Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and
Management and Efforts to Address Them (18-JUN-07, GAO-07-874).
The U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater program was designed to replace
aging vessels and aircraft and information capabilities with new
and upgraded assets and equipment. GAO's prior work raised
concerns about the Coast Guard's efforts to upgrade or acquire
assets on schedule and manage the Deepwater prime contractor.
This report responds to congressional direction contained in a
conference report accompanying the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) fiscal year 2007 appropriations bill. GAO
addressed two objectives: (1) What is the status of key Deepwater
assets and how is the Coast Guard addressing any asset-related
challenges that have been encountered? (2) What is the status of
the Coast Guard's overall management of the Deepwater contract?
GAO's work is based on reports, memorandums, and data on the
plans and management of the Deepwater program and interviews with
key officials. GAO is not making any new recommendations. DHS and
the Coast Guard reviewed a draft of this report and concurred
with our findings.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-874
ACCNO: A70925
TITLE: Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset
Deployment and Management and Efforts to Address Them
DATE: 06/18/2007
SUBJECT: Accountability
Aircraft
Cost control
Homeland security
Performance measures
Procurement planning
Program evaluation
Program management
Schedule slippages
Ships
Systems design
Federal procurement
Coast Guard Deepwater Project
Fast Response Cutter
HH-65 Helicopter
National Security Cutter
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GAO-07-874
* [1]Summary
* [2]Concluding Observations
* [3]Agency Comments
* [4]GAO Contacts
* [5]Acknowledgments
* [6]GAO's Mission
* [7]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [8]Order by Mail or Phone
* [9]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [10]Congressional Relations
* [11]Public Affairs
Report to the Subcommittees on Homeland Security, House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
June 2007
COAST GUARD
Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and Management and Efforts
to Address Them
GAO-07-874
Contents
Letter 1
Summary 3
Concluding Observations 4
Agency Comments 5
Appendix I Briefing Slides 6
Appendix II Status of Deepwater Vessel and Aircraft Assets 59
Appendix III Status of Prior GAO Recommendations 69
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 71
Appendix V GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments 75
Related GAO Products 76
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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separately.
Abbreviations
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FRC Fast Response Cutter
GAO Government Accountability Office
ICGS Integrated Coast Guard Systems
IPT Integrated product team
LRI Long-Range Interceptor
LRS Long-Range Surveillance Aircraft
MCH Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopter
MPA Maritime Patrol Aircraft
MRR Medium-Range Recovery Helicopter
NSC National Security Cutter
OPC Offshore Patrol Cutter
SRP Short-Range Prosecutor
TOC Total ownership cost
VUAV Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
June 18, 2007
The Honorable David E. Price, Chair
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
House Committee on Appropriations
The Honorable Harold Rogers, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
House Committee on Appropriations
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd, Chair
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
Senate Committee on Appropriations
The Honorable Thad Cochran, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
Senate Committee on Appropriations
The Coast Guard is in the midst of the largest acquisition program in its
history--one that has experienced serious performance and management
problems. The Deepwater program is a 25-year, $24 billion plan to replace
or modernize the Coast Guard's fleet of vessels and aircraft (assets), and
information management capabilities. The Coast Guard chose a lead system
integrator to manage a "system-of-systems" approach intended to integrate
the delivery of assets, sensors, and communications links to accomplish
missions more effectively. Now in the final year of its first 5-year
Deepwater contract period, the Coast Guard is currently negotiating
contract modifications for the next performance period with the system
integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS). These negotiations are
to be completed by June 25, 2007. Our work reflects the status of the
program before such negotiations were finalized. The Coast Guard is in the
midst of the largest acquisition program in its history--one that has
experienced serious performance and management problems. The Deepwater
program is a 25-year, $24 billion plan to replace or modernize the Coast
Guard's fleet of vessels and aircraft (assets), and information management
capabilities. The Coast Guard chose a lead system integrator to manage a
"system-of-systems" approach intended to integrate the delivery of assets,
sensors, and communications links to accomplish missions more effectively.
Now in the final year of its first 5-year Deepwater contract period, the
Coast Guard is currently negotiating contract modifications for the next
performance period with the system integrator, Integrated Coast Guard
Systems (ICGS). These negotiations are to be completed by June 25, 2007.
Our work reflects the status of the program before such negotiations were
finalized.
Since the Deepwater program's inception, we have expressed concerns that
the system-of-systems acquisition strategy was risky for a project of this
magnitude within the Coast Guard. In particular, our work raised concerns
about the Coast Guard's efforts to upgrade or acquire Deepwater assets on
schedule, and manage and effectively monitor the lead system integrator,
and we made several recommendations to the Coast Guard to address these
concerns. More recently, the Coast Guard announced a number of changes
that are aimed at addressing these recommendations and other related
program concerns. In addition, the Coast Guard has Since the Deepwater
program's inception, we have expressed concerns that the system-of-systems
acquisition strategy was risky for a project of this magnitude within the
Coast Guard. In particular, our work raised concerns about the Coast
Guard's efforts to upgrade or acquire Deepwater assets on schedule, and
manage and effectively monitor the lead system integrator, and we made
several recommendations to the Coast Guard to address these concerns. More
recently, the Coast Guard announced a number of changes that are aimed at
addressing these recommendations and other related program concerns. In
addition, the Coast Guard has begun to take actions to hold the system
integrator accountable for problems that have arisen with the design and
construction of certain Deepwater assets that will affect the lead system
integrator's roles and responsibilities in executing the program moving
forward.
On May 15 and May 17, 2007, in response to congressional direction
contained in a conference report accompanying the Department of Homeland
Security's Fiscal Year 2007 Appropriations bill,^1 we briefed your
committees on two key objectives:
(1) What is the status of key Deepwater assets and how is the
Coast Guard addressing any asset-related challenges that have been
encountered?
(2) What is the status of the Coast Guard's overall management of
the Deepwater contract?
The content of our briefing, which provided examples of selected Deepwater
vessels and aircraft that illustrate progress made with certain assets, as
well as particular operational or management challenges, is contained in
appendix I. Details on the status of all 10 Deepwater asset classes are
contained in appendix II. Information on the status of prior GAO
recommendations related to this work is in appendix III. In addition, a
list of related GAO products is provided at the end of the report.
In conducting our work, we analyzed reports, memorandums, and data on the
Coast Guard's plans and management of the Deepwater program; obtained
information from multiple sources, including the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS); U.S. Coast Guard; Coast Guard Deepwater System Integration
Program Office; the Deepwater system integrator and its subcontractors;
and private engineering firms. We also interviewed officials responsible
for management of the Deepwater program during site visits to Coast Guard
headquarters, Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office, Deepwater System
Integration Program Office, Coast Guard Aircraft and Supply Center, and
Coast Guard Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands and their associated
Maintenance and Logistics Commands.
To assess the reliability of the data obtained from the Coast Guard and
from ICGS--including but not limited to cost, schedule, and staffing
data--we analyzed the data for errors in accuracy and completeness and
interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about these data. We determined
that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
Our work was conducted between July 2006 and May 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
^1H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-699 (2006), incorporating GAO reporting
provisions contained in H.R. Rep. No. 109-476 (2006).
Summary
Five years into the Deepwater contract, some assets have been delivered^2
and are undergoing planned improvements or initial testing, but several
other assets have encountered significant problems. For example, engine
upgrades to the HH-65 helicopters are well underway, the first two
Maritime Patrol Aircraft have been delivered, and eight Short-Range
Prosecutor cutter-based small patrol boats have been delivered according
to schedule. In contrast, other Deepwater assets have experienced
problems, which have created a number of challenges for the Coast Guard in
terms of delivery delays and loss of operational capabilities. The
Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VUAV) has
experienced delays as the Coast Guard assesses alternatives; the 123-foot
patrol boats experienced structural problems and were eventually removed
from service; and the Fast Response Cutter (FRC), which was to replace the
Coast Guard's legacy patrol boat fleet, experienced design problems and
the Coast Guard suspended all work. Further, the National Security Cutter
(NSC) has structural problems with the first two hulls that, if not
corrected, will reduce the fatigue lives of these vessels. To address
these and other challenges, the Coast Guard is taking a variety of
actions, such as relying more heavily on legacy assets to help address
patrol hour shortages, making plans to purchase off-the-shelf assets to
expedite delivery, and planning corrective structural modifications.
Over the past several years, we have expressed concerns and made
recommendations regarding the Coast Guard's ability to manage and oversee
the Deepwater program. Our concerns have centered on three main areas:
^2For purposes of this report, we are using the term "delivery" to refer
to the date when the Coast Guard takes possession of the asset from the
contractor. This does not correspond to the date the asset is operational,
because the asset will generally still require further evaluation and
testing before it is deployed.
o Program management: The Coast Guard had not effectively
implemented key components (e.g., integrated product teams)^3
needed to manage the program and oversee the system integrator.
o Contractor accountability: The Coast Guard had not effectively
measured contractor performance against Deepwater program goals.
o Cost control: Control of future costs through competition
remained a risk because of weak oversight of subcontractor
decisions related to competition.
These concerns were exacerbated by staffing shortfalls and poor
communication and collaboration between Deepwater and contractor
personnel. Since 2004, the Coast Guard has taken some actions in response
to these concerns and recommendations. However, challenges, such as
inadequate staffing levels and undefined roles between the Coast Guard and
contractor regarding maintenance and logistics support, remain. The Coast
Guard recently decided to become more involved in program management. It
plans to assume the lead role as system integrator while continuing to use
the prime contractor to perform certain functions. Furthermore, it has
decided to take other steps, including (1) changing the leadership and
decision-making authority of integrated product teams, (2) using third
parties to independently review asset development and major modifications,
(3) reaffirming the role of the Coast Guard's chief engineer as the
technical authority for all acquisition projects, and (4) reorganizing
Deepwater program acquisition functions within the Coast Guard
organization to ensure sufficient staff with the requisite acquisition
skills and abilities are in place.
Concluding Observations
While there has been progress with the design, acquisition, and delivery
of some Deepwater assets, problems with other assets raise questions about
the Coast Guard's ability to maintain an approach that fully integrates
and synchronizes the retirement of legacy assets with the introduction of
new assets. As problems are encountered and asset delivery schedules slip,
the overall operational capabilities of new Deepwater assets and the
system as a whole could be reduced, particularly in the shortterm.
The proactive program management actions the Coast Guard recently
announced could help get the Deepwater program on track. However, how the
planned actions are implemented is important. Further, while the Coast
Guard plans to assume more direct responsibility for Deepwater management,
until it has sufficient staff with the requisite skills and abilities to
execute new and expanding responsibilities, the Deepwater program will
remain at risk in terms of getting what is needed, on time, and at a fair
price.
^3Integrated product teams are composed of members representing the Coast
Guard, the contractor, and subcontractors.
Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Department of
Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast Guard. The department referred the
draft to the U.S. Coast Guard, which concurred with our findings. The
agency's formal comments appear in appendix IV.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or by e-mail at
[12][email protected] ; or John P. Hutton at (202) 512-7773 or by e-mail
at [13][email protected] . Key contributors to this report were Penny
Augustine, Amy Bernstein, Virginia Chanley, Christopher Conrad, Adam
Couvillion, Kathryn Edelman, Geoffrey Hamilton, Melissa Jaynes, Crystal
Jones, Raffaele Roffo, Sylvia Schatz, and Jonathan R. Tumin.
Stephen L. Caldwell, Director
Homeland Security and Justice
John P. Hutton, Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Briefing Slides
Appendix II: Status of Deepwater Vessel and Aircraft Assets
Appendix III: Status of Prior GAO Recommendations
GAO Recommendation 2004 GAO 2006 Status GAO 2007 Status
Program Management
Follow the procedures Implemented
outlined in the human
capital plan to ensure
that adequate staffing is
in place and turnover
among Deepwater personnel
is proactively addressed.
In collaboration with the Partially Partially Implemented: The
system integrator, take Implemented Coast Guard has taken over IPT
the necessary steps to leadership and plans to update
make IPTs effective the program management plan to
including: (1) training reflect changing roles and
IPT members in a timely responsibilities between the
manner, (2) chartering the Coast Guard and ICGS. It is too
sub-IPTs, (3) making early to assess the impact of
improvements to the these planned changes at this
electronic information time.
system that would result
in better information
sharing among IPT members
who are geographically
dispersed.
As Deepwater assets begin Partially Partially Implemented: The
to be delivered to Implemented Coast Guard has announced they
operational units, ensure are reaffirming the role of the
that field operators and Coast Guard's chief engineer as
maintenance personnel are the technical authority for all
provided with timely acquisition projects. In
information and training addition, the Coast Guard is
on how the transition will now the default provider of
occur and how maintenance maintenance and logistics and
responsibilities are to be is responsible for ensuring
divided between system that logistics products are
integrator and Coast Guard developed, implemented, and
personnel. delivered. Given these recent
decisions, time is needed to
evaluate the implementation.
Contractor Accountability
Develop and adhere to Implemented
measurable award fee
criteria consistent with
the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy's
guidance.
In all future award fee Implemented
assessments, ensure that
the input of contracting
officers' technical
representatives COTR) are
considered and set forth
in a more rigorous manner.
Hold the system integrator Implemented^a
accountable in future
award fee determinations
for improving the
effectiveness of IPTs.
Establish a TOC baseline USCG will not Closed: Although set forth in
that can be used to Implement its program management plan,
measure whether the the Coast Guard does not intend
Deepwater acquisition to establish a baseline cost
approach is providing the for replacing the assets under
government with increased a traditional approach which
efficiencies compared to could be used as a comparison
what it would have cost to the Deepwater system of
without this approach. systems acquisition approach.
Based on the current Partially Partially Implemented: Key
schedule for delivery of Implemented performance parameters have
Deepwater assets, been added to criteria for
establish a time frame for measuring operational
when the models and effectiveness; however, the
metrics will be in place models still lack the fidelity
with the appropriate to attribute improvements to
degree of fidelity to be the contractor or the Coast
able to measure the Guard.
contractor's progress
toward improving
operational effectiveness.
Establish criteria to Partially Partially Implemented: DHS's
determine when the TOC Implemented oversight requirements include
baseline should be an annual review of the
adjusted and ensure that Deepwater program baseline and
the reasons for any submission of quarterly
changes are documented. reports. The most recent
baseline update (Nov. 2006) has
yet to be approved by DHS. The
Coast Guard has provided DHS
with quarterly program reports.
Further, according to a Coast
Guard official, DHS approval is
pending on shifting the
baseline against which the
systems integrator is measured
to an asset basis.
Cost Control Through
Competition
For subcontracts over $5 Implemented
million awarded by ICGS to
Lockheed Martin and
Northrop Grumman, require
Lockheed Martin and
Northrop Grumman to notify
the Coast Guard of a
decision to perform the
work themselves rather
than contracting it out.
The documentation should
include an evaluation of
the alternatives
considered.
Develop a comprehensive Partially Partially Implemented: Although
plan for holding the Implemented the Coast Guard had requested
system integrator additional information from
accountable for ensuring ICGS on competition, it does
an adequate degree of not have the information to
competition among determine the level of
second-tier suppliers in competition achieved. Further,
future program years. This they have not included metrics
plan should include to measure competition outcomes
metrics to measure in the award fee decisions. In
outcomes and consideration the mean time, the Coast Guard
of how these outcomes will business case analyses
be taken into account in demonstrated that ICGS did not
future award fee leverage competition to deliver
decisions. the best value for certain
Deepwater assets. The Coast
Guard plans to gain insight
into competition by performing
additional business case
analyses and if necessary
re-competing assets.
Source: [14]GAO-04-380 , [15]GAO-06-546 , and GAO analysis of Coast Guard
data.
aIPT performance was included in the award fee criteria for the February
2005-December 2006 performance evaluation periods, but was removed from
the award fee criteria for the January 2007-June 2007 performance
evaluation period.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts
Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or by e-mail at
[16][email protected] ; or John P. Hutton at (202) 512-7773 or by e-mail
at [17][email protected] .
Acknowledgments
In addition to the above, key contributors to this report were Penny
Augustine, Amy Bernstein, Virginia Chanley, Christopher Conrad, Adam
Couvillion, Kathryn Edelman, Geoffrey Hamilton, Melissa Jaynes, Crystal
Jones, Raffaele Roffo, Sylvia Schatz, and Jonathan R. Tumin.
Related GAO Products
Coast Guard: Status of Efforts to Improve Deepwater Program Management and
Address Operational Challenges, [18]GAO-07-575T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8,
2007).
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on Deepwater Program Assets and
Management Challenges, [19]GAO-07-446T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2007).
Coast Guard: Coast Guard Efforts to Improve Management and Address
Operational Challenges in the Deepwater Program, [20]GAO-07-460T
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2007).
Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland Security's
Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program,
[21]GAO-07-453T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2007).
Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts,
[22]GAO-06-764 (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006).
Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program
Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring Is Warranted,
[23]GAO-06-546 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2006).
Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater Legacy Asset
Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition Challenges
Remain, [24]GAO-05-757 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005).
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater Legacy
Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, [25]GAO-05-651T (Washington,
D.C.: June 21, 2005).
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater Legacy
Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, [26]GAO-05-307T (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 20, 2005).
Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed,
[27]GAO-04-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004).
Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs Increased
Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, [28]GAO-04-380
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004).
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks,
[29]GAO-01-659T (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001).
Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Deepwater Project, but Risks Remain,
[30]GAO-01-564 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2001).
Coast Guard's Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's Justification
and Affordability Need to Be Addressed More Thoroughly, [31]GAO/RCED-99-6
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 1998).
(440533)
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[38]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-874 .
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For more information, contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or
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Highlights of [39]GAO-07-874 , a report to Subcommittees on Homeland
Security, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
June 2007
COAST GUARD
Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and Management and Efforts
to Address Them
The U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater program was designed to replace aging
vessels and aircraft and information capabilities with new and upgraded
assets and equipment. GAO's prior work raised concerns about the Coast
Guard's efforts to upgrade or acquire assets on schedule and manage the
Deepwater prime contractor.
This report responds to congressional direction contained in a conference
report accompanying the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) fiscal year
2007 appropriations bill. GAO addressed two objectives: (1) What is the
status of key Deepwater assets and how is the Coast Guard addressing any
asset-related challenges that have been encountered? (2) What is the
status of the Coast Guard's overall management of the Deepwater contract?
GAO's work is based on reports, memorandums, and data on the plans and
management of the Deepwater program and interviews with key officials. GAO
is not making any new recommendations. DHS and the Coast Guard reviewed a
draft of this report and concurred with our findings. Their formal
comments appear in appendix IV.
Five years into the Deepwater contract, some assets have been delivered
and are undergoing planned improvements or initial testing, but several
other assets have encountered significant problems. For example, engine
upgrades to the HH-65 helicopters are well under way; and the first two
Maritime Patrol Aircraft and the first eight Short Range Prosecutor
cutter-based small patrol boats have been delivered according to schedule.
In contrast, other Deepwater assets have experienced problems, which have
created a number of challenges for the Coast Guard in terms of delivery
delays and loss of operational capabilities. For example, the Vertical
Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle has experienced delays as the
Coast Guard assesses alternatives; the Fast Response Cutter, which was to
replace the Coast Guard's legacy patrol boat fleet, experienced design
problems and the Coast Guard suspended all work, and the first two hulls
of the National Security Cutter have structural design issues that, if not
corrected, will reduce the fatigue lives of these vessels. To address
these and other challenges, the Coast Guard is taking a variety of
actions, such as relying more heavily on legacy assets to help address
patrol hour shortages, making plans to purchase off-the-shelf assets to
expedite delivery, and planning corrective structural modifications.
Over the past several years, GAO has expressed concerns about the Coast
Guard's ability to manage and oversee the Deepwater program. Specifically,
the program has faced challenges in terms of management, contractor
accountability, and cost control. While the Coast Guard has taken actions
since 2004 in response to these concerns, challenges remain. As a result,
the Coast Guard recently decided to become more directly involved in
program management and has chosen to (1) take over the leadership of the
integrated product teams--a key program management tool; (2) acquire
certain Deepwater assets outside of the existing Deepwater contract; (3)
use independent, third-party reviews for asset development; and (4)
reorganize the Deepwater acquisition functions within the Coast Guard
organization. Given the Coast Guard's increased role, having sufficient
staff with the requisite skills and abilities to execute new and expanding
responsibilities will be important to getting what is needed, on time, and
at a fair price.
Deepwater Vessel and Aircraft Classes
References
Visible links
12. mailto:[email protected]
13. mailto:[email protected]
14. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-380
15. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-546
16. mailto:[email protected]
17. mailto:[email protected]
18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-575T
19. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-446T
20. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-460T
21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-453T
22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-764
23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-546
24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-757
25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-651T
26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-307T
27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-695
28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-380
29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-659T
30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-564
31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-99-6
32. http://www.gao.gov/
33. http://www.gao.gov/
34. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
35. mailto:[email protected]
36. mailto:[email protected]
37. mailto:[email protected]
38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-874
39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-874
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