Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to	 
In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be	 
Strengthened (31-JUL-07, GAO-07-891R).				 
                                                                 
Five years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,	 
concerns continue to be raised about the nation's system for	 
protecting commercial aviation. Past disclosures of terrorists'  
plans for smuggling liquids onboard aircraft to construct a bomb 
in flight highlighted the continued need to examine this key	 
aspect of homeland security. One layer of the aviation security  
system involves the ability of the federal government to respond 
to actual or potential security threats while a commercial	 
aircraft is in flight. These security threats can include the	 
following: (1) Passengers considered to be security risks to	 
aviation are found to be onboard flights bound for or leaving the
United States. (2) Situations develop while the aircraft is in	 
flight--for example, a passenger becomes disruptive or acts	 
suspiciously, a bomb threat is received, or an unidentified	 
package is found onboard the aircraft. (3) A commercial aircraft 
transmits a signal designed to alert authorities that a hijacking
is in process. Procedures for addressing these in-flight security
threats involve a wide range of federal agencies and entities.	 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for	 
taking much of the lead in responding to these incidents, and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established to  
ensure the security of all modes of transportation--including	 
aviation. Responding to an in-flight threat, however, involves	 
many agencies beyond DHS and TSA. Depending on the nature of the 
threat, managing and responding to in-flight threats can involve 
extensive coordination among more than 15 federal agencies and	 
agency components, each with its own set of responsibilities that
may influence the threat response. For example, another DHS	 
component, Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) National	 
Targeting Center (NTC), is responsible for comparing names and	 
other identifying information of passengers onboard commercial	 
aircraft flying to or from the United States with terrorist watch
lists of persons considered to be potential security risks. If a 
passenger is determined to match an identity listed on a	 
terrorist watch list, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
a Department of Justice (DOJ) agency, is often involved in	 
conducting a risk assessment of the threat posed by that	 
passenger while the flight is en route. Further, the Department  
of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)  
becomes involved with in-flight threats as it monitors aircraft  
traffic entering into and operating within U.S. airspace to	 
ensure safe operations, while the Department of Defense's (DOD)  
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)--a bi-national  
command established by agreement between the governments of the  
United States and Canada--becomes involved with the situation as 
it ensures the air sovereignty and air defense of U.S. airspace. 
Since these security incidents involve aircraft that are already 
in flight, timely and effective coordination among these agencies
and components is paramount. Congress asked that we examine	 
in-flight security threats and current federal efforts to respond
collaboratively to them. In response, on February 28, 2007, we	 
issued a classified report addressing the following questions:	 
(1) What were the number and types of in-flight security	 
incidents that occurred onboard commercial aircraft during 2005  
that were reported to TSA, and to what extent did these threats  
result in aircraft being diverted? (2) What is the process that  
federal agencies follow to identify, assess, and respond to	 
in-flight security threats? (3) To what extent did interagency	 
coordination problems occur during 2005, if at all, and what	 
steps did the involved agencies take to address any identified	 
problems?							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-891R					        
    ACCNO:   A73755						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to
In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be	 
Strengthened							 
     DATE:   07/31/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Airport security					 
	     Aviation security					 
	     Federal agencies					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Security threats					 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Policies and procedures				 

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GAO-07-891R

   

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July 31, 2007

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable John L. Mica
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry F. Costello
Chairman
The Honorable Thomas E. Petri
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Aviation
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
House of Representatives

Subject: Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to
In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened

Five years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns
continue to be raised about the nation's system for protecting commercial
aviation. Past disclosures of terrorists' plans for smuggling liquids
onboard aircraft to construct a bomb in flight highlighted the continued
need to examine this key aspect of homeland security. One layer of the
aviation security system involves the ability of the federal government to
respond to actual or potential security threats while a commercial
aircraft is in flight. These security threats can include the following:

           o Passengers considered to be security risks to aviation are found
           to be onboard flights bound for or leaving the United States.
           o Situations develop while the aircraft is in flight--for example,
           a passenger becomes disruptive or acts suspiciously, a bomb threat
           is received, or an unidentified package is found onboard the
           aircraft.
           o A commercial aircraft transmits a signal designed to alert
           authorities that a hijacking is in process.^1

Procedures for addressing these in-flight security threats involve a wide
range of federal agencies and entities. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is responsible for taking much of the lead in responding to
these incidents, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was
established to ensure the security of all modes of
transportation--including aviation.^2 Responding to an in-flight threat,
however, involves many agencies beyond DHS and TSA. Depending on the
nature of the threat, managing and responding to in-flight threats can
involve extensive coordination among more than 15 federal agencies and
agency components, each with its own set of responsibilities that may
influence the threat response. For example, another DHS component, Customs
and Border Protection's (CBP) National Targeting Center (NTC), is
responsible for comparing names and other identifying information of
passengers onboard commercial aircraft flying to or from the United States
with terrorist watch lists of persons considered to be potential security
risks. If a passenger is determined to match an identity listed on a
terrorist watch list, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a
Department of Justice (DOJ) agency, is often involved in conducting a risk
assessment of the threat posed by that passenger while the flight is en
route. Further, the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) becomes involved with in-flight threats as it
monitors aircraft traffic entering into and operating within U.S. airspace
to ensure safe operations, while the Department of Defense's (DOD) North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)--a bi-national command
established by agreement between the governments of the United States and
Canada--becomes involved with the situation as it ensures the air
sovereignty and air defense of U.S. airspace. Since these security
incidents involve aircraft that are already in flight, timely and
effective coordination among these agencies and components is paramount.

You asked that we examine in-flight security threats and current federal
efforts to respond collaboratively to them. In response, on February 28,
2007, we issued a classified report addressing the following questions:
(1) What were the number and types of in-flight security incidents that
occurred onboard commercial aircraft during 2005 that were reported to
TSA, and to what extent did these threats result in aircraft being
diverted? (2) What is the process that federal agencies follow to
identify, assess, and respond to in-flight security threats? (3) To what
extent did interagency coordination problems occur during 2005, if at all,
and what steps did the involved agencies take to address any identified
problems?

As our February 2007 report contained information that was deemed to be
either classified, sensitive security information, or law enforcement
sensitive, this version of the report is intended to generally summarize
our overall findings and recommendations while omitting sensitive
information about the in-flight security threat resolution process,
including specific agency roles and responsibilities and coordination
challenges that have occurred and steps agencies have taken to address
them. Our classified February 2007 report also summarized the events
associated with security-related aircraft diversions that occurred in
2005, but those summaries included classified or sensitive information and
therefore could not be included in this report. As our intent in preparing
this report is to convey, in a publicly available format, the
non-classified, non-sensitive results of the classified February 2007
report, we did not attempt to update the information here to reflect
changes that may have occurred since the publication of the February 2007
report.

^1Aircraft that violate restricted airspace may also pose a security
threat. We previously reported on the interagency operations to manage
aircraft incursions into restricted airspace. For more information, see
GAO, Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted
Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed, [3]GAO-05-928T
(Washington, D.C.: July 2005).

^2TSA was originally created as an agency within the Department of
Transportation (DOT). The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, signed into law on November 25, 2002, transferred
TSA from DOT to DHS.

Although the information provided in this report is much more limited in
scope, the overall methodology used for our initial report is relevant to
this version of the report as well because the information contained here
was derived from the initial classified report. To address the objectives
of our initial report, we analyzed security incident reports from TSA
dated January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2005. Because TSA is the
primary agency responsible for aviation security and maintains records of
aviation security incidents, the TSA incident reports were our primary
source of security threat information. These TSA incident reports contain
descriptions of in-flight threat incidents that were reported to TSA and
include information on the threat type and whether or not the aircraft was
diverted. To understand the in-flight security threat resolution process,
the extent to which interagency coordination problems occurred, and the
steps agencies have taken to strengthen interagency coordination, we met
with representatives from key offices within DHS, DOT, DOD, and DOJ who
have responsibility for in-flight security threat resolution.^3 We also
analyzed documentation--including agency aviation security incident
reports--from these agencies to supplement information obtained from TSA
security incident reports. In addition, we met with representatives of two
domestic and five foreign air carriers--including some air carriers that
have been involved in aircraft diversions--to discuss air carrier and
government responsibilities pertaining to in-flight security threats. We
also interviewed officials from three domestic and two international air
carrier associations that represent the interests of air carriers and
travelers to obtain their views on air carrier and government
responsibilities pertaining to in-flight security threats. We conducted
our work from April 2005 through November 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results

Aviation Security Consists of Multiple Layers

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001,
created TSA as the agency responsible for securing all modes of
transportation, including aviation.^4 Since then, TSA has worked with
other stakeholders to develop a layered approach to ensure the security of
commercial aviation, involving multiple diverse and coordinated measures.
These measures include enhancing passenger and checked baggage screening,
offering security training for flight and cabin crews to handle potential
threats onboard aircraft, expanding the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)
to place more federal air marshals on domestic and international
commercial flights, and training pilots on commercial passenger and cargo
aircraft on how to use lethal force against an intruder on the flight deck
through the Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDO) Program.^5

^3Specifically, within DHS we met with representatives and analyzed
documents from TSA, including the Federal Air Marshal Service, the Office
of Intelligence, and the Transportation Security Operations Center;
Customs and Border Protection's National Targeting Center; and the
Homeland Security Operations Center. Within DOT, we met with
representatives and analyzed documents from FAA and the National Capital
Region Coordination Center. Within DOJ, we met with representatives and
analyzed documents from FBI, including the Terrorist Screening Operations
Unit and the Terrorist Screening Center. Within DOD, we met with
representatives and analyzed documents from NORAD and U.S. Northern
Command. We also met with representatives from the National
Counterterrorism Center.

^4Pub. L. No. 107-71 (2001).

Many Agencies Are Involved in Resolving In-flight Security Threats

Consistent with its role as the lead federal agency responsible for
aviation security, TSA established the Transportation Security Operations
Center (TSOC), TSA's operational center for managing all types of
transportation security incidents. To assist TSOC in performing its
duties, in November 2004, TSA issued a security directive requiring all
commercial air carriers flying to, from, or within the United States to
report all in-flight security threats to TSOC so it can coordinate the
federal response.^6 The security directive contains the criteria for which
types of threats air carriers should report to TSOC, but according to TSA
officials, the guidelines were purposefully left vague because TSA
preferred that air carriers report too many incidents rather than too few.
For example, the security directive states that air carriers should report
all incidents and suspicious activity that could affect the security of
U.S. civil aviation. Prior to the issuance of this security directive, air
carriers were not required to report potential in-flight security threats
to TSA. As a result, TSA and other federal agencies did not always have
the information they needed to appropriately respond to security
incidents.

Although TSA was created and vested with authority to secure the nation's
aviation system, this effort requires a significant degree of interagency
collaboration and coordination because it involves many different aspects
of homeland security, aviation operations, and law enforcement--everything
from examining thousands of passenger lists for inbound and outbound
international flights to ensure that suspected terrorists are not boarding
aircraft, to diverting flights to alternative airports--and, if needed,
mobilizing military fighter jets to intercept threatening aircraft. Four
main departments are involved in this interagency effort: Homeland
Security, Justice, Transportation, and Defense. Additionally, the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), a component of the new Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, may also be involved. The nature and
extent of each agency's involvement depends on the type and nature of the
threat. The specific roles and responsibilities of each agency involved in
the resolution of in-flight security threats is considered law enforcement
sensitive and thus could not be included in this report.

^5Administered by TSA, the FFDO Program deputizes volunteer pilots of
commercial passenger aircraft as armed federal law enforcement officers
for the purpose of defending the flight deck "against acts of criminal
violence or air piracy." Since the program was officially established on
February 25, 2003, TSA has deputized thousands of eligible flight crew
members as FFDOs.

^6Security Directive 1544-04-15, "Incidents and Suspicious Activity
Reporting," became effective on December 8, 2004, and applies to all air
carriers that are required to adopt and carry out a security program
regulated under CFR Part 1544, and that operate flights to, from, or
within the United States. A security directive is used by an agency to
notify aircraft and airport operators or field staff of a specific
security concern where additional security measures are necessary to
respond to a threat assessment or a specific threat against the United
States. The security directive will require the entity that receives it to
carry out certain measures. If these certain measures cannot be carried
out, the entity that receives the security directive must have alternative
measures approved.

Agencies Use Interagency Communication Tools to Coordinate during
In-flight Security Threats

One communications tool that agencies use to gather and disseminate
information for all types of in-flight security threats is the Domestic
Events Network, an around-the-clock unclassified teleconference with
controlled access administered by FAA and monitored by approximately 60
users from a variety of federal agencies as well as state and local
entities.^7 This network was originally established as a conference call
on the morning of September 11, 2001, to coordinate the federal response
to the hijacked aircraft and has remained in existence since then as an
open telecommunication line that serves as a basis for interagency
communication. Any Domestic Events Network user can broadcast information,
allowing other agencies on the network to communicate and monitor a
situation in real time. Another important interagency communications tool
is the Defense Red Switch Network, which is a secure, classified network
administered by DOD. However, some officials involved in the interagency
resolution of in-flight security threats may not have the appropriate
clearances to participate in the Defense Red Switch Network discussions.
As a result, decisions reached via discussions over the Defense Red Switch
Network are typically broadcast over the unclassified Domestic Events
Network so officials without access to the classified network can stay
informed.

Relatively Few In-flight Incidents Were Reported during 2005, with a Small
Percentage Resulting in Aircraft Diversions

Federal agencies and air carriers reported relatively few in-flight
security threat incidents to TSA during calendar year 2005 as compared
with the number of flights that occurred.^8 In-flight security threats
include a wide range of incidents, but all are considered to threaten the
security and safety of an aircraft and occur between the times the
aircraft departs and lands. Approximately two-thirds of these reported
incidents involved disruptive passengers such as passengers who were
intoxicated, unruly, or trying to smoke in a lavatory. The remaining
one-third of reported incidents included, for example, situations in which
passengers that the U.S. government had previously identified as
representing a security risk were identified onboard international flights
traveling to or from the United States,^9 suspicious passenger behavior,
or an aircraft accidentally transmitting a signal that a hijack was in
process. In calendar year 2005, a relatively small percentage of all
reported in-flight security threats were deemed serious enough to initiate
the diversion of the aircraft from its original destination.^10

^7Events broadcast over the Domestic Events Network may include incidents
that occur in an airport terminal as well as situations that arise onboard
an aircraft.

^8The specific number of in-flight security threats is considered law
enforcement sensitive and therefore could not be included in this report.

^9The specific number of passengers previously identified as representing
a security risk, as well as the process that is used to identify these
passengers, is considered law enforcement sensitive and therefore could
not be included in this report.

^10The specific number of aircraft diversions that occurred in 2005 and a
detailed discussion of each diversion are considered law enforcement
sensitive and therefore could not be included in this report. For purposes
of this review, the phrase "initiate a diversion" refers to the security
decision that an aircraft should be diverted because of an in-flight
security threat. We are not referring to the operational implementation of
the diversion, such as directing the aircraft to a specific location.

Process for Resolving In-flight Security Threats Requires Extensive Agency
Coordination and Typically Involves Four Main Stages

The process that federal agencies follow to identify, assess, and respond
to in-flight security threats generally involves multiple federal agencies
and other entities (such as air carriers), each having specific roles and
responsibilities that vary according to the facts and circumstances of the
threat. TSA is responsible for coordinating the overall interagency
process for resolving in-flight security threats but does not control the
actions of other agencies; rather, each agency has its own mission,
responsibilities, and procedures. For example, NORAD uses its own
procedures for deciding how to respond to an in-flight security threat
(such as launching military jets to intercept a flight). The coordination
process that agencies use to resolve reported threats has never been
systematically or comprehensively documented. Using interviews and agency
documents, we developed a four-stage framework for describing the typical
interagency process for resolving in-flight security threats. The four
process stages are (1) identifying the threat and notifying affected
agencies; (2) sharing pertinent information and collaboratively assessing
the severity of the threat; (3) deciding on and carrying out the
appropriate in-flight response, such as initiating a diversion; and (4) if
necessary, completing the law enforcement response when the flight has
landed.

Federal agencies have options for responding to an in-flight security
threat incident such as (1) ordering the aircraft to divert by either
denying it access to U.S. airspace or requiring it to land at a U.S.
airport that is different from its intended destination,^11 and (2)
launching military fighter jets to monitor or intercept the aircraft. In
general, TSA is the federal agency responsible for deciding if an aircraft
should be diverted because of an in-flight security threat, and FAA is
responsible for managing the operational aspects of the diversion.^12 The
specific process agencies typically follow to make these determinations is
considered sensitive security information and therefore could not be
included in this report, but in general, TSA, the pilot in command,^13 or
FAA may initiate a diversion if it is considered the most appropriate
response to the security threat, based on the unique facts and
circumstances of each incident and the judgment of the individuals
involved.

Agencies Experienced Relatively Few Coordination Problems in Resolving
In-flight Security Threats and Took Steps to Address Them, but
Opportunities Exist to Further Strengthen Coordination

Agencies have taken steps to enhance the interagency coordination process
for resolving in-flight security threats. Although we identified a few
coordination problems during 2005, none resulted in serious consequences
such as a hijacking. Problems included misunderstandings of other
agencies' roles and responsibilities and untimely information sharing--due
in part to a lack of clear policies and procedures. Agencies took some
steps to address identified problems and proactively worked to strengthen
coordination. Nevertheless, we identified three concerns with the current
process for resolving in-flight security threats:

^11For purposes of this report, we are defining an aircraft diversion as
the redirecting of a commercial aircraft to a location other than its
intended destination because of an in-flight security threat involving
that specific aircraft. We are not including flight cancellations,
aircraft that are required to change their flight path but land at their
intended destination, or ground-based security incidents, such as an
airport closure, that result in an aircraft being redirected to an
alternative airport.

^12Once a diversion is initiated, FAA and its air traffic controllers are
responsible for any operational aspect of the diversion within U.S.
airspace. For example, FAA is responsible for providing information and
assistance to both TSA and the pilot to ensure that an aircraft is
diverted safely.

^13The pilot in command is the pilot responsible for the operation and
safety of an aircraft during flight.

           o Agencies lack a comprehensive document describing  each agency's
           roles and responsibilities for responding to in-flight security
           threats and the information to be shared among agencies. Without
           such a document, interagency communication and information sharing
           can be hindered, potentially leading to confusion and a slower
           response. Since the response to in-flight security threats is
           inherently an interagency effort, having established policies and
           procedures to guide this information exchange and resulting
           actions is important. Agency officials involved in the resolution
           of in-flight threats generally agreed that a concept of operations
           plan or similar document would help strengthen the interagency
           threat resolution process.

           o Procedures guiding the interagency coordination process are not
           uniformly established or shared. Some agencies lack established
           procedures, and some do not routinely share them, even though
           agencies agreed this could improve interagency coordination. In
           previous work, we found that a lack of clearly established
           policies and procedures for sharing information among agencies can
           hinder interagency coordination efforts.^14 Two key federal
           entities involved in the interagency resolution of in-flight
           security threats--FAA and TSOC, TSA's operational center for
           managing all types of transportation security incidents--have not
           finalized internal standard operating procedures outlining roles,
           responsibilities, and interactions with partner agencies. Agency
           officials from FAA and TSOC stated that their procedures would be
           finalized, but did not specify a date for when this would occur.
           In addition, agencies have also not routinely shared their
           procedures with other agencies that they regularly coordinate with
           to resolve in-flight threats, even though doing so could improve
           interagency coordination. For example, as of October 2006, FAA had
           not received standard operating procedures or other detailed
           procedural documentation from NORAD or TSOC. According to agency
           officials, sharing these procedures could help ensure that each
           agency establishes compatible policies and procedures to enhance
           the safety of in-flight security threat resolution and strengthen
           overall interagency coordination.

           o Some agencies have not documented and applied lessons learned
           from interagency exercises. FAA and TSA conduct interagency
           exercises to enhance coordination for responding to in-flight
           threat scenarios, but no mechanism exists for documenting the
           exercise results. As a result, officials did not systematically
           document or distribute the results of the exercises or identify
           any follow-up action items. TSA officials stated that they
           believed it was clear during the exercises who was responsible for
           follow-up activities, if any were needed. However, by not
           systematically producing after-action reports, agencies are
           unlikely to realize all of the benefits that participating in
           interagency exercises can provide. We have found that after-action
           reports provide accountability and wider dissemination of
           information because they identify problems or issues and can be
           used to track the progress of corrective action.^15

^14See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [4]GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).

^15With regard to monitoring and evaluation efforts, we reported in
January 2005 that U.S. Coast Guard units we studied were limited in their
ability to benefit from port security exercises because after-action
reports did not accurately capture all exercise results and lessons
learned. GAO, Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned
from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, [5]GAO-05-170 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005).

Conclusions and Recommendations for Executive Action

As the post-September 11 interagency threat resolution process matures, it
is important for agencies to develop mechanisms and procedures that enable
effective and efficient coordination. Such steps are necessary, for
example, to ensure that even when key individuals are absent, others will
know how to respond. To strengthen the interagency coordination process
for resolving in-flight security threats, we recommended in our February
2007 report that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Transportation, and
Defense, and the Attorney General, take the following two actions:

           o develop a concept of operations plan or similar interagency
           document that outlines the general interagency coordination
           strategy and clearly delineates lines of communication among all
           agencies and entities involved in resolving in-flight security
           threats and

           o ensure that each agency involved in the resolution of in-flight
           security threats has documented internal standard operating
           procedures that clearly identify agency procedures for resolving
           in-flight security incidents, and establish mechanisms for sharing
           these standard operating procedures with other agencies as
           appropriate.

We also recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and
Transportation direct the Administrators of TSA and FAA, respectively, to
enhance the effectiveness of interagency exercises involving in-flight
security threats by fully documenting and disseminating the results to all
participants and ensuring that any follow-up action items are addressed as
appropriate.

DHS and DOD agreed with the recommendations.^16 DOT and DOJ did not
comment on them.

^16Agency comments on the recommendations are considered sensitive
security information and therefore could not be included in this report.

We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security; the Secretary of the Department of Transportation; the
Secretary of the Department of Defense; the Attorney General; and
interested congressional committees. We will also make this report
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [6]http://www.gao.gov . If you
or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at
(202) 512-3404 or [7][email protected] . Other key contributors to this
report were Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director; Lisa Canini; Rudy Chatlos; Adam
Hoffman; David Hooper; James Madar; Denise McCabe; Leslie Sarapu; Kathryn
Smith; and Stan Stenersen.

Cathleen A. Berrick
Director, Homeland Security and Justice

(440616)

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References

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3. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-928T
4. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
5. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-170
6. http://www.gao.gov/
7. mailto:[email protected]
8. http://www.gao.gov/
9. http://www.gao.gov/
  10. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  11. mailto:[email protected]
  12. mailto:[email protected]
  13. mailto:[email protected]
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