Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims
of Catastrophic Disasters (28-FEB-07, GAO-07-88).
In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed thousands of homes
and displaced over 1 million people. In light of widespread
Congressional and public interest in U.S. agencies' performance
in assisting hurricane victims, GAO initiated work under the
Comptroller General's authority to examine federal housing
assistance. Specifically, this report examines (1) the extent to
which the National Response Plan (NRP) clearly described the
responsibilities and capabilities of federal agencies and the Red
Cross; (2) the extent to which these organizations had plans for
providing sheltering and housing assistance; and (3) the
perceptions of victims and others regarding the assistance needed
and provided. GAO reviewed the NRP and related documents,
interviewed Red Cross and federal agency officials and a limited
number of storm victims, and convened a group of experts to
discuss these issues.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-88
ACCNO: A66351
TITLE: Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing
Victims of Catastrophic Disasters
DATE: 02/28/2007
SUBJECT: Disaster relief aid
Emergency preparedness
Federal/state relations
Housing
Housing programs
Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Rita
Hurricanes
Interagency relations
National response plan
Standards
Federal agencies
Strategic planning
Disaster planning
National Response Plan
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GAO-07-88
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]The National Response Plan
* [4]Emergency Support Function-6
* [5]While ESF-6 Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clear,
* [6]The Red Cross's and FEMA's Responsibilities Under ESF-6 Were
* [7]ESF-6 Support Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clea
* [8]The Red Cross and Federal Agencies Generally Lacked Adequate
* [9]Red Cross Had Plans for Sheltering Hurricane Victims Under I
* [10]FEMA Had Not Completed Catastrophic Planning Efforts Prior t
* [11]Support Agencies Generally Lacked Plans for Providing Assist
* [12]Victims Expressed Varying Views about Sheltering and Tempora
* [13]Most Victims Had Similar Immediate Sheltering and Related Ne
* [14]Victims' Temporary Housing Needs and Their Views of Federal
* [15]Some Victims Lacked Access to Information on Federal Assista
* [16]Some Victims Continue to Experience Temporary Housing and Re
* [17]Strategy Required by Recent Legislation May Address Some Iss
* [18]Conclusions
* [19]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [20]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [21]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
* [22]Disaster Victim Interviews
* [23]Appendix II: Views of GAO's Expert Group on the Provision of
* [24]Members of GAO's Expert Group
* [25]Views of the Group of Experts
* [26]Federal Roles and Responsibilities
* [27]Federal Agency Planning for Providing Disaster Housing
Assis
* [28]Immediate Challenges Victims Face in Meeting Their
Housing N
* [29]Longer-Term Challenges Victims Face in Meeting Their
Housing
* [30]Appendix III: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing As
* [31]Appendix IV: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Ass
* [32]Appendix V: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assi
* [33]Appendix VI: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Ass
* [34]Appendix VII: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing As
* [35]Appendix VIII: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing A
* [36]Appendix IX: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Ass
* [37]Appendix X: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assi
* [38]Appendix XI: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Ass
* [39]Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Defense
* [40]Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of Housing and
* [41]Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of Treasury
* [42]Appendix XV: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affair
* [43]Appendix XVI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [44]GAO Contact
* [45]Acknowledgments
* [46]Order by Mail or Phone
Report to Congressional Addressees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
February 2007
DISASTER ASSISTANCE
Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic Disasters
GAO-07-88
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 5
Background 9
While ESF-6 Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clear, the National
Response Plan Did Not Fully Reflect Support Agencies' Capabilities 13
The Red Cross and Federal Agencies Generally Lacked Adequate Plans for
Providing Shelter and Temporary Housing to Victims of Catastrophic
Disasters 21
Victims Expressed Varying Views about Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Needs and the Assistance They Received 31
Conclusions 42
Recommendations for Executive Action 43
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 44
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 48
Appendix II Views of GAO's Expert Group on the Provision of Disaster
Housing Assistance by the Federal Government 53
Members of GAO's Expert Group 53
Views of the Group of Experts 53
Appendix III Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 57
Appendix IV Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the American Red Cross 60
Appendix V Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance Provided
by the Department of Agriculture 61
Appendix VI Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of Defense 64
Appendix VII Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by HUD 65
Appendix VIII Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of the Treasury 68
Appendix IX Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs 70
Appendix X Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance Provided
by Freddie Mac 71
Appendix XI Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by Fannie Mae 73
Appendix XII Comments from the Department of Defense 75
Appendix XIII Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development 77
Appendix XIV Comments from the Department of Treasury 80
Appendix XV Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs 83
Appendix XVI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 84
Tables
Table 1: Number of Completed Interviews with Hurricane Katrina Victims 51
Table 2: Self-Reported Demographic Data on Disaster Victims Interviewed 52
Figures
Figure 1: Organizational Structure for Emergency Support Function-6 12
Figure 2: Process for Activating ESF-6's Mass Care and Housing Functions
13
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense DHS Department of Homeland Security ESF
Emergency Support Function FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency HUD
Department of Housing and Urban Development IHP Individuals and Households
Program IRS Internal Revenue Service NRP National Response Plan USDA
Department of Agriculture VA Department of Veterans Affairs
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
February 28, 2007
Congressional Addressees:
In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, and
Hurricane Rita struck the same region less than 1 month later. These two
storms destroyed or damaged several hundred thousand homes and displaced
more than a million people from their residences. Federal agencies, the
American National Red Cross (Red Cross), and other organizations provided
emergency shelter and temporary housing for victims of these storms.
However, these storms illustrated the limitations of the nation's
readiness and ability to respond effectively to a catastrophic
disaster--that is, a disaster whose effects almost immediately overwhelm
the response capacities of affected state and local first responders and
require outside action and support from the federal government and other
entities. Congressional and other reports on the federal response to
Hurricane Katrina have identified various failures, including those
related to the federal government's efforts to provide housing assistance
to victims of this storm. In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck
the Gulf Coast, and Hurricane Rita struck the same region less than 1
month later. These two storms destroyed or damaged several hundred
thousand homes and displaced more than a million people from their
residences. Federal agencies, the American National Red Cross (Red Cross),
and other organizations provided emergency shelter and temporary housing
for victims of these storms. However, these storms illustrated the
limitations of the nation's readiness and ability to respond effectively
to a catastrophic disaster--that is, a disaster whose effects almost
immediately overwhelm the response capacities of affected state and local
first responders and require outside action and support from the federal
government and other entities. Congressional and other reports on the
federal response to Hurricane Katrina have identified various failures,
including those related to the federal government's efforts to provide
housing assistance to victims of this storm.
The federal government provides support for emergency shelter and
temporary housing for victims of disasters under several legislative and
executive provisions. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) primarily establishes the programs and
processes for the federal government to provide major disaster and
emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations,
individuals, and others. In addition, the Homeland Security Act of 2002
required that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) consolidate
existing federal government response plans into a single, coordinated
national response plan. In December 2004, DHS issued the National Response
Plan (NRP) to establish a comprehensive approach to domestic incident
management across a spectrum of activities including prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery. The NRP "base plan" describes the
structure and processes for integrating the efforts and resources of
federal, state, local, tribal, private- sector, and The federal government
provides support for emergency shelter and temporary housing for victims
of disasters under several legislative and executive provisions. The
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the
Stafford Act) primarily establishes the programs and processes for the
federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to
states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and others. In
addition, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 required that the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) consolidate existing federal government
response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan. In
December 2004, DHS issued the National Response Plan (NRP) to establish a
comprehensive approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum
of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.
The NRP "base plan" describes the structure and processes for integrating
the efforts and resources of federal, state, local, tribal, private-
sector, and nongovernmental organizations during incidents of national
significance.^1 In addition, the NRP includes 15 Emergency Support
Function (ESF) "annexes" that describe responsibilities for federal
agencies and the Red Cross in specific functional areas. The NRP also
requires each ESF to develop standard operating procedures and
notification protocols and to maintain current rosters and contact
information for the function.^2 Further, the NRP includes a separate
Catastrophic Incident Annex and a more detailed Catastrophic Incident
Supplement that describe additional responsibilities for federal agencies
in the event of a catastrophic incident.^3
ESF-6 addresses the nonmedical mass care, housing, and human services
needs of individuals impacted by incidents of national significance. ESF-6
designates the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the
coordinator for this function. The ESF-6 annex also identifies the Red
Cross as the primary agency for coordinating federal assistance for mass
care (including emergency shelter) and FEMA as the primary agency for
coordinating federal assistance for housing and human services. Further,
ESF-6 identifies several support agencies, such as the Departments of
Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA), as having responsibilities for
providing sheltering or housing assistance. In addition to its
responsibilities as a primary agency under ESF-6, the Red Cross is
expected to provide relief services to the public in the event of a
disaster under the terms of a congressional charter.^4
In light of widespread congressional and public interest in U.S. agencies'
performance in providing assistance to hurricane victims, we prepared this
report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on
his own initiative to review the events and aftermath surrounding
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This report is part of a continued effort to
assist Congress in identifying lessons from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
that can be used to improve federal assistance for victims of future
catastrophic disasters. Specifically, this report examines: (1) the extent
to which the NRP clearly described the responsibilities and capabilities
of the Red Cross and federal agencies for providing shelter and temporary
housing assistance, (2) the extent to which federal agencies and the Red
Cross had operational plans for providing sheltering and housing
assistance in response to such catastrophic disasters, and (3) the
perceptions of victims and others of victims' sheltering and housing needs
and the federal assistance provided after Hurricane Katrina to address
those needs.
^1The NRP defines an incident of national significance as an actual or
potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated and effective
response by an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal,
nongovernmental, and private sector entities in order to save lives,
minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery
and mitigation activities.
^2Throughout this report, unless otherwise noted, our reference to the NRP
includes the base plan, supporting annexes, and standard operating
procedures. The standard operating procedures for ESF-6 were in draft form
at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
^3The more detailed Catastrophic Incident Supplement was in draft form at
the time when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck. DHS issued the final
supplement in August 2006.
^4The Red Cross generally does not provide shelter to people with medical
and/or special needs such as those with physical or mental disabilities.
States and localities generally have responsibility for providing shelter
for these populations.
We included the following federal agencies and other organizations in our
study: DOD, FEMA, HUD, Treasury, USDA, and VA, as well as the Red Cross,
the Federal Home Loan and Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae).^5 To examine the
extent to which the NRP clearly described the responsibilities of federal
agencies and the Red Cross, we reviewed the NRP and its ESF-6 annex along
with relevant federal statutes and regulations pertaining to emergency
shelter and disaster housing assistance. In addition, we obtained
information from each organization about the types of sheltering and
temporary housing assistance they provided following the two hurricanes
and determined the extent to which the assistance was provided under a
responsibility described in the NRP. To examine the extent to which
federal agencies and the Red Cross had operational plans for providing
sheltering and housing assistance in response to catastrophic disasters
such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we analyzed available agency and Red
Cross documents, including policies, plans, and procedures these
organizations had for providing assistance at the time of the disasters.
In addition, we interviewed federal agency and Red Cross officials in
Washington, D.C., about the plans and procedures they used to provide
assistance following the hurricanes. While our focus was on the response
to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we have incorporated information on
relevant steps that the organizations within the scope of our study have
taken since those events. To obtain the perceptions of victims and others
of victims' shelter and housing needs and the federal assistance provided
to address those needs after Hurricane Katrina, we conducted standardized
telephone interviews with a purposeful stratified sample of 38 victims of
Hurricane Katrina.^6 While the results cannot be statistically generalized
to all victims of the storm, they do provide useful insights into the
experiences and needs of victims of this disaster. We also convened a
group of experts on the provision of disaster housing assistance by the
federal government.^7 Finally, to address all of our objectives, we
reviewed relevant literature on disaster housing and recent reports on the
federal response to Hurricane Katrina, including those issued by the
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,^8 the House
of Representatives,^9 the Senate,^10 and the White House.^11 While these
reports addressed a broad range of issues related to the preparedness for
and response to Hurricane Katrina, our report focuses exclusively on
federal assistance for sheltering and for providing temporary housing--the
activities covered by ESF-6.^12 Accordingly, we included a comprehensive
summary of the various types of housing assistance provided by each of the
ESF-6 agencies to the victims of the two hurricanes. These summaries
appear in appendixes III through XI.
^5ESF-6 also mentions the Small Business Administration (SBA) as having
responsibilities for providing housing assistance. We excluded SBA from
this report because GAO is reporting separately on SBA. See GAO, Small
Business Administration: Actions Needed to Provide More Timely Disaster
Assistance, [47]GAO-06-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006) and Small
Business Administration: A Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Agency
Preparedness for Future Disasters, GAO-07-114 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14,
2007).
^6A purposeful stratified sample is used in qualitative data collection to
gather data from individuals who can provide detailed information about
the issues of central importance to the purpose of the study, but which
also uses characteristics to divide the sample into smaller groups with
the purpose of attempting to capture major variations in the issues across
the groups.
^7Appendix II identifies and contains a summary of the views expressed by
the group of experts.
^8Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to
Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006).
^9United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A
Failure of Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
^10United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.:
May 2006).
^11The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned (Washington, D.C.: February 2006).
^12Although this report focuses on sheltering and housing activities
covered by ESF-6, the federal agencies included in this study also have
responsibilities under other ESF annexes as well. For example, in addition
to having responsibilities under ESF-6, USDA's Forest Service also has
responsibilities under other ESF annexes, such as ESF-1 (Transportation)
and ESF-2 (Communications).
We conducted our work between November 2005 and February 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See
appendix I for a detailed description of our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief
The overall responsibilities of the two ESF-6 primary agencies--the Red
Cross and FEMA--for coordinating federal sheltering and housing assistance
generally were clear under the NRP and related documents. However, the
responsibilities described in the ESF-6 annex for some support agencies
did not fully reflect their capabilities. The NRP clearly described that
the Red Cross is to coordinate federal mass care assistance to support
state and local sheltering efforts. For the most part, the NRP clearly
described FEMA's responsibilities, though neither the ESF-6 annex nor the
draft standard operating procedures fully described the scope of FEMA's
responsibility to work with appropriate private-sector organizations to
maximize use of all available resources, and FEMA experienced challenges
working with Fannie Mae to house victims in over 1,500 properties that
this organization made available.^13 As part of a housing task force, FEMA
is currently exploring ways of incorporating housing assistance offered by
private-sector organizations. Finally, while the ESF-6 support agencies'
responsibilities were generally clearly described in the NRP's ESF-6
annex, the document did not and currently does not fully reflect the
disaster housing capabilities of HUD, USDA, VA, and Treasury. For example,
USDA's Rural Development provided temporary housing for victims of the
disasters, and Treasury acted to make available some vacant rental units
subsidized through a tax program, but the ESF-6 annex did not mention
either of these capabilities. According to FEMA officials, as the only
multiagency all-hazards plan, the NRP (including the annexes) should
enable participating agencies to clearly delineate what assistance other
agencies are capable of providing and to be aware of what might be
expected of them as well, in order to properly plan to provide that
assistance if required. Officials of the support agencies told us that the
ESF-6 annex did not fully reflect their agencies' capabilities in part
because of the limited time to provide input into its development. Also,
Treasury officials believed that the NRP did not need to reflect the
Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) capability to make tax program properties
available to house disaster victims because this measure is taken only
after extraordinary events. Relatedly, none of the support agencies had
developed fact sheets--required by the ESF-6 draft standard operating
procedures--that included their appropriate roles and responsibilities,
notification and activation procedures, and agency-specific authorities.
Support agencies had not prepared the fact sheets because they generally
were not aware of this requirement. The lack of fully reflected support
agency capabilities within the NRP and the lack of information required by
the fact sheets hampered FEMA's ability to provide leadership in
coordinating and integrating overall federal efforts associated with
housing assistance. For example, as noted in the White House's February
2006 report on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA employees'
unfamiliarity with USDA's programs made it difficult to take advantage of
USDA's capabilities for providing temporary housing.
^13Congress established and chartered Fannie Mae, as well as Freddie Mac
(discussed later in the report), as government-sponsored enterprises that
are privately owned and operated. Their mission is to enhance the
availability of mortgage credit by purchasing mortgages from lenders
(banks, thrifts, and mortgage bankers) that use the proceeds to make
additional mortgage loans to home buyers.
The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked operational plans for
providing shelter and temporary housing in response to catastrophic
disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but have taken some steps
to improve their planning. Specifically:
o To provide disaster relief services to victims of the storms,
the Red Cross followed a specific response plan for tropical
storms and hurricanes that it updates annually. However, the Red
Cross did not anticipate the magnitude of an event like Hurricane
Katrina. For example, the Red Cross initially planned to open
shelters in 5 states, and had 306 shelters open or on standby when
Hurricane Katrina struck, but it ultimately opened more than 1,000
shelters in 27 states due to the large number of displaced
victims. The House Select Committee noted that the Red Cross
experienced many problems in obtaining enough food to satisfy
client needs. The Red Cross has taken a number of actions intended
to improve its planning and response for future hurricanes,
including expanding its warehouse capacity for disaster response
operations.
o FEMA had initiated various catastrophic planning efforts, but
they were incomplete at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
These efforts included preparing a draft Southeast Louisiana
Catastrophic Hurricane Plan that outlined the response and
recovery for a major hurricane that would flood New Orleans and
the surrounding parishes; however, this and other planning efforts
were incomplete when the storms struck. FEMA was overwhelmed by
the large number of people displaced by the storms, and it
experienced difficulties that not only delayed providing housing
assistance to some victims but also increased the potential for
fraud, waste, and abuse. FEMA officials told us that the agency
has taken steps to better plan for providing housing assistance.
For example, in July 2006, FEMA issued a high-level strategy for
providing sheltering and housing assistance in support of a
presidentially declared emergency or major disaster involving a
mass evacuation. FEMA intends to develop more detailed policies to
support this strategy. However, these policies were not completed
as of January 2007.
o The NRP requires support agencies named in ESF annexes to
develop supplemental plans and procedures for carrying out
assigned responsibilities. However, due to the lack of preexisting
operational plans detailing how the support agencies would provide
disaster housing assistance--including plans for meeting their
ESF-6 responsibilities--some agencies had to work out details or
improvise in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and
this affected the timeliness with which some victims were provided
with temporary housing. For example, VA worked with FEMA for
months after the storms in order to make vacant properties from
its programs available to disaster victims. In contrast,
Treasury's IRS and DOD's Army Corp of Engineers each had a
document that addressed meeting its responsibilities under ESF-6.
HUD, USDA, and VA officials told us that in an attempt to improve
their operational plans for providing housing assistance under
ESF-6, the agencies formed an informal working group since
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to work out certain procedural details
for providing housing assistance, including developing better
means of communicating and sharing information, to avoid the need
to do so after a disaster event. However, the informal working
group is not intended to address the full range of each of these
agencies' responsibilities under ESF-6, and does not have a
specific timetable for its activities.
According to victims, experts, and others we spoke with, the
shelter and housing needs of victims and the perceptions of the
federal assistance provided to meet these needs varied. For
example, most victims needed shelter, food, water, and other
necessities in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, but many
perceived that the assistance provided fell short. In particular,
many shelters were not prepared to accommodate the large number of
victims who were displaced and were not prepared to provide
assistance over an extended period of time. In most cases, victims
with a need for temporary housing in the weeks and months that
followed were eligible for some form of federal disaster housing
assistance, such as rental assistance or travel trailers from FEMA
or rental assistance from HUD. The specific needs of victims,
however, and their perceptions of the assistance that was provided
varied. Often those needs depended, at least in part, on victims'
own circumstances, such as where they were located after the
storm, whether they were homeowners or renters, and whether they
had special needs. Victims we contacted expressed both positive
and negative perceptions of the temporary housing assistance they
received. For example, victims perceived that rental assistance
generally was helpful in meeting their housing needs because it
allowed them to find a place to live and pay the rent while they
"got back on their feet," but some noted that the process of
having to recertify their eligibility for FEMA's rental assistance
every 3 months left them uncertain about whether they would
continue to receive aid. Similarly, some victims who received a
travel trailer that was located on their property said that it
enabled them to remain in close proximity to their home during
repairs. But other victims who had travel trailers placed on their
property indicated that the units were too small for the number of
family members needing housing. Further, our interviews with
victims, as well as our group of experts, indicated that temporary
housing needs include not just shelter, but also access to medical
facilities, public transportation, schools, employment
opportunities, and other social services--and, particularly for
those displaced to distant locations, information about all of
these things. Many victims needed but did not always get access to
reliable and accurate information about the assistance they were
eligible to receive and help locating temporary housing. FEMA has
initiated development of the national disaster housing strategy
mandated by Public Law 109-295 (October 4, 2006), which is to
address a number of these issues, including housing populations
with special needs, clustering temporary housing near appropriate
services, and providing information about eligibility for
assistance.
To help ensure that FEMA, as the designated primary agency for
housing and as the overall coordinator for ESF-6, can effectively
coordinate federal assistance in providing temporary housing for
victims of future disasters, we are recommending that (1) HUD,
Treasury, USDA, and VA propose revisions needed to ensure that the
NRP fully reflects their capabilities for providing temporary
housing assistance under ESF-6 and (2) Defense, HUD, Treasury,
USDA, and VA develop fact sheets as required by the ESF-6 standard
operating procedures. To help ensure that ESF-6 support agencies
are prepared to help expeditiously house victims of future
disasters, we are recommending that HUD, USDA, and VA develop
operational plans detailing how they will meet their housing
responsibilities under ESF-6.
We provided a draft of this report to the American Red Cross and
the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security,
Housing and Urban Development, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs. The
Red Cross did not provide comments. Defense, HUD, Treasury, and VA
concurred with our recommendations; these agencies' comments are
discussed later in the report and are reproduced in appendixes XII
through XV. USDA responded that it will continue to develop its
capabilities, fact sheets, and operational plans in order to meet
ESF-6 responsibilities, as we recommended. DHS, along with HUD,
Treasury, and VA, provided technical comments, which we
incorporated into the report as appropriate. In addition, we
provided relevant segments of this report to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac and incorporated technical comments from these
organizations where appropriate.
Background
Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast region in late August
2005, causing approximately $81 billion in estimated property
damage and over 1,500 deaths.^14 Hurricane Katrina caused
extensive damage and significant loss of life in Louisiana and
Mississippi, but damage from this disaster also extended into
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, ultimately covering approximately
90,000 square miles. Hurricane Katrina was also the most expensive
disaster in history, devastating far more residential property and
completely destroying or making uninhabitable an estimated 300,000
homes. Hurricane Rita made landfall near the Texas and Louisiana
border in late September 2005, causing approximately $10 billion
in estimated property damage. Hurricane Rita created a wide swath
of damage from Alabama to eastern Texas and caused flooding in
some areas of Louisiana that had seen flooding from Hurricane
Katrina about a month earlier. Hurricane Rita severely damaged or
destroyed more than 23,600 housing units in Southwest Louisiana
and Southeast Texas. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita displaced more
than 1 million people from their residences. According to the Red
Cross, 8 months following the disasters more than 750,000 persons
remained displaced across all 50 states.^15
The National Response Plan
DHS issued the NRP in December 2004, intending for it to be an
all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single,
comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents
where federal involvement is necessary. Major federal government
agencies and the Red Cross are signatories to the plan. The NRP is
designed on the premise that local jurisdictions generally handle
disaster response. In the vast majority of disasters, local
emergency personnel, such as police, fire, public health, and
emergency management personnel, act as first responders and
identify needed resources to aid the community. Local
jurisdictions can also call on state resources to provide
additional assistance. If an incident is of such severity that it
is deemed an incident of national significance, DHS and FEMA--an
agency within DHS--coordinate with other federal agencies to
provide the affected state and local governments with additional
resources and supplemental assistance. In these instances, state
and local governments can request federal assistance for needed
items. The Secretary of Homeland Security declared Hurricane
Katrina an incident of national significance on August 30, 2005.
This was the first time the federal government used the NRP in
response to an incident of national significance.
In addition to outlining the organizational structure used to
respond to disasters, the NRP includes (1) 15 Emergency Support
Function annexes that serve as the coordination mechanism to
provide assistance to state, local, and tribal governments or to
federal departments and agencies conducting missions of primary
federal responsibility; (2) 9 Support Annexes that describe the
framework through which federal departments and agencies; state,
local, and tribal entities; the private sector; volunteer
organizations; and nongovernmental organizations such as the Red
Cross will coordinate and execute common functional processes and
administrative requirements; and (3) 7 Incident Annexes that
address contingency or hazard situations requiring specialized
application of the NRP. For example, the Private-Sector
Coordination Support Annex describes the policies,
responsibilities, and concept of operations for federal incident
management activities involving the private sector during actual
or potential incidents of national significance. In addition, the
Catastrophic Incident Annex establishes the context and
overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an
accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic
incident.
Emergency Support Function-6
ESF-6, which is particularly relevant to sheltering victims and
providing temporary housing assistance, creates a working group of
key federal agencies and voluntary organizations to coordinate
federal assistance in support of state and local efforts. The
efforts are aimed at providing:
o mass care, including sheltering, feeding, and emergency first
aid;
o housing, both short and long term; and
o human services, such as counseling, processing of benefits, and
identifying support for persons with special needs.
ESF-6 designates a "primary" agency for each of these three areas.
FEMA has two roles under ESF-6: it serves as both the overall
ESF-6 coordinator and the primary agency for both housing and for
human services (fig. 1). As ESF-6 coordinator, FEMA oversees the
implementation of ESF-6 and ensures overall coordination among
mass care, housing, and human services. As the primary agency for
housing and human services, FEMA coordinates federal efforts to
provide these services to the victims of disasters. The Red Cross
is designated under ESF-6 as the primary agency for mass care,
which includes sheltering, feeding, and the provision of emergency
first aid. In this capacity, the Red Cross coordinates federal
mass care assistance in support of state and local mass care
efforts. Since 1905, the Red Cross also has had a congressional
charter, requiring the organization to provide volunteer
humanitarian assistance to the armed forces, serve as a medium of
communication between the people of the United States and the
armed forces, and provided disaster prevention and relief
services.
^14Preliminary estimate as reported by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration in August 2006.
^15The number of displaced persons includes those impacted by Hurricane
Wilma, which struck the United States in October 2005.
Figure 1: Organizational Structure for Emergency Support Function-6
Figure 2 illustrates the process for activating ESF-6's mass care and
housing areas in response to an incident of national significance. The
FEMA Operations Center activates ESF-6 and notifies the primary agencies.
The primary agencies--Red Cross and FEMA--then deploy staff to the
designated ESF-6 location. The primary agencies also notify and request
assistance from support agencies. ESF-6 support agencies are expected to
conduct operations, when requested by DHS or the designated ESF primary
agency, using their own authorities, subject-matter experts, capabilities,
or resources.
Figure 2: Process for Activating ESF-6's Mass Care and Housing Functions
While ESF-6 Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clear, the National
Response Plan Did Not Fully Reflect Support Agencies' Capabilities
The responsibilities of the two ESF-6 primary agencies for mass care and
housing--the Red Cross and FEMA--generally were clearly described in the
NRP. However, under its role as the primary agency for housing, FEMA's
responsibility for working with private-sector organizations was less
clearly described in the NRP, and FEMA experienced challenges working with
a private-sector organization to make housing units available to victims
of the disasters. In general, the NRP clearly described the
responsibilities for ESF-6 support agencies, but the plan did not fully
reflect all of these agencies' capabilities for providing housing
assistance in part because of the limited time agencies had to provide
input into its development. As a result, FEMA's ability to provide
leadership in coordinating and integrating overall federal efforts
associated with housing assistance was limited.
The Red Cross's and FEMA's Responsibilities Under ESF-6 Were Generally Clear
The Red Cross's responsibilities as the primary agency for mass care
(which includes sheltering) under ESF-6 were clearly described in the NRP.
For example, the ESF-6 annex to the NRP clearly states that the Red Cross
is to coordinate federal mass care assistance in support of state and
local mass care efforts. In addition, the more detailed ESF-6 standard
operating procedures in effect at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
clearly described additional Red Cross primary agency responsibilities,
such as assisting with the identification and coordination of (1)
nonmedical mass care services for sheltering and feeding operations, (2)
emergency first aid at designated sites, and (3) bulk distribution of
emergency relief items during incidents of national significance. To
fulfill its responsibilities, the Red Cross--after receiving requests from
state or local governments for federal resources to help meet sheltering
or other mass care needs--identifies resources to meet the needs or calls
FEMA to meet the needs. The Red Cross's responsibilities as the primary
agency for mass care under ESF-6 also included mass care reporting--that
is, providing to FEMA sheltering, feeding, and other mass care
information.
FEMA's responsibilities as the primary agency for housing under ESF-6 were
also generally clear. For example, the ESF-6 annex notes that FEMA is to
provide leadership in coordinating and integrating overall federal efforts
associated with housing services. In addition, the more detailed draft
ESF-6 standard operating procedures state that FEMA is to (1) assist with
the data collection of housing resources potentially available within
proximity of the impacted area, (2) coordinate temporary housing resources
needed to support sheltering shortfall, and (3) address the short-term and
long-term disaster related housing needs of victims during incidents of
national significance. Further, the introduction to the NRP's emergency
support function annexes states that any primary agency named in the plan
is to notify and request assistance from designated support agencies,
manage mission assignments,^16 coordinate with appropriate state agencies,
and work with appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize the use
of all available resources.
^16A mission assignment is a FEMA request to another federal agency to
provide a specific service. FEMA uses mission assignments to support
federal operations in a major disaster or emergency declaration under the
Stafford Act. It orders immediate, short-term emergency response
assistance when an applicable State or local government is overwhelmed by
the event and lacks the capability to perform, or contract for, the
necessary work.
While their responsibilities under the NRP were generally clear, the Red
Cross and FEMA disagreed about the operational role of the ESF-6
coordinator--a FEMA official with overall responsibility for leading
efforts to coordinate federal mass care, housing, and human services
assistance--as we reported in June 2006.^17 The Red Cross maintained that
the ESF-6 standard operating procedures in effect at the time permitted it
to take requests for FEMA assistance directly to the Operations Section
Chief--a FEMA official responsible for coordinating operational support to
incident management efforts. Specifically, the procedures stated that the
Red Cross would "not be precluded" from taking priorities directly to the
Operations Section Chief. However, following Hurricane Katrina, FEMA
instructed the Red Cross to direct these requests through the ESF-6
coordinator, who would pass the requests to the Operations Section Chief.
Red Cross officials told us that it complied with this procedure, but that
this added time to the process. In our June 2006 report, we recommended
that the Secretary of DHS direct FEMA to work with the Interim President
and Chief Executive Officer of the Red Cross as soon as possible on the
operating procedures they would both use in an incident of national
significance. FEMA and the Red Cross have worked to clarify their
understanding of the role of the ESF-6 coordinator. For example, FEMA
issued revised ESF-6 operating procedures in September 2006. The revised
procedures state that it is not envisioned that the ESF-6 coordinator will
have a direct operational role during response activities. During our work
for this current review, FEMA and Red Cross officials told us that both
organizations now agree that the Red Cross can take requests for FEMA
assistance to the Human Services Branch Chief for referral directly to the
Operations Section Chief. As a result, this should clarify both
organizations' understanding regarding the role of the ESF-6 coordinator
and the process for requesting FEMA assistance under ESF-6.
The DHS Inspector General's March 2006 report on the response to Hurricane
Katrina also suggested that the scope of the Red Cross's mass care
reporting activities might not have been mutually clear to both the Red
Cross and FEMA.^18 According to the report, a senior Red Cross official
said that it was responsible for coordinating and reporting only on the
Red Cross' own mass care operations, while FEMA was relying on the Red
Cross to coordinate and report on non-Red Cross mass care operations as
well. The Inspector General recommended that FEMA establish an ESF-6
working group to define the explicit roles and responsibilities for each
agency, develop standard operating procedures, and implement a
concept-of-operations plan for response activities that address all levels
of disasters. Red Cross officials told us that, notwithstanding the
official's statement in the Inspector General's report, the Red Cross was
clearly responsible under ESF-6 for reporting to FEMA on both Red Cross
and non-Red Cross sheltering operations, and that the organization relies
on state and local officials to supply some of this information. However,
Red Cross officials also told us that, following Hurricane Katrina, it was
unable to obtain complete information from some state and local officials.
FEMA officials told us that it had to gather information on its own
regarding some non-Red Cross shelter locations in response to the storm.
^17GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red
Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season, [48]GAO-06-712
(Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006).
^18Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, A Performance Review
of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina,
OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
Further, the NRP did not clearly describe the scope of FEMA's
responsibility to, or delineate how the agency would, work with
appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize the use of all
available housing resources for incidents of national significance. During
our review, we found that Fannie Mae approached FEMA in September 2005
with an offer to make some 1,500 of its properties available for
temporarily housing victims of the disasters. Because FEMA and Fannie Mae
had no prior working relationship, the organizations initially experienced
operational challenges regarding the leasing of these units. For example,
FEMA officials told us that Fannie Mae did not have a mechanism in place
for accepting calls from disaster victims that FEMA referred to the
organization. Also, according to Fannie Mae officials, it expected that
FEMA would be responsible for managing its offered housing units. However,
because FEMA did not have this capability, Fannie Mae had to develop a
mechanism for managing the units through its network of brokers. According
to Fannie Mae officials, structuring a brand new process for these
operational issues created some delays in providing benefits to disaster
victims. FEMA and Fannie Mae eventually did reach an agreement for placing
disaster victims in Fannie Mae-owned housing units, and disaster victims
began occupying these properties in October 2005.
Freddie Mac also offered assistance to victims of the disasters, placing
more than 1,000 families in temporary housing, including properties from
its own inventory. However, Freddie Mac provided this assistance through
nonprofit organizations rather than coordinating through FEMA. Freddie Mac
officials noted that it would have been difficult for FEMA to have been
involved in this effort in the absence of a previous relationship or
specific plans for coordination. According to FEMA officials, the agency
is assessing whether to develop agreements with private-sector
organizations as part of the agency's housing task force. The agreements
would outline processes for utilizing housing resources offered by these
organizations during catastrophic disasters.
ESF-6 Support Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clear, but Their
Capabilities Were Not Fully Reflected in the NRP
The ESF-6 annex clearly described responsibilities for support agencies,
but the annex did not fully reflect the housing-related capabilities of
these agencies. According to a FEMA official, the NRP (including the
annexes) should enable participating agencies to clearly delineate what
assistance other agencies are capable of providing and to be aware of what
might be expected of them as well, in order to properly plan to provide
that assistance if required. Further, as we have previously testified, in
the event of a catastrophic disaster, leadership roles, responsibilities,
and lines of authority for the response at all levels must be clearly
defined and effectively communicated in order to facilitate rapid and
effective decision making.^19
With the exception of DOD, each of the support agencies in our study
described to us assistance that they provided to victims of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita that was not reflected in the NRP. Specifically:
o Department of Agriculture--The ESF-6 annex clearly described
that USDA's Forest Service is to provide available departmental
resources (e.g., cots, blankets, sleeping bags, personnel) for
shelters. However, USDA's Rural Development also provided
temporary housing for victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in
multifamily units financed by the department and in its inventory
of single-family properties, but the ESF-6 annex did not reflect
these capabilities.^20 In addition, USDA provided other forms of
housing assistance that the ESF-6 annex did not reflect, including
(1) rental assistance to low-income disaster victims, in the form
of a subsidy to help cover their rent and (2) requests to holders
of program mortgages to provide temporary moratoriums on payments
and to exercise forbearance (i.e., refrain from foreclosures) for
program borrowers in the affected areas. While temporary
suspensions of mortgage payments and foreclosures are not, in
themselves, forms of temporary housing, they can help make it
financially possible for homeowners to rent alternative housing
until their homes can be reoccupied.
o Department of Housing and Urban Development--The ESF-6 annex
clearly described that HUD is to provide information on available
housing units owned or in HUD possession for use as emergency
shelters and temporary housing and utilize available HUD staff
when needed to assist with mass care and housing operations.
However, HUD provided other forms of housing-related assistance in
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that the ESF-6 annex did
not reflect. For example, HUD waived certain requirements in its
existing grant programs to assist disaster victims with
rehabilitating or purchasing a residence. Also, similar to USDA,
HUD asked lenders to adopt temporary payment moratoriums and to
exercise forbearance for victims with HUD-insured mortgages. In
addition, FEMA tasked HUD through a mission assignment to create a
housing voucher program for disaster victims who, prior to the
disaster, were served by HUD's rental assistance programs or were
homeless.^21
o Department of Treasury--The ESF-6 annex clearly described that
IRS is to distribute disaster kits containing tax forms and
publications to help victims determine the amount of a casualty
loss deduction for destroyed property. However, in response to
Hurricane Katrina, IRS also provided housing-related assistance
that the ESF-6 annex did not reflect. For example, IRS, at the
request of governors of the affected states, temporarily suspended
the income limits that normally restrict eligibility for certain
low-income housing tax credit projects in order to allow displaced
individuals to occupy vacant low-income units.^22 IRS also offered
tax relief under the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005. For
example, IRS permitted taxpayers who provided housing in their
main homes to individuals displaced by Hurricane Katrina to claim
additional exemptions of $500 per displaced person (up to $2,000)
in 2005 or 2006.
o Department of Veterans Affairs--The ESF-6 annex clearly
described that VA is to provide available facilities suitable for
mass shelter and develop and maintain plans to make VA-owned
housing assets available for use by disaster victims. However,
VA--like USDA and HUD--also provided mortgage assistance by asking
the holders of program mortgages to offer temporary moratoriums on
payments and to exercise forbearance for borrowers in the affected
areas, but the ESF-6 annex did not reflect this capability.
Appendixes III through XI contain a more detailed listing of the
shelter, temporary housing, and other types of housing assistance
that the Red Cross, FEMA, ESF-6 support agencies, and other
organizations provided in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
The introduction to the NRP states that the purpose of the plan,
among other things, is to describe the capabilities and resources
and establish responsibilities to help protect the nation from
natural and other hazards. If such capabilities change over time,
any department or agency with assigned responsibilities may
propose a change to the plan. In addition, the NRP states that DHS
and FEMA are responsible for the ongoing management and
maintenance of the plan, including coordinating all proposed
modifications with primary and support agencies and other
stakeholders and issuing an official notice of change for all
approved modifications.^23
The ESF-6 annex did not fully reflect support agency capabilities
for several reasons. For example, during the period in which DHS
was developing the NRP--essentially, between February 2003 and
December 2004--some ESF-6 support agency officials told us that
there was a limited amount of time to provide input into the
development of the annex. In addition, a FEMA official told us
that many of the support agency responsibilities under the ESF-6
annex were simply carried over from the Federal Response Plan, a
previous plan for disaster management, with very few revisions,
even though the scope of ESF-6 expanded under the NRP to include
housing and human services (in contrast, under the Federal
Response Plan, ESF-6 covered mass care activities only). Further,
a Treasury official told us that DHS described ESF-6 to them as
being more related to first responders and caring for basic human
needs, so Treasury decided that it would have very little to
offer. However, Treasury officials stated that they did not
believe it was necessary to include certain agency capabilities
under ESF-6. For example, these officials indicated that it was
not appropriate for ESF-6 to reflect the IRS's capability to
temporarily waive income limitations for subsidized rental units
because this action was not required for every presidential
disaster declaration. Finally, a USDA official told us that the
agency provided housing-related responsibilities to a centralized
office within USDA for inclusion in ESF-6, but these
responsibilities were not incorporated into the final document.
While the NRP calls for fully reflecting support agencies'
capabilities, the ESF-6 draft standard operating procedures in
effect at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita also required
each support agency to develop a fact sheet with appropriate roles
and responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and
agency-specific authorities; and to review the fact sheet annually
in order to keep it up to date. However, none of the ESF-6 support
agencies had developed the fact sheets, and most support agency
officials we spoke with were not aware of this requirement.
The lack of fully reflected support agency capabilities within the
NRP and the lack of information required by the fact sheets
hampered the ability of FEMA to provide leadership in coordinating
and integrating overall federal efforts associated with this
assistance. For example, FEMA was not aware in many cases of
housing assistance that ESF-6 support agencies could provide that
was not reflected in the NRP. As noted in the White House's report
on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, USDA had
capabilities for providing temporary housing but had difficulty
getting FEMA to take advantage of those capabilities because some
FEMA employees were unfamiliar with USDA programs. Having USDA's
full capabilities reflected in the ESF-6 annex or having access to
a fact sheet about the agency's capabilities and programs might
have helped to avoid this problem.
Recent legislation (Public Law 109-295, October 4, 2006) requires
FEMA, in consultation with other federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the Red Cross, to develop and provide a national
disaster housing strategy within 270 days. The legislation
requires that the strategy, among other things, (1) identify the
most efficient and cost-effective federal programs for meeting the
short-term and long-term housing needs of individuals affected by
a major disaster, and (2) clearly define the role, programs,
authorities, and responsibilities of each entity involved in
providing that assistance, including FEMA, HUD, USDA, VA, and any
other relevant federal agency. However, the legislation does not
specify the relationship of the strategy to the existing NRP and
its ESF-6 annex. According to FEMA, a stakeholders group planned
to begin work on the strategy in mid-February 2007, and the
initial report from the group was due to Congress on July 4, 2007.
According to FEMA officials responsible for coordinating housing
assistance under ESF-6, notwithstanding the strategy required by
the legislation, the NRP should fully reflect the capabilities of
the ESF-6 support agencies with disaster housing responsibilities.
The ESF-6 unit leader also confirmed that the fact sheets required
by the ESF-6 standard operating procedures are important because
support agencies must clearly define for the primary agencies what
types of housing assistance they can provide in response to a
disaster. In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA stated
that the agency is working with ESF-6 partner agencies to rewrite
the ESF-6 annex as part of full revision of the NRP. FEMA also
stated that the ESF-6 standard operating procedures are being
revised in partnership with the support agencies and that the
revised procedures would include fact sheets developed to describe
support agency disaster programs.
The Red Cross and Federal Agencies Generally Lacked Adequate Plans
for Providing Shelter and Temporary Housing to Victims of
Catastrophic Disasters
The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked adequate plans
for providing shelter and temporary housing to victims of
catastrophic disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For
example, the Red Cross followed its existing planning documents
but had difficulty providing relief services because of the
magnitude of destruction and the significant number of displaced
residents. FEMA's catastrophic planning efforts were incomplete at
the time of the disasters, and as a result the agency was
overwhelmed by the large number of people displaced by the
disaster. In addition, some of the steps that FEMA took in
response to the storms increased the potential for fraud, waste,
and abuse. Both the Red Cross and FEMA have taken steps since the
storms to better plan for their response to future catastrophic
disasters. Finally, ESF-6 support agencies generally had not
developed specific operational plans for meeting their
housing-related responsibilities at the time of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. Agency officials whom we spoke with said that they
relied on existing statutory authorities and other agreements to
provide assistance to victims of the disasters. However, the lack
of preexisting operational plans detailing how the support
agencies would provide disaster housing assistance meant that the
agencies had to work out details or improvise in the aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and this affected the timeliness with
which some victims were provided with temporary housing.
Red Cross Had Plans for Sheltering Hurricane Victims Under Its
Congressional Charter, but Has Taken Steps to Expand Capacity for
Large, Catastrophic Events
In addition to its responsibilities as the primary agency for mass
care under ESF-6, the Red Cross is expected to provide disaster
relief services under its congressional charter.^24 According to
the Red Cross, it has frequently executed a specific response plan
for tropical storms and hurricanes because these events pose a
recurring threat to a substantial number of individuals in the
United States. This plan, which is updated annually, outlines the
systematic approach that the Red Cross will take to prepare for
and respond to hurricanes, including pre- and postlandfall
activities. Further, the plan calls for the Red Cross to initiate
an anticipated service delivery plan before a hurricane makes
landfall, including recommended resource allocations, locations
for service centers, aid stations, and long-term shelters. For
Hurricane Katrina, Red Cross officials told us that it initially
planned to open shelters in five states and had 306 shelters open
or on standby when the storm made landfall.
However, Red Cross officials told us that the organization did not
anticipate the magnitude of the destruction of Hurricane Katrina
or the number of residents who would be displaced. As the extent
of the damage became clear, the Red Cross faced several challenges
providing relief services to victims impacted by the storm. These
included:
o The need for long-term shelter--Many individuals displaced by
the storms--particularly those in New Orleans--faced not being
able to return to their residence for weeks or months. Red Cross
officials noted that during most disasters, victims were generally
able to return to their residences within 48 hours following the
event. After Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross had to develop a
national strategy to provide assistance to the large number of
individuals who required longer-term shelter, and it ultimately
opened more than 1,000 shelters in 27 states. Complicating matters
was a shortage of trained managers to operate such a large number
of shelters for extended time periods.
o Supply shortages--The May 2006 Senate Report on Hurricane
Katrina noted that many shelter residents found conditions quite
difficult because of shortages of food and water and sanitation
problems. The report concluded that the Red Cross's planning
needed to be more detailed for such a catastrophic disaster,
during which residents typically need longer-term shelter.^25
Similarly, the House Select Committee in its report on Hurricane
Katrina noted that the Red Cross did not have a logistics capacity
sophisticated enough to deal with a catastrophic disaster the size
of Katrina, especially with regard to food service, as the
organization had many problems simply getting enough food to
satisfy victims' needs.^26 Officials at one local Red Cross
chapter told us that they had prepositioned supplies to support
Red Cross shelters for 3 days but that the supplies were stretched
for 7 days to support both Red Cross and non-Red Cross shelters.
These officials also told us that they experienced challenges
transporting supplies to shelters because of damage to the
roadways.
According to Red Cross officials, on August 28, 2005--the day
before Hurricane Katrina made landfall in New Orleans--FEMA,
anticipating the activation of ESF-6, contacted the Red Cross and
asked for its estimates of the sheltering needs expected from the
storm. The officials said that early on the morning of August 29,
2005, they provided estimates of resources that would be needed,
including kitchen supplies, meals, and personnel. The officials
noted that they based these estimates on assumptions contained in
the Catastrophic Incident Annex--that is, up to 300,000 victims
needing sheltering assistance for an extended period of time.
However, Red Cross officials told us that later that day, at
FEMA's request, they reduced the estimates but still did not
ultimately receive all of the items requested.
o The need for stronger relationships with partners--The Red Cross
reported that their experiences in responding to Hurricane Katrina
highlighted the fact that the organization had not developed
strong and enduring local partner relationships in certain
sections of hurricane-prone states. As a result, the Red Cross did
not react consistently when opportunities to cooperate with new
partners surfaced. For example, a Red Cross headquarters official
told us that the organization did not clearly communicate what
community-based sheltering partners could expect of the Red Cross.
Although the Red Cross provided substantial resources to
community-based shelters, this official acknowledged that
coordination with and support of Red Cross sheltering partners
could be improved.
Since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Red Cross has taken a
number of actions intended to improve its planning and response
during future hurricane seasons. The June 2006 report that
outlined these actions focused primarily on the disaster relief
services that the Red Cross provides, but it also identified
actions that the organization planned to take regarding its role
at the federal level.^27 These actions included (1) hiring Red
Cross employees in key risk states to work with state emergency
management to better prepare at-risk communities for disasters;
(2) working with appropriate federal agencies to clarify roles and
expectations, in particular the Red Cross's role under the NRP as
primary agency for coordinating federal mass care resources to
support state and local governments; and (3) creating a nationwide
shelter database with FEMA.
The Red Cross also has acted to enhance its ability to respond to
large-scale events. For example, the organization:
o launched a national pilot program to proactively recruit and
train corporate employees as local disaster response volunteers
and partnered with a nonprofit service that matches potential
volunteers with community service organizations via the Internet;
o increased its prepositioned supply inventory to support shelters
for up to 500,000 people and 1 million meals per day;
o expanded its warehouse capacity for disaster response operations
to more than 1.3 million square feet in over 30 locations in 24
states and territories; and
o developed basic written agreements that will establish roles,
responsibilities, and the general parameters for service delivery
for local entities that wish to be service providers during major
disasters.
FEMA Had Not Completed Catastrophic Planning Efforts Prior to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and Faced Challenges in Providing
Temporary Housing
Although FEMA had initiated various catastrophic planning efforts
prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, those efforts were
incomplete at the time of the disasters. For example, in 2004 FEMA
sponsored a disaster exercise called "Hurricane Pam." The purpose
of this exercise was to develop a response and recovery plan
specifically for a major hurricane that would flood New Orleans
and the surrounding parishes and identify any deficiencies in
current capabilities. In addition to widespread flooding, the
exercise included extensive evacuations and the resulting need to
shelter thousands of individuals left homeless after the storm.
From the Hurricane Pam exercise, FEMA produced a draft Southeast
Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan and also made efforts to
finalize agreements with hospital and university officials to
create temporary medical operation staging areas around the state.
However, by the time of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA had not yet
finalized plans for evacuating those with special needs or for
providing postlandfall care. Also, in early 2005 FEMA issued a
draft strategy for catastrophic incident planning that was
intended to establish a comprehensive set of goals and objectives
for fiscal years 2005 to 2009 and to prioritize
capability-building initiatives to meet the challenges posed by an
incident of catastrophic magnitude. However, this strategy was not
finalized or distributed.
In the absence of completed plans for catastrophic events, FEMA's
efforts to provide temporary housing to victims of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita were overwhelmed, and it faced several challenges
in providing temporary housing to victims of the storms. Red Cross
officials told us that the organization kept some shelters open
for up to 4 months after Hurricane Katrina because FEMA was not
able to transition victims to temporary housing assistance more
quickly. For example, FEMA experienced difficulties in making
available travel trailers to disaster victims.^28 According to the
House report on the response to Hurricane Katrina, the nation's
manufacturing capacity was about 6,000 trailers per month at the
time of the storm, limiting how quickly FEMA could obtain travel
trailers and make them available to disaster victims. Further,
DHS's Inspector General reported in March 2006 that FEMA had
difficulty identifying acceptable sites for the travel trailers
and manufactured homes and was slow in identifying applicants to
occupy these units.
FEMA also experienced difficulties utilizing the program housing
units made available by three support agencies--HUD, USDA, and VA.
In addition to its inventory of single-family properties, USDA
identified vacant units in multifamily properties that it
financed. These agencies made properties available to FEMA for
victims of the storms, but FEMA had difficulty utilizing them for
several reasons:
o FEMA officials told us that many of the housing units offered to
disaster victims needed repairs, and it did not have a means of
assuring that the repairs were made. As discussed later in this
report, VA--in response to Hurricane Katrina--sought to enter into
an interagency agreement with FEMA under which VA's Veterans
Benefits Housing Fund would be reimbursed for repairs needed to
make its available housing units habitable for disaster victims.
According to VA officials, the two organizations could not come to
an agreement because of FEMA's budgetary constraints.
o FEMA officials also told us that some of the offered properties
were located in rural areas that were not central to public
transportation or medical services desired by disaster victims.
o FEMA also encountered difficulties verifying that housing units
offered by the support agencies were indeed available. According
to FEMA officials, such verification was very important when
placing victims in temporary housing, as it did not want to refer
victims to housing units that were no longer available. FEMA
officials told us that the support agency housing databases it
relied on to determine the availability of housing units were not
always kept up to date.
o FEMA officials told us that because each of these entities had
its own rules, regulations, and authorities that affected the
conditions under which the properties could be made available, it
was difficult to coordinate and match disaster victims with
properties. According to the officials, during the aftermath of
the disasters FEMA worked on developing a document to facilitate
its understanding of each organization's authorities related to
leasing housing units to disaster victims, but the agency never
finalized the document.
In part because plans for catastrophic events had not been
completed, some of the steps FEMA took in response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita increased the potential for fraud, waste, and
abuse. For example:
o DHS's Inspector General testified in February 2006 that FEMA
might have purchased more manufactured homes and modular homes
than it needed. According to the Inspector General, FEMA purchased
24,967 manufactured homes at a cost of $857.8 million and 1,295
modular homes at a cost of $40 million. However, because FEMA
regulations prohibited using mobile homes in flood plains, some of
these homes and the manufactured homes and modular homes could not
be used where they were most needed (i.e., in parts of Louisiana
and Mississippi). FEMA also paid to store and maintain the
unoccupied units, and the Inspector General testified that more
than 10,000 manufactured homes at one site were improperly stored
without adequate support, causing the units to sink in the mud and
their frames to bend.
o As we testified in February 2006, the need to provide assistance
quickly led FEMA to implement expedited assistance with limited
controls to verify eligibility for the initial expedited
assistance payments.^29 We also reported in September 2006 that
the unprecedented challenges posed by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
exposed FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) to fraud
and abuse.^30 We estimated that, as of February 2006, 16 percent,
or approximately $1 billion, in FEMA IHP payments were improper
and potentially fraudulent because of invalid application data
such as Social Security Numbers and addresses.^31 Further, we
testified in December 2006 that FEMA continued to lose tens of
millions of dollars through potentially improper and/or fraudulent
payments from both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.^32
o Because FEMA was unable to immediately implement IHP assistance
(under section 408 of the Stafford Act) that would provide funds
to move victims from short-term lodging--including shelters,
hotels and motels--to longer-term housing alternatives such as
mobile homes and apartments, the agency used public assistance
funds. Normally, FEMA uses public assistance funds (authorized
under section 403 of the Stafford Act) only for immediate
emergency sheltering efforts. FEMA officials said if the agency
had followed its normal practice of using IHP assistance, the
program's rules would have left many applicants waiting months for
assistance. Under the IHP program, each applicant's damaged
dwelling must be inspected before FEMA provides any assistance.
However, the DHS Inspector General reported in March 2006 that the
use of public assistance funds was problematic for two reasons.
First, FEMA did not know whether those it housed were actually
eligible for assistance as a direct result of the disaster, and
second, using this type of assistance increased the potential for
duplication with other assistance programs.^33
To address the difficulties FEMA encountered in providing
temporary housing to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the
agency formed a joint housing solutions group to identify
manufactured housing options for disaster operations. The group's
goal is to help identify situation-appropriate manufactured or
other housing options for disasters. FEMA also convened a housing
task force, which began meeting in summer 2006. The task force had
two goals: to resolve procedural problems encountered in response
to the hurricanes, and to establish better working relationships
with other housing providers. As of January 2007, the housing task
force had not released any findings or taken any actions.
FEMA has taken other steps to improve its plans for providing
temporary housing assistance for large-scale disasters. For
example:
o In July 2006, FEMA issued a high-level strategy for providing
sheltering and housing assistance in support of a presidentially
declared emergency or major disaster involving a mass evacuation.
FEMA intends to develop more detailed policies to support this
strategy. However, these policies were not completed as of January
2007.
As previously noted, the ESF-6 annex did not reflect the
capabilities of USDA's Rural Housing Service to provide temporary
housing to victims of disasters.
o In December 2006, FEMA awarded grants totaling up to $388
million to states in the Gulf region to develop alternatives to
FEMA travel trailers and mobile homes under its Alternative
Housing Pilot Program.
Support Agencies Generally Lacked Plans for Providing Assistance
in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
The NRP requires federal agencies to develop supplemental plans
and procedures for carrying out the responsibilities assigned in
the ESF annexes. As we have previously testified, the NRP base
plan and its supporting catastrophic incident annex need to be
supported and supplemented by more detailed and robust operational
implementation plans that further define any capabilities that
might be needed in a catastrophic disaster.^34 More detailed
planning would provide greater visibility and understanding of the
types of support that support agencies could be expected to
provide following a catastrophic event, including the types of
assistance and capabilities that might be provided and what might
be done proactively and in response to specific requests.
The ESF-6 support agencies generally had not developed specific
operational plans for the housing assistance they provided in
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, whether or not the
agencies' capabilities for providing the assistance were
specifically reflected in the NRP. Rather, officials from the
ESF-6 support agencies told us that they generally worked out the
procedures for providing the assistance after the hurricanes
struck, relying on preexisting statutory authorities or
interagency agreements or, in some cases, acting in response to
FEMA mission assignments or legislation enacted after the storms.
For example:
o HUD officials noted that the department relied primarily on
existing statutory authorities to expedite the delivery of
assistance in disaster situations. However, it was not until after
Hurricane Katrina struck that HUD and FEMA entered into an
interagency agreement--on September 12, 2005--that defined how HUD
would make its properties available to victims. As noted above, in
response to a FEMA mission assignment after Hurricane Katrina, HUD
also created a housing voucher program to house disaster victims
who were previously assisted by HUD or were homeless.
o USDA officials told us that the department relied on existing
statutory authorities to provide housing-related assistance in
disaster situations. As previously noted, the ESF-6 annex did not
reflect the capabilities of USDA's Rural Development to provide
temporary housing to victims of disasters. However, the department
had a preexisting 1982 memorandum of understanding that outlined
the terms under which FEMA might utilize housing units owned by
USDA to provide temporary housing to victims of disasters. USDA
officials told us that the department followed this memorandum in
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita but did not locate any
single-family properties that qualified under the terms of the
memorandum.
o VA officials said that, while they had a memorandum of
understanding with FEMA--outlining the working relationship with
respect to disaster preparedness and relief activities after a
major disaster or emergency--dating back to 1982, after Hurricane
Katrina they attempted a new interagency agreement similar to the
one between FEMA and HUD. However, according to the officials,
FEMA and VA could not reach an agreement, primarily because of
differences over the reimbursement of property expenses to VA's
Veterans Benefits Housing Fund. FEMA and VA ultimately revised the
1982 memorandum in December 2005.
In contrast, Treasury's IRS, while also relying on existing
statutory authorities, had a preexisting reference tool that
identified specific actions that IRS will take to provide tax
relief in response to disasters or other significant emergencies,
and the officials and functional organizations responsible for
carrying out these actions. As noted previously, one of IRS's
responsibilities specifically described in ESF-6 is to help
victims determine the amount of a casualty loss deduction for
destroyed property. While encompassing a wider range of
activities, IRS's reference tool does address the responsibilities
described in ESF-6 annex. Similarly, DOD's Army Corp of Engineers
had procedures in place detailing how the agency would provide
temporary roofing for minimally damaged homes.
Due to the lack of preexisting operational plans detailing how the
support agencies would provide disaster housing
assistance--including plans for meeting their ESF-6
responsibilities--the agencies had to work out details or
improvise in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and
this affected the timeliness with which some victims were provided
with temporary housing. For example, VA's attempt to develop a new
interagency agreement--before ultimately revising an existing
memorandum of understanding with FEMA--delayed the availability of
VA properties for disaster victims until several months after the
storms. VA made 600 properties available for rent in 11 states in
January 2006. HUD, USDA, and VA officials told us that, in an
attempt to improve their operational plans for providing housing
assistance under ESF-6, they formed an informal working group
since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to work out certain procedural
details, including developing better means of communicating and
sharing information. The USDA official involved in this effort
noted the practical importance of working out such operational
details before a disaster strikes in order to avoid the need to do
so following the event. However, the informal working group is not
intended to address the full range of each of these agencies'
responsibilities under ESF-6, and as of January 2007 does not have
a specific timetable for its activities.
Victims Expressed Varying Views about Sheltering and Temporary
Housing Needs and the Assistance They Received
According to victims, experts, and others we spoke with, the
sheltering and housing needs of victims and the perceptions of the
federal assistance provided to meet these needs varied. For
example, most victims needed shelter, food, water, and other
necessities in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, but many
perceived that the assistance provided fell short of meeting these
needs. Over the weeks and months following the hurricane, many
victims developed a need for temporary housing while they made
arrangements to have their homes repaired or other plans to
recover from the disaster. In most cases, victims with a need for
temporary housing were eligible for some form of federal disaster
housing assistance, such as from FEMA or HUD. However, victims
expressed both positive and negative perceptions of the temporary
housing assistance they received. Furthermore, many victims
needed, but did not always receive, access to reliable and
accurate information about the assistance they were eligible to
receive and help locating temporary housing. More than a year
after the hurricane, some people continue to have temporary
housing needs, including some of the most vulnerable
individuals--the elderly, persons with disabilities, and those
from the most devastated areas. The recent amendments to the
Stafford Act call for provisions in the mandated disaster housing
strategy that appear to address a number of the issues that
victims and others raised regarding the assistance provided after
Hurricane Katrina.
Most Victims Had Similar Immediate Sheltering and Related Needs,
but Some Victims’ Needs Were Not Met
According to current and former Gulf Coast residents affected by
Hurricane Katrina, experts, and others we spoke with, immediately
before and after the hurricane made landfall many victims needed
shelter, food, water, and clothing. Some victims, such as those
who voluntarily evacuated before the storm made landfall, sought
shelter in a variety of locations, including the homes of family
and friends, hotels, and shelters operated by the Red Cross and
others. Many other victims, including those without
transportation, those with special needs such as the disabled and
the elderly, and those who would not abandon their homes or pets,
ended up in shelters of last resort such as the Louisiana
Superdome.^35 Regardless of where victims took shelter, however,
those providing it generally were unprepared for the number of
people needing help or the length of time they would have to
remain and did not have adequate resources to help all of them.
Many victims we spoke with did not feel that their immediate
sheltering and related needs were met for a number of reasons.
According to victims and others we spoke with, regardless of the
type or provider of shelter--family, Red Cross or church shelters,
or a hotel--conditions were generally overcrowded and
uncomfortable, and supplies were lacking. For example, many
victims we spoke with evacuated from their homes with limited
supplies of food and water and just the clothes on their back. One
victim we spoke with said that she evacuated from Mississippi and
went to stay with family, taking with her just a suitcase with
some clothing and some canned food. Another victim told us that
when she and her family evacuated, they only brought enough
clothing for 3 days. While some shelters had supplies on hand to
assist evacuees, resources were strained because they generally
did not anticipate the number of victims who were seeking shelter
or the length of time people would need shelter. For example, Red
Cross officials told us that they only planned to operate shelters
for 7-10 days in 5 states following Hurricane Katrina, but as
noted previously, some shelters were open for up to 4 months, and
the organization's operations covered 27 states. As noted
previously, Red Cross officials told us that they kept shelters
open for this long because FEMA was not able to transition victims
to temporary housing assistance more quickly.
Victims whose circumstances made it impossible for them to
evacuate prior to the storm or who chose not to evacuate were
probably even less likely to feel their immediate sheltering needs
were met than those who evacuated prior to the storm. Many of
these victims ended up at shelters of last resort such as the
Louisiana Superdome. These shelters were overcrowded and lacked an
adequate amount of supplies. One victim we spoke with who was
evacuated to the New Orleans Convention Center after the storm
said that she needed food, water, and clothing and that the
Convention Center had none of these items. Further, some victims
avoided centralized shelter due to concerns about safety. For
example, one victim we spoke with said that her family chose to
crowd 15 people into a small house rather than go to a shelter
because they had heard that the shelters were unsafe.
Although members of our group of experts suggested that victims
should be presented with a range of choices about where to
relocate, some of the victims were evacuated without knowing where
they would end up--for example buses and flights were diverted en
route to new destinations. One victim with whom we spoke said that
the Navy evacuated him from an apartment building in New Orleans a
week after the storm and put him on a plane to Washington, D.C.,
but that he was not told where he was headed until the plane had
taken off. Another victim we spoke with who was evacuated from the
New Orleans Convention Center said the U.S. Army flew her from the
Convention Center to Austin, Texas even though she had not asked
to go there. She was in Austin at a shelter for 5 more days before
being flown to Georgia, where she had family. Other victims said
they were given a choice about where to go. For example, one
victim said when the Army Corps of Engineers came to evacuate her
from Xavier University where she had taken shelter, she was able
request that she be sent to Fort Worth, Texas, because she had
family there.
Some of those who could not evacuate ahead of time were special
needs populations, especially the elderly and persons with
disabilities. As we previously reported, state and local
governments have primary responsibility for evacuating these
populations, but state and local governments in the areas affected
by Hurricane Katrina likely faced challenges in transporting many
special needs residents out of the disaster area due to legal and
social barriers and other factors.^36 Further, many shelters were
not prepared to accept special needs persons, such as those with
physical or mental disabilities, in part because the Red Cross
typically leaves sheltering of those with special needs to the
state and local government. As a result, at the time Hurricane
Katrina made landfall, some special needs individuals ended up in
shelters that were not prepared to meet their needs. For instance,
one elderly victim we spoke with said that she was at the New
Orleans Convention Center in poor conditions for more than 5 days
before being evacuated out of the city, and added that she did not
feel safe or secure while she was there. Eventually, many of those
in the mass shelters in New Orleans were evacuated to cities such
as Houston and Atlanta where they were provided shelter while
awaiting temporary housing.
Victims’ Temporary Housing Needs and Their Views of Federal
Assistance Varied with Circumstances
In the weeks and months following the hurricane, the housing needs
of many Gulf Coast residents evolved as they assessed storm
damage, and many realized that they would not be able to return
home immediately. In general, most victims were eligible for at
least some form of temporary federal disaster housing assistance,
such as rental assistance or travel trailers from FEMA or--if
prior to the disaster they were among those in HUD's rental
assistance programs or were homeless--housing vouchers from HUD.
The specific needs of victims, however, and their perceptions of
the assistance that was provided varied and depended, at least in
part, on victims' own circumstances such as their postdisaster
location relative to their predisaster home, whether they were
homeowners or renters, and if they had special needs. More
specifically:
o Postdisaster location--We found that victims' temporary housing
needs were often closely related to their postdisaster location.
In particular, many victims we spoke with either evacuated to or
were transported to other cities to find shelter from the
devastation. Because in many cases the extent of damage made
immediately returning to their predisaster homes uncertain or
unlikely, these victims needed access to some form of temporary
rental housing while they assessed their options and made plans
for returning home and repairing their residence or living
somewhere else. However, victims and experts that we spoke with
emphasized that temporary housing needs included not only shelter,
but also proximity to schools, grocery stores, jobs, and other
necessities. As discussed below, for those who found themselves in
new locations away from their predisaster homes, this meant a need
for information about both available housing and services.
In contrast, for a variety of reasons, some victims we spoke with
preferred and were able to remain in or near their predisaster
communities after the hurricanes and needed temporary housing that
could accommodate their circumstances, particularly if they could
not quickly reoccupy their predisaster home. In light of the
shortage of available rental housing in the Gulf Coast area after
the hurricanes, travel trailers were one of the few options
available for victims who wanted to remain near their predisaster
residences or communities.
o Homeownership status--In some cases, homeowners and renters had
different needs for temporary housing. For example, some
homeowners who could not reoccupy their predisaster homes
expressed a need for temporary housing that allowed them to be in
close proximity, so that they could monitor repair or
reconstruction and interact with insurance companies and
contractors. In some of these cases, FEMA was able to place travel
trailers directly on victims' property to address this need.
Because renters had little influence over the repair or
reconstruction of the apartment units they resided in prior to the
hurricanes, they generally needed temporary housing assistance
until they could make decisions about whether to remain in, or
return to, their predisaster locations or to reestablish
themselves in another area altogether. This generally came in the
form of rental assistance--either cash from FEMA or vouchers from
HUD. In cases where renters desired to remain in the disaster
area, some were able to obtain FEMA travel trailers, which were
generally placed on either FEMA-operated or privately operated
group sites.
o Special needs populations--The elderly and those with
disabilities that we spoke with expressed a need for temporary
housing that could accommodate their special needs. For example,
those who were mobility impaired needed housing that was
wheelchair accessible, while those who were elderly expressed a
need to be close to family and medical providers. Access to
transportation was another need mentioned to us by elderly and
disabled victims; those with specials needs said without access to
transportation, they had difficulty finding temporary housing. One
disabled victim we spoke with said that it would have been helpful
to her to have received transportation assistance to look for
housing since she uses a wheelchair, while another disabled victim
said that she received help from the Red Cross which transported
her around to find housing.
Members of our group of experts noted that special needs
populations are often overlooked in planning for disaster housing
assistance. These experts and others said that disaster assistance
often does not accommodate the needs of special populations such
as the elderly, homeless, those with mental and physical
disabilities, and residents of domestic violence shelters. For
instance, the elderly or disabled may need to be placed in ground
floor units to facilitate wheelchair access. Additionally, these
populations may face related needs that cannot be addressed by
temporary housing alone.
Victims expressed both positive and negative perceptions of the
temporary housing assistance they received, whether in the form or
rental assistance or a travel trailer. In general, victims who
received rental assistance perceived that it was helpful in
meeting their housing needs because it allowed them to find a
place to live and pay the rent while they "got back on their
feet." One victim said having rental assistance allowed her to
keep her sanity because she knew she had a place to live and her
kids were in a good school. However, some recipients, such as
those who received FEMA rental assistance, said that the process
of having to recertify their eligibility for the program every 3
months left them uncertain about whether they would continue to
receive the assistance. The uncertainty made it difficult for
victims to know what their long-term housing plans would be, as
they did not know when their rental assistance would be cut off or
what they would do about their housing after that. For example,
one victim said that her plans for the future were uncertain
because she did not know when the rental assistance would expire.
One elderly victim we spoke with said that she does not think
that, once the assistance ends, she will be able to afford her new
apartment, even though she would like to stay there.
Victims we spoke with who received temporary housing assistance
through HUD said that the disaster voucher program (DVP) generally
met their housing needs. For example, some of these individuals
said that the local housing authority in their new cities assisted
them in finding housing, making things easier for them. Others
said that not having to pay rent allowed them to use their
earnings for other necessities such as car payments or furniture
and also allowed them to look for work without having to worry
about how the rent would be paid.^37 HUD officials we spoke with
in the field also said that in their opinion, the disaster voucher
meets the needs of the people it was intended to serve; however,
they noted that it depended on the needs of the individual and the
willingness of the displaced family to move elsewhere to find
housing.
As with rental assistance, perceptions of those who received
travel trailers were also mixed. Some of the victims we spoke with
who were in trailers on their property said that the trailers were
helpful. For example, one victim from Mississippi whom we spoke
with said the trailer was wonderful because it provided her with
privacy, and another said that her trailer met her needs because
it provided shelter. Another victim from Alabama said that her
family received a FEMA trailer and that they were able to live in
it until they could repair and move back into their home. Although
some of these victims said that they had difficulty finding
contractors and that as a result, the rebuilding process was slow,
they also said that they had made progress and that the trailer
had met their temporary housing needs. Other homeowners did not
perceive the trailers as meeting their temporary housing needs.
Some victims we spoke with waited months to receive trailers, only
to find that the trailers were too small for their families. One
victim we spoke with needed a trailer for his family of five but
received a trailer that could house only two people. This victim
said that he ended up not using the trailer because it was too
small, the hot water never worked, and it had a bad odor that made
his eyes burn. Other victims we spoke with who received trailers
from FEMA also felt the trailers were uninhabitable. One victim
who was in the military said that she and her family spent only a
few days in the trailer they received because it leaked badly and
had mildew. She said that someone from FEMA had checked on these
problems but that they were never fixed. Ultimately she chose to
live on the Air National Guard base where her unit was
headquartered.
Perceptions of travel trailers located on group sites were
generally less positive than those of trailers placed on private
property. Experts noted that trailer sites may not provide ready
access to facilities like grocery stores, laundry facilities, or
playgrounds that are necessary for daily living. We found that
victims sometimes did not like group sites for these reasons. One
victim we spoke with said that he did not like living in the group
site, as it was too far from the doctors that he needed to see. He
was eventually able to get another trailer in another group site
that better met his needs. Another victim we spoke with said that
FEMA wanted to locate her to a group site but she refused and
insisted that the trailer be put on her property so that her
children could remain in their school and not have to relocate to
another community.
Some Victims Lacked Access to Information on Federal Assistance
and Help Finding Temporary Housing
Many victims we spoke with were grateful for the temporary housing
assistance they received after the disaster some, however,
regardless of where they lived or their other circumstances, said
that they needed better access to accurate and reliable
information about the housing assistance available. Because of
sustained disruption to normal modes of communication (such as
newspapers, television, telephone, and radio) following the
hurricane, many victims found it difficult to register for
assistance. In some cases, this may have hindered victims' efforts
to receive temporary housing assistance. However, while many
victims we spoke with said that once they got through on the phone
registering with FEMA was relatively easy, some said that the
information they received after they registered was confusing and
sometimes conflicting. These victims told us that when they
followed up with FEMA to find out about the assistance they
qualified for, their questions were not answered or they received
inconsistent answers from different employees. For example, one
victim we spoke with received two letters from FEMA on the same
day--one stating that she was eligible for rental assistance and
one stating that she was ineligible for assistance. This person
did not want to use the rental assistance because she feared that
FEMA would eventually ask that it be returned.
Some victims we spoke with also said that they could have used
assistance in finding temporary housing. When asked what the
government or others could have done to make finding housing
easier for them, many victims we spoke with said that they needed
assistance with finding a new place to live and help becoming
familiar with new surroundings. Some of those we interviewed said
they did not receive this assistance. Some of those we spoke with
were able to rely on family and friends to get help in finding
housing in a new city and others just navigated through the
process themselves. One former resident of New Orleans that we
spoke with said that her home was destroyed after Hurricane
Katrina and she needed help find housing in Texas, where she had
been moved. This victim used apartment-finding guides to help her
locate available housing. Another victim we spoke with who ended
up in Texas also said that she needed help getting oriented to her
new surroundings, such as finding housing that was in close
proximity to good schools for her children, stores, and the post
office. This victim said that since she wasn't familiar with the
area, she eventually relied on a realtor to help her find housing
that met her needs.
In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA noted that it had
initiated a contract to evaluate applicant communications in order
to develop a strategic communications plan. FEMA said that the
first phase of the study--target audience interviews--had been
completed and that the second phase of the contract would provide
strategies for improving and enhancing applicant communications,
with an emphasis on reaching diverse audiences, including those
with limited English speaking ability.
Some Victims Continue to Experience Temporary Housing and Related
Needs More than a Year after the Hurricanes
More than a year after Hurricane Katrina, some victims--including
those from the hardest hit areas, the elderly, and the
disabled--still have temporary housing and related needs. However,
the circumstances of those who continue to receive temporary
housing assistance vary. For example:
o Some of those receiving this assistance are homeowners who are
still waiting for settlements from their insurance company. One
homeowner from New Orleans told us that she had great difficulty
getting in touch with her insurance company and was still waiting
for a settlement as of July 2006. In the meantime, she is relying
on rental assistance from FEMA but worries her lease will expire
before her house is repaired.
o Many renters from the hardest-hit areas also face uncertainty
because much of the rental housing stock was destroyed and may not
be replaced. One renter from New Orleans said her landlord is
repairing the home she was renting, but she does not know if it
will be done before her FEMA rental assistance runs out.
o Some victims we spoke with expressed concern over their ability
to become self-sufficient once their federal housing assistance
expires. Some want to work but are having difficulty finding
employment. One victim said that if the federal assistance was
going to run out after 18 months, she thought it would be helpful
if the government could help people find jobs so they could become
self-sufficient.
o Some elderly and disabled who were displaced also continue to
face difficulty meeting their housing and related needs. Although
some of these populations had special needs before the hurricanes,
in some cases the stress of the disasters exacerbated their
situations. For example, one disabled victim we spoke with said
her health has worsened since the storm, and she does not have
medical benefits. She wants to work but needs to find something
she can do from home due to her disability. Another disabled
victim told us that her health made it difficult for her to climb
stairs but that she was living in a second-floor apartment because
that was all she could find. FEMA officials told us that after
Hurricane Katrina they tried to work closely with other agencies
that offered social services to ensure that these special needs
populations were receiving the services they needed, but
acknowledged that some needs had gone unmet.
Victims who receive temporary housing assistance from FEMA are
eligible to receive this assistance generally for up to 18 months
after the date of the disaster declaration (i.e., until the end of
February 2007 for victims of Hurricane Katrina). FEMA may extend
the assistance beyond the 18-month period if it determines that
due to extraordinary circumstances an extension would be in the
public interest. According to some experts and housing advocates,
18 months of housing assistance is not long enough to help some of
the victims of the disaster, and that ending federal assistance
could lead to a larger number of homeless families. Experts also
agreed that some victims have needs that extend beyond housing
assistance and that addressing such needs requires a case
management approach such as linking housing assistance with jobs,
child care, and education. Recently, FEMA announced that it
extended temporary housing assistance for some victims of
Hurricane Katrina for an additional 6 months--until August 31,
2007. It is uncertain what will happen to those who continue to
need housing assistance beyond this date.
According to HUD, as of November 2006, approximately 23,800
families were still receiving temporary housing assistance under
DVP. By definition, those continuing to receive DVP are primarily
those who, prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, resided in
HUD-assisted units or public housing that was damaged or
destroyed, or were homeless. It is uncertain when or whether many
of these units will be repaired or replaced. In the meantime, DVP
is set to expire in September 2007. HUD recently issued proposed
guidance explaining options available to those who will still be
receiving DVP assistance when the program expires. For example,
HUD proposed that a family that was living in public housing prior
to the hurricanes may choose to return to their predisaster unit
if it is available. If the family chooses not to return, it may
live in the DVP unit until the DVP assistance ends; if the
pre-disaster unit is unavailable for reoccupancy, the family may
receive another project-based unit or a special public housing
voucher may be made available.^38 HUD proposed that families who
were receiving tenant-based vouchers prior to the disaster may
find new units in the predisaster location, or, if choosing not to
return to the predisaster location, may receive DVP assistance
until it ends, at which time they will receive a regular voucher
under HUD's nondisaster voucher program.
Strategy Required by Recent Legislation May Address Some Issues
Identified by Victims
In requiring FEMA, working with other agencies, to prepare a
national disaster housing strategy, Public Law 109-295 in October
2006 addressed several issues raised during our interviews with
victims and experts. For example:
o Need for temporary housing that enables access to services--The
legislation directs FEMA, in developing the national disaster
housing strategy, to include plans for the operation of "clusters"
of housing provided to individuals and households, including
access to public services, site management, and security. As
previously discussed, this strategy was under development at the
time of this review.
o Need for assistance in finding housing as well as social
services--The legislation authorizes the President to provide case
management services, when needed, to state or local government
agencies or qualified private organizations to provide such
services to victims. According to FEMA, this new authority does
not apply to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. However, FEMA
told us that victims of the hurricanes who needed case management
were able to receive assistance from Katrina Aid Today--a
consortium of social service and voluntary organizations.^39
o Need for those with disabilities or other special
populations--The legislation provides that the national disaster
housing strategy describe programs directed to meet the needs of
special needs and low-income populations, and to ensure that a
sufficient number of housing units are provided for individuals
with disabilities.
o Need for accurate and timely information for victims about what
they are eligible for and how to obtain it--The legislation
requires FEMA to develop guidance to be issued to the public
following a disaster on the types of housing assistance available,
eligibility for such assistance, and the application procedures.
^19GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, [56]GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 8, 2006).
^20Like HUD and VA, USDA may at any given time have an inventory of vacant
homes, commonly referred to as "real estate-owned" or REO properties. This
inventory results from defaults in the agencies' mortgage loan and loan
guarantee programs.
^21HUD administers a variety of rental assistance programs, including
public housing; project-based Section 8 rental assistance; programs for
the elderly and persons with disabilities; and housing choice vouchers,
which are used by recipients to rent privately owned units.
^22Administered by IRS and state agencies, the Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit Program provides developers of and investors in eligible affordable
housing developments a dollar-for-dollar reduction in their federal taxes.
These tax credits are available for projects in which (1) at least 20
percent of units are both rent restricted and rented to households with
incomes of 50 percent or less than the area median income, or (2) at least
40 percent of units are both rent restricted and rented to households with
incomes of 60 percent or less than the area median income.
^23DHS is also responsible for coordinating full reviews and updates of
the NRP every 4 years, or more frequently if the Secretary of DHS deems
necessary. The review and update will consider lessons learned and best
practices identified during exercises and responses to actual events.
^24The detailed supplement to the NRP's Catastrophic Incident Annex notes
that the responsibilities assigned to the Red Cross as a primary agency
under ESF-6 do not supersede the organization's responsibilities under its
congressional charter.
^25United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, (Washington, D.C.:
May 2006).
^26United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A
Failure of Initiative, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
^27American Red Cross, From Challenge to Action: American Red Cross
Actions to Improve and Enhance Its Disaster Response and Related
Capabilities for the 2006 Hurricane Season and Beyond (June 2006).
^28Mobile homes and travel trailers (also referred to as "direct"
temporary housing assistance) are one of five types of financial
assistance that FEMA may provide under the Individuals and Households
Program. The other four include financial assistance to rent alternative
housing accommodations, existing rental units, manufactured housing,
recreational vehicles, or other readily fabricated dwellings; repair
owner-occupied private residences, utilities, and residential
infrastructure; replace owner-occupied private residences; and construct
permanent housing in insular and other remote areas where no alternative
housing resources are available and other forms of authorized temporary
housing assistance are unavailable, infeasible, or not cost effective.
^29GAO, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
FEMA's Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and
Abuse, [57]GAO-06-403T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2006).
^30IHP provides temporary housing or financial assistance to eligible
victims. See GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges
Exposed the Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions
Needed to Reduce Such Problems in the Future, [58]GAO-06-1013 (Washington,
D.C.: Sep. 27, 2006).
^31The 95 percent confidence interval associated with our estimate of
improper and potentially fraudulent registrations ranges from a low of
$600 million to a high of $1.4 billion in improper and potentially
fraudulent payments.
^32GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, [59]GAO-07-252T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2006).
^33OIG-06-32.
^34 [60]GAO-06-442T .
^35The Louisiana State Emergency Operation Plan identifies a shelter of
last resort as a place for persons to be protected from the high winds and
heavy rains of the storm. Unlike other shelters, there may be little or no
water or food and possibly no utilities.
^36See GAO, Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to
Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations,
[61]GAO-07-44 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2006).
^37Under DVP, voucher recipients were not required to make any
contribution toward their rental units' costs for the first 18 months that
the recipients received assistance, after which they were expected to
contribute 30 percent of their adjusted incomes.
^38Under the Disaster Voucher Program, funding must be obligated by
September 30, 2007, unless expressly renewed or extended by law.
^39Katrina Aid Today is sponsored by FEMA using donations from the
international community, and is administered by the humanitarian
development agency of the United Methodist Church. According to FEMA,
Katrina Aid Today assists victims in identifying sources of support,
developing personal recovery plans, and acquiring access to services
needed to rebuild their lives.
Conclusions
While the sheltering and temporary housing responsibilities of the
Red Cross and FEMA generally were clearly defined under the
National Response Plan, the lack of fully reflected capabilities
for ESF-6 support agencies, excepting DOD, hampered FEMA's ability
to effectively fulfill its primary agency role of coordinating
sheltering and temporary housing assistance to victims of
catastrophic disasters. For example, the ESF-6 annex did not
reflect USDA's capability to provide victims of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita with temporary housing in multifamily units that it
subsidizes. Similarly, the ESF-6 annex did not reflect Treasury's
ability to help make available vacant units in Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit properties. Although these agencies provided needed
housing assistance in response to the disaster, by fully
reflecting their capabilities under ESF-6 and by updating them as
needed, FEMA, as the designated primary agency for housing and as
the overall coordinator for ESF-6, would be better able to
effectively coordinate federal resources to provide temporary
housing in support of state and local efforts for victims of
future disasters. In this regard, FEMA would also have benefited
if the ESF-6 support agencies had developed--as required by the
draft standard operating procedures in effect at the time of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita--the fact sheets outlining appropriate
roles and responsibilities, notification and activation
procedures, and agency specific authorities pertaining to their
disaster housing responsibilities. Similarly, more specifically
defining FEMA's primary agency role to work with private-sector
organizations would help ensure the agency's ability to make
effective and expeditious use of housing resources offered by
organizations such as Fannie Mae. FEMA is currently exploring ways
of working with private sector organizations as part of its
ongoing disaster housing task force.
The extent of operational planning for providing sheltering and
temporary housing varied among the Red Cross, FEMA, and the ESF-6
support agencies, but generally their plans were not adequate to
deal with the needs created by catastrophic disasters on the scale
of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Red Cross had to significantly
exceed the parameters of its hurricane and tropical storm
plan--which it was able to do, despite experiencing operational
challenges--and as a result it has taken a number of steps
designed to enhance its capacity to respond to large, catastrophic
events. FEMA had initiated catastrophic event planning, but its
efforts were not complete at the time Hurricane Katrina struck. In
August 2006, DHS finalized the National Response Plan's
Catastrophic Incident Supplement, which describes additional
responsibilities for federal agencies in the event of a
catastrophic incident. The ESF-6 support agencies covered by our
review provided a variety of assistance, but all excepting
Treasury and DOD lacked specific operational plans, which
inhibited the timeliness of placing some victims in temporary
housing. For example, both HUD and VA entered into agreements with
FEMA detailing conditions for use of their properties--but not
until after the hurricanes struck. Just as it is important for the
support agencies' capabilities to be reflected in the NRP, so that
each agency and FEMA can be aware of options for housing disaster
victims, the support agencies need operational plans for effecting
those capabilities. Although HUD, USDA, and VA are working to
develop an agreement to improve the coordination among the three
agencies, developing operational plans for carrying out their
ESF-6 responsibilities would help ensure that the support agencies
are better prepared to help expeditiously house victims of future
disasters and help avoid the need to improvise after disasters
occur. The working group is not intended to produce operational
details for all of these agencies responsibilities under ESF-6.
Our interviews with victims of Hurricanes Katrina, experts, and
with officials involved in assisting them, as well as our review
of reports by others on the federal response to these disasters,
suggest that the federal government could improve the temporary
housing assistance it provides in response to disasters by
recognizing the broader needs of victims. These include the need
for access to medical facilities, public transportation, schools,
employment opportunities, and other social services--and,
particularly for those displaced to distant locations--information
about all of these things. The national disaster housing strategy
called for by recent legislation provides an opportunity to more
comprehensively plan for temporary housing assistance, with
specific provisions related to special-needs populations, access
to a range of services, and meeting victims' need for accurate
information. The legislation also authorized the provision of
additional case management services to victims of disasters.
Although FEMA recently extended temporary assistance for some
victims until August 2007, some of these victims may continue to
need temporary housing assistance beyond this period.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that FEMA, as the designated primary agency for
housing and as the overall coordinator for ESF-6, can effectively
coordinate federal assistance in providing temporary housing for
victims of future disasters, we recommend that:
o The Secretaries of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development,
Treasury, and Veterans Affairs propose revisions as needed to
ensure that the NRP fully reflects their respective agencies'
capabilities for providing temporary housing assistance under
ESF-6; and
o The Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban
Development, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs develop fact sheets
outlining appropriate roles and responsibilities, notification and
activation procedures, and agency specific authorities pertaining
to their disaster housing capabilities, as required by the ESF-6
standard operating procedures.
To help ensure that ESF-6 support agencies are prepared to help
expeditiously house victims of future disasters, we recommend that
the Secretaries of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development, and
Veterans Affairs develop operational plans that provide details on
how their respective agencies will meet their temporary housing
responsibilities under ESF-6.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided the American Red Cross and the Departments of
Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban
Development, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs with a draft of this
report for their review and comment. We received written comments
from Defense, HUD, Treasury, and VA, each of which concurred with
our recommendations. These comments are summarized below and
reprinted in appendixes XII through XV. The Red Cross did not
provide comments on the draft report. USDA responded that it will
continue to develop its capabilities, fact sheets, and operational
plans in order to meet ESF-6 responsibilities, as we recommended.
DHS, HUD, Treasury, and VA also provided technical comments, which
we incorporated into the report as appropriate. We also provided
relevant segments of this report to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and
incorporated technical comments from these organizations where
appropriate.
In its comments, Defense said that it concurred with the
recommendation to develop fact sheets outlining the appropriate
roles and responsibilities, notification and activation
procedures, and agency specific authorities pertaining to its
disaster housing capabilities.
While HUD concurred with our recommendations, it commented that it
provided fact sheets to FEMA and non-profit organizations.
However, our review of these fact sheets indicated that they did
not reference ESF-6 or include the information required by the
draft ESF-6 standard operating procedures, such as appropriate
roles and responsibilities, notification and activation
procedures, and agency-specific authorities. HUD also said that
our draft report should be expanded to more fully reflect the
activities that the department performed in response to Hurricane
Katrina, which included establishing Katrina Disaster Assistance
Program Centers, assisting public housing residents in relocating
to other housing units, and finding permanent units for disaster
victims. Our report, including appendix VII, discusses these and
other types of housing assistance provided by HUD at a level of
detail that we believe is consistent with our objectives.
Treasury noted that its role in providing disaster relief was
generally limited to relief provided under the Internal Revenue
Code, although the department also has a broader role in
facilitating federal payments. With regard to our recommendations,
Treasury said that it would work with DHS to ensure that the NRP
fully reflects the capabilities of the department to provide
temporary housing assistance. Treasury added that any amendment to
the department's section of the NRP that reflects the availability
of administrative relief relating to the low-income housing tax
credit should note that such relief is appropriate only in
extraordinary circumstances and take into consideration the impact
it might have on low-income taxpayers who are the intended
beneficiaries of the low-income housing tax credit. Treasury also
said that it would collaborate with DHS to ensure that it develops
the appropriate fact sheets under ESF-6.
VA noted that it is working with ESF-6 partner agencies to propose
NRP revisions that will detail each agency's full capabilities. VA
also noted that it would continue to work with ESF-6 partner
agencies and FEMA to formulate the fact sheets as required by the
ESF-6 standard operating procedures.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland
Security, Housing and Urban Development, Treasury, and Veterans
Affairs, the Red Cross, and other interested parties and will make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8678 or [email protected]. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix XVI.
David G. Wood
Director, Financial Markets and
Community Investment
List of Congressional Addressees
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Chairman
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Larry E. Craig
Ranking Member
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Barney Frank
Chairman
Committee on Financial Service
House of Representatives
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Davis
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Peter T. King
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable Steve Buyer
Ranking Member
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we examine: (1) the extent to which the
responsibilities for the Red Cross and federal agencies were
clearly described in the National Response Plan (NRP), (2) the
extent to which federal agencies and the Red Cross had operational
plans for providing sheltering and housing assistance in response
to catastrophic disasters, and (3) the perceptions victims and
others had of evacuees' sheltering and housing needs and the
assistance provided by the federal government to address those
needs after Hurricane Katrina. We included the following federal
agencies and other organizations in this study:
o American Red Cross
o Department of Agriculture
o Department of Defense
o Department of Housing and Urban Development
o Department of Treasury
o Department of Veterans Affairs
o Federal Emergency Management Agency
o Federal Home Loan and Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)
o Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
To address all of the objectives, we sponsored a group consisting
of seven experts on disaster response and housing. We contracted
with the National Academy of Sciences to convene a balanced,
diverse group of experts to discuss the federal role in providing
housing assistance after a presidentially declared disaster. The
individuals represented state and local agencies in Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Texas and academicians whose work focuses on
disaster response. (The names and organizational affiliations of
the group members are listed in app. II.) In keeping with National
Academies policy, members of the group were invited to provide
their individual views, and the group was not designed to reach a
consensus on any of the issues that we asked them to discuss. The
group of seven experts convened at the National Academies in
Washington, D.C., on August 17, 2006 (we had invited nine, but two
invitees were unable to attend). The meeting was recorded and
transcribed to ensure that we had accurately captured the group's
statements.
We also reviewed relevant literature on disaster housing and
recent reports on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina to
address all of our objectives, including those issued by the House
of Representatives,^1 the Senate,^2 and the White House.^3 While
these reports addressed a broad range of issues related to the
preparedness for, and response to Hurricanes Katrina, our report
focuses exclusively on federal assistance for sheltering and for
providing temporary housing--the activities covered by Emergency
Support Function (ESF) Number 6 (ESF-6).
To examine the extent to which the responsibilities for the Red
Cross and federal agencies were clearly described in the NRP, we
reviewed the ESF-6 annex and relevant federal statutes and
regulations that federal agencies and the Red Cross followed in
providing sheltering and housing-related assistance in response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition, we obtained information
from each organization about the types of sheltering and temporary
housing assistance they provided following the two hurricanes, and
determined the extent to which the assistance was provided under a
responsibility described in the NRP. We also discussed with
various federal, state, and local officials--in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas--how federal agencies and the Red Cross
carried out their responsibilities for providing sheltering and
housing-related assistance in response to the disasters. Further,
we reviewed recommendations made in prior GAO and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General reports related to ESF-6
and determined what progress had been made to address the
recommendations.
To examine the extent to which federal agencies and the Red Cross
had operational plans for providing sheltering and housing
assistance in response to catastrophic disasters, we obtained and
analyzed available plans, policies, and procedures that these
organizations followed in providing assistance under the ESF-6
annex. In addition, we discussed these documents with federal
agency and Red Cross officials in Washington, D.C., and federal,
state, and local officials in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
We also reviewed the NRP and ESF-6 standard operating procedures
to identify planning requirements and obtained information on the
characteristics of effective disaster response plans put forth by
disaster experts. Further, we reviewed prior GAO and DHS Inspector
General reports that addressed federal agency planning for
catastrophic disasters. While our focus was on the response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we have incorporated information on
relevant steps that the organizations within the scope of our
study have taken since those events.
^1United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A
Failure of Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
^2United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.:
May 2006).
^3The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned (Washington, D.C.: February 2006).
Disaster Victim Interviews
To examine the perceptions victims and others had of evacuees'
sheltering and housing needs and the assistance provided by the
federal government to address those needs after Hurricane Katrina,
we conducted standardized telephone interviews with victims of the
disaster. Due to the sensitivity of the topic to the interview
participant, and because there was no efficient way to attempt to
create a universe of all Hurricane Katrina disaster victims, we
used a qualitative data collection approach. We developed an
interview guide based on disaster housing literature and
government reports, interviews with government officials, a
preliminary discussion with a group of victims evacuated to the
metropolitan Washington, D.C. area, and unstructured interviews
with two victims from the metropolitan New Orleans area. We
pretested the interview guide with two disaster victims also from
the metropolitan New Orleans area. The interview questions covered
victims' housing and related needs since the disasters, the
locations of shelter and housing, sources of assistance in
securing housing, challenges in finding housing, the FEMA
registration process, types of assistance for which they were
eligible and received, current status of their neighborhood and
former homes, and their concerns and future housing plans.
We used a purposeful stratified sampling procedure where we
intentionally chose to interview people with particular
characteristics to capture both common core experiences, as well
as important variations among those with differing
characteristics. We identified the state in which the victim
resided before the disaster (Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas) and whether the victim received HUD housing assistance
prior to the storm as two characteristics that would influence
victims' needs and their experience finding housing after the
hurricanes. When using a nonprobability sample, like a purposeful
stratified sample, it is important to be resource efficient in
data collection, but also to simultaneously collect enough data to
ensure saturation, or repetition, in the information obtained.^4
Therefore, we sought to collect data from a total of 48 victims;
24 who had received public housing assistance prior the storm and
24 who had not, and within both groups of 24, an equal number of
participants from the four affected states (see table 1).
Table 1: Number of Completed Interviews with Hurricane Katrina
Victims
Individuals who received HUD Individuals who did not receive
housing assistance prior to HUD housing assistance prior to
State disaster disaster
Alabama 2 6
Louisiana 8 6
Mississippi 8 7
Texas 0 1
Source: GAO.
Note: We attempted to complete six interviews per table cell.
We identified victims either through word of mouth or through HUD
or FEMA disaster assistance lists. Names and contact information
for victims identified through word of mouth were provided to us
by organizations working directly with victims, such as churches,
nonprofit organizations, or other victims. We also asked HUD and
FEMA to provide us with the lists of victims who received
assistance through their agencies. HUD provided us a list as of
July 14, 2006, which was our primary means of identifying victims
who received HUD housing assistance prior to the hurricanes. FEMA
provided us a list as of July 20, 2006. After eliminating cases
that had no telephone numbers, victim names were systematically
selected from the agencies' lists.
We contacted victims and asked them to participate in our
telephone interview that lasted approximately 60 to 90 minutes. If
the victim was unable to be reached, declined, or was again not
available at the scheduled interview time, we eliminated the name
from our contact list. We completed 38 interviews with disaster
victims. We contacted approximately 319 victims to request their
participation.
^4Janice M. Morse, Designing Funded Qualitative Research (chapter 13, pp.
220-235) in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds), Handbook of
Qualitative Research, (Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, Calif, 1994).
Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 3rd
edition, (Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, Calif., 2002).
Demographic information on the victims whom we interviewed appears
in table 2. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to
make inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability
sample, some elements of the population being studied have no
chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the
sample. Although the findings we collected do not generalize to
all victims of Hurricanes Katrina, when coupled with results of
our group of experts, interviews with agency officials, and
housing advocates, they do provide useful insight into the
experiences and needs of victims of this disaster.
Table 2: Self-Reported Demographic Data on Disaster Victims
Interviewed
Age (in years)
Average 49
Range 22-72
Refused 1
Ethnicity
American Indian or Alaska Native 2
Asian 0
Black or African American 26
Hispanic or Latino 1
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 0
White 9
Homeownership status
Owner 13
Renter 25
Source: GAO.
We performed our work in Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana;
Biloxi, Gulfport, and Jackson, Mississippi; Austin, Fort Worth,
Houston, and Temple, Texas; and Washington, D.C. We conducted our
work between November 2005 and February 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Views of GAO’s Expert Group on the Provision of
Disaster Housing Assistance by the Federal Government
This appendix provides the views of the group of experts that GAO
convened on the provision of disaster housing assistance by the
federal government. The group consisted of seven experts who,
during a daylong meeting convened by the National Academies,
discussed issues related to the federal government's provision of
disaster housing assistance in response to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. All the ideas presented in this appendix may not represent
the view of every member of the group of experts. Moreover, these
ideas should not be considered to be the views of GAO.
Members of GAO’s Expert Group
The following individuals were members of GAO's group of experts
on the provision of disaster housing assistance by the federal
government:
o Pamela Dashiell, President, Holy Cross Neighborhood Association
o Buddy Grantham, Operations Officer, Joint Hurricane Housing Task
Force
o Robert Olshansky, Professor, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
o Jae Park, Chief Policy Analyst, Mississippi Governor's Office of
Recovery and Renewal
o Walter Peacock, Professor, Texas A&M University
o Lori Peek, Assistant Professor, Colorado State University
o Brenda Phillips, Professor, Oklahoma State University
Views of the Group of Experts
The group of experts addressed a number of issues related to the
federal government's provision of housing assistance in response
to disasters. Specifically, the group of experts' discussion
focused on the following: (1) the federal government's role in
providing housing assistance in response to disasters, (2) plans
federal agencies and the Red Cross follow in providing sheltering
and housing assistance in response to a disaster, and (3) opinions
regarding the sheltering and housing needs victims face following
a disaster and the extent to which these needs were met following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Federal Roles and Responsibilities
In general, the group of experts commented that the federal
government needed to take a more active leadership role in
providing or facilitating the provision of sheltering and
temporary housing in response to catastrophic disasters such as
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In particular, the group of experts
commented on the federal government's role in disseminating
information to victims and public officials, tracking victims, and
providing case management assistance to victims with multiple
needs. Specifically, group members discussed the following:
o The federal government should have played a greater role in
disseminating information on the roles and responsibilities of
those who provide sheltering and temporary housing assistance. For
example, one member of the group of experts said this should be
one of the federal government's primary responsibilities in
responding to disasters.
o The federal government should have done more to disseminate
information to individuals and public officials on how federal
assistance programs work. One member of the group of experts said
it was very confusing for both victims and public officials to try
to understand how the multiple federal programs and policies work.
Another group member who made a similar comment stated that
certain groups, such as the elderly, have a particularly difficult
time understanding how to access federal disaster assistance
programs.
o The federal government should have played a more active role in
tracking victims. For example, one member of the group of experts
said that there was no processing of victims into and out of the
shelters. Another member of the group said that out-processing of
disaster victims is common in other countries as a way to keep
families together. One member of the group of experts also stated
that during Hurricane Katrina, there was no system for tracking
victims across the multiple federal programs that provided housing
assistance.
o There is a role for the federal government to play in providing
case management for victims of Hurricane Katrina, many of whom
have multiple needs in addition to housing, including the need for
job training, education, and healthcare. For example, according to
one member of the group of experts, case management is the kind of
assistance that is needed in a disaster of this magnitude.
Federal Agency Planning for Providing Disaster Housing Assistance
Members of our group of experts said that a federal disaster
housing plan should define how agencies will coordinate with each
other in response to a disaster. The members of our group of
experts also said that a federal disaster housing plan should
include certain elements. More specifically, the group members
discussed the following:
o The members of our group of experts said that a federal disaster
housing plan must not just sit on the shelf; the federal
government must ensure that the plan is disseminated to the
appropriate individuals who will be involved in the response so
these individuals have an understanding of what is expected.
o The federal government must engage in disaster exercises and
simulations to ensure that a federal disaster housing plan is
properly rehearsed. The group members noted that the Hurricane Pam
exercise conducted in 2004 was an example of how the federal,
state, and local governments and nonprofit organizations came
together to plan for responding to a hurricane striking New
Orleans.
o A federal disaster housing plan should promote housing solutions
that enable individuals to maintain their community and social
networks to the extent possible, as research has shown that
individuals have a more difficult time recovering after a disaster
when their communities and social networks are destroyed. In
addition, the plan should promote a variety of housing solutions,
as our nation is made up of a diverse population and one approach
does not necessarily work for everyone. The plan also should
promote housing solutions that are sustainable over the long term.
Immediate Challenges Victims Face in Meeting Their Housing Needs
Group members stated that there are a number of immediate
challenges disaster victims face in meeting their housing needs.
These challenges encompass things such as access to information
about housing assistance, timeliness of assistance provided, the
different types of housing assistance to best meet individual
needs, returning to normalcy or a routine after a disaster, and
addressing needs beyond housing. More specifically, group members
discussed the following:
o Victims face challenges in getting access to information about
the federal disaster housing assistance that is available, the
eligibility requirements for assistance, and information on how
long assistance will last. Experts also said those providing
assistance need to be consistent in what they tell victims about
the assistance as victims heard conflicting information following
Hurricane Katrina.
o Disaster housing assistance needs to be provided in a timely
manner. For example, one expert noted that trailers were not
received by households in a timely manner, while two others had
observed trailers sitting unused. Experts noted that the necessary
infrastructure, such as land, water, sewer, and electricity, was
not consistently available to support trailer use.
o There are different types of housing assistance available and
victims need to receive the assistance that will best meet their
needs. Some of the experts commented that trailers may work better
for homeowners while for others, apartments may better meet their
needs.
o It is important following a disaster that those affected return
to a state of normalcy as soon as possible. The disaster housing
assistance provided should strive to ensure that victims are able
to reestablish a routine. Experts said temporary housing should
provide access to facilities like grocery stores, laundry
facilities, and playgrounds that are necessary for daily living.
Additionally, temporary housing should be located close to one's
community so victims can stay connected their community and jobs.
o Some victims have needs that extend beyond housing. Experts said
victims may need child care, access to jobs or job training, and
assistance integrating into a new community. Experts suggested
providing housing assistance as part of a case management approach
so victims' other needs could be simultaneously addressed.
Longer-Term Challenges Victims Face in Meeting Their Housing Needs
Members of our expert group identified some longer-term challenges
disaster victims may face in meeting their housing needs. They
said challenges include housing affordability issues and meeting
victims' needs after federal assistance expires. Some issues
discussed by the group of experts included the following:
o Displaced victims may have ended up in temporary housing that
they are unable to afford once federal assistance runs out.
o Experts said many victims will face challenges and uncertainty
if they continue to need housing assistance after 18 months when
federal assistance is set to expire. Some experts thought that
there could be a larger homeless population if assistance is not
extended while others thought states and localities would have to
step in and assume some of the responsibility for providing
housing assistance.
Appendix III: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Assistance Provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Department of
Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
provided disaster housing assistance by administering its
traditional programs for presidentially declared disasters: the
Public Assistance (PA) program and the Individuals and Households
Program (IHP), authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), Sections 403
and 408, respectively. The following information presents details
on the disaster housing assistance provided by FEMA in response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Sheltering
Cruise ships To provide transitional shelter for the large
number of displaced Hurricane victims, FEMA, for
the first time, contracted with four cruise
ships for 6 months using its authority under
Section 403 of the Stafford Act.^a The cruise
ships docked in Louisiana and Alabama. In
Alabama, FEMA's use of cruise ships was
primarily for evacuees from Mississippi who were
65 years and older and in good health, single
parents with children, and homeless individuals
living in adverse conditions, according to DHS.
In Louisiana, FEMA used cruise ships to house
disaster victims, with a primary focus on first
responders or personnel essential to recovery
efforts. FEMA's cruise ship contracts expired on
March 1, 2006. According to FEMA, cruise ships
provided emergency shelter for over 7,000
households affected by Hurricane Katrina.
Reimbursements for Under the Public Assistance program, state and
shelters local governments are eligible for grants for
reimbursement for costs of emergency protective
measures, which includes emergency sheltering.
State and local governments can apply to FEMA
for reimbursements for eligible costs, which
include costs for transportation, labor, and
sheltering operations. By statute, the federal
share may not be less than 75 percent of the
eligible costs. The federal government
reimbursed state and local applicants 100
percent of the eligible costs for Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita for specified time periods. As
of August 2006, FEMA reimbursed, through PA
grants, more than $663 million to 45 states and
the District of Columbia for sheltering and
emergency protective measures taken during the
evacuation of the Gulf Coast and for ongoing
shelter initiatives directly following Hurricane
Katrina. These funds were provided in addition
to nearly $1.75 billion obligated to Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama for emergency
sheltering operations.
Reimbursements for hotel FEMA has the authority to provide short-term
rooms assistance in the form of lodging expense
reimbursement, such as hotel rooms, to victims
whose homes have been made uninhabitable by
disasters. Traditionally, FEMA provides
reimbursements to individuals and households for
hotel stays through the IHP. However, in
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA
used its authority under Section 403 of the
Stafford Act to reimburse the Red Cross and
hotel owners for providing interim sheltering in
hotels to displaced victims. On behalf of FEMA
and on a reimbursable basis, the Red Cross
administered FEMA's Special Transient Housing
Accommodations Program until October 25, 2005,
when FEMA took over administration of the
program. FEMA then provided reimbursements to
hotel owners through a private contractor. To
receive lodging assistance, victims only needed
proof of residence in disaster-affected zip
codes. FEMA required all victims staying in
hotels obtain a FEMA authorization code by
January 30, 2006, to continue receiving
assistance. The authorization code allowed FEMA
to ensure displaced hurricane victims were
registered with FEMA for assistance and to
ensure they were fully processed for rental
assistance eligibility before transitioning to
longer-term housing. For most victims, hotel
room reimbursements ended in February or March
2006. According to FEMA, during its
administration of the program, from October 25,
2005, until March 2006, FEMA provided 4,270,350
cumulative hotel nights to hurricane victims.
Temporary Housing
Direct housing - travel Under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA has
trailers and mobile homes the authority to provide direct temporary
housing assistance under IHP. FEMA may provide
temporary housing units (e.g., mobile homes and
travel trailers), acquired by purchase or lease,
directly to disaster victims, who, because of a
lack of available housing resources, would be
unable to make use of financial assistance to
rent alternate housing accommodations (i.e.,
rental accommodations are not available). By
statute, direct assistance is limited to an
18-month period from the date of the
presidential disaster declaration, after which
FEMA may charge fair market rent for the housing
unless the President extends the 18-month period
due to extraordinary circumstances. For renters,
FEMA placed travel trailers or mobile homes at
emergency group sites developed by FEMA or
commercial sites. For homeowners, FEMA either
placed travel trailers or mobile homes on their
properties or on group sites. As of August 2006,
FEMA provided 123,957 travel trailers and mobile
homes in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and
Texas.
Financial assistance for Under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA has
temporary rental housing the authority to provide financial assistance
for temporary rental housing to disaster victims
through IHP. FEMA may provide financial
assistance to individuals or households to rent
alternative housing accommodations, existing
rental units, manufactured housing, recreational
vehicles, or other readily fabricated dwellings.
The maximum amount of financial assistance that
an individual or household may receive is capped
at $25,000, adjusted annually to reflect changes
in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). In 2005, the
maximum was $26,200. For 2006, the maximum was
$27,200, and the maximum in 2007 is $28,200.
Disaster victims must register with FEMA to
determine IHP eligibility. In response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Department of
Homeland Security, through FEMA's IHP program,
provided transitional housing assistance for
qualified homeowners and renters. Eligible
victims received an initial payment of $2,358
for 3 months of rental assistance. This payment
was calculated based on the average fair market
rent for a two-bedroom unit nationwide. Victims
could use this payment for transitional housing
costs for any location.
To receive extended assistance, victims must be
periodically recertified, and FEMA may adjust
the relevant fair market rate according to
location and family size. Rental assistance may
then be provided in 3- month increments
depending on the victim's temporary housing
needs. For qualified victims, assistance can be
provided for up to 18 months from the date of
the presidential disaster declaration or up to
the IHP financial assistance cap, whichever
occurs first. FEMA, in extraordinary
circumstances, may extend this assistance beyond
18 months. However, FEMA cannot exceed the
financial assistance cap. If a victim reaches
the financial assistance maximum, FEMA may
provide direct housing assistance by directly
paying rent to the landlord. As of May 31, 2006,
FEMA provided rental assistance to 717,262
distinct households displaced by Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.
Reimbursements for rental Under Section 403 of the Stafford Act, FEMA has
assistance the authority to reimburse state and local
governments for emergency sheltering through the
PA grant program. According to FEMA officials,
to house the large number of displaced residents
quickly, FEMA used this authority to reimburse
states for rental assistance provided to
evacuees of Hurricane Katrina. All contiguous
states were eligible for reimbursements for
housing assistance under the emergency
declaration issued by the President. According
to FEMA, approximately 60,000 households
received rental assistance under this authority.
In early 2006, FEMA began determining the
eligibility of those it was assisting under
Section 403 to transition to IHP under Section
408.^b In March 2006, FEMA announced that it
would no longer provide interim shelter under
Section 403 as of May 31, 2006.^c
Assistance to Homeowners/
Homebuyers
Home repair/ replacement Under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA may
grants and loans provide financial assistance for the repair of
owner-occupied private residences, utilities,
and residential infrastructure damaged by a
major disaster not covered by insurance through
IHP.^d The maximum amount of repair assistance
provided to a household is limited to $5,000,
adjusted annually to reflect changes in the CPI.
In 2005, the maximum was $5,200. For 2006, the
maximum was $5,400. FEMA may also provide
assistance to replace owner-occupied private
residences under Section 408. The amount of
replacement assistance FEMA may provide to a
household is limited to $10,000, adjusted
annually to reflect changes in the CPI. In 2005,
the maximum was $10,500. For 2006, the maximum
was $10,900. For a victim to receive this
assistance there must have been at least $10,000
of damage to the dwelling. In response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA provided home
repair assistance to 183,446 households and home
replacement assistance to 31,250 households.^e
Source: GAO analysis of FEMA data.
aBecause FEMA was unable to immediately implement IHP assistance
(under section 408 of the Stafford Act) to provide funds to
transition victims from short-term lodging to longer-term housing,
the agency used public assistance funds (authorized under section
403 of the Stafford Act). Normally, FEMA uses public assistance
funds only for immediate emergency sheltering efforts.
bThe United States District Court for the District of Columbia
ruled in November 2006 that FEMA must immediately restore Section
403 benefits to victims of Hurricanes and Katrina and Rita for
whom FEMA declared ineligible for IHP assistance. FEMA had
informed the victims of their ineligibility in connection with its
efforts to transition eligible individuals from Section 403 to
IHP. According to the court, FEMA violated the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution when it terminated Section 403 benefits and
provided only vague, confusing explanations to the victims as to
why they were being denied. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia suspended the District Court's ruling
that FEMA immediately restore Section 403 benefits. The suspension
will last at least until the appeals court hears arguments in the
case. The appeals court did not suspend the part of the district
court's ruling that ordered FEMA to provide victims clearer
explanations of the reasons they were not eligible for IHP
benefits.
cFEMA announced certain exceptions to the May 31, 2006, deadline.
In particular, FEMA stated that it planned to make every effort to
notify states of the IHP eligibility status of evacuees before
April 15, 2006. If this notification occurred after April 15,
states could request additional time to provide eligible and
ineligible evacuees with a 30-day lease termination notice.
Specifically, states could receive up to 15 additional days for
eligible evacuees, and up to 30 additional days for ineligible
evacuees. Also, for ineligible evacuees, the state would be
reimbursed for contractual lease termination costs associated with
leases that require greater than 30 days notice. FEMA subsequently
extended the May 31, 2006, deadline to June 30, 2006, for 11
jurisdictions. FEMA further extended the deadline for one of these
jurisdictions--Houston, Texas--until September 30, 2006.
dIHP repair assistance is designed to make the victim's
owner-occupied home habitable and functional, not to restore the
home to its predisaster condition. When disaster victims register
for FEMA assistance, they are asked to provide their approximate
household income. If the applicant's income exceeds certain
thresholds, FEMA automatically refers them to the Small Business
Administration's Disaster Loan Program. Applicants whose income
falls below the thresholds or who are denied SBA assistance are
referred back to FEMA for possible grant assistance under IHP.
eThe 2007 DHS Appropriations Act repealed the $5,000 and $10,000
limits for repair and replacement assistance.
Appendix IV: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Assistance Provided by the American Red Cross
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the American Red Cross
(Red Cross) provided disaster housing assistance according to its
congressionally mandated role to respond to disasters and mitigate
suffering. The Red Cross, working with governmental and
nongovernmental organizations, provided sheltering and other mass
care services to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita through
its nationwide network of local chapters and its Disaster Services
Program. In addition, the Red Cross administered the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) hotel/motel program on a
reimbursable basis. The following provides further details on
sheltering and temporary housing assistance provided by the Red
Cross.
Sheltering
Emergency shelters To provide assistance to hurricane victims, the
Red Cross executes its plan for responding to
tropical storms and hurricanes in accordance with
its Disaster Services Program, according to Red
Cross officials. The Red Cross, with local
governments, opens and operates shelters before a
disaster, during disaster evacuations, and after
a disaster occurs. According to Red Cross
officials, shelters are typically open for 7 to
10 days, and most disaster victims are able to
return to their homes within 48 to 72 hours of
the event. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, the Red Cross opened over 1,000 shelters
and provided over 3.7 million overnight shelter
stays for evacuees in 27 states and the District
of Columbia, according to the Red Cross. Some Red
Cross shelters for Hurricane Katrina evacuees
remained open for up to 4 months. The Red Cross
also provided support to shelters operated by
state and local governments and other nonprofit
organizations.
Reimbursements for hotel The Red Cross may operate a small-scale hotel
rooms program in areas where it is not feasible to open
shelters or to provide better shelter conditions
for large families, elderly victims, or persons
with certain medical conditions. Due to the large
number of Hurricane Katrina victims and the need
for longer-term sheltering, the Red Cross
administered a large-scale hotel program, the
Special Transient Hotel Accommodations Program,
on behalf of FEMA on a reimbursable basis.
Through an existing relationship with a private
contractor, the Red Cross reimbursed hotel owners
for hurricane victims' hotel stays. Hurricane
victims only needed proof of residence in the
disaster-affected areas to receive assistance.
The Red Cross administered this program from
August 28, 2005, until October 25, 2005, when
FEMA assumed administration of the program.
Through this effort, the Red Cross provided hotel
rooms to over 650,000 Hurricane Katrina and Rita
victims at more than 11,000 hotels in all 50
states.
Source: GAO analysis of Red Cross data.
Appendix V: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Assistance Provided by the Department of Agriculture
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) provided housing assistance using disaster
provisions under its traditional multifamily and single-family
rural housing programs.^1 USDA also established new initiatives
specifically to provide disaster housing assistance to the large
number of evacuees displaced as a result of the disasters. USDA
assisted victims of Katrina and Rita by providing temporary
housing assistance, including making multifamily units and
single-family homes available for lease nationwide, offering
rental assistance, and issuing program waivers. Also, USDA
provided assistance to homeowners and homebuyers by providing
grants and loans for home repair and replacement, and by providing
mortgage assistance. The following information provides further
details on the disaster housing assistance USDA provided in
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Temporary Housing
USDA multifamily units Homeowners of USDA-financed single-family
for lease properties and tenants of USDA multifamily
properties made uninhabitable by a
presidentially declared disaster are eligible
for occupancy nationwide as "displaced tenants"
at any USDA Rural Development financed
multi-family housing property. As a new
initiative, USDA also extended the lease of its
multifamily units to all hurricane evacuees
regardless of whether they were living in
USDA-financed single-family or multifamily
properties prior to the disasters. According to
USDA officials, hurricane victims could lease
these units as long as they paid rent. USDA
leased 3,848 units to victims of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, as of May 31, 2006.
USDA real estate-owned USDA typically offers for sale to the general
homes for lease public its foreclosed homes. In response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, USDA established a
new initiative by halting the sale of homes that
it owned, and making them available for lease to
displaced residents of the disaster areas.
According to USDA, the department offered 153
homes for lease under this initiative, of which
25 were eventually leased. Victims with no
income were eligible to receive up to 3 months
of free rent. Otherwise, they were required to
pay 30 percent of their adjusted income.
Disaster victims who rented USDA homes were
given the first option to purchase the homes at
any time during the lease period.
Rental assistance Under USDA's rental assistance program, the
department permits the transfer of rental
assistance for units made uninhabitable by a
presidentially declared disaster to another
eligible multifamily property. As a new
initiative, USDA also provided rental assistance
to displaced victims of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita who were not previously assisted by USDA.
These victims were provided USDA rental
assistance for up to 6 months, and some were
permitted 2-month extensions for hardships. Both
previously assisted and nonpreviously assisted
tenants were required to pay rent according to
USDA's standard rental assistance program, in
which renters pay 30 percent of their income in
rent and USDA provides the difference between
the tenant's contribution and the rent. As of
May 31, 2006, USDA provided rental assistance to
3,124 displaced disaster victims.
Waivers for placement of USDA is permitted to waive some program
hurricane victims in requirements to respond to disasters. In
USDA-financed properties response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, UDSA
implemented several program waivers, which were
in effect for 90 days, to allow USDA-financed
property owners to accept displaced tenants and
expedite placing victims in available units. For
example, USDA issued Letters of Priority
Entitlement (LOPE) by which victims are moved to
the top of waiting lists for vacancies for 120
days. Victims could provide documentation of
FEMA registration in lieu of a LOPE. USDA also
waived requirements such as 1-year lease terms,
security deposits, and age restrictions at
designated elderly properties to expedite
placing disaster victims in available housing.
Rural area population Subsequent to a natural disaster, USDA Rural
requirements Development has the authority to waive, for 3
years from the date of a presidential disaster
declaration, population limits for its
single-family and multifamily housing programs.
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, USDA
immediately increased the population limitation
in rural areas to 50,000 for any county or
parish declared for individual assistance as a
result the disasters. This waiver enabled USDA
to provide housing assistance in rural areas
that absorbed large numbers of evacuees.
Conversely, USDA considered some cities, which
lost a significant population due to the
disasters, as rural areas to enable the
department to provide assistance in these areas
as well. USDA also implemented waiver authority
under the 2006 Department of Defense Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act. This act
provided the Secretary of USDA the authority to
waive rural area population limitations for all
Rural Development programs for a period of 6
months.
Assistance to Homeowners/
Homebuyers
Home repair/ replacement To assist low- and moderate-income households to
grants and loans purchase, repair, or construct homes, USDA has
the authority to finance the purchase or repair
of single family housing in rural areas through
USDA grants, direct loans, or loans from private
lenders guaranteed by USDA. USDA borrowers who
are affected by presidentially declared
disasters may be eligible for this assistance to
repair or replace property damaged as a direct
result of a natural disaster. Applicants of this
assistance must meet certain income
requirements. The 2006 Department of Defense
Emergency Supplemental Act appropriated funds to
provide home repair and replacement loans,
grants, and loan guarantees. The repair grants
are generally provided only to persons 62 and
older who cannot afford a loan; however, these
grants were appropriated without age
restrictions. According to USDA, in response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the department has
obligated (1) $86.2 million in direct loans for
home purchase or repair, (2) $143.6 million in
guaranteed loans for home purchase or repair,
(3) $2.6 million in direct loans for home
repair, and (4) $14.8 million in grants for home
repair as of September 30, 2006.
Foreclosure moratorium In response to Hurricane Katrina, a 90-day hold
was placed on all direct home ownership loans
that were in foreclosure and located in the
presidentially declared disaster areas.
Mortgage payment After a presidential disaster declaration,
forbearance USDA-financed homeowners living in designated
disaster areas are eligible for a 6- month
moratorium on mortgage payments for direct USDA
loans. The moratorium may be extended but may
not exceed 2 years. For USDA-guaranteed loans,
USDA asks lenders to offer mortgage payment
forbearance as well. In response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, USDA provided a 6-month
suspension of mortgage payments and extended
this payment suspension for 2 years for accounts
that had not been returned to normal servicing.
According to USDA, 25,727 accounts were
originally placed on mortgage payment
moratorium.
^1USDA's traditional multifamily housing programs provide affordable
multifamily rental housing in rural areas for very low-, low-, and
moderate-income families, the elderly, and persons with disabilities
primarily through direct mortgages to finance multifamily housing and
rental subsides. USDA's single-family programs generally provide home
ownership opportunities to low- and moderate-income rural Americans
largely through loans, grants, and loan guarantees.
Source: GAO analysis of USDA data.
Appendix VI: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Assistance Provided by the Department of Defense
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Department of
Defense (DOD) provided temporary housing assistance to victims on
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Specifically, DOD provided temporary
housing assistance by installing temporary roofs. In addition, in
accordance with traditional evacuation assistance, DOD offered
safe haven benefits to its military and civilian personnel who
evacuated hurricane-damaged areas. The following information
provides further details on the disaster housing assistance DOD
provided in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Temporary Housing
Temporary roof Under a mission assignment from FEMA, the Army Corp of
repair Engineers provided free temporary roofs for residential
structures, daycare facilities, schools, and all publicly
owned facilities under Operation Blue Roof. These roofs
(plastic sheeting) allowed occupants to return to their
homes and facilities, providing temporary relief until the
owner made permanent repairs. To qualify for blue roofs,
damage to the roof must have been less than 50 percent and
the area to be covered must have been structurally sound.
Property owners were required to complete a right-of-entry
form to allow government and contract employees on their
property.
Relocation In accordance with Joint Federal Travel Regulations,
assistance military dependents, civilian employees, and families
ordered to evacuate military installations in Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas due to Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita were authorized to select an alternate safe haven
within the continental U.S. and receive safe haven
benefits. Safe haven benefits include travel costs, actual
costs of lodging, and allowances for meals and
incidentals. This authority applied to individuals whose
housing was made uninhabitable by the hurricanes.
According to DOD officials, approximately 10,000 military
and DOD civilian personnel were displaced by Hurricane
Katrina. Safe haven benefits are usually allowed for up to
180 days from the arrival at the alternate safe haven
location. Normally, full safe haven per diem rates are
offered for the first 30 days after relocation, and
reduced per diem rates are offered thereafter. In response
to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, unreduced per diem rates
were extended five times to cover the maximum 180 days of
safe haven benefits. In addition, DOD authorized a
continuation of evacuation allowances beyond 180 days for
hurricane evacuees until August 1, 2006, at the full per
diem rate.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Appendix VII: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Assistance Provided by HUD
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provided disaster housing
assistance using flexibilities allowed under its existing
multifamily and single-family housing programs and through its
disaster housing programs. HUD facilitated sheltering by issuing
waivers of certain program requirements. In addition, HUD provided
or facilitated the provision of temporary housing assistance, such
as by making homes that it owned exclusively available for lease
to victims of Katrina and Rita, and by issuing rental assistance
vouchers to previously HUD-assisted tenants and victims who were
homeless prior to the hurricanes. HUD also provided assistance to
homeowners, including providing mortgage relief to those with
FHA-insured loans. The following information presents further
details on the sheltering and housing assistance HUD provided to
victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Sheltering
Emergency shelter grant Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, HUD
waivers waived certain requirements for its Emergency
Shelter Grant program for presidentially
declared disaster areas. HUD waived
requirements related to citizen participation
for plan amendments, the definition of
emergency shelter facilities, and deadlines
for using grant funds.
Temporary Housing
HUD real estate-owned homes HUD typically offers for sale to the general
for lease public homes that it acquires due to
foreclosure on HUD-insured mortgages. In
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, HUD
and FEMA entered into an Interagency Agreement
on September 12, 2005, to make available these
properties--referred to as Real Estate Owned
(REO) properties--to families displaced by the
hurricanes. HUD took its REO properties off
the market and made them available to FEMA for
this purpose. According to HUD, as of August
2006, the department had leased over 2,000 of
its homes. Victims who leased these properties
had the option to purchase them at a
discounted price and qualify for financing
though HUD's Mortgage Insurance for Disaster
Victims Program. In addition, all evacuees had
the opportunity to purchase a HUD home, before
it was offered to the public, at a discounted
price.
Rental assistance vouchers In response to a mission assignment from FEMA,
HUD administered the Katrina Disaster Housing
Assistance Program (KDHAP), funded by FEMA, to
assist victims of Hurricane Katrina who
resided in HUD-assisted properties prior to
the disaster. To receive KDHAP funding,
families must have been (1) either assisted by
HUD prior to Hurricane Katrina through certain
housing programs or qualified as predisaster
homeless, (2) displaced by Hurricane Katrina,
and (3) registered with FEMA no later than
December 31, 2005. Under KDHAP, households
received a voucher which covered 100 percent
of the rent (capped at the local fair market
rent) for up to 18 months anywhere in the
United States. In December 2005, Congress
appropriated $390 million for temporary rental
voucher assistance for victims of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita through the 2006 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations. The act
authorized HUD to establish and administer a
new program--the Disaster Voucher Program
(DVP). DVP replaced KDHAP and expanded
assistance to victims of Hurricane Rita. In
February 2006, HUD began transitioning those
from KDHAP to DVP. Households eligible for DVP
must have been displaced by Hurricane Katrina
or Rita and must have been either previously
assisted under certain HUD-assisted housing
programs or qualified as a predisaster special
needs/homeless family. Under DVP, households
received a housing voucher which covers 100
percent of the rent (capped at the Public
Housing Authority payment standard) anywhere
in the United States for the first 18 months
the household receives DVP assistance. DVP
assistance is expected to expire in September
2007. As of November 15, 2006, HUD had
registered 29,470 households for DVP, and
23,832 DVP vouchers had been used to lease a
house or apartment.
Waivers for public housing Using flexibilities allowed under its existing
authorities authorities, HUD provided waivers to
facilitate the provision of temporary housing
assistance to victims of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. For example, HUD allowed Public
Housing Authorities additional time to submit
tenant verification and allowed assessment and
cost-limitation flexibilities.
Waivers for HUD's grant HUD testified that its Office of Community
programs Planning and Development issued waivers of
more than 40 requirements in an effort to
increase the flexibility of existing grant
programs to be used within their current
resources for disaster relief. These included
waivers for the HOME Investment Partnerships
program and American Dream Down Payment
Initiative to help low-income Louisianans
receive tenant-based rental assistance, and
rehabilitate and buy homes.
Assistance to Homeowners/
Homebuyers
Home repair/replacement Congress approved emergency supplemental
grants appropriations providing $11.5 billion and
$5.2 billion for HUD's Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) program to assist with
long-term housing and infrastructure
restoration in Gulf Coast states affected by
the hurricanes. HUD allocated funds based on
approved state plans. Some plans included
grants for homeowners whose homes were
destroyed or severely damaged following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. As of August
2006, HUD has approved plans and awarded CDBG
funds to Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana,
Texas, and Florida. Mississippi and Louisiana
have expended funds from their allocation, as
of September 2006.
Foreclosure moratorium In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
HUD issued mortgage letters instructing
servicers advising them not to foreclose on
homes with FHA-insured mortgages for 90 days
from the date of the presidential disaster
declaration. This moratorium was extended in
November 2005 and in February 2006. On June
30, 2006, the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) provided a limited extension of the
foreclosure moratorium through August 31,
2006.
Other mortgage relief and In October 2005, HUD issued a mortgagee letter
assistance to supplement its existing procedures for the
servicing of loans in states and communities
designated by FEMA as disaster areas as a
result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In
particular, the letter asked lenders to (1)
not charge late fees for unsuccessful
electronic or debit transactions, (2) not
charge fees for late payments, and (3) not
report to credit agencies until a property
goes into foreclosure. The mortgagee letter
also addressed delinquency, servicing, and
loss-mitigation matters, including requiring
lenders to explore all available
loss-mitigation options and special
forbearance for hurricane affected mortgages.
It further reminded lenders of the 90-day
moratorium on foreclosures and offered
guidance on property inspections in affected
areas. The letter emphasized the importance of
preservation and protection of properties,
particularly where owners have not returned.
The letter also encouraged mortgagees to make
exceptional efforts to assist borrowers in
gaining access to insurance funds as soon as
possible by providing copies of policies and
other insurance information, promptly
releasing insurance proceeds, and assuring
that hazard insurance claims are filed and
settled expeditiously. Finally, the letter
provided guidance on how to convey properties
already in foreclosure prior to the hurricanes
and disaster declarations. In addition, in
December 2005, the department announced an
additional homeownership retention initiative
to help homeowners with FHA-insured mortgages
who are unable to maintain their payment
obligations due to hurricane-related property
damage, curtailment of income, or increased
living expenses. Under the initiative, FHA
will advance mortgage payments for up to 12
months for eligible borrowers who are
committed to continued occupancy of their
homes as a principal residence and are
expected to have the financial capacity to
repair storm damage and resume making full
mortgage payments within a 12-month period.
According to HUD, this mortgage relief is
expected to help several thousand families to
remain homeowners.
Mortgage insurance HUD allowed disaster victims to obtain 100
percent financing on a replacement home
anywhere in the United States under its
special mortgage insurance program for
disaster victims. The benefit is for
individuals or families whose residences were
destroyed or damaged to such an extent that
reconstruction or replacement is necessary. In
addition, the department allows homeowners and
homebuyers who have lost their homes to
finance both the purchase price and/or
refinancing cost of a house and the cost of
its rehabilitation through a single mortgage.
HUD augmented this mortgage insurance program
to facilitate the purchase of properties
needing minor rehabilitation.
Source: GAO analysis of HUD data.
Appendix VIII: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Assistance Provided by the Department of the Treasury
The Department of the Treasury's Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
provided assistance to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita for
sheltering for temporary housing by offering relief under the
Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA) and the Gulf
Opportunity Act of 2005, which included tax exemptions, repayment
of qualified distributions, and recapturing of federal mortgage
subsidies. In addition, the IRS provided regulatory relief
regarding tenant rules for low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC)
projects. The following information provides further details.
Sheltering
Additional tax For homeowners or renters who provided housing in
exemptions their main homes to qualifying individuals
displaced by Hurricane Katrina, the IRS permitted
the claim of additional exemptions for a specific
displaced individual in 2005 or 2006.^a For each
displaced individual housed, a person could claim
an exemption of $500. For all tax years, the
maximum additional exemption amount that could be
claimed was $2,000 ($1,000 if married filing
separately). Taxpayers in the same home could not
claim additional exemptions for the same
displaced individuals. Exemptions could not be
claimed if the taxpayer received any amount of
rent from any source for providing the housing or
reimbursements for the extra costs of heat,
electricity, or water used by the displaced
individual. However, taxpayers could receive
payments or reimbursements that did not relate to
normal housing costs, such as food and clothing.
Temporary Housing
Temporary suspension of Administered by IRS and state tax credit
tenant income rules for allocation agencies, the Low-Income Housing Tax
low-income housing tax Credit Program (LIHTC) provides developers and
credit projects investors with eligible affordable housing
developments, a dollar-for-dollar reduction in
their federal taxes.^b In response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita and at the request of state
housing credit agencies, the IRS temporarily
suspended income limitation requirements for
certain low-income projects in which there were
vacant low-income units to allow states to
temporarily house displaced individuals. The
state housing credit agencies determined the
appropriate period of temporary housing for each
project, not to extend beyond September 30, 2006.
Assistance to
Homeowners/ Homebuyers
New rules for repayment The IRS implemented new rules to provide
of qualified tax-favored withdrawals, repayments, and loans
distributions from certain retirement plans for taxpayers who
suffered economic losses as a result of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Qualified
distributions were permitted without regard to
need or actual amount of economic loss.^c The
total of qualified hurricane distributions was
limited to $100,000 and was not subject to the
additional taxes usually assessed on early
distributions from retirement plans. Qualified
taxpayers have 3 years from the date of the
distribution to make a repayment. Amounts that
are repaid are not counted as income.
Increased loan amount Generally, persons who finance homes under a
for recapture of federal federally subsidized program (i.e., loans from
mortgage subsidy tax-exempt qualified mortgage bonds or loans with
mortgage credit certificates) have to recapture
all or part of the benefit received from the
program when the home is sold or otherwise
disposed of. However, borrowers do not have to
recapture any benefit if the mortgage loan was a
qualified home improvement loan of no more than
$15,000. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, the IRS increased this loan amount to
$150,000 if the loan is provided before 2011 and
used to (1) repair damage caused by Hurricane
Katrina to a residence in the disaster area, or
(2) alter, repair, or improve an existing
owner-occupied residence in the Katrina or Rita
Gulf Opportunity (GO) Zones (core disaster area).
Source: GAO analysis of Treasury data.
aQualifying displaced individuals must have had their main home in
the Hurricane Katrina core disaster area on August 28, 2005, and
been displaced from that home, or for homes inside the disaster
area but outside of the core disaster areas; the home must have
been damaged by Hurricane Katrina or the individual must have been
evacuated from that home because of Hurricane Katrina. To qualify,
the individual also must have been provided housing in the
taxpayer's home for at least 60 consecutive days ending in the tax
year for which the exemption is claimed. Finally, the individual
can not be the spouse or dependent of the taxpayer.
^bLIHTCs are available for projects with (1) at least 20 percent
of its units are both rent restricted and rented to households
with incomes of 50 percent or less than the area median income; or
(2) at least 40 percent of its units are both rent restricted and
rented to households with incomes of 60 percent or less than the
area median income.
cFor victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, distributions
(withdrawals) qualified if (1) the distribution was made after
August 24, 2005, and before January 1, 2007, for Hurricane Katrina
or after September 22, 2005, and before January 1, 2007, for
Hurricane Rita; (2) the victim's main home was in the disaster
areas on August 28, 2005 or September 23, 2005, for Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, respectively; and (3) the victim sustained as
economic loss because of Hurricane Katrina or Rita, including
damage or destruction of real property or losses related to
displacement.
Appendix IX: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Assistance Provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) provided temporary housing assistance and
assistance to homeowners and homebuyers affected by the
hurricanes. For example, the VA directly provided temporary
housing by making available units from its inventory of real
estate-owned (REO) properties. In addition, the VA provided
mortgage relief and assistance to homeowners and worked with loan
holders to establish mortgage payment forbearance, credit
protections, and a moratorium on mortgage foreclosures. The
following information provides additional details on the
disaster-related housing assistance the VA offered in response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Temporary Housing
VA real estate-owned Following Hurricane Katrina, the VA and the
homes for lease Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
amended an existing memorandum of understanding
for the lease of VA's REO homes to victims
certified for FEMA rental assistance. Although
VA had made its REO homes available in response
to previous disasters, Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita were the first disasters for which the
homes were leased to disaster victims, according
to VA officials. Victims could occupy VA homes
for up to the term of FEMA temporary housing
assistance under a month-to-month lease for $350
per month. As of May 2006, 312 VA homes had been
leased to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.
Assistance to Homeowners/
Homebuyers
Foreclosure moratorium The VA requested that loan holders establish a
90-day moratorium from the date of the declared
disaster on initiating new foreclosures in the
disaster area. The VA requested a 90-day
extension of this moratorium. In disaster areas
declared eligible for individual assistance by
FEMA, the VA requested an extension through
February 28, 2006. In addition, subject to
certain restrictions, the VA extended the
moratorium for an additional 120 days.
Mortgage payment The VA encouraged holders of guaranteed loans to
forbearance, late payment extend every possible forbearance to borrowers
waivers, and credit as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and
protections encouraged servicers to extend special
forbearance to members of the National Guard
called to active duty to assist in disaster
recovery. VA encouraged lenders to extend
mortgage payment forbearance until February 28,
2006, and requested another extension for an
additional 120 days subject to certain
restrictions. VA also encouraged all servicers
to waive late charges on loans in disaster
areas. In addition, the VA encouraged servicers
to consider suspension of credit bureau
reporting on borrowers nationwide who have been
affected by the hurricanes.
Underwriting VA issued guidance on eligibility and
flexibilities underwriting issues regarding veterans who have
been impacted by Hurricane Katrina or Rita.
According to VA, veterans who had derogatory
credit related to the effects of the hurricanes
but who had satisfactory credit prior to the
disasters should be determined as a satisfactory
credit risk. In addition, VA allowed
flexibilities regarding restoration of VA loan
entitlement and documentation requirements. VA
guidance also stated that lenders should not
consider the outstanding mortgage obligation on
damaged or destroyed properties when determining
a veteran's ability to make payments on a new
loan. Further, the Defense Appropriations Act
(Public Law 109-148, December 30, 2005) gave the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs the authority to
make a supplemental grant to a veteran whose
home was previously adapted and substantially
damaged or destroyed as a result of hurricanes
in the Gulf of Mexico in calendar year 2005.
Source: GAO analysis of VA data.
Appendix X: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Assistance Provided by Freddie Mac
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) provided temporary housing and
mortgage relief for victims of the disasters. Temporary housing
assistance Freddie Mac provided included direct housing
assistance, such making some of its real estate-owned (REO) units
available for lease, and providing grants to non-profits and other
housing organizations. In addition, Freddie Mac took steps to
provide mortgage relief and assistance to borrowers, including
issuing a temporary moratorium on foreclosures, extending mortgage
relief to members of the National Guard who were on state duty
involved in Hurricane Katrina operations, providing mortgage
payment forbearance, and by taking other measures. The following
provides further details on disaster-related housing assistance
provided by Freddie Mac in response to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.
Temporary Housing
Lease of REO homes and Freddie Mac created a program in late 2005 to
multifamily units lease some of its REO homes to victims of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Hurricane victims
could lease units free of charge for 6 months;
however, tenants were required to pay monthly
utilities. At the end of the lease term, tenants
had the option to purchase the home. If the
tenant had an interest in purchasing the home or
other temporary qualifying issues which support
the need for an extension, the tenant had the
option to request an extension of up to 6
additional months. As of September 30, 2006,
Freddie Mac had leased 65 REO homes in Texas and
Georgia. In addition, Freddie Mac also provided
temporary housing in one of its multifamily REO
properties to 31 Hurricane Katrina victims rent
free for 3 months.
Grants to non-profits Freddie Mac donated over $9 million to nonprofits
and other housing and other housing organizations for rental
organizations assistance and for the purchase, donation, and
lease of single-family homes, multifamily units,
and manufactured homes. For example, Freddie Mac
provided $900,000 to the Mississippi Home
Corporation, a quasigovernmental agency that
administers tax credits and housing bonds, for
the acquisition and positioning of 36
manufactured homes to provide temporary hosing to
hurricane victims in Mississippi. Overall,
Freddie Mac assistance provided homes for 118
displaced families, temporary homes for 483
displaced families, and rental assistance to
1,548 families.
Assistance to
Homeowners/ Homebuyers
Foreclosure moratorium Freddie Mac instructed servicers to suspend
foreclosure activities in the storm-affected
areas. Freddie Mac extended this moratorium for
mortgages on homes in the hurricane disaster
areas through February 28, 2006. For counties in
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas that
suffered the most severe damage, Freddie Mac
extended it moratorium until May 31, 2006, and
again until August 31, 2006, for counties in
Louisiana and Mississippi, after which Freddie
Mac has required servicers to obtain approval
before initiating any foreclosures.
Mortgage relief extended Freddie Mac instructed its servicers to extend
to national guard mortgage relief available to members of the armed
forces under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
(SCRA) to National Guard members on state duty
involved in Hurricane Katrina operations. SCRA
protects active duty personnel from foreclosure
and interest rates in excess of 6 percent.
National Guard members are covered when called to
state duty in response to a national emergency
declared by the President.
Mortgage payment As a new policy, Freddie Mac instructed its
forbearance, loan servicers to suspend mortgage payment collection
modification, and credit for September, October, and November 2005 in
protections disaster areas designated as eligible for
individual assistance by FEMA. This 3-month
suspension of mortgage payments applied to every
borrower with a Freddie Mac single-family
mortgage in the areas designated for FEMA's
individual assistance program, regardless of the
condition of the home. After the 3-month mortgage
payment suspension, Freddie Mac advised servicers
to offer additional assistance on a case-by-case
basis. Servicers could continue the mortgage
payment suspension or reduce mortgage payments
for a total of 12 months. Freddie Mac extended
its policy to allow servicers the discretion to
extend mortgage payment forbearance through March
31, 2007. As of August 31, 2006, Freddie Mac had
extended forbearance to over 33,500 homeowners
and approved more than 3,000 loan modifications.
In addition, Freddie Mac instructed its servicers
not to report to credit bureaus any reversed or
suspended payments on Freddie Mac-owned loans as
a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and to
suspend late fees during the 3-month mortgage
payment suspension. Unique credit-reporting
requirements were extended and will expire March
31, 2007. Servicers also had the option not to
advance interest on any Freddie Mac mortgage
granted forbearance under its special hurricane
policies.
Mortgage payment return For the first time, Freddie Mac allowed its
servicers discretion to return mortgage payments
for September 2005 to Hurricane Katrina-affected
borrowers and October 2005 to Hurricane
Rita-affected borrowers for payments made that
had not yet been reported to Freddie Mac.
Borrowers could also request a return of their
mortgage payments.
Underwriting Freddie Mac temporarily eased some underwriting
flexibilities requirements to allow hurricane victims to
qualify for mortgages that Freddie Mac would
purchase. The special underwriting requirements
applied to mortgages closed on or after August 30
for Hurricane Katrina victims and on or after
September 25 for victims of Hurricane Rita, and
expired on October 3, 2006. The underwriting
flexibility applied to borrowers who were victims
of either storm and lived in, had employers in,
or relocated from FEMA-designated major disaster
areas. Specifically, the underwriting
flexibilities allowed lenders to accommodate
hurricane victims who had to rely on temporary
income, alternative third-party documentation in
place of lost or destroyed records, or
storm-damaged credit reputations.
Tax-exempt mortgage Freddie Mac committed to purchasing up to $1
revenue bonds billion in tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds to
allow housing finance agencies in the Gulf Coast
to provide below-market-rate mortgaged and home
loans to as many as 10,000 families displace by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Freddie Mac made
this commitment after Congress passed the Katrina
Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 which waived
homebuyer requirements on mortgage revenue bond
loans and raised the cap on home repair loans
from $15,000 to $150,000.
Purchase of mortgages Freddie Mac eased some of its policies in order
secured by properties to purchase an estimated $300 million in
affected by Hurricane single-family mortgages, which were closed
Katrina between June 1 and August 29, 2005, and secured
by properties in areas heavily impacted by
Hurricane Katrina, to assist lenders with loans
funded and closed in anticipation of sale to
Freddie Mac. Normally, these loans may have no
longer been eligible for sale because of
potential property damage or income loss caused
by Hurricane Katrina. In response to Hurricane
Katrina, Freddie Mac offered to purchase these
loans through October 31, 2005.
Source: GAO analysis of Freddie Mac data.
Appendix XI: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Assistance Provided by Fannie Mae
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) offered direct housing
assistance and mortgage relief to the storms' victims. Fannie Mae
offered single family homes and multifamily units for lease from
its inventory of real estate-owned (REO) properties. Also, Fannie
Mae offered mortgage relief and assistance that included a
temporary moratorium on foreclosures, mortgage payment
forbearance, loan modifications, and credit protections. The
following information provides further details on disaster-related
housing assistance offered by Fannie Mae.
Temporary Housing
Lease of REO homes and Fannie Mae provided temporary housing assistance
multifamily units utilizing its inventory of REO homes and
multifamily units. Fannie Mae made 1,500 of its
REO homes available for lease to victims of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Fannie Mae REO homes
were available for lease for up to 18 months rent
free. To lease a Fannie Mae REO home, persons
must have been victims of Hurricane Katrina or
Rita and have had no prior felony convictions. As
of October 2006, Fannie Mae provided over 1,000
families rent free housing in its REO homes.
Evacuee tenants were also given the opportunity
to purchase these homes and Fannie Mae provided
purchase assistance. In addition, Fannie Mae
housed 308 hurricane victims in 148 of its REO
multifamily units in Dallas and Houston, Texas.
Victims who occupied REO multifamily units were
given free rent while they applied for FEMA
rental assistance. Tenants who received rental
assistance from FEMA then paid rent for Fannie
Mae's REO multifamily units. According to Fannie
Mae officials, most victims occupying its
multifamily units began receiving FEMA rental
assistance by January 2006.
Waiver of minimum lease Fannie Mae agreed to waive the minimum 6-month
term lease restriction on its multifamily units to
allow multifamily property owners to permit
shorter-term leases for households displaced by
Hurricane Katrina.
Assistance to
Homeowners/ Homebuyers
Foreclosure moratorium Fannie Mae established a moratorium on
foreclosures on single family properties in the
most devastated hurricane areas, lasting until
August 31, 2006. Afterwards, through March 31,
2007, servicers were required to obtain written
approval from Fannie Mae before initiating or
continuing a foreclosure in the six most damaged
counties/parishes.
Mortgage payment Fannie Mae reminded its servicers that its
forbearance, loan existing policy for natural disasters allows
modification, and credit servicers to offer forbearance as they deem
protections appropriate, on a case-by-case basis, for up to
18 months on single-family properties. For
multifamily properties, Fannie Mae agreed to
provide an initial 1-month forbearance from
exercising default remedies, and thereafter
authorized the servicers the ability to grant, on
a month-to-month basis, additional forbearance to
multifamily borrowers. In addition, lenders could
offer disaster victims a reduction in mortgage
payments for up to 18 months or create longer
payback plans on a case-by-case basis for
single-family properties. Fannie Mae also waived
income/asset verifications for repayment plans
and loan modifications and encouraged its
servicers to waive late payment charges when
likely due to a natural disaster for
single-family homes. In addition, Fannie Mae
instructed its servicers to suspend credit bureau
reporting for delinquencies caused by the
hurricanes and advised its servicers and lenders
not to report a delinquency to the credit
repositories in cases of missed payments that
were likely caused by hardships from the
hurricanes.
Underwriting Fannie Mae implemented new single-family
flexibilities underwriting flexibilities for hurricane-affected
borrowers to acquire new homes or loans to
renovate damaged homes. These flexibilities
allowed lenders to disregard obligations on
previously owner-occupied homes when calculating
a hurricane-impacted borrower's debt-to-income
ratio and permitted lenders to base loan
decisions on a borrower's credit prior to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Source: GAO analysis of Fannie Mae data.
Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development
Appendix XV: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs
Appendix XVI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of Treasury
GAO Contact
David G. Wood, (202) 512-8678, [email protected]
Acknowledgments
In addition to the individual named above, Charles Wilson, Jr.,
Assistant Director; Johnnie Barnes; Emily Chalmers; Marshall
Hamlett; Charlene Johnson; Alison Martin; Michael Maslowski; Marc
Molino; John McGrail; David Pittman; and Rachel Siegel made key
contributions to this report.
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Highlights of GAO-07-88, a report to congressional addressees
February 2007
DISASTER ASSISTANCE
Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic Disasters
In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed thousands of homes and
displaced over 1 million people. In light of widespread Congressional and
public interest in U.S. agencies' performance in assisting hurricane
victims, GAO initiated work under the Comptroller General's authority to
examine federal housing assistance. Specifically, this report examines (1)
the extent to which the National Response Plan (NRP) clearly described the
responsibilities and capabilities of federal agencies and the Red Cross;
(2) the extent to which these organizations had plans for providing
sheltering and housing assistance; and (3) the perceptions of victims and
others regarding the assistance needed and provided. GAO reviewed the NRP
and related documents, interviewed Red Cross and federal agency officials
and a limited number of storm victims, and convened a group of experts to
discuss these issues.
[62]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HUD, Treasury, USDA, and VA propose revisions to ESF-6
that fully reflect their capabilities; that these agencies and Defense
develop fact sheets as required by standard operating procedures; and that
HUD, USDA, and VA develop operational plans for their ESF-6
responsibilities. These agencies generally concurred with our
recommendations.
In general, the NRP, including its annex covering sheltering and temporary
housing (emergency support function no. 6 or ESF-6) clearly described the
overall responsibilities of the two primary agencies--the Red Cross and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). However, the
responsibilities described for the support agencies--the Departments of
Agriculture (USDA), Defense, Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA)--did not, and still do not, fully
reflect their capabilities. For example, USDA provided temporary housing
for victims, and Treasury acted to make available vacant rental units
subsidized through a tax program, but the ESF-6 annex did not reflect
these capabilities. Further, the support agencies had not, and have not
yet, developed fact sheets laying out their roles and responsibilities,
notification and activation procedures, and agency specific authorities,
as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. FEMA's ability to effectively
coordinate federal housing assistance was limited because the agency was
not aware of the support agencies' full capabilities.
The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked plans for providing
shelter and temporary housing in response to catastrophic disasters such
as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita but have since taken some steps to improve
their response capabilities. Some ESF-6 support agencies had not developed
operational plans for meeting their ESF-6 responsibilities, and while they
were ultimately able to contribute much-needed assistance, it was not as
timely as it might have been. For example, HUD and VA worked out
agreements with FEMA after the storms to provide vacant properties, but it
took several months before some were available to victims. HUD, USDA, and
VA have formed an informal working group to work out procedural details
for providing housing assistance, in order to avoid the need to do so
after a disaster event. However, this group is not intended to address the
full range of these agencies' responsibilities under ESF-6, and does not
have a specific timetable for its activities.
The specific needs of victims and their perceptions of the assistance that
was provided varied, depending in part on circumstances such as where they
were located after the disaster, whether they were homeowners or renters,
and whether they had special needs. Most victims were eligible for some
form of federal temporary housing assistance--such as rental assistance or
a travel trailer--and those we contacted had mixed perceptions of the
assistance they received. Our interviews with victims, as well as our
expert group, indicate that temporary housing needs include not just
shelter, but also access to medical facilities, public transportation,
schools, employment opportunities, and other social services--and,
particularly for those displaced to distant locations, information about
all of these things. Legislation enacted in October 2006 requires a
strategy that is to address a number of these ancillary needs for victims
of future catastrophic disasters, and FEMA has initiated this effort.
References
Visible links
47. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-860
48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-712
56. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-442T
57. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-403T
58. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1013
59. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-252T
60. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-442T
61. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-44
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