Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims  
of Catastrophic Disasters (28-FEB-07, GAO-07-88).		 
                                                                 
In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed thousands of homes
and displaced over 1 million people. In light of widespread	 
Congressional and public interest in U.S. agencies' performance  
in assisting hurricane victims, GAO initiated work under the	 
Comptroller General's authority to examine federal housing	 
assistance. Specifically, this report examines (1) the extent to 
which the National Response Plan (NRP) clearly described the	 
responsibilities and capabilities of federal agencies and the Red
Cross; (2) the extent to which these organizations had plans for 
providing sheltering and housing assistance; and (3) the	 
perceptions of victims and others regarding the assistance needed
and provided. GAO reviewed the NRP and related documents,	 
interviewed Red Cross and federal agency officials and a limited 
number of storm victims, and convened a group of experts to	 
discuss these issues.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-88						        
    ACCNO:   A66351						        
  TITLE:     Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing  
Victims of Catastrophic Disasters				 
     DATE:   02/28/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Disaster relief aid				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Housing						 
	     Housing programs					 
	     Hurricane Katrina					 
	     Hurricane Rita					 
	     Hurricanes 					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     National response plan				 
	     Standards						 
	     Federal agencies					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Disaster planning					 
	     National Response Plan				 

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GAO-07-88

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background

          * [3]The National Response Plan
          * [4]Emergency Support Function-6

     * [5]While ESF-6 Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clear,

          * [6]The Red Cross's and FEMA's Responsibilities Under ESF-6 Were
          * [7]ESF-6 Support Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clea

     * [8]The Red Cross and Federal Agencies Generally Lacked Adequate

          * [9]Red Cross Had Plans for Sheltering Hurricane Victims Under I
          * [10]FEMA Had Not Completed Catastrophic Planning Efforts Prior t
          * [11]Support Agencies Generally Lacked Plans for Providing Assist

     * [12]Victims Expressed Varying Views about Sheltering and Tempora

          * [13]Most Victims Had Similar Immediate Sheltering and Related Ne
          * [14]Victims' Temporary Housing Needs and Their Views of Federal
          * [15]Some Victims Lacked Access to Information on Federal Assista
          * [16]Some Victims Continue to Experience Temporary Housing and Re
          * [17]Strategy Required by Recent Legislation May Address Some Iss

     * [18]Conclusions
     * [19]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [20]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [21]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

          * [22]Disaster Victim Interviews

     * [23]Appendix II: Views of GAO's Expert Group on the Provision of

          * [24]Members of GAO's Expert Group
          * [25]Views of the Group of Experts

               * [26]Federal Roles and Responsibilities
               * [27]Federal Agency Planning for Providing Disaster Housing
                 Assis
               * [28]Immediate Challenges Victims Face in Meeting Their
                 Housing N
               * [29]Longer-Term Challenges Victims Face in Meeting Their
                 Housing

     * [30]Appendix III: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing As
     * [31]Appendix IV: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Ass
     * [32]Appendix V: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assi
     * [33]Appendix VI: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Ass
     * [34]Appendix VII: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing As
     * [35]Appendix VIII: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing A
     * [36]Appendix IX: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Ass
     * [37]Appendix X: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assi
     * [38]Appendix XI: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Ass
     * [39]Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Defense
     * [40]Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of Housing and
     * [41]Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of Treasury
     * [42]Appendix XV: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affair
     * [43]Appendix XVI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

          * [44]GAO Contact
          * [45]Acknowledgments

               * [46]Order by Mail or Phone

Report to Congressional Addressees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

February 2007

DISASTER ASSISTANCE

Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic Disasters

GAO-07-88

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5
Background 9
While ESF-6 Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clear, the National
Response Plan Did Not Fully Reflect Support Agencies' Capabilities 13
The Red Cross and Federal Agencies Generally Lacked Adequate Plans for
Providing Shelter and Temporary Housing to Victims of Catastrophic
Disasters 21
Victims Expressed Varying Views about Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Needs and the Assistance They Received 31
Conclusions 42
Recommendations for Executive Action 43
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 44
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 48
Appendix II Views of GAO's Expert Group on the Provision of Disaster
Housing Assistance by the Federal Government 53
Members of GAO's Expert Group 53
Views of the Group of Experts 53
Appendix III Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 57
Appendix IV Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the American Red Cross 60
Appendix V Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance Provided
by the Department of Agriculture 61
Appendix VI Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of Defense 64
Appendix VII Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by HUD 65
Appendix VIII Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of the Treasury 68
Appendix IX Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs 70
Appendix X Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance Provided
by Freddie Mac 71
Appendix XI Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by Fannie Mae 73
Appendix XII Comments from the Department of Defense 75
Appendix XIII Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development 77
Appendix XIV Comments from the Department of Treasury 80
Appendix XV Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs 83
Appendix XVI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 84

Tables

Table 1: Number of Completed Interviews with Hurricane Katrina Victims 51
Table 2: Self-Reported Demographic Data on Disaster Victims Interviewed 52

Figures

Figure 1: Organizational Structure for Emergency Support Function-6 12
Figure 2: Process for Activating ESF-6's Mass Care and Housing Functions
13

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense DHS Department of Homeland Security ESF
Emergency Support Function FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency HUD
Department of Housing and Urban Development IHP Individuals and Households
Program IRS Internal Revenue Service NRP National Response Plan USDA
Department of Agriculture VA Department of Veterans Affairs

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United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

February 28, 2007

Congressional Addressees:

In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, and
Hurricane Rita struck the same region less than 1 month later. These two
storms destroyed or damaged several hundred thousand homes and displaced
more than a million people from their residences. Federal agencies, the
American National Red Cross (Red Cross), and other organizations provided
emergency shelter and temporary housing for victims of these storms.
However, these storms illustrated the limitations of the nation's
readiness and ability to respond effectively to a catastrophic
disaster--that is, a disaster whose effects almost immediately overwhelm
the response capacities of affected state and local first responders and
require outside action and support from the federal government and other
entities. Congressional and other reports on the federal response to
Hurricane Katrina have identified various failures, including those
related to the federal government's efforts to provide housing assistance
to victims of this storm. In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck
the Gulf Coast, and Hurricane Rita struck the same region less than 1
month later. These two storms destroyed or damaged several hundred
thousand homes and displaced more than a million people from their
residences. Federal agencies, the American National Red Cross (Red Cross),
and other organizations provided emergency shelter and temporary housing
for victims of these storms. However, these storms illustrated the
limitations of the nation's readiness and ability to respond effectively
to a catastrophic disaster--that is, a disaster whose effects almost
immediately overwhelm the response capacities of affected state and local
first responders and require outside action and support from the federal
government and other entities. Congressional and other reports on the
federal response to Hurricane Katrina have identified various failures,
including those related to the federal government's efforts to provide
housing assistance to victims of this storm.

The federal government provides support for emergency shelter and
temporary housing for victims of disasters under several legislative and
executive provisions. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) primarily establishes the programs and
processes for the federal government to provide major disaster and
emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations,
individuals, and others. In addition, the Homeland Security Act of 2002
required that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) consolidate
existing federal government response plans into a single, coordinated
national response plan. In December 2004, DHS issued the National Response
Plan (NRP) to establish a comprehensive approach to domestic incident
management across a spectrum of activities including prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery. The NRP "base plan" describes the
structure and processes for integrating the efforts and resources of
federal, state, local, tribal, private- sector, and The federal government
provides support for emergency shelter and temporary housing for victims
of disasters under several legislative and executive provisions. The
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the
Stafford Act) primarily establishes the programs and processes for the
federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to
states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and others. In
addition, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 required that the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) consolidate existing federal government
response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan. In
December 2004, DHS issued the National Response Plan (NRP) to establish a
comprehensive approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum
of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.
The NRP "base plan" describes the structure and processes for integrating
the efforts and resources of federal, state, local, tribal, private-
sector, and nongovernmental organizations during incidents of national
significance.^1 In addition, the NRP includes 15 Emergency Support
Function (ESF) "annexes" that describe responsibilities for federal
agencies and the Red Cross in specific functional areas. The NRP also
requires each ESF to develop standard operating procedures and
notification protocols and to maintain current rosters and contact
information for the function.^2 Further, the NRP includes a separate
Catastrophic Incident Annex and a more detailed Catastrophic Incident
Supplement that describe additional responsibilities for federal agencies
in the event of a catastrophic incident.^3

ESF-6 addresses the nonmedical mass care, housing, and human services
needs of individuals impacted by incidents of national significance. ESF-6
designates the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the
coordinator for this function. The ESF-6 annex also identifies the Red
Cross as the primary agency for coordinating federal assistance for mass
care (including emergency shelter) and FEMA as the primary agency for
coordinating federal assistance for housing and human services. Further,
ESF-6 identifies several support agencies, such as the Departments of
Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA), as having responsibilities for
providing sheltering or housing assistance. In addition to its
responsibilities as a primary agency under ESF-6, the Red Cross is
expected to provide relief services to the public in the event of a
disaster under the terms of a congressional charter.^4

In light of widespread congressional and public interest in U.S. agencies'
performance in providing assistance to hurricane victims, we prepared this
report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on
his own initiative to review the events and aftermath surrounding
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This report is part of a continued effort to
assist Congress in identifying lessons from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
that can be used to improve federal assistance for victims of future
catastrophic disasters. Specifically, this report examines: (1) the extent
to which the NRP clearly described the responsibilities and capabilities
of the Red Cross and federal agencies for providing shelter and temporary
housing assistance, (2) the extent to which federal agencies and the Red
Cross had operational plans for providing sheltering and housing
assistance in response to such catastrophic disasters, and (3) the
perceptions of victims and others of victims' sheltering and housing needs
and the federal assistance provided after Hurricane Katrina to address
those needs.

^1The NRP defines an incident of national significance as an actual or
potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated and effective
response by an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal,
nongovernmental, and private sector entities in order to save lives,
minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery
and mitigation activities.

^2Throughout this report, unless otherwise noted, our reference to the NRP
includes the base plan, supporting annexes, and standard operating
procedures. The standard operating procedures for ESF-6 were in draft form
at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

^3The more detailed Catastrophic Incident Supplement was in draft form at
the time when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck. DHS issued the final
supplement in August 2006.

^4The Red Cross generally does not provide shelter to people with medical
and/or special needs such as those with physical or mental disabilities.
States and localities generally have responsibility for providing shelter
for these populations.

We included the following federal agencies and other organizations in our
study: DOD, FEMA, HUD, Treasury, USDA, and VA, as well as the Red Cross,
the Federal Home Loan and Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae).^5 To examine the
extent to which the NRP clearly described the responsibilities of federal
agencies and the Red Cross, we reviewed the NRP and its ESF-6 annex along
with relevant federal statutes and regulations pertaining to emergency
shelter and disaster housing assistance. In addition, we obtained
information from each organization about the types of sheltering and
temporary housing assistance they provided following the two hurricanes
and determined the extent to which the assistance was provided under a
responsibility described in the NRP. To examine the extent to which
federal agencies and the Red Cross had operational plans for providing
sheltering and housing assistance in response to catastrophic disasters
such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we analyzed available agency and Red
Cross documents, including policies, plans, and procedures these
organizations had for providing assistance at the time of the disasters.
In addition, we interviewed federal agency and Red Cross officials in
Washington, D.C., about the plans and procedures they used to provide
assistance following the hurricanes. While our focus was on the response
to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we have incorporated information on
relevant steps that the organizations within the scope of our study have
taken since those events. To obtain the perceptions of victims and others
of victims' shelter and housing needs and the federal assistance provided
to address those needs after Hurricane Katrina, we conducted standardized
telephone interviews with a purposeful stratified sample of 38 victims of
Hurricane Katrina.^6 While the results cannot be statistically generalized
to all victims of the storm, they do provide useful insights into the
experiences and needs of victims of this disaster. We also convened a
group of experts on the provision of disaster housing assistance by the
federal government.^7 Finally, to address all of our objectives, we
reviewed relevant literature on disaster housing and recent reports on the
federal response to Hurricane Katrina, including those issued by the
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,^8 the House
of Representatives,^9 the Senate,^10 and the White House.^11 While these
reports addressed a broad range of issues related to the preparedness for
and response to Hurricane Katrina, our report focuses exclusively on
federal assistance for sheltering and for providing temporary housing--the
activities covered by ESF-6.^12 Accordingly, we included a comprehensive
summary of the various types of housing assistance provided by each of the
ESF-6 agencies to the victims of the two hurricanes. These summaries
appear in appendixes III through XI.

^5ESF-6 also mentions the Small Business Administration (SBA) as having
responsibilities for providing housing assistance. We excluded SBA from
this report because GAO is reporting separately on SBA. See GAO, Small
Business Administration: Actions Needed to Provide More Timely Disaster
Assistance, [47]GAO-06-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006) and Small
Business Administration: A Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Agency
Preparedness for Future Disasters, GAO-07-114 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14,
2007).

^6A purposeful stratified sample is used in qualitative data collection to
gather data from individuals who can provide detailed information about
the issues of central importance to the purpose of the study, but which
also uses characteristics to divide the sample into smaller groups with
the purpose of attempting to capture major variations in the issues across
the groups.

^7Appendix II identifies and contains a summary of the views expressed by
the group of experts.

^8Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to
Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006).

^9United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A
Failure of Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).

^10United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.:
May 2006).

^11The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned (Washington, D.C.: February 2006).

^12Although this report focuses on sheltering and housing activities
covered by ESF-6, the federal agencies included in this study also have
responsibilities under other ESF annexes as well. For example, in addition
to having responsibilities under ESF-6, USDA's Forest Service also has
responsibilities under other ESF annexes, such as ESF-1 (Transportation)
and ESF-2 (Communications).

We conducted our work between November 2005 and February 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See
appendix I for a detailed description of our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief

The overall responsibilities of the two ESF-6 primary agencies--the Red
Cross and FEMA--for coordinating federal sheltering and housing assistance
generally were clear under the NRP and related documents. However, the
responsibilities described in the ESF-6 annex for some support agencies
did not fully reflect their capabilities. The NRP clearly described that
the Red Cross is to coordinate federal mass care assistance to support
state and local sheltering efforts. For the most part, the NRP clearly
described FEMA's responsibilities, though neither the ESF-6 annex nor the
draft standard operating procedures fully described the scope of FEMA's
responsibility to work with appropriate private-sector organizations to
maximize use of all available resources, and FEMA experienced challenges
working with Fannie Mae to house victims in over 1,500 properties that
this organization made available.^13 As part of a housing task force, FEMA
is currently exploring ways of incorporating housing assistance offered by
private-sector organizations. Finally, while the ESF-6 support agencies'
responsibilities were generally clearly described in the NRP's ESF-6
annex, the document did not and currently does not fully reflect the
disaster housing capabilities of HUD, USDA, VA, and Treasury. For example,
USDA's Rural Development provided temporary housing for victims of the
disasters, and Treasury acted to make available some vacant rental units
subsidized through a tax program, but the ESF-6 annex did not mention
either of these capabilities. According to FEMA officials, as the only
multiagency all-hazards plan, the NRP (including the annexes) should
enable participating agencies to clearly delineate what assistance other
agencies are capable of providing and to be aware of what might be
expected of them as well, in order to properly plan to provide that
assistance if required. Officials of the support agencies told us that the
ESF-6 annex did not fully reflect their agencies' capabilities in part
because of the limited time to provide input into its development. Also,
Treasury officials believed that the NRP did not need to reflect the
Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) capability to make tax program properties
available to house disaster victims because this measure is taken only
after extraordinary events. Relatedly, none of the support agencies had
developed fact sheets--required by the ESF-6 draft standard operating
procedures--that included their appropriate roles and responsibilities,
notification and activation procedures, and agency-specific authorities.
Support agencies had not prepared the fact sheets because they generally
were not aware of this requirement. The lack of fully reflected support
agency capabilities within the NRP and the lack of information required by
the fact sheets hampered FEMA's ability to provide leadership in
coordinating and integrating overall federal efforts associated with
housing assistance. For example, as noted in the White House's February
2006 report on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA employees'
unfamiliarity with USDA's programs made it difficult to take advantage of
USDA's capabilities for providing temporary housing.

^13Congress established and chartered Fannie Mae, as well as Freddie Mac
(discussed later in the report), as government-sponsored enterprises that
are privately owned and operated. Their mission is to enhance the
availability of mortgage credit by purchasing mortgages from lenders
(banks, thrifts, and mortgage bankers) that use the proceeds to make
additional mortgage loans to home buyers.

The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked operational plans for
providing shelter and temporary housing in response to catastrophic
disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but have taken some steps
to improve their planning. Specifically:

           o To provide disaster relief services to victims of the storms,
           the Red Cross followed a specific response plan for tropical
           storms and hurricanes that it updates annually. However, the Red
           Cross did not anticipate the magnitude of an event like Hurricane
           Katrina. For example, the Red Cross initially planned to open
           shelters in 5 states, and had 306 shelters open or on standby when
           Hurricane Katrina struck, but it ultimately opened more than 1,000
           shelters in 27 states due to the large number of displaced
           victims. The House Select Committee noted that the Red Cross
           experienced many problems in obtaining enough food to satisfy
           client needs. The Red Cross has taken a number of actions intended
           to improve its planning and response for future hurricanes,
           including expanding its warehouse capacity for disaster response
           operations.

           o FEMA had initiated various catastrophic planning efforts, but
           they were incomplete at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
           These efforts included preparing a draft Southeast Louisiana
           Catastrophic Hurricane Plan that outlined the response and
           recovery for a major hurricane that would flood New Orleans and
           the surrounding parishes; however, this and other planning efforts
           were incomplete when the storms struck. FEMA was overwhelmed by
           the large number of people displaced by the storms, and it
           experienced difficulties that not only delayed providing housing
           assistance to some victims but also increased the potential for
           fraud, waste, and abuse. FEMA officials told us that the agency
           has taken steps to better plan for providing housing assistance.
           For example, in July 2006, FEMA issued a high-level strategy for
           providing sheltering and housing assistance in support of a
           presidentially declared emergency or major disaster involving a
           mass evacuation. FEMA intends to develop more detailed policies to
           support this strategy. However, these policies were not completed
           as of January 2007.

           o The NRP requires support agencies named in ESF annexes to
           develop supplemental plans and procedures for carrying out
           assigned responsibilities. However, due to the lack of preexisting
           operational plans detailing how the support agencies would provide
           disaster housing assistance--including plans for meeting their
           ESF-6 responsibilities--some agencies had to work out details or
           improvise in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and
           this affected the timeliness with which some victims were provided
           with temporary housing. For example, VA worked with FEMA for
           months after the storms in order to make vacant properties from
           its programs available to disaster victims. In contrast,
           Treasury's IRS and DOD's Army Corp of Engineers each had a
           document that addressed meeting its responsibilities under ESF-6.
           HUD, USDA, and VA officials told us that in an attempt to improve
           their operational plans for providing housing assistance under
           ESF-6, the agencies formed an informal working group since
           Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to work out certain procedural details
           for providing housing assistance, including developing better
           means of communicating and sharing information, to avoid the need
           to do so after a disaster event. However, the informal working
           group is not intended to address the full range of each of these
           agencies' responsibilities under ESF-6, and does not have a
           specific timetable for its activities.

           According to victims, experts, and others we spoke with, the
           shelter and housing needs of victims and the perceptions of the
           federal assistance provided to meet these needs varied. For
           example, most victims needed shelter, food, water, and other
           necessities in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, but many
           perceived that the assistance provided fell short. In particular,
           many shelters were not prepared to accommodate the large number of
           victims who were displaced and were not prepared to provide
           assistance over an extended period of time. In most cases, victims
           with a need for temporary housing in the weeks and months that
           followed were eligible for some form of federal disaster housing
           assistance, such as rental assistance or travel trailers from FEMA
           or rental assistance from HUD. The specific needs of victims,
           however, and their perceptions of the assistance that was provided
           varied. Often those needs depended, at least in part, on victims'
           own circumstances, such as where they were located after the
           storm, whether they were homeowners or renters, and whether they
           had special needs. Victims we contacted expressed both positive
           and negative perceptions of the temporary housing assistance they
           received. For example, victims perceived that rental assistance
           generally was helpful in meeting their housing needs because it
           allowed them to find a place to live and pay the rent while they
           "got back on their feet," but some noted that the process of
           having to recertify their eligibility for FEMA's rental assistance
           every 3 months left them uncertain about whether they would
           continue to receive aid. Similarly, some victims who received a
           travel trailer that was located on their property said that it
           enabled them to remain in close proximity to their home during
           repairs. But other victims who had travel trailers placed on their
           property indicated that the units were too small for the number of
           family members needing housing. Further, our interviews with
           victims, as well as our group of experts, indicated that temporary
           housing needs include not just shelter, but also access to medical
           facilities, public transportation, schools, employment
           opportunities, and other social services--and, particularly for
           those displaced to distant locations, information about all of
           these things. Many victims needed but did not always get access to
           reliable and accurate information about the assistance they were
           eligible to receive and help locating temporary housing. FEMA has
           initiated development of the national disaster housing strategy
           mandated by Public Law 109-295 (October 4, 2006), which is to
           address a number of these issues, including housing populations
           with special needs, clustering temporary housing near appropriate
           services, and providing information about eligibility for
           assistance.

           To help ensure that FEMA, as the designated primary agency for
           housing and as the overall coordinator for ESF-6, can effectively
           coordinate federal assistance in providing temporary housing for
           victims of future disasters, we are recommending that (1) HUD,
           Treasury, USDA, and VA propose revisions needed to ensure that the
           NRP fully reflects their capabilities for providing temporary
           housing assistance under ESF-6 and (2) Defense, HUD, Treasury,
           USDA, and VA develop fact sheets as required by the ESF-6 standard
           operating procedures. To help ensure that ESF-6 support agencies
           are prepared to help expeditiously house victims of future
           disasters, we are recommending that HUD, USDA, and VA develop
           operational plans detailing how they will meet their housing
           responsibilities under ESF-6.

           We provided a draft of this report to the American Red Cross and
           the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security,
           Housing and Urban Development, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs. The
           Red Cross did not provide comments. Defense, HUD, Treasury, and VA
           concurred with our recommendations; these agencies' comments are
           discussed later in the report and are reproduced in appendixes XII
           through XV. USDA responded that it will continue to develop its
           capabilities, fact sheets, and operational plans in order to meet
           ESF-6 responsibilities, as we recommended. DHS, along with HUD,
           Treasury, and VA, provided technical comments, which we
           incorporated into the report as appropriate. In addition, we
           provided relevant segments of this report to Fannie Mae and
           Freddie Mac and incorporated technical comments from these
           organizations where appropriate.
			  
			  Background

           Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast region in late August
           2005, causing approximately $81 billion in estimated property
           damage and over 1,500 deaths.^14 Hurricane Katrina caused
           extensive damage and significant loss of life in Louisiana and
           Mississippi, but damage from this disaster also extended into
           Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, ultimately covering approximately
           90,000 square miles. Hurricane Katrina was also the most expensive
           disaster in history, devastating far more residential property and
           completely destroying or making uninhabitable an estimated 300,000
           homes. Hurricane Rita made landfall near the Texas and Louisiana
           border in late September 2005, causing approximately $10 billion
           in estimated property damage. Hurricane Rita created a wide swath
           of damage from Alabama to eastern Texas and caused flooding in
           some areas of Louisiana that had seen flooding from Hurricane
           Katrina about a month earlier. Hurricane Rita severely damaged or
           destroyed more than 23,600 housing units in Southwest Louisiana
           and Southeast Texas. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita displaced more
           than 1 million people from their residences. According to the Red
           Cross, 8 months following the disasters more than 750,000 persons
           remained displaced across all 50 states.^15
			  
			  The National Response Plan

           DHS issued the NRP in December 2004, intending for it to be an
           all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single,
           comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents
           where federal involvement is necessary. Major federal government
           agencies and the Red Cross are signatories to the plan. The NRP is
           designed on the premise that local jurisdictions generally handle
           disaster response. In the vast majority of disasters, local
           emergency personnel, such as police, fire, public health, and
           emergency management personnel, act as first responders and
           identify needed resources to aid the community. Local
           jurisdictions can also call on state resources to provide
           additional assistance. If an incident is of such severity that it
           is deemed an incident of national significance, DHS and FEMA--an
           agency within DHS--coordinate with other federal agencies to
           provide the affected state and local governments with additional
           resources and supplemental assistance. In these instances, state
           and local governments can request federal assistance for needed
           items. The Secretary of Homeland Security declared Hurricane
           Katrina an incident of national significance on August 30, 2005.
           This was the first time the federal government used the NRP in
           response to an incident of national significance.

           In addition to outlining the organizational structure used to
           respond to disasters, the NRP includes (1) 15 Emergency Support
           Function annexes that serve as the coordination mechanism to
           provide assistance to state, local, and tribal governments or to
           federal departments and agencies conducting missions of primary
           federal responsibility; (2) 9 Support Annexes that describe the
           framework through which federal departments and agencies; state,
           local, and tribal entities; the private sector; volunteer
           organizations; and nongovernmental organizations such as the Red
           Cross will coordinate and execute common functional processes and
           administrative requirements; and (3) 7 Incident Annexes that
           address contingency or hazard situations requiring specialized
           application of the NRP. For example, the Private-Sector
           Coordination Support Annex describes the policies,
           responsibilities, and concept of operations for federal incident
           management activities involving the private sector during actual
           or potential incidents of national significance. In addition, the
           Catastrophic Incident Annex establishes the context and
           overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an
           accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic
           incident.
			  
			  Emergency Support Function-6

           ESF-6, which is particularly relevant to sheltering victims and
           providing temporary housing assistance, creates a working group of
           key federal agencies and voluntary organizations to coordinate
           federal assistance in support of state and local efforts. The
           efforts are aimed at providing:

           o mass care, including sheltering, feeding, and emergency first
           aid;

           o housing, both short and long term; and

           o human services, such as counseling, processing of benefits, and
           identifying support for persons with special needs.

           ESF-6 designates a "primary" agency for each of these three areas.
           FEMA has two roles under ESF-6: it serves as both the overall
           ESF-6 coordinator and the primary agency for both housing and for
           human services (fig. 1). As ESF-6 coordinator, FEMA oversees the
           implementation of ESF-6 and ensures overall coordination among
           mass care, housing, and human services. As the primary agency for
           housing and human services, FEMA coordinates federal efforts to
           provide these services to the victims of disasters. The Red Cross
           is designated under ESF-6 as the primary agency for mass care,
           which includes sheltering, feeding, and the provision of emergency
           first aid. In this capacity, the Red Cross coordinates federal
           mass care assistance in support of state and local mass care
           efforts. Since 1905, the Red Cross also has had a congressional
           charter, requiring the organization to provide volunteer
           humanitarian assistance to the armed forces, serve as a medium of
           communication between the people of the United States and the
           armed forces, and provided disaster prevention and relief
           services.

^14Preliminary estimate as reported by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration in August 2006.

^15The number of displaced persons includes those impacted by Hurricane
Wilma, which struck the United States in October 2005.

Figure 1: Organizational Structure for Emergency Support Function-6

Figure 2 illustrates the process for activating ESF-6's mass care and
housing areas in response to an incident of national significance. The
FEMA Operations Center activates ESF-6 and notifies the primary agencies.
The primary agencies--Red Cross and FEMA--then deploy staff to the
designated ESF-6 location. The primary agencies also notify and request
assistance from support agencies. ESF-6 support agencies are expected to
conduct operations, when requested by DHS or the designated ESF primary
agency, using their own authorities, subject-matter experts, capabilities,
or resources.

Figure 2: Process for Activating ESF-6's Mass Care and Housing Functions

While ESF-6 Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clear, the National
Response Plan Did Not Fully Reflect Support Agencies' Capabilities

The responsibilities of the two ESF-6 primary agencies for mass care and
housing--the Red Cross and FEMA--generally were clearly described in the
NRP. However, under its role as the primary agency for housing, FEMA's
responsibility for working with private-sector organizations was less
clearly described in the NRP, and FEMA experienced challenges working with
a private-sector organization to make housing units available to victims
of the disasters. In general, the NRP clearly described the
responsibilities for ESF-6 support agencies, but the plan did not fully
reflect all of these agencies' capabilities for providing housing
assistance in part because of the limited time agencies had to provide
input into its development. As a result, FEMA's ability to provide
leadership in coordinating and integrating overall federal efforts
associated with housing assistance was limited.

The Red Cross's and FEMA's Responsibilities Under ESF-6 Were Generally Clear

The Red Cross's responsibilities as the primary agency for mass care
(which includes sheltering) under ESF-6 were clearly described in the NRP.
For example, the ESF-6 annex to the NRP clearly states that the Red Cross
is to coordinate federal mass care assistance in support of state and
local mass care efforts. In addition, the more detailed ESF-6 standard
operating procedures in effect at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
clearly described additional Red Cross primary agency responsibilities,
such as assisting with the identification and coordination of (1)
nonmedical mass care services for sheltering and feeding operations, (2)
emergency first aid at designated sites, and (3) bulk distribution of
emergency relief items during incidents of national significance. To
fulfill its responsibilities, the Red Cross--after receiving requests from
state or local governments for federal resources to help meet sheltering
or other mass care needs--identifies resources to meet the needs or calls
FEMA to meet the needs. The Red Cross's responsibilities as the primary
agency for mass care under ESF-6 also included mass care reporting--that
is, providing to FEMA sheltering, feeding, and other mass care
information.

FEMA's responsibilities as the primary agency for housing under ESF-6 were
also generally clear. For example, the ESF-6 annex notes that FEMA is to
provide leadership in coordinating and integrating overall federal efforts
associated with housing services. In addition, the more detailed draft
ESF-6 standard operating procedures state that FEMA is to (1) assist with
the data collection of housing resources potentially available within
proximity of the impacted area, (2) coordinate temporary housing resources
needed to support sheltering shortfall, and (3) address the short-term and
long-term disaster related housing needs of victims during incidents of
national significance. Further, the introduction to the NRP's emergency
support function annexes states that any primary agency named in the plan
is to notify and request assistance from designated support agencies,
manage mission assignments,^16 coordinate with appropriate state agencies,
and work with appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize the use
of all available resources.

^16A mission assignment is a FEMA request to another federal agency to
provide a specific service. FEMA uses mission assignments to support
federal operations in a major disaster or emergency declaration under the
Stafford Act. It orders immediate, short-term emergency response
assistance when an applicable State or local government is overwhelmed by
the event and lacks the capability to perform, or contract for, the
necessary work.

While their responsibilities under the NRP were generally clear, the Red
Cross and FEMA disagreed about the operational role of the ESF-6
coordinator--a FEMA official with overall responsibility for leading
efforts to coordinate federal mass care, housing, and human services
assistance--as we reported in June 2006.^17 The Red Cross maintained that
the ESF-6 standard operating procedures in effect at the time permitted it
to take requests for FEMA assistance directly to the Operations Section
Chief--a FEMA official responsible for coordinating operational support to
incident management efforts. Specifically, the procedures stated that the
Red Cross would "not be precluded" from taking priorities directly to the
Operations Section Chief. However, following Hurricane Katrina, FEMA
instructed the Red Cross to direct these requests through the ESF-6
coordinator, who would pass the requests to the Operations Section Chief.
Red Cross officials told us that it complied with this procedure, but that
this added time to the process. In our June 2006 report, we recommended
that the Secretary of DHS direct FEMA to work with the Interim President
and Chief Executive Officer of the Red Cross as soon as possible on the
operating procedures they would both use in an incident of national
significance. FEMA and the Red Cross have worked to clarify their
understanding of the role of the ESF-6 coordinator. For example, FEMA
issued revised ESF-6 operating procedures in September 2006. The revised
procedures state that it is not envisioned that the ESF-6 coordinator will
have a direct operational role during response activities. During our work
for this current review, FEMA and Red Cross officials told us that both
organizations now agree that the Red Cross can take requests for FEMA
assistance to the Human Services Branch Chief for referral directly to the
Operations Section Chief. As a result, this should clarify both
organizations' understanding regarding the role of the ESF-6 coordinator
and the process for requesting FEMA assistance under ESF-6.

The DHS Inspector General's March 2006 report on the response to Hurricane
Katrina also suggested that the scope of the Red Cross's mass care
reporting activities might not have been mutually clear to both the Red
Cross and FEMA.^18 According to the report, a senior Red Cross official
said that it was responsible for coordinating and reporting only on the
Red Cross' own mass care operations, while FEMA was relying on the Red
Cross to coordinate and report on non-Red Cross mass care operations as
well. The Inspector General recommended that FEMA establish an ESF-6
working group to define the explicit roles and responsibilities for each
agency, develop standard operating procedures, and implement a
concept-of-operations plan for response activities that address all levels
of disasters. Red Cross officials told us that, notwithstanding the
official's statement in the Inspector General's report, the Red Cross was
clearly responsible under ESF-6 for reporting to FEMA on both Red Cross
and non-Red Cross sheltering operations, and that the organization relies
on state and local officials to supply some of this information. However,
Red Cross officials also told us that, following Hurricane Katrina, it was
unable to obtain complete information from some state and local officials.
FEMA officials told us that it had to gather information on its own
regarding some non-Red Cross shelter locations in response to the storm.

^17GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red
Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season, [48]GAO-06-712
(Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006).

^18Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, A Performance Review
of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina,
OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).

Further, the NRP did not clearly describe the scope of FEMA's
responsibility to, or delineate how the agency would, work with
appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize the use of all
available housing resources for incidents of national significance. During
our review, we found that Fannie Mae approached FEMA in September 2005
with an offer to make some 1,500 of its properties available for
temporarily housing victims of the disasters. Because FEMA and Fannie Mae
had no prior working relationship, the organizations initially experienced
operational challenges regarding the leasing of these units. For example,
FEMA officials told us that Fannie Mae did not have a mechanism in place
for accepting calls from disaster victims that FEMA referred to the
organization. Also, according to Fannie Mae officials, it expected that
FEMA would be responsible for managing its offered housing units. However,
because FEMA did not have this capability, Fannie Mae had to develop a
mechanism for managing the units through its network of brokers. According
to Fannie Mae officials, structuring a brand new process for these
operational issues created some delays in providing benefits to disaster
victims. FEMA and Fannie Mae eventually did reach an agreement for placing
disaster victims in Fannie Mae-owned housing units, and disaster victims
began occupying these properties in October 2005.

Freddie Mac also offered assistance to victims of the disasters, placing
more than 1,000 families in temporary housing, including properties from
its own inventory. However, Freddie Mac provided this assistance through
nonprofit organizations rather than coordinating through FEMA. Freddie Mac
officials noted that it would have been difficult for FEMA to have been
involved in this effort in the absence of a previous relationship or
specific plans for coordination. According to FEMA officials, the agency
is assessing whether to develop agreements with private-sector
organizations as part of the agency's housing task force. The agreements
would outline processes for utilizing housing resources offered by these
organizations during catastrophic disasters.

ESF-6 Support Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clear, but Their
Capabilities Were Not Fully Reflected in the NRP

The ESF-6 annex clearly described responsibilities for support agencies,
but the annex did not fully reflect the housing-related capabilities of
these agencies. According to a FEMA official, the NRP (including the
annexes) should enable participating agencies to clearly delineate what
assistance other agencies are capable of providing and to be aware of what
might be expected of them as well, in order to properly plan to provide
that assistance if required. Further, as we have previously testified, in
the event of a catastrophic disaster, leadership roles, responsibilities,
and lines of authority for the response at all levels must be clearly
defined and effectively communicated in order to facilitate rapid and
effective decision making.^19

With the exception of DOD, each of the support agencies in our study
described to us assistance that they provided to victims of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita that was not reflected in the NRP. Specifically:

           o Department of Agriculture--The ESF-6 annex clearly described
           that USDA's Forest Service is to provide available departmental
           resources (e.g., cots, blankets, sleeping bags, personnel) for
           shelters. However, USDA's Rural Development also provided
           temporary housing for victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in
           multifamily units financed by the department and in its inventory
           of single-family properties, but the ESF-6 annex did not reflect
           these capabilities.^20 In addition, USDA provided other forms of
           housing assistance that the ESF-6 annex did not reflect, including
           (1) rental assistance to low-income disaster victims, in the form
           of a subsidy to help cover their rent and (2) requests to holders
           of program mortgages to provide temporary moratoriums on payments
           and to exercise forbearance (i.e., refrain from foreclosures) for
           program borrowers in the affected areas. While temporary
           suspensions of mortgage payments and foreclosures are not, in
           themselves, forms of temporary housing, they can help make it
           financially possible for homeowners to rent alternative housing
           until their homes can be reoccupied.

           o Department of Housing and Urban Development--The ESF-6 annex
           clearly described that HUD is to provide information on available
           housing units owned or in HUD possession for use as emergency
           shelters and temporary housing and utilize available HUD staff
           when needed to assist with mass care and housing operations.
           However, HUD provided other forms of housing-related assistance in
           response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that the ESF-6 annex did
           not reflect. For example, HUD waived certain requirements in its
           existing grant programs to assist disaster victims with
           rehabilitating or purchasing a residence. Also, similar to USDA,
           HUD asked lenders to adopt temporary payment moratoriums and to
           exercise forbearance for victims with HUD-insured mortgages. In
           addition, FEMA tasked HUD through a mission assignment to create a
           housing voucher program for disaster victims who, prior to the
           disaster, were served by HUD's rental assistance programs or were
           homeless.^21

           o Department of Treasury--The ESF-6 annex clearly described that
           IRS is to distribute disaster kits containing tax forms and
           publications to help victims determine the amount of a casualty
           loss deduction for destroyed property. However, in response to
           Hurricane Katrina, IRS also provided housing-related assistance
           that the ESF-6 annex did not reflect. For example, IRS, at the
           request of governors of the affected states, temporarily suspended
           the income limits that normally restrict eligibility for certain
           low-income housing tax credit projects in order to allow displaced
           individuals to occupy vacant low-income units.^22 IRS also offered
           tax relief under the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005. For
           example, IRS permitted taxpayers who provided housing in their
           main homes to individuals displaced by Hurricane Katrina to claim
           additional exemptions of $500 per displaced person (up to $2,000)
           in 2005 or 2006.

           o Department of Veterans Affairs--The ESF-6 annex clearly
           described that VA is to provide available facilities suitable for
           mass shelter and develop and maintain plans to make VA-owned
           housing assets available for use by disaster victims. However,
           VA--like USDA and HUD--also provided mortgage assistance by asking
           the holders of program mortgages to offer temporary moratoriums on
           payments and to exercise forbearance for borrowers in the affected
           areas, but the ESF-6 annex did not reflect this capability.

           Appendixes III through XI contain a more detailed listing of the
           shelter, temporary housing, and other types of housing assistance
           that the Red Cross, FEMA, ESF-6 support agencies, and other
           organizations provided in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

           The introduction to the NRP states that the purpose of the plan,
           among other things, is to describe the capabilities and resources
           and establish responsibilities to help protect the nation from
           natural and other hazards. If such capabilities change over time,
           any department or agency with assigned responsibilities may
           propose a change to the plan. In addition, the NRP states that DHS
           and FEMA are responsible for the ongoing management and
           maintenance of the plan, including coordinating all proposed
           modifications with primary and support agencies and other
           stakeholders and issuing an official notice of change for all
           approved modifications.^23

           The ESF-6 annex did not fully reflect support agency capabilities
           for several reasons. For example, during the period in which DHS
           was developing the NRP--essentially, between February 2003 and
           December 2004--some ESF-6 support agency officials told us that
           there was a limited amount of time to provide input into the
           development of the annex. In addition, a FEMA official told us
           that many of the support agency responsibilities under the ESF-6
           annex were simply carried over from the Federal Response Plan, a
           previous plan for disaster management, with very few revisions,
           even though the scope of ESF-6 expanded under the NRP to include
           housing and human services (in contrast, under the Federal
           Response Plan, ESF-6 covered mass care activities only). Further,
           a Treasury official told us that DHS described ESF-6 to them as
           being more related to first responders and caring for basic human
           needs, so Treasury decided that it would have very little to
           offer. However, Treasury officials stated that they did not
           believe it was necessary to include certain agency capabilities
           under ESF-6. For example, these officials indicated that it was
           not appropriate for ESF-6 to reflect the IRS's capability to
           temporarily waive income limitations for subsidized rental units
           because this action was not required for every presidential
           disaster declaration. Finally, a USDA official told us that the
           agency provided housing-related responsibilities to a centralized
           office within USDA for inclusion in ESF-6, but these
           responsibilities were not incorporated into the final document.

           While the NRP calls for fully reflecting support agencies'
           capabilities, the ESF-6 draft standard operating procedures in
           effect at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita also required
           each support agency to develop a fact sheet with appropriate roles
           and responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and
           agency-specific authorities; and to review the fact sheet annually
           in order to keep it up to date. However, none of the ESF-6 support
           agencies had developed the fact sheets, and most support agency
           officials we spoke with were not aware of this requirement.

           The lack of fully reflected support agency capabilities within the
           NRP and the lack of information required by the fact sheets
           hampered the ability of FEMA to provide leadership in coordinating
           and integrating overall federal efforts associated with this
           assistance. For example, FEMA was not aware in many cases of
           housing assistance that ESF-6 support agencies could provide that
           was not reflected in the NRP. As noted in the White House's report
           on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, USDA had
           capabilities for providing temporary housing but had difficulty
           getting FEMA to take advantage of those capabilities because some
           FEMA employees were unfamiliar with USDA programs. Having USDA's
           full capabilities reflected in the ESF-6 annex or having access to
           a fact sheet about the agency's capabilities and programs might
           have helped to avoid this problem.

           Recent legislation (Public Law 109-295, October 4, 2006) requires
           FEMA, in consultation with other federal agencies, state and local
           governments, and the Red Cross, to develop and provide a national
           disaster housing strategy within 270 days. The legislation
           requires that the strategy, among other things, (1) identify the
           most efficient and cost-effective federal programs for meeting the
           short-term and long-term housing needs of individuals affected by
           a major disaster, and (2) clearly define the role, programs,
           authorities, and responsibilities of each entity involved in
           providing that assistance, including FEMA, HUD, USDA, VA, and any
           other relevant federal agency. However, the legislation does not
           specify the relationship of the strategy to the existing NRP and
           its ESF-6 annex. According to FEMA, a stakeholders group planned
           to begin work on the strategy in mid-February 2007, and the
           initial report from the group was due to Congress on July 4, 2007.

           According to FEMA officials responsible for coordinating housing
           assistance under ESF-6, notwithstanding the strategy required by
           the legislation, the NRP should fully reflect the capabilities of
           the ESF-6 support agencies with disaster housing responsibilities.
           The ESF-6 unit leader also confirmed that the fact sheets required
           by the ESF-6 standard operating procedures are important because
           support agencies must clearly define for the primary agencies what
           types of housing assistance they can provide in response to a
           disaster. In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA stated
           that the agency is working with ESF-6 partner agencies to rewrite
           the ESF-6 annex as part of full revision of the NRP. FEMA also
           stated that the ESF-6 standard operating procedures are being
           revised in partnership with the support agencies and that the
           revised procedures would include fact sheets developed to describe
           support agency disaster programs.
			  
			  The Red Cross and Federal Agencies Generally Lacked Adequate Plans
			  for Providing Shelter and Temporary Housing to Victims of
			  Catastrophic Disasters

           The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked adequate plans
           for providing shelter and temporary housing to victims of
           catastrophic disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For
           example, the Red Cross followed its existing planning documents
           but had difficulty providing relief services because of the
           magnitude of destruction and the significant number of displaced
           residents. FEMA's catastrophic planning efforts were incomplete at
           the time of the disasters, and as a result the agency was
           overwhelmed by the large number of people displaced by the
           disaster. In addition, some of the steps that FEMA took in
           response to the storms increased the potential for fraud, waste,
           and abuse. Both the Red Cross and FEMA have taken steps since the
           storms to better plan for their response to future catastrophic
           disasters. Finally, ESF-6 support agencies generally had not
           developed specific operational plans for meeting their
           housing-related responsibilities at the time of Hurricanes Katrina
           and Rita. Agency officials whom we spoke with said that they
           relied on existing statutory authorities and other agreements to
           provide assistance to victims of the disasters. However, the lack
           of preexisting operational plans detailing how the support
           agencies would provide disaster housing assistance meant that the
           agencies had to work out details or improvise in the aftermath of
           Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and this affected the timeliness with
           which some victims were provided with temporary housing.
			  
			  Red Cross Had Plans for Sheltering Hurricane Victims Under Its
			  Congressional Charter, but Has Taken Steps to Expand Capacity for
			  Large, Catastrophic Events

           In addition to its responsibilities as the primary agency for mass
           care under ESF-6, the Red Cross is expected to provide disaster
           relief services under its congressional charter.^24 According to
           the Red Cross, it has frequently executed a specific response plan
           for tropical storms and hurricanes because these events pose a
           recurring threat to a substantial number of individuals in the
           United States. This plan, which is updated annually, outlines the
           systematic approach that the Red Cross will take to prepare for
           and respond to hurricanes, including pre- and postlandfall
           activities. Further, the plan calls for the Red Cross to initiate
           an anticipated service delivery plan before a hurricane makes
           landfall, including recommended resource allocations, locations
           for service centers, aid stations, and long-term shelters. For
           Hurricane Katrina, Red Cross officials told us that it initially
           planned to open shelters in five states and had 306 shelters open
           or on standby when the storm made landfall.

           However, Red Cross officials told us that the organization did not
           anticipate the magnitude of the destruction of Hurricane Katrina
           or the number of residents who would be displaced. As the extent
           of the damage became clear, the Red Cross faced several challenges
           providing relief services to victims impacted by the storm. These
           included:

           o The need for long-term shelter--Many individuals displaced by
           the storms--particularly those in New Orleans--faced not being
           able to return to their residence for weeks or months. Red Cross
           officials noted that during most disasters, victims were generally
           able to return to their residences within 48 hours following the
           event. After Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross had to develop a
           national strategy to provide assistance to the large number of
           individuals who required longer-term shelter, and it ultimately
           opened more than 1,000 shelters in 27 states. Complicating matters
           was a shortage of trained managers to operate such a large number
           of shelters for extended time periods.

           o Supply shortages--The May 2006 Senate Report on Hurricane
           Katrina noted that many shelter residents found conditions quite
           difficult because of shortages of food and water and sanitation
           problems. The report concluded that the Red Cross's planning
           needed to be more detailed for such a catastrophic disaster,
           during which residents typically need longer-term shelter.^25
           Similarly, the House Select Committee in its report on Hurricane
           Katrina noted that the Red Cross did not have a logistics capacity
           sophisticated enough to deal with a catastrophic disaster the size
           of Katrina, especially with regard to food service, as the
           organization had many problems simply getting enough food to
           satisfy victims' needs.^26 Officials at one local Red Cross
           chapter told us that they had prepositioned supplies to support
           Red Cross shelters for 3 days but that the supplies were stretched
           for 7 days to support both Red Cross and non-Red Cross shelters.
           These officials also told us that they experienced challenges
           transporting supplies to shelters because of damage to the
           roadways.

           According to Red Cross officials, on August 28, 2005--the day
           before Hurricane Katrina made landfall in New Orleans--FEMA,
           anticipating the activation of ESF-6, contacted the Red Cross and
           asked for its estimates of the sheltering needs expected from the
           storm. The officials said that early on the morning of August 29,
           2005, they provided estimates of resources that would be needed,
           including kitchen supplies, meals, and personnel. The officials
           noted that they based these estimates on assumptions contained in
           the Catastrophic Incident Annex--that is, up to 300,000 victims
           needing sheltering assistance for an extended period of time.
           However, Red Cross officials told us that later that day, at
           FEMA's request, they reduced the estimates but still did not
           ultimately receive all of the items requested.

           o The need for stronger relationships with partners--The Red Cross
           reported that their experiences in responding to Hurricane Katrina
           highlighted the fact that the organization had not developed
           strong and enduring local partner relationships in certain
           sections of hurricane-prone states. As a result, the Red Cross did
           not react consistently when opportunities to cooperate with new
           partners surfaced. For example, a Red Cross headquarters official
           told us that the organization did not clearly communicate what
           community-based sheltering partners could expect of the Red Cross.
           Although the Red Cross provided substantial resources to
           community-based shelters, this official acknowledged that
           coordination with and support of Red Cross sheltering partners
           could be improved.

           Since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Red Cross has taken a
           number of actions intended to improve its planning and response
           during future hurricane seasons. The June 2006 report that
           outlined these actions focused primarily on the disaster relief
           services that the Red Cross provides, but it also identified
           actions that the organization planned to take regarding its role
           at the federal level.^27 These actions included (1) hiring Red
           Cross employees in key risk states to work with state emergency
           management to better prepare at-risk communities for disasters;
           (2) working with appropriate federal agencies to clarify roles and
           expectations, in particular the Red Cross's role under the NRP as
           primary agency for coordinating federal mass care resources to
           support state and local governments; and (3) creating a nationwide
           shelter database with FEMA.

           The Red Cross also has acted to enhance its ability to respond to
           large-scale events. For example, the organization:

           o launched a national pilot program to proactively recruit and
           train corporate employees as local disaster response volunteers
           and partnered with a nonprofit service that matches potential
           volunteers with community service organizations via the Internet;

           o increased its prepositioned supply inventory to support shelters
           for up to 500,000 people and 1 million meals per day;

           o expanded its warehouse capacity for disaster response operations
           to more than 1.3 million square feet in over 30 locations in 24
           states and territories; and

           o developed basic written agreements that will establish roles,
           responsibilities, and the general parameters for service delivery
           for local entities that wish to be service providers during major
           disasters.
			  
			  FEMA Had Not Completed Catastrophic Planning Efforts Prior to
			  Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and Faced Challenges in Providing
			  Temporary Housing

           Although FEMA had initiated various catastrophic planning efforts
           prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, those efforts were
           incomplete at the time of the disasters. For example, in 2004 FEMA
           sponsored a disaster exercise called "Hurricane Pam." The purpose
           of this exercise was to develop a response and recovery plan
           specifically for a major hurricane that would flood New Orleans
           and the surrounding parishes and identify any deficiencies in
           current capabilities. In addition to widespread flooding, the
           exercise included extensive evacuations and the resulting need to
           shelter thousands of individuals left homeless after the storm.
           From the Hurricane Pam exercise, FEMA produced a draft Southeast
           Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan and also made efforts to
           finalize agreements with hospital and university officials to
           create temporary medical operation staging areas around the state.
           However, by the time of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA had not yet
           finalized plans for evacuating those with special needs or for
           providing postlandfall care. Also, in early 2005 FEMA issued a
           draft strategy for catastrophic incident planning that was
           intended to establish a comprehensive set of goals and objectives
           for fiscal years 2005 to 2009 and to prioritize
           capability-building initiatives to meet the challenges posed by an
           incident of catastrophic magnitude. However, this strategy was not
           finalized or distributed.

           In the absence of completed plans for catastrophic events, FEMA's
           efforts to provide temporary housing to victims of Hurricanes
           Katrina and Rita were overwhelmed, and it faced several challenges
           in providing temporary housing to victims of the storms. Red Cross
           officials told us that the organization kept some shelters open
           for up to 4 months after Hurricane Katrina because FEMA was not
           able to transition victims to temporary housing assistance more
           quickly. For example, FEMA experienced difficulties in making
           available travel trailers to disaster victims.^28 According to the
           House report on the response to Hurricane Katrina, the nation's
           manufacturing capacity was about 6,000 trailers per month at the
           time of the storm, limiting how quickly FEMA could obtain travel
           trailers and make them available to disaster victims. Further,
           DHS's Inspector General reported in March 2006 that FEMA had
           difficulty identifying acceptable sites for the travel trailers
           and manufactured homes and was slow in identifying applicants to
           occupy these units.

           FEMA also experienced difficulties utilizing the program housing
           units made available by three support agencies--HUD, USDA, and VA.
           In addition to its inventory of single-family properties, USDA
           identified vacant units in multifamily properties that it
           financed. These agencies made properties available to FEMA for
           victims of the storms, but FEMA had difficulty utilizing them for
           several reasons:

           o FEMA officials told us that many of the housing units offered to
           disaster victims needed repairs, and it did not have a means of
           assuring that the repairs were made. As discussed later in this
           report, VA--in response to Hurricane Katrina--sought to enter into
           an interagency agreement with FEMA under which VA's Veterans
           Benefits Housing Fund would be reimbursed for repairs needed to
           make its available housing units habitable for disaster victims.
           According to VA officials, the two organizations could not come to
           an agreement because of FEMA's budgetary constraints.

           o FEMA officials also told us that some of the offered properties
           were located in rural areas that were not central to public
           transportation or medical services desired by disaster victims.

           o FEMA also encountered difficulties verifying that housing units
           offered by the support agencies were indeed available. According
           to FEMA officials, such verification was very important when
           placing victims in temporary housing, as it did not want to refer
           victims to housing units that were no longer available. FEMA
           officials told us that the support agency housing databases it
           relied on to determine the availability of housing units were not
           always kept up to date.

           o FEMA officials told us that because each of these entities had
           its own rules, regulations, and authorities that affected the
           conditions under which the properties could be made available, it
           was difficult to coordinate and match disaster victims with
           properties. According to the officials, during the aftermath of
           the disasters FEMA worked on developing a document to facilitate
           its understanding of each organization's authorities related to
           leasing housing units to disaster victims, but the agency never
           finalized the document.

           In part because plans for catastrophic events had not been
           completed, some of the steps FEMA took in response to Hurricanes
           Katrina and Rita increased the potential for fraud, waste, and
           abuse. For example:

           o DHS's Inspector General testified in February 2006 that FEMA
           might have purchased more manufactured homes and modular homes
           than it needed. According to the Inspector General, FEMA purchased
           24,967 manufactured homes at a cost of $857.8 million and 1,295
           modular homes at a cost of $40 million. However, because FEMA
           regulations prohibited using mobile homes in flood plains, some of
           these homes and the manufactured homes and modular homes could not
           be used where they were most needed (i.e., in parts of Louisiana
           and Mississippi). FEMA also paid to store and maintain the
           unoccupied units, and the Inspector General testified that more
           than 10,000 manufactured homes at one site were improperly stored
           without adequate support, causing the units to sink in the mud and
           their frames to bend.

           o As we testified in February 2006, the need to provide assistance
           quickly led FEMA to implement expedited assistance with limited
           controls to verify eligibility for the initial expedited
           assistance payments.^29 We also reported in September 2006 that
           the unprecedented challenges posed by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
           exposed FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) to fraud
           and abuse.^30 We estimated that, as of February 2006, 16 percent,
           or approximately $1 billion, in FEMA IHP payments were improper
           and potentially fraudulent because of invalid application data
           such as Social Security Numbers and addresses.^31 Further, we
           testified in December 2006 that FEMA continued to lose tens of
           millions of dollars through potentially improper and/or fraudulent
           payments from both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.^32

           o Because FEMA was unable to immediately implement IHP assistance
           (under section 408 of the Stafford Act) that would provide funds
           to move victims from short-term lodging--including shelters,
           hotels and motels--to longer-term housing alternatives such as
           mobile homes and apartments, the agency used public assistance
           funds. Normally, FEMA uses public assistance funds (authorized
           under section 403 of the Stafford Act) only for immediate
           emergency sheltering efforts. FEMA officials said if the agency
           had followed its normal practice of using IHP assistance, the
           program's rules would have left many applicants waiting months for
           assistance. Under the IHP program, each applicant's damaged
           dwelling must be inspected before FEMA provides any assistance.
           However, the DHS Inspector General reported in March 2006 that the
           use of public assistance funds was problematic for two reasons.
           First, FEMA did not know whether those it housed were actually
           eligible for assistance as a direct result of the disaster, and
           second, using this type of assistance increased the potential for
           duplication with other assistance programs.^33

           To address the difficulties FEMA encountered in providing
           temporary housing to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the
           agency formed a joint housing solutions group to identify
           manufactured housing options for disaster operations. The group's
           goal is to help identify situation-appropriate manufactured or
           other housing options for disasters. FEMA also convened a housing
           task force, which began meeting in summer 2006. The task force had
           two goals: to resolve procedural problems encountered in response
           to the hurricanes, and to establish better working relationships
           with other housing providers. As of January 2007, the housing task
           force had not released any findings or taken any actions.

           FEMA has taken other steps to improve its plans for providing
           temporary housing assistance for large-scale disasters. For
           example:

           o In July 2006, FEMA issued a high-level strategy for providing
           sheltering and housing assistance in support of a presidentially
           declared emergency or major disaster involving a mass evacuation.
           FEMA intends to develop more detailed policies to support this
           strategy. However, these policies were not completed as of January
           2007.

           As previously noted, the ESF-6 annex did not reflect the
           capabilities of USDA's Rural Housing Service to provide temporary
           housing to victims of disasters.

           o In December 2006, FEMA awarded grants totaling up to $388
           million to states in the Gulf region to develop alternatives to
           FEMA travel trailers and mobile homes under its Alternative
           Housing Pilot Program.
			  
			  Support Agencies Generally Lacked Plans for Providing Assistance
			  in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

           The NRP requires federal agencies to develop supplemental plans
           and procedures for carrying out the responsibilities assigned in
           the ESF annexes. As we have previously testified, the NRP base
           plan and its supporting catastrophic incident annex need to be
           supported and supplemented by more detailed and robust operational
           implementation plans that further define any capabilities that
           might be needed in a catastrophic disaster.^34 More detailed
           planning would provide greater visibility and understanding of the
           types of support that support agencies could be expected to
           provide following a catastrophic event, including the types of
           assistance and capabilities that might be provided and what might
           be done proactively and in response to specific requests.

           The ESF-6 support agencies generally had not developed specific
           operational plans for the housing assistance they provided in
           response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, whether or not the
           agencies' capabilities for providing the assistance were
           specifically reflected in the NRP. Rather, officials from the
           ESF-6 support agencies told us that they generally worked out the
           procedures for providing the assistance after the hurricanes
           struck, relying on preexisting statutory authorities or
           interagency agreements or, in some cases, acting in response to
           FEMA mission assignments or legislation enacted after the storms.
           For example:

           o HUD officials noted that the department relied primarily on
           existing statutory authorities to expedite the delivery of
           assistance in disaster situations. However, it was not until after
           Hurricane Katrina struck that HUD and FEMA entered into an
           interagency agreement--on September 12, 2005--that defined how HUD
           would make its properties available to victims. As noted above, in
           response to a FEMA mission assignment after Hurricane Katrina, HUD
           also created a housing voucher program to house disaster victims
           who were previously assisted by HUD or were homeless.

           o USDA officials told us that the department relied on existing
           statutory authorities to provide housing-related assistance in
           disaster situations. As previously noted, the ESF-6 annex did not
           reflect the capabilities of USDA's Rural Development to provide
           temporary housing to victims of disasters. However, the department
           had a preexisting 1982 memorandum of understanding that outlined
           the terms under which FEMA might utilize housing units owned by
           USDA to provide temporary housing to victims of disasters. USDA
           officials told us that the department followed this memorandum in
           response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita but did not locate any
           single-family properties that qualified under the terms of the
           memorandum.

           o VA officials said that, while they had a memorandum of
           understanding with FEMA--outlining the working relationship with
           respect to disaster preparedness and relief activities after a
           major disaster or emergency--dating back to 1982, after Hurricane
           Katrina they attempted a new interagency agreement similar to the
           one between FEMA and HUD. However, according to the officials,
           FEMA and VA could not reach an agreement, primarily because of
           differences over the reimbursement of property expenses to VA's
           Veterans Benefits Housing Fund. FEMA and VA ultimately revised the
           1982 memorandum in December 2005.

           In contrast, Treasury's IRS, while also relying on existing
           statutory authorities, had a preexisting reference tool that
           identified specific actions that IRS will take to provide tax
           relief in response to disasters or other significant emergencies,
           and the officials and functional organizations responsible for
           carrying out these actions. As noted previously, one of IRS's
           responsibilities specifically described in ESF-6 is to help
           victims determine the amount of a casualty loss deduction for
           destroyed property. While encompassing a wider range of
           activities, IRS's reference tool does address the responsibilities
           described in ESF-6 annex. Similarly, DOD's Army Corp of Engineers
           had procedures in place detailing how the agency would provide
           temporary roofing for minimally damaged homes.

           Due to the lack of preexisting operational plans detailing how the
           support agencies would provide disaster housing
           assistance--including plans for meeting their ESF-6
           responsibilities--the agencies had to work out details or
           improvise in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and
           this affected the timeliness with which some victims were provided
           with temporary housing. For example, VA's attempt to develop a new
           interagency agreement--before ultimately revising an existing
           memorandum of understanding with FEMA--delayed the availability of
           VA properties for disaster victims until several months after the
           storms. VA made 600 properties available for rent in 11 states in
           January 2006. HUD, USDA, and VA officials told us that, in an
           attempt to improve their operational plans for providing housing
           assistance under ESF-6, they formed an informal working group
           since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to work out certain procedural
           details, including developing better means of communicating and
           sharing information. The USDA official involved in this effort
           noted the practical importance of working out such operational
           details before a disaster strikes in order to avoid the need to do
           so following the event. However, the informal working group is not
           intended to address the full range of each of these agencies'
           responsibilities under ESF-6, and as of January 2007 does not have
           a specific timetable for its activities.
			  
			  Victims Expressed Varying Views about Sheltering and Temporary
			  Housing Needs and the Assistance They Received

           According to victims, experts, and others we spoke with, the
           sheltering and housing needs of victims and the perceptions of the
           federal assistance provided to meet these needs varied. For
           example, most victims needed shelter, food, water, and other
           necessities in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, but many
           perceived that the assistance provided fell short of meeting these
           needs. Over the weeks and months following the hurricane, many
           victims developed a need for temporary housing while they made
           arrangements to have their homes repaired or other plans to
           recover from the disaster. In most cases, victims with a need for
           temporary housing were eligible for some form of federal disaster
           housing assistance, such as from FEMA or HUD. However, victims
           expressed both positive and negative perceptions of the temporary
           housing assistance they received. Furthermore, many victims
           needed, but did not always receive, access to reliable and
           accurate information about the assistance they were eligible to
           receive and help locating temporary housing. More than a year
           after the hurricane, some people continue to have temporary
           housing needs, including some of the most vulnerable
           individuals--the elderly, persons with disabilities, and those
           from the most devastated areas. The recent amendments to the
           Stafford Act call for provisions in the mandated disaster housing
           strategy that appear to address a number of the issues that
           victims and others raised regarding the assistance provided after
           Hurricane Katrina.
			  
			  Most Victims Had Similar Immediate Sheltering and Related Needs,
			  but Some Victimsâ Needs Were Not Met

           According to current and former Gulf Coast residents affected by
           Hurricane Katrina, experts, and others we spoke with, immediately
           before and after the hurricane made landfall many victims needed
           shelter, food, water, and clothing. Some victims, such as those
           who voluntarily evacuated before the storm made landfall, sought
           shelter in a variety of locations, including the homes of family
           and friends, hotels, and shelters operated by the Red Cross and
           others. Many other victims, including those without
           transportation, those with special needs such as the disabled and
           the elderly, and those who would not abandon their homes or pets,
           ended up in shelters of last resort such as the Louisiana
           Superdome.^35 Regardless of where victims took shelter, however,
           those providing it generally were unprepared for the number of
           people needing help or the length of time they would have to
           remain and did not have adequate resources to help all of them.

           Many victims we spoke with did not feel that their immediate
           sheltering and related needs were met for a number of reasons.
           According to victims and others we spoke with, regardless of the
           type or provider of shelter--family, Red Cross or church shelters,
           or a hotel--conditions were generally overcrowded and
           uncomfortable, and supplies were lacking. For example, many
           victims we spoke with evacuated from their homes with limited
           supplies of food and water and just the clothes on their back. One
           victim we spoke with said that she evacuated from Mississippi and
           went to stay with family, taking with her just a suitcase with
           some clothing and some canned food. Another victim told us that
           when she and her family evacuated, they only brought enough
           clothing for 3 days. While some shelters had supplies on hand to
           assist evacuees, resources were strained because they generally
           did not anticipate the number of victims who were seeking shelter
           or the length of time people would need shelter. For example, Red
           Cross officials told us that they only planned to operate shelters
           for 7-10 days in 5 states following Hurricane Katrina, but as
           noted previously, some shelters were open for up to 4 months, and
           the organization's operations covered 27 states. As noted
           previously, Red Cross officials told us that they kept shelters
           open for this long because FEMA was not able to transition victims
           to temporary housing assistance more quickly.

           Victims whose circumstances made it impossible for them to
           evacuate prior to the storm or who chose not to evacuate were
           probably even less likely to feel their immediate sheltering needs
           were met than those who evacuated prior to the storm. Many of
           these victims ended up at shelters of last resort such as the
           Louisiana Superdome. These shelters were overcrowded and lacked an
           adequate amount of supplies. One victim we spoke with who was
           evacuated to the New Orleans Convention Center after the storm
           said that she needed food, water, and clothing and that the
           Convention Center had none of these items. Further, some victims
           avoided centralized shelter due to concerns about safety. For
           example, one victim we spoke with said that her family chose to
           crowd 15 people into a small house rather than go to a shelter
           because they had heard that the shelters were unsafe.

           Although members of our group of experts suggested that victims
           should be presented with a range of choices about where to
           relocate, some of the victims were evacuated without knowing where
           they would end up--for example buses and flights were diverted en
           route to new destinations. One victim with whom we spoke said that
           the Navy evacuated him from an apartment building in New Orleans a
           week after the storm and put him on a plane to Washington, D.C.,
           but that he was not told where he was headed until the plane had
           taken off. Another victim we spoke with who was evacuated from the
           New Orleans Convention Center said the U.S. Army flew her from the
           Convention Center to Austin, Texas even though she had not asked
           to go there. She was in Austin at a shelter for 5 more days before
           being flown to Georgia, where she had family. Other victims said
           they were given a choice about where to go. For example, one
           victim said when the Army Corps of Engineers came to evacuate her
           from Xavier University where she had taken shelter, she was able
           request that she be sent to Fort Worth, Texas, because she had
           family there.

           Some of those who could not evacuate ahead of time were special
           needs populations, especially the elderly and persons with
           disabilities. As we previously reported, state and local
           governments have primary responsibility for evacuating these
           populations, but state and local governments in the areas affected
           by Hurricane Katrina likely faced challenges in transporting many
           special needs residents out of the disaster area due to legal and
           social barriers and other factors.^36 Further, many shelters were
           not prepared to accept special needs persons, such as those with
           physical or mental disabilities, in part because the Red Cross
           typically leaves sheltering of those with special needs to the
           state and local government. As a result, at the time Hurricane
           Katrina made landfall, some special needs individuals ended up in
           shelters that were not prepared to meet their needs. For instance,
           one elderly victim we spoke with said that she was at the New
           Orleans Convention Center in poor conditions for more than 5 days
           before being evacuated out of the city, and added that she did not
           feel safe or secure while she was there. Eventually, many of those
           in the mass shelters in New Orleans were evacuated to cities such
           as Houston and Atlanta where they were provided shelter while
           awaiting temporary housing.
			  
			  Victimsâ Temporary Housing Needs and Their Views of Federal
			  Assistance Varied with Circumstances

           In the weeks and months following the hurricane, the housing needs
           of many Gulf Coast residents evolved as they assessed storm
           damage, and many realized that they would not be able to return
           home immediately. In general, most victims were eligible for at
           least some form of temporary federal disaster housing assistance,
           such as rental assistance or travel trailers from FEMA or--if
           prior to the disaster they were among those in HUD's rental
           assistance programs or were homeless--housing vouchers from HUD.
           The specific needs of victims, however, and their perceptions of
           the assistance that was provided varied and depended, at least in
           part, on victims' own circumstances such as their postdisaster
           location relative to their predisaster home, whether they were
           homeowners or renters, and if they had special needs. More
           specifically:

           o Postdisaster location--We found that victims' temporary housing
           needs were often closely related to their postdisaster location.
           In particular, many victims we spoke with either evacuated to or
           were transported to other cities to find shelter from the
           devastation. Because in many cases the extent of damage made
           immediately returning to their predisaster homes uncertain or
           unlikely, these victims needed access to some form of temporary
           rental housing while they assessed their options and made plans
           for returning home and repairing their residence or living
           somewhere else. However, victims and experts that we spoke with
           emphasized that temporary housing needs included not only shelter,
           but also proximity to schools, grocery stores, jobs, and other
           necessities. As discussed below, for those who found themselves in
           new locations away from their predisaster homes, this meant a need
           for information about both available housing and services.

           In contrast, for a variety of reasons, some victims we spoke with
           preferred and were able to remain in or near their predisaster
           communities after the hurricanes and needed temporary housing that
           could accommodate their circumstances, particularly if they could
           not quickly reoccupy their predisaster home. In light of the
           shortage of available rental housing in the Gulf Coast area after
           the hurricanes, travel trailers were one of the few options
           available for victims who wanted to remain near their predisaster
           residences or communities.

           o Homeownership status--In some cases, homeowners and renters had
           different needs for temporary housing. For example, some
           homeowners who could not reoccupy their predisaster homes
           expressed a need for temporary housing that allowed them to be in
           close proximity, so that they could monitor repair or
           reconstruction and interact with insurance companies and
           contractors. In some of these cases, FEMA was able to place travel
           trailers directly on victims' property to address this need.
           Because renters had little influence over the repair or
           reconstruction of the apartment units they resided in prior to the
           hurricanes, they generally needed temporary housing assistance
           until they could make decisions about whether to remain in, or
           return to, their predisaster locations or to reestablish
           themselves in another area altogether. This generally came in the
           form of rental assistance--either cash from FEMA or vouchers from
           HUD. In cases where renters desired to remain in the disaster
           area, some were able to obtain FEMA travel trailers, which were
           generally placed on either FEMA-operated or privately operated
           group sites.

           o Special needs populations--The elderly and those with
           disabilities that we spoke with expressed a need for temporary
           housing that could accommodate their special needs. For example,
           those who were mobility impaired needed housing that was
           wheelchair accessible, while those who were elderly expressed a
           need to be close to family and medical providers. Access to
           transportation was another need mentioned to us by elderly and
           disabled victims; those with specials needs said without access to
           transportation, they had difficulty finding temporary housing. One
           disabled victim we spoke with said that it would have been helpful
           to her to have received transportation assistance to look for
           housing since she uses a wheelchair, while another disabled victim
           said that she received help from the Red Cross which transported
           her around to find housing.

           Members of our group of experts noted that special needs
           populations are often overlooked in planning for disaster housing
           assistance. These experts and others said that disaster assistance
           often does not accommodate the needs of special populations such
           as the elderly, homeless, those with mental and physical
           disabilities, and residents of domestic violence shelters. For
           instance, the elderly or disabled may need to be placed in ground
           floor units to facilitate wheelchair access. Additionally, these
           populations may face related needs that cannot be addressed by
           temporary housing alone.

           Victims expressed both positive and negative perceptions of the
           temporary housing assistance they received, whether in the form or
           rental assistance or a travel trailer. In general, victims who
           received rental assistance perceived that it was helpful in
           meeting their housing needs because it allowed them to find a
           place to live and pay the rent while they "got back on their
           feet." One victim said having rental assistance allowed her to
           keep her sanity because she knew she had a place to live and her
           kids were in a good school. However, some recipients, such as
           those who received FEMA rental assistance, said that the process
           of having to recertify their eligibility for the program every 3
           months left them uncertain about whether they would continue to
           receive the assistance. The uncertainty made it difficult for
           victims to know what their long-term housing plans would be, as
           they did not know when their rental assistance would be cut off or
           what they would do about their housing after that. For example,
           one victim said that her plans for the future were uncertain
           because she did not know when the rental assistance would expire.
           One elderly victim we spoke with said that she does not think
           that, once the assistance ends, she will be able to afford her new
           apartment, even though she would like to stay there.

           Victims we spoke with who received temporary housing assistance
           through HUD said that the disaster voucher program (DVP) generally
           met their housing needs. For example, some of these individuals
           said that the local housing authority in their new cities assisted
           them in finding housing, making things easier for them. Others
           said that not having to pay rent allowed them to use their
           earnings for other necessities such as car payments or furniture
           and also allowed them to look for work without having to worry
           about how the rent would be paid.^37 HUD officials we spoke with
           in the field also said that in their opinion, the disaster voucher
           meets the needs of the people it was intended to serve; however,
           they noted that it depended on the needs of the individual and the
           willingness of the displaced family to move elsewhere to find
           housing.

           As with rental assistance, perceptions of those who received
           travel trailers were also mixed. Some of the victims we spoke with
           who were in trailers on their property said that the trailers were
           helpful. For example, one victim from Mississippi whom we spoke
           with said the trailer was wonderful because it provided her with
           privacy, and another said that her trailer met her needs because
           it provided shelter. Another victim from Alabama said that her
           family received a FEMA trailer and that they were able to live in
           it until they could repair and move back into their home. Although
           some of these victims said that they had difficulty finding
           contractors and that as a result, the rebuilding process was slow,
           they also said that they had made progress and that the trailer
           had met their temporary housing needs. Other homeowners did not
           perceive the trailers as meeting their temporary housing needs.
           Some victims we spoke with waited months to receive trailers, only
           to find that the trailers were too small for their families. One
           victim we spoke with needed a trailer for his family of five but
           received a trailer that could house only two people. This victim
           said that he ended up not using the trailer because it was too
           small, the hot water never worked, and it had a bad odor that made
           his eyes burn. Other victims we spoke with who received trailers
           from FEMA also felt the trailers were uninhabitable. One victim
           who was in the military said that she and her family spent only a
           few days in the trailer they received because it leaked badly and
           had mildew. She said that someone from FEMA had checked on these
           problems but that they were never fixed. Ultimately she chose to
           live on the Air National Guard base where her unit was
           headquartered.

           Perceptions of travel trailers located on group sites were
           generally less positive than those of trailers placed on private
           property. Experts noted that trailer sites may not provide ready
           access to facilities like grocery stores, laundry facilities, or
           playgrounds that are necessary for daily living. We found that
           victims sometimes did not like group sites for these reasons. One
           victim we spoke with said that he did not like living in the group
           site, as it was too far from the doctors that he needed to see. He
           was eventually able to get another trailer in another group site
           that better met his needs. Another victim we spoke with said that
           FEMA wanted to locate her to a group site but she refused and
           insisted that the trailer be put on her property so that her
           children could remain in their school and not have to relocate to
           another community.
			  
			  Some Victims Lacked Access to Information on Federal Assistance
			  and Help Finding Temporary Housing

           Many victims we spoke with were grateful for the temporary housing
           assistance they received after the disaster some, however,
           regardless of where they lived or their other circumstances, said
           that they needed better access to accurate and reliable
           information about the housing assistance available. Because of
           sustained disruption to normal modes of communication (such as
           newspapers, television, telephone, and radio) following the
           hurricane, many victims found it difficult to register for
           assistance. In some cases, this may have hindered victims' efforts
           to receive temporary housing assistance. However, while many
           victims we spoke with said that once they got through on the phone
           registering with FEMA was relatively easy, some said that the
           information they received after they registered was confusing and
           sometimes conflicting. These victims told us that when they
           followed up with FEMA to find out about the assistance they
           qualified for, their questions were not answered or they received
           inconsistent answers from different employees. For example, one
           victim we spoke with received two letters from FEMA on the same
           day--one stating that she was eligible for rental assistance and
           one stating that she was ineligible for assistance. This person
           did not want to use the rental assistance because she feared that
           FEMA would eventually ask that it be returned.

           Some victims we spoke with also said that they could have used
           assistance in finding temporary housing. When asked what the
           government or others could have done to make finding housing
           easier for them, many victims we spoke with said that they needed
           assistance with finding a new place to live and help becoming
           familiar with new surroundings. Some of those we interviewed said
           they did not receive this assistance. Some of those we spoke with
           were able to rely on family and friends to get help in finding
           housing in a new city and others just navigated through the
           process themselves. One former resident of New Orleans that we
           spoke with said that her home was destroyed after Hurricane
           Katrina and she needed help find housing in Texas, where she had
           been moved. This victim used apartment-finding guides to help her
           locate available housing. Another victim we spoke with who ended
           up in Texas also said that she needed help getting oriented to her
           new surroundings, such as finding housing that was in close
           proximity to good schools for her children, stores, and the post
           office. This victim said that since she wasn't familiar with the
           area, she eventually relied on a realtor to help her find housing
           that met her needs.

           In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA noted that it had
           initiated a contract to evaluate applicant communications in order
           to develop a strategic communications plan. FEMA said that the
           first phase of the study--target audience interviews--had been
           completed and that the second phase of the contract would provide
           strategies for improving and enhancing applicant communications,
           with an emphasis on reaching diverse audiences, including those
           with limited English speaking ability.
			  
			  Some Victims Continue to Experience Temporary Housing and Related
			  Needs More than a Year after the Hurricanes

           More than a year after Hurricane Katrina, some victims--including
           those from the hardest hit areas, the elderly, and the
           disabled--still have temporary housing and related needs. However,
           the circumstances of those who continue to receive temporary
           housing assistance vary. For example:

           o Some of those receiving this assistance are homeowners who are
           still waiting for settlements from their insurance company. One
           homeowner from New Orleans told us that she had great difficulty
           getting in touch with her insurance company and was still waiting
           for a settlement as of July 2006. In the meantime, she is relying
           on rental assistance from FEMA but worries her lease will expire
           before her house is repaired.

           o Many renters from the hardest-hit areas also face uncertainty
           because much of the rental housing stock was destroyed and may not
           be replaced. One renter from New Orleans said her landlord is
           repairing the home she was renting, but she does not know if it
           will be done before her FEMA rental assistance runs out.

           o Some victims we spoke with expressed concern over their ability
           to become self-sufficient once their federal housing assistance
           expires. Some want to work but are having difficulty finding
           employment. One victim said that if the federal assistance was
           going to run out after 18 months, she thought it would be helpful
           if the government could help people find jobs so they could become
           self-sufficient.

           o Some elderly and disabled who were displaced also continue to
           face difficulty meeting their housing and related needs. Although
           some of these populations had special needs before the hurricanes,
           in some cases the stress of the disasters exacerbated their
           situations. For example, one disabled victim we spoke with said
           her health has worsened since the storm, and she does not have
           medical benefits. She wants to work but needs to find something
           she can do from home due to her disability. Another disabled
           victim told us that her health made it difficult for her to climb
           stairs but that she was living in a second-floor apartment because
           that was all she could find. FEMA officials told us that after
           Hurricane Katrina they tried to work closely with other agencies
           that offered social services to ensure that these special needs
           populations were receiving the services they needed, but
           acknowledged that some needs had gone unmet.

           Victims who receive temporary housing assistance from FEMA are
           eligible to receive this assistance generally for up to 18 months
           after the date of the disaster declaration (i.e., until the end of
           February 2007 for victims of Hurricane Katrina). FEMA may extend
           the assistance beyond the 18-month period if it determines that
           due to extraordinary circumstances an extension would be in the
           public interest. According to some experts and housing advocates,
           18 months of housing assistance is not long enough to help some of
           the victims of the disaster, and that ending federal assistance
           could lead to a larger number of homeless families. Experts also
           agreed that some victims have needs that extend beyond housing
           assistance and that addressing such needs requires a case
           management approach such as linking housing assistance with jobs,
           child care, and education. Recently, FEMA announced that it
           extended temporary housing assistance for some victims of
           Hurricane Katrina for an additional 6 months--until August 31,
           2007. It is uncertain what will happen to those who continue to
           need housing assistance beyond this date.

           According to HUD, as of November 2006, approximately 23,800
           families were still receiving temporary housing assistance under
           DVP. By definition, those continuing to receive DVP are primarily
           those who, prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, resided in
           HUD-assisted units or public housing that was damaged or
           destroyed, or were homeless. It is uncertain when or whether many
           of these units will be repaired or replaced. In the meantime, DVP
           is set to expire in September 2007. HUD recently issued proposed
           guidance explaining options available to those who will still be
           receiving DVP assistance when the program expires. For example,
           HUD proposed that a family that was living in public housing prior
           to the hurricanes may choose to return to their predisaster unit
           if it is available. If the family chooses not to return, it may
           live in the DVP unit until the DVP assistance ends; if the
           pre-disaster unit is unavailable for reoccupancy, the family may
           receive another project-based unit or a special public housing
           voucher may be made available.^38 HUD proposed that families who
           were receiving tenant-based vouchers prior to the disaster may
           find new units in the predisaster location, or, if choosing not to
           return to the predisaster location, may receive DVP assistance
           until it ends, at which time they will receive a regular voucher
           under HUD's nondisaster voucher program.
			  
			  Strategy Required by Recent Legislation May Address Some Issues
			  Identified by Victims

           In requiring FEMA, working with other agencies, to prepare a
           national disaster housing strategy, Public Law 109-295 in October
           2006 addressed several issues raised during our interviews with
           victims and experts. For example:

           o Need for temporary housing that enables access to services--The
           legislation directs FEMA, in developing the national disaster
           housing strategy, to include plans for the operation of "clusters"
           of housing provided to individuals and households, including
           access to public services, site management, and security. As
           previously discussed, this strategy was under development at the
           time of this review.

           o Need for assistance in finding housing as well as social
           services--The legislation authorizes the President to provide case
           management services, when needed, to state or local government
           agencies or qualified private organizations to provide such
           services to victims. According to FEMA, this new authority does
           not apply to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. However, FEMA
           told us that victims of the hurricanes who needed case management
           were able to receive assistance from Katrina Aid Today--a
           consortium of social service and voluntary organizations.^39

           o Need for those with disabilities or other special
           populations--The legislation provides that the national disaster
           housing strategy describe programs directed to meet the needs of
           special needs and low-income populations, and to ensure that a
           sufficient number of housing units are provided for individuals
           with disabilities.

           o Need for accurate and timely information for victims about what
           they are eligible for and how to obtain it--The legislation
           requires FEMA to develop guidance to be issued to the public
           following a disaster on the types of housing assistance available,
           eligibility for such assistance, and the application procedures.
			  
^19GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, [56]GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 8, 2006).

^20Like HUD and VA, USDA may at any given time have an inventory of vacant
homes, commonly referred to as "real estate-owned" or REO properties. This
inventory results from defaults in the agencies' mortgage loan and loan
guarantee programs.

^21HUD administers a variety of rental assistance programs, including
public housing; project-based Section 8 rental assistance; programs for
the elderly and persons with disabilities; and housing choice vouchers,
which are used by recipients to rent privately owned units.

^22Administered by IRS and state agencies, the Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit Program provides developers of and investors in eligible affordable
housing developments a dollar-for-dollar reduction in their federal taxes.
These tax credits are available for projects in which (1) at least 20
percent of units are both rent restricted and rented to households with
incomes of 50 percent or less than the area median income, or (2) at least
40 percent of units are both rent restricted and rented to households with
incomes of 60 percent or less than the area median income.

^23DHS is also responsible for coordinating full reviews and updates of
the NRP every 4 years, or more frequently if the Secretary of DHS deems
necessary. The review and update will consider lessons learned and best
practices identified during exercises and responses to actual events.

^24The detailed supplement to the NRP's Catastrophic Incident Annex notes
that the responsibilities assigned to the Red Cross as a primary agency
under ESF-6 do not supersede the organization's responsibilities under its
congressional charter.

^25United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, (Washington, D.C.:
May 2006).

^26United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A
Failure of Initiative, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).

^27American Red Cross, From Challenge to Action: American Red Cross
Actions to Improve and Enhance Its Disaster Response and Related
Capabilities for the 2006 Hurricane Season and Beyond (June 2006).

^28Mobile homes and travel trailers (also referred to as "direct"
temporary housing assistance) are one of five types of financial
assistance that FEMA may provide under the Individuals and Households
Program. The other four include financial assistance to rent alternative
housing accommodations, existing rental units, manufactured housing,
recreational vehicles, or other readily fabricated dwellings; repair
owner-occupied private residences, utilities, and residential
infrastructure; replace owner-occupied private residences; and construct
permanent housing in insular and other remote areas where no alternative
housing resources are available and other forms of authorized temporary
housing assistance are unavailable, infeasible, or not cost effective.

^29GAO, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
FEMA's Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and
Abuse, [57]GAO-06-403T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2006).

^30IHP provides temporary housing or financial assistance to eligible
victims. See GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges
Exposed the Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions
Needed to Reduce Such Problems in the Future, [58]GAO-06-1013 (Washington,
D.C.: Sep. 27, 2006).

^31The 95 percent confidence interval associated with our estimate of
improper and potentially fraudulent registrations ranges from a low of
$600 million to a high of $1.4 billion in improper and potentially
fraudulent payments.

^32GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, [59]GAO-07-252T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2006).

^33OIG-06-32.

^34 [60]GAO-06-442T .

^35The Louisiana State Emergency Operation Plan identifies a shelter of
last resort as a place for persons to be protected from the high winds and
heavy rains of the storm. Unlike other shelters, there may be little or no
water or food and possibly no utilities.

^36See GAO, Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to
Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations,
[61]GAO-07-44 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2006).

^37Under DVP, voucher recipients were not required to make any
contribution toward their rental units' costs for the first 18 months that
the recipients received assistance, after which they were expected to
contribute 30 percent of their adjusted incomes.

^38Under the Disaster Voucher Program, funding must be obligated by
September 30, 2007, unless expressly renewed or extended by law.

^39Katrina Aid Today is sponsored by FEMA using donations from the
international community, and is administered by the humanitarian
development agency of the United Methodist Church. According to FEMA,
Katrina Aid Today assists victims in identifying sources of support,
developing personal recovery plans, and acquiring access to services
needed to rebuild their lives.
			  
			  Conclusions

           While the sheltering and temporary housing responsibilities of the
           Red Cross and FEMA generally were clearly defined under the
           National Response Plan, the lack of fully reflected capabilities
           for ESF-6 support agencies, excepting DOD, hampered FEMA's ability
           to effectively fulfill its primary agency role of coordinating
           sheltering and temporary housing assistance to victims of
           catastrophic disasters. For example, the ESF-6 annex did not
           reflect USDA's capability to provide victims of Hurricanes Katrina
           and Rita with temporary housing in multifamily units that it
           subsidizes. Similarly, the ESF-6 annex did not reflect Treasury's
           ability to help make available vacant units in Low-Income Housing
           Tax Credit properties. Although these agencies provided needed
           housing assistance in response to the disaster, by fully
           reflecting their capabilities under ESF-6 and by updating them as
           needed, FEMA, as the designated primary agency for housing and as
           the overall coordinator for ESF-6, would be better able to
           effectively coordinate federal resources to provide temporary
           housing in support of state and local efforts for victims of
           future disasters. In this regard, FEMA would also have benefited
           if the ESF-6 support agencies had developed--as required by the
           draft standard operating procedures in effect at the time of
           Hurricanes Katrina and Rita--the fact sheets outlining appropriate
           roles and responsibilities, notification and activation
           procedures, and agency specific authorities pertaining to their
           disaster housing responsibilities. Similarly, more specifically
           defining FEMA's primary agency role to work with private-sector
           organizations would help ensure the agency's ability to make
           effective and expeditious use of housing resources offered by
           organizations such as Fannie Mae. FEMA is currently exploring ways
           of working with private sector organizations as part of its
           ongoing disaster housing task force.

           The extent of operational planning for providing sheltering and
           temporary housing varied among the Red Cross, FEMA, and the ESF-6
           support agencies, but generally their plans were not adequate to
           deal with the needs created by catastrophic disasters on the scale
           of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Red Cross had to significantly
           exceed the parameters of its hurricane and tropical storm
           plan--which it was able to do, despite experiencing operational
           challenges--and as a result it has taken a number of steps
           designed to enhance its capacity to respond to large, catastrophic
           events. FEMA had initiated catastrophic event planning, but its
           efforts were not complete at the time Hurricane Katrina struck. In
           August 2006, DHS finalized the National Response Plan's
           Catastrophic Incident Supplement, which describes additional
           responsibilities for federal agencies in the event of a
           catastrophic incident. The ESF-6 support agencies covered by our
           review provided a variety of assistance, but all excepting
           Treasury and DOD lacked specific operational plans, which
           inhibited the timeliness of placing some victims in temporary
           housing. For example, both HUD and VA entered into agreements with
           FEMA detailing conditions for use of their properties--but not
           until after the hurricanes struck. Just as it is important for the
           support agencies' capabilities to be reflected in the NRP, so that
           each agency and FEMA can be aware of options for housing disaster
           victims, the support agencies need operational plans for effecting
           those capabilities. Although HUD, USDA, and VA are working to
           develop an agreement to improve the coordination among the three
           agencies, developing operational plans for carrying out their
           ESF-6 responsibilities would help ensure that the support agencies
           are better prepared to help expeditiously house victims of future
           disasters and help avoid the need to improvise after disasters
           occur. The working group is not intended to produce operational
           details for all of these agencies responsibilities under ESF-6.

           Our interviews with victims of Hurricanes Katrina, experts, and
           with officials involved in assisting them, as well as our review
           of reports by others on the federal response to these disasters,
           suggest that the federal government could improve the temporary
           housing assistance it provides in response to disasters by
           recognizing the broader needs of victims. These include the need
           for access to medical facilities, public transportation, schools,
           employment opportunities, and other social services--and,
           particularly for those displaced to distant locations--information
           about all of these things. The national disaster housing strategy
           called for by recent legislation provides an opportunity to more
           comprehensively plan for temporary housing assistance, with
           specific provisions related to special-needs populations, access
           to a range of services, and meeting victims' need for accurate
           information. The legislation also authorized the provision of
           additional case management services to victims of disasters.
           Although FEMA recently extended temporary assistance for some
           victims until August 2007, some of these victims may continue to
           need temporary housing assistance beyond this period.
			  
			  Recommendations for Executive Action

           To help ensure that FEMA, as the designated primary agency for
           housing and as the overall coordinator for ESF-6, can effectively
           coordinate federal assistance in providing temporary housing for
           victims of future disasters, we recommend that:

           o The Secretaries of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development,
           Treasury, and Veterans Affairs propose revisions as needed to
           ensure that the NRP fully reflects their respective agencies'
           capabilities for providing temporary housing assistance under
           ESF-6; and
           o The Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban
           Development, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs develop fact sheets
           outlining appropriate roles and responsibilities, notification and
           activation procedures, and agency specific authorities pertaining
           to their disaster housing capabilities, as required by the ESF-6
           standard operating procedures.

           To help ensure that ESF-6 support agencies are prepared to help
           expeditiously house victims of future disasters, we recommend that
           the Secretaries of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development, and
           Veterans Affairs develop operational plans that provide details on
           how their respective agencies will meet their temporary housing
           responsibilities under ESF-6.
			  
			  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

           We provided the American Red Cross and the Departments of
           Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban
           Development, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs with a draft of this
           report for their review and comment. We received written comments
           from Defense, HUD, Treasury, and VA, each of which concurred with
           our recommendations. These comments are summarized below and
           reprinted in appendixes XII through XV. The Red Cross did not
           provide comments on the draft report. USDA responded that it will
           continue to develop its capabilities, fact sheets, and operational
           plans in order to meet ESF-6 responsibilities, as we recommended.
           DHS, HUD, Treasury, and VA also provided technical comments, which
           we incorporated into the report as appropriate. We also provided
           relevant segments of this report to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and
           incorporated technical comments from these organizations where
           appropriate.

           In its comments, Defense said that it concurred with the
           recommendation to develop fact sheets outlining the appropriate
           roles and responsibilities, notification and activation
           procedures, and agency specific authorities pertaining to its
           disaster housing capabilities.

           While HUD concurred with our recommendations, it commented that it
           provided fact sheets to FEMA and non-profit organizations.
           However, our review of these fact sheets indicated that they did
           not reference ESF-6 or include the information required by the
           draft ESF-6 standard operating procedures, such as appropriate
           roles and responsibilities, notification and activation
           procedures, and agency-specific authorities. HUD also said that
           our draft report should be expanded to more fully reflect the
           activities that the department performed in response to Hurricane
           Katrina, which included establishing Katrina Disaster Assistance
           Program Centers, assisting public housing residents in relocating
           to other housing units, and finding permanent units for disaster
           victims. Our report, including appendix VII, discusses these and
           other types of housing assistance provided by HUD at a level of
           detail that we believe is consistent with our objectives.

           Treasury noted that its role in providing disaster relief was
           generally limited to relief provided under the Internal Revenue
           Code, although the department also has a broader role in
           facilitating federal payments. With regard to our recommendations,
           Treasury said that it would work with DHS to ensure that the NRP
           fully reflects the capabilities of the department to provide
           temporary housing assistance. Treasury added that any amendment to
           the department's section of the NRP that reflects the availability
           of administrative relief relating to the low-income housing tax
           credit should note that such relief is appropriate only in
           extraordinary circumstances and take into consideration the impact
           it might have on low-income taxpayers who are the intended
           beneficiaries of the low-income housing tax credit. Treasury also
           said that it would collaborate with DHS to ensure that it develops
           the appropriate fact sheets under ESF-6.

           VA noted that it is working with ESF-6 partner agencies to propose
           NRP revisions that will detail each agency's full capabilities. VA
           also noted that it would continue to work with ESF-6 partner
           agencies and FEMA to formulate the fact sheets as required by the
           ESF-6 standard operating procedures.

           We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
           committees, the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland
           Security, Housing and Urban Development, Treasury, and Veterans
           Affairs, the Red Cross, and other interested parties and will make
           copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
           will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
           http://www.gao.gov.
			  
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8678 or [email protected]. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix XVI.

David G. Wood
Director, Financial Markets and
Community Investment

           List of Congressional Addressees

           The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable Susan M. Collins
			  Ranking Member
			  Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
			  United States Senate

           The Honorable Larry E. Craig
			  Ranking Member
			  Committee on Veterans' Affairs
			  United States Senate

           The Honorable Barney Frank
			  Chairman
			  Committee on Financial Service
           House of Representatives

           The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
			  Chairman
			  The Honorable Tom Davis
           Ranking Member
			  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
			  House of Representatives

           The Honorable Peter T. King
			  Ranking Member
			  Committee on Homeland Security
			  House of Representatives

           The Honorable Steve Buyer
			  Ranking Member
			  Committee on Veterans' Affairs
			  House of Representatives
			  
			  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

           In this report, we examine: (1) the extent to which the
           responsibilities for the Red Cross and federal agencies were
           clearly described in the National Response Plan (NRP), (2) the
           extent to which federal agencies and the Red Cross had operational
           plans for providing sheltering and housing assistance in response
           to catastrophic disasters, and (3) the perceptions victims and
           others had of evacuees' sheltering and housing needs and the
           assistance provided by the federal government to address those
           needs after Hurricane Katrina. We included the following federal
           agencies and other organizations in this study:

           o American Red Cross

           o Department of Agriculture

           o Department of Defense

           o Department of Housing and Urban Development

           o Department of Treasury

           o Department of Veterans Affairs

           o Federal Emergency Management Agency

           o Federal Home Loan and Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)

           o Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)

           To address all of the objectives, we sponsored a group consisting
           of seven experts on disaster response and housing. We contracted
           with the National Academy of Sciences to convene a balanced,
           diverse group of experts to discuss the federal role in providing
           housing assistance after a presidentially declared disaster. The
           individuals represented state and local agencies in Mississippi,
           Louisiana, and Texas and academicians whose work focuses on
           disaster response. (The names and organizational affiliations of
           the group members are listed in app. II.) In keeping with National
           Academies policy, members of the group were invited to provide
           their individual views, and the group was not designed to reach a
           consensus on any of the issues that we asked them to discuss. The
           group of seven experts convened at the National Academies in
           Washington, D.C., on August 17, 2006 (we had invited nine, but two
           invitees were unable to attend). The meeting was recorded and
           transcribed to ensure that we had accurately captured the group's
           statements.

           We also reviewed relevant literature on disaster housing and
           recent reports on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina to
           address all of our objectives, including those issued by the House
           of Representatives,^1 the Senate,^2 and the White House.^3 While
           these reports addressed a broad range of issues related to the
           preparedness for, and response to Hurricanes Katrina, our report
           focuses exclusively on federal assistance for sheltering and for
           providing temporary housing--the activities covered by Emergency
           Support Function (ESF) Number 6 (ESF-6).

           To examine the extent to which the responsibilities for the Red
           Cross and federal agencies were clearly described in the NRP, we
           reviewed the ESF-6 annex and relevant federal statutes and
           regulations that federal agencies and the Red Cross followed in
           providing sheltering and housing-related assistance in response to
           Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition, we obtained information
           from each organization about the types of sheltering and temporary
           housing assistance they provided following the two hurricanes, and
           determined the extent to which the assistance was provided under a
           responsibility described in the NRP. We also discussed with
           various federal, state, and local officials--in Louisiana,
           Mississippi, and Texas--how federal agencies and the Red Cross
           carried out their responsibilities for providing sheltering and
           housing-related assistance in response to the disasters. Further,
           we reviewed recommendations made in prior GAO and Department of
           Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General reports related to ESF-6
           and determined what progress had been made to address the
           recommendations.

           To examine the extent to which federal agencies and the Red Cross
           had operational plans for providing sheltering and housing
           assistance in response to catastrophic disasters, we obtained and
           analyzed available plans, policies, and procedures that these
           organizations followed in providing assistance under the ESF-6
           annex. In addition, we discussed these documents with federal
           agency and Red Cross officials in Washington, D.C., and federal,
           state, and local officials in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
           We also reviewed the NRP and ESF-6 standard operating procedures
           to identify planning requirements and obtained information on the
           characteristics of effective disaster response plans put forth by
           disaster experts. Further, we reviewed prior GAO and DHS Inspector
           General reports that addressed federal agency planning for
           catastrophic disasters. While our focus was on the response to
           Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we have incorporated information on
           relevant steps that the organizations within the scope of our
           study have taken since those events.
	  
^1United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A
Failure of Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).

^2United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.:
May 2006).

^3The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned (Washington, D.C.: February 2006).
			  
			  Disaster Victim Interviews

           To examine the perceptions victims and others had of evacuees'
           sheltering and housing needs and the assistance provided by the
           federal government to address those needs after Hurricane Katrina,
           we conducted standardized telephone interviews with victims of the
           disaster. Due to the sensitivity of the topic to the interview
           participant, and because there was no efficient way to attempt to
           create a universe of all Hurricane Katrina disaster victims, we
           used a qualitative data collection approach. We developed an
           interview guide based on disaster housing literature and
           government reports, interviews with government officials, a
           preliminary discussion with a group of victims evacuated to the
           metropolitan Washington, D.C. area, and unstructured interviews
           with two victims from the metropolitan New Orleans area. We
           pretested the interview guide with two disaster victims also from
           the metropolitan New Orleans area. The interview questions covered
           victims' housing and related needs since the disasters, the
           locations of shelter and housing, sources of assistance in
           securing housing, challenges in finding housing, the FEMA
           registration process, types of assistance for which they were
           eligible and received, current status of their neighborhood and
           former homes, and their concerns and future housing plans.

           We used a purposeful stratified sampling procedure where we
           intentionally chose to interview people with particular
           characteristics to capture both common core experiences, as well
           as important variations among those with differing
           characteristics. We identified the state in which the victim
           resided before the disaster (Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
           Texas) and whether the victim received HUD housing assistance
           prior to the storm as two characteristics that would influence
           victims' needs and their experience finding housing after the
           hurricanes. When using a nonprobability sample, like a purposeful
           stratified sample, it is important to be resource efficient in
           data collection, but also to simultaneously collect enough data to
           ensure saturation, or repetition, in the information obtained.^4
           Therefore, we sought to collect data from a total of 48 victims;
           24 who had received public housing assistance prior the storm and
           24 who had not, and within both groups of 24, an equal number of
           participants from the four affected states (see table 1).

           Table 1: Number of Completed Interviews with Hurricane Katrina
           Victims
			  
               Individuals who received HUD   Individuals who did not receive 
                housing assistance prior to   HUD housing assistance prior to 
State                           disaster                          disaster 
Alabama                                2                                 6 
Louisiana                              8                                 6 
Mississippi                            8                                 7 
Texas                                  0                                 1 			  

           Source: GAO.

           Note: We attempted to complete six interviews per table cell.

           We identified victims either through word of mouth or through HUD
           or FEMA disaster assistance lists. Names and contact information
           for victims identified through word of mouth were provided to us
           by organizations working directly with victims, such as churches,
           nonprofit organizations, or other victims. We also asked HUD and
           FEMA to provide us with the lists of victims who received
           assistance through their agencies. HUD provided us a list as of
           July 14, 2006, which was our primary means of identifying victims
           who received HUD housing assistance prior to the hurricanes. FEMA
           provided us a list as of July 20, 2006. After eliminating cases
           that had no telephone numbers, victim names were systematically
           selected from the agencies' lists.

           We contacted victims and asked them to participate in our
           telephone interview that lasted approximately 60 to 90 minutes. If
           the victim was unable to be reached, declined, or was again not
           available at the scheduled interview time, we eliminated the name
           from our contact list. We completed 38 interviews with disaster
           victims. We contacted approximately 319 victims to request their
           participation.
			  
^4Janice M. Morse, Designing Funded Qualitative Research (chapter 13, pp.
220-235) in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds), Handbook of
Qualitative Research, (Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, Calif, 1994).
Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 3rd
edition, (Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, Calif., 2002).

           Demographic information on the victims whom we interviewed appears
           in table 2. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to
           make inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability
           sample, some elements of the population being studied have no
           chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the
           sample. Although the findings we collected do not generalize to
           all victims of Hurricanes Katrina, when coupled with results of
           our group of experts, interviews with agency officials, and
           housing advocates, they do provide useful insight into the
           experiences and needs of victims of this disaster.

           Table 2: Self-Reported Demographic Data on Disaster Victims
           Interviewed
			  
Age (in years)                                  
Average                                      49 
Range                                     22-72 
Refused                                       1 
Ethnicity                                       
American Indian or Alaska Native              2 
Asian                                         0 
Black or African American                    26 
Hispanic or Latino                            1 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander     0 
White                                         9 
Homeownership status                            
Owner                                        13 
Renter                                       25 

           Source: GAO.

           We performed our work in Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana;
           Biloxi, Gulfport, and Jackson, Mississippi; Austin, Fort Worth,
           Houston, and Temple, Texas; and Washington, D.C. We conducted our
           work between November 2005 and February 2007 in accordance with
           generally accepted government auditing standards.
			  
			  Appendix II: Views of GAOâs Expert Group on the Provision of
			  Disaster Housing Assistance by the Federal Government

           This appendix provides the views of the group of experts that GAO
           convened on the provision of disaster housing assistance by the
           federal government. The group consisted of seven experts who,
           during a daylong meeting convened by the National Academies,
           discussed issues related to the federal government's provision of
           disaster housing assistance in response to Hurricanes Katrina and
           Rita. All the ideas presented in this appendix may not represent
           the view of every member of the group of experts. Moreover, these
           ideas should not be considered to be the views of GAO.
			  
			  Members of GAOâs Expert Group

           The following individuals were members of GAO's group of experts
           on the provision of disaster housing assistance by the federal
           government:

           o Pamela Dashiell, President, Holy Cross Neighborhood Association

           o Buddy Grantham, Operations Officer, Joint Hurricane Housing Task
           Force

           o Robert Olshansky, Professor, University of Illinois at
           Urbana-Champaign

           o Jae Park, Chief Policy Analyst, Mississippi Governor's Office of
           Recovery and Renewal

           o Walter Peacock, Professor, Texas A&M University

           o Lori Peek, Assistant Professor, Colorado State University

           o Brenda Phillips, Professor, Oklahoma State University
			  
			  Views of the Group of Experts

           The group of experts addressed a number of issues related to the
           federal government's provision of housing assistance in response
           to disasters. Specifically, the group of experts' discussion
           focused on the following: (1) the federal government's role in
           providing housing assistance in response to disasters, (2) plans
           federal agencies and the Red Cross follow in providing sheltering
           and housing assistance in response to a disaster, and (3) opinions
           regarding the sheltering and housing needs victims face following
           a disaster and the extent to which these needs were met following
           Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
			  
			  Federal Roles and Responsibilities

           In general, the group of experts commented that the federal
           government needed to take a more active leadership role in
           providing or facilitating the provision of sheltering and
           temporary housing in response to catastrophic disasters such as
           Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In particular, the group of experts
           commented on the federal government's role in disseminating
           information to victims and public officials, tracking victims, and
           providing case management assistance to victims with multiple
           needs. Specifically, group members discussed the following:

           o The federal government should have played a greater role in
           disseminating information on the roles and responsibilities of
           those who provide sheltering and temporary housing assistance. For
           example, one member of the group of experts said this should be
           one of the federal government's primary responsibilities in
           responding to disasters.

           o The federal government should have done more to disseminate
           information to individuals and public officials on how federal
           assistance programs work. One member of the group of experts said
           it was very confusing for both victims and public officials to try
           to understand how the multiple federal programs and policies work.
           Another group member who made a similar comment stated that
           certain groups, such as the elderly, have a particularly difficult
           time understanding how to access federal disaster assistance
           programs.

           o The federal government should have played a more active role in
           tracking victims. For example, one member of the group of experts
           said that there was no processing of victims into and out of the
           shelters. Another member of the group said that out-processing of
           disaster victims is common in other countries as a way to keep
           families together. One member of the group of experts also stated
           that during Hurricane Katrina, there was no system for tracking
           victims across the multiple federal programs that provided housing
           assistance.

           o There is a role for the federal government to play in providing
           case management for victims of Hurricane Katrina, many of whom
           have multiple needs in addition to housing, including the need for
           job training, education, and healthcare. For example, according to
           one member of the group of experts, case management is the kind of
           assistance that is needed in a disaster of this magnitude.
			  
			  Federal Agency Planning for Providing Disaster Housing Assistance

           Members of our group of experts said that a federal disaster
           housing plan should define how agencies will coordinate with each
           other in response to a disaster. The members of our group of
           experts also said that a federal disaster housing plan should
           include certain elements. More specifically, the group members
           discussed the following:

           o The members of our group of experts said that a federal disaster
           housing plan must not just sit on the shelf; the federal
           government must ensure that the plan is disseminated to the
           appropriate individuals who will be involved in the response so
           these individuals have an understanding of what is expected.

           o The federal government must engage in disaster exercises and
           simulations to ensure that a federal disaster housing plan is
           properly rehearsed. The group members noted that the Hurricane Pam
           exercise conducted in 2004 was an example of how the federal,
           state, and local governments and nonprofit organizations came
           together to plan for responding to a hurricane striking New
           Orleans.

           o A federal disaster housing plan should promote housing solutions
           that enable individuals to maintain their community and social
           networks to the extent possible, as research has shown that
           individuals have a more difficult time recovering after a disaster
           when their communities and social networks are destroyed. In
           addition, the plan should promote a variety of housing solutions,
           as our nation is made up of a diverse population and one approach
           does not necessarily work for everyone. The plan also should
           promote housing solutions that are sustainable over the long term.
			  
			  Immediate Challenges Victims Face in Meeting Their Housing Needs

           Group members stated that there are a number of immediate
           challenges disaster victims face in meeting their housing needs.
           These challenges encompass things such as access to information
           about housing assistance, timeliness of assistance provided, the
           different types of housing assistance to best meet individual
           needs, returning to normalcy or a routine after a disaster, and
           addressing needs beyond housing. More specifically, group members
           discussed the following:

           o Victims face challenges in getting access to information about
           the federal disaster housing assistance that is available, the
           eligibility requirements for assistance, and information on how
           long assistance will last. Experts also said those providing
           assistance need to be consistent in what they tell victims about
           the assistance as victims heard conflicting information following
           Hurricane Katrina.
           o Disaster housing assistance needs to be provided in a timely
           manner. For example, one expert noted that trailers were not
           received by households in a timely manner, while two others had
           observed trailers sitting unused. Experts noted that the necessary
           infrastructure, such as land, water, sewer, and electricity, was
           not consistently available to support trailer use.

           o There are different types of housing assistance available and
           victims need to receive the assistance that will best meet their
           needs. Some of the experts commented that trailers may work better
           for homeowners while for others, apartments may better meet their
           needs.

           o It is important following a disaster that those affected return
           to a state of normalcy as soon as possible. The disaster housing
           assistance provided should strive to ensure that victims are able
           to reestablish a routine. Experts said temporary housing should
           provide access to facilities like grocery stores, laundry
           facilities, and playgrounds that are necessary for daily living.
           Additionally, temporary housing should be located close to one's
           community so victims can stay connected their community and jobs.

           o Some victims have needs that extend beyond housing. Experts said
           victims may need child care, access to jobs or job training, and
           assistance integrating into a new community. Experts suggested
           providing housing assistance as part of a case management approach
           so victims' other needs could be simultaneously addressed.
			  
			  Longer-Term Challenges Victims Face in Meeting Their Housing Needs

           Members of our expert group identified some longer-term challenges
           disaster victims may face in meeting their housing needs. They
           said challenges include housing affordability issues and meeting
           victims' needs after federal assistance expires. Some issues
           discussed by the group of experts included the following:

           o Displaced victims may have ended up in temporary housing that
           they are unable to afford once federal assistance runs out.

           o Experts said many victims will face challenges and uncertainty
           if they continue to need housing assistance after 18 months when
           federal assistance is set to expire. Some experts thought that
           there could be a larger homeless population if assistance is not
           extended while others thought states and localities would have to
           step in and assume some of the responsibility for providing
           housing assistance.
			  
			  Appendix III: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
			  Assistance Provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency

           In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Department of
           Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
           provided disaster housing assistance by administering its
           traditional programs for presidentially declared disasters: the
           Public Assistance (PA) program and the Individuals and Households
           Program (IHP), authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
           Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), Sections 403
           and 408, respectively. The following information presents details
           on the disaster housing assistance provided by FEMA in response to
           Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
			  
Sheltering                                                                 
Cruise ships              To provide transitional shelter for the large    
                             number of displaced Hurricane victims, FEMA, for 
                             the first time, contracted with four cruise      
                             ships for 6 months using its authority under     
                             Section 403 of the Stafford Act.^a The cruise    
                             ships docked in Louisiana and Alabama. In        
                             Alabama, FEMA's use of cruise ships was          
                             primarily for evacuees from Mississippi who were 
                             65 years and older and in good health, single    
                             parents with children, and homeless individuals  
                             living in adverse conditions, according to DHS.  
                             In Louisiana, FEMA used cruise ships to house    
                             disaster victims, with a primary focus on first  
                             responders or personnel essential to recovery    
                             efforts. FEMA's cruise ship contracts expired on 
                             March 1, 2006. According to FEMA, cruise ships   
                             provided emergency shelter for over 7,000        
                             households affected by Hurricane Katrina.        
Reimbursements for        Under the Public Assistance program, state and   
shelters                  local governments are eligible for grants for    
                             reimbursement for costs of emergency protective  
                             measures, which includes emergency sheltering.   
                             State and local governments can apply to FEMA    
                             for reimbursements for eligible costs, which     
                             include costs for transportation, labor, and     
                             sheltering operations. By statute, the federal   
                             share may not be less than 75 percent of the     
                             eligible costs. The federal government           
                             reimbursed state and local applicants 100        
                             percent of the eligible costs for Hurricanes     
                             Katrina and Rita for specified time periods. As  
                             of August 2006, FEMA reimbursed, through PA      
                             grants, more than $663 million to 45 states and  
                             the District of Columbia for sheltering and      
                             emergency protective measures taken during the   
                             evacuation of the Gulf Coast and for ongoing     
                             shelter initiatives directly following Hurricane 
                             Katrina. These funds were provided in addition   
                             to nearly $1.75 billion obligated to Louisiana,  
                             Mississippi, and Alabama for emergency           
                             sheltering operations.                           
Reimbursements for hotel  FEMA has the authority to provide short-term     
rooms                     assistance in the form of lodging expense        
                             reimbursement, such as hotel rooms, to victims   
                             whose homes have been made uninhabitable by      
                             disasters. Traditionally, FEMA provides          
                             reimbursements to individuals and households for 
                             hotel stays through the IHP. However, in         
                             response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA    
                             used its authority under Section 403 of the      
                             Stafford Act to reimburse the Red Cross and      
                             hotel owners for providing interim sheltering in 
                             hotels to displaced victims. On behalf of FEMA   
                             and on a reimbursable basis, the Red Cross       
                             administered FEMA's Special Transient Housing    
                             Accommodations Program until October 25, 2005,   
                             when FEMA took over administration of the        
                             program. FEMA then provided reimbursements to    
                             hotel owners through a private contractor. To    
                             receive lodging assistance, victims only needed  
                             proof of residence in disaster-affected zip      
                             codes. FEMA required all victims staying in      
                             hotels obtain a FEMA authorization code by       
                             January 30, 2006, to continue receiving          
                             assistance. The authorization code allowed FEMA  
                             to ensure displaced hurricane victims were       
                             registered with FEMA for assistance and to       
                             ensure they were fully processed for rental      
                             assistance eligibility before transitioning to   
                             longer-term housing. For most victims, hotel     
                             room reimbursements ended in February or March   
                             2006. According to FEMA, during its              
                             administration of the program, from October 25,  
                             2005, until March 2006, FEMA provided 4,270,350  
                             cumulative hotel nights to hurricane victims.    
Temporary Housing                                                          
Direct housing - travel   Under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA has  
trailers and mobile homes the authority to provide direct temporary        
                             housing assistance under IHP. FEMA may provide   
                             temporary housing units (e.g., mobile homes and  
                             travel trailers), acquired by purchase or lease, 
                             directly to disaster victims, who, because of a  
                             lack of available housing resources, would be    
                             unable to make use of financial assistance to    
                             rent alternate housing accommodations (i.e.,     
                             rental accommodations are not available). By     
                             statute, direct assistance is limited to an      
                             18-month period from the date of the             
                             presidential disaster declaration, after which   
                             FEMA may charge fair market rent for the housing 
                             unless the President extends the 18-month period 
                             due to extraordinary circumstances. For renters, 
                             FEMA placed travel trailers or mobile homes at   
                             emergency group sites developed by FEMA or       
                             commercial sites. For homeowners, FEMA either    
                             placed travel trailers or mobile homes on their  
                             properties or on group sites. As of August 2006, 
                             FEMA provided 123,957 travel trailers and mobile 
                             homes in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and    
                             Texas.                                           
Financial assistance for  Under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA has  
temporary rental housing  the authority to provide financial assistance    
                             for temporary rental housing to disaster victims 
                             through IHP. FEMA may provide financial          
                             assistance to individuals or households to rent  
                             alternative housing accommodations, existing     
                             rental units, manufactured housing, recreational 
                             vehicles, or other readily fabricated dwellings. 
                             The maximum amount of financial assistance that  
                             an individual or household may receive is capped 
                             at $25,000, adjusted annually to reflect changes 
                             in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). In 2005, the  
                             maximum was $26,200. For 2006, the maximum was   
                             $27,200, and the maximum in 2007 is $28,200.     
                             Disaster victims must register with FEMA to      
                             determine IHP eligibility. In response to        
                             Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Department of   
                             Homeland Security, through FEMA's IHP program,   
                             provided transitional housing assistance for     
                             qualified homeowners and renters. Eligible       
                             victims received an initial payment of $2,358    
                             for 3 months of rental assistance. This payment  
                             was calculated based on the average fair market  
                             rent for a two-bedroom unit nationwide. Victims  
                             could use this payment for transitional housing  
                             costs for any location.                          
                                                                              
                             To receive extended assistance, victims must be  
                             periodically recertified, and FEMA may adjust    
                             the relevant fair market rate according to       
                             location and family size. Rental assistance may  
                             then be provided in 3- month increments          
                             depending on the victim's temporary housing      
                             needs. For qualified victims, assistance can be  
                             provided for up to 18 months from the date of    
                             the presidential disaster declaration or up to   
                             the IHP financial assistance cap, whichever      
                             occurs first. FEMA, in extraordinary             
                             circumstances, may extend this assistance beyond 
                             18 months. However, FEMA cannot exceed the       
                             financial assistance cap. If a victim reaches    
                             the financial assistance maximum, FEMA may       
                             provide direct housing assistance by directly    
                             paying rent to the landlord. As of May 31, 2006, 
                             FEMA provided rental assistance to 717,262       
                             distinct households displaced by Hurricanes      
                             Katrina and Rita.                                
Reimbursements for rental Under Section 403 of the Stafford Act, FEMA has  
assistance                the authority to reimburse state and local       
                             governments for emergency sheltering through the 
                             PA grant program. According to FEMA officials,   
                             to house the large number of displaced residents 
                             quickly, FEMA used this authority to reimburse   
                             states for rental assistance provided to         
                             evacuees of Hurricane Katrina. All contiguous    
                             states were eligible for reimbursements for      
                             housing assistance under the emergency           
                             declaration issued by the President. According   
                             to FEMA, approximately 60,000 households         
                             received rental assistance under this authority. 
                             In early 2006, FEMA began determining the        
                             eligibility of those it was assisting under      
                             Section 403 to transition to IHP under Section   
                             408.^b In March 2006, FEMA announced that it     
                             would no longer provide interim shelter under    
                             Section 403 as of May 31, 2006.^c                
Assistance to Homeowners/                                                  
Homebuyers                                                                 
Home repair/ replacement  Under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA may  
grants and loans          provide financial assistance for the repair of   
                             owner-occupied private residences, utilities,    
                             and residential infrastructure damaged by a      
                             major disaster not covered by insurance through  
                             IHP.^d The maximum amount of repair assistance   
                             provided to a household is limited to $5,000,    
                             adjusted annually to reflect changes in the CPI. 
                             In 2005, the maximum was $5,200. For 2006, the   
                             maximum was $5,400. FEMA may also provide        
                             assistance to replace owner-occupied private     
                             residences under Section 408. The amount of      
                             replacement assistance FEMA may provide to a     
                             household is limited to $10,000, adjusted        
                             annually to reflect changes in the CPI. In 2005, 
                             the maximum was $10,500. For 2006, the maximum   
                             was $10,900. For a victim to receive this        
                             assistance there must have been at least $10,000 
                             of damage to the dwelling. In response to        
                             Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA provided home  
                             repair assistance to 183,446 households and home 
                             replacement assistance to 31,250 households.^e   

           Source: GAO analysis of FEMA data.

           aBecause FEMA was unable to immediately implement IHP assistance
           (under section 408 of the Stafford Act) to provide funds to
           transition victims from short-term lodging to longer-term housing,
           the agency used public assistance funds (authorized under section
           403 of the Stafford Act). Normally, FEMA uses public assistance
           funds only for immediate emergency sheltering efforts.

           bThe United States District Court for the District of Columbia
           ruled in November 2006 that FEMA must immediately restore Section
           403 benefits to victims of Hurricanes and Katrina and Rita for
           whom FEMA declared ineligible for IHP assistance. FEMA had
           informed the victims of their ineligibility in connection with its
           efforts to transition eligible individuals from Section 403 to
           IHP. According to the court, FEMA violated the Due Process Clause
           of the Constitution when it terminated Section 403 benefits and
           provided only vague, confusing explanations to the victims as to
           why they were being denied. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals
           for the District of Columbia suspended the District Court's ruling
           that FEMA immediately restore Section 403 benefits. The suspension
           will last at least until the appeals court hears arguments in the
           case. The appeals court did not suspend the part of the district
           court's ruling that ordered FEMA to provide victims clearer
           explanations of the reasons they were not eligible for IHP
           benefits.

           cFEMA announced certain exceptions to the May 31, 2006, deadline.
           In particular, FEMA stated that it planned to make every effort to
           notify states of the IHP eligibility status of evacuees before
           April 15, 2006. If this notification occurred after April 15,
           states could request additional time to provide eligible and
           ineligible evacuees with a 30-day lease termination notice.
           Specifically, states could receive up to 15 additional days for
           eligible evacuees, and up to 30 additional days for ineligible
           evacuees. Also, for ineligible evacuees, the state would be
           reimbursed for contractual lease termination costs associated with
           leases that require greater than 30 days notice. FEMA subsequently
           extended the May 31, 2006, deadline to June 30, 2006, for 11
           jurisdictions. FEMA further extended the deadline for one of these
           jurisdictions--Houston, Texas--until September 30, 2006.

           dIHP repair assistance is designed to make the victim's
           owner-occupied home habitable and functional, not to restore the
           home to its predisaster condition. When disaster victims register
           for FEMA assistance, they are asked to provide their approximate
           household income. If the applicant's income exceeds certain
           thresholds, FEMA automatically refers them to the Small Business
           Administration's Disaster Loan Program. Applicants whose income
           falls below the thresholds or who are denied SBA assistance are
           referred back to FEMA for possible grant assistance under IHP.

           eThe 2007 DHS Appropriations Act repealed the $5,000 and $10,000
           limits for repair and replacement assistance.
			  
			  Appendix IV: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
			  Assistance Provided by the American Red Cross

           In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the American Red Cross
           (Red Cross) provided disaster housing assistance according to its
           congressionally mandated role to respond to disasters and mitigate
           suffering. The Red Cross, working with governmental and
           nongovernmental organizations, provided sheltering and other mass
           care services to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita through
           its nationwide network of local chapters and its Disaster Services
           Program. In addition, the Red Cross administered the Federal
           Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) hotel/motel program on a
           reimbursable basis. The following provides further details on
           sheltering and temporary housing assistance provided by the Red
           Cross.
			  
Sheltering                                                                 
Emergency shelters       To provide assistance to hurricane victims, the   
                            Red Cross executes its plan for responding to     
                            tropical storms and hurricanes in accordance with 
                            its Disaster Services Program, according to Red   
                            Cross officials. The Red Cross, with local        
                            governments, opens and operates shelters before a 
                            disaster, during disaster evacuations, and after  
                            a disaster occurs. According to Red Cross         
                            officials, shelters are typically open for 7 to   
                            10 days, and most disaster victims are able to    
                            return to their homes within 48 to 72 hours of    
                            the event. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and  
                            Rita, the Red Cross opened over 1,000 shelters    
                            and provided over 3.7 million overnight shelter   
                            stays for evacuees in 27 states and the District  
                            of Columbia, according to the Red Cross. Some Red 
                            Cross shelters for Hurricane Katrina evacuees     
                            remained open for up to 4 months. The Red Cross   
                            also provided support to shelters operated by     
                            state and local governments and other nonprofit   
                            organizations.                                    
Reimbursements for hotel The Red Cross may operate a small-scale hotel     
rooms                    program in areas where it is not feasible to open 
                            shelters or to provide better shelter conditions  
                            for large families, elderly victims, or persons   
                            with certain medical conditions. Due to the large 
                            number of Hurricane Katrina victims and the need  
                            for longer-term sheltering, the Red Cross         
                            administered a large-scale hotel program, the     
                            Special Transient Hotel Accommodations Program,   
                            on behalf of FEMA on a reimbursable basis.        
                            Through an existing relationship with a private   
                            contractor, the Red Cross reimbursed hotel owners 
                            for hurricane victims' hotel stays. Hurricane     
                            victims only needed proof of residence in the     
                            disaster-affected areas to receive assistance.    
                            The Red Cross administered this program from      
                            August 28, 2005, until October 25, 2005, when     
                            FEMA assumed administration of the program.       
                            Through this effort, the Red Cross provided hotel 
                            rooms to over 650,000 Hurricane Katrina and Rita  
                            victims at more than 11,000 hotels in all 50      
                            states.                                           

           Source: GAO analysis of Red Cross data.
			  
			  Appendix V: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
			  Assistance Provided by the Department of Agriculture

           In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Department of
           Agriculture (USDA) provided housing assistance using disaster
           provisions under its traditional multifamily and single-family
           rural housing programs.^1 USDA also established new initiatives
           specifically to provide disaster housing assistance to the large
           number of evacuees displaced as a result of the disasters. USDA
           assisted victims of Katrina and Rita by providing temporary
           housing assistance, including making multifamily units and
           single-family homes available for lease nationwide, offering
           rental assistance, and issuing program waivers. Also, USDA
           provided assistance to homeowners and homebuyers by providing
           grants and loans for home repair and replacement, and by providing
           mortgage assistance. The following information provides further
           details on the disaster housing assistance USDA provided in
           response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
			  
Temporary Housing                                                          
USDA multifamily units    Homeowners of USDA-financed single-family        
for lease                 properties and tenants of USDA multifamily       
                             properties made uninhabitable by a               
                             presidentially declared disaster are eligible    
                             for occupancy nationwide as "displaced tenants"  
                             at any USDA Rural Development financed           
                             multi-family housing property. As a new          
                             initiative, USDA also extended the lease of its  
                             multifamily units to all hurricane evacuees      
                             regardless of whether they were living in        
                             USDA-financed single-family or multifamily       
                             properties prior to the disasters. According to  
                             USDA officials, hurricane victims could lease    
                             these units as long as they paid rent. USDA      
                             leased 3,848 units to victims of Hurricanes      
                             Katrina and Rita, as of May 31, 2006.            
USDA real estate-owned    USDA typically offers for sale to the general    
homes for lease           public its foreclosed homes. In response to      
                             Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, USDA established a  
                             new initiative by halting the sale of homes that 
                             it owned, and making them available for lease to 
                             displaced residents of the disaster areas.       
                             According to USDA, the department offered 153    
                             homes for lease under this initiative, of which  
                             25 were eventually leased. Victims with no       
                             income were eligible to receive up to 3 months   
                             of free rent. Otherwise, they were required to   
                             pay 30 percent of their adjusted income.         
                             Disaster victims who rented USDA homes were      
                             given the first option to purchase the homes at  
                             any time during the lease period.                
Rental assistance         Under USDA's rental assistance program, the      
                             department permits the transfer of rental        
                             assistance for units made uninhabitable by a     
                             presidentially declared disaster to another      
                             eligible multifamily property. As a new          
                             initiative, USDA also provided rental assistance 
                             to displaced victims of Hurricanes Katrina and   
                             Rita who were not previously assisted by USDA.   
                             These victims were provided USDA rental          
                             assistance for up to 6 months, and some were     
                             permitted 2-month extensions for hardships. Both 
                             previously assisted and nonpreviously assisted   
                             tenants were required to pay rent according to   
                             USDA's standard rental assistance program, in    
                             which renters pay 30 percent of their income in  
                             rent and USDA provides the difference between    
                             the tenant's contribution and the rent. As of    
                             May 31, 2006, USDA provided rental assistance to 
                             3,124 displaced disaster victims.                
Waivers for placement of  USDA is permitted to waive some program          
hurricane victims in      requirements to respond to disasters. In         
USDA-financed properties  response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, UDSA    
                             implemented several program waivers, which were  
                             in effect for 90 days, to allow USDA-financed    
                             property owners to accept displaced tenants and  
                             expedite placing victims in available units. For 
                             example, USDA issued Letters of Priority         
                             Entitlement (LOPE) by which victims are moved to 
                             the top of waiting lists for vacancies for 120   
                             days. Victims could provide documentation of     
                             FEMA registration in lieu of a LOPE. USDA also   
                             waived requirements such as 1-year lease terms,  
                             security deposits, and age restrictions at       
                             designated elderly properties to expedite        
                             placing disaster victims in available housing.   
Rural area population     Subsequent to a natural disaster, USDA Rural     
requirements              Development has the authority to waive, for 3    
                             years from the date of a presidential disaster   
                             declaration, population limits for its           
                             single-family and multifamily housing programs.  
                             In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, USDA 
                             immediately increased the population limitation  
                             in rural areas to 50,000 for any county or       
                             parish declared for individual assistance as a   
                             result the disasters. This waiver enabled USDA   
                             to provide housing assistance in rural areas     
                             that absorbed large numbers of evacuees.         
                             Conversely, USDA considered some cities, which   
                             lost a significant population due to the         
                             disasters, as rural areas to enable the          
                             department to provide assistance in these areas  
                             as well. USDA also implemented waiver authority  
                             under the 2006 Department of Defense Emergency   
                             Supplemental Appropriations Act. This act        
                             provided the Secretary of USDA the authority to  
                             waive rural area population limitations for all  
                             Rural Development programs for a period of 6     
                             months.                                          
Assistance to Homeowners/                                                  
Homebuyers                                                                 
Home repair/ replacement  To assist low- and moderate-income households to 
grants and loans          purchase, repair, or construct homes, USDA has   
                             the authority to finance the purchase or repair  
                             of single family housing in rural areas through  
                             USDA grants, direct loans, or loans from private 
                             lenders guaranteed by USDA. USDA borrowers who   
                             are affected by presidentially declared          
                             disasters may be eligible for this assistance to 
                             repair or replace property damaged as a direct   
                             result of a natural disaster. Applicants of this 
                             assistance must meet certain income              
                             requirements. The 2006 Department of Defense     
                             Emergency Supplemental Act appropriated funds to 
                             provide home repair and replacement loans,       
                             grants, and loan guarantees. The repair grants   
                             are generally provided only to persons 62 and    
                             older who cannot afford a loan; however, these   
                             grants were appropriated without age             
                             restrictions. According to USDA, in response to  
                             Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the department has  
                             obligated (1) $86.2 million in direct loans for  
                             home purchase or repair, (2) $143.6 million in   
                             guaranteed loans for home purchase or repair,    
                             (3) $2.6 million in direct loans for home        
                             repair, and (4) $14.8 million in grants for home 
                             repair as of September 30, 2006.                 
Foreclosure moratorium    In response to Hurricane Katrina, a 90-day hold  
                             was placed on all direct home ownership loans    
                             that were in foreclosure and located in the      
                             presidentially declared disaster areas.          
Mortgage payment          After a presidential disaster declaration,       
forbearance               USDA-financed homeowners living in designated    
                             disaster areas are eligible for a 6- month       
                             moratorium on mortgage payments for direct USDA  
                             loans. The moratorium may be extended but may    
                             not exceed 2 years. For USDA-guaranteed loans,   
                             USDA asks lenders to offer mortgage payment      
                             forbearance as well. In response to Hurricanes   
                             Katrina and Rita, USDA provided a 6-month        
                             suspension of mortgage payments and extended     
                             this payment suspension for 2 years for accounts 
                             that had not been returned to normal servicing.  
                             According to USDA, 25,727 accounts were          
                             originally placed on mortgage payment            
                             moratorium.                                      

^1USDA's traditional multifamily housing programs provide affordable
multifamily rental housing in rural areas for very low-, low-, and
moderate-income families, the elderly, and persons with disabilities
primarily through direct mortgages to finance multifamily housing and
rental subsides. USDA's single-family programs generally provide home
ownership opportunities to low- and moderate-income rural Americans
largely through loans, grants, and loan guarantees.

           Source: GAO analysis of USDA data.
			  
			  Appendix VI: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
			  Assistance Provided by the Department of Defense

           In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Department of
           Defense (DOD) provided temporary housing assistance to victims on
           Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Specifically, DOD provided temporary
           housing assistance by installing temporary roofs. In addition, in
           accordance with traditional evacuation assistance, DOD offered
           safe haven benefits to its military and civilian personnel who
           evacuated hurricane-damaged areas. The following information
           provides further details on the disaster housing assistance DOD
           provided in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
			  
Temporary Housing                                                          
Temporary roof  Under a mission assignment from FEMA, the Army Corp of
repair          Engineers provided free temporary roofs for residential
                   structures, daycare facilities, schools, and all publicly
                   owned facilities under Operation Blue Roof. These roofs
                   (plastic sheeting) allowed occupants to return to their
                   homes and facilities, providing temporary relief until the
                   owner made permanent repairs. To qualify for blue roofs,
                   damage to the roof must have been less than 50 percent and
                   the area to be covered must have been structurally sound.
                   Property owners were required to complete a right-of-entry
                   form to allow government and contract employees on their
                   property.                       
Relocation      In accordance with Joint Federal Travel Regulations,
assistance      military dependents, civilian employees, and families
                   ordered to evacuate military installations in Louisiana,
                   Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas due to Hurricanes Katrina
                   and Rita were authorized to select an alternate safe haven
                   within the continental U.S. and receive safe haven
                   benefits. Safe haven benefits include travel costs, actual
                   costs of lodging, and allowances for meals and
                   incidentals. This authority applied to individuals whose
                   housing was made uninhabitable by the hurricanes.
                   According to DOD officials, approximately 10,000 military
                   and DOD civilian personnel were displaced by Hurricane
                   Katrina. Safe haven benefits are usually allowed for up to
                   180 days from the arrival at the alternate safe haven
                   location. Normally, full safe haven per diem rates are
                   offered for the first 30 days after relocation, and
                   reduced per diem rates are offered thereafter. In response
                   to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, unreduced per diem rates
                   were extended five times to cover the maximum 180 days of
                   safe haven benefits. In addition, DOD authorized a
                   continuation of evacuation allowances beyond 180 days for
                   hurricane evacuees until August 1, 2006, at the full per
                   diem rate.                      
			  
           Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
			  
			  Appendix VII: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
			  Assistance Provided by HUD

           In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Department of
           Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provided disaster housing
           assistance using flexibilities allowed under its existing
           multifamily and single-family housing programs and through its
           disaster housing programs. HUD facilitated sheltering by issuing
           waivers of certain program requirements. In addition, HUD provided
           or facilitated the provision of temporary housing assistance, such
           as by making homes that it owned exclusively available for lease
           to victims of Katrina and Rita, and by issuing rental assistance
           vouchers to previously HUD-assisted tenants and victims who were
           homeless prior to the hurricanes. HUD also provided assistance to
           homeowners, including providing mortgage relief to those with
           FHA-insured loans. The following information presents further
           details on the sheltering and housing assistance HUD provided to
           victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Sheltering                                                                 
Emergency shelter grant     Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, HUD     
waivers                     waived certain requirements for its Emergency  
                               Shelter Grant program for presidentially       
                               declared disaster areas. HUD waived            

                               requirements related to citizen participation  
                               for plan amendments, the definition of         
                               emergency shelter facilities, and deadlines    
                               for using grant funds.                         
Temporary Housing                                                          
HUD real estate-owned homes HUD typically offers for sale to the general   
for lease                   public homes that it acquires due to           
                               foreclosure on HUD-insured mortgages. In       
                               response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, HUD   
                               and FEMA entered into an Interagency Agreement 
                               on September 12, 2005, to make available these 
                               properties--referred to as Real Estate Owned   
                               (REO) properties--to families displaced by the 
                               hurricanes. HUD took its REO properties off    
                               the market and made them available to FEMA for 
                               this purpose. According to HUD, as of August   
                               2006, the department had leased over 2,000 of  
                               its homes. Victims who leased these properties 
                               had the option to purchase them at a           
                               discounted price and qualify for financing     
                               though HUD's Mortgage Insurance for Disaster   
                               Victims Program. In addition, all evacuees had 
                               the opportunity to purchase a HUD home, before 
                               it was offered to the public, at a discounted  
                               price.                                         
Rental assistance vouchers  In response to a mission assignment from FEMA, 
                               HUD administered the Katrina Disaster Housing  
                               Assistance Program (KDHAP), funded by FEMA, to 
                               assist victims of Hurricane Katrina who        
                               resided in HUD-assisted properties prior to    
                               the disaster. To receive KDHAP funding,        
                               families must have been (1) either assisted by 
                               HUD prior to Hurricane Katrina through certain 
                               housing programs or qualified as predisaster   
                               homeless, (2) displaced by Hurricane Katrina,  
                               and (3) registered with FEMA no later than     
                               December 31, 2005. Under KDHAP, households     
                               received a voucher which covered 100 percent   
                               of the rent (capped at the local fair market   
                               rent) for up to 18 months anywhere in the      
                               United States. In December 2005, Congress      
                               appropriated $390 million for temporary rental 
                               voucher assistance for victims of Hurricanes   
                               Katrina and Rita through the 2006 Emergency    
                               Supplemental Appropriations. The act           
                               authorized HUD to establish and administer a   
                               new program--the Disaster Voucher Program      
                               (DVP). DVP replaced KDHAP and expanded         
                               assistance to victims of Hurricane Rita. In    
                               February 2006, HUD began transitioning those   
                               from KDHAP to DVP. Households eligible for DVP 
                               must have been displaced by Hurricane Katrina  
                               or Rita and must have been either previously   
                               assisted under certain HUD-assisted housing    
                               programs or qualified as a predisaster special 
                               needs/homeless family. Under DVP, households   
                               received a housing voucher which covers 100    
                               percent of the rent (capped at the Public      
                               Housing Authority payment standard) anywhere   
                               in the United States for the first 18 months   
                               the household receives DVP assistance. DVP     
                               assistance is expected to expire in September  
                               2007. As of November 15, 2006, HUD had         
                               registered 29,470 households for DVP, and      
                               23,832 DVP vouchers had been used to lease a   
                               house or apartment.                            
Waivers for public housing  Using flexibilities allowed under its existing 
authorities                 authorities, HUD provided waivers to           
                               facilitate the provision of temporary housing  
                               assistance to victims of Hurricanes Katrina    
                               and Rita. For example, HUD allowed Public      
                               Housing Authorities additional time to submit  
                               tenant verification and allowed assessment and 
                               cost-limitation flexibilities.                 
Waivers for HUD's grant     HUD testified that its Office of Community     
programs                    Planning and Development issued waivers of     
                               more than 40 requirements in an effort to      
                               increase the flexibility of existing grant     
                               programs to be used within their current       
                               resources for disaster relief. These included  
                               waivers for the HOME Investment Partnerships   
                               program and American Dream Down Payment        
                               Initiative to help low-income Louisianans      
                               receive tenant-based rental assistance, and    
                               rehabilitate and buy homes.                    
Assistance to Homeowners/                                                  
Homebuyers                                                                 
Home repair/replacement     Congress approved emergency supplemental       
grants                      appropriations providing $11.5 billion and     
                               $5.2 billion for HUD's Community Development   
                               Block Grant (CDBG) program to assist with      
                               long-term housing and infrastructure           
                               restoration in Gulf Coast states affected by   
                               the hurricanes. HUD allocated funds based on   
                               approved state plans. Some plans included      
                               grants for homeowners whose homes were         
                               destroyed or severely damaged following        
                               Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. As of August      
                               2006, HUD has approved plans and awarded CDBG  
                               funds to Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana,      
                               Texas, and Florida. Mississippi and Louisiana  
                               have expended funds from their allocation, as  
                               of September 2006.                             
Foreclosure moratorium      In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,    
                               HUD issued mortgage letters instructing        
                               servicers advising them not to foreclose on    
                               homes with FHA-insured mortgages for 90 days   
                               from the date of the presidential disaster     
                               declaration. This moratorium was extended in   
                               November 2005 and in February 2006. On June    
                               30, 2006, the Federal Housing Administration   
                               (FHA) provided a limited extension of the      
                               foreclosure moratorium through August 31,      
                               2006.                                          
Other mortgage relief and   In October 2005, HUD issued a mortgagee letter 
assistance                  to supplement its existing procedures for the  
                               servicing of loans in states and communities   
                               designated by FEMA as disaster areas as a      
                               result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In      
                               particular, the letter asked lenders to (1)    
                               not charge late fees for unsuccessful          
                               electronic or debit transactions, (2) not      
                               charge fees for late payments, and (3) not     
                               report to credit agencies until a property     
                               goes into foreclosure. The mortgagee letter    
                               also addressed delinquency, servicing, and     
                               loss-mitigation matters, including requiring   
                               lenders to explore all available               
                               loss-mitigation options and special            
                               forbearance for hurricane affected mortgages.  
                               It further reminded lenders of the 90-day      
                               moratorium on foreclosures and offered         
                               guidance on property inspections in affected   
                               areas. The letter emphasized the importance of 
                               preservation and protection of properties,     
                               particularly where owners have not returned.   
                               The letter also encouraged mortgagees to make  
                               exceptional efforts to assist borrowers in     
                               gaining access to insurance funds as soon as   
                               possible by providing copies of policies and   
                               other insurance information, promptly          
                               releasing insurance proceeds, and assuring     
                               that hazard insurance claims are filed and     
                               settled expeditiously. Finally, the letter     
                               provided guidance on how to convey properties  
                               already in foreclosure prior to the hurricanes 
                               and disaster declarations. In addition, in     
                               December 2005, the department announced an     
                               additional homeownership retention initiative  
                               to help homeowners with FHA-insured mortgages  
                               who are unable to maintain their payment       
                               obligations due to hurricane-related property  
                               damage, curtailment of income, or increased    
                               living expenses. Under the initiative, FHA     
                               will advance mortgage payments for up to 12    
                               months for eligible borrowers who are          
                               committed to continued occupancy of their      
                               homes as a principal residence and are         
                               expected to have the financial capacity to     
                               repair storm damage and resume making full     
                               mortgage payments within a 12-month period.    
                               According to HUD, this mortgage relief is      
                               expected to help several thousand families to  
                               remain homeowners.                             
Mortgage insurance          HUD allowed disaster victims to obtain 100     
                               percent financing on a replacement home        
                               anywhere in the United States under its        
                               special mortgage insurance program for         
                               disaster victims. The benefit is for           
                               individuals or families whose residences were  
                               destroyed or damaged to such an extent that    
                               reconstruction or replacement is necessary. In 
                               addition, the department allows homeowners and 
                               homebuyers who have lost their homes to        
                               finance both the purchase price and/or         
                               refinancing cost of a house and the cost of    
                               its rehabilitation through a single mortgage.  
                               HUD augmented this mortgage insurance program  
                               to facilitate the purchase of properties       
                               needing minor rehabilitation.                  

           Source: GAO analysis of HUD data.
			  
			  Appendix VIII: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
			  Assistance Provided by the Department of the Treasury

           The Department of the Treasury's Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
           provided assistance to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita for
           sheltering for temporary housing by offering relief under the
           Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA) and the Gulf
           Opportunity Act of 2005, which included tax exemptions, repayment
           of qualified distributions, and recapturing of federal mortgage
           subsidies. In addition, the IRS provided regulatory relief
           regarding tenant rules for low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC)
           projects. The following information provides further details.
			  
			  
Sheltering                                                                 
Additional tax           For homeowners or renters who provided housing in 
exemptions               their main homes to qualifying individuals        
                            displaced by Hurricane Katrina, the IRS permitted 
                            the claim of additional exemptions for a specific 
                            displaced individual in 2005 or 2006.^a For each  
                            displaced individual housed, a person could claim 
                            an exemption of $500. For all tax years, the      
                            maximum additional exemption amount that could be 
                            claimed was $2,000 ($1,000 if married filing      
                            separately). Taxpayers in the same home could not 
                            claim additional exemptions for the same          
                            displaced individuals. Exemptions could not be    
                            claimed if the taxpayer received any amount of    
                            rent from any source for providing the housing or 
                            reimbursements for the extra costs of heat,       
                            electricity, or water used by the displaced       
                            individual. However, taxpayers could receive      
                            payments or reimbursements that did not relate to 
                            normal housing costs, such as food and clothing.  
Temporary Housing                                                          
Temporary suspension of  Administered by IRS and state tax credit          
tenant income rules for  allocation agencies, the Low-Income Housing Tax   
low-income housing tax   Credit Program (LIHTC) provides developers and    
credit projects          investors with eligible affordable housing        
                            developments, a dollar-for-dollar reduction in    
                            their federal taxes.^b In response to Hurricanes  
                            Katrina and Rita and at the request of state      
                            housing credit agencies, the IRS temporarily      
                            suspended income limitation requirements for      
                            certain low-income projects in which there were   
                            vacant low-income units to allow states to        
                            temporarily house displaced individuals. The      
                            state housing credit agencies determined the      
                            appropriate period of temporary housing for each  
                            project, not to extend beyond September 30, 2006. 
Assistance to                                                              
Homeowners/ Homebuyers                                                     
New rules for repayment  The IRS implemented new rules to provide          
of qualified             tax-favored withdrawals, repayments, and loans    
distributions            from certain retirement plans for taxpayers who   
                            suffered economic losses as a result of           
                            Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Qualified            
                            distributions were permitted without regard to    
                            need or actual amount of economic loss.^c The     
                            total of qualified hurricane distributions was    
                            limited to $100,000 and was not subject to the    
                            additional taxes usually assessed on early        
                            distributions from retirement plans. Qualified    
                            taxpayers have 3 years from the date of the       
                            distribution to make a repayment. Amounts that    
                            are repaid are not counted as income.             
Increased loan amount    Generally, persons who finance homes under a      
for recapture of federal federally subsidized program (i.e., loans from    
mortgage subsidy         tax-exempt qualified mortgage bonds or loans with 
                            mortgage credit certificates) have to recapture   
                            all or part of the benefit received from the      
                            program when the home is sold or otherwise        
                            disposed of. However, borrowers do not have to    
                            recapture any benefit if the mortgage loan was a  
                            qualified home improvement loan of no more than   
                            $15,000. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and    
                            Rita, the IRS increased this loan amount to       
                            $150,000 if the loan is provided before 2011 and  
                            used to (1) repair damage caused by Hurricane     
                            Katrina to a residence in the disaster area, or   
                            (2) alter, repair, or improve an existing         
                            owner-occupied residence in the Katrina or Rita   
                            Gulf Opportunity (GO) Zones (core disaster area). 

           Source: GAO analysis of Treasury data.

           aQualifying displaced individuals must have had their main home in
           the Hurricane Katrina core disaster area on August 28, 2005, and
           been displaced from that home, or for homes inside the disaster
           area but outside of the core disaster areas; the home must have
           been damaged by Hurricane Katrina or the individual must have been
           evacuated from that home because of Hurricane Katrina. To qualify,
           the individual also must have been provided housing in the
           taxpayer's home for at least 60 consecutive days ending in the tax
           year for which the exemption is claimed. Finally, the individual
           can not be the spouse or dependent of the taxpayer.

           ^bLIHTCs are available for projects with (1) at least 20 percent
           of its units are both rent restricted and rented to households
           with incomes of 50 percent or less than the area median income; or
           (2) at least 40 percent of its units are both rent restricted and
           rented to households with incomes of 60 percent or less than the
           area median income.

           cFor victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, distributions
           (withdrawals) qualified if (1) the distribution was made after
           August 24, 2005, and before January 1, 2007, for Hurricane Katrina
           or after September 22, 2005, and before January 1, 2007, for
           Hurricane Rita; (2) the victim's main home was in the disaster
           areas on August 28, 2005 or September 23, 2005, for Hurricanes
           Katrina and Rita, respectively; and (3) the victim sustained as
           economic loss because of Hurricane Katrina or Rita, including
           damage or destruction of real property or losses related to
           displacement.
			  
			  Appendix IX: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
			  Assistance Provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs

           In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Department of
           Veterans Affairs (VA) provided temporary housing assistance and
           assistance to homeowners and homebuyers affected by the
           hurricanes. For example, the VA directly provided temporary
           housing by making available units from its inventory of real
           estate-owned (REO) properties. In addition, the VA provided
           mortgage relief and assistance to homeowners and worked with loan
           holders to establish mortgage payment forbearance, credit
           protections, and a moratorium on mortgage foreclosures. The
           following information provides additional details on the
           disaster-related housing assistance the VA offered in response to
           Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Temporary Housing                                                          
VA real estate-owned      Following Hurricane Katrina, the VA and the      
homes for lease           Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)       
                             amended an existing memorandum of understanding  
                             for the lease of VA's REO homes to victims       
                             certified for FEMA rental assistance. Although   
                             VA had made its REO homes available in response  
                             to previous disasters, Hurricanes Katrina and    
                             Rita were the first disasters for which the      
                             homes were leased to disaster victims, according 
                             to VA officials. Victims could occupy VA homes   
                             for up to the term of FEMA temporary housing     
                             assistance under a month-to-month lease for $350 
                             per month. As of May 2006, 312 VA homes had been 
                             leased to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and      
                             Rita.                                            
Assistance to Homeowners/                                                  
Homebuyers                                                                 
Foreclosure moratorium    The VA requested that loan holders establish a   
                             90-day moratorium from the date of the declared  
                             disaster on initiating new foreclosures in the   
                             disaster area. The VA requested a 90-day         
                             extension of this moratorium. In disaster areas  
                             declared eligible for individual assistance by   
                             FEMA, the VA requested an extension through      
                             February 28, 2006. In addition, subject to       
                             certain restrictions, the VA extended the        
                             moratorium for an additional 120 days.           
Mortgage payment          The VA encouraged holders of guaranteed loans to 
forbearance, late payment extend every possible forbearance to borrowers   
waivers, and credit       as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and   
protections               encouraged servicers to extend special           
                             forbearance to members of the National Guard     
                             called to active duty to assist in disaster      
                             recovery. VA encouraged lenders to extend        
                             mortgage payment forbearance until February 28,  
                             2006, and requested another extension for an     
                             additional 120 days subject to certain           
                             restrictions. VA also encouraged all servicers   
                             to waive late charges on loans in disaster       
                             areas. In addition, the VA encouraged servicers  
                             to consider suspension of credit bureau          
                             reporting on borrowers nationwide who have been  
                             affected by the hurricanes.                      
Underwriting              VA issued guidance on eligibility and            
flexibilities             underwriting issues regarding veterans who have  
                             been impacted by Hurricane Katrina or Rita.      
                             According to VA, veterans who had derogatory     
                             credit related to the effects of the hurricanes  
                             but who had satisfactory credit prior to the     
                             disasters should be determined as a satisfactory 
                             credit risk. In addition, VA allowed             
                             flexibilities regarding restoration of VA loan   
                             entitlement and documentation requirements. VA   
                             guidance also stated that lenders should not     
                             consider the outstanding mortgage obligation on  
                             damaged or destroyed properties when determining 
                             a veteran's ability to make payments on a new    
                             loan. Further, the Defense Appropriations Act    
                             (Public Law 109-148, December 30, 2005) gave the 
                             Secretary of Veterans Affairs the authority to   
                             make a supplemental grant to a veteran whose     
                             home was previously adapted and substantially    
                             damaged or destroyed as a result of hurricanes   
                             in the Gulf of Mexico in calendar year 2005.     

           Source: GAO analysis of VA data.
			  
			  Appendix X: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
			  Assistance Provided by Freddie Mac

           In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal Home Loan
           Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) provided temporary housing and
           mortgage relief for victims of the disasters. Temporary housing
           assistance Freddie Mac provided included direct housing
           assistance, such making some of its real estate-owned (REO) units
           available for lease, and providing grants to non-profits and other
           housing organizations. In addition, Freddie Mac took steps to
           provide mortgage relief and assistance to borrowers, including
           issuing a temporary moratorium on foreclosures, extending mortgage
           relief to members of the National Guard who were on state duty
           involved in Hurricane Katrina operations, providing mortgage
           payment forbearance, and by taking other measures. The following
           provides further details on disaster-related housing assistance
           provided by Freddie Mac in response to Hurricanes Katrina and
           Rita.
			  
Temporary Housing                                                          
Lease of REO homes and   Freddie Mac created a program in late 2005 to     
multifamily units        lease some of its REO homes to victims of         
                            Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Hurricane victims    
                            could lease units free of charge for 6 months;    
                            however, tenants were required to pay monthly     
                            utilities. At the end of the lease term, tenants  
                            had the option to purchase the home. If the       
                            tenant had an interest in purchasing the home or  
                            other temporary qualifying issues which support   
                            the need for an extension, the tenant had the     
                            option to request an extension of up to 6         
                            additional months. As of September 30, 2006,      
                            Freddie Mac had leased 65 REO homes in Texas and  
                            Georgia. In addition, Freddie Mac also provided   
                            temporary housing in one of its multifamily REO   
                            properties to 31 Hurricane Katrina victims rent   
                            free for 3 months.                                
Grants to non-profits    Freddie Mac donated over $9 million to nonprofits 
and other housing        and other housing organizations for rental        
organizations            assistance and for the purchase, donation, and    
                            lease of single-family homes, multifamily units,  
                            and manufactured homes. For example, Freddie Mac  
                            provided $900,000 to the Mississippi Home         
                            Corporation, a quasigovernmental agency that      
                            administers tax credits and housing bonds, for    
                            the acquisition and positioning of 36             
                            manufactured homes to provide temporary hosing to 
                            hurricane victims in Mississippi. Overall,        
                            Freddie Mac assistance provided homes for 118     
                            displaced families, temporary homes for 483       
                            displaced families, and rental assistance to      
                            1,548 families.                                   
Assistance to                                                              
Homeowners/ Homebuyers                                                     
Foreclosure moratorium   Freddie Mac instructed servicers to suspend       
                            foreclosure activities in the storm-affected      
                            areas. Freddie Mac extended this moratorium for   
                            mortgages on homes in the hurricane disaster      
                            areas through February 28, 2006. For counties in  
                            Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas that   
                            suffered the most severe damage, Freddie Mac      
                            extended it moratorium until May 31, 2006, and    
                            again until August 31, 2006, for counties in      
                            Louisiana and Mississippi, after which Freddie    
                            Mac has required servicers to obtain approval     
                            before initiating any foreclosures.               
Mortgage relief extended Freddie Mac instructed its servicers to extend    
to national guard        mortgage relief available to members of the armed 
                            forces under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act  
                            (SCRA) to National Guard members on state duty    
                            involved in Hurricane Katrina operations. SCRA    
                            protects active duty personnel from foreclosure   
                            and interest rates in excess of 6 percent.        
                            National Guard members are covered when called to 
                            state duty in response to a national emergency    
                            declared by the President.                        
Mortgage payment         As a new policy, Freddie Mac instructed its       
forbearance, loan        servicers to suspend mortgage payment collection  
modification, and credit for September, October, and November 2005 in      
protections              disaster areas designated as eligible for         
                            individual assistance by FEMA. This 3-month       
                            suspension of mortgage payments applied to every  
                            borrower with a Freddie Mac single-family         
                            mortgage in the areas designated for FEMA's       
                            individual assistance program, regardless of the  
                            condition of the home. After the 3-month mortgage 
                            payment suspension, Freddie Mac advised servicers 
                            to offer additional assistance on a case-by-case  
                            basis. Servicers could continue the mortgage      
                            payment suspension or reduce mortgage payments    
                            for a total of 12 months. Freddie Mac extended    
                            its policy to allow servicers the discretion to   
                            extend mortgage payment forbearance through March 
                            31, 2007. As of August 31, 2006, Freddie Mac had  
                            extended forbearance to over 33,500 homeowners    
                            and approved more than 3,000 loan modifications.  
                            In addition, Freddie Mac instructed its servicers 
                            not to report to credit bureaus any reversed or   
                            suspended payments on Freddie Mac-owned loans as  
                            a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and to   
                            suspend late fees during the 3-month mortgage     
                            payment suspension. Unique credit-reporting       
                            requirements were extended and will expire March  
                            31, 2007. Servicers also had the option not to    
                            advance interest on any Freddie Mac mortgage      
                            granted forbearance under its special hurricane   
                            policies.                                         
Mortgage payment return  For the first time, Freddie Mac allowed its       
                            servicers discretion to return mortgage payments  
                            for September 2005 to Hurricane Katrina-affected  
                            borrowers and October 2005 to Hurricane           
                            Rita-affected borrowers for payments made that    
                            had not yet been reported to Freddie Mac.         
                            Borrowers could also request a return of their    
                            mortgage payments.                                
Underwriting             Freddie Mac temporarily eased some underwriting   
flexibilities            requirements to allow hurricane victims to        
                            qualify for mortgages that Freddie Mac would      
                            purchase. The special underwriting requirements   
                            applied to mortgages closed on or after August 30 
                            for Hurricane Katrina victims and on or after     
                            September 25 for victims of Hurricane Rita, and   
                            expired on October 3, 2006. The underwriting      
                            flexibility applied to borrowers who were victims 
                            of either storm and lived in, had employers in,   
                            or relocated from FEMA-designated major disaster  
                            areas. Specifically, the underwriting             
                            flexibilities allowed lenders to accommodate      
                            hurricane victims who had to rely on temporary    
                            income, alternative third-party documentation in  
                            place of lost or destroyed records, or            
                            storm-damaged credit reputations.                 
Tax-exempt mortgage      Freddie Mac committed to purchasing up to $1      
revenue bonds            billion in tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds to   
                            allow housing finance agencies in the Gulf Coast  
                            to provide below-market-rate mortgaged and home   
                            loans to as many as 10,000 families displace by   
                            Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Freddie Mac made     
                            this commitment after Congress passed the Katrina 
                            Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 which waived     
                            homebuyer requirements on mortgage revenue bond   
                            loans and raised the cap on home repair loans     
                            from $15,000 to $150,000.                         
Purchase of mortgages    Freddie Mac eased some of its policies in order   
secured by properties    to purchase an estimated $300 million in          
affected by Hurricane    single-family mortgages, which were closed        
Katrina                  between June 1 and August 29, 2005, and secured   
                            by properties in areas heavily impacted by        
                            Hurricane Katrina, to assist lenders with loans   
                            funded and closed in anticipation of sale to      
                            Freddie Mac. Normally, these loans may have no    
                            longer been eligible for sale because of          
                            potential property damage or income loss caused   
                            by Hurricane Katrina. In response to Hurricane    
                            Katrina, Freddie Mac offered to purchase these    
                            loans through October 31, 2005.                   

           Source: GAO analysis of Freddie Mac data.
			  
			  Appendix XI: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing
			  Assistance Provided by Fannie Mae

           In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal National
           Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) offered direct housing
           assistance and mortgage relief to the storms' victims. Fannie Mae
           offered single family homes and multifamily units for lease from
           its inventory of real estate-owned (REO) properties. Also, Fannie
           Mae offered mortgage relief and assistance that included a
           temporary moratorium on foreclosures, mortgage payment
           forbearance, loan modifications, and credit protections. The
           following information provides further details on disaster-related
           housing assistance offered by Fannie Mae.
			  
Temporary Housing                                                          
Lease of REO homes and   Fannie Mae provided temporary housing assistance  
multifamily units        utilizing its inventory of REO homes and          
                            multifamily units. Fannie Mae made 1,500 of its   
                            REO homes available for lease to victims of       
                            Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Fannie Mae REO homes 
                            were available for lease for up to 18 months rent 
                            free. To lease a Fannie Mae REO home, persons     
                            must have been victims of Hurricane Katrina or    
                            Rita and have had no prior felony convictions. As 
                            of October 2006, Fannie Mae provided over 1,000   
                            families rent free housing in its REO homes.      
                            Evacuee tenants were also given the opportunity   
                            to purchase these homes and Fannie Mae provided   
                            purchase assistance. In addition, Fannie Mae      
                            housed 308 hurricane victims in 148 of its REO    
                            multifamily units in Dallas and Houston, Texas.   
                            Victims who occupied REO multifamily units were   
                            given free rent while they applied for FEMA       
                            rental assistance. Tenants who received rental    
                            assistance from FEMA then paid rent for Fannie    
                            Mae's REO multifamily units. According to Fannie  
                            Mae officials, most victims occupying its         
                            multifamily units began receiving FEMA rental     
                            assistance by January 2006.                       
Waiver of minimum lease  Fannie Mae agreed to waive the minimum 6-month    
term                     lease restriction on its multifamily units to     
                            allow multifamily property owners to permit       
                            shorter-term leases for households displaced by   
                            Hurricane Katrina.                                
Assistance to                                                              
Homeowners/ Homebuyers                                                     
Foreclosure moratorium   Fannie Mae established a moratorium on            
                            foreclosures on single family properties in the   
                            most devastated hurricane areas, lasting until    
                            August 31, 2006. Afterwards, through March 31,    
                            2007, servicers were required to obtain written   
                            approval from Fannie Mae before initiating or     
                            continuing a foreclosure in the six most damaged  
                            counties/parishes.                                
Mortgage payment         Fannie Mae reminded its servicers that its        
forbearance, loan        existing policy for natural disasters allows      
modification, and credit servicers to offer forbearance as they deem       
protections              appropriate, on a case-by-case basis, for up to   
                            18 months on single-family properties. For        
                            multifamily properties, Fannie Mae agreed to      
                            provide an initial 1-month forbearance from       
                            exercising default remedies, and thereafter       
                            authorized the servicers the ability to grant, on 
                            a month-to-month basis, additional forbearance to 
                            multifamily borrowers. In addition, lenders could 
                            offer disaster victims a reduction in mortgage    
                            payments for up to 18 months or create longer     
                            payback plans on a case-by-case basis for         
                            single-family properties. Fannie Mae also waived  
                            income/asset verifications for repayment plans    
                            and loan modifications and encouraged its         
                            servicers to waive late payment charges when      
                            likely due to a natural disaster for              
                            single-family homes. In addition, Fannie Mae      
                            instructed its servicers to suspend credit bureau 
                            reporting for delinquencies caused by the         
                            hurricanes and advised its servicers and lenders  
                            not to report a delinquency to the credit         
                            repositories in cases of missed payments that     
                            were likely caused by hardships from the          
                            hurricanes.                                       
Underwriting             Fannie Mae implemented new single-family          
flexibilities            underwriting flexibilities for hurricane-affected 
                            borrowers to acquire new homes or loans to        
                            renovate damaged homes. These flexibilities       
                            allowed lenders to disregard obligations on       
                            previously owner-occupied homes when calculating  
                            a hurricane-impacted borrower's debt-to-income    
                            ratio and permitted lenders to base loan          
                            decisions on a borrower's credit prior to         
                            Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.                      
           
			  Source: GAO analysis of Fannie Mae data.
			  
			  Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Defense
			  
			  Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban
			  Development
			  
			  Appendix XV: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs
			  
			  Appendix XVI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of Treasury
			  
			  GAO Contact

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			  Acknowledgments

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           Molino; John McGrail; David Pittman; and Rachel Siegel made key
           contributions to this report.
			  
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Highlights of GAO-07-88, a report to congressional addressees

February 2007

DISASTER ASSISTANCE

Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic Disasters

In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed thousands of homes and
displaced over 1 million people. In light of widespread Congressional and
public interest in U.S. agencies' performance in assisting hurricane
victims, GAO initiated work under the Comptroller General's authority to
examine federal housing assistance. Specifically, this report examines (1)
the extent to which the National Response Plan (NRP) clearly described the
responsibilities and capabilities of federal agencies and the Red Cross;
(2) the extent to which these organizations had plans for providing
sheltering and housing assistance; and (3) the perceptions of victims and
others regarding the assistance needed and provided. GAO reviewed the NRP
and related documents, interviewed Red Cross and federal agency officials
and a limited number of storm victims, and convened a group of experts to
discuss these issues.

[62]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that HUD, Treasury, USDA, and VA propose revisions to ESF-6
that fully reflect their capabilities; that these agencies and Defense
develop fact sheets as required by standard operating procedures; and that
HUD, USDA, and VA develop operational plans for their ESF-6
responsibilities. These agencies generally concurred with our
recommendations.

In general, the NRP, including its annex covering sheltering and temporary
housing (emergency support function no. 6 or ESF-6) clearly described the
overall responsibilities of the two primary agencies--the Red Cross and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). However, the
responsibilities described for the support agencies--the Departments of
Agriculture (USDA), Defense, Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA)--did not, and still do not, fully
reflect their capabilities. For example, USDA provided temporary housing
for victims, and Treasury acted to make available vacant rental units
subsidized through a tax program, but the ESF-6 annex did not reflect
these capabilities. Further, the support agencies had not, and have not
yet, developed fact sheets laying out their roles and responsibilities,
notification and activation procedures, and agency specific authorities,
as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. FEMA's ability to effectively
coordinate federal housing assistance was limited because the agency was
not aware of the support agencies' full capabilities.

The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked plans for providing
shelter and temporary housing in response to catastrophic disasters such
as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita but have since taken some steps to improve
their response capabilities. Some ESF-6 support agencies had not developed
operational plans for meeting their ESF-6 responsibilities, and while they
were ultimately able to contribute much-needed assistance, it was not as
timely as it might have been. For example, HUD and VA worked out
agreements with FEMA after the storms to provide vacant properties, but it
took several months before some were available to victims. HUD, USDA, and
VA have formed an informal working group to work out procedural details
for providing housing assistance, in order to avoid the need to do so
after a disaster event. However, this group is not intended to address the
full range of these agencies' responsibilities under ESF-6, and does not
have a specific timetable for its activities.

The specific needs of victims and their perceptions of the assistance that
was provided varied, depending in part on circumstances such as where they
were located after the disaster, whether they were homeowners or renters,
and whether they had special needs. Most victims were eligible for some
form of federal temporary housing assistance--such as rental assistance or
a travel trailer--and those we contacted had mixed perceptions of the
assistance they received. Our interviews with victims, as well as our
expert group, indicate that temporary housing needs include not just
shelter, but also access to medical facilities, public transportation,
schools, employment opportunities, and other social services--and,
particularly for those displaced to distant locations, information about
all of these things. Legislation enacted in October 2006 requires a
strategy that is to address a number of these ancillary needs for victims
of future catastrophic disasters, and FEMA has initiated this effort.

References

Visible links
  47. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-860
  48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-712
  56. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-442T
  57. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-403T
  58. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1013
  59. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-252T
  60. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-442T
  61. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-44
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