Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration
at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies
(20-OCT-06, GAO-07-89).
Because terrorists do not operate on a 9-5 schedule, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its operational
components have established information gathering and analysis
centers that conduct activities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
365 days a year. Staff at these operations centers work to help
detect, deter, and prevent terrorist acts. DHS has determined
that out of 25 operations centers, four require higher levels of
collaboration that can only be provided by personnel from
multiple DHS agencies, and other federal, and sometimes state and
local, agencies. For these four multi-agency operations centers,
this report (1) describes their missions, products, functions,
and customers and (2) assesses the extent to which DHS efforts to
promote collaboration among the multiple agencies responsible for
the centers reflect key practices for enhancing and sustaining
collaborative efforts. To do so, GAO visited operations centers,
reviewed data and reports from the centers, and interviewed
center and other DHS officials.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-89
ACCNO: A62444
TITLE: Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance
Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS
Agencies
DATE: 10/20/2006
SUBJECT: Accountability
Agency missions
Counterterrorism
Federal agencies
Homeland security
Information management
Interagency relations
Monitoring
Program evaluation
Reporting requirements
Strategic planning
Terrorism
Terrorists
Intelligence gathering operations
Policies and procedures
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GAO-07-89
* Results in Brief
* Background
* Twenty-two Agencies Merged to Form DHS in the Aftermath of 9
* Three DHS Components Sponsor Multi-Agency Operations Centers
* Transformation Challenges and Practices That Can Help Enhanc
* While the Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers' Missions and
* The Different Missions of the Four Multi-Agency Operations C
* Air and Marine Operations Center
* National Targeting Center
* Transportation Security Operations Center
* National Operations Center-Interagency Watch
* The Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Share Common Functi
* Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at DHS's Four M
* The Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Lack Documented Goa
* The Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Are at Varying Stag
* Three of the Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Have Not E
* DHS Did Not Provide All Multi-Agency Operations Centers with
* Three of Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Have Not Devel
* The Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Are at Various Stag
* DHS's Operations Directorate Has an Opportunity to Help Ensu
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* GAO Contact
* Acknowledgments
* GAO's Mission
* Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* Order by Mail or Phone
* To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* Congressional Relations
* Public Affairs
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Requesters
GAO
October 2006
HOMELAND SECURITY
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers
Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies
GAO-07-89
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 6
Background 9
While the Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers' Missions and Products
Differ, Functions and Customers Are Similar 13
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at DHS's Four Multi-Agency
Operations Centers 25
Conclusions 34
Recommendations for Executive Action 35
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35
Appendix I Missions of 24/7/365 DHS Centers Staffed by One DHS Component
38
Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 41
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 44
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 49
Tables
Table 1: 24/7/365 DHS National Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS
Agencies 3
Table 2: Description of the Functions Performed by the Four DHS
Multi-Agency Operations Centers 23
Figures
Figure 1: Organizations within the Department of Homeland Security That
Conduct 24/7/365 Activities 10
Figure 2: Air and Marine Operations Center Sources of Information and Data
15
Figure 3: National Targeting Center Sources of Information and Data at and
between the Nation's Ports of Entry 17
Figure 4: Modes of Transportation Monitored by the Transportation Security
Operations Center 19
Figure 5: National Operations Center-Interagency Watch Information and
Data Sources 22
Abbreviations
AMOC Air and Marine Operations Center
CBP Customs and Border Protection
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
HSIN Homeland Security Information Network
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
NOC National Operations Center
NOC-Watch National Operations Center-Interagency Watch
NTC National Targeting Center
TSA Transportation Security Agency
TSOC Transportation Security Operations Center
USCG United States Coast Guard
USSS United States Secret Service
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
October 20, 2006
The Honorable Susan M. Collins Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs United States Senate
The Honorable Norm Coleman Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Homeland Security Act of 20021 established the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) with the primary mission of preventing terrorist attacks
against the United States. To accomplish this mission, DHS must be aware
of the potential risks and vulnerabilities faced by the nation, including
terrorist threats to our transportation infrastructure (such as rail,
aviation, and shipping); terrorists entering our country through land,
air, and sea ports; and terrorists operating within our borders. Because
terrorists do not operate on a 9-to-5 schedule, DHS and some of its
operational components (six DHS agencies and DHS's Operations
Directorate2) have established information gathering and/or analysis
centers that conduct activities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a
year. Staff at these operations centers conduct monitoring and
surveillance activities to help detect, deter, and prevent terrorist acts
by providing real-time situational awareness to a variety of federal,
state, and local governments and private-sector entities. According to
DHS, this constant situational awareness is needed to facilitate an
immediate response during times of crisis or other national incidents.
The six DHS agencies and the DHS Operations Directorate that run national
operations centers "24/7/365" gather and/or analyze information through
monitoring and surveillance activities to help detect, deter, and prevent
terrorist acts across the entire United States.3 In addition, DHS conducts
other 24/7/365 activities, such as telecommunications services, security
alarm monitoring, and region-specific operations at a variety of other
centers. We identified a total of 20 national and 5 regional DHS centers
that conduct 24/7/365 activities.4 Twenty-one of the 25 centers employ
staff from one DHS agency on a regular full-time basis and perform
agency-specific functions. Appendix I provides details on the missions and
functions of these centers.
1 Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
2 Established in 2005, the Operations Directorate is a separate
organization within DHS that is responsible for one 24/7/365 center and
exists to improve operational efficiency and coordination across the
department, among other things.
DHS has determined that the remaining 4 centers have broader security
missions and require higher levels of collaboration that can only be
provided by personnel from multiple DHS agencies, and other federal, and
sometimes state and local, agencies. In January 2003, we designated
implementation and transformation of the new Department of Homeland
Security as high risk based on three factors: the enormity of the effort,
the challenges faced by the components, and the potential impact of
failure to effectively carry out the homeland security mission.5 Given the
critical homeland security role played by these operations centers and the
opportunity to facilitate the department's transformation efforts by
maximizing collaboration at the program level, this report focuses on
these four national operations centers that are "multi-agency," that is,
staffed by personnel from more than one agency within DHS, along with
other federal, and sometimes state and local, agencies. The 4 centers are
described in table 1.
3 The six primary component agencies that conduct 24/7/365 operations are
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Transportation Security
Administration, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service; the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services does not have an operations center
that conducts activities 24/7/365 days a year.
4 As defined for this report, the national centers conduct information
gathering and/or analysis activities that cover the entire nation as
opposed to a specific region or activities limited to alarm system
monitoring or communications relays. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard has
46 command center locations at the area, district, and sector levels to
serve as regional points of coordination for operational command and
control, communications, and intelligence and analysis. Meanwhile, the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Federal Protective Service
Mega-Center System consists of four individual regional center locations
that provide alarm monitoring to federally owned or leased buildings. We
did not count these DHS regional centers with multiple locations more than
once since they performed the same mission. As another example, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's Mobile Emergency Response Support
Operations Centers are located in five regions that we counted as one
center, for the purposes of our review.
5 GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January
2003).
Table 1: 24/7/365 DHS National Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS
Agencies
Sponsoring Other
organization: participating Other participating
center Mission DHS agencies agencies outside DHS
Customs and To detect, sort, U.S. Coast Federal Aviation
Border track, and Guard Administration
Protection facilitate the
(CBP): interdiction of Department of Defense
criminal entities National Guard
Air Marine and throughout the Bureau-Air National
Operations Western Hemisphere, Guard
Center (AMOC)a by utilizing
integrated air and Government of Mexico
National marine forces, the
Targeting latest technology,
Center (NTC) and tactical
intelligence.
To coordinate and Immigration and Federal Bureau of
support all agency Customs Investigation
field-level Enforcement
anti-terrorism Department of State
activities by Federal Air
providing tactical Marshals Food and Drug
targeting and Administration
analytical Transportation
research, and to be Security U.S. Department of
a single point of Administration Agriculture
reference for all
agency U.S. Coast
anti-terrorism Guard
efforts.
Transportation To provide U.S. Secret Federal Bureau of
Security situational Servicec Investigation
Administration awareness and
(TSA): information sharing Customs and Federal Aviation
in day-to-day Border Administration
Transportation coordination and Protectionc
Security incident management U.S. Capitol Police
Operations for all
Center (TSOC)b transportation U.S. Air Force
security-related
operations and D.C. Metro Police
issues worldwide by
monitoring,
responding to, and
investigating
security incidents
involving all
transportation
sectors.
DHS Operations To act as the U.S. Secret Central Intelligence
Directorate: primary Service Agency
national-level hub
National for domestic Immigration and Defense Intelligence
Operations situational Customs Agency
Center awareness, common Enforcement
Interagency operating picture, National Security
Watch combining and Federal Agency
(NOC-Watch)d sharing of Protective
information, Service National
communications, and Geospatial-Intelligence
operations Federal Air Agency
coordination Marshals
pertaining to the Federal Bureau of
prevention of Transportation Investigation
terrorist attacks Security
and domestic Administration Department of Interior
incident management
by facilitating Customs and Drug Enforcement
information sharing Border Administration
with other federal, Protection
state, local, Alcohol, Tobacco,
tribal, and U.S. Coast Firearms and Explosives
nongovernmental Guard
emergency Virginia State Police
operations centers; Federal
and by fusing law Emergency Fairfax County Police
enforcement, Management
national Agency New York, Boston, and
intelligence, Los Angeles police
emergency response, departments
and private-sector
reporting.
Source: GAO generated based on information from DHS.
aOn August 22, 1988, the Customs Air Interdiction Program established the
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Center, West, at March
Air Force Base in Riverside, California. In October 1994, the facility was
renamed the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center. In 1999, marine
programs were merged with air interdiction programs, and the name of the
Riverside facility was changed to the Air and Marine Interdiction
Coordination Center. Effective March 1, 2003, the center was renamed the
Air and Marine Operations Center.
bThe TSOC comprises three watch functions-the National Capital Region
Coordination Center is responsible for National Capital Region air
security and defense functions; the National Infrastructure Coordination
Center is responsible for continuously assessing the status of the
nation's critical infrastructure and key resources; and the TSA Command
Watch is responsible for coordinating the execution of the TSOC mission.
cThe National Capital Region Command Center, one of three watch functions
of the TSOC, constitutes the multi-agency element because it is staffed by
other DHS component agencies-the U.S. Secret Service and CBP.
dPrior to May 25, 2006, the National Operations Center-Interagency Watch
was called the Homeland Security Operations Center. The Interagency Watch
also incorporates staff from DHS's Offices of Information & Analysis;
Infrastructure Protection, and Incident Management Division, as well as a
variety of other DHS and non-DHS organizations.
To assess the collaboration among DHS agencies working at each
multi-agency 24/7/365 operations center, this report answers the following
questions:
1. What are the missions, functions, and products of the
multi-agency 24/7/365 DHS operations centers and who are their
customers?
2. To what extent has DHS implemented key practices for enhancing
and sustaining collaboration at these multi-agency centers?
To answer our first objective, we analyzed information obtained from the
responsible component agencies and the Operations Directorate on the
mission and functions of all of the 24/7/365 activities in DHS. We visited
all 4 multi-agency centers, as well as centers operated by other component
agencies including the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Coast
Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service to observe their operations, interview
officials responsible for managing the centers, and identify centers that
employed staff from multiple DHS agencies.6 From the 4 national operations
centers that employed staff from multiple DHS component agencies--the Air
and Marine Operations Center (AMOC), the National Targeting Center (NTC),
the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC), and the National
Operations Center-Interagency Watch (NOC-Watch)-we obtained additional
information on both the products the centers regularly developed and their
primary customers. We also interviewed several staff assigned to centers
from participating DHS component agencies-referred to as watchstanders7-to
discuss their roles and responsibilities at the centers and the overall
mission of the centers to which they had been assigned.
6 During incidents or emergencies, other operations centers may employ
staff from multiple agencies. For example, the Coast Guard's regional
command centers that normally focus on a variety of U.S. Coast Guard's
missions and are not normally interagency in structure have established
protocols with other DHS agencies, such as Customs and Border Protection
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to activate a unified or incident
command structure when needed. These U.S. Coast Guard centers have extra
space and equipment that allow for surge capabilities and full
coordination with each partner agency to host ad hoc interagency
operations.
To answer our second objective, we met with the acting director and other
responsible officials from the Operations Directorate to discuss its role
and responsibilities. We reviewed transition, management integration, and
planning and policy documents as well as strategic plans and annual
performance reports and planning documents from DHS and its component
agencies. We also reviewed and analyzed the results of studies undertaken
by DHS to assess and improve coordination and collaboration at the
multi-agency centers as well as reports from GAO, the Congressional
Research Service, the DHS Office of Inspector General, and others that
addressed the integration, coordination, and collaboration of
departmentwide program functions. We then assessed DHS's efforts related
to integration, coordination, and collaboration at the multi-agency
centers to determine the extent to which they reflect DHS's application of
the key practices we have found can help enhance and sustain collaboration
among federal agencies and found to be at the center of successful mergers
and transformations.8
We conducted our work from October 2005 through September 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix
II includes more detailed information on our scope and methodology.
7 For the purpose of this report, we use the term "watchstander" to refer
to an individual required to work full-time on a rotating 24-hour
schedule, 7 days per week, to maintain situational awareness, conduct
information assessment and threat monitoring to deter, detect, and prevent
terrorist incidents. A watchstander may also act as a liaison between his
agency and other agency representatives at the center, and may manage
response to critical threats and incidents.
8 GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 21, 2005).
Results in Brief
The four multi-agency operations centers each have their own mission and
generate different products while performing some similar functions and
sharing a number of customers. The missions of the AMOC, NTC, and TSOC are
tactical, including such activities as monitoring the nation's airspace,
the movement of potential terrorists, and the passengers on commercial
flights, respectively. NOC-Watch's mission is more strategic in that it
collects information gathered by the other multi-agency operations
centers9 and provides a national perspective on situational awareness for
potential terrorist activity. The products of the four multi-agency
operations centers reflect their different missions and range from reports
on suspicious private air and marine craft from the AMOC, individuals
entering the country at land, sea and airports from the NTC, and
individuals traveling on commercial flights from the TSOC, to an overview
of the national threat environment from the NOC-Watch. The multi-agency
operations centers all share common functions such as maintaining
situational awareness, information sharing and communications;
coordinating internal operations and coordinating among federal, state,
local, tribal, and private-sector entities; and managing incidents and
making decisions. In addition, the AMOC and NOC-Watch exercise operational
command and control and, along with the NTC, coordinate with foreign
governments. The four multi-agency operations centers' primary customers
include federal, state, and local governments; private-sector entities;
and some foreign governments.
DHS has leveraged its resources-one key collaborative practice-by having
staff from multiple agencies work together at the four operations centers.
However, opportunities exist to further implement this and the other
relevant practices that our previous work has identified as important to
enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal agencies.
Specifically, not all of the components responsible for managing the
operation centers have
o established goals to define and articulate a common outcome and
mutually reinforcing or joint strategies for collaboration
(related to two of our key practices);
o assessed staffing needs to leverage resources;
o defined roles and responsibilities of watchstanders from
agencies other than the managing one;
o applied standards, policies, and procedures for DHS's
information sharing network to provide a means to operate across
agency boundaries;
o prepared mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results
of the operations centers to reinforce collaborative efforts; and
o reinforced agency accountability for collaboration efforts
through agency plans and reports.
9 In addition, the NOC-Watch gathers information from other DHS operations
centers, as well as a variety of other federal, state, and local
government and law enforcement organizations.
For example, some DHS components have established a variety of internal
and external working agreements, memorandums, and in the case of the Joint
Field Offices, standard operating procedures. However, DHS's Operations
Directorate, which is responsible for coordinating operations, has not
provided guidance on how and when such agreements should be used to
improve collaboration among the sponsoring and participating components at
the operations centers we reviewed. Nor have any of these centers
documented goals or joint strategies using these or other types of
agreements. Without having a documented joint strategy for collaboration,
there is a risk that center staff monitoring potential terrorist
activities may not operate in the most collaborative manner. DHS has also
not assessed staffing needs to leverage resources and help ensure that
there are enough watchstanders, who occupy the primary positions at the
multi-agency operations centers, to conduct surveillance activities. While
three of the four multi-agency operations centers had developed
descriptions for the watchstander position staffed by their own agency,
only one center-the AMOC-had also developed a position description for
staff assigned to the center from another DHS agency. The other centers
relied on the components providing staff to define their watchstanders'
roles and responsibilities. Lack of a consistent definition for the
watchstander position may lead to people at the same center in the same
role performing the same responsibilities differently or not at all.
Because of the potentially critical, time-sensitive need for decisive
action at 24/7/365 operations centers, it is important that the roles and
responsibilities of watchstanders are described and understood by both the
staff and the officials responsible for managing the operations centers.
In another example, DHS had not provided the standards, policies, and
procedures for the use of its Homeland Security Information Network, its
primary information-sharing tool. Without the application of the
standards, policies, and procedures, users were unsure of how to use the
network and, therefore, did not maximize the operation centers' capacity
for sharing security-related information. In terms of monitoring,
evaluating, and reporting the results of joint efforts at the multi-agency
operations centers, in January 2004, AMOC began collecting data to measure
productivity, but had not yet evaluated efforts, and the rest of the
multi-agency centers have not developed any methods for evaluating and
reporting results. Finally, neither DHS nor the multi-agency operations
centers have reinforced accountability for collaborative efforts through
joint agency planning and reporting. Such public accounting through
published strategic and annual performance plans and reports makes
agencies answerable for collaboration results. The Operations Directorate,
established in November 2005 to improve operational efficiency and
coordination, provides DHS with an opportunity to more fully implement the
key practices that are important to enhancing and sustaining collaboration
at its multi-agency operations centers. Although the Operations
Directorate does not possess administrative, budgetary, or operational
control over the other component's operations centers, guidance from the
Operations Directorate could help the other components responsible for the
24/7/365 multi-agency operations centers make key advances in each
collaborative practice.
To provide a setting for enhanced collaboration among the staff at each
operations center, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security charge the Director of the Operations Directorate with
developing and providing guidance and helping to ensure the three
component agencies of the four multi-agency operations centers take the
following six actions: define common goals and joint strategies; clarify
the roles and responsibilities for watchstanders; apply standards,
policies, and procedures for using DHS's information network; conduct
staffing needs assessments; prepare mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and
report on the results of collaborative efforts; and address collaborative
efforts at the four multi-agency operations centers in plans and reports.
In reviewing a draft of this report, DHS agreed with the recommended
actions to enhance collaboration at the DHS multi-agency operations
centers. Among other things, DHS noted plans to conduct an independent
study, initiated in September 2006, to leverage technical and analytical
expertise to support expanding the capabilities of the Operations
Directorate. In addition, DHS said it plans to move elements of the
National Operations Center to the Transportation Security Operations
Center in 2007 and, ultimately to colocate the DHS headquarters, and all
the DHS component headquarters along with their respective staffs and
operations centers, at one location. We agree that these leadership
efforts provided by the Operations Directorate could further enhance
collaboration among DHS's component agencies, along with the key practices
suggested by our review of collaboration practices among agencies across
the federal government. DHS's written comments are presented in appendix
III.
Background
Twenty-two Agencies Merged to Form DHS in the Aftermath of 9/11
DHS was created in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001. Not since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947 has the
federal government undertaken an organizational merger of this magnitude.
Enacted on November 25, 2002, the Homeland Security Act established DHS by
merging 22 distinct agencies and organizations with multiple missions,
values, and cultures.10 The 22 agencies whose powers were absorbed or in
part assumed by DHS came from eight different departments (Agriculture,
Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Justice,
Transportation, and the Treasury) and two independent offices (the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and the General Services Administration). In
addition, DHS merged responsibilities from former agencies to create some
new agencies, such as Customs and Border Protection. On March 1, 2003, DHS
officially began operations as a new department. DHS is among the largest
federal government agencies, with approximately 180,000 employees and an
estimated budget of $43.6 billion for fiscal year 2007.
DHS's mission is to lead the unified national effort to secure America,
prevent and deter terrorist attacks, protect against and respond to
threats and hazards to the nation, ensure safe and secure borders, welcome
lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free flow of commerce. Six
of the seven primary operational agencies, and the Operations Directorate
of the department, have identified the need to conduct activities in
support of the homeland security mission 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
365 days a year. The department's July 2006 organizational chart, as
illustrated in figure 1, highlights these six agencies and the Operations
Directorate.
10 DHS was initially created with 22 originating agencies and
organizations. Shortly thereafter in June 2003, a 23rd organization, the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center, was transferred into DHS from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.
Figure 1: Organizations within the Department of Homeland Security That
Conduct 24/7/365 Activities
Three DHS Components Sponsor Multi-Agency Operations Centers
The three components of DHS that have overall responsibility for the four
multi-agency 24/7/365 operations centers were created in response to the
events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent establishment of DHS. By
merging portions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture with elements of U.S. Customs, CBP was
created as part of DHS in 2003 to protect the nation's borders in order to
prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering or exiting the
United States while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel.
CBP sponsors two 24/7/365 multi-agency operations centers: the Air and
Marine Operations Center and the National Targeting Center. TSA,
established in 2001 (as part of the Department of Transportation), and
incorporated into DHS in 2003, protects the nation's transportation
systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce and sponsors
the Transportation Security Operations Center. DHS established the Office
of Operations Coordination (referred to as the Operations Directorate)
after a broad internal review in 2005. The Operations Directorate, which
sponsors the National Operations Center (includes the previous Homeland
Security Operations Center), is responsible for coordinating internal and
external operational issues throughout the department, conducting incident
management, and facilitating rapid staff planning and execution.11 The
three sponsoring components provide overall direction and management for
their respective centers.
Transformation Challenges and Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain
Collaboration among Federal Agencies
We have previously reported that establishing the new DHS is an enormous
undertaking and the new department needs to build a successful
transformation that does the following: instills the organization with
important management principles; rapidly implements a phased-in transition
plan; leverages the new department and other agencies in executing the
national homeland security strategy; and builds collaborative partnerships
with federal, state, local, and private-sector organizations.12
DHS faces significant management and organizational transformation
challenges as it works to protect the nation from terrorism and
simultaneously establish itself. For these reasons, in January 2005, we
continued to designate the implementation and transformation of the
department as high risk. DHS's Inspector General reported, in December
2004, that integrating DHS's many separate components into a single,
effective, efficient, and economical department remains one of its biggest
challenges.13 We also reported in 2005 that agencies can enhance and
sustain their collaborative efforts by engaging in eight key management
practices:14
11 According to DHS, the National Operations Center incorporates the
24/7/365 Interagency Watch, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's National Response Coordination
Center, and an office called the Planning Element. The National Operations
Center also shares responsibility for the National Infrastructure
Coordination Center which is colocated and integrated as a watch function
at the Transportation Security Operations Center.
12 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures, Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
o defining and articulating a common outcome;
o establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies;
o identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources;
o agreeing on roles and responsibilities;
o establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means
to operate across agency boundaries;
o developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on
results of collaborative efforts;
o reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative efforts
through agency plans and reports; and
o reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts
through performance management systems.
Although there is no commonly accepted definition for collaboration, in
our previous assessment of collaborative efforts among federal agencies we
defined it as any joint activity by two or more organizations that is
intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the
organizations act alone. This report focuses on the actions DHS and its
components have taken to make collaboration at multi-agency operations
centers as effective as possible. Joint activities take place at
operations centers where multiple components staff watchstander positions
and provide liaison, expertise, and access to information that would not
otherwise be on hand. For this report, we selected the first seven of the
eight key practices listed above and assessed the first two key practices
together, thereby reducing our focus to six areas. We did not address the
eighth practice-reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative
efforts through performance management systems-because an in-depth
examination of component agencies' performance management systems was
beyond the scope of this review.
13 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office of
Audits, Major Management Challenges Facing The Department Of Homeland
Security, DHS/OIG-05-06 (Washington, D.C.: December 2004).
14 GAO-06-15 , 4.
While the Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers' Missions and Products Differ,
Functions and Customers Are Similar
The four multi-agency operations centers each have their own mission and
generate different products while performing similar functions and sharing
a number of customers. The missions of the AMOC, NTC, and TSOC are
tactical, including such activities as monitoring the nation's airspace,
the movement of potential terrorists, and the passengers on commercial
flights, respectively. NOC-Watch's mission is more strategic in that it
collects information gathered by the other multi-agency operations
centers15 and provides a national perspective on situational awareness.
The products of the four multi-agency operations centers reflect their
different missions and range from reports on suspect individuals traveling
on commercial flights to reports on suspicious private air and marine
craft. The multi-agency operations centers all share some common
functions: maintaining situational awareness and information sharing and
communications; coordinating internal operations and coordinating among
federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector entities; and managing
incidents and making decisions. While all the multi-agency operations
centers share common customers, such as foreign, federal, state, and local
governments, the NOC-Watch has a larger number of customers, given its
role as a hub for overall situational awareness.
The Different Missions of the Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Result in
Different Products
Of the four multi-agency operations centers, three-AMOC, NTC and TSOC-have
tactical yet different missions and provide different products that
reflect their respective missions. The NOC-Watch has a more strategic
mission in providing an overall assessment of situational awareness.
Air and Marine Operations Center
The AMOC's primary mission is to detect, sort, track, and facilitate the
interdiction of criminal entities throughout the Western Hemisphere, by
utilizing integrated air and marine forces, the latest technology, and
tactical intelligence. AMOC's maintains day-to-day, around-the-clock
airspace situational awareness of the nation's borders through
identification and detection of foreign and domestic threats. Created in
1988 by the U.S. Customs Service and located in Southern California, the
AMOC was established as the Air and Marine Operations Center on March 1,
2003. In addition to CBP and U.S. Coast Guard personnel, the AMOC is
staffed by the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department of
Defense National Guard Bureau-Air National Guard, as well as a
representative of the government of Mexico.
15 In addition, the NOC-Watch gathers information from other DHS
operations centers, as well as a variety of other federal, state, and
local government and law enforcement organizations.
AMOC staff use surveillance systems and databases to detect, identify, and
track potential threats, and to coordinate the apprehension of criminals
using law enforcement air, marine, and ground interdiction forces. Staff
utilize a surveillance system that includes an extensive network of over
200 ground-based radar and satellite tracking systems throughout North
America and the Caribbean. Staff also use numerous law enforcement and
Federal Aviation Administration databases to ensure that U.S. entry policy
and procedures are followed. Figure 2 shows the variety of information and
data sources employed by the AMOC.
Figure 2: Air and Marine Operations Center Sources of Information and Data
Staff can conduct detailed research from a transnational and criminal
threat perspective to identify suspect persons, aircraft, and marine
vessels. AMOC staff use the resulting information to coordinate air and
marine law enforcement activity with various agencies such as the U.S.
Coast Guard and Immigration and Customs Enforcement; federal, state, and
local law enforcement; the Department of Defense; U.S. and foreign air
traffic control facilities; and foreign government coordination centers.16
The AMOC Daily Intelligence Report focuses on the nation's borders
involving suspicious private air and marine craft that are detected by
radar, eyewitnesses, or surveillance aircraft.
National Targeting Center
The NTC's mission is to coordinate and support all agency field-level
anti-terrorism activities by providing tactical targeting and analytical
research, and to be a single point of reference for all agency
anti-terrorism efforts. NTC monitors the movement of potential terrorists
and prevents them and any weapons of terror from entering and exiting our
country through land, air, and sea ports. Established on October 22, 2001,
under the U.S. Customs Service, the NTC, located in Northern Virginia,
began 24/7/365 operations November 10, 2001. In addition to CBP personnel,
the NTC is staffed by the U.S. Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Federal Air Marshal Service, and the Transportation Security
Administration.
NTC staff use sophisticated information-gathering techniques and
analytical tools to look at data containing passenger and flight
information. These data include lists of known terrorists, foreign
visitors whose official authorization permitting entry into and travel
within the United States has elapsed (visa overstays), passport
information, and cargo listings to seek potential matches. Any
inconsistency identified in the data can trigger additional analysis.
Figure 3 shows the variety of sources of information and data sources
employed by the NTC.
16 Foreign government coordination centers that partner with the Air and
Marine Operations Center include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Joint
Interagency Task Forces, Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos, the U.S.
Embassy Mexico's Intelligence Analysis Center, and the Canadian National
Operations Center.
Figure 3: National Targeting Center Sources of Information and Data at and
between the Nation's Ports of Entry
NTC works with a variety of federal stakeholders. For example, the NTC
works with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Screening
Center to identify persons on the National Terrorist Watch List. NTC staff
also provide information from CBP's Advance Passenger Information System
for TSA's performance of a risk assessment on crewmembers on international
flights. Federal Air Marshals use information developed by the NTC to
determine if they need to put resources on a specific flight. Using NTC
capabilities to screen crew, vessel, and cargo, along with other
information, the U.S. Coast Guard determines vessels and crewmembers that
warrant further surveillance or assessment and can prioritize its
inspection efforts. NTC also helps in implementing the pilot Immigration
Advisory Program by reviewing advance information on travelers forwarded
by program teams to identify travelers at foreign airports that may
present a risk or warrant more intensive examination before they board
aircraft bound for the United States. (Passengers whose travel documents
are invalid, expired, or otherwise may have been altered, counterfeited or
obtained through fraud are advised, as is the airline, before they leave
their foreign location that they will likely be deemed inadmissible and
denied entry upon arrival in the United States.) The NTC reports we
reviewed primarily identified individuals at and between domestic ports of
entry and certain critical foreign ports.
Transportation Security Operations Center
The TSOC's mission is to provide situational awareness and information
sharing in day-to-day coordination and incident management for all
transportation security related operations and issues worldwide by
monitoring, responding to, and investigating security incidents involving
all transportation sectors. TSOC maintains situational awareness of
passengers on commercial flights and works to minimize and mitigate
security vulnerabilities of the National Capital Region and critical
infrastructure such as commercial airports, rail stations, and pipelines.
The TSOC, located in Northern Virginia, began 24/7/365 operations in
August 2003. The National Capital Region Command Center constitutes the
multi-agency element of the TSOC because it is staffed by other DHS
component agencies-specifically the U.S. Secret Service and Customs and
Border Protection. In addition, representatives of organizations outside
of DHS such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, District of Columbia
Metro Police, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Capitol Police, and
the U.S. Air Force (Northeast Air Defense Sector) provide watchstanders
for the TSOC.
As part of its mission, TSOC staff coordinate with federal, state, and
local homeland security entities to identify activities that might
indicate a threat to national security and isolate indications of
impending attack while assessing their potential impact. The TSOC also
furnishes alerts and reports to field security organizations while
combining intelligence with operational information across all modes of
transportation. Last, it monitors incidents and crises, including national
special events such as presidential inaugurations and the Super Bowl, for
TSA headquarters and makes recommendations to DHS leadership. Figure 4
shows the modes of transportation monitored by the TSOC.
Figure 4: Modes of Transportation Monitored by the Transportation Security
Operations Center
The TSOC reports we reviewed provided information on incidents across all
modes of transportation, including National Capital Region security
incidents, critical infrastructure, and individuals of interest related to
the No-Fly List.17
National Operations Center-Interagency Watch
The NOC-Watch is designed to perform a more strategic mission than the
other three multi-agency operations centers. NOC-Watch acts as the primary
national-level coordination point for awareness of events that may affect
national security or safety. The center is responsible for combining and
sharing of information, communications, and operations coordination
pertaining to the prevention of terrorist attacks and domestic incident
management by facilitating information sharing with other federal, state,
local, tribal, and nongovernmental entities and by fusing law enforcement,
national intelligence, emergency response, and private-sector reporting.
Created as the Homeland Security Operations Center and located in
Northwest Washington, D.C., the center was established on February 19,
2003, and redesignated the National Operations Center on May 25, 2006. The
NOC-Watch is the 24/7/365 element of the center. In addition to staff from
the Operations Directorate, the NOC-Watch includes other DHS staff from 20
components and offices such as representatives from the U.S. Secret
Service, Federal Protective Service, Federal Air Marshal Service,
Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border Protection,
U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Border Patrol,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, National Biological
Surveillance Group, U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office, and other DHS directorates. The NOC-Watch also
includes representatives from 35 other federal, state, and local agencies
such as the Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency;
National Security Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; Federal
Bureau of Investigation; Department of Interior (U.S. Park Police); Drug
Enforcement Administration; Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives;
Virginia State Police; Fairfax County Police; and the New York, Boston,
and Los Angeles police departments; and a number of other organizations.
17 The No-Fly List is a list of individuals who are prohibited from
boarding an aircraft. Originally created and maintained by TSA, the No-Fly
List is the consolidated terrorist watch list maintained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation-administered Terrorist Screening Center. Both TSA
and CBP use the No-Fly List for screening airline passengers. TSA is
responsible for screening domestic airline passengers; CBP screens
international passengers. CBP also uses this list to screen cruise line
passengers.
NOC-Watch staff use information gathered and communicated by the three
tactical centers; other DHS operation centers; other federal, state, and
local entities; and a wide variety of other information sources to provide
overall national situational awareness related to homeland security. The
NOC-Watch reports, via the DHS Director of Operations, to the Secretary of
Homeland Security and coordinates directly with the White House and
focuses on two goals: (1) the detection, prevention, and deterrence of
terrorist attacks and (2) domestic incident management during crises and
disasters or national special events. Figure 5 shows some of the sources
of information and agencies with which that information is shared.
Figure 5: National Operations Center-Interagency Watch Information and
Data Sources
Situation reports prepared by the Operations Directorate's NOC-Watch that
we reviewed contained information reported from other DHS subcomponents
and operations centers such as the TSOC, NTC, and AMOC, as well as
external intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and the private
sector. The NOC-Watch also prepares a Homeland Security Operations Morning
Brief that provides information to federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies on the national picture at the sensitive but
unclassified level.
The Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Share Common Functions and Customers
All four centers conduct common functions to maintain situational
awareness and communicate and coordinate with other federal, state, and
local governments, as well as private-sector entities. The centers do so
to support both the mission of the sponsoring component organization and
the underlying homeland security mission of DHS. On the basis of our
discussions with center officials and our assessment of documents they
provided, we summarized these functions and found that all DHS
multi-agency operations centers perform 9 of 11 functions identified in
table 2. (According to TSOC officials, the TSOC does not coordinate with
foreign governments, and NTC and TSOC officials said they do not exercise
command and control functions.)
Table 2: Description of the Functions Performed by the Four DHS
Multi-Agency Operations Centers
Functions Description
Situation awareness/information
sharing and communications
Situation awareness/monitoring The continual process of collecting,
(all four centers) analyzing, and disseminating
intelligence, information, and knowledge
to allow organizations and individuals
to anticipate requirements and to react
effectively and to establish a common
operational picture-a broad view of the
overall situation as reflected by
situation reports, aerial photography,
and other information or intelligence.
Situation assessment/analysis The evaluation and interpretation of
(all four centers) information gathered from a variety of
sources (including weather information
and forecasts, computerized models,
Geographic Information Systems data
mapping, remote sensing sources, ground
surveys, etc.) that, when communicated
to emergency managers and decision
makers, can provide a basis for incident
management decision making.
Information dissemination and The process of providing information
real-time communications (all such as current threat-level
four centers) information, announcements, reports, and
urgent alerts to federal, state, local,
tribal, and private-sector officials
about possible terrorism activitiesa on
a continuous basis.
Coordination
Intradepartmental coordination The sharing of information and
(all four centers) operations with other DHS component
agencies to synchronize activities and
accomplish a collective task.
Other federal agency coordination The sharing of information, activities,
and state, local, tribal and operations with federal, state, and
coordination (all four centers) local governments who have a shared
responsibility in preparing for
terrorist attacks as well as other
disasters to accomplish a collective
task.
Private-sector, nongovernment The sharing of information, activities,
coordination (all four centers) and operations with organizations and
entities that are not part of any
governmental structure to accomplish a
collective task (e.g., for-profit and
not-for-profit organizations, formal and
informal structures, commerce and
industry, private emergency response
organizations, and private voluntary
organizations).
Foreign government coordination The sharing of information and
(NOC-Watch, NTC, and AMOC) operations with representatives of other
foreign national governments to
synchronize activities and accomplish a
collective task.
Incident management and
decision-making
Incident management (all four The development of strategies and
centers) tactics and the ordering, coordination,
and release of resources in response to
an event, such as a terrorist attack or
natural disaster.
Decision-making support (all four The development of ideas, alternatives,
centers) or plans to aid decision makers in
selection of a course of action, in
responding to a new event or to make
adjustments as an ongoing situation
changes.
Operational activities
Operational coordination The integrating or linking together of different
organizational elements by synchronizing
(all four centers) activities to accomplish a collective task.
Operational command and The exercise of authority and direction by a
control properly designated command organization over
assigned forces or assets in the accomplishment
(NOC-Watch and AMOC) of a specified mission.
Source: GAO based on DHS information.
aSection 892(f)(1) of the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2252 (2002), defines homeland security
information to include information possessed by a federal, state, or local
agency that (A) relates to the threat of terrorist activity; (B) relates
to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity; (C)
would improve the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist
or terrorist organization; or (D) would improve the response to a
terrorist act.
Multi-agency operations centers' customers include federal, state, and
local governments and private-sector entities, along with foreign
governments. The NOC-Watch has a larger number of overall customers; as
the national-level multi-agency hub for situational awareness and a common
operating picture, the NOC-Watch provides information to a wider range of
government customers, including federal executive leadership, and
intelligence and law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local
level.
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at DHS's Four Multi-Agency
Operations Centers
DHS has leveraged its resources-one key collaborative practice-by having
staff from multiple agencies work together at the four operations centers.
However, opportunities exist to further implement this and the other
relevant practices that our previous work has identified as important to
enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal agencies. For
example, not all of the components responsible for managing the operation
centers had
o established goals to define and articulate a common outcome and
mutually reinforcing or joint strategies for collaboration
(related to two of our key practices);
o assessed staffing needs to leverage resources;
o defined roles and responsibilities of watchstanders from
agencies other than the managing one;
o applied standards, policies, and procedures for DHS's
information sharing network to provide a means to operate across
agency boundaries;
o prepared mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results
of the operations centers to reinforce for collaborative efforts;
and
o reinforced agency accountability for collaboration efforts
through agency plans and reports.
The Operations Directorate, established in November 2005 to improve
operational efficiency and coordination, provides DHS with an opportunity
to more consistently implement these practices that can enhance and
sustain collaboration among federal agencies at multi-agency operations
centers.
The Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Lack Documented Goals and Joint
Strategies
The three DHS components responsible for the four multi-agency centers
have not developed and documented common goals or joint strategies for
their operation that our work has shown could enhance collaboration among
the agencies. Officials at the four multi-agency operations centers we
visited said they did consider formally documenting working agreements but
concluded it was not essential since all of the agencies involved were
part of DHS. Officials from the NOC said that the lack of formal
agreements is a reflection of the speed with which the center was
established and the inherent flexibility offered to DHS agencies in order
to get them to staff the operation center positions. Nonetheless, as the
DHS Office of Inspector General has reported, memorandums of understanding
are valuable tools for establishing protocols for managing a
national-level program between two organizations.18 Within DHS, external
and internal memorandums of agreement and other interagency joint
operating plans are often used to document common organizational goals and
how agencies will work together. For example:
o The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan19 among the
Department of Defense, Office of National Drug Control Policy, and
the AMOC highlights an agreement between a DHS component and other
federal agencies.
o The Joint Field Office Activation and Operations Interagency
Integrated Standard Operating Procedure20 describes how a
temporary federal multi-agency coordination center should be
established locally to facilitate field-level domestic incident
management activities related to prevention, preparedness,
response, and recovery and addresses the roles and
responsibilities of multiple DHS components such as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and other federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
o Guidelines Governing Interaction Between ICE's Office of
Investigations and CBP's Office of Border Patrol21 documents a
memorandum of understanding between the Office of Investigations
at Immigration and Customs Enforcement and CBP's Border Patrol,
entered into in November 2004, that governs the interaction
between the two components and formalizes roles and
responsibilities in order to further enhance information sharing.
18 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office of
Inspections and Special Reviews, An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge
Customs and Border Protection with Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
OIG-06-04 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2005).
19 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Interdiction Command
and Control Plan, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2005).
Thus, although some DHS components have established a variety of internal
and external working agreements, memorandums, and in the case of the Joint
Field Offices, standard operating procedures, DHS's Operations
Directorate, which is responsible for coordinating operations, has not
provided guidance on how and when such agreements should be used to
improve collaboration among the sponsoring and participating components at
the operations centers we reviewed. Nor have any of these centers
documented goals or joint strategies using these or other types of
agreements.
Our previous work has shown that memorandums of agreement or understanding
and strategic plans can both be used to establish common goals and define
joint strategies for how agencies will work together. According to our
work, collaborative efforts are further enhanced when staff working across
agency lines define and articulate a common federal outcome, or purpose,
that is consistent with their respective agency goals and missions. Joint
strategies or mutual agreements also contribute to another key area when
they are used as a vehicle for identifying and defining more specific
expectations of the roles and responsibilities of staff provided by
collaborating agencies.
20 Department of Homeland Security, Joint Field Office Activation and
Operations Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure, version
8.3 Interim Approval (Washington, D.C.: April 2006) i-ii.
21 As cited in DHS-OIG-06-04, 42.
The Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Are at Varying Stages of Assessing
Staffing Needs
The extent to which officials responsible for managing the four
multi-agency operations centers had conducted needs assessments to
determine the staffing requirements of each center varied. For example,
CBP officials conducted an evaluation in June 2005 that addressed AMOC
capabilities and continuing staffing needs related to AMOC personnel, but
did not address the need for, or responsibilities of, U.S. Coast Guard
staff at the center. AMOC officials did cite a requirement for additional
staff from the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as a requirement for an
Immigration and Customs Enforcement position in a subsequent strategic
planning effort (although these requirements had not been filled).
However, there was not a specific assessment supporting the need for these
staff positions. NTC officials had not conducted a staffing needs
assessment but said they plan to conduct an assessment based upon current
targeting programs, the scheduled expansion of existing programs, and the
onset of additional CBP targeting programs. They said they plan to include
data on the volume of telephone calls handled by the center and the number
of information requests completed by the NTC in support of CBP targeting
and operations, and they expect to complete the assessment in October
2006. TSOC and NOC-Watch officials said they had not documented a needs
analysis for staff from agencies other than the sponsoring agency.
Instead, they viewed the cross-agency staffing requirement as a historical
edict based on a general assumption that other agency staff expertise was
needed to fulfill the mission of their operations center.
Our work has shown that collaborating agencies should identify the
resources, including human resources, needed to initiate or sustain their
collaborative effort and take steps to leverage those resources. Because
each agency, or component, has different strengths and limitations,
assessing these varying levels allows them collectively to obtain
additional resources otherwise unavailable individually. Formal assessment
of the need for all participating agencies' staff to perform specific
functions allows for the leveraging of resources to more effectively meet
the operational needs of each agency or component.
Three of the Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Have Not Established a
Definition of Watchstander Roles and Responsibilities for All Agencies at Each
Center
While three of the four multi-agency operations centers had developed
descriptions for the watchstander position staffed by their own agency,
only one center-the AMOC-had developed a position description for staff
assigned to the center from another DHS agency. At the AMOC, center
officials require that Coast Guard staff meet a standardized set of
requirements for radar watchstanders. The other centers relied on the
components providing staff to define their watchstanders' roles and
responsibilities. Lack of a consistent definition for the watchstander
position may lead to people at the same center in the same role performing
the same responsibilities differently or not at all.
Our work has shown that defining roles and responsibilities both enhances
and sustains collaboration among federal agencies. Because of the
potentially critical, time-sensitive need for decisive action at 24/7/365
operations centers, it is important that the roles and responsibilities of
watchstanders are described and understood stood by both the staff and the
officials responsible for managing the operations centers. Further, a
definition of the watchstander role and responsibilities is important for
supporting agency officials who must make staffing decisions about
assigning qualified and knowledgeable personnel to the centers. Finally,
internal controls standards22 require that management and employees
establish a positive control environment as a foundation for strong
organizational internal controls. According to the standard, one activity
that agency officials may consider implementing as part of the control
environment is to identify, define, and provide formal, up-to-date job
descriptions or other means of identifying and defining job-specific
tasks.
22 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21 .3.1 (Washington, D.C. November 1999).
DHS Did Not Provide All Multi-Agency Operations Centers with Standards,
Policies, and Procedures for Use of Its Information Sharing Network to Operate
across Agency Boundaries
To collaborate by sharing information through DHS's primary information
sharing system, the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN),23
agencies participating in multi-agency operations centers need to be
connected to the network and have the guidance that enables its use. In
the course of our work, we learned that CBP's National Targeting Center
could not collaborate with other users of HSIN because the system was not
connected for NTC watchstanders.24 Other concerns about the use of HSIN to
enhance coordination and collaboration have also been identified by the
DHS Inspector General. According to the Inspector General, DHS did not
provide adequate user guidance, including clear information sharing
processes, training, and reference materials needed to effectively
implement HSIN.25 The report noted that in the absence of clear DHS
direction, users were unsure of how to use the system. Though DHS
officials said other networks such as the Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System are
primarily used for coordination of intelligence analysis, the connectivity
problem with the primary DHS-wide information sharing system, HSIN,
remained unresolved as of September 2006.
Our work has shown that to facilitate collaboration, agencies need to
address the compatibility of standards, policies, procedures, and data
systems used in the collaborative effort. Furthermore, as agencies bring
diverse cultures to the collaborative effort, it is important to address
these differences to enable a cohesive working relationship and to create
the mutual trust required to enhance and sustain the collaborative effort.
Frequent communication among collaborating agencies is another means to
facilitate working across agency boundaries and prevent misunderstanding.
The lack of standards, policies, and procedures for use of HSIN at DHS
operations centers could limit the frequency and effectiveness of
communications among the centers.
23 The HSIN is an unclassified, Web-based system that provides a secure,
collaborative environment for real-time information sharing that includes
reporting, graphics, and chat capabilities, as well as a document library
that contains reports from multiple federal, state, local, and
private-sector sources. HSIN supplies suspicious incident and pre-incident
information, mapping and imagery tools, 24x7 situational awareness, and
analysis of terrorist threats, tactics, and weapons.
24 Other single agency operations centers such as the U.S. Coast Guard's
Intelligence Coordination Center were also not fully connected. For
example, U.S. Coast Guard officials told us that HSIN has never been
widely used by analysts or watchstanders at their Intelligence
Coordination Center due to technical and testing issues that made the
system unavailable. We were also told that the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Operations Center had never been connected to HSIN due to
technical problems.
25 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office of
Information Technology, HSIN Could Support Information Sharing More
Effectively, DHS/OIG-06-38 (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).
Three of Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Have Not Developed Methods to
Monitor, Evaluate, and Report Results of Joint Efforts
With the exception of AMOC, the multi-agency centers have not developed
methods to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of joint efforts. For
example, the Office of Management and Budget's assessment of the NOC-Watch
for 2005 determined that center officials had not established effective
annual or long-term performance goals.26 Nor were performance measures or
other mechanisms in place to monitor and evaluate the joint efforts of
multiple DHS agencies at the TSOC and NTC. In response to a report by the
DHS Office of Inspector General in March 2004 that found the AMOC did not
have organizational performance measures and individual performance
standards to assess AMOC's effectiveness and productivity,27 AMOC
officials reported to the Inspector General that they began collecting
data in January 2004 on a daily basis to measure productivity for the
overall operations center as well as individual watchstanders, including
U.S. Coast Guard representatives.
Our work has shown that developing means to monitor, evaluate, and report
areas of improvement allow agencies to enhance collaboration. Developing
performance measures and mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the
contributions can help management, key decision makers, and both
stakeholders and customers obtain feedback through internal reports in
order to improve operational effectiveness and policy. Developing goals
and providing performance results can also help reinforce accountability
through joint planning and reporting of collaborative efforts.
26 As reported on ExpectMore.gov found at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail.10003615.2005.html .
27 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office of
Audits, AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance
To Other Agencies, DHS/OIG-04-20 (Washington, D.C.: March 2004).
The Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Are at Various Stages of Reinforcing
Accountability for Collaborative Efforts through Joint Agency Planning and
Reporting
Neither DHS nor the component agencies responsible for managing the four
multi-agency operations centers consistently discuss or include a
description of the contribution of collaborative efforts of the
multi-agency operations centers in their strategic or annual performance
plans and reports. The most recent DHS strategic plan, issued in 2004,
neither included a discussion of performance goals nor addressed the joint
operations of the multi-agency centers. The plan reported only that DHS
"will provide integrated logistical support to ensure a rapid and
effective response and coordinate among Department of Homeland Security
and other federal, state, and local operations centers consistent with
national incident command protocols." CBP's 2005 annual report on the
operations of the NTC does, however, include a section dedicated to the
contributions of the external liaisons in describing the roles and
responsibilities of other DHS agency personnel including the Federal Air
Marshal Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Coast
Guard, and the accomplishments they have made in the center's operations.
In addition, the AMOC strategic plan for 2005 generally discussed the
importance of collaboration with other component agencies and included a
goal to strengthen component agency partnerships to maximize homeland
security strategies. Reports of the components responsible for managing
the other centers do not address the roles and contributions of other
supporting agencies in accomplishing the centers' missions. DHS agencies
responsible for providing staff to support watchstander positions for
multi-agency operations centers managed by other agencies also do not
address their participation in the operations of the operations center in
strategic plans or performance reports. In general, managing and
supporting agencies that do mention the operations centers do not include
any discussion of the relationship between the participating agencies'
missions or strategies and those of the centers.
Our work has shown that federal agencies can use their strategic and
annual performance plans as tools to drive collaboration with other
agencies and partners and establish complementary goals and strategies for
achieving results. These performance plans can also be used to ensure that
goals are consistent and, if possible, mutually reinforcing.
Accountability is also reinforced when strategic and annual performance
plans help to align agency policy with collaborative goals. A public
accounting through published strategic and annual performance plans and
reports makes agencies answerable for collaboration.
DHS's Operations Directorate Has an Opportunity to Help Ensure That Key
Practices for Collaboration Are Implemented at the Multi-Agency Operations
Centers
DHS established a new Office of Operations Coordination in November 2005
(referred to as the Operations Directorate) to increase its ability to
prepare for, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and other
emergencies and improve coordination and efficiency of operations. In
responding to a draft of this report, DHS cited a number of efforts that
the new directorate plans to take to fulfill this leadership role. Among
other things, DHS said it plans to conduct an independent study, initiated
in September 2006, to leverage technical and analytical expertise to
support expanding the capabilities of the Operations Directorate. In
addition, DHS said it plans to move elements of the National Operations
Center to the Transportation Security Operations Center in 2007 and,
ultimately to colocate the DHS headquarters and all the DHS component
headquarters along with their respective staffs and operations centers at
one location. DHS also cited the development of a new working group that
is developing a national command and coordination capability. While we
agree that these leadership efforts proposed by the Operations Directorate
could further enhance collaboration among DHS's component agencies,
because DHS officials did not provide any information or documentation of
these efforts in response to our requests during the course of the review,
we were unable to determine the extent to which these efforts are likely
to enhance and sustain departmental collaboration. Nonetheless, further
departmental focus on the key practices we have identified could enhance
collaboration among the component agencies. For example, at the time of
our review, the directorate had not taken steps to gather information on
the resources available at each center. The director's office did not have
ready access to information such as centers' budgets or other financial
information needed for reporting across the components, the number of
staff employed at the multi-agency centers, or the number and type of
operations centers managed by the various components. After being directed
to the components for budget and staffing information, we found that the
managing components of the multi-agency operations centers also did not
have ready access to up-to-date information on the number of staff the
centers employed. Such information could be useful to the directorate's
efforts to develop a national command and coordination capability and
further enhance collaboration among the components with multi-agency
operations centers. Directorate officials said that the Operations
Directorate had not assumed its full range of responsibilities due to not
being fully staffed until March 2006 and because of the revisions to the
National Response Plan formalized in May 2006.28 In responding to a draft
of this report, DHS said that the Operations Directorate does not have the
authority to direct or exercise control over other components' operations
centers with respect to administration and support, including
organization, staffing, control of resources and equipment, personnel
management, logistics, and training. Nonetheless, while the Operations
Directorate lacks authority to direct the actions of the other components'
operations centers and obtaining compatible data may be difficult since
the reporting systems of several centers were in place prior to the
creation of DHS, without compatible staffing and financial data Operations
Directorate leadership officials are hampered in their ability to
understand and compare the relative personnel and operating costs of the
24/7/365 operations centers and use such information to promote the
expected unity of effort within the department.
28 Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Change to the National
Response Plan Version 5.0, (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006).
Enhanced leadership from the Operations Directorate to support consistent
reporting of operations centers' budgets and staffing could also support
collaborative actions in two of the previously mentioned key areas:
assessing staffing needs to leverage resources, and applying standards,
policies, and procedures to operate across agency boundaries. In the
absence of leadership to support these and other collaborative efforts,
DHS officials have not yet taken full advantage of an opportunity to meet
the directorate's responsibilities.29
Conclusions
The establishment of the Operations Directorate with the express intent of
enhancing collaboration and coordination among the department's
operational components provides an opportunity to implement practices that
could enhance collaboration among DHS agencies working together at each
multi-agency 24/7/365 operations center. Having staff from multiple
agencies work together is a way of leveraging resources, one key practice
for enhancing collaboration. However, those resources may not be used to
their full potential if other steps to enhance collaboration are not
taken, and the Operations Directorate could provide guidance to help
ensure that the sponsors of the operations centers take the appropriate
steps. There are multi-agency operations centers that lack common goals
and joint strategies; clearly defined roles and responsibilities;
compatible standards, policies, and procedures for information networking;
consistent staffing assessments; prepared mechanisms to monitor, evaluate,
and report on the results of collaborative efforts; and reinforced agency
accountability through agency plans and reports. Our previous work has
shown that these are all critical components in enhancing collaboration
among federal agencies. Given that the collaboration in multi-agency
operations centers focuses on gathering and disseminating information on
real-time situational awareness related to disasters and possible
terrorist activity, it is important that the staff at the centers achieve
the most effective collaboration possible.
29 Our work on mergers and transformations suggests that leadership within
the department must set the direction, pace, and tone and provide a clear,
consistent rationale that brings everyone together behind a single mission
and establish integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation.
Highlights Of A GAO Forum-Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for
a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).
Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide a setting for more effective collaboration among the staff at
each multi-agency 24/7/365 operations center, we recommend that the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security charge the Director of
the Operations Directorate with developing and providing guidance and
helping to ensure the agencies that sponsor the centers take the following
six actions:
o define common goals and joint strategies;
o clarify the roles and responsibilities for watchstanders;
o implement compatible standards, policies, and procedures for
using DHS's information network to provide a means of operating
across agency boundaries;
o conduct staffing needs assessments;
o implement mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the
results of collaborative efforts; and
o address collaborative efforts at the four multi-agency
operations centers in plans and reports on the level of each
operation center's managing agency.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
On October 16, 2006, DHS provided written comments on a draft of this
report (see app. III.) DHS agreed with the six recommended actions to
enhance collaboration at the DHS multi-agency operations centers and said
it planned to take action to implement the practices. In the draft report,
we said that the Operations Directorate had not yet taken actions to
fulfill its leadership role and that a lack of leadership by the
Operations Directorate to support consistent reporting of operations
centers' budgets and staffing limits collaborative actions. DHS did not
agree that leadership provided by the Operation Directorate to support
collaboration is lacking and provided a number of examples of leadership
efforts. Among other things, DHS noted plans to conduct an independent
study, initiated in September 2006, to leverage technical and analytical
expertise to support expanding the capabilities of the Operations
Directorate. In addition, DHS said it plans to move elements of the
National Operations Center to the Transportation Security Operations
Center in 2007 and, ultimately to colocate the DHS headquarters and all
the DHS component headquarters along with their respective staffs and
operations centers at one location. We identified the planned actions in
the report and agree that these leadership efforts by the Operations
Directorate have the potential to further enhance collaboration among
DHS's component agencies, along with the key practices suggested by our
efforts to review collaboration among agencies across the federal
government. However, because Operations Directorate officials did not
provide any information or documentation of these efforts in response to
our requests during the course of the review, we were unable to determine
the extent to which these efforts are likely to enhance and sustain
departmental collaboration.
In addition, DHS officials cited what they considered to be misconceptions
expressed in the draft report. They said that the Operations Directorate
does not have the administrative, budgetary, programmatic, or command and
control authority to direct or exercise control over other component's
operations centers. They also said that our draft incorrectly reported
that the National Operations Center replaced the Homeland Security
Operations Center. Although it was not our intent to imply that the
Operations Directorate has administrative, budgetary, programmatic, or
command and control authority to direct or exercise control over other
component's operations centers, we added a clarifying reference to address
DHS's concern. Finally, although we reported that the new National
Operations Center includes (rather than replaced) the previous Homeland
Security Operations Center, we also added a footnote to further clarify
that the scope of responsibilities of the new National Operations Center
is greater than that of the Homeland Security Operations Center.
We are sending copies of this report to the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Assistant
Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration, the Commissioner
of Customs and Border Protection, and interested congressional committees.
We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
report will be available on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, or wish to
discuss the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or
[email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations
and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Paul L. Jones
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Appendix I: Missions of 24/7/365 DHS Centers Staffed by One DHS Component
DHS agency # Center Mission
Department of 1. U.S.-Computer To monitor cyber
Homeland Emergency security, respond
Security Readiness Team to incidents, and
Headquarters direct
(DHS) communications.
2. National Communications Center To assist in the
initiation,
coordination,
restoration, and
reconstitution of
national security
and emergency
preparedness
telecommunications
services or
facilities under all
conditions, crises,
or emergencies.
Transportation 3. TSA Office of To provide
Security Intelligence warning and
Administration intelligence
(TSA) analysis to
inform field
operators,
industry, and TSA
leadership.
4. Federal Air Marshal Service, To provide support
Mission Operations Control to for scheduling,
Center law enforcement
situations, crisis
management, and
safety and security-
related matters.
Customs and 5. Situation Room To provide
Border information on
Protection (CBP) significant
incidents from
field and sector
offices,
providing
situational
awareness to the
Commissioner and
senior CBP
management.
6. Caribbean Air Marine Operations To utilize
Center (Regional Operations) integrated air and
marine forces,
technology, and
tactical
intelligence to
detect, sort, track,
and facilitate the
interdiction of
criminal entities
throughout the
Caribbean area.
7. National Airspace Security To utilize
Operations Center (Regional integrated air
Operations) forces, technology,
and tactical
intelligence to
maintain air domain
awareness, and
detect, sort, track,
and facilitate the
interception of
intruder aircraft
throughout the
National Capital
Region.
8. National Law Enforcement To monitor radio
Communications Center communications among
CBP personnel for
officer safety
purposes, and to
coordinate tactical
communications and
analytical
investigative
support to various
DHS and other law
enforcement agencies
to support homeland
security.
Immigration and 9. ICE Operations To provide senior
Customs Center management with
Enforcement daily reports and
(ICE) coordination on
all significant
incidents,
events, and
matters that have
an impact on the
mission of ICE
and DHS.
10. ICE Intelligence Watch To provide timely,
effective classified
intelligence support
to ICE headquarters
and field personnel
by serving as a
clearinghouse for
the screening,
evaluation,
processing,
exploitation,
dissemination, and
coordination of
intelligence
information.
11. Law Enforcement Support Center To provide timely
immigration status
and identification
information to
federal, state, and
local law
enforcement agencies
on aliens suspected,
arrested, or
convicted of
criminal activity.
12. Federal Protective Service To provide alarm
Mega-Center System (4 regional monitoring and
centers)a dispatch services to
all federally owned
and leased
buildings.
DHS Agency # Center Mission
Federal 13. National To maintain
Emergency Response national
Management Coordination situational
Agency (FEMA) Center awareness and to
monitor emerging
incidents or
potential
incidents with
possible
operational
consequences
(becomes
multi-agency under
incident surge
conditions).
14. FEMA Operations Centerb To facilitate, in
coordination with the
NOC, the distribution
of warnings, alerts,
and bulletins to the
entire emergency
management community
using a variety of
communications
systems.
15. Mobile Emergency Response Support To serve as the
Operations Centers (5 regional emergency operations
centers) center for FEMA
regions and
associated state
operations centers
providing
time-sensitive
information flow
affecting federal
involvement and
provide a deployed
operations center
platform using
assigned mobile
assets during all
catastrophic events.
United States 16. Joint To provide
Secret Service Operations command, control,
(USSS) Center communication, and
monitoring for
ensuring the
security of the
White House
complex and
surrounding
grounds.
17. Intelligence Division Duty Desk To coordinate
communications for
the receipt,
coordination, and
dissemination of
protective
intelligence
information and
activities that
require immediate
action in support of
protection
assignments. Also
provides "as needed"
information and
coordination support
for the service.
United States 18. U.S. Coast To gather,
Coast Guard Guard Command coordinate, and
(USCG) Center disseminate
information as the
direct
representative of
the Coast Guard
Commandant and the
National Response
Center. Serves as
the primary
communications
link of priority
operational and
administrative
matters between
USCG field units,
District and Area
Commanders, senior
Coast Guard
officials, DHS
officials, the
White House, other
federal agencies,
state and local
officials, and
foreign
governments.
19. Intelligence Coordination Center To function as the
(includes three 24/7/365 watch national-level
locations with one, the Intel coordinator for
Plot, colocated at U.S. Coast collection, analysis,
Guard Command Center) production, and
dissemination of
Coast Guard
intelligence.
Provides all-source,
tailored, and
integrated
intelligence and
intelligence services
to DHS, Coast Guard,
Commandant/staff,
intelligence
community, combatant
commanders, and other
services and
agencies.
The Intel Plot
provides predictive
and comprehensive
intelligence support
to priority
requirements of the
Commandant and senior
staff at Coast Guard
headquarters.
20. National Response Centerc To serve as the
single federal point
of contact for all
pollution incident
reporting. Also
serves as a
communications center
in receiving,
evaluating, and
relaying information
to predesignated
federal responders,
and advises FEMA of
potential major
disaster situations.
DHS Agency # Center Mission
21. Regional Command To serve as points of coordination at
Centers (46)d various organizational levels for
operational command, control,
Area Command Centers communications, intelligence, and
(2) analysis.
District Command
Centers (9)
Sector Command
Centers (35)
Source: GAO generated based on information from DHS.
aAccording to a Federal Protective Service official, the service has
expanded its mission parameters in recent years beyond physical
protection, and has initiated programs to better identify vulnerabilities,
threats, and response requirements for attacks by international or
domestic terrorist individuals or groups. The official said that with the
advent of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the service is
applying a specialized intelligence capability to support its expanded
role as national coordinator for enhancing the protection of all federal,
state, and local government facilities that are determined to be
nationally critical.
bAccording to FEMA officials, the FEMA Operations Center serves as the
alternate NOC. Should the NOC be rendered incapable of functioning for any
reason, they said the FEMA Operations Center will assume critical NOC
functions until the NOC is returned to normal operating status.
cAccording to U.S. Coast Guard officials, the National Response Center is
a joint effort cochaired by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Environmental
Protection Agency that is housed at U.S. Coast Guard headquarters.
dAccording to a U.S. oast Guard official, the Area and District Command
Centers are also designated as International Rescue Coordination Centers,
and all Sector Command Centers are also designated Rescue Sub-Centers in
accordance with international convention.
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our overall objective was to assess the collaboration among the four
multi-agency DHS operations centers. The key questions addressed were as
follows:
1. What are the missions, functions, and products of the multi-agency
24/7/365 DHS operations centers and who are their customers?
2. To what extent has DHS implemented key practices for enhancing
and sustaining collaboration at these multi-agency centers?
To answer our first objective, we obtained and reviewed information on the
missions and functions of all 24/7/365 operations centers in DHS. We
visited centers managed by the Operations Directorate, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the
Secret Service to observe their operations, interview officials
responsible for managing the centers, and identify centers that employed
staff from multiple DHS agencies. We identified four centers that employed
staff from multiple DHS component agencies: the Air and Marine Operations
Center, the National Targeting Center, the Transportation Security
Operations Center, and the National Operations Center-Interagency Watch.
We gathered and analyzed information regarding the products the
multi-agency centers developed on a regular basis and the primary
customers served by the centers.
To answer our second objective, we met with responsible officials of the
NOC-Watch and the acting Director of the Operations Directorate to discuss
the roles and responsibilities of the new organization established as a
result of the department's Second Stage Review. We discussed the
transition, current operations, and policy and procedures put in place by
the Operations Directorate since the reorganization. We also met with
officials from TSA, USCG, CBP, ICE, and the Operations Directorate to
discuss how staff are assigned by these agencies to the four multi-agency
operations centers. We spoke with watchstanders assigned to several of the
centers from other DHS component agencies to discuss their roles and
responsibilities at the centers, and the overall mission of the centers to
which they had been assigned. We reviewed planning and policy documents
including DHS's strategic plans and performance and accountability reports
as well as our prior reports1 and reports from DHS's Inspector General
that addressed DHS management issues. For the four national operations
centers we identified as multi-agency DHS centers, we also reviewed
strategic plans, standard operating procedures, and annual reports and
performance and accountability reports. We assessed DHS's efforts and
actions taken by the Operations Directorate to encourage coordination
among the multi-agency centers and to promote collaboration among the
staff representing DHS agencies at the centers to determine the extent
that they reflected consideration of key practices that our previous work
has shown can enhance and sustain a collaborative relationship among
federal agencies. Eight practices we identified to enhance and sustain
collaboration are identified below:
o defining and articulating a common outcome;
o establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies;
o identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources;
o agreeing on roles and responsibilities;
o establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means
to operate across agency boundaries;
o developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on
results;
o reinforcing agency accountability for collaboration efforts
through agency plans and reports; and,
o reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts
through performance management systems.
For the purposes of this review, we selected the first seven of the eight
practices. We combined our discussion of the implementation of the first
two practices-defining and articulating a common outcome and establishing
mutually reinforcing or joint strategies. We did not address the eighth
practice-reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts
through performance management systems-because an in-depth examination of
component agencies' performance management systems was beyond the scope of
this review. We selected examples that, in our best judgment, clearly
illustrated and strongly supported the need for improvement in specific
areas where the key practices could be implemented.
1 GAO, A Comprehensive and Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve Management
Integration, GAO-05-139 (Washington, D.C.: March 2005); Practices That Can
Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
We conducted our work from October 2005 through September 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Paul L. Jones (202) 512-8777
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Keisling, Kathleen
Ebert, Dorian Dunbar, Scott Behen, Keith Wandtke, Amanda Miller, Christine
Davis, and Willie Commons III made key contributions to this report.
Additional assistance was provided by Katherine Davis.
(440451)
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Highlights of GAO-07-89, a report to congressional requesters
October 2006
HOMELAND SECURITY
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers
Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies
Because terrorists do not operate on a 9-5 schedule, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and its operational components have established
information gathering and analysis centers that conduct activities 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Staff at these operations
centers work to help detect, deter, and prevent terrorist acts. DHS has
determined that out of 25 operations centers, four require higher levels
of collaboration that can only be provided by personnel from multiple DHS
agencies, and other federal, and sometimes state and local, agencies. For
these four multi-agency operations centers, this report (1) describes
their missions, products, functions, and customers and (2) assesses the
extent to which DHS efforts to promote collaboration among the multiple
agencies responsible for the centers reflect key practices for enhancing
and sustaining collaborative efforts. To do so, GAO visited operations
centers, reviewed data and reports from the centers, and interviewed
center and other DHS officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of the DHS Operations Directorate provide
guidance to multi-agency operations centers to implement key practices to
enhance and sustain collaboration. DHS agreed with our recommendations and
identified a number of actions that the Operations Directorate plans to
take to enhance collaboration.
Each of the four multi-agency 24/7/365 operations centers has a different
mission and therefore produces different products, yet all contribute to
the larger mission of DHS and have similar functions and customers.
Customs and Border Protection runs two of the four multi-agency operations
centers-the National Targeting Center and the Air and Marine Operations
Center. The former monitors the international movement of potential
terrorists and produces reports on suspect individuals; the latter
maintains situational awareness of the nation's airspace, general
aviation, and sea-lanes and produces reports on suspicious private air and
marine craft. The Transportation Security Administration's operations
center monitors passengers on commercial flights; works to mitigate the
vulnerabilities of commercial airports, rail stations, and pipelines, the
National Capital Region, and critical infrastructure across the nation;
and produces reports on these topics. DHS's Operations Directorate runs
the National Operations Center Interagency Watch and works to enhance
efficiency and collaboration among DHS components. This operations center
has a more strategic mission in that it uses information gathered by the
other operations centers to provide overall national situational
awareness, and it prepares security briefs for federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies.
Opportunities exist to enhance collaboration among 24/7/365 multi-agency
operations centers. While DHS has leveraged resources by having staff from
multiple agencies work together, the centers lack joint strategies for
collaboration and staffing needs assessments, and they have not
established a definition of watchstander roles for all agencies at each
center. The centers also lack standards and procedures for using DHS's
primary information sharing network; mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and
report on results; and reinforced accountability through agency plans and
reports.
GAO's previous work has shown that such practices are effective in
enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal agencies. The
establishment of DHS's Operations Directorate in 2005 provides a means to
promote implementation of more collaborative practices at the centers.
Staff Working to Maintain Situational Awareness at Operations Centers
*** End of document. ***