NASA Supplier Base: Challenges Exist in Transitioning from the
Space Shuttle Program to the Next Generation of Human Space
Flight Systems (25-JUL-07, GAO-07-940).
The Space Shuttle Program is currently supported by over 1,500
active suppliers, some of whom are the only known or certified
source of a particular material, part or service. The retirement
of the Shuttle and transition to planned exploration activities,
as called for in the President's Vision for Space Exploration,
creates the need for NASA to begin making decisions today about
its supplier base needs for the future. GAO was asked to (1)
describe NASA's plans and processes for managing its supplier
base through the Shuttle's retirement and the transition to the
Constellation's exploration activities; (2) address factors that
could impact the effectiveness of those plans and processes; and
(3) identify any other issues that NASA will likely encounter as
the agency transitions to and implements the Constellation
Program.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-940
ACCNO: A73269
TITLE: NASA Supplier Base: Challenges Exist in Transitioning
from the Space Shuttle Program to the Next Generation of Human
Space Flight Systems
DATE: 07/25/2007
SUBJECT: Budgeting
Decision making
Procurement planning
Program management
Space exploration
Strategic planning
Technology
Program implementation
Cost estimates
NASA Constellation Program
NASA Space Shuttle Program
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GAO-07-940
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]NASA's New Plans and Processes Establish a Foundation for Ma
* [4]New Plans Reflect NASA's Overall Strategy to Manage Transiti
* [5]NASA Has Developed New Decision-Making Process to Manage Sup
* [6]Effectiveness of NASA's Transition Plans and Processes Not K
* [7]Constellation Lacks Detailed Supplier Base Needs Requirement
* [8]Increasing Number of Supplier and Capability Decisions to Be
* [9]Obsolescence, Workforce Issues, and Transition Cost Estimate
* [10]Obsolescence
* [11]Supplier Viability
* [12]Potential Loss of NASA Expertise
* [13]Environmental Disposal and Cleanup
* [14]Transition Cost Estimates
* [15]Conclusions
* [16]Recommendation
* [17]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [18]GAO Contact
* [19]Acknowledgments
* [20]GAO's Mission
* [21]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [22]Order by Mail or Phone
* [23]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [24]Congressional Relations
* [25]Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Requesters
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
July 2007
NASA SUPPLIER BASE
Challenges Exist in Transitioning from the Space Shuttle Program to the
Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems
GAO-07-940
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 2
Background 4
NASA's New Plans and Processes Establish a Foundation for Managing
Transition, Retirement, and the Supplier Base 6
Effectiveness of NASA's Transition Plans and Processes Not Known until
Constellation's Supplier Base Needs Become Clearer and More Decisions Have
Been Processed 12
Obsolescence, Workforce Issues, and Transition Cost Estimates Pose Other
Challenges to NASA's Transition Efforts 16
Conclusions 20
Recommendation 20
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 22
Appendix II Space Shuttle Program Critical Single Source Suppliers 24
Appendix III Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration 32
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34
Table
Table 1: Overview of NASA's Decision-Making Process 10
Figures
Figure 1: Overview of Space Shuttle and Constellation Programs 5
Figure 2: NASA's Plans for Transition and Retirement 8
Figure 3: Revision of NASA's Anticipated Key Decision Dates for Shuttle
Capabilities 15
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Abbreviations
CLV Crew Launch Vehicle
ESMD Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
SMRT Space Shuttle Management Resource Transition
SOMD Space Operations Mission Directorate
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
July 25, 2007
The Honorable Bart Gordon Chairman
The Honorable Ralph M. Hall
Ranking Member
Committee on Science and Technology
House of Representatives
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst
of phasing out the Space Shuttle Program and beginning another major
undertaking, the Constellation Program, which will create the next
generation of spacecraft for human spaceflight. This is NASA's biggest
transition effort since landing humans on the moon more than 3 decades ago
and then initiating the Space Shuttle Program a few years later. Numerous
people, hardware, and infrastructures will be impacted by coming changes.
Indeed, the supplier base that has been supporting the Space Shuttle since
its infancy is already in flux as NASA seeks to determine which suppliers
will no longer be needed after the last Shuttle mission is flown, which
will transfer to the Constellation Program, and what will happen to
mission-critical suppliers who have to wait years for new exploration
activities to begin. Over 230 of the Space Shuttle Program's 1,500 or so
active suppliers are considered critical single source suppliers, that is,
suppliers for items (parts/materials) or providers of services for which
there is no direct or immediate replacement available. Due to the recent
budget reductions, NASA officials acknowledge that the agency will not be
able to launch its new exploration vehicles until 2015, later than the
scheduled first launch date in 2014. This results in a prolonged gap of
over 4 years between the end of the Shuttle Program and when the
Constellation's Orion and the Ares 1 vehicles come online. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of phasing out
the Space Shuttle Program and beginning another major undertaking, the
Constellation Program, which will create the next generation of spacecraft
for human spaceflight. This is NASA's biggest transition effort since
landing humans on the moon more than 3 decades ago and then initiating the
Space Shuttle Program a few years later. Numerous people, hardware, and
infrastructures will be impacted by coming changes. Indeed, the supplier
base that has been supporting the Space Shuttle since its infancy is
already in flux as NASA seeks to determine which suppliers will no longer
be needed after the last Shuttle mission is flown, which will transfer to
the Constellation Program, and what will happen to mission-critical
suppliers who have to wait years for new exploration activities to begin.
Over 230 of the Space Shuttle Program's 1,500 or so active suppliers are
considered critical single source suppliers, that is, suppliers for items
(parts/materials) or providers of services for which there is no direct or
immediate replacement available. Due to the recent budget reductions, NASA
officials acknowledge that the agency will not be able to launch its new
exploration vehicles until 2015, later than the scheduled first launch
date in 2014. This results in a prolonged gap of over 4 years between the
end of the Shuttle Program and when the Constellation's Orion and the Ares
1 vehicles come online.
Given the magnitude of the overall transition effort, you requested that
we (1) describe NASA's plans and processes for managing its supplier base
through the Shuttle's retirement and the transition to the Constellation's
exploration activities; (2) address factors that could impact the
effectiveness of those plans and processes; and (3) identify any other
issues that NASA will likely encounter as the agency transitions to and
implements the Constellation Program. Given the magnitude of the overall
transition effort, you requested that we (1) describe NASA's plans and
processes for managing its supplier base through the Shuttle's retirement
and the transition to the Constellation's exploration activities; (2)
address factors that could impact the effectiveness of those plans and
processes; and (3) identify any other issues that NASA will likely
encounter as the agency transitions to and implements the Constellation
Program.
To conduct our work, we reviewed NASA plans and processes related to
transition and retirement. We reviewed project-specific documentation To
conduct our work, we reviewed NASA plans and processes related to
transition and retirement. We reviewed project-specific documentation
related to transition and retirement within NASA as well as various NASA
reports and studies on similar efforts elsewhere in the federal
government. We reviewed budgetary information and guidance related to
transition and retirement costs. We conducted interviews with NASA
officials in the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD) and the
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) who are responsible for
transition and retirement efforts, including the transition managers. In
addition, we interviewed NASA and prime contractor officials within the
Space Shuttle and Constellation Program and project offices about the
transition and retirement effort and met with NASA officials from the
International Space Station Program. More details about our scope and
methodology are in appendix I.
Results in Brief
NASA has taken steps in laying a foundation to transition from Shuttle
retirement through the Constellation Program's return to spaceflight. NASA
has laid out an overarching strategy for transition and retirement,
developed a plan to integrate acquisitions between the two programs, and
released a management plan that is specific to the final years of the
Shuttle Program. Taken together, these plans demonstrate consideration of
the challenges ahead. Outlined in these plans are methods for
communicating change to the Shuttle workforce and metrics intended to help
NASA management measure accomplishments and gauge cost, schedule, and
performance risk. NASA has established a new organizational hierarchy and
processes through which numerous decisions about suppliers will be
funneled. For example, NASA has developed a Strategic Capabilities
Assessment database that tracks Shuttle capabilities and the property,
personnel, suppliers, and contracts related to each capability. The agency
also uses a Critical Single Source Supplier List to help Shuttle program
managers track suppliers, keep an eye on potential loss of capability, and
assess the impact of potential losses on the ability to meet launch
schedule.
The effectiveness of NASA's transition plans and decision-making processes
is not yet known because few key decisions have formally been considered
to date. Uncertainties about the Constellation Program's supplier base
needs leave NASA's new plans and processes relatively untested. NASA
officials have made preliminary decisions about suppliers that no longer
will be needed after the Shuttle's retirement, but agency officials are
not ready to decide whether these suppliers' capabilities will definitely
be needed for the Constellation Program, which is still in the early
design phase. This decision-making gap means that NASA may need to
continue funding suppliers, even when they are no longer working on
Shuttle operations, until Constellation officials make a decision. To
ensure that critical single source suppliers--such as the ones who produce
actuators, nozzles, and heat exchange coils for the Shuttle orbiter and
solid rocket booster--do not go out of business during this gap, NASA may
provide gap funding until agency officials have a clear idea of
Constellation's requirements. Another factor that will impact the
effectiveness of NASA's new decision-making processes is the sheer volume
of decisions that working groups and control boards must consider that
involve each capability, corresponding supplier, real property, personnel,
and contracts. Just this year, NASA has had to reschedule a number of key
decision dates to later years because the original schedule was deemed
overly optimistic.
NASA will likely encounter a number of other issues as the agency
transitions to and implements the Constellation Program, including
continued use of obsolescent materials; supplier viability; potential loss
of needed science and engineering expertise; safe disposal of Shuttle
facilities; and the challenge of producing estimates of transition costs.
To save money, NASA plans to use certain proven Shuttle technologies in
the Constellation Program. However, in doing so, the Constellation Program
stands to inherit problems that the Shuttle Program was unable to resolve
during its lifespan. For example, the Shuttle Program still uses
chrysotile fiber (asbestos), a known carcinogen, and methyl chloroform, an
ozone-depleting substance, and has not found any acceptable replacements
for those two materials. In addition, maintaining a viable supplier base
was a challenge for the Shuttle Program, which has, over the years,
experienced many instances of suppliers dropping off unpredictably. The
Constellation Program could face similar challenges as it will be using
many of the same suppliers for new exploration activities. And within NASA
itself, realigning employee resources and planning for a smaller workforce
poses a challenge. Another challenge is how to dispose of the facilities
that no longer are needed after the Shuttle's retirement while complying
with federal, state, and local environmental laws and regulations. Last
but not least, developing cost estimates for these and many other funding
needs is a challenge. The Shuttle Program is scheduled to end in 2010, but
many activities related to closeout will continue past that date, perhaps
through 2020. Although NASA has identified its funding needs through
fiscal year 2010 for transition activities, the total cost of retiring the
Shuttle and transitioning to new exploration activities is still being
developed. Without cost estimates, NASA does not have the information
needed to support the budget preparation process or assess the costs of
addressing its supplier challenges; for example, in its fiscal year 2008
budget submission to Congress identifying funding needs for fiscal years
2008 through 2012, NASA elected not to include funds for transition and
retirement activities beyond fiscal year 2010.
In order that NASA will be able to formulate its budget for transition and
retirement activities for the years beyond 2010, we are recommending that
the NASA Administrator direct the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
and Space Operations Mission Directorate to jointly develop cost estimates
for transition and retirement activities beyond 2010, so that, in NASA's
fiscal year 2009 budget submission, NASA can include transition and
retirement funding needs for the required out-years through fiscal year
2013. We would expect the cost estimates to be adjusted every year and
have more fidelity as NASA gains more knowledge about its transition
costs, Constellation Program requirements and supplier needs. NASA
concurred with our recommendation, but stated that NASA management will
work with the Office of Management and Budget to determine the appropriate
timing for including transition and retirement costs in the President's
Budget Proposal.
Background
In January 2004, following the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003,
the President announced a new exploration policy entitled A Renewed Spirit
of Discovery: The President's Vision for U.S. Space Exploration. The
President's vision calls for retiring the Space Shuttle upon completion of
the International Space Station in 2010 and creating a new family of
exploratory vehicles for human spaceflight that will allow a return to the
moon and voyages to Mars and points beyond. To implement the President's
vision, NASA embarked on a major study and made recommendations for
technologies and potential approaches for vehicle design. NASA
incorporated these recommendations into the Constellation Program along
with exploration activities called for in the President's vision. NASA's
newly created Exploration Systems Mission Directorate manages the
Constellation program, which will oversee three major projects--Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle, the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, and the Ares V Cargo
Launch Vehicle. Figure 1 shows the general design of the Constellation
vehicles and how they differ from the Shuttle.
Figure 1: Overview of Space Shuttle and Constellation Programs
The Space Operations Mission Directorate manages the Space Shuttle
Program. In order to support the 5 major projects--orbiter, Space Shuttle
main engine, solid rocket booster, reusable solid rocket motor, and
external tank--that comprise the Space Shuttle Program, NASA has 654
facilities that utilize more than 980,000 line items of equipment and
employs over 2,000 civil service and more than 15,000 contractor
personnel. NASA has several space centers, but the three that hold the
majority of this workforce are Johnson Space Center in Houston; Kennedy
Space Center, in Cape Canaveral, Fla.; and Marshall Space Flight Center in
Huntsville, Ala. The Space Operations Mission Directorate also manages the
International Space Station.
NASA's New Plans and Processes Establish a Foundation for Managing Transition,
Retirement, and the Supplier Base
NASA has developed plans intended to help the agency sort through a myriad
of decisions relating to transition and retirement, with some aspects
focused on NASA's transition management structure and others specifically
addressing the supplier base. NASA has an overarching agency-level
transition plan, a joint acquisition plan, and a Space Shuttle Program
Transition Management Plan, which demonstrate an initial effort to
establish a strategy for managing change. Monitoring risk at different
levels of the agency is one of the issues addressed in the plans. Also
addressed, in general, is the decision-making process related to
transitioning the supplier based from the Space Shuttle Program to the
Constellation Program.
New Plans Reflect NASA's Overall Strategy to Manage Transition and Retirement
In response to a legislative mandate,1 NASA developed the Human Space
Flight Transition Plan. This agencywide plan describes the overarching
strategy for transition from the Shuttle to the Constellation Program's
new exploration activities and discusses desired outcomes, processes,
roles, responsibilities, and certain program-level requirements. The plan
also includes a range of issues that NASA will need to address to achieve
a successful transition--budget, acquisition, human capital, and property
and environmental management. NASA expects the Human Space Flight
Transition Plan to serve as initial, top-level strategic guidance and a
governance framework for the development of lower-level directorate,
program, and project transition planning guidance documents. NASA
officials say they are revising the plan to incorporate guidelines that
the inspector general recommended with respect to program and project
management.2
The Space Operations and Exploration Systems Mission Directorates are
developing a joint acquisition road map to avoid substantial duplication
of acquisition costs. For example, the Constellation Program has begun
work under a current NASA follow-on contract for Shuttle-related support
to the Constellation Program and intends to begin work on the engine that
will be used in the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle through an interagency
agreement with the Air Force and National Reconnaissance Office.
1NASA Authorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-155, S 502 (b) (2005).
2NASA Office of Inspector General, NASA's Plan for Space Shuttle
Transition Could Be Improved by Following Project Management Guidelines,
IG-07-005 (Washington, D.C.: January 2007).
NASA also recently approved the Space Shuttle Program Transition
Management Plan, which defines how the Space Shuttle Program should
organize and manage its retirement and transition activities to support
the agency-level Human Space Flight Transition Plan and overall Vision.
The plan describes the organizational structure, management approach,
processes, products, and tools used to manage the transition and
retirement of Space Shuttle Program capabilities. The shuttle program's
five project offices are developing separate transition plans, as are
three of NASA's space centers. Figure 2 shows the various plans and the
NASA organizations affected by the plans.
Figure 2: NASA's Plans for Transition and Retirement
Note: The Projects depicted are the ones with major supplier transitions,
but the list is not inclusive of all of the Projects within the respective
programs.
In addition to the plans mentioned above, NASA has developed a
communications strategy to keep the Shuttle workforce informed about the
activities, intentions, and goals related to retirement of the Shuttle and
transition to new exploration activities. Weekly teleconferences, monthly
reports, quarterly newsletters and magazines, and Transition Quarterly
Program Manager's Reviews will strive to lessen confusion and frustration
in this environment of change. NASA and the prime contractors are
conducting supplier visits to better inform the subcontractor workforce
about transition activities and the opportunities available for future
work.
To measure progress on Shuttle retirement and transition, NASA has
identified a collection of metrics that can be used at an agencywide or
program level to assess cost, schedule, technical, and risks. NASA
officials say they intend, on a quarterly basis, to analyze progress made
and to look ahead for opportunities to, for example, save money, mitigate
risks, and see what decisions need to be made about which suppliers. Key
metrics at the agency level include cost avoidance, schedule variances,
and government personnel time charges for work on single versus multiple
programs. Various tools will be used to track risks related to transition
and retirement activities. Such risks include loss of critical Shuttle
personnel, transfer of facilities funding from the Space Shuttle Program
to the Constellation Program, and cargo transportation shortfalls for the
International Space Station after 2010.
NASA Has Developed New Decision-Making Process to Manage Supplier Base
NASA has developed a new decision-making process to manage supplier
decisions related to the retirement of the Shuttle and transition to the
Constellation Program. The new process defines key areas of authority and
responsibility and lines of reporting. Control boards, comprising
representatives from the Space Shuttle, Constellation, and International
Space Station programs, are expected to provide guidance and facilitate
decisions on important transition issues. Transition managers have been
appointed at the directorate, program, and center levels. Table 1 provides
an overview of the various processes.
Table 1: Overview of NASA's Decision-Making Process
Directorate level
Joint Integration Control Focuses on long-range strategic decisions, such
Board as budgets, schedules, and conflicting
directorate priorities; ensures successful
integration of development with operations in
support of exploration architecture.
Transition Control Board Serves as short-term decision-making forum; for
example, if it is unclear which program
(Shuttle or Constellation) should provide
funding to sustain a given supplier during the
gapa between the Shuttle's retirement and on
start of the Constellation Program, this board
would make the determination.
Program level
Joint Program Requirements Will resolve technical or programmatic problems
Control Board and approve joint program requirements and
milestones; this board, which existed prior to
the President's vision, was expanded to include
the Constellation Program.
Transition Program Recommends courses of action with regard to
Requirements Control Board existing capabilities and associated suppliers;
prime contractors for the Shuttle Program can
provide input to this board; this board has its
own budget to fund transition-related
activities and was allocated $10 million in
fiscal year 2006 and $30 million in fiscal year
2007 from the Shuttle Program's budget. Will
fund shutdowns of suppliers, transitions of
suppliers to Constellation Program, and gap
funding. Still in development is the creation
of a control board that will deal specifically
with the Constellation Program's transition
requirements.
Center level
Johnson Space Center Provide intra-center forums for exchanging
Working Group information relevant to transition and
Kennedy Space Center elevating significant issues to senior
Working Group management; center-level transition plans are
Marshall Space Flight still in development.
Center Working Group
Project level
Five Shuttle project Transition managers at each of the five Shuttle
offices (orbiter, Space project offices are responsible for planning
Shuttle main engine, solid and implementing project-specific transition
rocket booster, reusable plans, which are still in development; most of
solid rocket motor, the coordination between the Shuttle and
external tank) Constellation programs is occurring at the
project level and done through informal means
with participation by the Constellation Program
Transition Manager.
Source: NASA (data); GAO (presentation and analysis).
aGap funding can take place, according to NASA, when the Space Shuttle
Program no longer needs a supplier and the Constellation Program does not
have an immediate need but may have a future need for the same supplier.
NASA can then choose to fund the supplier, which is typically a
subcontractor to a NASA prime contractor, for work that would maintain the
supplier's capability/skills during the gap.
To make better informed decisions, the boards obtain supplier assessments,
known as Space Shuttle Management Resource Transition (SMRT) documents,
usually completed by the project offices, which provide rationale and
potential impact for recommended courses of action. Shuttle capabilities
with potential use for the Constellation Program are usually elevated to
Transition Control Board for coordination and review.
NASA is using the Critical Single Source Supplier List and the new
Strategic Capabilities Assessment database to manage its supplier base
through the retirement of the Shuttle and transition to the Constellation
Program. The Critical Single Source Supplier List existed prior to the
announcement of the Shuttle's retirement and is used to monitor the unique
capabilities provided by critical single source suppliers and note any
supportability issues that could arise.3 NASA considers a supplier to be a
critical single source supplier if it is the only known or only certified
source of particular hardware or services and has received hardware or
services from them in the past 5 years or expects to do business with them
again in the future. The list contains over 230 suppliers identified by
each of the five major Shuttle project offices (see app. II for a list of
NASA's critical single source suppliers). NASA can exercise various
options to ensure that certain key capabilities and the critical suppliers
associated with those capabilities are maintained until no longer needed.
For example, a skills retention contract can be put in place by Shuttle
program officials through the prime contractor to ensure that a
subcontractor will maintain the minimum skills necessary to perform
failure analysis until the end of the Shuttle Program.
The Strategic Capabilities Assessment database, created after the
Shuttle's retirement was announced, provides an initial review and
categorization of Shuttle's assets and is used for tracking, controlling,
maintaining, and updating information associated with Shuttle
capabilities. Each capability comes bundled with property, personnel,
suppliers, contracts, and Shuttle last-need date, which together produce a
product or service, and the database tracks risk associated with each
capability. Using the information gathered in the database, NASA can
generate a master schedule that provides the basis for transition plans
and adds insight into the progress of transition and retirement
activities. The Transition Program Requirements Control Board plans to use
the master schedule to estimate how many decisions need to be made each
quarter. The Shuttle Program has identified most of the last-need dates
and release dates for the 300 or so capabilities that are contained in the
Strategic Capabilities Assessment database, according to NASA officials.
Constellation Program officials have completed in the spring of 2007 a
preliminary assessment of which capabilities will be needed in the future,
but acknowledged that further requirements refinement and definitions are
needed.
3NASA assigns a supplier code to each critical single source supplier that
defines the risk to the program including the inability to deliver
hardware and the impact on meeting the launch schedule. Identification of
these risks varies depending on whether alternate paths exist for
obtaining the hardware, such as cannibalizing other shuttle components.
NASA also identifies "generic causes" for the defined risk, including, for
example, obsolescence, no longer in business, or lack of skills to perform
the work.
Effectiveness of NASA's Transition Plans and Processes Not Known until
Constellation's Supplier Base Needs Become Clearer and More Decisions Have Been
Processed
Whether NASA's transition plans and processes will be effective is unclear
because NASA has not set requirements for Constellation's supplier base
needs and few decisions about suppliers have worked their way through the
new processes.
Constellation Lacks Detailed Supplier Base Needs Requirements
While the Shuttle is, in some cases, ready to release or transfer certain
suppliers, its ability to do so has been impacted by the lack of detailed
requirements from the Constellation Program. According to NASA officials,
because the Constellation Program is early in its design cycle, it is not
able to "pull" suppliers to Constellation as a counter to the "push" from
the Shuttle Program to release or transfer suppliers. For instance,
according to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) project manager, even
though his office has identified, to the best of its abilities, the
suppliers that could be needed for the J-2X engine (which will be used on
the Crew Launch Vehicle), the Constellation Program is still working on
the requirements for the J-2X and has not made any determinations about
which Shuttle suppliers will be needed. The SSME project office was able
to identify suppliers that could be used for new exploration activities
because the same prime contractor that produces the Shuttle main engines
will produce the J-2X engine. There is a risk that the SSME project will
have to make decisions prior to the establishment of defined requirements
at a risk of losing some key capabilities. When NASA makes decisions as
whether to maintain an existing supplier that might not be needed in the
future, NASA is attempting to balance the risk associated with losing that
supplier and unnecessarily spending funds that could be used for other
priorities. As a result of Constellation's lack of detailed requirements,
there are cases where NASA has provided funding for certain Shuttle
suppliers' work through its prime contractor's subcontracts because of a
possible future need for the suppliers with the Constellation Program and
the need to maintain the critical skills. Following are examples of such
cases.
o One subcontractor is a critical single source supplier that
makes tubes for nozzles and heat exchange coils. At the time of
our review, the last delivery from the subcontractor is scheduled
for summer of 2007, after which the prime contractor could end its
relationship with the subcontractor. However, the SSME project
office will seek gap funding for work that would maintain the
subcontractor's capability/skills because SSME project office
officials believe that Constellation Program will likely have a
future, but not an immediate need for the subcontractor's
services. SSME project office officials pointed out that the
subcontractor may go out of business without NASA funding.
o Another subcontractor is a critical single source supplier
certified to refurbish and re-certify the post-flight Solid Rocket
Booster (SRB) actuators. The SRB project currently has inventories
that can support the remaining Shuttle flights plus eight spares.
Therefore, the SRB project office could have informed the prime
contractor that it no longer needed the subcontractor's services
as of January 2007. However, because the subcontractor's
refurbishment capability may be needed for the Ares 1 Crew Launch
Vehicle (CLV), the SRB project office sought and obtained $1.8
million in gap funding from the Transition Program Requirements
Control Board for work that would preserve the subcontractor's
capability/skills for the CLV through the end of fiscal year 2007.
Otherwise, according to analysis completed by NASA, if the
Constellation Program needed to restart the subcontractor's
refurbishment capability in the future through a new subcontract
with the CLV's prime, it would cost $15 million. At the time of
our review, the Space Shuttle Program Transition Manager stated
that the Constellation Program should decide by summer of 2007
whether it needs the subcontractor as its supplier.
The lack of a "pull" from the Constellation Program--that would identify
current Shuttle suppliers that will be used in the new exploration
program--may result in additional gap funding for some critical suppliers,
costly production restarts in the event that some suppliers are let go but
found to be needed later, or the capability could be lost altogether.
Increasing Number of Supplier and Capability Decisions to Be Made in Coming
Years Could Overwhelm NASA's Processes
The lack of requirements for the Constellation Program is not the only
factor impacting NASA's transition plans and decision-making processes.
NASA's plans and decision-making processes are relatively untested because
only a small number of supplier decisions have been vetted through the
decision-making process thus far. The Strategic Capability Assessment
database, as described earlier, was created to efficiently and effectively
manage the transition and retirement of Shuttle capabilities. The database
divides each Shuttle project element into a list of capabilities that
comprise the entire project. Each capability covers property, personnel,
suppliers, and contracts data. A key decision date, last-need date, and
estimated release date are determined for each capability.
Documenting decisions is an important part of the decision-making process.
Each transition-ready capability in the Strategic Capabilities Assessment
database should be paired with a corresponding SMRT document that will
wind its way through the decision-making process and then be approved by
the program-level Transition Program Requirements Control Board and/or the
Transition Control Board at the directorate level. The document provides a
body of relevant information from which decisions can be rendered,
communicated, documented, and tracked. This paperwork is needed for any
Shuttle capability that is being partially or fully terminated before the
Shuttle Program ends--including those to be transferred to the
Constellation Program.
As of January 2007, Shuttle program officials predicted they would need to
set 42 key decision dates for fiscal year 2007; in May 2007, after
realizing that this target was too optimistic, officials reduced the
number to 21 and rescheduled a number of key decision dates to later
years. Future dates also were adjusted. Figure 3 shows the number of dates
set in January 2007 and then revised in May 2007.
Figure 3: Revision of NASA's Anticipated Key Decision Dates for Shuttle
Capabilities
As the number of key decision dates and the corresponding SMRT documents
to be processed increase in the coming years, the ability of the
transition process to function effectively will be tested. NASA officials
acknowledge that the increasing number of SMRT documents scheduled for
upcoming years has the potential to overwhelm the transition
decision-making process.
Obsolescence, Workforce Issues, and Transition Cost Estimates Pose Other
Challenges to NASA's Transition Efforts
NASA is likely to encounter other issues as it transitions to new
exploration activities, including:
o obsolescence, particularly with regard to outdated materials for
which no replacements have yet been developed;
o supplier viability;
o potential loss of NASA personnel with science and engineering
expertise;
o safe disposal and cleanup of Shuttle facilities and equipment;
and
o developing estimates of transition costs.
Obsolescence
To lower development costs for the Constellation Program, NASA plans to
leverage some of the Space Shuttle Program's existing technologies. In
doing so, the Constellation Program stands to inherit problems, such as
the continued use of obsolete materials for which replacements have yet to
be found. Some long-used Shuttle materials are now known to pose
environmental or health hazards. Examples include chrysotile fiber
(asbestos), a component in rubber insulation; hydrazine, a type of fuel;
methyl chloroform, a cleaning solvent and degreaser; and HCFC-141b, a
foam-blowing agent. The Environmental Protection Agency classifies
asbestos as a known carcinogen and hydrazine as a probable carcinogen,
while both methyl chloroform and the foam-blowing agent are classified as
ozone-depleting substances. If the Constellation Program continues to use
these materials, health and environmental concerns will persist and
administrative and technical burdens will likely increase.
Supplier Viability
Supplier viability presents another challenge. Over the years, the Shuttle
Program has experienced many instances of suppliers dropping off
unpredictably, making supply chain management more difficult and costly.
The Integrated Space Operations Summit, attended by representatives from
NASA, industry, and academia, issued a report in April of 2005 that stated
the following: "the average mitigation cost from a loss of supplier, based
on over 100 industry case studies, is between $200,000 and $700,000.
Inventory, tooling, design, freight, people time, rush premiums, and
extraordinary costs add to this figure."4 NASA created the Critical Single
Source Supplier List as a way to monitor critical suppliers that were the
only known source or only certified source of a certain component or
material. In addition, the statement of work in Shuttle's Space Program
Operations contract specifies that the prime contractors need to identify
and resolve issues pertaining to loss of repair capabilities, failure
analysis, or production capabilities. This information allows Space
Shuttle Program officials to proactively monitor the supplier base and
formulate appropriate risk mitigation plans, if needed. Given that the
Constellation Program is the Shuttle's replacement and will likely span
decades, supplier viability issues could arise as they did during the
Shuttle Program. Appropriately monitoring the supplier base early on,
especially during the production and sustainment phases of the
Constellation Program, could help to mitigate potential supplier viability
issues.
4NASA Integrated Space Operations Summit, Space Shuttle Program Transition
Panel Final Report (April 2005).
Potential Loss of NASA Expertise
NASA acknowledges that it must realign employee resources and plan for a
smaller workforce. NASA projects fewer resources will be required for
operating and sustaining hardware, especially during vehicle processing
and launch operations. By fiscal year 2012, the total number of personnel
needed to meet NASA's strategic goals is likely to drop from 18,100 to
17,000. As new space systems are designed, emphasis will shift to
personnel with skills in systems development and engineering, program
management, and systems integration. NASA made the decision to maintain
program management and systems engineering competencies within the civil
service workforce to ensure that it has the capabilities it needs to
develop programs and projects for its missions. NASA acknowledges that, in
coming years, these very skills will be in high demand across the federal
government and in the private sector. NASA's senior leaders recognize the
need for an effective workforce in achieving mission success and to ensure
the agency has the scientific and technical expertise necessary to
preserve the nation's role as a leader in aeronautics, earth and space
science, and technology. NASA has a strategic human capital plan and
Shuttle strategic human capital plan, but more work is needed in workforce
planning and deployment. In a separate review requested by Congress, GAO
is assessing the extent to which NASA's human framework is aligned with
its strategic mission and programmatic goals; whether NASA is effectively
recruiting, developing, and retaining critically skilled staff; and what
internal or external challenges NASA faces in achieving its workforce
needs.
Environmental Disposal and Cleanup
While executing the remaining Shuttle missions, NASA will simultaneously
begin the process of disposing Shuttle facilities that are no longer
needed and transitioning facilities that can be used by other NASA
programs. NASA officials say that a much smaller number of facilities than
the current 654 Shuttle facilities will probably be required to support
the development or operation of future exploration systems. Environmental
management encompasses a wide range of activities, including identifying
and mitigating the environmental consequences of program and project
activities, informing systems engineering decisions to enhance safety,
preventing pollution, correcting environmental damage from past
operations, and maintaining compliance with federal, state, and local
environmental laws and regulations. Although NASA has an approach for
identifying environmental risks, the agency does not have a comprehensive
estimate of the environmental cleanup costs associated with the transition
and disposal of the Shuttle Program's facilities and equipment. In our
report on major challenges facing the nation in the 21st century, we
pointed out that frequently the costs associated with environmental
cleanup dramatically exceed available funding levels.5 For example, it
cost the Titan IV Program6 approximately $300 million over 6 years on
cleaning facilities, equipment, and tools. Paying for environmental
cleanup may require a significant future outflow of funds at the same time
that NASA will be facing many other competing demands for its limited
dollars, such as development of Orion, Ares I, and other exploration
projects.
Transition Cost Estimates
Developing cost estimates is a complex task for a transition of this
magnitude. Although NASA has identified its funding needs through fiscal
year 2010 for transition activities--such as planning and initial
asset/facilities screening and disposition--the total cost of retiring the
Shuttle and transitioning to new exploration activities is currently being
developed. The last Shuttle flight is scheduled to be flown in 2010, but
many transition and retirement activities will occur after that date.
Disposal of program facilities, contract closeouts, and transition and/or
severance of the remaining workforce are among the tasks ahead. According
to NASA officials, such efforts could last through 2020. At this time,
NASA does not know the extent of the Shuttle Program's environmental
liabilities. Paying for such liabilities later may complicate NASA's
future fiscal landscape, especially when there will be other competing
demands, such as Constellation's crew exploration vehicle, the crew launch
vehicle, and other new exploration activities.
5GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, [26]GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
6Titan IV was an Air Force program that produced rockets for launching
satellites.
In 2006, NASA developed a cost estimate of $2.8 billion for transition and
retirement activities through fiscal year 2020. NASA officials say the
estimate was based on a preliminary set of assumptions that were not
properly validated and was calculated without the involvement of the
NASA's space centers and other institutions. Thus, NASA officials consider
the estimate immature and, in its fiscal year 2008 budget submission to
Congress identifying funding needs for fiscal year 2008 plus the required
4 out-years through fiscal year 2012, NASA elected not to include any
funds for transition and retirement activities for fiscal years 2011 and
2012. Without cost estimates, NASA does not have the information needed to
support the budget preparation process or assess the costs of addressing
its supplier challenges. The Shuttle Program's risk assessment states that
not having secured funds for transition and retirement activities for
fiscal year 2011 and 2012 is a risk to follow-on programs and institutions
and to the agency as a whole.
As stated in NASA's Inspector General report7 issued in January 2007,
NASA's own program and project management guidelines, the Integrated Space
Operations Summit Transition Panel Report, and one of the Shuttle's
benchmarking studies (the Titan IV Program) all call for the establishment
of a detailed cost estimate for the Shuttle's retirement and transition.
NASA officials say they are in the process of recalculating the total cost
estimate through fiscal year 2020 and are deciding how to budget for
transition and retirement activities beyond 2010. NASA officials told us
that transition and retirement costs past 2010 will likely be absorbed by
the other NASA programs--including the Constellation Program--and the
space centers when the Shuttle Program ceases to exist. This will likely
affect the scope of those activities as well.
7NASA Office of Inspector General, NASA's Plan for Space Shuttle
Transition Could Be Improved by Following Project Management Guidelines,
IG-07-005 (Washington, D.C.: January 2007).
Conclusions
NASA's transition plans and processes increase the chances that key
decisions about the supplier base will be made with sufficient input from
the right people with the right expertise. The lack of defined
requirements for the Constellation Program is having an impact on supplier
transition decisions. Even if all of Constellation's requirements were
known today, NASA still may not be prepared to process the myriad of
decisions ahead. Only after NASA funnels more supplier decisions through
its new processes will the agency be able to declare success or failure.
The sheer volume of decisions could create bottlenecks, with some critical
suppliers getting lost in the mix, dropping out altogether before NASA
makes up its mind, and adding risk that NASA will have nowhere to turn for
certain capabilities. Lastly, the costs of transition and managing
suppliers will be affected by many decisions yet to be made, including gap
funding requirements and environmental remediation efforts. As a result,
it is important that NASA begin estimating its transition and retirement
costs and continually revisit these estimates to reflect final decisions
on requirements and additional knowledge gained on technology development
and supplier needs. Such cost estimates also need to be part of NASA's
budget submission to ensure Congress and NASA can balance investments and
negotiate between competing priorities.
Recommendation
Given the fact that many of NASA's transition and retirement activities
will continue to occur following the Shuttle retirement in 2010, it is
important that NASA identify and estimate the costs associated with these
activities in an accountable and transparent manner. Therefore, we are
recommending that the NASA Administrator direct the Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate and Space Operations Mission Directorate to jointly
develop cost estimates for transition and retirement activities beyond
fiscal year 2010 so that, in NASA's fiscal year 2009 budget submission,
NASA can include transition and retirement funding needs for the required
out-years through fiscal year 2013. We would expect these estimates to be
adjusted every year and have more fidelity as NASA gains more knowledge
and makes more decisions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. IV), NASA
concurred with our recommendation, but stated that NASA management will
work with the Office of Management and Budget to determine the appropriate
timing for including transition and retirement costs in the President's
Budget Proposal. We also received technical comments from NASA, which have
been addressed in the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of the report to NASA's Administrator and interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at [27]http://www.gao.gov .
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or at [28][email protected] .
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made
key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Cristina T. Chaplain
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
(1) To determine what plans and processes the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) has established to effectively manage its
supplier base to ensure both sustainment of the Shuttle Program and
successful transition to planned exploration activities, we performed the
following:
o Obtained and reviewed documents from NASA describing plans and
processes for managing retirement and transition activities,
including the Human Space Flight Transition Plan, Space Shuttle
Program Transition Management Plan, Space Shuttle Program
Transition and Retirement Requirements, and the Space Shuttle
Program Risk Management Plan.
o Reviewed various NASA reports and studies on similar retirement
and transition efforts elsewhere in the federal government.
o Examined databases relevant to NASA's transition, specifically
the Strategic Capabilities Assessment database and the Shuttle
Integrated Risk Management Application.
o Reviewed Space Shuttle Management Resource Transition documents
and meeting minutes.
o Interviewed NASA's transition management officials at NASA
Headquarters and the NASA Centers.
o Compared NASA's plans and processes to GAO's Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government.
(2) To describe factors that could impact the effectiveness of such plans
and processes for managing NASA's supplier base and to (3) identify any
other issues that NASA will likely encounter as the agency transitions to
and implements its planned exploration activities, we performed the
following:
o Reviewed NASA's 2008 Budget Request along with Planning,
Programming, Budgeting and Execution Guidance for 2008 and 2009.
o Collected and analyzed information derived from the Strategic
Capabilities Assessment Database, including last need dates and
key decision dates.
o Interviewed NASA Constellation, Space Shuttle, and International
Space Station Program officials for information on coordination
between programs.
o Discussed transition challenges with NASA officials at the
agency, program, and project level, with prime contractors for the
Space Shuttle and Exploration programs, and with representatives
of the Aerospace Industries Association.
o Reviewed past GAO testimonies and reports.
o Identified obsolescence and supplier viability issues noted in
NASA and contractor reports and briefing charts that might impact
new exploration activities.
To accomplish our work, we interviewed NASA and prime contractor officials
for the Orbiter project at Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral,
Florida; NASA and prime contractor officials for the External Tank, Solid
Rocket Booster, Reusable Solid Rocket Motor and Space Shuttle Main Engine
projects at Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama; and NASA
officials for the Constellation, Space Shuttle and International Space
Station programs at Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. We also
attended the January 2007 Transition Quarterly Program Manager's Review to
garner information on the status of transition. At NASA Headquarters in
Washington, D.C., we met with the SOMD and ESMD Transition Managers, the
Deputy Associate Administrator for Program Integration, the ESMD Special
Procurement Advisor, and representatives from the SOMD and ESMD Resources
Management Offices.
We conducted our work from September 2006 to June 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Space Shuttle Program Critical Single Source Suppliers
Company Material/part/service
External tank
Tru-Circle Metal and Tool, Manhole Frames
Inc.
Summa Technology, Inc. Fittings
AMRO Fabricating Corp. Thrust Panels
Klune Industries, Inc. Feedline Fairings
Machine Craft, Inc. Miscellaneous Detail Parts
GKN Aerospace Monitor, Longerons
Inc.
Chromalox, Inc. Heaters
Kaiser Aluminum and Diffusers
Chemical Corp.
General Tool Co. LO2 Elbow, Ball fitting, SRB End Fitting
Goodrich Corp. - Rosemount Pressure Transducers
Aerospace, Inc.
Goodrich Corp. - Simmonds Level Sensors
Precision Products, Inc.
Plastic Fabricating Co., Fittings
Inc.
Tayco Engineering, Inc. Heaters
Senior Operations, Inc. - Vent Relief Valves
DBA Ketema Aerospace
Senior Operations, Inc. GH2 Ventline, LH2 Feedline Bellows Assembly
Ecliptic Enterprises Corp. ET Camera Electronic Box
Arrowhead Products Corp. Propulsion Lines
Meggitt Thermal Systems, Pressurization Lines
Inc.
Lord Corp. 7450, 391 Adhesives
North Carolina Foam NCFI 26-007, NCFI 24-57 Foam, NCFI 24-124 Foam
Industries
Cytec Olean, Inc. Conathane
Stepan Co. BX-265 Foam
Trelleborg Emerson & Silica Microspheres
Cuming, Inc.
National Process Vitrolube
Industries
PRC-DeSoto International, MMSK 719 Primer
Inc.
Orbiter
Ball Aerospace & PRSD Tank, Vac-Ion Pumps, DC/DC Converters,
Technologies Corp. Solid State Star Trackers
Hamilton Sundstrand Space Water Spray Boiler, Flash Evaporator Subsystem
Systems International,
Inc.
Edo Corp. - Antenna S-Band Preamp
Products & Technologies
Division
Sypris Data Systems, Inc. MADS Recorder
Albany International Corp. Thermal Protection System - Reusable Surface
- DBA Albany International Insulation
Research Company
Applied Resources Corp. Round Meters, Switches
PerkinElmer Interior Lights
OptoElectronics
Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. Auxiliary Power Units, Flight Control Hardware
- DBA Hamilton Sundstrand
Aerospace
Goodrich Corp.- Universal Emergency Egress Slide, Thruster Assembly,
Propulsion Company, Inc. Window Pyrotechnic Devices
(UPCO)
Michelin Aircraft Tire Tires
Corp.
Glenair, Inc. Connectors & Connector/Protectors
Hi Temp Insulation, Inc. Insulation
Arrowhead Products Corp. MPS Feed Lines
Carleton Technologies, O2/N2 Sensors, PPO2 Sensors, Valves
Inc.
Corning Glass Works Window Panes
Senior Operations Inc. - ECLSS Waste and Potable Water Tank, Bellows
Metal Bellows Division Assembly (Lines, Tanks)
3M Co. Surface Modifier
Aerojet General Corp. - APU Gas Generators, Vernier Thrusters, Small
Propulsion Division Parts
Ametek, Inc. Pressure Transducers
Argo Tech Corp. - Carter Seals, Springs
Ground Fueling Division
Barry Controls APU Isolation Mounts
BASF Corp. Polyurethane Foam
Cox & Co., Inc. Heater Lines
Parker Hannifin Corp. - Hoses and Fittings; Lift Off QD; Ground Probes
Stratoflex Product
Division
Eldec Corp. Dedicated Signal Conditioners, Proximity Switch
Endevco Corp. Low Pass Filter
FMH Corp. - DBA Flexible Flex Hoses
Metal Hose
Florida Seal & Rubber, LLC Seals
Richards, Gary E Retainer Bearings
Irvin Aerospace, Inc. Quick Disconnects
Kirkhill - TA Co. Seals
Long-Lok Fasteners Corp. Fasteners
M/A - COM, Inc. RF Cables
Magellan Aerospace Turbine SSME Interface Seals
Services
Pacific Scientific Co. Piece Parts - MADS
Parker Hannifin Corp. - Fluid Disconnects
Parker Stratoflex Division
RBC Transport Dynamics Bearing Housings
Corp.
RDF Corp. Temperature Transducers
Saint Gobain Performance Seals
Plastics Corp. - High
Performance Seals Division
Saint Gobain Performance Various Materials
Plastics Corp. - Coated
Fabrics Division
Dover Diversified, Inc. - Shell Assembly (Salad Bowl)
DBA Sargent Controls &
Aerospace
Senior Operations, Inc. - MPS Feed Lines/Gimble Joints/ Re-circulation
DBA Ketema Aerospace Manifold, GN2 Isolation Valve
Smiths Tubular Systems - Pressure Equalization Check Valves
Laconia, Inc.
Stillman Seal Corp. Window Seals
Wyle Laboratories Connectors
Teledyne Wireless, Inc. S-Band Switch Assembly
Senior Operations, Inc. Bellows Assembly for Class I GSE
Wintec, LLC Filters
Cerac, Inc. Tetraboron Silicide
Momentive Performance RTVs (Room Temperature Vulcanization
Materials, Inc. Adhesives), Adhesives
Tayco Engineering, Inc. Sensor, Heater (Thermocouple)
BAE Systems Information & Multiplexer Interface Adapters, S-MIA, D-MIA
Electronic Systems
Integration, Inc.
The Boeing Co. - Coldplates
Integrated Defense Systems
- NASA Systems Division
PTI Technologies, Inc. Check Valve and Filter
Lockheed Martin Corp. - RCC, LESS, RFCA (Used in the Thermal Protection
Lockheed Martin Missiles System)
and Fire Control
Arkwin Industries, Inc. Hydraulic 3-Way Valves, Hydraulic Control Valve
& Bootstrap Reservoir
Curtiss-Wright Controls, Actuators
Inc.
Eaton Corp, Valves
Goodrich Corp. MLG-NLG Landing Gear Production and Storage for
Special Tooling/Special Test Equipment
Honeywell International, Actuators
Inc. - Torrance, CA
Honeywell International, Controllers
Inc. - Clearwater, FL
Honeywell International, Enhanced Multiplexer/De-multiplexer,
Inc. - Glendale, AZ Multifunction Electronic Display System
Honeywell International, Air Data Transducer Assembly, Annunciator
Inc. - Tucson, AZ Control Unit
Kearfott Guidance and Inertial Measurement Units (IMU)
Navigation Corp.
L3 Communications Corp. Frequency Division Multiplexer (FDM)
Lockheed Martin Corp. - General Purpose Computer, Multi-function CRT
System Integration Display System
Lockheed Martin Corp. - Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller
Space Systems Company
Moog, Inc. Hydraulic Actuators / Power Valve Assembly
Moog, Inc. Thrust Vector Control Fuel Isolation Valve
Northrop Grumman Systems Master Timer Unit
Corp.
Eaton Corp. - Fluid 2-3 Way Valves
Conveyance Systems
Rockwell Collins, Inc. TACAN, GPS, DDU, HIS (Used for Guidance,
Navigation and/or Control)
SEAKR Engineering, Inc. Modular Memory Unit
Tavis Corp. Flowmeter
Telair International Actuators
Telephonics Corp. Microwave Scan Beam Landing System Decoders,
Transmitters, Antenna, RF Assemblies
The Boeing Co. - C3 Advanced Master Events Controller, Enhanced
Networks Division Master Events Controller
UTC Power Corp. Fuel Cells
Vacco Industries Filters, Valves, Regulators, Disconnects
Hamilton Sundstrand Waste Collection System
Management Services, Inc.
Smiths Aerospace, LLC Device Drive Unit (DDU)
Aerodyne Controls, Inc. Shut Off Valves
Ellanef Manufacturing Vent Door Actuators
Corp.
Gardner Bellows Corp. Hypergolic & Power Reactant Storage and
Distribution Bellow Assembly for Quick
Disconnects
Goodrich Corp. - Aerospace MLG Wheels & Brakes
Division (Aircraft Wheels
and Brakes)
Goodrich Corp. - Aerospace Storage of Miscellaneous Parts
Flight Systems Division
(Optical and Space
Systems)
Degussa Corp. Dimethylethoxysilane (DMES)
Reusable Solid Rocket
Motor
Kayco Composites Foam Billets
Standard Tool & Die Co. Case Nozzle Hardware
(STADCO)
Krayden, Inc. Permabond, Sealing Compound, & Molykote 321
SPS Technologies, Inc. Igniter Fasteners
Glenair, Inc. Cables
Irvin Aerospace, Inc. Heater Retainer Straps
Dodge-Regupol, Inc. Cork (External)
Unitech Composites, Inc. Railcar, End Grain, and Nozzle Shipping Covers
Aceto Corp. MAPO (Inhibitor Curative)
Noveon, Inc. HC Polymer
Votaw Precision Nozzle Hardware
Technologies, Inc.
Cytec Engineered Glass, Carbon, Silica Cloth
Materials, Inc.
Cytec Engineered Glass, Carbon, Silica Cloth
Materials, Inc.
Highland Industries Rayon Fabric Weaver (Nozzle)
Alcoa, Inc. Aluminum Powder
American Pacific Corp. Ammonium Perchlorate
American Synthetic Rubber HB Polymer
Corp. (ASRC)
Dow Chemical Liquid Epoxy Resin
Hitco Carbon Composites, Carbon Fiber-filled EPDM
Inc.
Kirkhill - TA Company EPDM Rubber/NBR
MS Aerospace, Inc. Nozzle Fasteners
Stellar Technology, Inc. Igniter
3M Co. Witness Pad Adhesives
Borden Chemicals Co. Phenolic Resin (Nozzle)
Dow Corning Corp. RTV's & Primers
Momentive Performance RTV's & Primers
Materials, Inc.
Loctite Aerospace Adhesives, Epoxy
Parker Hannifin Corp. - Igniter Gaskets
O-Ring Division
Parker Hannifin Corp. - O-Ring, Performed Packing, Gaskets
O-Ring Division
Resin Technology Group, Ablation Compound
LLC
SGL Polycarbon - USA Carbonization of cloth
Tayco Engineering, Inc. Heaters, Sensor Cables
Vacco Industries Safe & Arm Devices
Solid Rocket Booster
L3 Communications Corp. - Integrated Electronic Assembly (IEA), SRB Range
Space and Navigation Safety Distributor, Command Receiver Decoder,
Division Attitude Switch Assembly
Honeywell International, Enhanced Multiplexer/De-multiplexer,
Inc. Multiplexer/De-multiplexer
Moog, Inc. Servoactuator
Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. Auxiliary Power Unit
Aerojet General Corp. - Gas Generator
Propulsion Division
Marotta Controls, Inc. Gas Generator Valve Module
Parker Hannifin Corp. - Hydraulic Pump
Hydraulic Systems Division
Pacific Scientific Frangible Nut, Separation Nuts, Separation
Energetic Materials Co. Bolts
Goodrich Corp. - Universal Linear Shaped Charges (LSC), Nose Cap
Propulsion Co., Inc. Thrusters, Pressure Cartridges, Confined
(UPCO) Detonating Fuse Manifold, Range Safety System
LSC, Frustum LSC
General Products, LLC ET Bolt Catchers, Struts, ETA Rings, Spherical
Washers
Aerocraft Industries, Inc. ET Strut Cover & Fairing Assembly, Zinc Anodes
C & M Machine Holding, Tunnel Floor Components
Inc.
Consolidated Hinge & Aeroheat Shield
Manufactured Products,
Inc. - DBA The Champ Co.
Eaton Aerospace K & E Seals
Herley Industries, Inc. C-Band Antenna/Power Divider/Transponder
LaBarge, Inc. Range Safety Antenna
Oceaneering International, Thermal Curtains
Inc. - DBA Oceaneering
Space Systems - Space and
Thermal Division
Parker Hannifin Corp. - Dynatube Fittings
Stratoflex Product
Division
Parker Hannifin Corp. - Forward Skirt Door Seal, Gaskets
O-Ring Division
Pneudraulics, Inc. Fluid Manifolds
PRC-DeSoto CDP, Inc. PR 855, Sealant 1422
3M Co. Epoxy Resin (2216)
AMORIM Industrial P-50 Sheet Cork
Solutions, Inc.
Cabot Corp. - Cab-O-Sil Cab-o-Sil, Fumed Silicon Dioxide
Division
Lord Corp. Primer, Adhesive
Conax Florida Corp. Sea Water Activated Release (SWAR) (parachute
line cutting system), SWAR batteries
E/M Coating Services Dry Film Lube
Loctite Aerospace Hysol EA 934 NA (Epoxy Paste Adhesive),
Thixotropic Epoxy Adhesive
Maryland Cork Co., Inc. Granular Cork
Richmond Technology RCAS 2400 (Anti-static Packaging Material)
Solutions (RTSI)
Rust-Oleum Corp. Top Coat, Primer
LaBarge, Inc. Cables
Wyle Laboratories, Inc. Instrumented Hold-down Studs
Air Products & Chemicals, K54 Hardener
Inc.
Everlube Products LubeLok 1000X
Deft, Inc. Primer
Dow Corning Corp. 6077 Foam, RTV, DC 1200
Dow Chemical Instafoam
EMF, Inc - Engravers Metal EPDM Covers
Fabricators
Momentive Performance Adhesive (RTV 133)
Materials, Inc.
Henkel Corp. Alodine Coatings
Hentzen Coatings, Inc. Epoxy Primer
Summa Technology, Inc. SRB Nose Caps
National Starch and Glass Ecospheres
Chemical Co., Emerson &
Cuming - Specialty
Polymers Division
Puroflow Corp. Auxiliary Power Unit Flush & Purge Filter
Pro Battery, Inc. CBC Batteries
Kirkhill - TA Co. EPDM
Resin Technology Group, RT-455
LLC
Hexion Specialty EPON-828
Chemicals, Inc.
Gaco Western, Inc. Hypalon Paint
BST Systems, Inc. Operational Flight Instrumentation Battery
Space Shuttle Main Engines
Valley Metals Tubing Raw Materials
Morgan Advanced Ceramics, Precious Metal Braze Alloys
Inc. - DBA Wesgo Div.
Precision Tube Bending Tube Bending
Schlosser Forge Co. Liner - Main Combustion Chamber (MCC), Forging
Inlet Manifold Splitter
Hi Temp Insulation, Inc. Insulation Nozzle Thermal
Le Fiell Manufacturing Co. Heat Exchange Coil Assembly, Nozzle Coolant
Tubes, Nozzle Steerhorn Tubes
Thermal Vac, Inc. Nickel Plating of Nozzle Tubes
Arcturus Manufacturing Forging Jacket MCC, Forging Inducer Low
Corp. Pressure Fuel Turbopump (LPFTP)
Industrial Tectonics Stainless Steel Bearings
Bearing (ITB) Corp. -
(Subsidiary of Roller
Bearing Co.)
Magellan Aerospace Turbine Seals for Pumps
Services, LLC
Hoefner Corp. Machining of Valves
Size Control Plating Co. Chrome Plating
Precision Castparts Corp. MCC AFT Manifold; FWD Manifold
(PCC)
PCC Airfoils, LLC Small Castings
Eaton Aerospace, LLC - Pressure Sensor
Aerospace Controls
Division - Sensing &
Controls
G & N Rubicon Gear, Inc. Machine Splines
Hemphill Spring Co. A Spring, Anti-Flood Valve
Corp.
Winsted Precision Ball Balls for Bearings (Metal & SiN3)
Corp.
Metal Surfaces Inc. (MSI) Precious Metal and Nickel Plating
Metalex Manufacturing, Complex Machine Parts, Housings
Inc.
The Balancing Co., Inc. Balance Components
G & D Industries, Inc. Protective Covers, Closers, Caps
Circlemaster, Inc. Roll Nozzle Hatbands
GKN Aerospace Nozzle Jacket
Chem-Tronics, Inc.
Coast Plating, Inc. Hard Anodize of Low Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
(LPOTP) Housing
Dell Aerospace, Inc. Burst Diaphragms for Valves
Dixon Hard Chrome, Inc. Chrome Plating
JPM of Mississippi, Inc. Machining of Bearing Cages
FPI, Inc. Seals, HPTP Turbine Inlet Bellows
FAG/Aircraft Super Silicon Nitride Bearings
Precision Bearings
Honeywell International, Block II Controller
Inc.
Aerospace Techniques, Inc. Turbine Blade and Vane Fabrication
Howmet Corp. - Hampton Large Castings for Turbopumps
Casting Division
FMH Corp. - DBA Flexible Bellows Assembly (Lines, Tanks)
Metal Hose
Thermtech Corp. Fluorinated Ethylene-Propylene Coating for
Bearing Cages
HR Textron, Inc. Propellant Valve/Hydraulic Actuator Main
Oxidizer Valve Actuator (MOVA), Main Fuel Valve
Actuator (MFVA), Preburner Fuel Oxidizer Valve
Actuator (FPOVA), Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer
Valve Actuator(OPOVA), Chamber Coolant Valve
Actuator( CCVA)
Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne HPOTP, HPFTP (High Pressure Oxidizer and Fuel
Turbopumps)
Source: NASA.
Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Cristina T. Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, James L. Morrison, Assistant
Director; Lily Chin; Hillary Loeffler; Jeffrey Niblack; Shelby S. Oakley;
Sylvia Schatz; and John P.K. Ting made key contributions to this report.
(120586)
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[35]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-940 .
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Highlights of [36]GAO-07-940 , a report to the Chairman and Ranking
Member, Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives
July 2007
NASA SUPPLIER BASE
Challenges Exist in Transitioning from the Space Shuttle Program to the
Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems
The Space Shuttle Program is currently supported by over 1,500 active
suppliers, some of whom are the only known or certified source of a
particular material, part or service. The retirement of the Shuttle and
transition to planned exploration activities, as called for in the
President's Vision for Space Exploration, creates the need for NASA to
begin making decisions today about its supplier base needs for the future.
GAO was asked to (1) describe NASA's plans and processes for managing its
supplier base through the Shuttle's retirement and the transition to the
Constellation's exploration activities; (2) address factors that could
impact the effectiveness of those plans and processes; and (3) identify
any other issues that NASA will likely encounter as the agency transitions
to and implements the Constellation Program.
[37]What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the NASA Administrator direct the Exploration
Systems Mission and Space Operations Mission directorates to jointly
develop cost estimates for transition and retirement activities beyond
fiscal year 2010 so that NASA can include the funding needs for the
required out-years in its fiscal year 2009 budget submission to ensure
that Congress and NASA can balance investments and negotiate between
competing priorities, including supplier needs. NASA concurred with this
recommendation.
NASA is developing and implementing transition plans and processes to
manage its supplier base through the retirement of the Shuttle and
transition to the next generation of human space flight systems. Such
efforts include: various transition plans; a decision-making structure
that should enable the agency to make necessary supplier decisions; and a
communications strategy and metrics to gauge the progress of transition
activities. In addition, NASA has identified risks associated with the
shuttle's retirement and has begun identifying capabilities and suppliers
needed for future exploration activities.
While NASA has developed plans and processes aimed at effectively managing
the supplier base, several factors could impact their effectiveness. NASA
may have to continue funding suppliers for work that would maintain the
supplier's skills and capabilities, even when they are no longer working
on Shuttle operations, until Constellation officials make a decision on
whether or not they will be needed for future exploration activities due
to a lack of detailed program requirements. In addition, relatively few
supplier-related decisions have made it through the newly created
decision-making process and NASA officials acknowledge the increasing
number of decisions scheduled for upcoming years have the potential to
overwhelm the transition decision-making process.
Other issues have been identified that NASA will have to face in order to
successfully transition from the shuttle program to its next generation
human space flight systems. Challenges exist in the continued use of
obsolescent materials, maintaining the overall viability of the supplier
base, managing the overall workforce, disposing of property and equipment,
and completing environmental cleanup.
NASA has not developed cost estimates for transition and retirement
activities past fiscal year 2010. Without cost estimates, NASA does not
have the information needed to support the budget preparation process,
assess the costs of addressing its supplier challenges, or account for how
NASA will fund transition and retirement activities once the Space Shuttle
Program comes to an end in 2010. Such knowledge is important because NASA
and Congress will need to allocate funds among many competing priorities.
In addition, it will be important for NASA to adjust its cost estimates
every year as NASA gains more knowledge about its transition costs.
References
Visible links
26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-325SP
27. http://www.gao.gov/
28. mailto:[email protected]
29. http://www.gao.gov/
30. http://www.gao.gov/
31. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
32. mailto:[email protected]
33. mailto:[email protected]
34. mailto:[email protected]
35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-940
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-940
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