Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the
Army's Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address
Implementation Challenges (06-AUG-07, GAO-07-936).
The Army considers modular force transformation its most
extensive restructuring since World War II. The Army has
estimated that restructuring units from a division-based force to
a more agile and responsive modular brigade-based force will
require a significant investment through fiscal year 2011. To
facilitate this transformation, Public Law No. 109-163 Section
353 directs the Army to develop and implement a training strategy
for the modular brigades. This law also directs GAO to report on
the implementation of the strategy. This report discusses (1) the
extent to which the Army's training strategy addresses the five
elements specified in the public law and (2) the actions the Army
has taken to implement its training strategy and the
implementation challenges it faces. To address these objectives,
GAO reviewed Army training strategy documentation and interviewed
Army training personnel.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-936
ACCNO: A73933
TITLE: Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop
the Army's Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address
Implementation Challenges
DATE: 08/06/2007
SUBJECT: Armed forces reserve training
Army personnel
Cost analysis
Defense capabilities
Military forces
Military training
Performance measures
Strategic forces
Strategic planning
Training utilization
Program implementation
Program goals or objectives
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GAO-07-936
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Army's Training Strategy Provides Purpose, but Other Element
* [4]Purpose of the Strategy Is Fully Articulated
* [5]Overarching Performance Goal Established, but Supporting Goa
* [6]Army Lacks Metrics That Objectively Measure Achievement of P
* [7]Reporting System and Funding Model Do Not Provide Enough Inf
* [8]Actions Taken to Implement the Army Training Strategy, but K
* [9]Army Is Developing Guidance for Implementing the Strategy
* [10]Ongoing Operational Commitments Limit the Availability of Fo
* [11]Army Faces Challenges in Expanding Capacity at Its Combat Tr
* [12]Current Combat Training Center Capacity Does Not Support
ARF
* [13]Exportable Training Capability Not Fully Developed or
Tested
* [14]Operations Groups at the Army's Combat Training Centers
Not
* [15]Conclusions
* [16]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [17]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [18]GAO's Mission
* [19]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [20]Order by Mail or Phone
* [21]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [22]Congressional Relations
* [23]Public Affairs
Report to the Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
August 2007
MILITARY TRAINING
Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army's Strategy for Training
Modular Brigades and Address Implementation Challenges
GAO-07-936
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 4
Background 7
Army's Training Strategy Provides Purpose, but Other Elements Required to
Support the Strategy Need Further Development 12
Actions Taken to Implement the Army Training Strategy, but Key
Implementation Challenges Remain 18
Conclusions 26
Recommendations for Executive Action 27
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 31
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 33
Tables
Table 1: Details of Army Force Generation Readiness Pools 9
Table 2: The Army's Combat Training Centers 11
Table 3: Army Chief of Staff Guidelines for the Transformation of Army
Training 12
Table 4: Status of Master Plans 20
Figures
Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Brigades 8
Figure 2: ARFORGEN Training Cycle 10
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
August 6, 2007
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Daniel K Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
In 2004, the Army began its modular force transformation to restructure
itself from a division-based force to a more agile and responsive modular
brigade-based force--an undertaking it considers the most extensive
reorganization of its force since World War II. According to Army
estimates, this initiative will require a significant investment through
fiscal year 2011, at a time when the Army is fully engaged in operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq supporting the Global War on Terrorism.
Transformation is guided by the Army Campaign Plan, which provides
guidance about basing, restructuring specialties in the Army, increasing
the length and stability of tours in the United States, and training. The
Army is expanding its operational force from 33 existing combat brigades
to 42 modular combat brigades in the active force and creating 28 National
Guard modular combat brigades. Support units will also be reorganized into
functional support brigades to provide independent support to several
brigade combat teams during combat operations. The Army expects to
complete reorganization of the force by the end of fiscal year 2011. In
addition to transformation, the Army plans to increase in size from
512,400 to 547,000 personnel over the next 5 years.
To help manage its personnel and equipment, coordinate training, and
prioritize resources, the Army developed a force rotation model called
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). Under this model, active and Guard units
will progress through a series of three stages, called readiness
pools--reset/train, ready, and available. Active duty brigades will spend
approximately 1 year in each pool over a 3-year cycle and Guard units will
train under a 6-year cycle spending approximately 4 years in reset/train
and 1 year each in the ready and available pools. Units will progress from
the reset/train pool to the ready pool and from the ready pool to the
available pool based on their commander's assessment following completion
of an exercise at one of the Army's combat training centers.^1 Once a
brigade is assigned to the available pool, it is considered fully mission
ready and available to deploy.
Because of the magnitude and associated costs of the Army's
transformation, Congress directed the Army to develop and implement a
training strategy for brigade-based combat teams and functional supporting
brigades to ensure their readiness. Public Law No. 109-163 Section 353
directs the Army to develop and implement a training strategy that
includes the following five elements: (1) purpose; (2) performance goals,
which should include specific goals for live, virtual, and constructive
training;^2 (3) metrics; (4) a reporting process; and (5) a funding
model.^3
^1The Army's combat training centers enable commanders, their staffs, and
units to execute advanced training under a variety of conditions that
approximate actual combat as closely as possible. The combat training
centers include the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, which focuses on computer-assisted battle commander-centric
training exercises at the Joint Task Force, Army, corps, division, and
brigade levels, and the maneuver combat training centers--the Joint
Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany; the Joint Readiness
Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the National Training Center
at Fort Irwin, California--which conduct brigade-sized live training
exercises.
Public Law No. 109-163 Section 353 also directs GAO to report on the
status of the Army's implementation of this training strategy. In February
2007, the Army issued a three-page report to Congress responding to the
legislative requirement to report on its development of a training
strategy.^4 This brief Army document touches on each of the five elements
as directed, but does not provide a great deal of detail. Specifically,
the report briefly discusses certain elements of the strategy, such as
performance goals, training ranges, and funding requirements, and
indicates that the Army has begun implementing its strategy. According to
Army officials, the overall training strategy, however, is an integrated
collection of documents reflecting the Army's guidance, strategies,
models, systems, and processes that must work together to develop a
trained and ready force. In addition, Army guidance, including the Army's
Chief of Staff Memorandum on Army training transformation^5 and the Army's
2007 Posture Statement,^6 states that this training strategy directly
supports the Army's Force Generation model. For this report, we focused
our analysis on this broader collection of documents in addition to the
three-page report. Specifically, we assessed the (1) extent to which the
Army's training strategy addresses the five elements specified in the
public law and (2) actions the Army has taken to implement its training
strategy and identify challenges it faces in implementing the training
strategy.
In conducting this analysis, we used the language of Public Law No.
109-163 Section 353, relevant Army regulations, and the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)^7 as criteria for determining
how the elements of the Army training strategy address the five elements
specified in the public law and to what degree further development is
needed. In order to determine the extent to which the Army's training
strategy addressed the five specified elements and actions taken to
implement the strategy, we reviewed the Army's Report to Congress on the
Army Training Strategy and Army Training Strategy documents, guidance, and
funding plans. We performed content and data analysis on this material to
determine if the elements identified by the Army met the requirements of
the mandate and what implementing instructions and guidance have been
developed. We also examined the extent to which funds and resources have
been expended or programmed to support the strategy. Additionally, to
determine the challenges facing implementation, we interviewed Army
personnel responsible for developing and implementing the Army training
strategy at the Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau, three of
the Army's combat training centers, Army Training Doctrine Command, Army
Forces Command, and the United States Army, Europe. We then compared the
reports and testimony of officials in the field with the Army Training
Strategy documents, guidance, and funding plans provided by Army
headquarters to identify possible constraints. We conducted our review
from August 2006 through June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
^2Live training is that which is conducted in a physical environment.
Virtual simulation training provides crews, leaders, and units with
realistic training experiences using sophisticated simulators.
Constructive simulation training is the use of computer models and
game-type simulations.
^3National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2006 (2006).
^4Department of the Army, Report to Congress, Subject: Army Training
Strategy for Brigade Based Combat Teams and Functional Supporting Brigades
(Washington, D.C.: December 2006).
^5Army Chief of Staff Memorandum, Transformation of Training (Washington,
D.C.: May 9, 2006).
^6Army Posture Statement 2007, February 14, 2007.
^7Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).
Results in Brief
While the Army's training strategy addresses each of the five elements
specified in the public law to some extent, additional work needs to be
done by the Army to fully develop the strategy. The purpose of the Army's
training strategy is clearly articulated in the Chief of Staff's strategic
direction and in the 2006 Strategic Training Guidance. However, the
performance goals, metrics, reporting process, and funding model require
further development. A performance goal--as defined in GPRA--should be a
target level of performance expressed as a tangible, measurable objective,
against which actual achievement can be compared. The Army has established
an overall performance goal for brigades in the modular force to be "fully
mission capable" when they are available for deployment. In addition, the
Army has developed specific performance goals for live and virtual
training for all of the brigade combat teams and some of the functional
supporting brigades. However, the use of these goals to guide training is
not mandatory, and neither constructive training nor the goals for it are
clearly articulated in the templates that units use to plan training. In
addition, the Army's training strategy currently lacks metrics that can
objectively measure achievement against its stated overarching performance
goal. To measure achievement of fully mission capable status, the Army
relies on a commander's professional assessment--a subjective evaluation
on whether he or she believes a unit is fully capable of completing its
mission. Additionally, while the Army has characterized two types of
metrics it collects as measures of training performance, none of the
metrics collected objectively determines fully mission capable status.
Furthermore, the reporting systems the Army uses to support the new
training strategy do not provide enough information. For example, the
Army's reporting system, the unit status report, provides an overview of
training status, but does not provide detailed information about the
status of collective training. The Army intends to use a "new" Department
of Defense (DOD) system to capture unit collective training information as
part of the unit status report by the end of fiscal year 2008. Moreover,
the Army's current funding model does not realistically estimate the costs
associated with achieving the overall performance goal of being fully
mission capable. Specifically, the model calculates costs for all of the
training events identified in the planning templates, even though they are
not mandatory or tied to the overall performance goal. Until the Army
fully develops the required elements in its training strategy, it will not
be in a sound position to assess if it can achieve the long-term benefits
of having a consistently trained force, measure how well units have been
trained, and accurately determine the costs of training. To improve the
Army's ability to assess unit training and identify funding needs for
training, we recommend that it clearly identify constructive training
events and the total activity goals associated with them, develop metrics
that can objectively and reliably measure achievement against the Army's
stated performance goal, and revise its methods--including a funding
model--to better estimate the costs associated with achieving the
performance goal. In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD concurred
with our recommendations to develop metrics and revise its methods to
estimate costs. However, DOD did not concur with our recommendation that
the Army establish milestones for developing constructive training goals.
DOD stated that the Army has documented these goals. To support this
position, Army officials provided us with additional evidence. After
reviewing this evidence, we have modified our recommendation to emphasize
the Army's need to clearly identify constructive training and the goals
associated with it in the planning templates.
The Army has taken some actions to implement the training strategy, but
key implementation challenges remain, such as the availability of forces,
the capacity of the Army's training centers, and personnel shortages. Our
analysis of the Army's implementation planning documents shows that the
Army has developed guidance, such as training templates and instructions,
for implementing the training strategy; however, actual implementation has
been hindered by current operational commitments. The Army's overall
training strategy was designed to support ARFORGEN, which is built on the
assumption that one-third of the Army's active duty brigade combat teams
are deployed at one time; however almost half of these brigades are
currently deployed. Because of the pace of operations, active duty units
cannot spend the 2 years in training expected by the model; in fact, units
are spending much less time in training before being deployed again.^8
Training objectives for recent combat training center rotations are
focused on mission rehearsal exercises to prepare troops for ongoing
operations; they do not cover all the combat skills needed for
full-spectrum operations. According to Army officials, implementation of
the training strategy, which includes building full-spectrum operational
skills, cannot occur until operational commitments decrease and forces are
available to enter into the phased ARFORGEN cycles. The Army has not
adjusted its training strategy to account for conducting the current high
level of operations. Furthermore, the Army's combat training centers do
not currently have the capacity to support ARFORGEN requirements. For
example, to support the model, the Army estimates that its three maneuver
combat training centers must provide 36 combat training rotations for
modular brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2010. However, the centers can
accommodate only 28 combat training rotations,^9 and there are no plans to
increase the capacity of the fixed site combat training centers in light
of the planned increase in the Army's end strength. Instead, the Army is
developing an exportable training capability to supplement the number of
rotations that can be conducted at the centers. This capability is
intended to create a combat training center-like event for brigade combat
teams at their home stations. While the Army has developed plans for
establishing two organizations--one in the United States and one in
Germany--to conduct this exportable training, the concepts have not yet
been tested and it is unclear how much it will cost, even though budget
documents show that the Army plans to request funding for building the
exportable training capability in the United States in fiscal year 2009.
Furthermore, it is unclear what adjustments may or may not be needed in
order to fulfill existing training commitments in Germany. Implementation
of the training strategy has also been hampered by a lack of personnel
available to fill combat training center instructor slots because of other
operational commitments. For example, the Army's training center for
functional support brigades and theater brigades cannot execute training
exercises because of a shortage of staff. The Army does not have a plan to
address this challenge. Without developing a plan to address the
challenges associated with the Army's current operational commitments, the
Army will not know if it will be able to achieve its goals of having fully
mission capable trained forces to conduct full-spectrum operations.
Moreover, until the Army completes its testing of the exportable training
capability, it will not know what resources--such as funding--are needed
to implement the strategy or if the concept is the most appropriate
approach for addressing the limited capacity of the existing combat
training centers. To address the challenges facing the implementation of
the strategy, we recommend revising or adjusting the training strategy to
account for current operations and complete the proof of principle test
for the exportable training capability, to verify that it can support
increasing capacity requirements and use the results to guide future
funding requests. DOD concurred with our recommendation to revise or
adjust the training strategy and to establish milestones for the proof of
principle test. DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Army
clarify the capacity needed at the combat training centers. DOD stated
that the Army has been continuously identifying and updating capacity
demands, leading the Army to recently decide it needed additional
exportable training capability. As a result, we have revised our
recommendation to emphasize that the proof of principle should be
completed in order for DOD to verify whether the capability is the most
appropriate approach for meeting its future capacity demands and to adjust
its fiscal year 2009 request, and future funding requests, accordingly.
^8Specific information about the length of time spent in training is
classified.
^9 The centers can surge to accommodate 32 rotations a year.
Background
The Army's conversion to a modular force encompasses the Army's total
force--active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve--and directly
affects not only the Army's combat units but related command and support
organizations. A key to the Army's new modular force design is embedding
within combat brigades reconnaissance, logistics, and other support units
that previously made up parts of division-level and higher-level command
and support organizations, allowing the brigades to operate independently.
The Army is also organizing support forces into functional supporting
brigades. These brigades will continue to provide high-level support, such
as aviation, rocket artillery, or large-scale logistics, as part of the
brigade-based force. By fiscal year 2011, the Army plans to have
reconfigured its total force into the modular design. The foundation of
the modular force is the modular brigade combat teams that will have a
common organizational design and are intended to increase the rotational
pool of ready units. Modular combat brigades (depicted in fig. 1) will
have one of three standard designs--heavy brigade, infantry brigade, or
Stryker brigade.
Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Brigades
The Army plans to use a force rotation model--ARFORGEN--to manage the
modular force. Under the model, active, reserve, and Guard units progress
through a series of readiness pools. The Army uses these
pools--reset/train, ready, and available, which are described in table
1--and mission requirements to prioritize resources and coordinate
training, personnel, and equipment.
Table 1: Details of Army Force Generation Readiness Pools
Tasks being Move to next pool
Readiness pool conducted Available for when
Reset/train 1. Receiving 1. Homeland Unit successfully
personnel and security 2. completes combat
equipment 2 Humanitarian and training
Individual and disaster relief center-level
collective training collective training
on core tasks event
Ready Collective training Mobilization for Unit successfully
on theater-specific full-spectrum completes
tasks operations theater-focused
combat training
center-level
collective training
event
Available 1. Deployed in 1. Conducting Unit returns to home
operational mission active operations station
2. Standby for 2. Mobilization
immediate deployment for full-spectrum
as required operations
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
Units will transition through these pools based on the commander's
assessment of unit capability levels following a combat training
center-level collective training event, validated by the next higher
commander and monitored by United States Army Forces Command, as shown in
figure 2. Army guidance, including the Army's Chief of Staff Memorandum on
the transformation of Army training and the Army's 2007 Posture Statement,
states that the Army's training strategy, from initial entry training to
unit combat training center rotations, directly supports ARFORGEN.
Figure 2: ARFORGEN Training Cycle
In addition to training at the home station, the modular force trains at
the Army's combat training centers. These centers allow brigades to
perform advanced training under a variety of conditions that approximate
actual combat as closely as possible, enabling units to assess and build
upon skills learned at the home station using a combination of live,
virtual, and constructive training. The Army maintains four combat
training centers, as shown in table 2. The Joint Multinational Readiness
Center (JMRC), the Joint Readiness Training Center, and the National
Training Center are collectively referred to as the maneuver combat
training centers.
Table 2: The Army's Combat Training Centers
Name Location Element trained Focus
Battle Command Fort Corps, division, Full-spectrum
Training Program Leavenworth, KS and brigade staff operations in a joint,
interagency,
intergovernmental, and
multinational
environment
Joint Hohenfels, Brigade combat Full-spectrum
Multinational Germany team, selected operations in a joint,
Readiness Center division maneuver interagency,
and support intergovernmental, and
units, special multinational
operations environment
forces, and
selected brigade
support elements.
Joint Readiness Fort Polk, LA Brigade combat Full-spectrum
Training Center team, selected operations in a joint,
division maneuver interagency,
and support intergovernmental, and
units, special multinational
operations environment
forces, and
selected brigade
support elements.
National Training Fort Irwin, CA Brigade combat Full-spectrum
Center team, selected operations in a joint,
division maneuver interagency,
and support intergovernmental, and
units, special multinational
operations environment
forces, and
selected brigade
support elements
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
Army's Training Strategy Provides Purpose, but Other Elements Required to
Support the Strategy Need Further Development
While the Army's training strategy addresses each of the required five
elements to some extent, additional work needs to be done to fully develop
these elements in the strategy. Section 353 of Public Law No. 109-163
requires the Army's training strategy for brigade-based combat teams and
functional supporting brigades to include five elements: (1) purpose; (2)
performance goals, which should include specific goals for live, virtual,
and constructive training; (3) metrics; (4) a reporting process; and (5) a
funding model. The Army has fully articulated the purpose of the strategy,
but the remaining elements needed to manage training require further
development. Although the Army has established an overarching performance
goal, the specific goals for live, virtual, and constructive training are
either incomplete or not mandatory. Moreover, the Army does not have an
objective method of measuring performance against its stated overarching
performance goal. In addition, the current reporting and funding systems
do not provide the level of detail necessary to achieve the Army's stated
performance goal. Until the Army fully develops the required elements in
its training strategy, it will not be in a sound position to assess if it
can achieve the long-term benefits of having a consistently trained force,
measure how well units have been trained, and accurately determine the
cost of training.
Purpose of the Strategy Is Fully Articulated
The Army has clearly articulated the purpose of training for its brigade
combat teams and functional supporting brigades. The purpose is stated in
the Army Chief of Staff's strategic direction memorandum of May 9, 2006,
and the Strategic Training Guidance dated June 26, 2006. The overall
purpose of the Army's training strategy is to train to win the current war
while developing leaders for the next war using ARFORGEN. In order to
achieve this purpose, the Chief of Staff of the Army established the
guidelines for training, which are shown in table 3.
Table 3: Army Chief of Staff Guidelines for the Transformation of Army
Training
Guidelines
Retain the Warrior Ethos as training foundations
Train to support the ARFORGEN
Synchronize the modular transformation of units
Appropriately resource the training base with equipment
Improve home station training
Achieve full-spectrum capability with full-spectrum training
Focus on defeating improvised explosive devices
Assimilate future combat systems
Stay current and relevant
Build the bench (develop decision making at the lowest level)
Remain a values-based Army built on standards and discipline while
embracing a culture of innovation
Preserve combat power by reducing accidents
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
Furthermore, the Strategic Training Guidance identifies the processes,
skills, and technologies needed to meet the Army's goals and objectives.
For example, among the issues the guidance explains are ARFORGEN for
training units; the development of military and civilian leaders through
training and education; the various training methods, such as
institutional training (e.g., schoolhouse training) and operational
training (e.g., home station and the combat training centers); and the
systems and technologies present in the Training Support System. Our
analysis of these documents, guidelines, and guidance showed that they
defined the purpose of a strategy, which GPRA identified as necessary,
such as including a description of the operational processes, skills and
technology, and the human capital, information, and other resources
required to meet goals and objectives.
Overarching Performance Goal Established, but Supporting Goals Are Not Complete
or Mandatory
Our review of training strategy documentation reveals that the Army has
identified one overarching performance goal for its modular brigades.
However, the specific supporting performance goals for live, virtual, and
constructive training required by the mandate^10 are neither complete for
all the brigades nor are units required to execute the training the goals
measure. The Army has identified progression through the ARFORGEN
readiness cycle to achieve fully mission capable status as the overarching
performance goal for the modular brigade-based combat teams and functional
supporting brigades. To achieve fully mission capable status, units must
progress first from the reset pool to the ready pool and then from the
ready pool to the available pool. To pass through each pool, brigade
combat teams must undergo (1) a maneuver combat training center-level
training event and (2) a commander's assessment. Functional supporting
brigades complete a command and staff training exercise at the Battle
Command Training Center and a commander's assessment.
^10 Pub. L. No. 109-163 S 353 (a) (2) (B) (2006).
The Army is developing planning templates that identify supporting
activity goals for live and virtual training. These planning templates
list training events with recommended frequencies and associated activity
levels for each live and virtual training event. While the templates
include constructive training exercises, they are not clearly identified.
In addition, the templates do not clearly articulate total activity goals
for constructive training, as they do for live and virtual training.
According to Army officials, commanders can use these planning templates
to develop training programs for their units, and the Army can also use
the total activity goals as indicators of readiness. In addition, the Army
has not completed the planning templates for all the functional supporting
brigades, although Army officials stated that they intend to complete them
during fiscal year 2007. Army officials stated that preparing the
templates for combat units had priority and they focused on completing
those planning templates first.
In addition, according to Army officials, execution of the planning
templates is not mandatory. Instead, commanders may opt to conduct
different training events, or decide to train to activity levels that are
higher or lower than those specified in the planning templates. Army
officials stated they do not want to take away the commanders' flexibility
in training their units by making the planning templates mandatory.
Because achievement of the supporting activity goals is not required by
the Army, they are not effective performance goals. By GPRA standards,
effective performance goals are target levels of performance expressed as
a tangible, measurable objective against which actual achievement is
compared. Without requiring units to achieve these goals, units may be
conducting different levels of live, virtual, and constructive training,
and the Army will not be able to determine if units are trained
consistently.
Army Lacks Metrics That Objectively Measure Achievement of Performance Goal
Our analysis of the Army's training strategy shows that it currently lacks
metrics that can objectively measure achievement against its stated
overarching performance goal. The mandate requires that the Army's
training strategy include metrics that measure training performance
against the strategy's performance goals.^11 The Senate committee report
on GPRA states that performance indicators (metrics) are used to measure
whether a goal is being achieved, and GAO standards identify clarity,
objectivity, and reliability as key attributes of successful
indicators.^12 However, the Army has decided to continue to rely on the
subjective assessment of the commander to determine the readiness
progression of its units in order to provide commanders with more
flexibility in their training plans--just as it did before the development
of the current training strategy. Units move through the ARFORGEN
operational readiness cycle based on the commander's assessment. The
commander bases the assessment on personal observations, feedback from
training events, and external evaluations. The Army has not developed a
set of uniform standards or parameters to guide the commander's
development of the assessment; instead, the assessment is the commander's
subjective evaluation of the unit's ability to complete its mission based
on the commander's professional experience. Consequently, the achievement
of the overarching performance goal is not being objectively measured,
making it difficult to evaluate training to a single Army standard across
units.
^11 Pub. L. No. 109-163, S 353 (a) (2) (B) (2006).
The Army's report to Congress also characterizes two systems as providing
metrics to quantify training performance against the performance goals
specified by the strategy: (1) the unit status report and (2) the training
resource model (TRM). However, the metrics collected by these systems do
not objectively determine fully mission capable status. The Army's unit
status report enables a commander to determine and report his or her
unit's overall level of readiness to accomplish its designed wartime
mission based on the unit's equipment, personnel, and training levels. The
training component of the unit status report allows commanders to report
their evaluation of their unit's proficiency in its mission-essential
tasks. While the unit status report includes objective measures--in the
areas of equipment and personnel--training levels are determined based on
the commander's subjective evaluation of their unit.
In addition, the Army uses TRM to collect data on training activity. TRM
determines operational funding requirements for unit training based on a
unit's activity level, measured in terms of miles driven--tank-miles--or
hours flown--flight-hours. Army officials stated that tank-miles and
flight-hours are indicators of estimated readiness, although driving large
numbers of tank-miles does not necessarily indicate high readiness while
failing to drive a required number of tank-miles does not automatically
equate to low readiness. Instead, the activity measurements are weighed
against a commander's assessment of unit readiness. Therefore, while units
report their activity levels to the Army on a regular basis, these reports
do not provide a basis for determining if units pass through the pools of
the ARFORGEN cycle and reach fully mission capable status.
^12 See GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax
Filing Season Performance Measures, app. I, [24]GAO-03-143 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002).
In using the unit status report and TRM to meet the requirements of the
mandate, the Army is relying on systems and metrics that are not directly
linked to the new overarching performance goal. To measure units' progress
in achieving the strategy's overarching performance goal, the Army
continues to rely on a subjective commander's assessment. As a result, the
Army is using metrics that are not able to objectively quantify actual
training performance against the performance goals currently specified by
the strategy. Until the Army develops metrics that can objectively measure
achievement of its performance goals, it will not be able to objectively
measure how well its forces have been trained and achieve the long-term
benefit of having a consistently trained force.
Reporting System and Funding Model Do Not Provide Enough Information
Current reporting systems and funding models do not provide all the
information needed to manage the training progression of units through
ARFORGEN. The mandate requires that the Army's training strategy
incorporate a process to report the status of collective training^13 for
monitoring the training performance of modular brigade-based combat teams
and functional supporting brigades.^14 While the Army's unit status report
provides an overview of unit training, our analysis shows that it does not
provide specific details on unit collective training performance. By
fiscal year 2008, the Army is scheduled to use a new system called the
Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army^15 that is intended to establish
new performance indicators to evaluate the ability of units to execute
their mission-essential tasks as part of the unit status report. In
addition, the system is intended to support the implementation of ARFORGEN
by requiring commanders to submit a detailed assessment of their units'
collective training, which ties directly to the mission-essential tasks.
Moreover, the Army has developed an additional system, the Digital
Training Management System, that allows commanders at brigade and lower
levels to plan collective training, incorporate theater-specific tasks,
and integrate lessons learned. It also allows their supervisors to monitor
the progress of units as they complete training events and upgrade their
collective training status. However, this system is not linked to the unit
status report.
^13Collective training is training that is conducted within a unit and
focused on preparing the unit to perform its assigned missions.
^14Pub. L. No. 109-163, S 353 (a) (2) (D) (2006).
^15In June 2002, DOD issued a directive establishing the Department of
Defense Readiness Reporting System. This system is intended to measure and
report on the readiness of military forces and the supporting
infrastructure to meet missions and goals assigned by the Secretary of
Defense. All DOD components are required to align their readiness
reporting processes in accordance with the directive.
In addition, the Army's funding model (TRM) for estimating training costs
does not fully estimate the costs required to achieve the Army's stated
performance goals. The mandate requires that the Army's training strategy
include a model to quantify and forecast the operation and maintenance
funding required for each fiscal year to attain the performance goals
specified in the strategy.^16 In its report to Congress, the Army
identifies two types of costs needed to support the training of its
brigade combat teams and functional supporting brigades: (1) operational
unit costs, which include the resources required to conduct and support
unit training, maintain unit equipment, and sustain day-to-day unit
operations, and (2) costs to support the Training Support System, which
include all of the training support products, training facilities, and
services required to enable the execution of training. TRM is part of a
broad process used to calculate institutional, operational, and Training
Support System requirements. According to DOD, this process, which
includes models and cost estimates based on expert judgment, is reviewed
and validated by officials on the Army operations staff.
Army officials use TRM to forecast the operational unit costs for the
training of active component and reserve component units. The estimated
cost per tank-mile/flight-hour and the level of activity associated with
recommended training events are generated by TRM. TRM uses reported
activity data--the actual past costs of training, maintenance, and routine
operations--from units to generate these estimates. TRM estimates costs
based on the full execution of all of the training events and activity
goals detailed in the planning templates. However, TRM activity goals
represent recommended, not required, training events and frequencies. As a
result, the estimates generated by TRM do not necessarily reflect the cost
of the actual amount of training that a unit will conduct. Moreover, TRM
forecasts the greatest cost for training because it includes training that
is not required to be completed. Because the Army has not standardized
what training is necessary for all units to complete to become fully
mission capable, it cannot link training costs to the achievement of its
performance goals.
^16Pub. L. No. 109-163, S 353 (a) (2) (E) (2006).
In using TRM to meet the requirements of the mandate, the Army is
forecasting the costs of implementing the new training strategy with a
funding model that does not realistically estimate the cost of achieving
the overarching performance goal of the strategy. As a result, the Army
risks not having enough information to determine the level of funds needed
to fully train its units and risks investing funds in training that has
not been tied to units achieving performance goals.
Actions Taken to Implement the Army Training Strategy, but Key Implementation
Challenges Remain
The Army has taken some actions to implement its training strategy, but
key implementation challenges remain. Our analysis of the Army's
implementation documents, current training curriculum, and event training
objectives show that the Army is developing guidance, such as training
templates and instructions, to implement the training strategy. However,
implementation of the strategy has been limited because the Army's current
ongoing operational commitments limit the availability of forces as needed
to fully execute the strategy and training is focused on mission rehearsal
instead of full-spectrum operations. In addition, capacity at the Army's
combat training centers is currently inadequate to support the
requirements of ARFORGEN. While the Army intends to address combat
training center capacity by developing an exportable training capability,
this capability has not been tested. Furthermore, implementation is
challenged by the limited availability of training personnel and the
Army's current lack of a plan to deal with the issue. Without developing a
plan to address the challenges associated with the Army's current
operational commitments and the limited capacity of the existing combat
training centers, the Army will not know if it will be able to achieve its
goals of having fully mission capable trained forces to conduct
full-spectrum operations. Moreover, until the Army completes its testing
of the exportable training capability, it will not know what
resources--such as funding--are needed to implement the strategy or if the
concept will meet its needs.
Army Is Developing Guidance for Implementing the Strategy
The Army is developing guidance, such as training templates and
instructions, to implement its training strategy. As required by the
mandate,^17 the Army is developing and attempting to implement a strategy
for training brigade-based combat teams and functional supporting
brigades. As part of this effort, the Army developed one-page training
templates that illustrate ARFORGEN core tasks and reporting criteria for
each type of brigade combat team and functional supporting brigade to help
commanders design unit training plans. This is in addition to the
previously mentioned planning templates that list possible training events
and associated activity goals.
In addition to creating the training templates, the Army is developing
instructions that will provide the Army training community with a road map
to execute the training strategy. The Army's June 2006 Strategic Training
Guidance indicates that these instructions, or master plans, will turn
guidance into actions that support modular brigade training. Specifically,
these instructions will provide planning guidance for several Army
training entities, including the combat training centers, home station
training, the training support system, deployed training, and
institutional training as detailed in table 4.
^17Pub. L. No. 109-163, S 353 (a) (1) (2006).
Table 4: Status of Master Plans
Name Purpose Status
Combat Training Articulates the current state Complete/issued for fiscal
Center Master of the combat training years 2008-2013. Fiscal
Plan centers and identifies years 2010-2015 draft being
resourcing requirements and staffed for publication
outlines a road map to adapt with an issuance date of no
the combat training centers later than the end of
to support the Army December 2007.
transformation/Army Campaign
Plan efforts.
Home Station Addresses modular force Complete/under review at
Master Plan operational and Department of the Army.
organizational concepts and
doctrine, and describes the
training support capabilities
required at home station
during reset/train and ready
force pools.
Training Support Captures what resources are Under development/estimated
System Master needed and are available to issuance November 2007.
Plan support training on all major
U.S. Army installations.
Institutional Integrates soldiers into Will not be formally
Instructions units preparing for issued/concepts have been
deployment and determines incorporated into current
what skills can be learned institutional training.
hands-on or through
distributive learning at
other locations including
home stations and deployed
bases.
Deployment Addresses deployment training Will not be formally
Instructions for units as a component issued/incorporated into
within the Training Support Training Support System
System Master Plan. Master Plan.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
Although our review identified that the Army has developed preparation
tools, such as templates and instructions, to implement the training
strategy, the Army still faces many challenges in its implementation that
these tools do not account for.
Ongoing Operational Commitments Limit the Availability of Forces Needed to Fully
Implement the Training Strategy
While the Army's overall training strategy is designed to support ARFORGEN
by training units through a series of phases, the Army has not fully
implemented the model because ongoing operational requirements have
prevented troops from being available for the required amount of time to
complete the training phases. Army guidance, including the Army's Chief of
Staff Memorandum on the transformation of Army training and the Army's
2007 Posture Statement, states that the Army's training strategy, from
initial entry training to unit combat training center rotations, directly
supports ARFORGEN. However, our analysis indicates that the Army's current
operational commitments preclude ARFORGEN from reaching its steady state.
ARFORGEN as described in the Army Campaign Plan assumes that only
one-third of the Army's combat brigades are deployed at any one time.
However, because of the Army's current operational demands, almost half of
the Army's active duty combat brigades are deployed. According to Army
officials, ARFORGEN normally provides combatant commanders with 18 to 21
combat brigades to support operations. While the number of combat brigades
needed to support the Army's operational commitments varies over time, as
of April 2007, the number of combat brigades needed to support operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan exceed those provided by the model. To meet these
demands, the Army has reduced the time that units spend in ARFORGEN's
rotation pools, revised its reserve mobilization policy, and extended
active unit deployments from 12 months to 15 months. Furthermore, under
ARFORGEN, active duty units are expected to spend 2 years resetting and
training in between deployments; however, brigades are currently spending
much less time in training before being deployed again.^18
Additionally, the Army currently focuses training on preparing units for
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which does not necessarily include the
development and maintenance of skills for full-spectrum operations, such
as preparing for a wide range of scenarios from low-intensity combat to
high-intensity combat. Our analysis of past and recent unit training plans
and discussions with Army training officials indicate that unit commander
training plans have focused solely on preparing for their unit's assigned
mission instead of moving progressively from preparing for core missions
to training for full-spectrum operations, as described in ARFORGEN. Since
February 2004, all combat training rotations conducted at the Army's
National Training Center have been mission rehearsal exercises to prepare
units for deployments, primarily to Iraq and Afghanistan. Army officials
we spoke with indicated that until the Army's operational commitments
decrease, ARFORGEN will not reach its steady state, and because the Army's
training strategy is designed to support ARFORGEN, it cannot be fully
executed until that time. The Army has not adjusted its training strategy
to account for conducting the current high level of operations. In
addition--as stated in the Army's guidance--until ARFORGEN reaches its
steady state, other programs essential to providing combat training to
units such as functional brigades may be curtailed. According to the
Army's ARFORGEN implementation guidance, until the Army fully executes
ARFORGEN, its ability to train units for continuous full-spectrum
operations may be at risk. Without revising the training strategy so that
it includes a plan to support full-spectrum training while maintaining a
high level of ongoing operations, the Army may not train the force to meet
the full range of possible threats.
^18Specific information about the length of time spent in training is
classified.
Army Faces Challenges in Expanding Capacity at Its Combat Training Centers
The Army faces challenges in implementing its training strategy because
the current capacity of the combat training center programs cannot fully
support the training requirements described by ARFORGEN and the model does
not reflect the planned increase in Army end strength. While steps are
being taken to expand the program--such as developing a mobile combat
training center called the Exportable Training Capability (ETC)--these
efforts are not yet fully developed or tested, and may be affected by a
variety of existing training commitments. Moreover, the operations groups
at the Army's combat training centers are not fully staffed because of
ongoing commitments.
Current Combat Training Center Capacity Does Not Support ARFORGEN Requirements
Capacity at the Army's three maneuver combat training centers is currently
inadequate to support the requirements of ARFORGEN. ARFORGEN requires that
combat brigades complete two combat training center-level events--one at
the end of the reset/train pool and another during the ready pool--prior
to entering the available force pool. While the Army has identified the
increased resources needed to train the modular brigade combat teams as
part of its Combat Training Center Way Ahead process, currently the Army's
combat training centers only have the capacity to accommodate up to 28
combat training rotations per year.^19 However, by fiscal year 2010, the
Army must conduct 36 combat training center rotations to support the
modular force structure and the implementation of ARFORGEN.
The Army determined its combat training center capacity needs with the
assumption that under ARFORGEN it would have to train a rotational pool of
70 combat brigades. However, the Army intends to increase the size of its
active force from 512,400 to 547,000 over the next 5 years.^20 The Army
intends to accomplish this by establishing 6 new combat brigades,
resulting in a rotational pool of 76 combat brigades. As of June 2007,
Army officials identified a requirement for 40 combat training center
rotations per year to support the Army's increased end strength.
^19 According to an Army official, the maneuver combat training centers
could surge to conduct additional rotations--adding one each at the
National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center and two
rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center for a total of 32
combat training rotations per year.
Exportable Training Capability Not Fully Developed or Tested
The Army plans to meet the increased demand for combat training rotations
required under ARFORGEN by developing a mobile combat training center, the
ETC. The ETC includes the essential combat training center support,
including a fully equipped operations group with personnel and vehicles;
an instrumentation system; and an opposing force, to conduct brigade-level
training exercises. The Army intends the ETC to travel to training areas
such as unit home stations to provide combat training center-level
exercises. Normally, the ETC will conduct training events to units in the
reset/train phase of ARFORGEN; however, in some circumstances the ETC may
provide training events to units in lieu of a combat training rotation at
a one of the current maneuver training centers.
The ETC concept, however, has not been fully developed or tested. While
the Army has created an organizational and operation concept for the ETC
and has conducted mobile combat training exercises before, it has not
conducted these exercises on the magnitude the proposed ETC concept will
employ. For example, Army officials at the National Training Center stated
that the National Training Center has provided home station mission
rehearsal exercises at three Army installations located in the United
States, but these exercises were on a smaller scale than those conducted
at the center. In addition, the Army's JMRC in Germany currently hosts a
mobile training capability it calls the Expeditionary Training Capability.
JMRC uses this capability to assist with joint training with allied forces
based in Europe and to expand the capability of JMRC by providing combat
training center capabilities to existing German and allied ranges.
According to JMRC officials, the capability currently has the capacity to
support the training of one battalion-size element. This is substantially
different from the Army's ETC concept, which is intended to support an
entire brigade. As this testing has not been completed, it is unclear how
the Army identified $19.3 million in fiscal year 2009 for the
References
Visible links
24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-143
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