    State Department: The July 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens
    from Lebanon (07-JUN-07, GAO-07-893R).

    The evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens from Lebanon
    during July and August 2006 was one of the largest overseas
    evacuations of American citizens in recent history. The
    Department of State (State) has the lead responsibility for
    evacuating American citizens from overseas locations in times of
    crisis. However, the size and unforeseen nature of the Lebanon
    evacuation required the assistance of the Defense Department
    (DOD). Specifically, State needed DOD's ability to secure safe
    passage for American citizens in a war zone, as well as DOD's
    expertise and resources in providing sea and air transportation
    for large numbers of people. At your request, we have been
    conducting an ongoing review of State's efforts to plan for,
    execute, and recover from the evacuation of U.S. government
    personnel and American citizens from overseas posts. As part of
    this review, we collected information on State and DOD's efforts
    to evacuate U.S. citizens from Lebanon in July and August 2006.
    To address your questions about the Lebanon evacuation, we
    briefed members of your staff on April 30, 2007, on (1) how State
    and DOD prepare for evacuations; (2) how State and DOD carried
    out the Lebanon evacuation; and (3) our observations on State and
    DOD's successes and challenges in implementing the evacuation.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-893R
        ACCNO:   A70428
      TITLE:     State Department: The July 2006 Evacuation of American
    Citizens from Lebanon
         DATE:   06/07/2007
      SUBJECT:   Accountability
    	     Americans abroad
    	     Embassies
    	     Emergency preparedness
    	     Evacuation
    	     Interagency relations
    	     Lessons learned
    	     Crisis communications
    	     Cyprus
    	     Israel
    	     Lebanon

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    ******************************************************************
    GAO-07-893R

         * [1]d07893R Enclosure II v3.pdf

              * [2]Briefing for the Staff of the House Committee on Foreign
                Affairs and Representative Thelma Drake April 30, 2007
              * [3]The Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon in July 2006
              * [4]Objectives
              * [5]Context
              * [6]Context: State tools to prepare for evacuations
              * [7]Context: State tools to prepare for evacuations
              * [8]Context: DOD and joint DOD-State planning and preparation for
                evacuations
              * [9]Context: State entities involved in Lebanon evacuation
              * [10]Context: DOD entities involved in Lebanon evacuation
              * [11]Context:Lebanon evacuation was not typical
              * [12]Timeline
              * [13]Timeline: the crisis
              * [14]Timeline : planning for evacuation
              * [15]Timeline: departing Lebanon
              * [16]Timeline: departing Lebanon
              * [17]Timeline: Cyprus arrivals and departures
              * [18]Observations
              * [19]Magnitude of crisis taxed State's capacity to respond
              * [20]State did not communicate efficiently with the public
              * [21]State and DOD encountered difficulties working together
              * [22]Actions State has taken after the Lebanon evacuation

         * [23]PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf

              * [24]Order by Mail or Phone

    June 7, 2007

    The Honorable Tom Lantos
    Chairman
    The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
    Ranking Member
    Committee on Foreign Affairs
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable Thelma Drake
    House of Representatives

    Subject: State Department: The July 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens
    from Lebanon

    The evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens from Lebanon during July
    and August 2006 was one of the largest overseas evacuations of American
    citizens in recent history. The Department of State (State) has the lead
    responsibility for evacuating American citizens from overseas locations in
    times of crisis. However, the size and unforeseen nature of the Lebanon
    evacuation required the assistance of the Defense Department (DOD).
    Specifically, State needed DOD's ability to secure safe passage for
    American citizens in a war zone, as well as DOD's expertise and resources
    in providing sea and air transportation for large numbers of people.

    At your request, we have been conducting an ongoing review of State's
    efforts to plan for, execute, and recover from the evacuation of U.S.
    government personnel and American citizens from overseas posts. As part of
    this review, we collected information on State and DOD's efforts to
    evacuate U.S. citizens from Lebanon in July and August 2006. To address
    your questions about the Lebanon evacuation, we briefed members of your
    staff on April 30, 2007, on (1) how State and DOD prepare for evacuations;
    (2) how State and DOD carried out the Lebanon evacuation; and (3) our
    observations on State and DOD's successes and challenges in implementing
    the evacuation. This letter summarizes the main points from our
    presentation. See Enclosure II for a copy of the briefing slides from that
    presentation, which we have updated based on technical comments from State
    and DOD.

    To answer our three objectives, we met with State and DOD officials in
    Beirut, Lebanon; Nicosia, Cyprus; Washington D.C.; and at DOD's
    Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) headquarters in Illinois. In addition,
    we reviewed State and DOD documents on preparing for evacuations and other
    crises, as well as documentation related to the Lebanon evacuation that we
    obtained from these locations. We performed our work from July 2006 to
    April 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards. For additional information on our scope and methodology, see
    enclosure I.

    Results in Brief

    State and DOD have several tools to prepare for the evacuation of American
    citizens in a time of crisis. For example, U.S. embassies world-wide are
    required to develop Emergency Action Plans (EAP) to prepare for
    emergencies, take part in periodic crisis management exercises, and
    develop estimates of the number of American citizens in each country.
    Within DOD, the Marine Corps regularly trains Marine Expeditionary Units
    on how to conduct evacuations of civilians. State and DOD also have a
    Memorandum of Agreement to define their respective roles and
    responsibilities in the event State requires DOD's assistance in carrying
    out an evacuation.

    State and DOD's evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon was an
    unusually large, complex operation that arose suddenly from an unforeseen
    international crisis. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah guerillas kidnapped two
    Israeli soldiers at Israel's border with Lebanon. Israel responded the
    next day with a major military assault, bombing Lebanon's airport in
    Beirut and forcing its closure, blockading Lebanon's ports, and bombing
    roads and bridges. On July 14, State and DOD began developing a plan to
    move American citizens from Beirut to Cyprus with helicopters, U.S.
    military ships, and contracted commercial ships. Although small groups of
    Americans began leaving Beirut by helicopter two days later--July 16,
    2006--the first large group of Americans did not depart by boat from
    Beirut to Cyprus until July 19. The thousands of Americans arriving in
    Cyprus began overwhelming local hotels, which were already at close to
    peak capacity during the height of the summer tourist season. As a result,
    State arranged for emergency shelter and asked for DOD's assistance in
    arranging flights back to the United States. The last American evacuees
    departing on U.S. government-arranged flights left Cyprus on August 2,
    2006.

    Though State and DOD's evacuation effort was an overall success, the
    departments were challenged in several areas. State and DOD successfully
    evacuated nearly 15,000 American citizens from a war zone to the United
    States in less than a month. This significant accomplishment was the
    result of State and DOD's ability to develop and carry out an evacuation
    operation within a rapidly evolving context with uncertain information. We
    found three key areas where State and DOD faced challenges in evacuating
    American citizens. First, the magnitude of the Lebanon crisis taxed
    State's capacity to respond. Second, State did not communicate effectively
    with the public, including potential evacuees in Lebanon and their family
    and friends in the United States. For example, State initially restricted
    Beirut Embassy officials' ability to convey critical information via the
    media to Americans seeking to leave Lebanon. Third, State and DOD's
    different institutional cultures and systems impeded their ability to work
    together; among other things, these differences resulted in
    miscommunications and possible delays in chartering ships and planes to
    evacuate American citizens. State is taking some steps to address these
    challenges.

    The observations in this report will be incorporated in our broader review
    of State's efforts to plan for, execute, and recover from the evacuation
    of U.S. government personnel and American citizens from overseas posts. We
    expect to issue that report in September.

    Background

    At the beginning of the summer of 2006, after the conclusion of a long
    civil war and periods of unrest spanning several decades, tourists and
    Lebanese-Americans were returning to visit or stay in Lebanon. While State
    had a travel warning in place describing recent incidents, such as
    assassinations, bombings, and demonstrations, and noting that "the
    potential for violence remains," the warning did not mention the
    possibility of a large-scale war breaking out. In July 2006, State
    estimated that there were about 50,000 Americans in Lebanon.

    Shortly after the outbreak of war on July 13, 2006, the U.S. embassy in
    Beirut was flooded with calls from American citizens seeking to leave. The
    U.S. Ambassador in Beirut concluded that State, on its own, would not be
    able to safely evacuate potentially thousands of American citizens from
    the midst of an ongoing war in Lebanon. As a result, on July 14, 2006,
    State took the relatively unusual step of asking DOD for military
    assistance to evacuate American citizens.^1 Although State has conducted
    more than 80 evacuations of U.S. government personnel and U.S. private
    citizens over the last 5 years, very few involved DOD. In most of these
    cases, State was able to rely on commercially available transportation.

    State and DOD Have Several Tools to Prepare for Evacuations

    State has several tools to prepare for evacuations. For example, every
    U.S. overseas post is required to have:

               o An Emergency Action Plan (EAP) based on State guidance compiled
               in the Emergency Planning Handbook. The EAP includes planning for
               specific emergencies and "tripwires" used to determine when to
               authorize post staff and dependants to leave, order them to leave,
               close down the post, or initiate the evacuation of American
               citizens.
               o Crisis management exercises (CME), which are emergency
               simulations intended to improve crisis preparedness. CMEs are
               conducted every 1 to 2-and-a-half years, depending on the dangers
               State associates with living at the post.
               o An F-77 report, which provides an estimate of the number of
               Americans in the country.

    At State headquarters in Washington, D.C., a Crisis Management Support
    unit coordinates crisis response with other departments and agencies,
    supports taskforces that assist posts in handling crises, and trains staff
    in evacuation procedures and policy.  Several State bureaus are also
    involved in preparations for possible evacuations. For example, these
    include the Bureau of Administration, which is responsible for
    transportation logistics; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which
    generates emergency guidance and oversees planning for crises; and the
    Consular Affairs Bureau, which interfaces with American citizens abroad.
    State also encourages, but cannot require, U.S. citizens to register with
    the department when traveling abroad. According to State officials, this
    allows State to have better information on the number and location of
    American citizens in a country should a crisis arise. Pursuant to
    statutory authority, State has a mechanism for seeking reimbursement from
    American citizens for commercial transportation costs associated with an
    evacuation.^2

    ^1 State can request DOD's assistance by having its Executive Secretary
    send a memo to his or her counterpart at DOD. Once the decision has been
    made to use military personnel and equipment to assist with an evacuation,
    the military commander is solely responsible for conducting the
    operations, albeit in coordination with and under policies established by
    the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative in the affected
    country.

    Within DOD, the Marine Corps trains Marine Expeditionary Units in
    evacuating civilians. These units are trained to rapidly plan and execute
    operations to address regional uncertainties and threats. The training
    typically includes U.S. embassy officials and other State and U.S.
    government personnel who might be involved in a crisis response. The other
    DOD entities involved in the Lebanon evacuation included the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, which coordinated interaction with State; TRANSCOM's
    subcommands responsible for arranging air and sea transport; and two
    regional commands: Central Command (CENTCOM), which at the time covered
    Lebanon, and European Command (EUCOM), which covered Cyprus, Turkey, and
    Israel.^3

    A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between State and DOD addresses the roles
    and responsibilities of each agency in implementing evacuations. State is
    responsible for the protection and evacuation of all U.S. citizens abroad
    and is generally responsible for evacuating U.S. citizens. However, under
    the MOA, State may request assistance from DOD if it is unable to obtain
    commercial transportation to support an evacuation. Once DOD assistance
    has been requested, DOD is solely responsible for conducting the
    evacuation, in consultation with the U.S. Ambassador. During an
    evacuation, the MOA calls for high-level coordination between State and
    DOD through a liaison group that is responsible for evacuation planning
    and implementation.

    Evacuation from Lebanon Was Unusually Large and Complex

    The evacuation from Lebanon presented State and DOD with several
    significant challenges. First, it was conducted during an ongoing conflict
    where air and land evacuation routes were blocked. In addition, safely
    navigating sea routes required negotiation with Israel. Second, since the
    crisis was unforeseen, DOD did not have naval assets immediately available
    for a sea evacuation. Third, thousands of American citizens wanted to
    leave Lebanon. State and DOD were also actively engaged in trying to
    address military, humanitarian, and diplomatic issues related to the wider
    conflict.

    ^2 State evacuates U.S. citizens from overseas locations according to 22
    U.S.C. 2671(b)(2)(A), which authorizes expenditures from the department's
    appropriation for Emergencies in the Diplomatic or Consular Service (the
    "K Fund") for "the evacuation when their lives are endangered by war,
    civil unrest, or natural disaster of (i) United States Government
    employees and their dependents; and (ii) private United States citizens or
    third-country nationals, on a reimbursable basis to the maximum extent
    practicable..."

    ^3 Lebanon is now covered by EUCOM for evacuation purposes.

    U.S. Embassy officials in Beirut requested DOD's help on July 14, the day
    after Israel initiated its bombing campaign. Together, State and DOD
    developed a plan to sealift thousands of U.S. citizens out of Beirut and
    airlift several hundred urgent cases, including those who were sick or
    infirm, to Cyprus via helicopter. DOD designated CENTCOM as the command
    responsible for addressing the Lebanon crisis. The 24^th Marine
    Expeditionary Unit set sail on July 14 from the Red Sea to the
    Mediterranean, a trip that would take 6 days. Meanwhile, on July 15,
    TRANSCOM posted a bid for commercial ships to assist with the evacuation,
    and DOD began evacuating small groups to Cyprus via helicopter on July 16.
    The first U.S.-contracted ship departed Beirut for Cyprus on July 19 with
    an initial load of more than 1,000 U.S. evacuees. This Lebanese-owned ship
    was one of several commercial vessels contracted by TRANSCOM during the
    crisis. U.S. naval ships from the 24^th Marine Expeditionary Unit began
    evacuating Americans from Beirut the next day.

    By July 23, State and DOD had evacuated almost 10,000 American citizens to
    Cyprus. These citizens were arriving in Cyprus faster than State could
    arrange charter flights for them back to the United States (see fig. 1).
    Therefore, because of the presence of these U.S. citizens, along with
    citizens from other countries also evacuated to Cyprus as well as visitors
    in Cyprus during the peak summer tourist season, local hotels were quickly
    overwhelmed. The U.S. embassy in Nicosia worked with the Cypriot
    government to arrange for the Americans to stay at the Nicosia
    fairgrounds, in large exhibit halls normally used for trade shows. The
    Cypriot government, DOD, State, NGOs, and local businesses provided cots,
    portable showers, food, entertainment, and other amenities for U.S.
    citizens until they could be flown back to the United States.

    Figure 1: U.S. Evacuees in Cyprus: Arrivals and Departures

    The evacuation was unusually large, complex, and actually consisted of two
    distinct evacuation phases: first, removing nearly 15,000 people from the
    war zone in Lebanon to temporary safe havens--DOD transported about 90
    percent of the U.S. evacuees to Cyprus, and took the rest to Incirlik
    Airbase in Turkey; and, second, flying them from these safe havens to the
    United States. Normally, DOD limits its assistance to removing evacuees
    from danger, and then turns them over to State at a safe haven, where
    State assists them in making travel arrangements to return home. In the
    Lebanon evacuation, however, State asked DOD to assist in the
    transportation of evacuees to the United States. Due to the large numbers
    of American and other evacuees as well as tourists on Cyprus, regularly
    scheduled commercial flights were already close to fully booked and there
    was intense competition for contracting charter flights. TRANSCOM arranged
    for a combination of commercial charter and military planes to fly the
    evacuees out of Cyprus and Turkey. TRANSCOM was also using these same
    resources to move troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and had to divert some
    flights intended for that purpose to the evacuation operation. The last
    Americans evacuated from both Beirut and Cyprus on U.S.
    government-arranged transport left on August 2, just 3 weeks after the
    crisis began. Most of the American citizens evacuated to Cyprus returned
    to the U.S. on flights arranged by DOD.^4 However, according to a State
    consular official in Cyprus, about 2,000 people who arrived in Cyprus as
    part of the U.S. evacuation effort made their own arrangements to leave
    the island.^5

    State and DOD Safely Evacuated Almost 15,000 Americans, but Faced Several
    Challenges

    State and DOD safely evacuated almost 15,000 Americans from an
    unpredictable war zone with uncertain information regarding the number of
    U.S. citizens seeking to leave. However, State faced challenges in three
    key areas that impeded the evacuation efforts--the magnitude of the
    crisis, State's shortcomings in communicating with the public, and State's
    difficulties working with DOD. State is taking some actions to respond to
    these challenges.

    State and DOD Safely Evacuated Nearly 15,000 Americans

    State and DOD evacuated nearly 15,000 Americans from a war zone with no
    U.S. evacuees killed or injured during the course of the operation.
    Moreover, the departments had to plan the evacuation with uncertain
    information. According to a high-level official at the U.S. Embassy in
    Beirut, the unpredictable nature of the war, in which both Christian and
    Muslim areas were bombed, may have caused greater numbers of people to
    panic and leave than State had originally anticipated. In addition, a
    consular official at the embassy noted that State's announcement, several
    days into the evacuation, that it would not seek reimbursement for
    evacuation-related costs may have further increased the numbers of
    American citizens seeking to leave. Early in the evacuation, State and DOD
    instituted a vital communication tool--twice daily video conferences with
    key officials in both agencies--that was not in State's emergency plan for
    Beirut, yet, according to State officials, was critical to the success of
    the evacuation efforts.

    ^4 According to State officials, State chartered some of these flights,
    and paid for many of the commercial flights arranged by DOD.

    ^5 State officials noted that State and the Department of Homeland
    Security considered less than 75 of these individuals to be security risks
    and denied them permission to board U.S.-bound flights. The officials
    added that some of those denied permission to go to the United States may
    have eventually made their way back to Lebanon.

    Magnitude of the Crisis Taxed State's Capacity to Respond

    State's emergency guidance and post-specific action plan were quickly
    overtaken by the speed, severity, and scope of the crisis, and Beirut
    embassy officials said they did not use them. Nearly every aspect of
    State's preparations for evacuation was overwhelmed. For example:

               o Embassy officials in Beirut told us they did not use the
               Emergency Planning Handbook or the EAP. The Beirut EAP called for
               using commercial flights from the airport to evacuate people from
               the country, but the airport was closed and overland travel was
               prohibitively risky.^6
               o Consular officials had trouble registering the surging numbers
               of U.S. citizens who had not registered with the embassy before
               the crisis and were now seeking the embassy's assistance in
               getting out of Lebanon.
               o Five days into the crisis, State suspended its policy of
               collecting promissory notes from evacuees regarding reimbursement
               for evacuation-related costs; State officials said they viewed
               this policy as a potential hurdle in the evacuation process.
               o State's Administration Bureau also had difficulty chartering the
               large volume of flights needed out of Cyprus, and had to turn to
               TRANSCOM for help. State lacked the manpower, training, and
               tracking equipment for an operation of this magnitude. For
               example, State had difficulty determining how many flights it
               needed.
               o The email system at the taskforces coordinating the evacuation
               was overwhelmed. Information was shared primarily by email and all
               email messages were automatically sent to all taskforce members,
               making it difficult to prioritize actions or determine which
               actions had been completed.

    Since the evacuation, State has taken several steps to address some of
    these issues including:

               o Encouraging American travelers to register with State by
               distributing brochures on how to register as part of the passport
               application process.
               o Sending several cables to all posts detailing various practical
               lessons learned from the Lebanon evacuation.
               o Interviewing U.S. government officials and locally-employed
               staff in Lebanon, Cyprus, Turkey, and Washington, as well as
               evacuees, to glean more lessons, with the intention of using the
               videotaped interviews as a training tool.
               o Introducing a web-based portal for sharing information
               efficiently within State and between State and other agencies.

    ^6 Given that sea and air transport were not possible or practical for
    extricating Americans from landlocked towns in southern Lebanon, the
    embassy orchestrated a bus convoy to bring them to Beirut. This was an
    extremely dangerous trip that was closely coordinated with Israeli
    military authorities and involved very tight timeframes for safe travel
    between bombing runs.

    State Did Not Communicate Efficiently with the Public

    In the crucial first days of the crisis, State did not communicate
    efficiently with the public. For example, State initially tried to control
    media contact from Washington, which constrained the Beirut embassy's
    ability to communicate logistical information in a timely manner to U.S.
    citizens seeking to leave. Initially, evacuees had a difficult time
    getting information from State on what to do or where to assemble. Embassy
    officials in Lebanon stated that people were reassured when State
    subsequently modified its policy to allow embassy staff to speak directly
    to the media, and said this contact also served as a vital source of
    information when other forms of communication were compromised due to the
    bombing of cell phone towers and power stations.

    State's Emergency Planning Handbook provides guidance on communicating
    with the media in various crisis situations and requires posts to
    coordinate such contact with Washington. However, the Handbook has no
    specific guidance for addressing the public during a mass evacuation of
    American citizens from a war zone, and the Beirut Embassy's Emergency
    Action Plan has no additional guidance on media communications.

    State taskforces in Washington also had difficulty responding to the
    public because their members did not have adequate training or access to a
    reliable, centralized source of information. For example, relatives of
    Americans trying to leave Lebanon were not always able to get through to
    taskforce hotlines or to obtain consistent information from State about
    the developing situation in Lebanon and U.S. efforts to aid their loved
    ones^7. As a result, State is developing new, web-based tools and training
    to improve taskforce performance. The tools provide a centralized source
    of information, with links to the latest situation reports, maps, and
    other information. The links also eliminate the need for mass emails.
    After testing an initial roll out of these tools, the Ambassador to Beirut
    said they were a significant improvement over the system he used to
    interact with the taskforces during the crisis.

    State and DOD Encountered Difficulties Working Together

    State and DOD have different institutional cultures and systems, which
    impeded their ability to work together. For example, officials at both
    agencies noted that State and DOD speak different "languages," which made
    it difficult for State to communicate its needs and the urgency of the
    crisis to DOD. A case in point presented to us was that, where State
    officials might request "10 planes," DOD officials would want to know the
    precise numbers of people and tonnage of equipment to be transported. DOD
    would then determine the number and type of aircraft needed. State
    acknowledged these communication difficulties in a cable to all posts that
    discussed lessons learned from the Lebanon evacuation. The cable urged
    State officials to "define requests for military assistance in terms of
    specific requirements" and to "adapt your language when necessary" to
    military specifications. In addition, State consular and DOD officials in
    Lebanon and Cyprus use data systems with different classification levels,
    which inhibited the exchange of important logistical information.
    Compounding these institutional differences, the Memorandum of Agreement
    between the two agencies does not specify the capabilities and limitations
    of each, or a threshold at which DOD can take over transportation
    logistics from State. For example, in situations where a large number of
    persons are seeking or needing to leave within a short period of time, and
    commercial transportation resources (e.g., flights) are limited, DOD would
    likely have more assets to draw on in order to implement the evacuation.

    ^7 According to State, the Consular Affairs contract call center and task
    forces responded to more than 25,000 calls from the public, with many
    coming directly from Americans in Lebanon.

    These issues resulted in miscommunications and possible delays in
    chartering ships and planes. For example, State officials in Lebanon acted
    quickly after the crisis hit, but had to wait 5 days before the first
    U.S.-controlled ship began evacuating people from the country. Further,
    State and DOD were competing for some of the same commercial planes,
    thereby creating duplicate requests that gave the perception of fewer
    available planes for contract. Communication challenges between State and
    DOD also resulted in additional time processing evacuees, since State
    consular officers did not know that DOD can create passenger manifests
    more efficiently than they can.^8

    In an attempt to address some of these challenges, State sent two
    officials from its Administration Bureau to TRANSCOM headquarters for
    several days to learn more about how TRANSCOM operates and its
    capabilities, and to develop relationships with key contacts there.
    State's new taskforce web tools also address information exchange issues
    with DOD by including a direct link to DOD sites and information.

    The observations in this report will be incorporated in our broader review
    of State's efforts to plan for, execute, and recover from the evacuation
    of U.S. government personnel and American citizens from overseas posts. We
    expect to issue that report in September.

    Agency Comments

    We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
    Defense. State provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as
    appropriate. DOD did not comment on the report.

    As agreed with your staff, unless you publicly announce the contents of
    this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 5 days from the
    report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
    Secretaries of State and Defense and interested congressional committees.
    We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
    report will be available at no charge on the GAO web site at
    [25]http://www.gao.gov .

    ^8 Despite the difficulties described above, Embassy Nicosia reported
    excellent civilian-military coordination with Combined Task Force 59 in
    Cyprus.

    If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512- 4268 or [26]fordj@gao.gov . Contact points for
    our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
    the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report include
    David Maurer, Assistant Director; Joseph Carney; Ian Ferguson; Jon
    Fremont; and Kay Halpern.

    Sincerely Yours,

    Jess T. Ford

    Director, International Affairs and Trade

    Enclosures

    Enclosure I

                                 Scope and Methodology

    To review State and DOD's preparation for evacuations we examined State
    and DOD documents related to evacuation planning, including State's
    Emergency Planning Handbook, the Beirut Embassy's Emergency Action Plan,
    and the Memorandum of Agreement between State and DOD. We also met with
    State officials in the Diplomatic Security Bureau and the Foreign Service
    Institute, which overseas crisis management training, and with DOD
    officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

    To review how State and DOD carried out the evacuation, and make
    observations on these agencies' successes and challenges in doing so, we
    traveled to Lebanon and Cyprus, where we met with U.S. embassy and host
    government officials involved in the evacuation. In Lebanon we visited
    sites where U.S. evacuees were processed and where they boarded transport
    vessels to U.S. navy ships, as well as the Port of Beirut, where they
    boarded commercial ships. In Cyprus, we visited the ports of Larnaca and
    Limassol, where evacuees arrived; the airport at Larnaca, where they
    boarded flights to the United States; and the Nicosia fairgrounds, where
    they were housed during the interim. In Washington, we met with the
    Undersecretary of State for Management; the Assistant Secretary of State
    for Consular Affairs and other officials from the Consular Affairs Bureau;
    and officials from the Bureaus for European and Eurasian Affairs, Near
    Eastern Affairs, Administration, Political-Military Affairs, and Resource
    Management. We also met with the Crisis Management Support Director and
    toured State's Operations Center, where the taskforces are located; we
    visited the taskforce rooms on August 3, 2006, while there was still fresh
    evidence of their work on the Lebanon crisis. We met with DOD officials in
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
    and TRANSCOM's Military Sealift Command, and traveled to Scott Air Force
    Base in Illinois to meet with officials at TRANSCOM's headquarters and its
    Air Mobility Command. In addition, we spoke by telephone with CENTCOM
    officials in Tampa, Florida. We examined State and DOD documents related
    to the Lebanon evacuation, including situation reports, lessons learned
    cables and other documents discussing lessons learned. We obtained and
    reviewed materials documenting the number of evacuees arriving and
    departing Cyprus, the contracting of ships and planes, and other materials
    related to the Lebanon evacuation. We assessed the reliability of this
    data by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data, and by
    reviewing existing documents. We determined that the data were
    sufficiently reliable to estimate the number of American citizens
    evacuated. We performed our work from July 2006 to April 2007 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    (320501)

    Enclosure II

                    Briefing for the Staff of the House Committee on
                    Foreign Affairs and Representative Thelma Drake

                                     April 30, 2007

             The Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon in July 2006

                                       Objectives

               oWe assessed:
               oCONTEXT: How State and DOD prepare for evacuations
               oTIMELINE: How State and DOD carried out the evacuation of
               American Citizens from Lebanon
               oOBSERVATIONS: What worked well and what challenges were faced by
               State and DOD

                                        Context

               The Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) have several
               tools to prepare for evacuations
               Several State and DOD entities were involved in the Lebanon
               evacuation
               The Lebanon evacuation was not a typical evacuation

                                        Context:

                         State tools to prepare for evacuations

    Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH) -The EPH contains State's emergency
    policies and procedures, and is a post's principal reference for preparing
    and revising its Emergency Action Plan.

    Emergency Action Plan (EAP) -All posts arerequired to create and
    periodically update an EAP that includes planning for specific emergencies
    and "tripwires" used to determine when to authorize post staff and
    dependants to leave, order themto leave, close down the post, or initiate
    the evacuation of American citizens.

    Crisis Management Exercises (CMEs) -CMEsare crisis simulations conducted
    at all posts every 1-2  1/2 years that are intended to improve crisis
    preparedness.

                                        Context:

                         State tools to prepare for evacuations

    Task Forces -Task Forces are State's primary crisis management tools. Task
    forces facilitate State and interagency coordination and communication in
    response to a particular crisis.

    Crisis Management Support (CMS) -State's CMS unit supports the task forces
    during crises and trains staff in evacuation procedures and policy. CMS
    also chairs a Washington-based interagency liaison group.

    Washington Liaison Group-This interagency body consists of representatives
    from State, DOD, and other agencies that meet todiscuss crisis response
    and evacuation planning.

    Promissory Notes -Private American citizens are normally asked to sign
    promissory notes when being evacuated. State then bills them for what it
    would have cost them for commercial transport.

    Traveler registration -State encourages Americans to register with State
    when traveling abroad, but cannot require them to do so.

    F-77 report -The F-77 report provides an estimation of the number of
    private American citizens in a country, based in part on traveler
    registration, and is used by State and DOD in planning for and conducting
    evacuations of American citizens.

                            Context: DOD and joint DOD-State

                        planning and preparation for evacuations

    Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) -The current MOA between State and DOD on
    the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens and other designated
    persons, which dates from 1997-1998, is meant to define the roles and
    responsibilities of each agency in carrying out evacuations.

    DOD Training of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) -DOD regularly trains
    MEUsin how to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). A NEO
    involves the evacuation of noncombatants, or civilians.

                                        Context:

                           Lebanon evacuation was not typical

    [27]Text Box: Typical evacuationsUnfold with time to assess tripwires and
    consult EAPInvolve primarily U.S. government employees

                                        Timeline

               The crisis hits
               Planning for evacuation
               Departing Lebanon
               Cyprus arrivals and departures

                                  Timeline: the crisis

    Wednesday, July 12, 2006

               Hezbollah incursion at Israeli border

    Thursday, July 13, 2006

               Israel bombs Beirut airport; airport closes; Israel blockades port

    Friday, July 14, 2006

               State requests Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) from DOD
               State authorizes departure for Embassy Beirut non-emergency staff
               who wish to leave

    Monday, August 14, 2006

               Hostilities end with cease-fire between Hezbollah and Israel

    Source: Lebanon Internal Security Force.

                           Timeline : planning for evacuation

    Friday, July 14, 2006:

               DOD designates Central Command (CENTCOM) as the command
               responsible for addressing the Lebanon crisis.
               CENTCOM orders naval ships under its command in the Red Sea to set
               sail for Lebanon.

    Saturday, July 15, 2006:

               DOD established rules of engagement for Lebanon evacuation based
               on recommendations from U.S. Ambassadorin Beirutand DOD commander.
               Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) posts a solicitation for
               commercial ships to support the evacuation.

    Monday, July 17, 2006:

               DOD orders TRANSCOM to give sole source contract to a cruise ship,
               the Orient Queen

    Thursday, July 20, 2006

               Embassy Nicosia sets up fairgrounds as temporary shelter for
               evacuees.

    Most evacuees were transported to

    Cyprus (top photo), and some, to Turkey

    Source: Defense Inteligence Agency (photos).

                              Timeline: departing Lebanon

    Saturday, July 15, 2006 Embassy Beirut issues warden messages and press
    releases informing American citizens of developing crisis and urging them
    to register with embassy.

    Sunday, July 16, 2006: Military helicopters begin ferrying small groups to
    Cyprus.

    Tuesday, July 18, 2006: State determines that it is "impracticable to
    charge reimbursement" from evacuees "in this exceptional case."

    Source: Lebanon Internal Security Force (photos).

                              Timeline: departing Lebanon

    Wednesday, July 19, 2006: The first U.S.-controlled ship (Orient Queen)
    departs Beirut with over 1,000 U.S. evacuees, one day after arriving in
    Lebanon.

    Thursday, July 20, 2006: The first U.S. Navy ship arrives in Beirut, loads
    over 1,000 U.S. evacuees, and departs for Cyprus.

    Saturday, July 29, 2006: Last ship with U.S. evacuees departs Beirut with
    286 private American passengers.

    Wednesday, August 2, 2006: Last helicopter departs Beirut with 33 American
    evacuees.

    Source: Lebanon Internal Security Force (photos).

                                       Timeline:

                             Cyprus arrivals and departures

    Sunday, July 16, 2006: The first U.S. evacuees begin arriving via
    helicopter.

    Wednesday, July 19, 2006:The first flight carrying 145 evacuees departs
    Cyprus for the United States.

    Thursday, July 20, 2006: The first U.S.-controlled ship arrives in Cyprus
    with over 1,000 evacuees.

    Saturday, July 22, 2006: The number of U.S. evacuees arriving in Cyprus
    reaches its peak, with 3,755 arrivals.

    Monday, July 24, 2006: The number of U.S. evacuees departing Cyprus
    reaches its peak, with 2,578 leaving.

    Wednesday, August 2, 2006 The last U.S.-arranged flight leaves Cyprus with
    170 American evacuees.

    Source: U.S. Embassy, Nicosia, Cyprus (photos).

    [28]Text Box: Timeline:  Cyprus arrivals and departures

                                      Observations

    What worked well:

               Stateand DOD safely evacuated almost 15,000 Americans from a war
               zone.
               State and DOD developed and carried out an evacuation operation
               within a rapidly evolving context, with uncertain information.
               Twice daily video teleconferences worked well; these were not in
               EAP.

    Challenges:

               The magnitude of crisis taxed State's capacity to respond.
               State did not communicate efficiently with the public.
               State and DOD encountered difficulties working together.

                 Magnitude of crisis taxed State's capacity to respond

               EPH and EAP quickly overtaken by events:Embassy Beirut did not use
               these planning documents because they did notaddress a crisis of
               this speed, severity, and scope.
               Consular officials had trouble meeting registration demand during
               the crisis: They admitted that those seeking to leave had
               difficulty registering.
               Promissory notes not practical:State initially attempted to use
               them but deemed them impractical 5 days into the crisis.
               State lacked sufficient capacity to arrange air travel:State had
               difficulty chartering the large volume of flights needed out of
               Cyprus and required TRANSCOM'S help to move thousands out of
               Cyprus, which reduced overcrowding at the Nicosia fairgrounds as
               the number of evacuees swelled.
               Taskforce email system overwhelmed: Emails were sent to all
               taskforce members, making it difficult to prioritize actionsor
               determine which actions had already been completed.

                 State did not communicate efficiently with the public

               EPH and EAP guidance counterproductive: It constrained Embassy
               Beirut's ability to communicate logistical information in a timely
               manner to American citizens seeking to leave.

    State initially tried to control media contact from Washington: Embassy
    Beirut officials said American citizens in Lebanon were reassured when
    embassy staff were subsequently allowed to speak directly to the TV
    cameras; this also served as a vital source of information when other
    forms ofcommunication were compromised.

               Taskforces did not expedite responses to public: State
               acknowledged that the public had difficulty getting through to
               taskforce call centers; taskforce members did not have adequate
               training or access to a reliable, centralized source of
               information.

                State and DOD encountered difficulties working together

               Differences in institutional "languages"impeded State's ability to
               communicate its needs and the urgency of the crisis to DOD.
               The MOA does not specifyeach agency's capabilities and
               limitations, or a threshold at which DOD can take over
               transportation logistics from State.
               Impaired communication on critical issues,like the arrival of
               ships and planes and passenger manifests, due to State Consular
               and DOD officials' differing data systems.
               These challenges resulted in:
               miscommunications and possible delays in chartering ships and
               planes.
               time wasted processing evacuees, since State consular officers did
               not know that DOD can create ship passenger manifests more
               efficiently than they can.

                  Actions State has taken after the Lebanon evacuation

               New web-based tools to improve capacity and communications:CMS is
               developing these tools to improve taskforce communications within
               State, with the public, and between State and DOD, and has begun
               to use them in responding to current crises.
               Working with DOD:The Administration Bureau has sent staff to
               TRANSCOM to learn more about how TRANSCOM operates.
               Disseminating lessons learned:
               The Consular Affairs Bureau is conducting an "oral history
               project" to learn more about the Lebanon evacuation and train its
               staff.
               The Undersecretaries for Political Affairs and Management, and the
               Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs have issued
               cables detailing lessons learned from the Lebanon evacuation.
               Mechanism to increase traveler registration:The Consular Affairs
               Bureau is encouraging American travelers to register with the
               State Department.

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