    Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the
    Army's Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address
    Implementation Challenges (06-AUG-07, GAO-07-936).

    The Army considers modular force transformation its most
    extensive restructuring since World War II. The Army has
    estimated that restructuring units from a division-based force to
    a more agile and responsive modular brigade-based force will
    require a significant investment through fiscal year 2011. To
    facilitate this transformation, Public Law No. 109-163 Section
    353 directs the Army to develop and implement a training strategy
    for the modular brigades. This law also directs GAO to report on
    the implementation of the strategy. This report discusses (1) the
    extent to which the Army's training strategy addresses the five
    elements specified in the public law and (2) the actions the Army
    has taken to implement its training strategy and the
    implementation challenges it faces. To address these objectives,
    GAO reviewed Army training strategy documentation and interviewed
    Army training personnel.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-936
        ACCNO:   A73933
      TITLE:     Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop
    the Army's Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address
    Implementation Challenges
         DATE:   08/06/2007
      SUBJECT:   Armed forces reserve training
    	     Army personnel
    	     Cost analysis
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Military forces
    	     Military training
    	     Performance measures
    	     Strategic forces
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Training utilization
    	     Program implementation
    	     Program goals or objectives

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    GAO-07-936

         * [1]Results in Brief
         * [2]Background
         * [3]Army's Training Strategy Provides Purpose, but Other Element

              * [4]Purpose of the Strategy Is Fully Articulated
              * [5]Overarching Performance Goal Established, but Supporting Goa
              * [6]Army Lacks Metrics That Objectively Measure Achievement of P
              * [7]Reporting System and Funding Model Do Not Provide Enough Inf

         * [8]Actions Taken to Implement the Army Training Strategy, but K

              * [9]Army Is Developing Guidance for Implementing the Strategy
              * [10]Ongoing Operational Commitments Limit the Availability of Fo
              * [11]Army Faces Challenges in Expanding Capacity at Its Combat Tr

                   * [12]Current Combat Training Center Capacity Does Not Support
                     ARF
                   * [13]Exportable Training Capability Not Fully Developed or
                     Tested
                   * [14]Operations Groups at the Army's Combat Training Centers
                     Not

         * [15]Conclusions
         * [16]Recommendations for Executive Action
         * [17]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * [18]GAO's Mission
         * [19]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

              * [20]Order by Mail or Phone

         * [21]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
         * [22]Congressional Relations
         * [23]Public Affairs

    Report to the Congressional Committees

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    August 2007

    MILITARY TRAINING

    Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army's Strategy for Training
    Modular Brigades and Address Implementation Challenges

    GAO-07-936

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 4
    Background 7
    Army's Training Strategy Provides Purpose, but Other Elements Required to
    Support the Strategy Need Further Development 12
    Actions Taken to Implement the Army Training Strategy, but Key
    Implementation Challenges Remain 18
    Conclusions 26
    Recommendations for Executive Action 27
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28
    Appendix I Scope and Methodology 31
    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 33

    Tables

    Table 1: Details of Army Force Generation Readiness Pools 9
    Table 2: The Army's Combat Training Centers 11
    Table 3: Army Chief of Staff Guidelines for the Transformation of Army
    Training 12
    Table 4: Status of Master Plans 20

    Figures

    Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Brigades 8
    Figure 2: ARFORGEN Training Cycle 10

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office
    Washington, DC 20548

    August 6, 2007

    The Honorable Carl Levin
    Chairman
    The Honorable John McCain
    Ranking Member
    Committee on Armed Services
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Daniel K Inouye
    Chairman
    The Honorable Ted Stevens
    Ranking Member
    Subcommittee on Defense
    Committee on Appropriations
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Ike Skelton
    Chairman
    The Honorable Duncan Hunter
    Ranking Member
    Committee on Armed Services
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable John P. Murtha
    Chairman
    The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
    Ranking Member
    Subcommittee on Defense
    Committee on Appropriations
    House of Representatives

    In 2004, the Army began its modular force transformation to restructure
    itself from a division-based force to a more agile and responsive modular
    brigade-based force--an undertaking it considers the most extensive
    reorganization of its force since World War II. According to Army
    estimates, this initiative will require a significant investment through
    fiscal year 2011, at a time when the Army is fully engaged in operations
    in Afghanistan and Iraq supporting the Global War on Terrorism.
    Transformation is guided by the Army Campaign Plan, which provides
    guidance about basing, restructuring specialties in the Army, increasing
    the length and stability of tours in the United States, and training. The
    Army is expanding its operational force from 33 existing combat brigades
    to 42 modular combat brigades in the active force and creating 28 National
    Guard modular combat brigades. Support units will also be reorganized into
    functional support brigades to provide independent support to several
    brigade combat teams during combat operations. The Army expects to
    complete reorganization of the force by the end of fiscal year 2011. In
    addition to transformation, the Army plans to increase in size from
    512,400 to 547,000 personnel over the next 5 years.

    To help manage its personnel and equipment, coordinate training, and
    prioritize resources, the Army developed a force rotation model called
    Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). Under this model, active and Guard units
    will progress through a series of three stages, called readiness
    pools--reset/train, ready, and available. Active duty brigades will spend
    approximately 1 year in each pool over a 3-year cycle and Guard units will
    train under a 6-year cycle spending approximately 4 years in reset/train
    and 1 year each in the ready and available pools. Units will progress from
    the reset/train pool to the ready pool and from the ready pool to the
    available pool based on their commander's assessment following completion
    of an exercise at one of the Army's combat training centers.^1 Once a
    brigade is assigned to the available pool, it is considered fully mission
    ready and available to deploy.

    Because of the magnitude and associated costs of the Army's
    transformation, Congress directed the Army to develop and implement a
    training strategy for brigade-based combat teams and functional supporting
    brigades to ensure their readiness. Public Law No. 109-163 Section 353
    directs the Army to develop and implement a training strategy that
    includes the following five elements: (1) purpose; (2) performance goals,
    which should include specific goals for live, virtual, and constructive
    training;^2 (3) metrics; (4) a reporting process; and (5) a funding
    model.^3

    ^1The Army's combat training centers enable commanders, their staffs, and
    units to execute advanced training under a variety of conditions that
    approximate actual combat as closely as possible. The combat training
    centers include the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth,
    Kansas, which focuses on computer-assisted battle commander-centric
    training exercises at the Joint Task Force, Army, corps, division, and
    brigade levels, and the maneuver combat training centers--the Joint
    Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany; the Joint Readiness
    Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the National Training Center
    at Fort Irwin, California--which conduct brigade-sized live training
    exercises.

    Public Law No. 109-163 Section 353 also directs GAO to report on the
    status of the Army's implementation of this training strategy. In February
    2007, the Army issued a three-page report to Congress responding to the
    legislative requirement to report on its development of a training
    strategy.^4 This brief Army document touches on each of the five elements
    as directed, but does not provide a great deal of detail. Specifically,
    the report briefly discusses certain elements of the strategy, such as
    performance goals, training ranges, and funding requirements, and
    indicates that the Army has begun implementing its strategy. According to
    Army officials, the overall training strategy, however, is an integrated
    collection of documents reflecting the Army's guidance, strategies,
    models, systems, and processes that must work together to develop a
    trained and ready force. In addition, Army guidance, including the Army's
    Chief of Staff Memorandum on Army training transformation^5 and the Army's
    2007 Posture Statement,^6 states that this training strategy directly
    supports the Army's Force Generation model. For this report, we focused
    our analysis on this broader collection of documents in addition to the
    three-page report. Specifically, we assessed the (1) extent to which the
    Army's training strategy addresses the five elements specified in the
    public law and (2) actions the Army has taken to implement its training
    strategy and identify challenges it faces in implementing the training
    strategy.

    In conducting this analysis, we used the language of Public Law No.
    109-163 Section 353, relevant Army regulations, and the Government
    Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)^7 as criteria for determining
    how the elements of the Army training strategy address the five elements
    specified in the public law and to what degree further development is
    needed. In order to determine the extent to which the Army's training
    strategy addressed the five specified elements and actions taken to
    implement the strategy, we reviewed the Army's Report to Congress on the
    Army Training Strategy and Army Training Strategy documents, guidance, and
    funding plans. We performed content and data analysis on this material to
    determine if the elements identified by the Army met the requirements of
    the mandate and what implementing instructions and guidance have been
    developed. We also examined the extent to which funds and resources have
    been expended or programmed to support the strategy. Additionally, to
    determine the challenges facing implementation, we interviewed Army
    personnel responsible for developing and implementing the Army training
    strategy at the Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau, three of
    the Army's combat training centers, Army Training Doctrine Command, Army
    Forces Command, and the United States Army, Europe. We then compared the
    reports and testimony of officials in the field with the Army Training
    Strategy documents, guidance, and funding plans provided by Army
    headquarters to identify possible constraints. We conducted our review
    from August 2006 through June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards.

    ^2Live training is that which is conducted in a physical environment.
    Virtual simulation training provides crews, leaders, and units with
    realistic training experiences using sophisticated simulators.
    Constructive simulation training is the use of computer models and
    game-type simulations.

    ^3National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2006 (2006).

    ^4Department of the Army, Report to Congress, Subject: Army Training
    Strategy for Brigade Based Combat Teams and Functional Supporting Brigades
    (Washington, D.C.: December 2006).

    ^5Army Chief of Staff Memorandum, Transformation of Training (Washington,
    D.C.: May 9, 2006).

    ^6Army Posture Statement 2007, February 14, 2007.

    ^7Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).

    Results in Brief

    While the Army's training strategy addresses each of the five elements
    specified in the public law to some extent, additional work needs to be
    done by the Army to fully develop the strategy. The purpose of the Army's
    training strategy is clearly articulated in the Chief of Staff's strategic
    direction and in the 2006 Strategic Training Guidance. However, the
    performance goals, metrics, reporting process, and funding model require
    further development. A performance goal--as defined in GPRA--should be a
    target level of performance expressed as a tangible, measurable objective,
    against which actual achievement can be compared. The Army has established
    an overall performance goal for brigades in the modular force to be "fully
    mission capable" when they are available for deployment. In addition, the
    Army has developed specific performance goals for live and virtual
    training for all of the brigade combat teams and some of the functional
    supporting brigades. However, the use of these goals to guide training is
    not mandatory, and neither constructive training nor the goals for it are
    clearly articulated in the templates that units use to plan training. In
    addition, the Army's training strategy currently lacks metrics that can
    objectively measure achievement against its stated overarching performance
    goal. To measure achievement of fully mission capable status, the Army
    relies on a commander's professional assessment--a subjective evaluation
    on whether he or she believes a unit is fully capable of completing its
    mission. Additionally, while the Army has characterized two types of
    metrics it collects as measures of training performance, none of the
    metrics collected objectively determines fully mission capable status.
    Furthermore, the reporting systems the Army uses to support the new
    training strategy do not provide enough information. For example, the
    Army's reporting system, the unit status report, provides an overview of
    training status, but does not provide detailed information about the
    status of collective training. The Army intends to use a "new" Department
    of Defense (DOD) system to capture unit collective training information as
    part of the unit status report by the end of fiscal year 2008. Moreover,
    the Army's current funding model does not realistically estimate the costs
    associated with achieving the overall performance goal of being fully
    mission capable. Specifically, the model calculates costs for all of the
    training events identified in the planning templates, even though they are
    not mandatory or tied to the overall performance goal. Until the Army
    fully develops the required elements in its training strategy, it will not
    be in a sound position to assess if it can achieve the long-term benefits
    of having a consistently trained force, measure how well units have been
    trained, and accurately determine the costs of training. To improve the
    Army's ability to assess unit training and identify funding needs for
    training, we recommend that it clearly identify constructive training
    events and the total activity goals associated with them, develop metrics
    that can objectively and reliably measure achievement against the Army's
    stated performance goal, and revise its methods--including a funding
    model--to better estimate the costs associated with achieving the
    performance goal. In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD concurred
    with our recommendations to develop metrics and revise its methods to
    estimate costs. However, DOD did not concur with our recommendation that
    the Army establish milestones for developing constructive training goals.
    DOD stated that the Army has documented these goals. To support this
    position, Army officials provided us with additional evidence. After
    reviewing this evidence, we have modified our recommendation to emphasize
    the Army's need to clearly identify constructive training and the goals
    associated with it in the planning templates.

    The Army has taken some actions to implement the training strategy, but
    key implementation challenges remain, such as the availability of forces,
    the capacity of the Army's training centers, and personnel shortages. Our
    analysis of the Army's implementation planning documents shows that the
    Army has developed guidance, such as training templates and instructions,
    for implementing the training strategy; however, actual implementation has
    been hindered by current operational commitments. The Army's overall
    training strategy was designed to support ARFORGEN, which is built on the
    assumption that one-third of the Army's active duty brigade combat teams
    are deployed at one time; however almost half of these brigades are
    currently deployed. Because of the pace of operations, active duty units
    cannot spend the 2 years in training expected by the model; in fact, units
    are spending much less time in training before being deployed again.^8
    Training objectives for recent combat training center rotations are
    focused on mission rehearsal exercises to prepare troops for ongoing
    operations; they do not cover all the combat skills needed for
    full-spectrum operations. According to Army officials, implementation of
    the training strategy, which includes building full-spectrum operational
    skills, cannot occur until operational commitments decrease and forces are
    available to enter into the phased ARFORGEN cycles. The Army has not
    adjusted its training strategy to account for conducting the current high
    level of operations. Furthermore, the Army's combat training centers do
    not currently have the capacity to support ARFORGEN requirements. For
    example, to support the model, the Army estimates that its three maneuver
    combat training centers must provide 36 combat training rotations for
    modular brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2010. However, the centers can
    accommodate only 28 combat training rotations,^9 and there are no plans to
    increase the capacity of the fixed site combat training centers in light
    of the planned increase in the Army's end strength. Instead, the Army is
    developing an exportable training capability to supplement the number of
    rotations that can be conducted at the centers. This capability is
    intended to create a combat training center-like event for brigade combat
    teams at their home stations. While the Army has developed plans for
    establishing two organizations--one in the United States and one in
    Germany--to conduct this exportable training, the concepts have not yet
    been tested and it is unclear how much it will cost, even though budget
    documents show that the Army plans to request funding for building the
    exportable training capability in the United States in fiscal year 2009.
    Furthermore, it is unclear what adjustments may or may not be needed in
    order to fulfill existing training commitments in Germany. Implementation
    of the training strategy has also been hampered by a lack of personnel
    available to fill combat training center instructor slots because of other
    operational commitments. For example, the Army's training center for
    functional support brigades and theater brigades cannot execute training
    exercises because of a shortage of staff. The Army does not have a plan to
    address this challenge. Without developing a plan to address the
    challenges associated with the Army's current operational commitments, the
    Army will not know if it will be able to achieve its goals of having fully
    mission capable trained forces to conduct full-spectrum operations.
    Moreover, until the Army completes its testing of the exportable training
    capability, it will not know what resources--such as funding--are needed
    to implement the strategy or if the concept is the most appropriate
    approach for addressing the limited capacity of the existing combat
    training centers. To address the challenges facing the implementation of
    the strategy, we recommend revising or adjusting the training strategy to
    account for current operations and complete the proof of principle test
    for the exportable training capability, to verify that it can support
    increasing capacity requirements and use the results to guide future
    funding requests. DOD concurred with our recommendation to revise or
    adjust the training strategy and to establish milestones for the proof of
    principle test. DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Army
    clarify the capacity needed at the combat training centers. DOD stated
    that the Army has been continuously identifying and updating capacity
    demands, leading the Army to recently decide it needed additional
    exportable training capability. As a result, we have revised our
    recommendation to emphasize that the proof of principle should be
    completed in order for DOD to verify whether the capability is the most
    appropriate approach for meeting its future capacity demands and to adjust
    its fiscal year 2009 request, and future funding requests, accordingly.

    ^8Specific information about the length of time spent in training is
    classified.

    ^9 The centers can surge to accommodate 32 rotations a year.

    Background

    The Army's conversion to a modular force encompasses the Army's total
    force--active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve--and directly
    affects not only the Army's combat units but related command and support
    organizations. A key to the Army's new modular force design is embedding
    within combat brigades reconnaissance, logistics, and other support units
    that previously made up parts of division-level and higher-level command
    and support organizations, allowing the brigades to operate independently.
    The Army is also organizing support forces into functional supporting
    brigades. These brigades will continue to provide high-level support, such
    as aviation, rocket artillery, or large-scale logistics, as part of the
    brigade-based force. By fiscal year 2011, the Army plans to have
    reconfigured its total force into the modular design. The foundation of
    the modular force is the modular brigade combat teams that will have a
    common organizational design and are intended to increase the rotational
    pool of ready units. Modular combat brigades (depicted in fig. 1) will
    have one of three standard designs--heavy brigade, infantry brigade, or
    Stryker brigade.

    Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Brigades

    The Army plans to use a force rotation model--ARFORGEN--to manage the
    modular force. Under the model, active, reserve, and Guard units progress
    through a series of readiness pools. The Army uses these
    pools--reset/train, ready, and available, which are described in table
    1--and mission requirements to prioritize resources and coordinate
    training, personnel, and equipment.

    Table 1: Details of Army Force Generation Readiness Pools

                      Tasks being                            Move to next pool
    Readiness pool conducted            Available for     when
    Reset/train    1. Receiving         1. Homeland       Unit successfully
                      personnel and        security 2.       completes combat
                      equipment 2          Humanitarian and  training
                      Individual and       disaster relief   center-level
                      collective training                    collective training
                      on core tasks                          event
    Ready          Collective training  Mobilization for  Unit successfully
                      on theater-specific  full-spectrum     completes
                      tasks                operations        theater-focused
                                                             combat training
                                                             center-level
                                                             collective training
                                                             event
    Available      1. Deployed in       1. Conducting     Unit returns to home
                      operational mission  active operations station
                      2. Standby for       2. Mobilization
                      immediate deployment for full-spectrum
                      as required          operations

    Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.

    Units will transition through these pools based on the commander's
    assessment of unit capability levels following a combat training
    center-level collective training event, validated by the next higher
    commander and monitored by United States Army Forces Command, as shown in
    figure 2. Army guidance, including the Army's Chief of Staff Memorandum on
    the transformation of Army training and the Army's 2007 Posture Statement,
    states that the Army's training strategy, from initial entry training to
    unit combat training center rotations, directly supports ARFORGEN.

    Figure 2: ARFORGEN Training Cycle

    In addition to training at the home station, the modular force trains at
    the Army's combat training centers. These centers allow brigades to
    perform advanced training under a variety of conditions that approximate
    actual combat as closely as possible, enabling units to assess and build
    upon skills learned at the home station using a combination of live,
    virtual, and constructive training. The Army maintains four combat
    training centers, as shown in table 2. The Joint Multinational Readiness
    Center (JMRC), the Joint Readiness Training Center, and the National
    Training Center are collectively referred to as the maneuver combat
    training centers.

    Table 2: The Army's Combat Training Centers

    Name              Location        Element trained   Focus
    Battle Command    Fort            Corps, division,  Full-spectrum
    Training Program  Leavenworth, KS and brigade staff operations in a joint,
                                                           interagency,
                                                           intergovernmental, and
                                                           multinational
                                                           environment
    Joint             Hohenfels,      Brigade combat    Full-spectrum
    Multinational     Germany         team, selected    operations in a joint,
    Readiness Center                  division maneuver interagency,
                                         and support       intergovernmental, and
                                         units, special    multinational
                                         operations        environment
                                         forces, and
                                         selected brigade
                                         support elements.
    Joint Readiness   Fort Polk, LA   Brigade combat    Full-spectrum
    Training Center                   team, selected    operations in a joint,
                                         division maneuver interagency,
                                         and support       intergovernmental, and
                                         units, special    multinational
                                         operations        environment
                                         forces, and
                                         selected brigade
                                         support elements.
    National Training Fort Irwin, CA  Brigade combat    Full-spectrum
    Center                            team, selected    operations in a joint,
                                         division maneuver interagency,
                                         and support       intergovernmental, and
                                         units, special    multinational
                                         operations        environment
                                         forces, and
                                         selected brigade
                                         support elements

    Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.

    Army's Training Strategy Provides Purpose, but Other Elements Required to
    Support the Strategy Need Further Development

    While the Army's training strategy addresses each of the required five
    elements to some extent, additional work needs to be done to fully develop
    these elements in the strategy. Section 353 of Public Law No. 109-163
    requires the Army's training strategy for brigade-based combat teams and
    functional supporting brigades to include five elements: (1) purpose; (2)
    performance goals, which should include specific goals for live, virtual,
    and constructive training; (3) metrics; (4) a reporting process; and (5) a
    funding model. The Army has fully articulated the purpose of the strategy,
    but the remaining elements needed to manage training require further
    development. Although the Army has established an overarching performance
    goal, the specific goals for live, virtual, and constructive training are
    either incomplete or not mandatory. Moreover, the Army does not have an
    objective method of measuring performance against its stated overarching
    performance goal. In addition, the current reporting and funding systems
    do not provide the level of detail necessary to achieve the Army's stated
    performance goal. Until the Army fully develops the required elements in
    its training strategy, it will not be in a sound position to assess if it
    can achieve the long-term benefits of having a consistently trained force,
    measure how well units have been trained, and accurately determine the
    cost of training.

    Purpose of the Strategy Is Fully Articulated

    The Army has clearly articulated the purpose of training for its brigade
    combat teams and functional supporting brigades. The purpose is stated in
    the Army Chief of Staff's strategic direction memorandum of May 9, 2006,
    and the Strategic Training Guidance dated June 26, 2006. The overall
    purpose of the Army's training strategy is to train to win the current war
    while developing leaders for the next war using ARFORGEN. In order to
    achieve this purpose, the Chief of Staff of the Army established the
    guidelines for training, which are shown in table 3.

    Table 3: Army Chief of Staff Guidelines for the Transformation of Army
    Training

    Guidelines
    Retain the Warrior Ethos as training foundations
    Train to support the ARFORGEN
    Synchronize the modular transformation of units
    Appropriately resource the training base with equipment
    Improve home station training
    Achieve full-spectrum capability with full-spectrum training
    Focus on defeating improvised explosive devices
    Assimilate future combat systems
    Stay current and relevant
    Build the bench (develop decision making at the lowest level)
    Remain a values-based Army built on standards and discipline while
    embracing a culture of innovation
    Preserve combat power by reducing accidents

    Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.

    Furthermore, the Strategic Training Guidance identifies the processes,
    skills, and technologies needed to meet the Army's goals and objectives.
    For example, among the issues the guidance explains are ARFORGEN for
    training units; the development of military and civilian leaders through
    training and education; the various training methods, such as
    institutional training (e.g., schoolhouse training) and operational
    training (e.g., home station and the combat training centers); and the
    systems and technologies present in the Training Support System. Our
    analysis of these documents, guidelines, and guidance showed that they
    defined the purpose of a strategy, which GPRA identified as necessary,
    such as including a description of the operational processes, skills and
    technology, and the human capital, information, and other resources
    required to meet goals and objectives.

    Overarching Performance Goal Established, but Supporting Goals Are Not Complete
    or Mandatory

    Our review of training strategy documentation reveals that the Army has
    identified one overarching performance goal for its modular brigades.
    However, the specific supporting performance goals for live, virtual, and
    constructive training required by the mandate^10 are neither complete for
    all the brigades nor are units required to execute the training the goals
    measure. The Army has identified progression through the ARFORGEN
    readiness cycle to achieve fully mission capable status as the overarching
    performance goal for the modular brigade-based combat teams and functional
    supporting brigades. To achieve fully mission capable status, units must
    progress first from the reset pool to the ready pool and then from the
    ready pool to the available pool. To pass through each pool, brigade
    combat teams must undergo (1) a maneuver combat training center-level
    training event and (2) a commander's assessment. Functional supporting
    brigades complete a command and staff training exercise at the Battle
    Command Training Center and a commander's assessment.

    ^10 Pub. L. No. 109-163 S 353 (a) (2) (B) (2006).

    The Army is developing planning templates that identify supporting
    activity goals for live and virtual training. These planning templates
    list training events with recommended frequencies and associated activity
    levels for each live and virtual training event. While the templates
    include constructive training exercises, they are not clearly identified.
    In addition, the templates do not clearly articulate total activity goals
    for constructive training, as they do for live and virtual training.
    According to Army officials, commanders can use these planning templates
    to develop training programs for their units, and the Army can also use
    the total activity goals as indicators of readiness. In addition, the Army
    has not completed the planning templates for all the functional supporting
    brigades, although Army officials stated that they intend to complete them
    during fiscal year 2007. Army officials stated that preparing the
    templates for combat units had priority and they focused on completing
    those planning templates first.

    In addition, according to Army officials, execution of the planning
    templates is not mandatory. Instead, commanders may opt to conduct
    different training events, or decide to train to activity levels that are
    higher or lower than those specified in the planning templates. Army
    officials stated they do not want to take away the commanders' flexibility
    in training their units by making the planning templates mandatory.
    Because achievement of the supporting activity goals is not required by
    the Army, they are not effective performance goals. By GPRA standards,
    effective performance goals are target levels of performance expressed as
    a tangible, measurable objective against which actual achievement is
    compared. Without requiring units to achieve these goals, units may be
    conducting different levels of live, virtual, and constructive training,
    and the Army will not be able to determine if units are trained
    consistently.

    Army Lacks Metrics That Objectively Measure Achievement of Performance Goal

    Our analysis of the Army's training strategy shows that it currently lacks
    metrics that can objectively measure achievement against its stated
    overarching performance goal. The mandate requires that the Army's
    training strategy include metrics that measure training performance
    against the strategy's performance goals.^11 The Senate committee report
    on GPRA states that performance indicators (metrics) are used to measure
    whether a goal is being achieved, and GAO standards identify clarity,
    objectivity, and reliability as key attributes of successful
    indicators.^12 However, the Army has decided to continue to rely on the
    subjective assessment of the commander to determine the readiness
    progression of its units in order to provide commanders with more
    flexibility in their training plans--just as it did before the development
    of the current training strategy. Units move through the ARFORGEN
    operational readiness cycle based on the commander's assessment. The
    commander bases the assessment on personal observations, feedback from
    training events, and external evaluations. The Army has not developed a
    set of uniform standards or parameters to guide the commander's
    development of the assessment; instead, the assessment is the commander's
    subjective evaluation of the unit's ability to complete its mission based
    on the commander's professional experience. Consequently, the achievement
    of the overarching performance goal is not being objectively measured,
    making it difficult to evaluate training to a single Army standard across
    units.

    ^11 Pub. L. No. 109-163, S 353 (a) (2) (B) (2006).

    The Army's report to Congress also characterizes two systems as providing
    metrics to quantify training performance against the performance goals
    specified by the strategy: (1) the unit status report and (2) the training
    resource model (TRM). However, the metrics collected by these systems do
    not objectively determine fully mission capable status. The Army's unit
    status report enables a commander to determine and report his or her
    unit's overall level of readiness to accomplish its designed wartime
    mission based on the unit's equipment, personnel, and training levels. The
    training component of the unit status report allows commanders to report
    their evaluation of their unit's proficiency in its mission-essential
    tasks. While the unit status report includes objective measures--in the
    areas of equipment and personnel--training levels are determined based on
    the commander's subjective evaluation of their unit.

    In addition, the Army uses TRM to collect data on training activity. TRM
    determines operational funding requirements for unit training based on a
    unit's activity level, measured in terms of miles driven--tank-miles--or
    hours flown--flight-hours. Army officials stated that tank-miles and
    flight-hours are indicators of estimated readiness, although driving large
    numbers of tank-miles does not necessarily indicate high readiness while
    failing to drive a required number of tank-miles does not automatically
    equate to low readiness. Instead, the activity measurements are weighed
    against a commander's assessment of unit readiness. Therefore, while units
    report their activity levels to the Army on a regular basis, these reports
    do not provide a basis for determining if units pass through the pools of
    the ARFORGEN cycle and reach fully mission capable status.

    ^12 See GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax
    Filing Season Performance Measures, app. I, [24]GAO-03-143 (Washington,
    D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002).

    In using the unit status report and TRM to meet the requirements of the
    mandate, the Army is relying on systems and metrics that are not directly
    linked to the new overarching performance goal. To measure units' progress
    in achieving the strategy's overarching performance goal, the Army
    continues to rely on a subjective commander's assessment. As a result, the
    Army is using metrics that are not able to objectively quantify actual
    training performance against the performance goals currently specified by
    the strategy. Until the Army develops metrics that can objectively measure
    achievement of its performance goals, it will not be able to objectively
    measure how well its forces have been trained and achieve the long-term
    benefit of having a consistently trained force.

    Reporting System and Funding Model Do Not Provide Enough Information

    Current reporting systems and funding models do not provide all the
    information needed to manage the training progression of units through
    ARFORGEN. The mandate requires that the Army's training strategy
    incorporate a process to report the status of collective training^13 for
    monitoring the training performance of modular brigade-based combat teams
    and functional supporting brigades.^14 While the Army's unit status report
    provides an overview of unit training, our analysis shows that it does not
    provide specific details on unit collective training performance. By
    fiscal year 2008, the Army is scheduled to use a new system called the
    Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army^15 that is intended to establish
    new performance indicators to evaluate the ability of units to execute
    their mission-essential tasks as part of the unit status report. In
    addition, the system is intended to support the implementation of ARFORGEN
    by requiring commanders to submit a detailed assessment of their units'
    collective training, which ties directly to the mission-essential tasks.
    Moreover, the Army has developed an additional system, the Digital
    Training Management System, that allows commanders at brigade and lower
    levels to plan collective training, incorporate theater-specific tasks,
    and integrate lessons learned. It also allows their supervisors to monitor
    the progress of units as they complete training events and upgrade their
    collective training status. However, this system is not linked to the unit
    status report.

    ^13Collective training is training that is conducted within a unit and
    focused on preparing the unit to perform its assigned missions.

    ^14Pub. L. No. 109-163, S 353 (a) (2) (D) (2006).

    ^15In June 2002, DOD issued a directive establishing the Department of
    Defense Readiness Reporting System. This system is intended to measure and
    report on the readiness of military forces and the supporting
    infrastructure to meet missions and goals assigned by the Secretary of
    Defense. All DOD components are required to align their readiness
    reporting processes in accordance with the directive.

    In addition, the Army's funding model (TRM) for estimating training costs
    does not fully estimate the costs required to achieve the Army's stated
    performance goals. The mandate requires that the Army's training strategy
    include a model to quantify and forecast the operation and maintenance
    funding required for each fiscal year to attain the performance goals
    specified in the strategy.^16 In its report to Congress, the Army
    identifies two types of costs needed to support the training of its
    brigade combat teams and functional supporting brigades: (1) operational
    unit costs, which include the resources required to conduct and support
    unit training, maintain unit equipment, and sustain day-to-day unit
    operations, and (2) costs to support the Training Support System, which
    include all of the training support products, training facilities, and
    services required to enable the execution of training. TRM is part of a
    broad process used to calculate institutional, operational, and Training
    Support System requirements. According to DOD, this process, which
    includes models and cost estimates based on expert judgment, is reviewed
    and validated by officials on the Army operations staff.

    Army officials use TRM to forecast the operational unit costs for the
    training of active component and reserve component units. The estimated
    cost per tank-mile/flight-hour and the level of activity associated with
    recommended training events are generated by TRM. TRM uses reported
    activity data--the actual past costs of training, maintenance, and routine
    operations--from units to generate these estimates. TRM estimates costs
    based on the full execution of all of the training events and activity
    goals detailed in the planning templates. However, TRM activity goals
    represent recommended, not required, training events and frequencies. As a
    result, the estimates generated by TRM do not necessarily reflect the cost
    of the actual amount of training that a unit will conduct. Moreover, TRM
    forecasts the greatest cost for training because it includes training that
    is not required to be completed. Because the Army has not standardized
    what training is necessary for all units to complete to become fully
    mission capable, it cannot link training costs to the achievement of its
    performance goals.

    ^16Pub. L. No. 109-163, S 353 (a) (2) (E) (2006).

    In using TRM to meet the requirements of the mandate, the Army is
    forecasting the costs of implementing the new training strategy with a
    funding model that does not realistically estimate the cost of achieving
    the overarching performance goal of the strategy. As a result, the Army
    risks not having enough information to determine the level of funds needed
    to fully train its units and risks investing funds in training that has
    not been tied to units achieving performance goals.

    Actions Taken to Implement the Army Training Strategy, but Key Implementation
    Challenges Remain

    The Army has taken some actions to implement its training strategy, but
    key implementation challenges remain. Our analysis of the Army's
    implementation documents, current training curriculum, and event training
    objectives show that the Army is developing guidance, such as training
    templates and instructions, to implement the training strategy. However,
    implementation of the strategy has been limited because the Army's current
    ongoing operational commitments limit the availability of forces as needed
    to fully execute the strategy and training is focused on mission rehearsal
    instead of full-spectrum operations. In addition, capacity at the Army's
    combat training centers is currently inadequate to support the
    requirements of ARFORGEN. While the Army intends to address combat
    training center capacity by developing an exportable training capability,
    this capability has not been tested. Furthermore, implementation is
    challenged by the limited availability of training personnel and the
    Army's current lack of a plan to deal with the issue. Without developing a
    plan to address the challenges associated with the Army's current
    operational commitments and the limited capacity of the existing combat
    training centers, the Army will not know if it will be able to achieve its
    goals of having fully mission capable trained forces to conduct
    full-spectrum operations. Moreover, until the Army completes its testing
    of the exportable training capability, it will not know what
    resources--such as funding--are needed to implement the strategy or if the
    concept will meet its needs.

    Army Is Developing Guidance for Implementing the Strategy

    The Army is developing guidance, such as training templates and
    instructions, to implement its training strategy. As required by the
    mandate,^17 the Army is developing and attempting to implement a strategy
    for training brigade-based combat teams and functional supporting
    brigades. As part of this effort, the Army developed one-page training
    templates that illustrate ARFORGEN core tasks and reporting criteria for
    each type of brigade combat team and functional supporting brigade to help
    commanders design unit training plans. This is in addition to the
    previously mentioned planning templates that list possible training events
    and associated activity goals.

    In addition to creating the training templates, the Army is developing
    instructions that will provide the Army training community with a road map
    to execute the training strategy. The Army's June 2006 Strategic Training
    Guidance indicates that these instructions, or master plans, will turn
    guidance into actions that support modular brigade training. Specifically,
    these instructions will provide planning guidance for several Army
    training entities, including the combat training centers, home station
    training, the training support system, deployed training, and
    institutional training as detailed in table 4.

    ^17Pub. L. No. 109-163, S 353 (a) (1) (2006).

    Table 4: Status of Master Plans

    Name             Purpose                       Status
    Combat Training  Articulates the current state Complete/issued for fiscal
    Center Master    of the combat training        years 2008-2013. Fiscal
    Plan             centers and identifies        years 2010-2015 draft being
                        resourcing requirements and   staffed for publication
                        outlines a road map to adapt  with an issuance date of no
                        the combat training centers   later than the end of
                        to support the Army           December 2007.
                        transformation/Army Campaign
                        Plan efforts.
    Home Station     Addresses modular force       Complete/under review at
    Master Plan      operational and               Department of the Army.
                        organizational concepts and
                        doctrine, and describes the
                        training support capabilities
                        required at home station
                        during reset/train and ready
                        force pools.
    Training Support Captures what resources are   Under development/estimated
    System Master    needed and are available to   issuance November 2007.
    Plan             support training on all major
                        U.S. Army installations.
    Institutional    Integrates soldiers into      Will not be formally
    Instructions     units preparing for           issued/concepts have been
                        deployment and determines     incorporated into current
                        what skills can be learned    institutional training.
                        hands-on or through
                        distributive learning at
                        other locations including
                        home stations and deployed
                        bases.
    Deployment       Addresses deployment training Will not be formally
    Instructions     for units as a component      issued/incorporated into
                        within the Training Support   Training Support System
                        System Master Plan.           Master Plan.

    Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.

    Although our review identified that the Army has developed preparation
    tools, such as templates and instructions, to implement the training
    strategy, the Army still faces many challenges in its implementation that
    these tools do not account for.

    Ongoing Operational Commitments Limit the Availability of Forces Needed to Fully
    Implement the Training Strategy

    While the Army's overall training strategy is designed to support ARFORGEN
    by training units through a series of phases, the Army has not fully
    implemented the model because ongoing operational requirements have
    prevented troops from being available for the required amount of time to
    complete the training phases. Army guidance, including the Army's Chief of
    Staff Memorandum on the transformation of Army training and the Army's
    2007 Posture Statement, states that the Army's training strategy, from
    initial entry training to unit combat training center rotations, directly
    supports ARFORGEN. However, our analysis indicates that the Army's current
    operational commitments preclude ARFORGEN from reaching its steady state.

    ARFORGEN as described in the Army Campaign Plan assumes that only
    one-third of the Army's combat brigades are deployed at any one time.
    However, because of the Army's current operational demands, almost half of
    the Army's active duty combat brigades are deployed. According to Army
    officials, ARFORGEN normally provides combatant commanders with 18 to 21
    combat brigades to support operations. While the number of combat brigades
    needed to support the Army's operational commitments varies over time, as
    of April 2007, the number of combat brigades needed to support operations
    in Iraq and Afghanistan exceed those provided by the model. To meet these
    demands, the Army has reduced the time that units spend in ARFORGEN's
    rotation pools, revised its reserve mobilization policy, and extended
    active unit deployments from 12 months to 15 months. Furthermore, under
    ARFORGEN, active duty units are expected to spend 2 years resetting and
    training in between deployments; however, brigades are currently spending
    much less time in training before being deployed again.^18

    Additionally, the Army currently focuses training on preparing units for
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which does not necessarily include the
    development and maintenance of skills for full-spectrum operations, such
    as preparing for a wide range of scenarios from low-intensity combat to
    high-intensity combat. Our analysis of past and recent unit training plans
    and discussions with Army training officials indicate that unit commander
    training plans have focused solely on preparing for their unit's assigned
    mission instead of moving progressively from preparing for core missions
    to training for full-spectrum operations, as described in ARFORGEN. Since
    February 2004, all combat training rotations conducted at the Army's
    National Training Center have been mission rehearsal exercises to prepare
    units for deployments, primarily to Iraq and Afghanistan. Army officials
    we spoke with indicated that until the Army's operational commitments
    decrease, ARFORGEN will not reach its steady state, and because the Army's
    training strategy is designed to support ARFORGEN, it cannot be fully
    executed until that time. The Army has not adjusted its training strategy
    to account for conducting the current high level of operations. In
    addition--as stated in the Army's guidance--until ARFORGEN reaches its
    steady state, other programs essential to providing combat training to
    units such as functional brigades may be curtailed. According to the
    Army's ARFORGEN implementation guidance, until the Army fully executes
    ARFORGEN, its ability to train units for continuous full-spectrum
    operations may be at risk. Without revising the training strategy so that
    it includes a plan to support full-spectrum training while maintaining a
    high level of ongoing operations, the Army may not train the force to meet
    the full range of possible threats.

    ^18Specific information about the length of time spent in training is
    classified.

    Army Faces Challenges in Expanding Capacity at Its Combat Training Centers

    The Army faces challenges in implementing its training strategy because
    the current capacity of the combat training center programs cannot fully
    support the training requirements described by ARFORGEN and the model does
    not reflect the planned increase in Army end strength. While steps are
    being taken to expand the program--such as developing a mobile combat
    training center called the Exportable Training Capability (ETC)--these
    efforts are not yet fully developed or tested, and may be affected by a
    variety of existing training commitments. Moreover, the operations groups
    at the Army's combat training centers are not fully staffed because of
    ongoing commitments.

      Current Combat Training Center Capacity Does Not Support ARFORGEN Requirements

    Capacity at the Army's three maneuver combat training centers is currently
    inadequate to support the requirements of ARFORGEN. ARFORGEN requires that
    combat brigades complete two combat training center-level events--one at
    the end of the reset/train pool and another during the ready pool--prior
    to entering the available force pool. While the Army has identified the
    increased resources needed to train the modular brigade combat teams as
    part of its Combat Training Center Way Ahead process, currently the Army's
    combat training centers only have the capacity to accommodate up to 28
    combat training rotations per year.^19 However, by fiscal year 2010, the
    Army must conduct 36 combat training center rotations to support the
    modular force structure and the implementation of ARFORGEN.

    The Army determined its combat training center capacity needs with the
    assumption that under ARFORGEN it would have to train a rotational pool of
    70 combat brigades. However, the Army intends to increase the size of its
    active force from 512,400 to 547,000 over the next 5 years.^20 The Army
    intends to accomplish this by establishing 6 new combat brigades,
    resulting in a rotational pool of 76 combat brigades. As of June 2007,
    Army officials identified a requirement for 40 combat training center
    rotations per year to support the Army's increased end strength.

    ^19 According to an Army official, the maneuver combat training centers
    could surge to conduct additional rotations--adding one each at the
    National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center and two
    rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center for a total of 32
    combat training rotations per year.

      Exportable Training Capability Not Fully Developed or Tested

    The Army plans to meet the increased demand for combat training rotations
    required under ARFORGEN by developing a mobile combat training center, the
    ETC. The ETC includes the essential combat training center support,
    including a fully equipped operations group with personnel and vehicles;
    an instrumentation system; and an opposing force, to conduct brigade-level
    training exercises. The Army intends the ETC to travel to training areas
    such as unit home stations to provide combat training center-level
    exercises. Normally, the ETC will conduct training events to units in the
    reset/train phase of ARFORGEN; however, in some circumstances the ETC may
    provide training events to units in lieu of a combat training rotation at
    a one of the current maneuver training centers.

    The ETC concept, however, has not been fully developed or tested. While
    the Army has created an organizational and operation concept for the ETC
    and has conducted mobile combat training exercises before, it has not
    conducted these exercises on the magnitude the proposed ETC concept will
    employ. For example, Army officials at the National Training Center stated
    that the National Training Center has provided home station mission
    rehearsal exercises at three Army installations located in the United
    States, but these exercises were on a smaller scale than those conducted
    at the center. In addition, the Army's JMRC in Germany currently hosts a
    mobile training capability it calls the Expeditionary Training Capability.
    JMRC uses this capability to assist with joint training with allied forces
    based in Europe and to expand the capability of JMRC by providing combat
    training center capabilities to existing German and allied ranges.
    According to JMRC officials, the capability currently has the capacity to
    support the training of one battalion-size element. This is substantially
    different from the Army's ETC concept, which is intended to support an
    entire brigade. As this testing has not been completed, it is unclear how
    the Army identified $19.3 million in fiscal year 2009 for the

    References

    Visible links
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