    Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and
    Management and Efforts to Address Them (18-JUN-07, GAO-07-874).

    The U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater program was designed to replace
    aging vessels and aircraft and information capabilities with new
    and upgraded assets and equipment. GAO's prior work raised
    concerns about the Coast Guard's efforts to upgrade or acquire
    assets on schedule and manage the Deepwater prime contractor.
    This report responds to congressional direction contained in a
    conference report accompanying the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) fiscal year 2007 appropriations bill. GAO
    addressed two objectives: (1) What is the status of key Deepwater
    assets and how is the Coast Guard addressing any asset-related
    challenges that have been encountered? (2) What is the status of
    the Coast Guard's overall management of the Deepwater contract?
    GAO's work is based on reports, memorandums, and data on the
    plans and management of the Deepwater program and interviews with
    key officials. GAO is not making any new recommendations. DHS and
    the Coast Guard reviewed a draft of this report and concurred
    with our findings.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-874
        ACCNO:   A70925
      TITLE:     Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset
    Deployment and Management and Efforts to Address Them
         DATE:   06/18/2007
      SUBJECT:   Accountability
    	     Aircraft
    	     Cost control
    	     Homeland security
    	     Performance measures
    	     Procurement planning
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Program management
    	     Schedule slippages
    	     Ships
    	     Systems design
    	     Federal procurement
    	     Coast Guard Deepwater Project
    	     Fast Response Cutter
    	     HH-65 Helicopter
    	     National Security Cutter

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    ******************************************************************
    GAO-07-874

         * [1]Summary
         * [2]Concluding Observations
         * [3]Agency Comments
         * [4]GAO Contacts
         * [5]Acknowledgments
         * [6]GAO's Mission
         * [7]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

              * [8]Order by Mail or Phone

         * [9]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
         * [10]Congressional Relations
         * [11]Public Affairs

    Report to the Subcommittees on Homeland Security, House and Senate
    Committees on Appropriations

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    June 2007

    COAST GUARD

    Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and Management and Efforts
    to Address Them

    GAO-07-874

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Summary 3
    Concluding Observations 4
    Agency Comments 5
    Appendix I Briefing Slides 6
    Appendix II Status of Deepwater Vessel and Aircraft Assets 59
    Appendix III Status of Prior GAO Recommendations 69
    Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 71
    Appendix V GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments 75
    Related GAO Products 76

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
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    separately.

    Abbreviations

    DHS Department of Homeland Security
    FRC Fast Response Cutter
    GAO Government Accountability Office
    ICGS Integrated Coast Guard Systems
    IPT Integrated product team
    LRI Long-Range Interceptor
    LRS Long-Range Surveillance Aircraft
    MCH Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopter
    MPA Maritime Patrol Aircraft
    MRR Medium-Range Recovery Helicopter
    NSC National Security Cutter
    OPC Offshore Patrol Cutter
    SRP Short-Range Prosecutor
    TOC Total ownership cost
    VUAV Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

    United States Government Accountability Office
    Washington, DC 20548

    June 18, 2007

    The Honorable David E. Price, Chair
    Subcommittee on Homeland Security
    House Committee on Appropriations

    The Honorable Harold Rogers, Ranking Member
    Subcommittee on Homeland Security
    House Committee on Appropriations

    The Honorable Robert C. Byrd, Chair
    Subcommittee on Homeland Security
    Senate Committee on Appropriations

    The Honorable Thad Cochran, Ranking Member
    Subcommittee on Homeland Security
    Senate Committee on Appropriations

    The Coast Guard is in the midst of the largest acquisition program in its
    history--one that has experienced serious performance and management
    problems. The Deepwater program is a 25-year, $24 billion plan to replace
    or modernize the Coast Guard's fleet of vessels and aircraft (assets), and
    information management capabilities. The Coast Guard chose a lead system
    integrator to manage a "system-of-systems" approach intended to integrate
    the delivery of assets, sensors, and communications links to accomplish
    missions more effectively. Now in the final year of its first 5-year
    Deepwater contract period, the Coast Guard is currently negotiating
    contract modifications for the next performance period with the system
    integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS). These negotiations are
    to be completed by June 25, 2007. Our work reflects the status of the
    program before such negotiations were finalized. The Coast Guard is in the
    midst of the largest acquisition program in its history--one that has
    experienced serious performance and management problems. The Deepwater
    program is a 25-year, $24 billion plan to replace or modernize the Coast
    Guard's fleet of vessels and aircraft (assets), and information management
    capabilities. The Coast Guard chose a lead system integrator to manage a
    "system-of-systems" approach intended to integrate the delivery of assets,
    sensors, and communications links to accomplish missions more effectively.
    Now in the final year of its first 5-year Deepwater contract period, the
    Coast Guard is currently negotiating contract modifications for the next
    performance period with the system integrator, Integrated Coast Guard
    Systems (ICGS). These negotiations are to be completed by June 25, 2007.
    Our work reflects the status of the program before such negotiations were
    finalized.

    Since the Deepwater program's inception, we have expressed concerns that
    the system-of-systems acquisition strategy was risky for a project of this
    magnitude within the Coast Guard. In particular, our work raised concerns
    about the Coast Guard's efforts to upgrade or acquire Deepwater assets on
    schedule, and manage and effectively monitor the lead system integrator,
    and we made several recommendations to the Coast Guard to address these
    concerns. More recently, the Coast Guard announced a number of changes
    that are aimed at addressing these recommendations and other related
    program concerns. In addition, the Coast Guard has Since the Deepwater
    program's inception, we have expressed concerns that the system-of-systems
    acquisition strategy was risky for a project of this magnitude within the
    Coast Guard. In particular, our work raised concerns about the Coast
    Guard's efforts to upgrade or acquire Deepwater assets on schedule, and
    manage and effectively monitor the lead system integrator, and we made
    several recommendations to the Coast Guard to address these concerns. More
    recently, the Coast Guard announced a number of changes that are aimed at
    addressing these recommendations and other related program concerns. In
    addition, the Coast Guard has begun to take actions to hold the system
    integrator accountable for problems that have arisen with the design and
    construction of certain Deepwater assets that will affect the lead system
    integrator's roles and responsibilities in executing the program moving
    forward.

    On May 15 and May 17, 2007, in response to congressional direction
    contained in a conference report accompanying the Department of Homeland
    Security's Fiscal Year 2007 Appropriations bill,^1 we briefed your
    committees on two key objectives:

               (1) What is the status of key Deepwater assets and how is the
               Coast Guard addressing any asset-related challenges that have been
               encountered?
               (2) What is the status of the Coast Guard's overall management of
               the Deepwater contract?

    The content of our briefing, which provided examples of selected Deepwater
    vessels and aircraft that illustrate progress made with certain assets, as
    well as particular operational or management challenges, is contained in
    appendix I. Details on the status of all 10 Deepwater asset classes are
    contained in appendix II. Information on the status of prior GAO
    recommendations related to this work is in appendix III. In addition, a
    list of related GAO products is provided at the end of the report.

    In conducting our work, we analyzed reports, memorandums, and data on the
    Coast Guard's plans and management of the Deepwater program; obtained
    information from multiple sources, including the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS); U.S. Coast Guard; Coast Guard Deepwater System Integration
    Program Office; the Deepwater system integrator and its subcontractors;
    and private engineering firms. We also interviewed officials responsible
    for management of the Deepwater program during site visits to Coast Guard
    headquarters, Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office, Deepwater System
    Integration Program Office, Coast Guard Aircraft and Supply Center, and
    Coast Guard Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands and their associated
    Maintenance and Logistics Commands.

    To assess the reliability of the data obtained from the Coast Guard and
    from ICGS--including but not limited to cost, schedule, and staffing
    data--we analyzed the data for errors in accuracy and completeness and
    interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about these data. We determined
    that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
    Our work was conducted between July 2006 and May 2007 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    ^1H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-699 (2006), incorporating GAO reporting
    provisions contained in H.R. Rep. No. 109-476 (2006).

    Summary

    Five years into the Deepwater contract, some assets have been delivered^2
    and are undergoing planned improvements or initial testing, but several
    other assets have encountered significant problems. For example, engine
    upgrades to the HH-65 helicopters are well underway, the first two
    Maritime Patrol Aircraft have been delivered, and eight Short-Range
    Prosecutor cutter-based small patrol boats have been delivered according
    to schedule. In contrast, other Deepwater assets have experienced
    problems, which have created a number of challenges for the Coast Guard in
    terms of delivery delays and loss of operational capabilities. The
    Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VUAV) has
    experienced delays as the Coast Guard assesses alternatives; the 123-foot
    patrol boats experienced structural problems and were eventually removed
    from service; and the Fast Response Cutter (FRC), which was to replace the
    Coast Guard's legacy patrol boat fleet, experienced design problems and
    the Coast Guard suspended all work. Further, the National Security Cutter
    (NSC) has structural problems with the first two hulls that, if not
    corrected, will reduce the fatigue lives of these vessels. To address
    these and other challenges, the Coast Guard is taking a variety of
    actions, such as relying more heavily on legacy assets to help address
    patrol hour shortages, making plans to purchase off-the-shelf assets to
    expedite delivery, and planning corrective structural modifications.

    Over the past several years, we have expressed concerns and made
    recommendations regarding the Coast Guard's ability to manage and oversee
    the Deepwater program. Our concerns have centered on three main areas:

    ^2For purposes of this report, we are using the term "delivery" to refer
    to the date when the Coast Guard takes possession of the asset from the
    contractor. This does not correspond to the date the asset is operational,
    because the asset will generally still require further evaluation and
    testing before it is deployed.

               o Program management: The Coast Guard had not effectively
               implemented key components (e.g., integrated product teams)^3
               needed to manage the program and oversee the system integrator.
               o Contractor accountability: The Coast Guard had not effectively
               measured contractor performance against Deepwater program goals.
               o Cost control: Control of future costs through competition
               remained a risk because of weak oversight of subcontractor
               decisions related to competition.

    These concerns were exacerbated by staffing shortfalls and poor
    communication and collaboration between Deepwater and contractor
    personnel. Since 2004, the Coast Guard has taken some actions in response
    to these concerns and recommendations. However, challenges, such as
    inadequate staffing levels and undefined roles between the Coast Guard and
    contractor regarding maintenance and logistics support, remain. The Coast
    Guard recently decided to become more involved in program management. It
    plans to assume the lead role as system integrator while continuing to use
    the prime contractor to perform certain functions. Furthermore, it has
    decided to take other steps, including (1) changing the leadership and
    decision-making authority of integrated product teams, (2) using third
    parties to independently review asset development and major modifications,
    (3) reaffirming the role of the Coast Guard's chief engineer as the
    technical authority for all acquisition projects, and (4) reorganizing
    Deepwater program acquisition functions within the Coast Guard
    organization to ensure sufficient staff with the requisite acquisition
    skills and abilities are in place.

    Concluding Observations

    While there has been progress with the design, acquisition, and delivery
    of some Deepwater assets, problems with other assets raise questions about
    the Coast Guard's ability to maintain an approach that fully integrates
    and synchronizes the retirement of legacy assets with the introduction of
    new assets. As problems are encountered and asset delivery schedules slip,
    the overall operational capabilities of new Deepwater assets and the
    system as a whole could be reduced, particularly in the shortterm.

    The proactive program management actions the Coast Guard recently
    announced could help get the Deepwater program on track. However, how the
    planned actions are implemented is important. Further, while the Coast
    Guard plans to assume more direct responsibility for Deepwater management,
    until it has sufficient staff with the requisite skills and abilities to
    execute new and expanding responsibilities, the Deepwater program will
    remain at risk in terms of getting what is needed, on time, and at a fair
    price.

    ^3Integrated product teams are composed of members representing the Coast
    Guard, the contractor, and subcontractors.

    Agency Comments

    We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Department of
    Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast Guard. The department referred the
    draft to the U.S. Coast Guard, which concurred with our findings. The
    agency's formal comments appear in appendix IV.

    If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
    contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or by e-mail at
    [12]caldwells@gao.gov ; or John P. Hutton at (202) 512-7773 or by e-mail
    at [13]huttonj@gao.gov . Key contributors to this report were Penny
    Augustine, Amy Bernstein, Virginia Chanley, Christopher Conrad, Adam
    Couvillion, Kathryn Edelman, Geoffrey Hamilton, Melissa Jaynes, Crystal
    Jones, Raffaele Roffo, Sylvia Schatz, and Jonathan R. Tumin.

    Stephen L. Caldwell, Director
    Homeland Security and Justice

    John P. Hutton, Director
    Acquisition and Sourcing Management

    Appendix I: Briefing Slides

    Appendix II: Status of Deepwater Vessel and Aircraft Assets

    Appendix III: Status of Prior GAO Recommendations

    GAO Recommendation 2004    GAO 2006 Status GAO 2007 Status
    Program Management
    Follow the procedures      Implemented
    outlined in the human
    capital plan to ensure
    that adequate staffing is
    in place and turnover
    among Deepwater personnel
    is proactively addressed.
    In collaboration with the  Partially       Partially Implemented: The
    system integrator, take    Implemented     Coast Guard has taken over IPT
    the necessary steps to                     leadership and plans to update
    make IPTs effective                        the program management plan to
    including: (1) training                    reflect changing roles and
    IPT members in a timely                    responsibilities between the
    manner, (2) chartering the                 Coast Guard and ICGS. It is too
    sub-IPTs, (3) making                       early to assess the impact of
    improvements to the                        these planned changes at this
    electronic information                     time.
    system that would result
    in better information
    sharing among IPT members
    who are geographically
    dispersed.
    As Deepwater assets begin  Partially       Partially Implemented: The
    to be delivered to         Implemented     Coast Guard has announced they
    operational units, ensure                  are reaffirming the role of the
    that field operators and                   Coast Guard's chief engineer as
    maintenance personnel are                  the technical authority for all
    provided with timely                       acquisition projects. In
    information and training                   addition, the Coast Guard is
    on how the transition will                 now the default provider of
    occur and how maintenance                  maintenance and logistics and
    responsibilities are to be                 is responsible for ensuring
    divided between system                     that logistics products are
    integrator and Coast Guard                 developed, implemented, and
    personnel.                                 delivered. Given these recent
                                                  decisions, time is needed to
                                                  evaluate the implementation.
    Contractor Accountability
    Develop and adhere to      Implemented
    measurable award fee
    criteria consistent with
    the Office of Federal
    Procurement Policy's
    guidance.
    In all future award fee    Implemented
    assessments, ensure that
    the input of contracting
    officers' technical
    representatives COTR) are
    considered and set forth
    in a more rigorous manner.
    Hold the system integrator Implemented^a
    accountable in future
    award fee determinations
    for improving the
    effectiveness of IPTs.
    Establish a TOC baseline   USCG will not   Closed: Although set forth in
    that can be used to        Implement       its program management plan,
    measure whether the                        the Coast Guard does not intend
    Deepwater acquisition                      to establish a baseline cost
    approach is providing the                  for replacing the assets under
    government with increased                  a traditional approach which
    efficiencies compared to                   could be used as a comparison
    what it would have cost                    to the Deepwater system of
    without this approach.                     systems acquisition approach.
    Based on the current       Partially       Partially Implemented: Key
    schedule for delivery of   Implemented     performance parameters have
    Deepwater assets,                          been added to criteria for
    establish a time frame for                 measuring operational
    when the models and                        effectiveness; however, the
    metrics will be in place                   models still lack the fidelity
    with the appropriate                       to attribute improvements to
    degree of fidelity to be                   the contractor or the Coast
    able to measure the                        Guard.
    contractor's progress
    toward improving
    operational effectiveness.
    Establish criteria to      Partially       Partially Implemented: DHS's
    determine when the TOC     Implemented     oversight requirements include
    baseline should be                         an annual review of the
    adjusted and ensure that                   Deepwater program baseline and
    the reasons for any                        submission of quarterly
    changes are documented.                    reports. The most recent
                                                  baseline update (Nov. 2006) has
                                                  yet to be approved by DHS. The
                                                  Coast Guard has provided DHS
                                                  with quarterly program reports.
                                                  Further, according to a Coast
                                                  Guard official, DHS approval is
                                                  pending on shifting the
                                                  baseline against which the
                                                  systems integrator is measured
                                                  to an asset basis.
    Cost Control Through
    Competition
    For subcontracts over $5   Implemented
    million awarded by ICGS to
    Lockheed Martin and
    Northrop Grumman, require
    Lockheed Martin and
    Northrop Grumman to notify
    the Coast Guard of a
    decision to perform the
    work themselves rather
    than contracting it out.
    The documentation should
    include an evaluation of
    the alternatives
    considered.
    Develop a comprehensive    Partially       Partially Implemented: Although
    plan for holding the       Implemented     the Coast Guard had requested
    system integrator                          additional information from
    accountable for ensuring                   ICGS on competition, it does
    an adequate degree of                      not have the information to
    competition among                          determine the level of
    second-tier suppliers in                   competition achieved. Further,
    future program years. This                 they have not included metrics
    plan should include                        to measure competition outcomes
    metrics to measure                         in the award fee decisions. In
    outcomes and consideration                 the mean time, the Coast Guard
    of how these outcomes will                 business case analyses
    be taken into account in                   demonstrated that ICGS did not
    future award fee                           leverage competition to deliver
    decisions.                                 the best value for certain
                                                  Deepwater assets. The Coast
                                                  Guard plans to gain insight
                                                  into competition by performing
                                                  additional business case
                                                  analyses and if necessary
                                                  re-competing assets.

    Source: [14]GAO-04-380 , [15]GAO-06-546 , and GAO analysis of Coast Guard
    data.

    aIPT performance was included in the award fee criteria for the February
    2005-December 2006 performance evaluation periods, but was removed from
    the award fee criteria for the January 2007-June 2007 performance
    evaluation period.

    Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

    Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments

    GAO Contacts

    Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or by e-mail at
    [16]caldwells@gao.gov ; or John P. Hutton at (202) 512-7773 or by e-mail
    at [17]huttonj@gao.gov .

    Acknowledgments

    In addition to the above, key contributors to this report were Penny
    Augustine, Amy Bernstein, Virginia Chanley, Christopher Conrad, Adam
    Couvillion, Kathryn Edelman, Geoffrey Hamilton, Melissa Jaynes, Crystal
    Jones, Raffaele Roffo, Sylvia Schatz, and Jonathan R. Tumin.

    Related GAO Products

    Coast Guard: Status of Efforts to Improve Deepwater Program Management and
    Address Operational Challenges, [18]GAO-07-575T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8,
    2007).

    Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on Deepwater Program Assets and
    Management Challenges, [19]GAO-07-446T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2007).

    Coast Guard: Coast Guard Efforts to Improve Management and Address
    Operational Challenges in the Deepwater Program, [20]GAO-07-460T
    (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2007).

    Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland Security's
    Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program,
    [21]GAO-07-453T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2007).

    Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts,
    [22]GAO-06-764 (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006).

    Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program
    Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring Is Warranted,
    [23]GAO-06-546 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2006).

    Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater Legacy Asset
    Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition Challenges
    Remain, [24]GAO-05-757 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005).

    Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater Legacy
    Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, [25]GAO-05-651T (Washington,
    D.C.: June 21, 2005).

    Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater Legacy
    Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, [26]GAO-05-307T (Washington,
    D.C.: Apr. 20, 2005).

    Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed,
    [27]GAO-04-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004).

    Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs Increased
    Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, [28]GAO-04-380
    (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004).

    Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks,
    [29]GAO-01-659T (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001).

    Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Deepwater Project, but Risks Remain,
    [30]GAO-01-564 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2001).

    Coast Guard's Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's Justification
    and Affordability Need to Be Addressed More Thoroughly, [31]GAO/RCED-99-6
    (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 1998).

    (440533)

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    Highlights of [39]GAO-07-874 , a report to Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations

    June 2007

    COAST GUARD

    Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and Management and Efforts
    to Address Them

    The U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater program was designed to replace aging
    vessels and aircraft and information capabilities with new and upgraded
    assets and equipment. GAO's prior work raised concerns about the Coast
    Guard's efforts to upgrade or acquire assets on schedule and manage the
    Deepwater prime contractor.

    This report responds to congressional direction contained in a conference
    report accompanying the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) fiscal year
    2007 appropriations bill. GAO addressed two objectives: (1) What is the
    status of key Deepwater assets and how is the Coast Guard addressing any
    asset-related challenges that have been encountered? (2) What is the
    status of the Coast Guard's overall management of the Deepwater contract?

    GAO's work is based on reports, memorandums, and data on the plans and
    management of the Deepwater program and interviews with key officials. GAO
    is not making any new recommendations. DHS and the Coast Guard reviewed a
    draft of this report and concurred with our findings. Their formal
    comments appear in appendix IV.

    Five years into the Deepwater contract, some assets have been delivered
    and are undergoing planned improvements or initial testing, but several
    other assets have encountered significant problems. For example, engine
    upgrades to the HH-65 helicopters are well under way; and the first two
    Maritime Patrol Aircraft and the first eight Short Range Prosecutor
    cutter-based small patrol boats have been delivered according to schedule.
    In contrast, other Deepwater assets have experienced problems, which have
    created a number of challenges for the Coast Guard in terms of delivery
    delays and loss of operational capabilities. For example, the Vertical
    Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle has experienced delays as the
    Coast Guard assesses alternatives; the Fast Response Cutter, which was to
    replace the Coast Guard's legacy patrol boat fleet, experienced design
    problems and the Coast Guard suspended all work, and the first two hulls
    of the National Security Cutter have structural design issues that, if not
    corrected, will reduce the fatigue lives of these vessels. To address
    these and other challenges, the Coast Guard is taking a variety of
    actions, such as relying more heavily on legacy assets to help address
    patrol hour shortages, making plans to purchase off-the-shelf assets to
    expedite delivery, and planning corrective structural modifications.

    Over the past several years, GAO has expressed concerns about the Coast
    Guard's ability to manage and oversee the Deepwater program. Specifically,
    the program has faced challenges in terms of management, contractor
    accountability, and cost control. While the Coast Guard has taken actions
    since 2004 in response to these concerns, challenges remain. As a result,
    the Coast Guard recently decided to become more directly involved in
    program management and has chosen to (1) take over the leadership of the
    integrated product teams--a key program management tool; (2) acquire
    certain Deepwater assets outside of the existing Deepwater contract; (3)
    use independent, third-party reviews for asset development; and (4)
    reorganize the Deepwater acquisition functions within the Coast Guard
    organization. Given the Coast Guard's increased role, having sufficient
    staff with the requisite skills and abilities to execute new and expanding
    responsibilities will be important to getting what is needed, on time, and
    at a fair price.

    Deepwater Vessel and Aircraft Classes

    References

    Visible links
      12. mailto:caldwells@gao.gov
      13. mailto:huttonj@gao.gov
      14. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-380
      15. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-546
      16. mailto:caldwells@gao.gov
      17. mailto:huttonj@gao.gov
      18. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-575T
      19. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-446T
      20. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-460T
      21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-453T
      22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-764
      23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-546
      24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-757
      25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-651T
      26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-307T
      27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-695
      28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-380
      29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-659T
      30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-564
      31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-99-6
      32. http://www.gao.gov/
      33. http://www.gao.gov/
      34. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
      35. mailto:fraudnet@gao.gov
      36. mailto:JarmonG@gao.gov
      37. mailto:AndersonP1@gao.gov
      38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-874
      39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-874
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