Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased	 
Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities (11-JUL-07,		 
GAO-07-836).							 
                                                                 
Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations rank the	 
need for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)	 
capabilities as high on their priority lists. The Department of  
Defense (DOD) is investing in many ISR systems, including	 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), to meet the growing demand for  
ISR assets to support the warfighter. GAO was asked to evaluate  
DOD's efforts to integrate UAS into ongoing operations while	 
optimizing the use of all DOD ISR assets. Specifically, this	 
report addresses the extent that (1) DOD has taken steps to	 
facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations, and (2)
DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets considers
all available ISR capabilities, including those provided by UAS. 
GAO also reviewed the extent that DOD evaluates the performance  
of its ISR assets, including UAS, in meeting warfighters' needs. 
To perform this work, GAO analyzed data and guidance on the use  
of ISR assets, and interviewed DOD officials, including those	 
supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-836 					        
    ACCNO:   A72426						        
  TITLE:     Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and      
Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities		 
     DATE:   07/11/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Concept of operations				 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military intelligence				 
	     Military operations				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Systems integration				 
	     Unmanned aerial systems				 
	     Army Extended Range Multi-Purpose			 
	     Unmanned Aircraft System				 
                                                                 
	     Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle			 
	     U-2 Aircraft					 
	     Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicle			 

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GAO-07-836

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background
     * [3]DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate the Integration of UAS, bu

          * [4]DOD Has Developed Guidance to Facilitate the Integration of
          * [5]DOD Continues to Face UAS Integration Challenges
          * [6]Lack of DOD-wide Advance Coordination May Exacerbate Integra

     * [7]DOD's Approach to Allocating and Tasking UAS and Other ISR A

          * [8]DOD Does Not Have Visibility over All ISR Assets Available t
          * [9]DOD Does Not Have Visibility over the Tasking of All DOD Air

     * [10]DOD Lacks Complete Metrics and Feedback for Fully Evaluating

          * [11]DOD Is Developing Metrics to Measure Success of Its ISR Asse
          * [12]DOD Lacks Consistent Feedback on Whether ISR Assets Meet War

     * [13]Conclusions
     * [14]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [15]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [16]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
     * [17]Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
     * [18]Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

          * [19]GAO Contact
          * [20]Acknowledgments

     * [21]Related GAO Products

          * [22]Order by Mail or Phone

GAO

July 2007

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

Advance Coordination and Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize
Capabilities

GAO-07-836

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 7
DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate the Integration of UAS, but Further
Steps Are Needed to Address Integration Challenges 10
DOD's Approach to Allocating and Tasking UAS and Other ISR Assets Does Not
Consider the Capabilities of All ISR Assets 13
DOD Lacks Complete Metrics and Feedback for Fully Evaluating the
Performance of Its ISR Assets to Ensure Warfighter's Needs Are Met 17
Conclusions 19
Recommendations for Executive Action 20
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 25
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 27
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 31
Related GAO Products 32

Table

Table 1: UAS Nomenclature/Characteristics 8

Abbreviations

CENTCOM Central Command
CONOPS concept of operations
DOD Department of Defense
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFCC-ISR Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance
UAS unmanned aircraft systems

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

July 11, 2007

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie Chairman The Honorable Jim Saxton Ranking
Member Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives The Honorable Neil Abercrombie Chairman The
Honorable Jim Saxton Ranking Member Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are being transformed
by new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and strike
capabilities, some of which have been achieved through the use of unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS). Effective ISR can provide early warning of enemy
threats and precision targeting, as well as enable U.S. military forces to
increase effectiveness, coordination, and lethality. ISR data can come
from a variety of sources, including surveillance and reconnaissance
systems such as satellites; manned aircraft like the U-2; unmanned
aircraft systems like the Air Force's Global Hawk and Predator and the
Army's Hunter; other ground, air, sea, or space-based equipment; and human
intelligence teams. Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
are being transformed by new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
(ISR), and strike capabilities, some of which have been achieved through
the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Effective ISR can provide
early warning of enemy threats and precision targeting, as well as enable
U.S. military forces to increase effectiveness, coordination, and
lethality. ISR data can come from a variety of sources, including
surveillance and reconnaissance systems such as satellites; manned
aircraft like the U-2; unmanned aircraft systems like the Air Force's
Global Hawk and Predator and the Army's Hunter; other ground, air, sea, or
space-based equipment; and human intelligence teams.

Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations are supported by the
Department of Defense's (DOD) ISR assets, including theater-level ISR
assets that are generally used to support combatant commander ISR
priorities, tactical ISR assets that are generally used to support
operational units including conventional and special operations forces,
and assets acquired by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization to aid in the identification and elimination of improvised
explosive devices. Additionally, combatant commanders receive support from
ISR assets controlled by U.S. intelligence agencies such as the National
Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. U.S. allies also provide ISR assets to
support ongoing combat operations. Combatant commanders carrying out
ongoing operations are supported by the Department of Defense's (DOD) ISR
assets, including theater-level ISR assets that are generally used to
support combatant commander ISR priorities, tactical ISR assets that are
generally used to support operational units including conventional and
special operations forces, and assets acquired by the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization to aid in the identification and
elimination of improvised explosive devices. Additionally, combatant
commanders receive support from ISR assets controlled by U.S. intelligence
agencies such as the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance
Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. U.S. allies also
provide ISR assets to support ongoing combat operations.

Battlefield commanders rank the need for ISR systems and the information
they produce as high on their priority lists, a fact that is reflected in
DOD's planned investment in ISR. The demand for ISR assets at every level
of command is growing, and DOD is making investments in a number of ISR
systems, including unmanned aircraft systems, manned platforms, and
space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems. Specifically, for UAS,
Battlefield commanders rank the need for ISR systems and the information
they produce as high on their priority lists, a fact that is reflected in
DOD's planned investment in ISR. The demand for ISR assets at every level
of command is growing, and DOD is making investments in a number of ISR
systems, including unmanned aircraft systems, manned platforms, and
space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems. Specifically, for UAS,
funding has increased from $363 million in fiscal year 2001 to $2.23
billion in fiscal year 2007, and DOD has requested $2.54 billion for
fiscal year 2008.1 As of February 2007, DOD had more than 3,900 unmanned
aircraft in its inventory2 compared to fewer than 50 in 2000. The majority
of these aircraft are currently being used in support of ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In December 2005, we reported that while commanders are experiencing
mission success with UAS in ongoing operations, they face challenges in
fully optimizing the use of these assets, due in part to the growing
number of UAS.3 Specifically, we reported that DOD had achieved
operational successes with UAS, but challenges such as interoperability
and limited communications bandwidth were hampering joint operations or
preventing timely UAS deployment. Additionally, in April 2006, we
testified that while DOD continues to request funds to support service
plans for acquiring UAS, it lacks a viable strategic plan to guide UAS
development and investment decisions.4

You asked us to review DOD's efforts to integrate UAS into ongoing combat
operations while optimizing the capabilities offered by all DOD ISR
assets. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) DOD has taken
steps to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations; and (2)
DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets considers all
available ISR capabilities, including those provided by UAS. We are also
providing information on the extent to which DOD evaluates the performance
of its ISR assets, including UAS, in meeting the warfighters' needs.

1Figures include procurement, operations and maintenance, and research,
development and evaluation funding provided through DOD's regular
appropriations and do not include funding provided in supplemental
appropriations.

2This number represents the number of unmanned aircraft including test and
training assets, rather than unmanned aircraft systems, which include
aircraft, sensors, communications equipment, and ground control stations.

3GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, [23]GAO-06-49
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005).

4GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition
Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges, [24]GAO-06-610T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).

To address our objectives, we reviewed DOD and military service
publications and documentation pertaining to ISR, including those specific
to UAS such as joint publications, concepts of operations, manuals on
tactics and procedures, and the 2005-2030 UAS Roadmap. We also interviewed
officials from the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning Task Force within
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics; the Joint Staff; each of the military services; U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) and associated Army and Air Force component
commands; and the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). Further, we reviewed
documentation, such as joint publications and briefings that explain the
process for tasking ISR assets, and interviewed officials at CENTCOM to
better understand how ISR assets are assigned to specific missions.
Additionally, we discussed the use of UAS in military operations with
Combined Air Operations Center officials in Qatar and units that recently
returned from or are currently supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. To understand how requests for ISR support are generated and
satisfied at the tactical level, we spoke with units that recently
returned from, or are currently supporting, ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan as well as units within the services such as the Marine Corps'
Tactical Fusion Center that are involved in determining if tactical assets
are available to satisfy those requests or if the requests need to be
forwarded for theater-level support. We performed our work from June 2006
to June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. More details on our scope and methodology are presented at
appendix I.

In addition to this report, we recently issued a report that discussed
whether DOD is acquiring its ISR assets in the most efficient manner. We
are also conducting work for the committee examining how DOD determines
its requirements for ISR systems and expect to report on this work early
next year.

Results in Brief

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of
UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to fully
coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed a
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical
Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of Operations
for Unmanned Aircraft Systems.5 This guidance represents an important
first step for the use of UAS in combat operations and DOD officials
acknowledge these documents will continue to evolve as DOD learns more
about the capabilities of UAS and other ISR assets and their application
in combat operations. However, the guidance does not address, on a
DOD-wide basis, the issue of advance coordination, which CENTCOM has
recognized is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations
by enabling efficient deployment and utilization of assets and by allowing
the combatant commander time to plan to support incoming assets. In the
absence of such guidance, CENTCOM has established procedures for the
services to coordinate system requirements prior to ISR assets arriving
into CENTCOM's theater of operations. These procedures apply only to
CENTCOM's theater of operations. However, we found that CENTCOM's
procedures for advance coordination were not always followed because the
services indicated that they were not aware of the requirement. According
to CENTCOM officials, they distributed these procedures to each of
CENTCOM's service components, such as Central Command Air Forces and U.S.
Naval Forces Central Command, but were not aware if they were distributed
further, and the service officials we interviewed were not aware of the
requirement. As a result of this lack of advance coordination, CENTCOM is
not always aware, on a timely basis, of assets entering theater, which can
potentially exacerbate existing operational challenges such as limited
interoperability and communications bandwidth. While this example is
limited to CENTCOM, the potential exists for DOD to need to establish
operations in other areas of the world very quickly. A DOD-wide procedure
for advance coordination is critical to enable DOD to quickly support UAS
and other ISR assets once deployed to support these operations. Until DOD
takes steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may
continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS and other ISR
assets into combat operations and may exacerbate existing integration
challenges such as the lack of interoperability and limited bandwidth.
Therefore, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense, in
conjunction with the service secretaries and combatant commanders,
establish DOD-wide requirements for coordination in advance of introducing
ISR assets into theater; develop a plan for communicating those
requirements throughout DOD; and establish a mechanism to ensure the
services comply with these requirements. DOD generally concurred with this
recommendation. DOD noted that it currently has a well-defined process to
coordinate with the combatant commanders on the introduction of UAS into
theater and cited several examples including the annual process for
allocating theater-level UAS, and actions between stateside units and
units in theater to plan for deployment of ISR capabilities. DOD, however,
acknowledged that a more standardized method could improve efficiency of
the coordination process and stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
be tasked to look at standardizing the coordination process and evaluate
and provide direction for an improved coordination process. Further, DOD
noted that, based on this evaluation, if direction is required, it will be
issued via a Chairman's directive which is mandatory and therefore
establishes the mechanism that ensures compliance. We recognize that DOD
has various processes related to UAS but note that none, including the
examples cited by DOD, represent a standardized, DOD-wide approach that
the services and combatant commanders can follow in coordinating the
specific details of deploying UAS assets, regardless of geographic area.
Furthermore, we believe that a directive requiring coordination, by
itself, does not ensure compliance, and would encourage DOD to include
provisions detailing how implementation of the directive will be
monitored.

5The Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical
Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems was prepared under the direction
of representatives from the Army, Navy, and Air Force for use by their
respective commands and other commands as appropriate. The Joint Concept
of Operations for UAS was prepared under the direction of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

DOD's current approach to allocating and tasking DOD's ISR assets,
including UAS, hinders its ability to optimize the use of DOD's ISR assets
because it does not consider the availability of all ISR assets in
determining how best to meet warfighting needs. The Joint Functional
Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(JFCC-ISR), which is charged with recommending to the Secretary of Defense
how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be allocated to support the
operational requirements of combatant commanders, has an awareness of, or
visibility into, most DOD ISR assets, but it does not have an awareness of
all ISR assets available to support the combatant commanders, such as
assets that are owned and controlled by U.S. national intelligence
agencies such as the National Security Agency or by our allies supporting
ongoing operations. According to JFCC-ISR officials, although they are
working to gain better visibility over all ISR assets, they currently do
not have this level of visibility. DOD does not currently have a mechanism
for obtaining information on all ISR assets, including all DOD, national,
and allied assets, operating in each of the combatant commanders' area of
operations. Absent a mechanism, JFCC-ISR has been trying to learn more
about the capabilities of non-DOD ISR assets by building relationships
with other national and allied intelligence agencies and addressing
limitations related to intelligence agency system access. Similarly,
during ongoing operations, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander
(JFACC), who is responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring
joint air operations, does not have information on how tactical assets
embedded in and controlled by tactical units are being used on a daily
basis or what missions they have been tasked to support. Nor do tactical
units have information on how theater-level assets and ISR assets embedded
in other units are being tasked. DOD does not currently have a mechanism
for tracking the missions both theater and tactical-level ISR assets are
supporting or how they are being used on a daily basis. This lack of
visibility at all levels into how ISR assets are being tasked could result
in unnecessary duplicative taskings and limit DOD's ability to leverage
all available ISR assets. DOD recognizes the opportunity to better plan
for and control its ISR assets and has initiated a study to assess this,
but this study is not expected to be completed until August or September
2007. Without an approach to its allocation and tasking processes that
considers all ISR capabilities, DOD may not be in a sound position to
fully leverage all the capabilities of available ISR assets and to
optimize the use of those assets, and therefore cannot be assured that it
is addressing warfighter needs in the most efficient and effective manner.
To provide greater visibility into the availability and use of ISR assets,
including UAS, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense develop a
mechanism to gain information on all available ISR capabilities, where
they are operating, and how they are being used. DOD generally concurred
with this recommendation. DOD agreed that a mechanism for obtaining
information on all ISR assets is needed and commented that work is
underway to develop such a mechanism. DOD also stated that it is not
currently practical to provide situational awareness on some UAS, such as
the small, hand-launched UAS at the lowest operational level because of
technological limitations. It noted it will determine the operational
levels that will provide widespread situational awareness. We recognize
that obtaining situational awareness may not currently be practical for
some UAS but would encourage the department to seek to maximize coverage
in exploring options for improved situational awareness.

DOD is unable to fully evaluate the success of its ISR missions because it
lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive feedback
from operators and intelligence analysts to ensure the warfighter's needs
were met. Although the JFCC-ISR has been tasked with developing metrics
and standards of performance to assess DOD ISR mission accomplishment, DOD
evaluates its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics such as the
number of targets planned versus the number of targets collected. While
these metrics are a good start, DOD officials acknowledge that the current
metrics do not take into account all of the qualitative considerations
associated with measuring ISR asset effectiveness, such as the cumulative
knowledge provided by numerous ISR missions, or provide insight on how the
intelligence collected contributed toward accomplishment of the mission.
JFCC-ISR is working with the combatant commanders to develop additional
quantitative ISR metrics as well as qualitative metrics to evaluate the
performance of ISR collection assets, but no DOD-wide milestones have been
established. Milestones would include the required steps and planned dates
for completion of those steps leading up to metrics development.
Furthermore, Joint Publication 2-01 calls for intelligence personnel and
consumers to evaluate and provide immediate feedback on how well
intelligence operations perform to meet commander's intelligence
requirements; however, DOD officials acknowledge that this feedback is not
consistently occurring due, mainly, to the fast pace of operations in
theater. Without feedback and metrics for evaluating ISR assets, DOD may
not be in the best position to validate how well the warfighter needs are
being met, the true demand for ISR assets, and whether it is optimizing
the use of existing assets, or which new systems DOD should acquire in
order to best support warfighting needs. To improve DOD's ability to
evaluate the effectiveness of its ISR missions, we recommend DOD establish
DOD-wide milestones for metrics development, develop a process for
systematically capturing feedback on how effective ISR assets are in
meeting warfighter requirements and consider this information when making
ISR acquisition, allocation, and tasking decisions. DOD generally
concurred with this recommendation. DOD agreed milestones for development
of ISR metrics should be established, but pointed out that organizations
within the department collect feedback or conduct lessons learned studies.
While the feedback captured by those organizations is noteworthy, it is
often not immediate or specific to individual missions. DOD further
commented that it has mechanisms in place to inform its decision-making
processes on the acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets
such as the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System which
assesses, among other things, capability gaps and solutions. We agree that
the mechanisms mentioned in DOD's response exist; however, DOD currently
does not have sufficient qualitative and quantitative metrics needed to
collect data on UAS performance nor does it have a means for incorporating
such data into the processes currently used to make decisions on ISR
assets.

Background

UAS represent one of many DOD airborne ISR assets available to support
ongoing combat operations. Unmanned aircraft are deployed and controlled
at different levels of command and can be categorized into three main
classes: man-portable, tactical, and theater. Table 1 illustrates examples
of UAS in each category. Man-portable UAS are small, self-contained, and
portable and are generally used to support the small ground combat teams
in the field. Tactical UAS are larger systems that are generally used to
support operational units at tactical levels of command such as the
battalion or brigade. Tactical UAS are locally operated and controlled by
the units. Theater UAS are operated and controlled by the Joint Forces Air
Component Commander (JFACC) and are generally used to support combatant
commander ISR priorities, although in certain circumstances they can be
assigned to support tactical operations, such as when troops are being
fired on. Theater UAS traditionally have been more capable than tactical
or man-portable systems. For example, theater UAS typically contain
characteristics that make them more capable than other categories of UAS,
such as their more robust communications architecture and more capable
payloads that allow for production of more diverse intelligence data
products. However, some tactical systems, such as the Army's Warrior UAS,
are being developed that are capable of performing theater-level
requirements and, as currently envisioned, will be embedded in and
controlled at the tactical level by units.

Table 1: UAS Nomenclature/Characteristics

                    Maximum altitude (feet) Maximum endurance (hours)a 
Man-portable UAS                                                    
Dragon Eye       500 AGLb                                         1 
Raven            1,000 AGL                                        1 
Tactical UAS                                                        
Hunter           15,000 MSLc                                    8-9 
Shadow           15,000 MSL                                       5 
ERMP (Warrior)   29,000 MSL                                      36 
Theater UAS                                                         
Predator         26,000 MSL                                      20 
Global Hawk      60,000 MSL                                      28 

Source: DOD.

aEndurance equals total time from takeoff to landing.

bAGL is feet above ground level.

cMSL is feet above mean sea level.

DOD uses an annual process for allocating or distributing available DOD
theater-level airborne ISR assets, including UAS, to the combatant
commanders. The allocation process is managed by U.S. Strategic Command's
Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). In 2003, DOD altered its unified command plan
to give U.S. Strategic Command responsibility for planning, integrating,
and coordinating ISR in support of strategic and global operations. To
execute this responsibility, U.S. Strategic Command established the
JFCC-ISR in March 2005. The JFCC-ISR is charged with recommending to the
Secretary of Defense how DOD's theater-level ISR assets should be
allocated, or distributed, among combatant commanders and for the
integration and synchronization of DOD, national, and allied ISR
capabilities and collection efforts.

Once DOD's ISR assets are allocated to the combatant commanders, they are
available to be assigned or tasked based on combatant commander priorities
against specific missions in support of ongoing operations. Authority for
tasking ISR assets, including UAS, is generally determined by the level of
the objective the asset is deployed to support and the command level of
the unit that controls the asset. Therefore, most theater-level UAS assets
that are controlled and tasked by the JFACC are generally used to support
theater-level objectives and priorities, as established by the combatant
commander. Most tactical UAS assets controlled by the services or the U.S.
Special Operations Command are used to support tactical objectives and
priorities, which may differ from theater-level priorities. For example,
authority to task the Army's Hunter resides with the commander of the unit
in which it is embedded, whereas authority for tasking the Air Force's
Predator resides with the JFACC.

In August 2005 DOD issued its current UAS Roadmap which was developed to
assist DOD in developing a long-range strategy for UAS development,
acquisition, and other planning efforts as well as to guide industry in
developing UAS related technology. According to DOD officials, DOD is in
the process of developing an update to this Roadmap and expects to issue
the updated version in late summer 2007. The UAS Roadmap is intended to
guide UAS planning; however, it does address limited operational aspects
such as operational issues or challenges that have emerged as a result of
operating UAS in support of ongoing operations. For example, the Roadmap
acknowledges that the limited number of bandwidth frequencies constrains
DOD's ability to operate multiple unmanned aircraft simultaneously.

DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate the Integration of UAS, but Further Steps Are
Needed to Address Integration Challenges

DOD components have developed guidance--such as a Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of Operations for UAS--to facilitate
UAS integration. However, DOD continues to face UAS integration
challenges, such as the lack of interoperability and limited
communications bandwidth. These challenges may be exacerbated because DOD
has not established DOD-wide advance coordination procedures for
integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD takes steps to address
the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may continue to face
challenges in successfully integrating UAS into combat operations and may
exacerbate existing integration challenges.

DOD Has Developed Guidance to Facilitate the Integration of UAS

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of
UAS into combat operations. For example, in August 2006 DOD issued its
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical
Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This document was designed to
serve as a planning, coordination, and reference guide for the services
and provides a framework for warfighters employing UAS. Furthermore, in
March 2007 DOD issued its Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems, which provides overarching principles, a discussion of
UAS capabilities, operational views, and a discussion of UAS use in
various operational scenarios. Each of the above documents represent an
important first step for the use of UAS in combat operations, and DOD
officials acknowledge these documents will continue to evolve as DOD
learns more about the capabilities of UAS and their application in combat
operations.

DOD Continues to Face UAS Integration Challenges

DOD continues to face challenges, such as interoperability and
communications bandwidth, in integrating UAS into combat operations. In
December 2005 we reported that challenges such as the lack of
interoperability and limited communications bandwidth have emerged to
hamper recent joint operations or prevent timely UAS employment.6
Specifically, some UAS cannot easily exchange data, sometimes even within
a single service, because they were not designed with interoperable
communications standards. Additionally, as we previously reported, U.S.
forces are unable to interchangeably use some payloads from one type of
UAS on another, a capability known as "payload commonality." Furthermore,
electromagnetic spectrum frequencies, often referred to as bandwidth, are
congested by a large number of UAS and other weapons or communications
systems using the same frequency simultaneously. While some UAS can change
to different, less congested, frequency bands, most UAS were built without
the ability to change frequency bands. Thus, commanders have had to delay
certain missions until frequency congestion cleared. DOD is taking steps
to address these challenges such as equipping UAS with the Tactical Common
Data Link7 and, according to DOD officials, it is developing common ground
control stations to improve interoperability of its UAS.

6 [25]GAO-06-49 .

Lack of DOD-wide Advance Coordination May Exacerbate Integration Challenges of
UAS and Other ISR Assets

Existing UAS integration challenges may be exacerbated because DOD has not
established DOD-wide advance coordination procedures for integrating UAS
and other ISR assets into combat operations. Specifically, DOD officials
indicate that assets arriving in theater without advance coordination may
exacerbate UAS integration challenges, such as further taxing the limited
available bandwidth. As additional ISR assets are rapidly acquired and
fielded to meet the increasing demand for ISR support in ongoing
operations, CENTCOM has recognized that advance coordination is a critical
factor in integrating UAS into combat operations by enabling efficient
deployment of assets and effective utilization of them once they are in
theater. Furthermore, advance knowledge of system requirements is crucial
to allow the combatant commander sufficient time to adequately plan to
support incoming assets. DOD officials acknowledge that having to
incorporate assets quickly into the theater infrastructure creates
additional challenges and further emphasizes the need for advance
coordination.

In response to this issue, CENTCOM has developed procedures to ensure the
services coordinate their plans prior to deploying UAS to CENTCOM's
theater of operations. In May 2005 CENTCOM established the Concept of
Operations for Employment of Full Motion Video Assets, which states that
when a full-motion video-capable asset8 or weapons system is scheduled for
deployment to CENTCOM's theater of operations, the controlling unit will
notify CENTCOM of the deployment no later than 30 days prior to arrival of
the asset in theater. It also states that the controlling unit will
provide a system and platform concept of operations to CENTCOM no later
than 15 days prior to the asset's arrival. According to CENTCOM officials,
they distributed these procedures to each of CENTCOM's service components,
such as Central Command Air Forces and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command.
However, they were unaware if the procedures were distributed further to
the services, and service officials we interviewed, including those at the
service Headquarters as well as those stationed within units returning
from ongoing operations, indicated they were not aware of the requirement.
CENTCOM officials indicate that the procedures have not always been
followed.

7The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-163 S 141 (2006), required that the Secretary of Defense take such
steps to ensure that all service tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (except
those for which the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics has waived this requirement through the
procedures outlined in the Act) are equipped and configured so that the
data link used is the Tactical Common Data Link and those vehicles use
data formats consistent with the architectural standard for tactical UAS.
Use of the tactical common data link will allow UAS to be programmed to a
wider range of frequencies, thus reducing dependence on the currently
congested frequencies such as C band.

The Warrior Alpha, which was fielded by the Joint Improvised Explosive

Device Defeat Organization and operated by the Army to aid in the
identification and elimination of improvised explosive devices,
illustrates why this advance coordination is so critical. As a result of
coordinating with CENTCOM, the Army was made aware of limitations such as
bandwidth and limited ramp space and decided to deploy the Warrior Alpha
to an alternate location. While CENTCOM and Army officials disagree on
whether the coordination was completed in a timely manner, all agree it
was ultimately completed. While this example is limited to CENTCOM's area
of operations, the potential exists for DOD to have to quickly establish
operations in other areas of the world, which makes the need for advance
coordination even more critical.

CENTCOM officials acknowledge the need for advance coordination for all
ISR assets entering CENTCOM's theater of operations, not just those assets
that are capable of full-motion video. To address this need, CENTCOM
developed in November 2006 an ISR Systems Concept of Operations
Standardization Memo. CENTCOM officials stated that the ISR memo is
intended to provide CENTCOM with awareness of what assets are coming into
theater and to allow CENTCOM to ensure the asset is able to be
incorporated into the existing infrastructure, given operational
challenges such as limited communications bandwidth. This memo requires
the inclusion of certain elements in all ISR system concepts of
operations, including how the asset will be tasked; how intelligence will
be processed, exploited, and disseminated; and system bandwidth
requirements that must be coordinated with CENTCOM prior to deployment of
ISR assets.

8A full-motion video-capable asset has the capability to collect and
transmit real-time full-motion video imagery.

This ISR memo applies only to CENTCOM's theater of operations and does not
constitute DOD-wide guidance. While the Warrior Alpha example is limited
to CENTCOM, the potential exists for DOD to need to establish operations
in other areas of the world very quickly. A DOD-wide procedure for advance
coordination would be critical for quickly supporting UAS and other ISR
assets once deployed. Until DOD takes steps to address the need for
DOD-wide advance coordination, it may be unable to successfully integrate
UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations and existing integration
challenges may be exacerbated.

DOD's Approach to Allocating and Tasking UAS and Other ISR Assets Does Not
Consider the Capabilities of All ISR Assets

DOD's current approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including
UAS, does not consider the capabilities of all ISR assets because it lacks
an awareness or visibility over all ISR capabilities available to support
the combatant commanders and how DOD ISR assets are being used, which
hinders DOD's ability to optimize the use of its assets. Although DOD has
established a process for allocating available DOD ISR assets, including
UAS, to the combatant commanders to meet their needs, it does not have an
awareness of all ISR assets, which impairs its ability to distribute or
allocate DOD assets while considering the capabilities of all ISR assets.
Additionally, DOD's process for tasking its ISR assets does not currently
allow for information at all levels into how DOD's ISR assets are being
used on a daily basis, which hinders its ability to leverage other assets
operating in an area and to avoid unnecessary duplicative taskings.
Without an approach to its allocation and tasking processes that considers
all ISR capabilities, DOD is not in a sound position to fully leverage all
the capabilities of available ISR assets and to optimize the use of those
assets, and therefore cannot be assured that it is addressing warfighter
needs in the most efficient and effective manner. DOD recognizes the
opportunity to better plan for and control its ISR assets and has
initiated a study to examine the issue.

DOD Does Not Have Visibility over All ISR Assets Available to Meet the
Warfighters' Needs

Although DOD has established a process for allocating available DOD ISR
assets to the combatant commanders to meet the warfighters' needs, it does
not have an awareness or visibility over the total number and types of ISR
assets available to support combatant commanders or the capabilities
represented by those assets. DOD uses an annual process for allocating or
distributing its available ISR assets, including UAS, to the combatant
commanders to meet theater-level needs. That process is managed by U.S.
Strategic Command's JFCC-ISR, which is tasked with making recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense on how best to allocate DOD ISR resources for
theater use across the combatant commands and ensuring the integration and
synchronization of DOD, national, and allied ISR capabilities and
collection efforts. DOD officials indicate that annual allocation levels
are constrained by the number of ISR assets in DOD's inventory and believe
that JFCC-ISR is, therefore, not able to allocate to the combatant
commanders ISR assets in sufficient numbers to meet all requests for ISR
support. However, our work suggests that additional information is needed
to assess the true demand for ISR assets and the best way to meet this
demand. Specifically, JFCC-ISR's ability to fulfill its mission of
integrating DOD, national, and allied partner ISR capabilities and making
recommendations on how best to allocate ISR assets to support the
warfighter depends, in part, on the extent to which it has awareness and
visibility over all ISR assets, including DOD, national, and allied ISR
assets. JFCC-ISR does not have complete visibility into all assets that
could be used to support combatant commanders' needs, which hinders its
ability to optimally distribute or allocate DOD ISR assets. JFCC-ISR
officials estimate it has 80-90 percent visibility into DOD ISR assets but
does not have the same level of visibility into other national and allied
ISR assets available to support theater-level requirements, such as assets
that are owned and controlled by U.S. national intelligence agencies such
as the National Security Agency or by our allies supporting ongoing
operations. According to JFCC-ISR officials, although they are working to
gain better visibility over all ISR assets, they currently do not have
this level of visibility because DOD does not currently have a mechanism
for obtaining information on all ISR assets--including all DOD, national,
and allied assets--operating in each of the combatant commanders' area of
operations. Absent such a mechanism, JFCC-ISR has been trying to learn
more about the capabilities of non-DOD ISR assets by building
relationships with other national and allied intelligence agencies and
addressing limitations related to intelligence agency system access.
Without an approach to its allocation process that considers all available
ISR capabilities, JFCC-ISR does not have all the information it needs to
leverage the capabilities of all available ISR assets and to optimize the
allocation of DOD's ISR assets.

DOD Does Not Have Visibility over the Tasking of All DOD Airborne ISR Assets,
Including UAS

DOD's process for tasking its airborne ISR assets, including UAS, does not
provide for visibility at all levels into how DOD airborne ISR assets are
being used on a daily basis. Once DOD ISR assets have been allocated,
those assets are available to the combatant commanders to be assigned, or
tasked, against specific requests for ISR support in ongoing operations.
The JFACC is responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint
air operations to focus the effect of air capabilities and for assuring
their effective and efficient use in achieving the combatant commanders'
objectives. However, while the JFACC has visibility into how all
theater-level ISR assets, like the Air Force's Predator, are being used,
he or she does not have visibility into how tactical ISR assets, such as
the Army's Hunter, are being used on a daily basis or what missions they
are supporting. The JFACC generally tasks assets that support
theater-level objectives, while assets that support tactical-level
objectives are tasked and controlled by the services or by the U.S.
Special Operations Command. Tactical units utilize their embedded, or
tactical, assets first to satisfy unit intelligence needs. However, when
tactical assets are not available or capable of satisfying a unit's need
for ISR support, the unit requests theater-level ISR support. Requests for
most theater-level assets are entered into a central DOD database, but
there is no similar database that captures requests for tactical-level
assets. While there are procedures, such as the Air Tasking Order and
Airspace Control Order, for tracking where theater- and tactical-level
assets are operating for airspace control and deconfliction purposes, a
comparable mechanism for tracking the missions these assets are supporting
or how they are being used on a daily basis does not exist. For example,
the Air Tasking Order would track the time, date, and location where a UAS
was operating, but there is no mechanism that would track what
intelligence the UAS was supposed to gather on a mission or why the UAS
was being used on a mission. Without a database or similar mechanism
providing visibility into how tactical-level assets are being tasked, the
JFACC is limited in his or her awareness of how those assets are being
used on a daily basis, which hinders the JFACC's ability to optimize the
use of those assets.

This lack of visibility limits the JFACC's ability to leverage those
assets using techniques such as cross-cueing, which is the collaborative
effort of using capabilities offered by multiple ISR platforms to fulfill
a mission. By using techniques such as cross-cueing, the JFACC has been
able to use the different types of capabilities brought by different
theater-level manned and unmanned ISR assets to maximize the intelligence
collected. For example, a manned Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System was tasked to monitor an area. When this system sensed movement in
the area, a Predator was then tasked to collect imagery to confirm
suspected activity. Without visibility into how tactical assets are being
utilized, the JFACC is limited in his or her ability to optimize the use
of all available DOD ISR assets and to focus the effect of these assets to
ensure their efficient and effective use. Such visibility will become even
more important given that services such as the Army are acquiring, and
planning to embed in units, ISR assets capable of satisfying theater-level
requirements, such as the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose or Warrior UAS,
which could otherwise be leveraged to support JFACC requirements.

Duplicative taskings that occur are often driven by a lack of visibility
into where ISR assets at all levels are operating and what they are tasked
to do. For example, a DOD official shared with us an example of
unnecessary duplication where an Army unit requested a full-motion
video-capable asset to support a high-priority requirement. When the
asset, a Predator UAS, arrived to support the requirement, its operator
realized the Army unit had also tasked one of its tactical assets, a
Hunter UAS, against the requirement. As a result of the lack of visibility
over all assets, the potential exists for multiple ISR aircraft to be
tasked to operate in the same area and against the same requirement.
However, some level of duplication may be necessary when driven by mission
requirements and system capabilities. Certain missions, such as special
operations, often need a certain amount of duplication in order to achieve
the desired result. For example, a mission intended to track activity of
suspected terrorists may require multiple systems to follow identified
individuals who flee the scene in different directions. Furthermore,
assets such as the Predator UAS experience system limitations when
equipped with a full-motion-video sensor in that they are only able to
provide surveillance of a narrow or "soda straw" view. A certain level of
duplication of UAS may be necessary to support a mission to obtain a
complete view of the area under surveillance.

Greater visibility at the tactical level could provide units with a
greater awareness of where other ISR assets, including both theater-level
and those assets embedded in other units, are operating and what they are
being used to do. A mechanism that provides this visibility would allow
tactical units, when appropriate,9 to leverage other assets operating in
their area to optimize the information captured and avoid unnecessary
duplicative taskings.

9Some missions, such as special operations are classified and it is not
always appropriate to share specifics of the missions.

DOD recognizes the opportunity to better plan for and control its ISR
assets and has initiated a Persistent ISR Capabilities Based Assessment
Study. The study, sponsored by the Battlespace Awareness Functional
Capabilities Board, focuses on what other actions such as better planning,
direction, command and control, and better fusion and exploitation of
information can provide the warfighter with more persistent surveillance
capability. The study is expected to be completed in the August-September
2007 time frame.

DOD Lacks Complete Metrics and Feedback for Fully Evaluating the Performance of
Its ISR Assets to Ensure Warfighter's Needs Are Met

DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets because
it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive
feedback from operators and intelligence personnel to ensure the
warfighter's needs are met. Specifically, although JFCC-ISR is tasked with
developing metrics and standards of performance to measure the success of
DOD ISR missions, existing metrics are limited and no DOD-wide milestones
have been established. Furthermore, DOD officials acknowledged that they
do not consistently receive feedback from operators and intelligence
analysts to ensure the warfighter's needs are met. Without feedback and a
complete set of metrics for evaluating its ISR assets, DOD may not be in
the best position to validate how well the warfighter needs are being met,
the true demand for ISR assets, and whether it is optimizing the use of
existing assets, or to acquire new systems that best support warfighting
needs.

DOD Is Developing Metrics to Measure Success of Its ISR Assets, but Progress Has
Been Limited and DOD Has Not Established Milestones

DOD is working to develop additional quantitative ISR metrics as well as
qualitative metrics to measure the success of its ISR assets, but existing
quantitative metrics are limited and no milestones have been established.
The JFCC-ISR is tasked with developing metrics and standards of
performance to assess DOD ISR mission accomplishment. Moreover, we
recommended in a December 2005 report10 that DOD ensure its performance
measurement systems measure how effectively UAS perform their missions,
identify performance indicator information that needs to be collected, and
systematically collect identified performance information. We continue to
believe this recommendation has merit, and DOD officials agree that
metrics are needed not only for UAS, but for all ISR missions. However,
DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics
such as the number of targets planned versus the number collected against.
While these metrics are a good start, DOD officials acknowledge that the
current metrics do not take into account all of the qualitative
considerations associated with measuring ISR asset effectiveness such as
the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous ISR missions, whether the
ISR asset did what it was intended to do, whether it had the intended
effect, and whether the intelligence captured contributed towards
accomplishment of the mission.

10 [26]GAO-06-49 .

The JFCC-ISR is working with the combatant commands to develop additional
quantitative ISR metrics as well as qualitative metrics to assess the
effectiveness of ISR assets, although DOD officials acknowledge the
progress in developing metrics has been limited. In developing these
metrics, the JFCC-ISR is leveraging national intelligence attributes,
which include characteristics such as whether the intelligence is
comprehensive to perform all missions anywhere and at anytime in any
weather; credible to allow users to make sound decisions and take
appropriate action; persistent to collect often and long enough to get the
job done; and timely to meet user needs. Furthermore, the JFCC-ISR has not
made any progress in establishing DOD-wide milestones for the development
of these metrics. Milestones are the required steps and planned dates for
completion of those steps leading up to metrics development.

DOD officials indicate that determining the success of ISR missions is
difficult given the nature of intelligence collection. Specifically,
hundreds of hours of ISR missions and target tracking could culminate in
the capture of a high value target; however, it may be difficult to
measure the effectiveness of each individual ISR mission that led to the
ultimate capture and mission success. This cumulative knowledge provided
by ISR assets is difficult to quantify. An official from the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics also
acknowledged that it may be more difficult to evaluate the success of
ongoing operations due to the dynamic and subjective nature of
requirements. The official noted, however, that DOD is better equipped to
measure the success of its more mature and traditional ISR missions, such
as sensitive reconnaissance operations, because the objectives are better
defined allowing more direct determination of success.

DOD Lacks Consistent Feedback on Whether ISR Assets Meet Warfighters' Needs

In addition to metrics, DOD also relies on feedback for evaluating how
successful its ISR assets are in meeting the warfighter's needs. However,
DOD lacks consistent feedback on whether ISR assets meet the needs of the
warfighters. Joint Publication 2-0111 calls for intelligence personnel and
consumers to evaluate and provide immediate feedback on how well
intelligence operations perform to meet commander's intelligence
requirements. This information could be used to inform DOD's acquisition,
allocation, and tasking of ISR assets. While DOD officials indicate they
occasionally receive feedback on ISR asset performance, they acknowledge
that feedback specific to how ISR assets performed in individual ISR
missions is not consistently occurring. While there is real-time
communication among unmanned aircraft system operators, requesters, and
intelligence personnel during an operation, and agency officials indicate
this communication is beneficial to providing real-time feedback, there is
little to no feedback after the operation to determine whether the
warfighters' needs were met. Officials indicate that the fast pace of
operations in theater affects the ability of end users to provide feedback
on every ISR mission. For example, according to Marine Corps officials,
there is a mechanism for Marine Corps units to provide feedback, but the
feedback is not consistently provided because there is no systematic
process in place to ensure that this feedback is captured. Without
developing metrics and systematically gathering feedback that enables it
to assess the extent to which ISR assets are successful in supporting
warfighter needs, DOD is not in a position to validate the true demand for
ISR assets, determine whether it is allocating and tasking its ISR assets
in the most effective manner, or acquire new systems that best support
warfighting needs.

Conclusions

DOD has achieved operational success with UAS in ongoing operations, but
it continues to face operational challenges that limit its ability to
fully optimize the use of these assets. These operational challenges have
been exacerbated by the lack of advance coordination when new assets are
being deployed in theater. While operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
been ongoing for some time, the potential exists for DOD to need to
establish operations in other areas of the world very quickly. A DOD-wide
procedure for advance coordination is critical to enable DOD to quickly
support ISR assets once deployed to ongoing operations. Until DOD takes
steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may be
limited in its ability to efficiently deploy and utilize UAS assets and
may not allow the combatant commander time to plan to support incoming
assets.

11Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-01, Joint and National
Intelligence Support to Military Operations, page III-56 (Oct. 7, 2004).

With the operational successes that have been realized with UAS,
commanders are requesting them in greater numbers. In spite of a dramatic
increase in UAS funding, DOD officials indicate that annual allocation
levels are constrained by the number of ISR assets in the inventory and
JFCC-ISR is, therefore, not able to allocate to the combatant commanders
DOD ISR assets in sufficient numbers to meet all requests for ISR support.
However, our work indicates that DOD's approach to UAS may not leverage
all of the DOD ISR assets currently available and DOD may not be in the
best position to determine if perceived demand is well-founded. Given the
substantial investment DOD is making in UAS and the increasing demand for
them, it is critical that DOD's approach to managing its ISR assets,
including UAS, allow it to optimize the use of these assets. Without an
approach to its allocation and tasking processes that considers all ISR
capabilities, DOD may not be in a position to leverage all available ISR
assets and to optimize the use of those assets. Moreover, DOD lacks
visibility over the true demand for and use of ISR assets, which could
hinder its ability to make informed decisions about the need to purchase
additional UAS assets and what quantities should be purchased.
Furthermore, without developing metrics and systematically gathering
feedback that enables DOD to assess the extent to which ISR missions are
successful in supporting warfighter needs, decision makers may not be in a
position to determine which UAS systems would best support the
warfighters' needs.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To mitigate challenges in integrating UAS, and other ISR assets, into
combat operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in
conjunction with the service secretaries and combatant commanders, take
the following three actions:

           o establish DOD-wide requirements for coordinating with the
           combatant commanders in advance of bringing UAS into the theater
           of operations;

           o develop a plan for communicating those requirements throughout
           DOD; and

           o establish a mechanism to ensure the services comply with these
           requirements.

           To ensure DOD has the information needed to consider all ISR
           assets when allocating and tasking these assets, we recommend that
           the Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism for

           o obtaining information on all ISR assets, including all DOD,
           national, and allied assets, operating in each of the combatant
           commanders' area of operations; and

           o allowing users at all levels within DOD to gain real-time
           situational awareness on where DOD ISR assets are operating and,
           where not prohibited by the mission, what they are being used to
           do.

           To improve DOD's ability to evaluate the performance of its ISR
           missions, we recommend the Secretary of Defense

           o establish DOD-wide milestones for development of qualitative and
           quantitative metrics;

           o develop a process for systematically capturing feedback from
           intelligence and operations communities to assess how effective
           ISR assets are in meeting warfighters' requirements; and

           o create a mechanism to ensure this information is used to inform
           DOD's acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets.
			  
			  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

           In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally
           concurred with all of our recommendations. DOD generally agreed
           with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense, in
           conjunction with the service secretaries and combatant commanders,
           establish DOD-wide requirements for coordinating with the
           combatant commanders in advance of bringing UAS into the theater
           of operations; develop a plan for communicating those requirements
           throughout DOD; and establish a mechanism to ensure the services
           comply with these requirements. DOD noted that it currently has a
           well-defined process to coordinate with the combatant commanders
           on the introduction of UAS into theater and cited several examples
           including the annual process for allocating theater-level UAS, and
           actions between stateside units and units in theater to plan for
           deployment of ISR capabilities. DOD, however, acknowledged that a
           more standardized method could improve efficiency of the
           coordination process and stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
           would be tasked to look at standardizing the coordination process
           and evaluate and provide direction for an improved coordination
           process. Further, DOD noted that, based on this evaluation, if
           direction is required, it will be issued via a Chairman's
           directive which is mandatory and therefore establishes the
           mechanism that ensures compliance. We recognize that DOD has
           various processes related to UAS but note that none, including the
           examples cited by DOD, represent a standardized, DOD-wide approach
           that the services and combatant commanders can follow in
           coordinating the specific details of deploying UAS assets,
           regardless of geographic area. Furthermore, we believe that a
           directive requiring coordination, by itself, does not ensure
           compliance, and would encourage DOD to include provisions
           detailing how implementation of the directive will be monitored.

           DOD also generally concurred with our recommendation that the
           Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism for obtaining information
           on all ISR assets--including all DOD, national, and allied
           assets--operating in each of the combatant commanders' area of
           operations; and allowing users at all levels within DOD to gain
           real-time situational awareness on where DOD ISR assets are
           operating and, where not prohibited by the mission, what they are
           being used to do. Specifically, DOD agrees that a mechanism for
           obtaining information on all ISR assets is needed and commented
           that work is underway within the JFCC-ISR to develop such a
           mechanism. DOD commented that it is not currently practical to
           provide situational awareness on some UAS such as the small,
           hand-launched UAS at the lowest operational level because these
           systems do not have the capacity or capability to communicate
           their position to a common point. DOD noted that it will determine
           the UAS operational levels that will provide widespread
           situational awareness, including operational details and timelines
           of data reporting. We recognize that situational awareness may not
           currently be practical for some UAS but would encourage the
           department to seek to maximize coverage in exploring options for
           improved situational awareness.

           DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
           Defense establish DOD-wide milestones for development of
           qualitative and quantitative metrics and stated that JFCC-ISR is
           standing up an Assessments Division that will be responsible for
           the development of metrics. We recognize the Assessment Division
           has been tasked with development of ISR metrics and reemphasize
           the need to develop milestones for metrics development. DOD
           partially concurred with our recommendations that it develop a
           process for systematically capturing feedback from intelligence
           and operations communities to assess how effective ISR assets are
           in meeting warfighters' requirements and create a mechanism to
           ensure this information is used to inform DOD's acquisition,
           allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets. DOD agreed that an
           improved and standardized process for collection and reporting of
           feedback would enhance visibility and provide more effective
           warfighter support, but pointed out that organizations within the
           department collect feedback or conduct lessons learned studies. We
           acknowledge that DOD has organizations such as the Army's Center
           for Lessons Learned that are responsible for capturing feedback
           and developing lessons learned based on that feedback. However,
           these organizations are charged with capturing lessons learned on
           a number of issues and are not focused on ISR effectiveness.
           Furthermore, our recommendation pertains to DOD's guidance which
           states it is imperative that intelligence personnel and consumers
           to evaluate and provide immediate feedback on how well individual
           intelligence operations perform to meet commanders' intelligence
           requirements. While the feedback that may be captured by those
           lessons learned organizations is noteworthy, it is often not
           immediate and specific to individual missions. As we noted in our
           report, DOD officials acknowledged that feedback specific to how
           ISR assets performed in individual ISR missions is not
           consistently occurring. DOD further commented that it has
           mechanisms in place to inform its decision making processes on the
           acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets such as the
           Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System which
           assesses, among other things, capability gaps and solutions. We
           agree that the mechanisms mentioned in DOD's response exist;
           however, DOD currently does not have sufficient qualitative and
           quantitative metrics needed to collect data on UAS performance nor
           does it have a means for incorporating such data into the
           processes currently used to make decisions on ISR assets.

           The full text of DOD's written comments is reprinted in appendix
           II. DOD also provided technical comments separately and we have
           made adjustments where appropriate. In particular, the Army
           provided additional information on the coordination of the Warrior
           Alpha UAS in its technical comments, including a timeline for
           introduction of the asset into theater.

           We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense.
           We will make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
           the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
           [27]http://www.gao.gov . If you or your staff have any questions
           regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or
           [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
           Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
           report. Staff members who made key contributions to this report
           are listed in appendix III.

           Sharon Pickup
			  Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
			  
			  Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

           To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has
           taken steps to facilitate the integration of unmanned aircraft
           systems (UAS) into combat operations, we examined DOD and military
           service publications and documentation on UAS such as the
           2005-2030 UAS Roadmap, the Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
           Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft
           Systems, the Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft
           Systems, the Concept of Operations for Employment of Full Motion
           Video Assets, and the ISR Systems Concept of Operations
           Standardization Memo. Additionally, we met with key DOD and
           service officials, including those from the Joint UAS Center of
           Excellence and the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning Task Force
           within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
           Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Air Land Sea
           Application Center. We also met with officials from U.S. Central
           Command and the services, including units that had returned from
           deployment to the theater, or that were currently supporting
           ongoing operations, to discuss the integration of UAS into U.S.
           Central Command's area of responsibility and to better understand
           integration challenges.

           To determine the extent to which DOD's approach to allocating and
           tasking its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
           assets, including UAS, considers all available ISR assets to
           optimize their capabilities, we met with key DOD and service
           officials, including those from U.S. Central Command and
           associated Army and Air Force component commands, the Combined Air
           Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the Joint
           Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
           Reconnaissance and other organizations. We interviewed and
           obtained documentation including the fiscal year 2007 ISR
           allocation briefing from officials of the Joint Functional
           Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
           Reconnaissance to better understand the allocation process. We
           also reviewed documentation such as joint publications and
           briefings that explain the process for tasking ISR assets and
           interviewed officials at U.S. Central Command, Central Command Air
           Forces, and the Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar to better
           understand how ISR assets are assigned to specific missions. To
           understand how requests for ISR support are generated and
           satisfied at the tactical level, we spoke with units that recently
           returned from, or are currently supporting, ongoing operations in
           Iraq as well as units within the services such as the Marine
           Corps' Tactical Fusion Center that are involved in determining if
           tactical assets are available to satisfy those requests or if the
           requests need to be forwarded for theater-level support. To
           understand how manned and unmanned assets are being leveraged to
           optimize the intelligence captured, we met with manned and
           unmanned units stationed at the Al Dhafra Air Base in the United
           Arab Emirates. To understand DOD's ongoing efforts to study its
           process for tasking ISR assets, we reviewed documentation and
           interviewed an official from the Battlespace Awareness Functional
           Capabilities Board.

           To assess whether DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets,
           including UAS, to ensure that warfighters' needs are met, we
           interviewed DOD and service officials to discuss the metrics for
           evaluating the performance of its ISR assets. We discussed with
           the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
           Surveillance, and Reconnaissance its efforts to establish metrics
           for evaluating ISR assets performance. We reviewed metrics
           routinely captured to assess the success of DOD's ISR missions. We
           also met with service officials and service units recently
           returned from Iraq to determine the extent to which feedback is
           received on how effective ISR support is in meeting the
           warfighters' needs. We performed our work from June 2006 to June
           2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
           standards.
			  
			  Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
			  
			  Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  GAO Contact

           Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or [email protected]
			  
			  Acknowledgments

           In addition to the individual named above, Patty Lentini,
           Assistant Director; Renee Brown; Jamie Khanna; Kate Lenane;
           LaShawnda Lindsey; Elisha Matvay; and Susan Tindall made key
           contributions to this report.
			  
			  Related GAO Products

           Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's
           Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems.
           [28]GAO-07-578 . Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.

           Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary
           Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New
           Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development. [29]GAO-07-596T
           . Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007.

           Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition
           Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges.
           [30]GAO-06-610T . Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.

           Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
           Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments.
           [31]GAO-06-49 . Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.

           Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition
           Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. [32]GAO-05-395T .
           Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2005.
			  
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(350891)

[39]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-836 .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [40]GAO-07-836 , a report to the Subcommittee on Air and
Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

July 2007

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

Advance Coordination and Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize
Capabilities

Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations rank the need for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as high
on their priority lists. The Department of Defense (DOD) is investing in
many ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), to meet the
growing demand for ISR assets to support the warfighter. GAO was asked to
evaluate DOD's efforts to integrate UAS into ongoing operations while
optimizing the use of all DOD ISR assets. Specifically, this report
addresses the extent that (1) DOD has taken steps to facilitate the
integration of UAS into combat operations, and (2) DOD's approach to
allocating and tasking its ISR assets considers all available ISR
capabilities, including those provided by UAS. GAO also reviewed the
extent that DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets, including
UAS, in meeting warfighters' needs. To perform this work, GAO analyzed
data and guidance on the use of ISR assets, and interviewed DOD officials,
including those supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[41]What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending actions to improve DOD's ability to coordinate the
deployment of its UAS and other ISR assets, consider the availability of
all ISR assets in allocating and tasking them, and evaluate the
performance of its ISR assets. DOD generally concurred with our
recommendations.

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of
UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to
coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed
guidance for the tactical employment of UAS and a Joint UAS Concept of
Operations. This guidance is an important first step but does not address
coordinating UAS and other ISR assets prior to deploying them to ongoing
operations, which U.S. Central Command recognized is a critical factor in
integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD addresses the need for
DOD-wide advance coordination, it may continue to face challenges in
successfully integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations
and may exacerbate integration challenges such as limited bandwidth.

DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including UAS,
hinders its ability to optimize the use of these assets because it does
not consider the capabilities of all available ISR assets. The command
charged with recommending how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be
allocated to support operational requirements does not have awareness of
all available ISR assets because DOD does not have a mechanism for
obtaining this information. Similarly, the commander responsible for
coordinating ongoing joint air operations does not have information on how
assets controlled by tactical units are being used or what missions
they've been tasked to support. Nor do tactical units have information on
how theater-level assets and ISR assets embedded in other units are being
tasked, which results in problems such as duplicative taskings. This lack
of visibility occurs because DOD does not have a mechanism for tracking
the missions both theater- and tactical-level ISR assets are supporting or
how they are being used. Without an approach to allocation and tasking
that includes a mechanism for considering all ISR capabilities, DOD may be
unable to fully leverage all available ISR assets and optimize their use.

DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets because
it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive
feedback to ensure the warfighter's needs were met. Although the Joint
Functional Component Command for ISR has been tasked with developing ISR
metrics, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative
metrics such as the number of targets planned versus captured. While these
metrics are a good start, DOD officials acknowledge that the current
metrics do not capture all of the qualitative considerations associated
with measuring ISR asset effectiveness such as the cumulative knowledge
provided by numerous ISR missions. There is an ongoing effort within DOD
to develop additional quantitative as well as qualitative ISR metrics, but
no DOD-wide milestones have been established. Furthermore, DOD guidance
calls for an evaluation of the results of joint operations; however, DOD
officials acknowledge that this feedback is not consistently occurring due
to the fast pace of operations in theater. Without metrics and feedback,
DOD may not be able to validate how well the warfighters' needs are being
met, whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or which new
systems would best support warfighting needs.

References

Visible links
  23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-49
  24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-610T
  25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-49
  26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-49
  27. http://www.gao.gov/
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-578
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-596T
  30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-610T
  31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-49
  32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-0395T
  33. http://www.gao.gov/
  34. http://www.gao.gov/
  35. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  36. mailto:[email protected]
  37. mailto:[email protected]
  38. mailto:[email protected]
  39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-836
  40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-836
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