State Department: The July 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens  
from Lebanon (07-JUN-07, GAO-07-893R).				 
                                                                 
The evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens from Lebanon	 
during July and August 2006 was one of the largest overseas	 
evacuations of American citizens in recent history. The 	 
Department of State (State) has the lead responsibility for	 
evacuating American citizens from overseas locations in times of 
crisis. However, the size and unforeseen nature of the Lebanon	 
evacuation required the assistance of the Defense Department	 
(DOD). Specifically, State needed DOD's ability to secure safe	 
passage for American citizens in a war zone, as well as DOD's	 
expertise and resources in providing sea and air transportation  
for large numbers of people. At your request, we have been	 
conducting an ongoing review of State's efforts to plan for,	 
execute, and recover from the evacuation of U.S. government	 
personnel and American citizens from overseas posts. As part of  
this review, we collected information on State and DOD's efforts 
to evacuate U.S. citizens from Lebanon in July and August 2006.  
To address your questions about the Lebanon evacuation, we	 
briefed members of your staff on April 30, 2007, on (1) how State
and DOD prepare for evacuations; (2) how State and DOD carried	 
out the Lebanon evacuation; and (3) our observations on State and
DOD's successes and challenges in implementing the evacuation.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-893R					        
    ACCNO:   A70428						        
  TITLE:     State Department: The July 2006 Evacuation of American   
Citizens from Lebanon						 
     DATE:   06/07/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Americans abroad					 
	     Embassies						 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Evacuation 					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Lessons learned					 
	     Crisis communications				 
	     Cyprus						 
	     Israel						 
	     Lebanon						 

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GAO-07-893R

   

     * [1]d07893R Enclosure II v3.pdf

          * [2]Briefing for the Staff of the House Committee on Foreign
            Affairs and Representative Thelma Drake April 30, 2007
          * [3]The Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon in July 2006
          * [4]Objectives
          * [5]Context
          * [6]Context: State tools to prepare for evacuations
          * [7]Context: State tools to prepare for evacuations
          * [8]Context: DOD and joint DOD-State planning and preparation for
            evacuations
          * [9]Context: State entities involved in Lebanon evacuation
          * [10]Context: DOD entities involved in Lebanon evacuation
          * [11]Context:Lebanon evacuation was not typical
          * [12]Timeline
          * [13]Timeline: the crisis
          * [14]Timeline : planning for evacuation
          * [15]Timeline: departing Lebanon
          * [16]Timeline: departing Lebanon
          * [17]Timeline: Cyprus arrivals and departures
          * [18]Observations
          * [19]Magnitude of crisis taxed State's capacity to respond
          * [20]State did not communicate efficiently with the public
          * [21]State and DOD encountered difficulties working together
          * [22]Actions State has taken after the Lebanon evacuation

     * [23]PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf

          * [24]Order by Mail or Phone

June 7, 2007

The Honorable Tom Lantos
Chairman
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives

The Honorable Thelma Drake
House of Representatives

Subject: State Department: The July 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens
from Lebanon

The evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens from Lebanon during July
and August 2006 was one of the largest overseas evacuations of American
citizens in recent history. The Department of State (State) has the lead
responsibility for evacuating American citizens from overseas locations in
times of crisis. However, the size and unforeseen nature of the Lebanon
evacuation required the assistance of the Defense Department (DOD).
Specifically, State needed DOD's ability to secure safe passage for
American citizens in a war zone, as well as DOD's expertise and resources
in providing sea and air transportation for large numbers of people.

At your request, we have been conducting an ongoing review of State's
efforts to plan for, execute, and recover from the evacuation of U.S.
government personnel and American citizens from overseas posts. As part of
this review, we collected information on State and DOD's efforts to
evacuate U.S. citizens from Lebanon in July and August 2006. To address
your questions about the Lebanon evacuation, we briefed members of your
staff on April 30, 2007, on (1) how State and DOD prepare for evacuations;
(2) how State and DOD carried out the Lebanon evacuation; and (3) our
observations on State and DOD's successes and challenges in implementing
the evacuation. This letter summarizes the main points from our
presentation. See Enclosure II for a copy of the briefing slides from that
presentation, which we have updated based on technical comments from State
and DOD.

To answer our three objectives, we met with State and DOD officials in
Beirut, Lebanon; Nicosia, Cyprus; Washington D.C.; and at DOD's
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) headquarters in Illinois. In addition,
we reviewed State and DOD documents on preparing for evacuations and other
crises, as well as documentation related to the Lebanon evacuation that we
obtained from these locations. We performed our work from July 2006 to
April 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. For additional information on our scope and methodology, see
enclosure I.

Results in Brief

State and DOD have several tools to prepare for the evacuation of American
citizens in a time of crisis. For example, U.S. embassies world-wide are
required to develop Emergency Action Plans (EAP) to prepare for
emergencies, take part in periodic crisis management exercises, and
develop estimates of the number of American citizens in each country.
Within DOD, the Marine Corps regularly trains Marine Expeditionary Units
on how to conduct evacuations of civilians. State and DOD also have a
Memorandum of Agreement to define their respective roles and
responsibilities in the event State requires DOD's assistance in carrying
out an evacuation.

State and DOD's evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon was an
unusually large, complex operation that arose suddenly from an unforeseen
international crisis. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah guerillas kidnapped two
Israeli soldiers at Israel's border with Lebanon. Israel responded the
next day with a major military assault, bombing Lebanon's airport in
Beirut and forcing its closure, blockading Lebanon's ports, and bombing
roads and bridges. On July 14, State and DOD began developing a plan to
move American citizens from Beirut to Cyprus with helicopters, U.S.
military ships, and contracted commercial ships. Although small groups of
Americans began leaving Beirut by helicopter two days later--July 16,
2006--the first large group of Americans did not depart by boat from
Beirut to Cyprus until July 19. The thousands of Americans arriving in
Cyprus began overwhelming local hotels, which were already at close to
peak capacity during the height of the summer tourist season. As a result,
State arranged for emergency shelter and asked for DOD's assistance in
arranging flights back to the United States. The last American evacuees
departing on U.S. government-arranged flights left Cyprus on August 2,
2006.

Though State and DOD's evacuation effort was an overall success, the
departments were challenged in several areas. State and DOD successfully
evacuated nearly 15,000 American citizens from a war zone to the United
States in less than a month. This significant accomplishment was the
result of State and DOD's ability to develop and carry out an evacuation
operation within a rapidly evolving context with uncertain information. We
found three key areas where State and DOD faced challenges in evacuating
American citizens. First, the magnitude of the Lebanon crisis taxed
State's capacity to respond. Second, State did not communicate effectively
with the public, including potential evacuees in Lebanon and their family
and friends in the United States. For example, State initially restricted
Beirut Embassy officials' ability to convey critical information via the
media to Americans seeking to leave Lebanon. Third, State and DOD's
different institutional cultures and systems impeded their ability to work
together; among other things, these differences resulted in
miscommunications and possible delays in chartering ships and planes to
evacuate American citizens. State is taking some steps to address these
challenges.

The observations in this report will be incorporated in our broader review
of State's efforts to plan for, execute, and recover from the evacuation
of U.S. government personnel and American citizens from overseas posts. We
expect to issue that report in September.

Background

At the beginning of the summer of 2006, after the conclusion of a long
civil war and periods of unrest spanning several decades, tourists and
Lebanese-Americans were returning to visit or stay in Lebanon. While State
had a travel warning in place describing recent incidents, such as
assassinations, bombings, and demonstrations, and noting that "the
potential for violence remains," the warning did not mention the
possibility of a large-scale war breaking out. In July 2006, State
estimated that there were about 50,000 Americans in Lebanon.

Shortly after the outbreak of war on July 13, 2006, the U.S. embassy in
Beirut was flooded with calls from American citizens seeking to leave. The
U.S. Ambassador in Beirut concluded that State, on its own, would not be
able to safely evacuate potentially thousands of American citizens from
the midst of an ongoing war in Lebanon. As a result, on July 14, 2006,
State took the relatively unusual step of asking DOD for military
assistance to evacuate American citizens.^1 Although State has conducted
more than 80 evacuations of U.S. government personnel and U.S. private
citizens over the last 5 years, very few involved DOD. In most of these
cases, State was able to rely on commercially available transportation.

State and DOD Have Several Tools to Prepare for Evacuations

State has several tools to prepare for evacuations. For example, every
U.S. overseas post is required to have:

           o An Emergency Action Plan (EAP) based on State guidance compiled
           in the Emergency Planning Handbook. The EAP includes planning for
           specific emergencies and "tripwires" used to determine when to
           authorize post staff and dependants to leave, order them to leave,
           close down the post, or initiate the evacuation of American
           citizens.
           o Crisis management exercises (CME), which are emergency
           simulations intended to improve crisis preparedness. CMEs are
           conducted every 1 to 2-and-a-half years, depending on the dangers
           State associates with living at the post.
           o An F-77 report, which provides an estimate of the number of
           Americans in the country.

At State headquarters in Washington, D.C., a Crisis Management Support
unit coordinates crisis response with other departments and agencies,
supports taskforces that assist posts in handling crises, and trains staff
in evacuation procedures and policy.  Several State bureaus are also
involved in preparations for possible evacuations. For example, these
include the Bureau of Administration, which is responsible for
transportation logistics; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which
generates emergency guidance and oversees planning for crises; and the
Consular Affairs Bureau, which interfaces with American citizens abroad.
State also encourages, but cannot require, U.S. citizens to register with
the department when traveling abroad. According to State officials, this
allows State to have better information on the number and location of
American citizens in a country should a crisis arise. Pursuant to
statutory authority, State has a mechanism for seeking reimbursement from
American citizens for commercial transportation costs associated with an
evacuation.^2

^1 State can request DOD's assistance by having its Executive Secretary
send a memo to his or her counterpart at DOD. Once the decision has been
made to use military personnel and equipment to assist with an evacuation,
the military commander is solely responsible for conducting the
operations, albeit in coordination with and under policies established by
the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative in the affected
country.

Within DOD, the Marine Corps trains Marine Expeditionary Units in
evacuating civilians. These units are trained to rapidly plan and execute
operations to address regional uncertainties and threats. The training
typically includes U.S. embassy officials and other State and U.S.
government personnel who might be involved in a crisis response. The other
DOD entities involved in the Lebanon evacuation included the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, which coordinated interaction with State; TRANSCOM's
subcommands responsible for arranging air and sea transport; and two
regional commands: Central Command (CENTCOM), which at the time covered
Lebanon, and European Command (EUCOM), which covered Cyprus, Turkey, and
Israel.^3

A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between State and DOD addresses the roles
and responsibilities of each agency in implementing evacuations. State is
responsible for the protection and evacuation of all U.S. citizens abroad
and is generally responsible for evacuating U.S. citizens. However, under
the MOA, State may request assistance from DOD if it is unable to obtain
commercial transportation to support an evacuation. Once DOD assistance
has been requested, DOD is solely responsible for conducting the
evacuation, in consultation with the U.S. Ambassador. During an
evacuation, the MOA calls for high-level coordination between State and
DOD through a liaison group that is responsible for evacuation planning
and implementation.

Evacuation from Lebanon Was Unusually Large and Complex

The evacuation from Lebanon presented State and DOD with several
significant challenges. First, it was conducted during an ongoing conflict
where air and land evacuation routes were blocked. In addition, safely
navigating sea routes required negotiation with Israel. Second, since the
crisis was unforeseen, DOD did not have naval assets immediately available
for a sea evacuation. Third, thousands of American citizens wanted to
leave Lebanon. State and DOD were also actively engaged in trying to
address military, humanitarian, and diplomatic issues related to the wider
conflict.

^2 State evacuates U.S. citizens from overseas locations according to 22
U.S.C. 2671(b)(2)(A), which authorizes expenditures from the department's
appropriation for Emergencies in the Diplomatic or Consular Service (the
"K Fund") for "the evacuation when their lives are endangered by war,
civil unrest, or natural disaster of (i) United States Government
employees and their dependents; and (ii) private United States citizens or
third-country nationals, on a reimbursable basis to the maximum extent
practicable..."

^3 Lebanon is now covered by EUCOM for evacuation purposes.

U.S. Embassy officials in Beirut requested DOD's help on July 14, the day
after Israel initiated its bombing campaign. Together, State and DOD
developed a plan to sealift thousands of U.S. citizens out of Beirut and
airlift several hundred urgent cases, including those who were sick or
infirm, to Cyprus via helicopter. DOD designated CENTCOM as the command
responsible for addressing the Lebanon crisis. The 24^th Marine
Expeditionary Unit set sail on July 14 from the Red Sea to the
Mediterranean, a trip that would take 6 days. Meanwhile, on July 15,
TRANSCOM posted a bid for commercial ships to assist with the evacuation,
and DOD began evacuating small groups to Cyprus via helicopter on July 16.
The first U.S.-contracted ship departed Beirut for Cyprus on July 19 with
an initial load of more than 1,000 U.S. evacuees. This Lebanese-owned ship
was one of several commercial vessels contracted by TRANSCOM during the
crisis. U.S. naval ships from the 24^th Marine Expeditionary Unit began
evacuating Americans from Beirut the next day.

By July 23, State and DOD had evacuated almost 10,000 American citizens to
Cyprus. These citizens were arriving in Cyprus faster than State could
arrange charter flights for them back to the United States (see fig. 1).
Therefore, because of the presence of these U.S. citizens, along with
citizens from other countries also evacuated to Cyprus as well as visitors
in Cyprus during the peak summer tourist season, local hotels were quickly
overwhelmed. The U.S. embassy in Nicosia worked with the Cypriot
government to arrange for the Americans to stay at the Nicosia
fairgrounds, in large exhibit halls normally used for trade shows. The
Cypriot government, DOD, State, NGOs, and local businesses provided cots,
portable showers, food, entertainment, and other amenities for U.S.
citizens until they could be flown back to the United States.

Figure 1: U.S. Evacuees in Cyprus: Arrivals and Departures

The evacuation was unusually large, complex, and actually consisted of two
distinct evacuation phases: first, removing nearly 15,000 people from the
war zone in Lebanon to temporary safe havens--DOD transported about 90
percent of the U.S. evacuees to Cyprus, and took the rest to Incirlik
Airbase in Turkey; and, second, flying them from these safe havens to the
United States. Normally, DOD limits its assistance to removing evacuees
from danger, and then turns them over to State at a safe haven, where
State assists them in making travel arrangements to return home. In the
Lebanon evacuation, however, State asked DOD to assist in the
transportation of evacuees to the United States. Due to the large numbers
of American and other evacuees as well as tourists on Cyprus, regularly
scheduled commercial flights were already close to fully booked and there
was intense competition for contracting charter flights. TRANSCOM arranged
for a combination of commercial charter and military planes to fly the
evacuees out of Cyprus and Turkey. TRANSCOM was also using these same
resources to move troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and had to divert some
flights intended for that purpose to the evacuation operation. The last
Americans evacuated from both Beirut and Cyprus on U.S.
government-arranged transport left on August 2, just 3 weeks after the
crisis began. Most of the American citizens evacuated to Cyprus returned
to the U.S. on flights arranged by DOD.^4 However, according to a State
consular official in Cyprus, about 2,000 people who arrived in Cyprus as
part of the U.S. evacuation effort made their own arrangements to leave
the island.^5

State and DOD Safely Evacuated Almost 15,000 Americans, but Faced Several
Challenges

State and DOD safely evacuated almost 15,000 Americans from an
unpredictable war zone with uncertain information regarding the number of
U.S. citizens seeking to leave. However, State faced challenges in three
key areas that impeded the evacuation efforts--the magnitude of the
crisis, State's shortcomings in communicating with the public, and State's
difficulties working with DOD. State is taking some actions to respond to
these challenges.

State and DOD Safely Evacuated Nearly 15,000 Americans

State and DOD evacuated nearly 15,000 Americans from a war zone with no
U.S. evacuees killed or injured during the course of the operation.
Moreover, the departments had to plan the evacuation with uncertain
information. According to a high-level official at the U.S. Embassy in
Beirut, the unpredictable nature of the war, in which both Christian and
Muslim areas were bombed, may have caused greater numbers of people to
panic and leave than State had originally anticipated. In addition, a
consular official at the embassy noted that State's announcement, several
days into the evacuation, that it would not seek reimbursement for
evacuation-related costs may have further increased the numbers of
American citizens seeking to leave. Early in the evacuation, State and DOD
instituted a vital communication tool--twice daily video conferences with
key officials in both agencies--that was not in State's emergency plan for
Beirut, yet, according to State officials, was critical to the success of
the evacuation efforts.

^4 According to State officials, State chartered some of these flights,
and paid for many of the commercial flights arranged by DOD.

^5 State officials noted that State and the Department of Homeland
Security considered less than 75 of these individuals to be security risks
and denied them permission to board U.S.-bound flights. The officials
added that some of those denied permission to go to the United States may
have eventually made their way back to Lebanon.

Magnitude of the Crisis Taxed State's Capacity to Respond

State's emergency guidance and post-specific action plan were quickly
overtaken by the speed, severity, and scope of the crisis, and Beirut
embassy officials said they did not use them. Nearly every aspect of
State's preparations for evacuation was overwhelmed. For example:

           o Embassy officials in Beirut told us they did not use the
           Emergency Planning Handbook or the EAP. The Beirut EAP called for
           using commercial flights from the airport to evacuate people from
           the country, but the airport was closed and overland travel was
           prohibitively risky.^6 
           o Consular officials had trouble registering the surging numbers
           of U.S. citizens who had not registered with the embassy before
           the crisis and were now seeking the embassy's assistance in
           getting out of Lebanon.
           o Five days into the crisis, State suspended its policy of
           collecting promissory notes from evacuees regarding reimbursement
           for evacuation-related costs; State officials said they viewed
           this policy as a potential hurdle in the evacuation process.
           o State's Administration Bureau also had difficulty chartering the
           large volume of flights needed out of Cyprus, and had to turn to
           TRANSCOM for help. State lacked the manpower, training, and
           tracking equipment for an operation of this magnitude. For
           example, State had difficulty determining how many flights it
           needed.
           o The email system at the taskforces coordinating the evacuation
           was overwhelmed. Information was shared primarily by email and all
           email messages were automatically sent to all taskforce members,
           making it difficult to prioritize actions or determine which
           actions had been completed.

Since the evacuation, State has taken several steps to address some of
these issues including:

           o Encouraging American travelers to register with State by
           distributing brochures on how to register as part of the passport
           application process.
           o Sending several cables to all posts detailing various practical
           lessons learned from the Lebanon evacuation.
           o Interviewing U.S. government officials and locally-employed
           staff in Lebanon, Cyprus, Turkey, and Washington, as well as
           evacuees, to glean more lessons, with the intention of using the
           videotaped interviews as a training tool.
           o Introducing a web-based portal for sharing information
           efficiently within State and between State and other agencies.

^6 Given that sea and air transport were not possible or practical for
extricating Americans from landlocked towns in southern Lebanon, the
embassy orchestrated a bus convoy to bring them to Beirut. This was an
extremely dangerous trip that was closely coordinated with Israeli
military authorities and involved very tight timeframes for safe travel
between bombing runs.

State Did Not Communicate Efficiently with the Public

In the crucial first days of the crisis, State did not communicate
efficiently with the public. For example, State initially tried to control
media contact from Washington, which constrained the Beirut embassy's
ability to communicate logistical information in a timely manner to U.S.
citizens seeking to leave. Initially, evacuees had a difficult time
getting information from State on what to do or where to assemble. Embassy
officials in Lebanon stated that people were reassured when State
subsequently modified its policy to allow embassy staff to speak directly
to the media, and said this contact also served as a vital source of
information when other forms of communication were compromised due to the
bombing of cell phone towers and power stations.

State's Emergency Planning Handbook provides guidance on communicating
with the media in various crisis situations and requires posts to
coordinate such contact with Washington. However, the Handbook has no
specific guidance for addressing the public during a mass evacuation of
American citizens from a war zone, and the Beirut Embassy's Emergency
Action Plan has no additional guidance on media communications.

State taskforces in Washington also had difficulty responding to the
public because their members did not have adequate training or access to a
reliable, centralized source of information. For example, relatives of
Americans trying to leave Lebanon were not always able to get through to
taskforce hotlines or to obtain consistent information from State about
the developing situation in Lebanon and U.S. efforts to aid their loved
ones^7. As a result, State is developing new, web-based tools and training
to improve taskforce performance. The tools provide a centralized source
of information, with links to the latest situation reports, maps, and
other information. The links also eliminate the need for mass emails.
After testing an initial roll out of these tools, the Ambassador to Beirut
said they were a significant improvement over the system he used to
interact with the taskforces during the crisis.

State and DOD Encountered Difficulties Working Together

State and DOD have different institutional cultures and systems, which
impeded their ability to work together. For example, officials at both
agencies noted that State and DOD speak different "languages," which made
it difficult for State to communicate its needs and the urgency of the
crisis to DOD. A case in point presented to us was that, where State
officials might request "10 planes," DOD officials would want to know the
precise numbers of people and tonnage of equipment to be transported. DOD
would then determine the number and type of aircraft needed. State
acknowledged these communication difficulties in a cable to all posts that
discussed lessons learned from the Lebanon evacuation. The cable urged
State officials to "define requests for military assistance in terms of
specific requirements" and to "adapt your language when necessary" to
military specifications. In addition, State consular and DOD officials in
Lebanon and Cyprus use data systems with different classification levels,
which inhibited the exchange of important logistical information.
Compounding these institutional differences, the Memorandum of Agreement
between the two agencies does not specify the capabilities and limitations
of each, or a threshold at which DOD can take over transportation
logistics from State. For example, in situations where a large number of
persons are seeking or needing to leave within a short period of time, and
commercial transportation resources (e.g., flights) are limited, DOD would
likely have more assets to draw on in order to implement the evacuation.

^7 According to State, the Consular Affairs contract call center and task
forces responded to more than 25,000 calls from the public, with many
coming directly from Americans in Lebanon.

These issues resulted in miscommunications and possible delays in
chartering ships and planes. For example, State officials in Lebanon acted
quickly after the crisis hit, but had to wait 5 days before the first
U.S.-controlled ship began evacuating people from the country. Further,
State and DOD were competing for some of the same commercial planes,
thereby creating duplicate requests that gave the perception of fewer
available planes for contract. Communication challenges between State and
DOD also resulted in additional time processing evacuees, since State
consular officers did not know that DOD can create passenger manifests
more efficiently than they can.^8

In an attempt to address some of these challenges, State sent two
officials from its Administration Bureau to TRANSCOM headquarters for
several days to learn more about how TRANSCOM operates and its
capabilities, and to develop relationships with key contacts there.
State's new taskforce web tools also address information exchange issues
with DOD by including a direct link to DOD sites and information.

The observations in this report will be incorporated in our broader review
of State's efforts to plan for, execute, and recover from the evacuation
of U.S. government personnel and American citizens from overseas posts. We
expect to issue that report in September.

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
Defense. State provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as
appropriate. DOD did not comment on the report.

As agreed with your staff, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 5 days from the
report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
Secretaries of State and Defense and interested congressional committees.
We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO web site at
[25]http://www.gao.gov .

^8 Despite the difficulties described above, Embassy Nicosia reported
excellent civilian-military coordination with Combined Task Force 59 in
Cyprus.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512- 4268 or [26][email protected] . Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report include
David Maurer, Assistant Director; Joseph Carney; Ian Ferguson; Jon
Fremont; and Kay Halpern.

Sincerely Yours,

Jess T. Ford

Director, International Affairs and Trade

Enclosures

Enclosure I

                             Scope and Methodology

To review State and DOD's preparation for evacuations we examined State
and DOD documents related to evacuation planning, including State's
Emergency Planning Handbook, the Beirut Embassy's Emergency Action Plan,
and the Memorandum of Agreement between State and DOD. We also met with
State officials in the Diplomatic Security Bureau and the Foreign Service
Institute, which overseas crisis management training, and with DOD
officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

To review how State and DOD carried out the evacuation, and make
observations on these agencies' successes and challenges in doing so, we
traveled to Lebanon and Cyprus, where we met with U.S. embassy and host
government officials involved in the evacuation. In Lebanon we visited
sites where U.S. evacuees were processed and where they boarded transport
vessels to U.S. navy ships, as well as the Port of Beirut, where they
boarded commercial ships. In Cyprus, we visited the ports of Larnaca and
Limassol, where evacuees arrived; the airport at Larnaca, where they
boarded flights to the United States; and the Nicosia fairgrounds, where
they were housed during the interim. In Washington, we met with the
Undersecretary of State for Management; the Assistant Secretary of State
for Consular Affairs and other officials from the Consular Affairs Bureau;
and officials from the Bureaus for European and Eurasian Affairs, Near
Eastern Affairs, Administration, Political-Military Affairs, and Resource
Management. We also met with the Crisis Management Support Director and
toured State's Operations Center, where the taskforces are located; we
visited the taskforce rooms on August 3, 2006, while there was still fresh
evidence of their work on the Lebanon crisis. We met with DOD officials in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
and TRANSCOM's Military Sealift Command, and traveled to Scott Air Force
Base in Illinois to meet with officials at TRANSCOM's headquarters and its
Air Mobility Command. In addition, we spoke by telephone with CENTCOM
officials in Tampa, Florida. We examined State and DOD documents related
to the Lebanon evacuation, including situation reports, lessons learned
cables and other documents discussing lessons learned. We obtained and
reviewed materials documenting the number of evacuees arriving and
departing Cyprus, the contracting of ships and planes, and other materials
related to the Lebanon evacuation. We assessed the reliability of this
data by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data, and by
reviewing existing documents. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable to estimate the number of American citizens
evacuated. We performed our work from July 2006 to April 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

(320501)

Enclosure II

                Briefing for the Staff of the House Committee on
                Foreign Affairs and Representative Thelma Drake

                                 April 30, 2007

         The Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon in July 2006

                                   Objectives

           oWe assessed:
           oCONTEXT: How State and DOD prepare for evacuations
           oTIMELINE: How State and DOD carried out the evacuation of
           American Citizens from Lebanon
           oOBSERVATIONS: What worked well and what challenges were faced by
           State and DOD

                                    Context

           The Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) have several
           tools to prepare for evacuations
           Several State and DOD entities were involved in the Lebanon
           evacuation
           The Lebanon evacuation was not a typical evacuation

                                    Context:

                     State tools to prepare for evacuations

Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH) -The EPH contains State's emergency
policies and procedures, and is a post's principal reference for preparing
and revising its Emergency Action Plan.

Emergency Action Plan (EAP) -All posts arerequired to create and
periodically update an EAP that includes planning for specific emergencies
and "tripwires" used to determine when to authorize post staff and
dependants to leave, order themto leave, close down the post, or initiate
the evacuation of American citizens.

Crisis Management Exercises (CMEs) -CMEsare crisis simulations conducted
at all posts every 1-2  1/2 years that are intended to improve crisis
preparedness.

                                    Context:

                     State tools to prepare for evacuations

Task Forces -Task Forces are State's primary crisis management tools. Task
forces facilitate State and interagency coordination and communication in
response to a particular crisis.

Crisis Management Support (CMS) -State's CMS unit supports the task forces
during crises and trains staff in evacuation procedures and policy. CMS
also chairs a Washington-based interagency liaison group.

Washington Liaison Group-This interagency body consists of representatives
from State, DOD, and other agencies that meet todiscuss crisis response
and evacuation planning.

Promissory Notes -Private American citizens are normally asked to sign
promissory notes when being evacuated. State then bills them for what it
would have cost them for commercial transport.

Traveler registration -State encourages Americans to register with State
when traveling abroad, but cannot require them to do so.

F-77 report -The F-77 report provides an estimation of the number of
private American citizens in a country, based in part on traveler
registration, and is used by State and DOD in planning for and conducting
evacuations of American citizens.

                        Context: DOD and joint DOD-State

                    planning and preparation for evacuations

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) -The current MOA between State and DOD on
the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens and other designated
persons, which dates from 1997-1998, is meant to define the roles and
responsibilities of each agency in carrying out evacuations.

DOD Training of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) -DOD regularly trains
MEUsin how to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). A NEO
involves the evacuation of noncombatants, or civilians.

                                    Context:

                       Lebanon evacuation was not typical

[27]Text Box: Typical evacuationsUnfold with time to assess tripwires and
consult EAPInvolve primarily U.S. government employees

                                    Timeline

           The crisis hits
           Planning for evacuation
           Departing Lebanon
           Cyprus arrivals and departures

                              Timeline: the crisis

Wednesday, July 12, 2006

           Hezbollah incursion at Israeli border

Thursday, July 13, 2006

           Israel bombs Beirut airport; airport closes; Israel blockades port

Friday, July 14, 2006

           State requests Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) from DOD
           State authorizes departure for Embassy Beirut non-emergency staff
           who wish to leave

Monday, August 14, 2006

           Hostilities end with cease-fire between Hezbollah and Israel

Source: Lebanon Internal Security Force.

                       Timeline : planning for evacuation

Friday, July 14, 2006:

           DOD designates Central Command (CENTCOM) as the command
           responsible for addressing the Lebanon crisis.
           CENTCOM orders naval ships under its command in the Red Sea to set
           sail for Lebanon.

Saturday, July 15, 2006:

           DOD established rules of engagement for Lebanon evacuation based
           on recommendations from U.S. Ambassadorin Beirutand DOD commander.
           Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) posts a solicitation for
           commercial ships to support the evacuation.

Monday, July 17, 2006:

           DOD orders TRANSCOM to give sole source contract to a cruise ship,
           the Orient Queen

Thursday, July 20, 2006

           Embassy Nicosia sets up fairgrounds as temporary shelter for
           evacuees.

Most evacuees were transported to

Cyprus (top photo), and some, to Turkey

Source: Defense Inteligence Agency (photos).

                          Timeline: departing Lebanon

Saturday, July 15, 2006 Embassy Beirut issues warden messages and press
releases informing American citizens of developing crisis and urging them
to register with embassy.

Sunday, July 16, 2006: Military helicopters begin ferrying small groups to
Cyprus.

Tuesday, July 18, 2006: State determines that it is "impracticable to
charge reimbursement" from evacuees "in this exceptional case."

Source: Lebanon Internal Security Force (photos).

                          Timeline: departing Lebanon

Wednesday, July 19, 2006: The first U.S.-controlled ship (Orient Queen)
departs Beirut with over 1,000 U.S. evacuees, one day after arriving in
Lebanon.

Thursday, July 20, 2006: The first U.S. Navy ship arrives in Beirut, loads
over 1,000 U.S. evacuees, and departs for Cyprus.

Saturday, July 29, 2006: Last ship with U.S. evacuees departs Beirut with
286 private American passengers.

Wednesday, August 2, 2006: Last helicopter departs Beirut with 33 American
evacuees.

Source: Lebanon Internal Security Force (photos).

                                   Timeline:

                         Cyprus arrivals and departures

Sunday, July 16, 2006: The first U.S. evacuees begin arriving via
helicopter.

Wednesday, July 19, 2006:The first flight carrying 145 evacuees departs
Cyprus for the United States.

Thursday, July 20, 2006: The first U.S.-controlled ship arrives in Cyprus
with over 1,000 evacuees.

Saturday, July 22, 2006: The number of U.S. evacuees arriving in Cyprus
reaches its peak, with 3,755 arrivals.

Monday, July 24, 2006: The number of U.S. evacuees departing Cyprus
reaches its peak, with 2,578 leaving.

Wednesday, August 2, 2006 The last U.S.-arranged flight leaves Cyprus with
170 American evacuees.

Source: U.S. Embassy, Nicosia, Cyprus (photos).

[28]Text Box: Timeline:  Cyprus arrivals and departures

                                  Observations

What worked well:

           Stateand DOD safely evacuated almost 15,000 Americans from a war
           zone.
           State and DOD developed and carried out an evacuation operation
           within a rapidly evolving context, with uncertain information.
           Twice daily video teleconferences worked well; these were not in
           EAP.

Challenges:

           The magnitude of crisis taxed State's capacity to respond.
           State did not communicate efficiently with the public.
           State and DOD encountered difficulties working together.

             Magnitude of crisis taxed State's capacity to respond

           EPH and EAP quickly overtaken by events:Embassy Beirut did not use
           these planning documents because they did notaddress a crisis of
           this speed, severity, and scope.
           Consular officials had trouble meeting registration demand during
           the crisis: They admitted that those seeking to leave had
           difficulty registering.
           Promissory notes not practical:State initially attempted to use
           them but deemed them impractical 5 days into the crisis.
           State lacked sufficient capacity to arrange air travel:State had
           difficulty chartering the large volume of flights needed out of
           Cyprus and required TRANSCOM'S help to move thousands out of
           Cyprus, which reduced overcrowding at the Nicosia fairgrounds as
           the number of evacuees swelled.
           Taskforce email system overwhelmed: Emails were sent to all
           taskforce members, making it difficult to prioritize actionsor
           determine which actions had already been completed.

             State did not communicate efficiently with the public

           EPH and EAP guidance counterproductive: It constrained Embassy
           Beirut's ability to communicate logistical information in a timely
           manner to American citizens seeking to leave.

State initially tried to control media contact from Washington: Embassy
Beirut officials said American citizens in Lebanon were reassured when
embassy staff were subsequently allowed to speak directly to the TV
cameras; this also served as a vital source of information when other
forms ofcommunication were compromised.

           Taskforces did not expedite responses to public: State
           acknowledged that the public had difficulty getting through to
           taskforce call centers; taskforce members did not have adequate
           training or access to a reliable, centralized source of
           information.

            State and DOD encountered difficulties working together

           Differences in institutional "languages"impeded State's ability to
           communicate its needs and the urgency of the crisis to DOD.
           The MOA does not specifyeach agency's capabilities and
           limitations, or a threshold at which DOD can take over
           transportation logistics from State.
           Impaired communication on critical issues,like the arrival of
           ships and planes and passenger manifests, due to State Consular
           and DOD officials' differing data systems.
           These challenges resulted in:
           miscommunications and possible delays in chartering ships and
           planes.
           time wasted processing evacuees, since State consular officers did
           not know that DOD can create ship passenger manifests more
           efficiently than they can.

              Actions State has taken after the Lebanon evacuation

           New web-based tools to improve capacity and communications:CMS is
           developing these tools to improve taskforce communications within
           State, with the public, and between State and DOD, and has begun
           to use them in responding to current crises.
           Working with DOD:The Administration Bureau has sent staff to
           TRANSCOM to learn more about how TRANSCOM operates.
           Disseminating lessons learned:
           The Consular Affairs Bureau is conducting an "oral history
           project" to learn more about the Lebanon evacuation and train its
           staff.
           The Undersecretaries for Political Affairs and Management, and the
           Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs have issued
           cables detailing lessons learned from the Lebanon evacuation.
           Mechanism to increase traveler registration:The Consular Affairs
           Bureau is encouraging American travelers to register with the
           State Department.

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