Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and	 
Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations (27-SEP-07, GAO-07-884T).	 
                                                                 
The possibility that terrorists and criminals might exploit	 
border vulnerabilities and enter the United States poses a	 
serious security risk, especially if they were to bring 	 
radioactive material or other contraband with them. Although	 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken steps to secure the
170 ports of entry on the northern and southern U.S. borders,	 
Congress is concerned that unmanned and unmonitored areas between
these ports of entry may be vulnerable. In unmanned locations,	 
CBP relies on surveillance cameras, unmanned aerial drones, and  
other technology to monitor for illegal border activity. In	 
unmonitored locations, CBP does not have this equipment in place 
and must rely on alert citizens or other information sources to  
meet its obligation to protect the border. Today's testimony will
address what GAO investigators found during a limited security	 
assessment of seven border areas that were unmanned, unmonitored,
or both--four at the U.S.-Canada border and three at the	 
U.S.-Mexico border. In three of the four locations on the	 
U.S.-Canada border, investigators carried a duffel bag across the
border to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive	 
materials or other contraband. Safety considerations prevented	 
GAO investigators from attempting to cross north into the United 
States from a starting point in Mexico. 			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-884T					        
    ACCNO:   A76770						        
  TITLE:     Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and
Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations				 
     DATE:   09/27/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Border patrols					 
	     Border security					 
	     Contraband 					 
	     Investigations into federal agencies		 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Monitoring 					 
	     Port security					 
	     Radioactive materials				 
	     State highways					 
	     Terrorism						 

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GAO-07-884T

   

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Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Thursday, September 27, 2007: 

Border Security: 

Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border 
Locations: 

Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and 
Special Investigations: 

John W. Cooney, Assistant Director Forensic Audits and Special 
Investigations: 

The testimony was revised on October 2, 2007, to include a link to 
digital video simulating the transport of radioactive material and 
other contraband across northern and southern U.S. borders at 
unmanned or unmonitored locations. A link has been added in the 
Northern Border Location One section on page 4. 

GAO-07-884T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-884T, a testimony before the Committee on Finance, 
U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The possibility that terrorists and criminals might exploit border 
vulnerabilities and enter the United States poses a serious security 
risk, especially if they were to bring radioactive material or other 
contraband with them. Although Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has 
taken steps to secure the 170 ports of entry on the northern and 
southern U.S. borders, Congress is concerned that unmanned and 
unmonitored areas between these ports of entry may be vulnerable. In 
unmanned locations, CBP relies on surveillance cameras, unmanned aerial 
drones, and other technology to monitor for illegal border activity. In 
unmonitored locations, CBP does not have this equipment in place and 
must rely on alert citizens or other information sources to meet its 
obligation to protect the border. 

Todayï¿½s testimony will address what GAO investigators found during a 
limited security assessment of seven border areas that were unmanned, 
unmonitored, or bothï¿½four at the U.S.ï¿½Canada border and three at the 
U.S.ï¿½Mexico border. In three of the four locations on the U.S.ï¿½Canada 
border, investigators carried a duffel bag across the border to 
simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other 
contraband. Safety considerations prevented GAO investigators from 
attempting to cross north into the United States from a starting point 
in Mexico. 

What GAO Found: 

On the U.S.ï¿½Canada border, GAO found state roads close to the border 
that CBP did not appear to man or monitor. In some of these locations, 
the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross 
without being challenged by law enforcement, successfully simulating 
the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband 
into the United States from Canada. In one location on the northern 
border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO activities through 
the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol 
agents were not able to locate GAO investigators. Also on the northern 
border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry that had 
posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. 

On the southern border, investigators observed a large law enforcement 
and Army National Guard presence on a state road, including unmanned 
aerial vehicles. Also, GAO identified federally managed lands that were 
adjacent to the U.S.ï¿½Mexico border. These areas did not appear to be 
monitored or did not have an observable law enforcement presence, which 
contrasted sharply with GAO observations on the state road. Although 
CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting federal lands adjacent to 
the border, CBP officials told GAO that certain legal, environmental, 
and cultural considerations limit options for enforcementï¿½for example, 
environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights. 

Table: Summary of Selected GAO Border Security Activities: 

Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border; Investigator 
activity: An investigator simulated the cross-border movement of 
radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from 
Canada; Law enforcement response and additional observations: 
* Suspicious activity was reported to the U.S. Border Patrol, but 
responding agents were unable to locate GAO investigators and their 
simulated contraband. 

Security vulnerability: Ports of entry with posted hours; Investigator 
activity: investigators attempted to trigger a law enforcement response 
by taking photographs of a port of entry that had closed for the night; 
Law enforcement response and additional observations: 
* A gate was placed across the road, but investigators observed it 
would be possible to drive around the gate;
* U.S. Border Patrol responded 20 minutes after investigators were 
caught on camera at the port of entry;
* Responding U.S. Border Patrol agent did not attempt to verify 
identity of investigators or search their vehicle. 

Security vulnerability: Federally managed lands adjacent to border; 
Investigator activity: Investigators approached the U.S.ï¿½Mexico border; 
Law enforcement response and additional observations: 
* No visible law enforcement response; 
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment; 
* Investigators observed evidence of frequent border crossings into the 
United States at this location. 

Security vulnerability: Federally managed lands adjacent to border; 
Investigator activity: Investigator stepped over a 4-foot-high border 
fence, entered Mexico, and returned again to the United States; Law 
enforcement response and additional observations: 
* No visible law enforcement response; 
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment; 
* No observed law enforcement presence despite proximity to border. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-884T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gregory D. Kutz (202) 512-
9505 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation of potential 
security vulnerabilities on northern and southern U.S. borders. The 
United States shares over 5,000 miles of border with Canada to the 
north, and 1,900 miles of border with Mexico to the south. Individuals 
attempting to legally enter the United States by land present 
themselves to a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer at one of 
the 170 ports of entry located along these borders. Any other method of 
land entry is illegal.[Footnote 1] Because CBP checks the 
identification of entrants into the United States and searches vehicles 
for contraband at ports of entry, individuals entering the United 
States illegally may attempt to avoid screening procedures by crossing 
the border in areas between ports of entry. The U.S. Border Patrol, 
which is part of CBP, is responsible for patrolling and monitoring 
these areas to stop cross-border violators. However, given limited 
resources and the wide expanse of the border, the U.S. Border Patrol is 
limited in its ability to monitor the border either through use of 
technology or with a consistent manned presence. Commensurate with the 
perceived threat, there is a sharp contrast between how CBP distributes 
human resources on the northern border as opposed to the southern 
border. According to CBP, as of May 2007, it had 972 U.S. Border Patrol 
agents on the northern border and 11,986 agents on the southern border. 

Given the potential security vulnerabilities on our borders, you 
expressed concern that cross-border violators may attempt to enter the 
United States, possibly bringing with them radioactive materials or 
other contraband, such as explosives, drugs, counterfeit money, and 
bogus credit cards. We were therefore asked to perform a limited 
security assessment to identify vulnerable border areas where CBP does 
not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there is no 
apparent monitoring equipment in place. You also requested that, where 
possible, our investigators attempt to simulate the cross-border 
movement of radioactive materials or other contraband to demonstrate 
the existence of serious security vulnerabilities. To perform this 
work, our investigators visited seven border areas that were unmanned, 
unmonitored, or both--four at the U.S.-Canada border and three at the 
U.S.-Mexico border. We identified these areas by reviewing information 
that is publicly available and by reviewing our previous work on border 
security.[Footnote 2] These areas were located in four states on the 
northern border and two states on the southern border. We did not 
attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. 
Investigators used a global positioning system (GPS) in some cases and 
geographic landmarks in others to determine the location of the border. 
In three out of four locations on the U.S.-Canada border, investigators 
crossed into the United States from Canada carrying a duffel bag to 
simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other 
contraband. Safety considerations prevented our investigators from 
attempting to cross north into the United States from a starting point 
in Mexico. 

We conducted our investigation from October 2006 through June 2007 in 
accordance with quality standards for investigations as set forth by 
the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

Summary of Investigation: 

In four states along the U.S.-Canada border we found state roads that 
were very close to the border that CBP did not appear to monitor. In 
three states, the proximity of the road to the border allowed 
investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the cross- 
border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the 
United States from Canada. In one apparently unmanned, unmonitored area 
on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to our 
activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding 
U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate our investigators and 
their simulated contraband. Also on the northern border, our 
investigators located several ports of entry that had posted daytime 
hours and were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that 
surveillance equipment was in operation, but that the only preventive 
measure to stop an individual from crossing the border into the United 
States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. 

In contrast to the northern border locations we visited, on a state 
road near the southern border, investigators observed a large law 
enforcement and Army National Guard presence, including unmanned aerial 
vehicles. However, our limited security assessment identified potential 
security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the 
U.S.-Mexico border; we did not observe monitoring or a law enforcement 
presence during the time our investigators visited these areas. The 
Department of the Interior (Interior) provided us with a memorandum of 
understanding between itself; the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), of which CBP is a component; and the Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) documenting the agreed approach to protecting federal lands 
along U.S. borders. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for 
protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal, 
environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for 
enforcement. 

Northern Border: 

According to CBP, the ease and speed with which a cross-border violator 
can travel to the border, cross the border, and leave the location of 
the crossing, are critical factors in determining whether an area of 
the border is vulnerable. We identified state roads close to the border 
that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate 
the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband 
from Canada into the United States. We also located several ports of 
entry that had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were 
unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment 
was in operation but that the only observable preventive measure to 
stop a cross-border violator from entering the United States was a 
barrier across the road that could be driven around. CBP provided us 
with records that confirmed our observations, indicating that on one 
occasion a cross-border violator drove around this type of barrier to 
illegally enter the United States. The violator was later caught by 
state law enforcement officers and arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol. 

State Roads Close to the Northern Border: 

We found state roads close to the U.S.-Canada border in several states. 
Many of the roads we found appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, 
allowing us to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive 
materials or other contraband from Canada into the United States. 

Northern Border Location One: 

On October 31, 2006, our investigators positioned themselves on 
opposite sides of the U.S.-Canada border in an unmanned location. Our 
investigators selected this location because roads on either side of 
the border would allow them to quickly and easily exchange simulated 
contraband. After receiving a signal via cell phone, the investigator 
in Canada left his vehicle and walked approximately 25 feet to the 
border carrying a red duffel bag. While investigators on the U.S. side 
took photographs and made a digital video recording,[Footnote 3] the 
individual with the duffel bag proceeded the remaining 50 feet, 
transferred the duffel bag to the investigators on the U.S. side, and 
returned to his vehicle on the Canadian side (see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: GAO Investigator Crossing from Canada to the United States in 
Northern Border Location One: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

Note: Investigator's face has been blurred to protect his identity. 

[End of figure] 

The set up and exchange lasted approximately 10 minutes, during which 
time the investigators were in view of residents both on the Canadian 
and U.S. sides of the border. 

According to CBP records of this incident, an alert citizen notified 
the U.S. Border Patrol about the suspicious activities of our 
investigators. The U.S. Border Patrol subsequently attempted to search 
for a vehicle matching the description of the rental vehicle our 
investigators used. However, the U.S. Border Patrol was not able to 
locate the investigators with the duffel bag, even though they had 
parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the port of entry. 

Northern Border Location Two: 

Investigators identified over a half dozen locations in this area where 
state roads ended at the U.S.-Canada border. Although investigators 
took pictures of the border area, they did not attempt to cross the 
border because of private property concerns. There was no visible U.S. 
Border Patrol response to our activities and no visible electronic 
monitoring equipment. CBP told us that the activities of our 
investigators would not be grounds for a formal investigation. Still, 
according to CBP records, criminals are aware of vulnerabilities in 
this area and have taken advantage of the access provided by roads 
close to the border. For example, appendix I details an incident on 
January 25, 2007, in which an alert citizen notified CBP about 
suspicious activities on the citizen's property, leading to the arrest 
of several cross-border violators. 

Northern Border Location Three: 

On November 15, 2006, our investigators visited an area in this state 
where state roads ended at the U.S.-Canada border. One of our 
investigators simulated the cross-border movement of radioactive 
materials or other contraband by crossing the border north into Canada 
and then returning to the United States (see fig. 2). There did not 
appear to be any monitoring or intrusion alarm system in place at this 
location, and there was no U.S. Border Patrol response to our border 
crossing. 

Figure 2: GAO Investigator Crossing from Canada into the United States 
in Northern Border Location Three: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

Note: Investigator's face has been blurred to protect his identity. 

[End of figure] 

Northern Border Location Four: 

On December 5, 2006, our investigators traveled along a road parallel 
to the U.S.-Canada border. This road is so close to the border that 
jumping over a ditch on the southern side of the road allows an 
individual to stand in the United States. While driving the length of 
this road on the Canadian side, our investigators noticed cameras 
placed at strategic locations on the U.S. side of the border. They also 
observed U.S. Border Patrol vehicles parked at different locations 
along the border. At a location that appeared to be unmanned and 
unmonitored, one investigator left the vehicle carrying a red duffel 
bag. He crossed the ditch and walked into the United States for several 
hundred feet before returning to the vehicle. Our investigators stayed 
in this location for about 15 minutes, but there was no observed 
response from law enforcement. At two other locations, investigators 
crossed into the United States to find out whether their presence would 
be detected. In all cases, there was no observed response from law 
enforcement. 

Ports of Entry with Posted Hours on the Northern Border: 

We identified several ports of entry with posted daytime hours in a 
state on the northern border. During the daytime these ports of entry 
are staffed by CBP officers. During the night, CBP told us that it 
relies on surveillance systems to monitor, respond to, and attempt to 
interdict illegal border crossing activity. On November 14, 2006, at 
about 11:00 p.m., our investigators arrived on the U.S. side of one 
port of entry that had closed for the night. Investigators observed 
that surveillance equipment was in operation but that the only visible 
preventive measure to stop an individual from entering the United 
States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. 
Investigators stayed at the port of entry for approximately 12 minutes 
to see whether the U.S. Border Patrol would respond. During this time, 
the investigators walked around the port of entry area and took 
photographs. When the U.S. Border Patrol did not arrive at the port of 
entry, our investigators returned south, only to have a U.S. Border 
Patrol agent pull them over 3 miles south of the port of entry. When 
questioned by the U.S. Border Patrol agent, our investigators indicated 
that they were federal investigators testing security procedures at the 
U.S. border. The agent did not ask for identification from our 
investigators and glanced only briefly at the badge and commission book 
the driver offered for inspection. In addition, he did not attempt to 
search the vehicle, ask what agency our investigators worked for, or 
record their names. According to DHS, the agent acted in a manner 
consistent with operational protocol because he was satisfied with the 
credentials presented to him and did not have probable cause to search 
the vehicle. 

CBP provided us with records concerning this incident. According to the 
records, the agent was dispatched because of the suspicious activities 
of our investigators in front of the port of entry camera. The records 
indicated that after this incident, CBP staff researched the incident 
fully to determine whether our investigators posed a threat. By 
performing an Internet search on the name of the investigator who 
rented the vehicle, CBP linked the investigators to GAO. CBP also 
provided us with records that confirmed our observations about the 
barrier at this port of entry, indicating that on one occasion a cross- 
border violator drove around this type of barrier to illegally enter 
the United States. The violator was later caught by state law 
enforcement officers and arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol. 

Southern Border: 

Safety considerations prevented our investigators from performing the 
same assessment work on the U.S.-Mexico border as performed on the 
northern border. In contrast to our observations on the northern 
border, our investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army 
National Guard presence near a state road on the southern border, 
including unmanned aerial vehicles. However, our limited security 
assessment also identified potential security vulnerabilities on 
federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas 
did not appear to be monitored or have a noticeable law enforcement 
presence during the time our investigators visited the sites. Although 
CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting these areas, officials 
told us that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations 
limit options for enforcement. 

State Road Close to the Southern Border: 

On October 17, 2006, two of our investigators left a main U.S. route 
about a quarter mile from a U.S.-Mexico port of entry. Traveling on a 
dirt road that parallels the border, our investigators used a GPS 
system to get as close to the border as possible. Our investigators 
passed U.S. Border Patrol agents and U.S. Army National Guard units. In 
addition, our investigators spotted unmanned aerial vehicles and a 
helicopter flying parallel to the border. At the point where the dirt 
road ran closest to the U.S.-Mexico border, our investigators spotted 
additional U.S. Border Patrol vehicles parked in a covered position. 
About three-fourths of a mile from these vehicles, our investigators 
pulled off the road. One investigator exited the vehicle and proceeded 
on foot through several gulches and gullies toward the Mexican border. 
His intent was to find out whether he would be questioned by law 
enforcement agents about his activities. He returned to the vehicle 
after 15 minutes, at which time our investigators returned to the main 
road. Our investigators did not observe any public traffic on this road 
for the 1 hour that they were in the area, but none of the law 
enforcement units attempted to stop our investigators and find out what 
they were doing. According to CBP, because our investigators did not 
approach from the direction of Mexico, there would be no expectation 
for law enforcement units to question these activities. (See fig. 3.) 

Figure 3: Route of GAO Investigators at U.S.-Mexico Border Location: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Federal Lands Adjacent to the Southern Border: 

Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on 
federally managed land adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas 
did not appear to be monitored or have a manned CBP presence during the 
time our investigators visited the sites. Investigators learned that a 
memorandum of understanding exists between DHS (of which CBP is a 
component), Interior, and USDA regarding the protection of federal 
lands adjacent to U.S. borders. Although CBP is ultimately responsible 
for protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal, 
environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for 
enforcement--for example, environmental restrictions and tribal 
sovereignty rights. 

Southern Border Location One: 

On January 9, 2007, our investigators entered federally managed land 
adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. The investigators had identified a 
road running parallel to the border in this area. Our investigators 
were informed by an employee of a visitor center that because the U.S. 
government was building a fence, the road was closed to the public. 
However, our investigators proceeded to the road and found that it was 
not physically closed. While driving west along this road, our 
investigators did not observe any surveillance cameras or law 
enforcement vehicles. A 4-foot-high fence (appropriate to prevent the 
movement of a vehicle rather than a person) stood at the location of 
the border. Our investigators pulled over to the side of the road at 
one location. To determine whether he would activate any intrusion 
alarm systems, one investigator stepped over the fence, entered Mexico, 
and returned to the United States. The investigators remained in the 
location for approximately 15 minutes but there was no observed law 
enforcement response to their activities. 

Southern Border Location Two: 

On January 23, 2007, our investigators arrived on federally managed 
lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. In this area, the Rio Grande 
River forms the southern border between the United States and Mexico. 
After driving off-road in a 4x4 vehicle to the banks of the Rio Grande, 
our investigators observed, in two locations, evidence that frequent 
border crossings took place. In one location, the investigators 
observed well-worn footpaths and tire tracks on the Mexican side of the 
river. At another location, a boat ramp on the U.S. side of the Rio 
Grande was mirrored by a boat ramp on the Mexican side. Access to the 
boat ramp on the Mexican side of the border had well-worn footpaths and 
vehicle tracks (see fig. 4). 

Figure 4: GAO Investigator at a U.S.-Mexico Border Location: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

An individual who worked in this area told our investigators that at 
several times during the year, the water is so low that the river can 
easily be crossed on foot. Our investigators were in this area for 1 
hour and 30 minutes and observed no surveillance equipment, intrusion 
alarm systems, or law enforcement presence. Our investigators were not 
challenged regarding their activities. According to CBP officials, in 
some locations on federally managed lands, social and cultural issues 
lead the U.S. Border Patrol to defer to local police in providing 
protection. This sensitivity to social and cultural issues appears to 
be confirmed by the provisions of the memorandum of understanding 
between DHS, Interior, and USDA. 

Corrective Action Briefing: 

On February 23, 2007, we met with CBP officials to discuss the results 
of our investigation. CBP officials clarified their approach to law 
enforcement in unmanned and unmonitored areas at the northern and 
southern U.S. borders, including an explanation of jurisdictional 
issues on federally managed lands. CBP indicated that resource 
restrictions prevent U.S. Border Patrol agents from investigating all 
instances of suspicious activity. They added that the northern border 
presents more of a challenge than the southern border and that many 
antiquated ports of entry exist. 

Conclusions: 

Our visits to the northern border show that CBP faces significant 
challenges in effectively monitoring the border and preventing 
undetected entry into the United States. Our work shows that a 
determined cross-border violator would likely be able to bring 
radioactive materials or other contraband undetected into the United 
States by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at any of the locations we 
investigated. CBP records indicate that it does successfully stop many 
individuals from crossing the border illegally, but our own 
observations and experiences (along with CBP's acknowledgment of 
existing challenges) lead us to conclude that more human capital and 
technological capabilities are needed to effectively protect the 
northern border. Our observations on the southern border showed a 
significant disparity between the large law enforcement presence on 
state lands in one state and what seemed to be a lack of law 
enforcement presence on federally managed lands. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement. 
I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this 
time. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D. 
Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or [email protected]. Contacts points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this testimony. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Case Studies of Successful Customs and Border Protection 
Responses to Suspicious Activities on Northern and Southern U.S. 
Borders: 

This appendix details four cases where Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) apprehended individuals who were engaged in suspicious activities 
on the northern and southern borders. According to CBP, U.S. Border 
Patrol agents followed proper protocols in responding to these 
incidents. We are summarizing these case studies--which CBP provided to 
us--to further illustrate challenges the U.S. Border Patrol faces. 

Northern Border Incident One: 

At about 3:20 a.m. on June 24, 2006, electronic surveillance equipment 
observed a vehicle arrive at the port of entry gate from the direction 
of Canada. The suspect got out of the vehicle and, after inspecting the 
area around the gate, returned to the vehicle and drove around the gate 
into the United States. U.S. Border Patrol agents were notified, along 
with state law enforcement. The state officer identified and stopped 
the vehicle while the U.S. Border Patrol agents were en route. U.S. 
Border Patrol agents arrived and arrested the suspect. The suspect was 
identified as a citizen of Albania and admitted to driving around the 
port of entry gate. The suspect had applied for asylum in the United 
States and been denied in 2001, at which point he had moved to Canada. 
Attempts to return the suspect to Canada failed, as he had no legal 
status in Canada. Suspect was held in jail pending removal proceedings. 

Northern Border Incident Two: 

At about 6:00 p.m. on January 25, 2007, the U.S. Border Patrol was 
notified of suspicious activity on the U.S.-Canada border. U.S. 
residents on the border had observed a vehicle dropping off several 
individuals near their home. A U.S. Border Patrol agent proceeded to 
the area where residents had observed the suspicious activity. Once 
there, the agent followed footprints in the snow and discovered two 
suspects hiding among a stand of pine trees. The suspects were 
Columbian nationals, one male and one female. They indicated that a man 
was going to pick them up on the Canadian side of the border, and that 
a friend had driven them to the agreed-upon location on the U.S. side. 
Cell phone numbers retrieved from the suspect's phone linked him to 
phone numbers belonging to a known alien smuggler in the area. The 
suspects said they intended to seek political asylum in Canada. They 
were sent to a detention facility after their arrest. 

Northern Border Incident Three: 

On February 10, 2007, at about 2:00 a.m., U.S. Border Patrol 
surveillance equipment detected six suspects entering the United States 
from Canada. The suspects were walking south along railroad tracks. 
After a short foot chase, U.S. Border Patrol agents apprehended all six 
suspects--two individuals who were believed to be smugglers and a 
family of four. All the suspects were citizens of South Korea. 
According to interviews with the suspects, after the family arrived in 
Canada they were approached by an individual who said he could take 
them to the United States. He brought the family to a desolate area and 
introduced them to a male and a female, who they were to follow across 
the border. The individual then instructed the family to leave their 
luggage in the car and said that he would pick all six of them up in 
the United States. The wife and two children in the family were 
released for humanitarian reasons after apprehension, and the male was 
placed in detention. 

Southern Border Incident One: 

On May 3, 2007, at about 1:20 a.m., an alert citizen reported a 
possible illegal alien near the U.S.-Mexico border. The responding U.S. 
Border Patrol agent located the individual, who claimed to be a citizen 
of Uruguay. He said that he had used a variety of transportation means, 
including airplanes and buses, to travel from Uruguay to a Mexican city 
just south of the U.S. border. The individual claimed to have crossed 
the border by foot along with four other individuals. He then walked 
for 4 days through the desert. When he became dehydrated, he sought 
help at a nearby U.S. town. As a result, he was spotted by the alert 
citizen who notified the U.S. Border Patrol. The individual was 
scheduled to be removed from the country but requested a hearing before 
an immigration judge. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] 19 U.S.C. ï¿½ï¿½ 1433, 1459; 8 C.F.R. ï¿½235.1. 

[2] See GAO, Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their 
Strategies and Operations on Federal Lands, GAO-04-590 (Washington, 
D.C.: June 16, 2004). 

[3] This testimony was revised on October 2, 2007, to include a link to 
digital video simulating the transport of radioactive material and 
other contraband across northern and southern U.S. borders at 
unmanned or unmonitored locations. View the video at: 
[hyperlink, http://wwww.gao.gov/media/video/gao-07-884t/]. 

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