federal Acquisition Challenges and
Opportunities in the 21st Century, [25]GAO-07-45SP (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
6, 2006).
11GAO, Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and Oversight
Would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to Address Risks,
[26]GAO-06-996 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2006).
Use of System Integrator Poses Management Challenges
Government agencies, including DHS components, have turned to a systems
integrator in situations such as when they believe they do not have the
in-house capability to design, develop, and manage complex acquisitions.
This arrangement creates an inherent risk, as the contractor is given more
discretion to make certain program decisions. Along with this greater
discretion comes the need for more government oversight and an even
greater need to develop well-defined outcomes at the outset. Our reviews
of the Coast Guard's Deepwater program have found that the Coast Guard had
not effectively managed the program or overseen the system integrator.12
Specifically, we expressed concerns and made a number of recommendations
to improve the program in three areas: program management, contractor
accountability, and cost control through competition.13 While the Coast
Guard took some actions in response to some of our concerns, they have
recently announced a series of additional steps to address problems with
the Deepwater program, including taking on more program management
responsibilities from the systems integrator.
Enhanced Oversight Required for Service Contracts
We also have ongoing work reviewing other aspects of DHS acquisition
management. For example, we are reviewing DHS's contracts that closely
support inherently governmental functions and the level of oversight given
to these contracts. Federal procurement regulation and policy contain
special requirements for overseeing service contracts that have the
potential for influencing the authority, accountability, and
responsibilities of government officials.14 Agencies are required to
provide greater scrutiny of these service contracts and an enhanced degree
of management oversight, which includes assigning a sufficient number of
qualified government employees to provide oversight, to better ensure that
contractors do not perform inherently governmental functions. The risks
associated with contracting for services that closely support the
performance of inherently governmental functions are longstanding
governmentwide concerns. We are also reviewing oversight issues related to
DHS's use of performance-based services acquisitions. If this acquisition
method is not appropriately planned and structured, there is an increased
risk that the government may receive products or services that are over
cost estimates, delivered late, and of unacceptable quality.
12Deepwater is a 25-year, $24 billion effort to upgrade or replace
existing Coast Guard aircraft and vessels in order to carry out its
missions along our coastlines and farther out at sea.
13GAO, Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program
Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring Is Warranted,
[27]GAO-06-546 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2006; Contract Management:
Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs Increased Attention to Management
and Contractor Oversight, [28]GAO-04-380 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004);
and Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on Deepwater Program Assets and
Management Challenges, [29]GAO-07-446T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2007).
Conclusion
Since DHS was established in 2003, it has been challenged to integrate 22
separate federal agencies and organizations with multiple missions,
values, and cultures into one cabinet-level department. Due to the
complexity of its organization, DHS is likely to continue to face
challenges in integrating the acquisition functions of its components and
overseeing their acquisitions--particularly those involving large and
complex investments. Given the size of DHS and the scope of its
acquisitions, we are continuing to assess the department's acquisition
oversight process and procedures in ongoing work.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond to
any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this
time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact John
Hutton at (202) 512-4841 or [30][email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this product. Other individuals making key contributions to
this testimony were Amelia Shachoy, Assistant Director; Tatiana Winger;
William Russell; Heddi Nieuwsma; Karen Sloan; and Sylvia Schatz.
14Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 37.114. OMB Policy Letter
93-1: Management Oversight of Service Contracting, Office of Federal
Procurement Policy, May 18, 1994.
(120671)
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[37]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-948T .
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Highlights of [38]GAO-07-948T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate
June 7, 2007
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ongoing Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition Organization
In fiscal year 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) obligated
$15.6 billion to support its broad and complex acquisition portfolio.
Since it was tasked with integrating 22 separate federal agencies and
organizations into one cabinet-level department, DHS has been working to
create an integrated acquisition organization while addressing its ongoing
mission requirements and responding to natural disasters and other
emergencies. Due to the enormity of this challenge, GAO designated the
establishment of the department and its transformation as high-risk in
January 2003.
This testimony discusses DHS's (1) challenges to creating an integrated
acquisition function; (2) investment review process; and (3) reliance on
contracting for critical needs. This testimony is based primarily on prior
GAO reports and testimonies.
[39]What GAO Recommends
While GAO is not making recommendations in this testimony, GAO has made
numerous recommendations over the past few years to help improve DHS's
acquisition function. The department has generally concurred with these
recommendations and is taking, or plans to take, action to improve its
acquisitions.
The structure of DHS's acquisition function creates ambiguity about who is
accountable for acquisition decisions because it depends on a system of
dual accountability and collaboration between the Chief Procurement
Officer (CPO) and the component heads. Further, a common theme in GAO's
work on acquisition management has been DHS's struggle to provide adequate
support for its mission components and resources for departmentwide
oversight. In 2006, DHS reported significant progress in staffing for the
components and the CPO, though much work remained to fill the positions.
In addition, DHS has established an acquisition oversight program,
designed to provide the CPO comprehensive insight into each component's
acquisition programs and disseminate successful acquisition management
approaches departmentwide. However, GAO continues to be concerned that the
CPO may not have sufficient authority to effectively oversee the
department's acquisitions.
In 2003, DHS put in place an investment review process to help protect its
major complex investments. In 2005, GAO reported that this process adopted
many acquisition best practices that, if applied consistently, could help
increase the chances for successful outcomes. However, GAO noted that
incorporating additional program reviews and knowledge deliverables into
the process could better position DHS to make well-informed decisions.
Concerns have been raised about how the investment review process has been
used to oversee its largest acquisitions, and DHS plans to revise the
process.
DHS has contracted extensively for a broad range of services and complex
acquisitions. The growing complexity of contracting for technically
difficult and sophisticated services increases challenges in terms of
setting appropriate requirements and effectively monitoring contractor
performance. However, DHS has been challenged to provide the appropriate
level of oversight and management attention to its contracting for
services and major systems.
Department of Homeland Security Missions, Assets
Border Security Patrol National Security Cutter Baggage Screening
Source: DHS.
References
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21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-544
22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-179
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26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-996
27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-546
28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-380
29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-446T
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