Defense Logistics: Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply
Support for Joint Military Operations Could Benefit from a
Coordinated Management Approach (29-JUN-07, GAO-07-807).
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army and the Marine Corps
experienced problems with the delivery of supplies to the
warfighter. Such problems highlight long-standing weaknesses in
the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chain management. DOD
has identified joint theater logistics as a key effort aimed at
improving distribution and supply support. GAO was asked to
examine DOD's efforts to develop and implement joint theater
logistics. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which DOD's approach to
managing joint theater logistics departmentwide encompasses sound
management principles and (2) the progress DOD has made in
implementing joint theater logistics initiatives. GAO reviewed
DOD documents and interviewed officials from the Joint Staff,
services, agencies, and geographic combatant commands.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-807
ACCNO: A71767
TITLE: Defense Logistics: Efforts to Improve Distribution and
Supply Support for Joint Military Operations Could Benefit from a
Coordinated Management Approach
DATE: 06/29/2007
SUBJECT: Best practices
Combat readiness
Defense capabilities
Defense operations
Interoperability
Iraq War and reconstruction
Logistics
Management reengineering
Military forces
Program evaluation
Program management
Property and supply management
Strategic planning
Supply chain management
Program goals or objectives
Program implementation
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GAO-07-807
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]DOD Has Not Developed a Coordinated and Comprehensive Manage
* [4]DOD's Approach to Joint Theater Logistics Is Not Consistent
* [5]Changes in DOD's Overall Logistics Strategy Hinder Developme
* [6]DOD Has Made Progress on Joint Theater Logistics Initiatives
* [7]New Port Opening Capability Faces Implementation Challenges
* [8]DOD Has Established a New Port Opening Unit
* [9]Army Officials Have Raised Concerns About the Port
Opening U
* [10]DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Supply Distribution, but Asse
* [11]DOD Has Established Joint Operations Centers in the
Geograph
* [12]Lack of System Interoperability Has Impeded Asset
Visibility
* [13]Problems With Container Management Have Continued
* [14]Separate Organizations Are Being Established to Coordinate S
* [15]Sustainment Commands and Surface Mobility Directorate
Are Ai
* [16]Initiatives Face Implementation Challenges
* [17]Consolidated Storage and Shipping Arrangements Have Been Imp
* [18]Consolidated Storage and Shipping Initiatives
* [19]Additional Opportunities for Consolidating Shipping and
Stor
* [20]Command and Control Over Joint Logistics Functions Remains U
* [21]Several Command and Control Options Have Emerged
* [22]Command and Control Issues Have Not Been Resolved
* [23]Conclusions
* [24]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [25]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [26]Scope and Methodology
* [27]GAO Contact
* [28]Acknowledgments
* [29]GAO's Mission
* [30]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [31]Order by Mail or Phone
* [32]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [33]Congressional Relations
* [34]Public Affairs
Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
June 2007
DEFENSE LOGISTICS
Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply Support for Joint Military
Operations Could Benefit from a Coordinated Management Approach
Defense Logistics Defense Logistics Defense Logistics ense Logistics
GAO-07-807
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 6
DOD Has Not Developed a Coordinated and Comprehensive Management Approach
to Joint Theater Logistics 9
DOD Has Made Progress on Joint Theater Logistics Initiatives but Faces
Challenges That Hinder Its Ability to Fully Realize the Benefits of These
Efforts 19
Conclusions 51
Recommendations for Executive Action 52
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 53
Scope and Methodology 54
Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 57
Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 59
Table
Table 1: Challenges Hindering DOD's Ability to Fully Implement Joint
Theater Logistics Initiatives 19
Figures
Figure 1: Recent Strategic Planning Documents Addressing DOD Logistics 15
Figure 2: Military Storage Containers in Kuwait (October 2006) 27
Figure 3: Views of Container and Yard Storage at Army General Support
Warehouse, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (October 2006) 42
Figure 4: Exterior and Interior Views of Warehouses at the DLA
Distribution Depot, Kuwait (October 2006) 43
Figure 5: Continuum of Logistics Command and Control Options Included in
the Joint Experimental Deployment and Support Initiative 47
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
June 29, 2007
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka
Chairman
The Honorable George V. Voinovich
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Department of Defense (DOD) experienced problems with logistics
support and supply chain management during military operations in Iraq
that impeded the timely delivery of supplies and contributed to shortages
of items critical to the warfighter.^1 These problems--which affected both
Army and Marine Corps ground forces--included an insufficient capability
to provide support to combat forces during the early stages of the
conflict, difficulties in distributing supplies within the theater of
operations, and limitations in asset visibility.^212 Such problems also
occurred during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991. During the
1990s, following the end of the Cold War, DOD reexamined the future threat
environment that U.S. military forces could face and identified logistics
capabilities that would be needed to support future military operations.
One of these identified capabilities, joint theater logistics, is aimed at
improving the ability of a joint force commander to direct various
logistics functions, including distribution and supply support activities,
across the theater of operations to accomplish an assigned mission. The
Department of Defense (DOD) experienced problems with logistics support
and supply chain management during military operations in Iraq that
impeded the timely delivery of supplies and contributed to shortages of
items critical to the warfighter. These problems--which affected both Army
and Marine Corps ground forces--included an insufficient capability to
provide support to combat forces during the early stages of the conflict,
difficulties in distributing supplies within the theater of operations,
and limitations in asset visibility. Such problems also occurred during
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991. During the 1990s, following
the end of the Cold War, DOD reexamined the future threat environment that
U.S. military forces could face and identified logistics capabilities that
would be needed to support future military operations. One of these
identified capabilities, joint theater logistics, is aimed at improving
the ability of a joint force commander to direct various logistics
functions, including distribution and supply support activities, across
the theater of operations to accomplish an assigned mission.
Under DOD doctrine for conducting joint military operations, the joint
force commander is ultimately responsible for synchronizing all aspects of
Under DOD doctrine for conducting joint military operations, the joint
force commander is ultimately responsible for synchronizing all aspects of
logistics necessary to support the mission.^3 However, the joint force
commander relies on various DOD components, including the military
services, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and U.S. Transportation Command,
to provide the logistics resources and systems needed to support U.S.
forces. Various provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code establish
responsibilities and authorities for supplying and equipping the armed
forces.^4 These and other Title 10 functions are promulgated by DOD
through directives.^5 Implementing joint theater logistics involves
harnessing these diffuse resources and systems, which are not integrated
but rather separately funded and managed across DOD's components.
^1DOD defines logistics as the science of planning and carrying out the
movement and maintenance of forces. Logistics includes six broad
functional areas: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering,
health services, and other services. Supply chain management consists of
processes and activities to purchase, produce, and deliver
materiel--including ammunition, spare parts, fuel, food, water, clothing,
personal equipment, and other items--to a force that is highly dispersed
and mobile.
^2DOD describes asset visibility as the ability to provide timely and
accurate information on the location, quantity, condition, movement, and
status of equipment and supplies.
The Joint Staff Logistics Directorate is DOD's lead proponent for joint
theater logistics, and this effort involves developing and implementing a
number of initiatives across the department. DOD believes joint theater
logistics will improve the distribution and visibility of assets in a
theater of operations. For this reason, DOD has listed joint theater
logistics as one of several key initiatives in its supply chain management
improvement plan. Because of long-standing systemic weaknesses that have
been identified in our previous reports, we have designated DOD's supply
chain management as a high-risk area. In 2005, DOD developed the supply
chain management improvement plan to place it on a path toward removing
supply chain management from our high-risk list.
At your request, we have examined DOD's efforts to develop and implement
joint theater logistics as part of its plans for improving logistics
support and supply chain management. Specifically, this report assesses
(1) the extent to which DOD's approach to managing joint theater logistics
departmentwide encompasses sound management principles and (2) the
progress DOD has made in implementing joint theater logistics initiatives
in the areas of distribution and supply support.
^3Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic
Support of Joint Operations (Apr. 6, 2000), p. I-3. (Hereafter cited as
JCS Pub 4-0 (Apr. 6, 2000), p. XX).
^4See 10 U.S.C. SS 3013, 3062, 5013, 5062, 5063, 8013, and 8062.
^5DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its
Major Components (Aug. 1, 2002) states that the military services are
responsible for providing logistic support for service forces. DOD
Directive 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency (May 17, 2006), directs DLA,
among other responsibilities and functions, to provide materiel
commodities and supply chain management for items of supply and services.
DOD Directive 5158.4, United States Transportation Command (Jan. 8, 1993),
states that the command shall have combatant command over all
transportation assets of the military departments, except for
service-unique or theater-assigned assets.
To assess DOD's approach to managing joint theater logistics, we
identified sound management principles based on prior work on
organizational transformation and federal agency implementation of the
Government Performance and Results Act.^6 We reviewed doctrine,
regulations, guidance, plans, briefings, status reports, and other
documents related to the development of joint theater logistics, logistics
strategic planning, and supply chain management, to include reports by
various audit and non-audit organizations that have assessed DOD's
logistics operations. We also interviewed officials from the Joint Staff
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense who are involved with joint
theater logistics and logistics transformation. To assess DOD's progress
in implementing joint theater logistics initiatives, we visited the five
geographic combatant commands, the subordinate unified command in Korea,
military service component commands in three theaters, and operational
units in Germany, Korea, and Kuwait. We met with military service
officials at headquarters offices, as well as at selected commands and
reserve components. We also visited U.S. Transportation Command, U.S.
Joint Forces Command, and DLA to obtain information on specific
initiatives. In addition, we attended the out-brief for an Army conference
on theater opening, reviewed after-action reports from exercises testing
the initiatives, and analyzed lessons learned reports from Operation Iraqi
Freedom. We determined that the data we used were sufficiently reliable
for our purposes. Additional information on our scope and methodology is
provided at the end of this letter. We conducted our review from July 2006
to April 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief
DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management approach
to guide and oversee implementation of joint theater logistics across the
department. Efforts to develop and implement joint theater logistics
initiatives have been fragmented among various DOD components due largely
to a lack of specific goals and strategies, accountability for achieving
results, and outcome-oriented performance measures--key principles of
sound management. While DOD has broadly defined joint theater logistics as
an adaptive ability to anticipate and respond to emerging theater
logistics and support requirements, it has not developed specific goals
and strategies linked to this vision. In addition, DOD has not assigned
accountability for achieving results under joint theater logistics and has
not developed outcome-oriented performance measures that would enable the
department to know whether its efforts are fully and effectively achieving
a joint theater logistics capability. Furthermore, the diffused
organization of DOD's logistics operations, including separate funding and
management of resources and systems, complicates DOD's ability to adopt a
coordinated and comprehensive management approach to developing and
implementing joint theater logistics capabilities. A number of studies
that have assessed DOD's logistics operations have recommended changes to
DOD's organizational structure and control of resources for providing
joint logistics support to military operations. Moreover, changes in DOD's
overall logistics transformation strategy have hampered its ability to
adopt a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to joint theater
logistics. Over the years, DOD has made a number of attempts to articulate
a long-term strategy to guide logistics transformation, including joint
theater logistics, but progress on these efforts has been hindered by
differing visions within the department. DOD is currently testing a new
approach to managing joint capabilities and is considering a realignment
of capabilities in its long-term logistics strategy--efforts that could
affect the future of joint theater logistics. Under this realignment,
joint theater logistics may cease to exist as a stand-alone capability
area; however, the tenets of joint theater logistics would be retained,
and the functional areas associated with joint theater logistics would be
integrated within the broader joint logistics portfolio. Without a
coordinated and comprehensive approach to managing joint theater
logistics, DOD lacks assurance that it is on the right path toward
achieving this capability and that individual initiatives will
collectively address gaps in logistics capabilities. Further, DOD will
have difficulty achieving the desired improvements in distribution and
asset visibility associated with joint theater logistics as portrayed in
the supply chain management improvement plan. We are recommending that DOD
develop a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to guide and
oversee efforts across the department to improve distribution and supply
support in a joint theater. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD
concurred with our recommendation.
^6Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).
Although a coordinated and comprehensive management approach does not
exist, DOD components have made progress developing and implementing joint
theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and supply
support; however, the department faces a number of challenges that hinder
its ability to fully realize the benefits of these efforts. A notable
improvement has been the establishment of Joint Deployment Distribution
Operations Centers that can help joint force commanders synchronize the
arrival of supplies into a theater and assist in other aspects of
distribution and supply support. However, officials we interviewed said
these operations centers alone will not resolve distribution and supply
support problems. Other initiatives are at various stages of development
and implementation as DOD experiments with new organizational
arrangements, writes new concepts of operations, and revises doctrine.
Despite this progress, DOD faces a number of challenges in fully
developing and implementing joint theater logistics initiatives in the
areas of distribution and supply support. Some of the challenges are as
follows:
o DOD has established an expeditionary organization to manage the
arrival of supplies moving into a theater during the early stages
of a military operation, but Army officials have raised questions
about the need for this new organization and the resources devoted
to it, as well as about the command and control over this
organization.
o While Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers have been
established in each geographic combatant command to help manage
supplies moving across the distribution system, senior commanders
in Kuwait said achieving asset visibility has been difficult
because of a lack of interoperability among information technology
systems. We also found continuing problems with container
management, although improvements have been made.
o Initiatives to improve the coordination of surface
transportation assets theaterwide also face challenges with issues
of command and control, the availability of information technology
tools, and potential duplication of responsibilities with other
organizations.
o Efforts to consolidate multiple storage and shipping activities
in a theater have been implemented on a limited scale and
additional consolidation opportunities may exist. During our site
visits to Kuwait, we found that DLA and the Army were operating
separate facilities that have the potential for consolidation,
which could result in more efficient use of resources. Since our
fieldwork was completed, DLA assessed ways to improve theater
distribution and made recommendations to consolidate and relocate
existing operations. Because this study was focused on the U.S.
Central Command area of operations, we are recommending DLA
undertake similar assessments within all the geographic combatant
commands. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred
with this recommendation.
o Finally, various options have emerged for improving the ability
of a joint force commander to exercise command and control over
joint theater logistics functions. However, the military services
have raised concerns about how their own roles and
responsibilities for providing logistics support might be affected
and have opposed expansion of the most robust command and control
option that has emerged.
Unless DOD successfully addresses these challenges, the
initiatives are not likely to significantly improve the ability of
a joint force commander to harness the diffuse logistics resources
and systems that exist within the department and effectively and
efficiently direct logistics functions, including distribution and
supply support activities, across the theater of operations to
accomplish an assigned mission. Moreover, without addressing such
challenges, DOD is likely to continue to experience some of the
same types of distribution and asset visibility problems that
occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Background
We have identified weaknesses in DOD's supply and distribution
support in prior reports.^7 These weaknesses have affected the
department's ability to meet its goal of delivering the "right
items to the right place at the right time" to support the
deployment and sustainment of military forces. One problem with
logistics support has been an insufficient capability to support
combat forces during the early stages of a conflict. In Operation
Iraqi Freedom, for example, DOD's priority was to move combat
forces into the theater first, with logistics personnel arriving
later in the deployment. Because of the shortage of support
personnel in theater, the forces experienced delays in receiving,
storing, and distributing supplies. For example, early in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, inefficient packaging and palletizing of
air shipments created supply backlogs in Kuwait that delayed the
delivery of supplies shipped by air to units in Iraq. Once in
theater, mixed shipments had to be manually opened, sorted, and
re-palletized at theater distribution points, causing additional
delays in getting repair parts to their end users. Another problem
has been limited visibility of assets within the distribution
system. Incomplete radio frequency identification tags required
logistics personnel to spend time opening and sorting the
shipments, significantly increasing processing time. Additionally,
logistics systems used to order, track, and account for supplies
were not well integrated and could not provide the essential
information to effectively manage theater distribution. Thus, we
have indicated that materiel distribution and asset visibility are
two key focus areas critical to resolving these supply and
distribution problems.
^7GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of
Logistics Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom, [35]GAO-04-305R
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003); Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to
Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future
Operations, [36]GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005); and Defense
Logistics: DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution Operations, but
Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain These Efforts, [37]GAO-05-775
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2005).
Joint theater logistics is one of seven future logistics
capabilities that DOD has grouped under the term "focused
logistics." DOD has broadly defined joint theater logistics as an
adaptive ability to anticipate and respond to emerging theater
logistics and support requirements. In addition to joint theater
logistics, focused logistics capabilities include joint
deployment/rapid distribution, agile sustainment, operational
engineering, force health protection, multinational logistics, and
logistics information fusion. Together, these capabilities are
intended to support an overall joint logistics capability, which
DOD defines as "the capability to build effective, responsive, and
efficient capacity into the deployment and sustainment pipeline;
exercise control over the pipeline from end to end; and provide
certainty to the supported joint force commander that forces,
equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive where needed and
on time." According to DOD, focused logistics can be achieved by
transforming logistics capabilities. To succeed, these focused
logistics capabilities must be fully integrated, expeditionary,
networked, decentralized, adaptable, and capable of decision
superiority. Further, they must support future joint operations
that are continuous and distributed across the full range of
military operations.
Since the 1990s, DOD has developed various strategic planning
documents, such as Joint Vision 2010, which included focused
logistics as a needed capability. In 2000, DOD incorporated joint
theater logistics and other focused logistics capabilities in
joint warfighting doctrine. In 2003, the department approved the
joint functional concept for focused logistics.^8 In 2005, DOD
issued its Focused Logistics Roadmap, presenting an "as is"
compendium of programs and initiatives associated with the fiscal
year 2006 President's Budget and aligned under the focused
logistics capabilities. The "as is" roadmap was intended to
complement previously published logistics strategies and to
represent the portfolio of programs and initiatives for which the
Focused Logistics Functional Capabilities Board^9 and Joint Staff
Logistics Directorate have primary oversight responsibility. In
2006, DOD approved the Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint
Integrating Concept,^10 which complements the joint functional
concept and calls for a joint deployment and distribution
enterprise that is capable of providing joint force commanders
with the ability to rapidly and effectively move and sustain
forces in support of major combat operations or other joint
operations. This document describes the enterprise as an
integrated system of assets, materiel, personnel, leaders,
organizations, procedures, tools, training, facilities, and
doctrine that is expected to enable the joint force commander to
minimize seams in the distribution pipeline. The joint deployment
and distribution enterprise is expected to complement and augment
service or joint force commander-unique distribution
responsibilities and capabilities.
^8Joint functional concepts describe, and are used as a basis to shape,
joint capabilities across the department.
Distribution is part of the process and activities for managing
the supply chain. According to joint doctrine, distribution is the
process of synchronizing all elements of the logistics system to
deliver the "right things" to the "right place" at the "right
time." DOD's distribution system has two segments:
strategic-national and theater. The strategic segment of this
pipeline involves the movement of supplies from points outside a
theater of military operations into the theater. The theater
segment consists of distribution that occurs within a theater of
military operations. The military services have the responsibility
to organize, train, equip, and provide logistics support to their
respective forces.^11 The military services and DLA manage
supplies and provide for asset visibility. U.S. Transportation
Command is responsible for providing transportation support,
primarily strategic airlift and sealift, as well as in-transit
asset visibility.^12 The geographic combatant commands are
responsible for logistics in their theaters, to include managing
and directing the theater distribution system.^13
^9DOD has eight Functional Capabilities Boards that support the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council and lead the capabilities assessment
process.
^10Whereas a joint functional concept is a broad description of joint
force functions, a joint integrating concept is a description of narrowly
focused operations or functions and is used to identify, describe, and
apply specific capabilities.
^11See 10 U.S.C. SS 3013, 3062, 5013, 5062, 5063, 8013, and 8062.
^12DOD defines in-transit visibility as the near-real-time capability to
track logistic resources and transportation assets while they are mobile
and underway.
In September 2003, the Secretary of Defense assigned new
organizational responsibilities in the logistics area, including
designating the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) as the Defense Logistics Executive, and
the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, as the Distribution
Process Owner. The Defense Logistics Executive has authority to
address logistics and supply issues. The role of the Distribution
Process Owner is to improve the efficiency and interoperability of
the end-to-end distribution system. Prior to these new
organizational designations, the Secretary of Defense designated
U.S. Joint Forces Command as the Joint Deployment Process Owner,
responsible for improving joint deployment and redeployment
processes. The commanders of U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S.
Transportation Command--recognizing that many deployment and
distribution processes are common and that both commands serve a
common customer: the supported joint force commander--signed a
joint vision statement in September 2006 to help guide their
partnership as they work together to improve DOD's joint
deployment and distribution.
DOD Has Not Developed a Coordinated and Comprehensive Management
Approach to Joint Theater Logistics
DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management
approach for guiding and overseeing the implementation of joint
theater logistics across the department. While DOD intends joint
theater logistics to improve the distribution and visibility of
assets in theater, its current approach is not consistent with
sound management principles that have been shown to be effective
in accomplishing organizational transformation, and has led to
fragmented efforts across components. In addition, changes in
DOD's overall logistics transformation strategy have hampered
DOD's ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive management
approach to joint theater logistics. Without a coordinated and
comprehensive approach, DOD will continue to face difficulties
achieving improvements in theater distribution and asset
visibility, which impair its ability to improve overall supply
chain management.
^13Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-01.4, Joint Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution (Aug. 22, 2000),
p. II-6.
DOD's Approach to Joint Theater Logistics Is Not Consistent With Sound
Management Principles and Has Led to Fragmented Efforts
Our review of DOD's efforts to develop joint theater logistics
showed that the department has taken a piecemeal approach rather
than a coordinated and comprehensive approach that is consistent
with sound management principles. DOD's current approach has led
to fragmented efforts among components to develop and implement
initiatives. Sound management principles, such as those used by
leading organizations to transform their culture and embodied in
the Government Performance and Results Act, include (1) specific
goals and strategies, (2) accountability for achieving results,
and (3) outcome-oriented performance measures. We have previously
reported that organizations that have progressed toward the
results-oriented framework of the Government Performance and
Results Act have established performance goals for which they will
be held accountable, determined strategies and resources to
effectively accomplish the goals, and measured progress towards
those goals. A focus on results, as envisioned by the Government
Performance and Results Act, implies that collaboration is
important to ensure that consistent and complementary goals and
strategies for achieving results are developed and implemented
across the enterprise. Performance metrics are critical for
demonstrating progress toward achieving results and providing
information on which to base organizational and management
decisions. Further, outcome-focused performance metrics show
results or outcomes related to an initiative or program in terms
of its effectiveness, efficiency, or impact. When combined with
effective leadership, these principles provide a framework to
guide program efforts in a coordinated and comprehensive fashion
and allow leadership to determine if these efforts are achieving
the desired results. In contrast, an insufficient articulation of
program goals and inadequate information on performance may be
impediments to improving program efficiency and effectiveness.
DOD's approach to joint theater logistics is not consistent with
these principles of sound management. First, while DOD has a broad
definition of joint theater logistics, it has not articulated
specific goals and strategies linked to this vision. For example,
DOD's Focused Logistics Roadmap, supply chain management
improvement plan, and other documents we reviewed do not contain
specific goals and strategies for achieving joint theater
logistics. DOD also has yet to identify the resources and time
frames for fully implementing joint theater logistics. Moreover,
DOD's description of joint theater logistics has not been
consistent over time, which may affect its ability to develop
specific goals and strategies. This issue is discussed later in
this report.
Second, DOD has not assigned accountability for achieving results
under joint theater logistics. Although the Joint Staff Logistics
Directorate has been designated the lead proponent for joint
theater logistics, no one entity within DOD has responsibility for
coordinating and overseeing programs and initiatives related to
joint theater logistics. In addition, while DOD has designated
executive agents and process owners aimed at addressing logistics
challenges that cut across the department, the roles and
responsibilities among DOD components have not always been clearly
delineated and may overlap. We have previously reported on
problems DOD has experienced in defining accountability and
authority for addressing supply distribution problems.^14 For
example, although the Secretary of Defense in 2003 designated the
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, as DOD's Distribution
Process Owner--with responsibilities for overseeing the overall
effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of DOD-wide distribution
activities--DOD has yet to issue a directive defining the process
owner's authority, accountability, resources, and
responsibility.^15 Additionally, during our current review,
service and combatant command officials had concerns with U.S.
Transportation Command expanding beyond its traditional roles and
responsibilities for strategic distribution, believing that there
should be a hand-off of responsibilities once assets arrive in
theater.
Furthermore, the diffused organization of DOD's logistics
operations, including separate funding and management of resources
and systems, complicates DOD's ability to adopt a coordinated and
comprehensive management approach to developing and implementing
joint theater logistics capabilities. Since 2003, a number of
studies that have assessed DOD's logistics organization have
recommended changes to DOD's organizational structure for
providing joint logistics and supply support to military
operations.^16 Some of these organizations have noted that control
over resources is a critical issue to be addressed. For example,
the Defense Science Board recommended creation of a Joint
Logistics Command that would combine the missions of U.S.
Transportation Command, DLA, and service logistics commands. The
Center for Strategic and International Studies also suggested the
creation of a departmentwide logistics command responsible for
end-to-end supply chain operations. Regarding resource allocation,
it further stated that resources should be organized, managed, and
budgeted largely along military service lines, but in those
instances where joint capability needs are not being met with
service-centric processes, the Secretary must turn to joint
processes and entities for their realization. The Lexington
Institute, which also recommended creation of a U.S. Logistics
Command at the four-star level, concluded that Title 10 can be
used to prevent joint logistics transformation and
interoperability and may need to be amended in order to create a
Logistics Command. The Lexington Institute also concluded that
existing funding mechanisms act as disincentives for joint
logistics transformation and interoperability. The Defense
Business Practice Implementation Board, while not agreeing with
the idea of combining U.S. Transportation Command and DLA,
recommended that DOD elevate leadership for supply chain
integration by designating a new Under Secretary of Defense who
would have authority to direct integration activities, including
control over budget decisions affecting these two components and
the military services. While we noted that transformational
changes such as those proposed by these organizations may not be
possible without amending existing laws, the scope of our review
did not include an assessment of these proposals or what changes,
if any, would require congressional action.
^14 [38]GAO-05-775 .
^15In May 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense redesignated the
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command as DOD's Distribution Process
Owner. Under this redesignation, the mission of the Distribution Process
Owner is to oversee the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment
of DOD-wide distribution activities and to establish concepts and
operational frameworks relating to the planning and execution of DOD
transportation operations.
^16For more information on these recommendations, see GAO, DOD's High-Risk
Areas: Progress Made Implementing Supply Chain Management Recommendations,
but Full Extent of Improvement Unknown, [39]GAO-07-234 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 17, 2007).
On the basis of our prior work on DOD's approach to business
transformation,^17 we have stated that DOD needs to establish a
chief management official at an appropriate level with the
authority to be responsible and accountable for enterprisewide
business transformation, including business operations related to
supply chain management. Also, in our report on 21st century
challenges confronting the federal government,^18 we stated that
DOD faces significant challenges in accomplishing its
transformation goals and making improvements in key business areas
such as supply chain management. We also suggested in that report
that decision makers may need to reexamine fundamental aspects of
DOD's programs by considering issues such as whether current
organizations are aligned and empowered to meet the demands of the
new security environment as efficiently as possible and what kinds
of economies of scale and improvements in delivery of support
services would result from combining, realigning, or otherwise
changing selected support functions, including logistics.
^17GAO, Defense Business Transformation: A Comprehensive Plan, Integrated
Efforts, and Sustained Leadership Are Needed to Assure Success,
[40]GAO-07-229T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2006).
^18GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, [41]GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2005).
Third, DOD has not developed outcome-oriented performance measures
for either joint theater logistics in general or for its specific
initiatives. The supply chain management improvement plan lists
potential metrics for joint theater logistics, but these have not
been made into quantifiable, outcome-oriented measures. For
example, the plan names visibility of logistics capabilities,
logistics footprint,^19 and joint logistics and distribution
planning improvement as three potential metrics that could be
developed to track results and show the impact of joint theater
logistics implementation. Other documents we reviewed, including a
joint theater logistics implementation plan that was drafted in
2006 but not finalized, recognize a need to identify metrics for
the specific tasks required to achieve the joint processes
supporting joint theater logistics. However, these metrics have
not been identified as yet.
Because DOD has lacked a coordinated and comprehensive approach to
managing joint theater logistics, efforts to advance joint theater
logistics across the department have been fragmented. While DOD
has developed a series of initiatives to improve joint theater
logistics, leadership on individual initiatives is dispersed among
various DOD components. Many of these initiatives have been
introduced by individual services, combatant commanders, and other
DOD components without an overarching management approach for
coordinating efforts. For example, of the four initiatives
identified in the Focused Logistics Roadmap as supporting joint
theater logistics, two have been submitted by U.S. Transportation
Command, one has been developed by the Army, and another has been
created by U.S. Joint Forces Command. During our field visits, DOD
officials identified a number of other initiatives they had under
way which they regarded as joint theater logistics. Specific
examples of DOD's fragmented efforts to develop and implement
joint theater logistics initiatives are discussed later in this
report. This fragmented approach could lead to duplication of
effort as well as capability gaps, diminishing the potential
benefits of joint theater logistics. Without a coordinated and
comprehensive approach that embodies sound management principles,
DOD may be unable to fully implement initiatives and achieve this
capability. As a result, DOD will have difficulty improving supply
chain management in the areas of distribution and asset visibility
associated with joint theater logistics.
^19Logistics footprint is the amount of personnel, spare parts, resources,
and capabilities physically present and occupying space at a deployed
location.
Changes in DOD's Overall Logistics Strategy Hinder Development
of Joint Theater Logistics
Changes in DOD's overall logistics strategy have hampered the
department's ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive
management approach to joint theater logistics. These changes
indicate that DOD has lacked a consistent vision and strategy
regarding its efforts to transform logistics. Over the course of
the last 10 years, DOD has made multiple alterations to its
overall logistics strategy that have reflected differing visions
about the future of the department's logistics system. Figure 1
shows several of the strategic planning documents, including
vision statements, doctrine, campaign plans, and roadmaps, that
have addressed the future of DOD's logistics systems.
Figure 1: Recent Strategic Planning Documents Addressing DOD Logistics
Many of the strategic planning documents shown in figure 1 have addressed
joint theater logistics, but the description of this concept has varied
over time. For example, a strategic planning document derived from Joint
Vision 2010 refers to "joint theater logistics command and control,"
describing this focused logistics capability primarily as a concept to
clarify lines of authority through a single entity responsible for
logistics support in a joint warfighting environment. However, the Focused
Logistics Joint Functional Concept appeared to change the focus of joint
theater logistics from command and control to management. This document
identified joint theater logistics as a capability aimed at developing
tools to allow the joint force commander to effectively oversee management
of logistics through the range of military operations and did not focus on
clarifying lines of authority through a single logistics command and
control organization. As part of this continuing evolution of DOD
logistics strategies, the most recent efforts include (1) the "to be"
roadmap, (2) the revision of the Focused Logistics Joint Functional
Concept, and (3) the capabilities portfolio management test for joint
logistics.
o "To Be" Roadmap. As a follow-on to the 2005 "as is" Focused
Logistics Roadmap, DOD is developing a "to be" roadmap. Because
the "as is" roadmap indicated that key focused logistics
capabilities would not be achieved by 2015, the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) directed the
department to prepare a more rigorous "to be" roadmap that would
identify the scope of logistics problems and capability gaps to be
addressed, including joint theater logistics. According to DOD
officials, the roadmap is intended to portray where the department
is headed in the logistics area and how it will get there, monitor
progress toward achieving its objectives, and institutionalize a
continuous assessment process that links ongoing capability
development, program reviews, and budgeting. The first edition of
the "to be" roadmap was scheduled for completion in February 2007,
in conjunction with the submission of the President's Budget for
Fiscal Year 2008. However, DOD put the roadmap on hold pending the
completion of other strategic initiatives. As of March 2007, DOD
estimated it would complete the roadmap by March of 2008, after
completion of its capabilities portfolio management test.
Capabilities portfolio management is discussed below.
o Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept. DOD is revising the
Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, which could affect the
future of joint theater logistics. In August 2006, Joint Staff
officials told us that they no longer believe that the Focused
Logistics Joint Functional Concept approved in 2003 accurately
captures the capabilities needed by the warfighter, as they found
it difficult to delineate the relationships among the seven
focused logistics capabilities, including joint theater logistics.
Consequently, the Joint Staff is currently rewriting the Focused
Logistics Joint Functional Concept, which they expect to be
finalized in the fall of 2007. According to Joint Staff officials,
the revision will likely realign focused logistics capabilities,
reducing the number of capabilities supporting joint logistics
from seven to five. They have stated that joint theater logistics
may cease to exist as a stand-alone capability area under the
proposed realignment. However, they have said that the tenets of
joint theater logistics would be retained in the remaining
capability areas addressing the supply chain, and the functional
areas associated with joint theater logistics would be integrated
within the broader joint logistics portfolio. Once the Focused
Logistics Joint Functional Concept paper is rewritten, DOD intends
to complete the "to be" roadmap in alignment with the new joint
logistics capability areas. Additionally, DOD's key joint doctrine
document for joint logistics operations, Joint Publication 4-0, is
being rewritten to reflect these changes.
Prior to these changes, the Joint Staff's Joint Theater Logistics
working group had begun developing an implementation plan for
joint theater logistics. As part of this plan, the working group
identified 13 capability areas in support of joint theater
logistics.^20 For each capability, the working group planned to
evaluate different processes used by the services and merge the
common parts of these individual processes into a joint process to
meet the commander's requirements. The working group finished
identifying the joint processes for 3 of these potential
capability areas that were considered most readily
joint--ammunition, fuels, and mortuary affairs-- and began
drafting the joint tasks and metrics associated with each. Drafts
of these documents were completed prior to the summer of 2006, and
the goal was to have the tasks identified for the 3 capability
areas by July 2006. All the services have agreed to these three
joint processes, and officials said that the next step is to
complete task identification for all 13 capabilities. However,
these efforts have been placed on hold pending DOD's realignment
of the joint capability areas.
^20The 13 joint theater logistics capabilities areas identified in this
process were: engineering; joint reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration; joint expeditionary theater opening; joint contracting; joint
deployment and distribution management; joint petroleum management; joint
service support; joint financial management visibility; joint repair and
maintenance; joint subsistence, food service support, and water
management; mortuary affairs; joint theater conventional munitions
management; and health service support.
o Capabilities Portfolio Management. In a separate but related
effort, the department has begun testing a new approach to
managing the development of joint capabilities DOD-wide. This new
approach is known as joint capabilities portfolio management. In
September 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense selected joint
logistics as one of four capability areas for testing capabilities
portfolio management.^21 These experiments were initiated in
response to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review that emphasized
DOD's need to build on capabilities-based planning and management.
According to DOD officials, the purpose of this test is to
determine if DOD can make better leadership decisions by managing
a portfolio of capabilities instead of managing systems and
capabilities individually. Thus, this portfolio test is intended
to enable senior leaders to consider trade-offs across previously
stovepiped areas and to better understand the implications of
investment decisions across competing priorities. The Joint Staff
Director for Logistics is the test director for the joint
logistics test case, which will include all capabilities required
to project and sustain joint force operations, including supply
chain operations. DOD will examine the capabilities and their
initiatives in order to identify gaps or redundancies or determine
where initiatives complement one another. According to Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff officials, the
initial results of the joint logistics capability portfolio
management test were expected to be available in late spring 2007.
The officials told us that these results will then be used to
write the revision to the Focused Logistics Joint Functional
Concept, which they said will enable them to complete the "to be"
roadmap. Joint Staff officials are also awaiting the completion of
the test prior to updating their joint theater logistics
implementation plan.
As DOD continues its attempt to articulate an overall strategy to
guide logistic transformation, the development of the "to be"
roadmap and other activities related to implementing joint theater
logistics have been delayed due to these changes. In addition, the
initiation of the capabilities portfolio management experiment has
the potential to fundamentally alter the management of joint
logistics. Until DOD decides on its vision and aligns its
strategic direction, it will be unable to develop a coordinated
and comprehensive approach to joint theater logistics. Moreover,
it will be unable to ensure that it is achieving its desired
improvements in theater distribution and asset visibility
associated with joint theater logistics.
^21The other three test cases are Joint Command and Control, Joint Network
Operations, and Battlespace Awareness.
DOD Has Made Progress on Joint Theater Logistics Initiatives but
Faces Challenges That Hinder Its Ability to Fully Realize the
Benefits of These Efforts
DOD components have several initiatives under way that are aimed
at developing a joint theater logistics capability in the area of
distribution and supply support. Our analysis showed that the
current initiatives generally address five areas of distribution
and supply support to a joint force commander. Some of the
initiatives have been specifically designated by DOD as supporting
joint theater logistics, and other initiatives supporting this
capability were identified during our field visits with DOD
components. Although progress has been made on some initiatives,
DOD faces challenges in fully developing and implementing these
initiatives. Table 1 summarizes the five areas of distribution and
supply support, the related joint theater logistics initiatives,
and the challenges we identified during our review.
Table 1: Challenges Hindering DOD's Ability to Fully Implement Joint
Theater Logistics Initiatives
Area of distribution Related joint theater Challenges hindering full
and supply support logistics initiatives implementation
Receiving and Joint Task Force-Port o Potential redundancy
processing a large Opening of efforts
influx of supplies at o Sourcing and use of
the beginning of a personnel
military operation o Command and control
issues
Management of supplies Joint Deployment o Noninteroperable
moving across the Distribution Operations information technology
distribution system Center systems
o Container management
Theaterwide Theater and o Fragmented theater
coordination of surface Expeditionary logistics operations
transportation assets Sustainment Commands, o Lack of information
Director of Mobility technology tools
Forces-Surface o Insufficient numbers
of skilled personnel
o Unclear position in
command structure
o Command and control
issues
o Potential
duplication of efforts
Consolidation of supply Node Management and o Funding of
storage and shipping Deployable Depot, Joint inventories
activities Regional Inventory and o Security concerns
Material Management,
Theater Consolidation
and Shipping Point
Exercise of command and Joint Experimental o Statutory
control over joint Deployment and Support requirements for
logistics functions logistics support
o Exercising directive
authority for
logistics
o Operational and
financial
considerations
Source: GAO analysis.
Unless DOD successfully addresses these challenges, the initiatives are
not likely to significantly improve the ability of a joint force commander
to harness the diffuse logistics resources and systems that exist within
the department and effectively and efficiently direct logistics functions,
including distribution and supply support activities, across the theater
of operations to accomplish an assigned mission. Moreover, without
addressing such challenges, DOD is likely to continue to experience some
of the same types of distribution and asset visibility problems that have
occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
New Port Opening Capability Faces Implementation Challenges
DOD has developed an initiative to improve its port opening capability but
faces implementation challenges because of concerns with potential
redundancy of efforts, staffing, and command and control issues. The
capability to rapidly open a new port in a theater to receive and process
a large influx of equipment and supplies is critical during the initial
stages of a military operation, ranging from humanitarian missions to
major combat operations. A rapid port opening capability provides the
joint force commander with an expeditionary force to conduct an airfield
or distribution assessment, establish initial command and control, set up
critical in-transit visibility and communications systems, and establish
movement control over distribution operations. However, in the early
stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. forces did not deploy a sufficient
port opening capability that was needed in Kuwait to successfully
establish initial supply and distribution operations. For example, we have
previously reported that because DOD's priority was for combat forces to
move into the theater first, logistics support forces to establish an
initial theater distribution system were either deleted from the
deployment plan or shifted back in the deployment timeline.^22 As a
result, logistics personnel could not effectively support the increasing
numbers of combat troops moving into theater, and the shortage of
logistics support resulted in delays in the processing of supplies as well
as backlogs. According to Army officials, these early decisions regarding
port opening capabilities led to problems in sustaining a large influx and
flow of materiel during early operations. The Army's deployed port opening
capability could not support more than a brigade-sized element, which
resulted in a number of theater distribution problems.
DOD Has Established a New Port Opening Unit
To improve DOD's rapid port-opening capability, U.S. Transportation
Command began developing the Joint Task Force-Port Opening initiative in
2005, and the Secretary of Defense approved a standing Execution Order for
the initiative in May 2006. As the Distribution Process Owner, U.S.
Transportation Command wanted a capability to rapidly extend the
distribution network into a theater and facilitate theater distribution.
The mission of the joint task force is to rapidly open a port and manage
initial distribution operations. Joint Task Force-Port Opening is
comprised of air and surface elements that train and work together, are
deployable in 12 hours, and are to be deployed for approximately 45-60
days before being replaced by follow-on forces. According to U.S.
Transportation Command, Joint Task Force-Port Opening is designed to
rapidly establish and initially operate a port, facilitating more
effective movement of materiel within the theater by arranging cargo just
off the airfield in a logical pattern and creating a forward distribution
point, or node,^23 within 10 kilometers. The capability was initially
validated for an aerial port of debarkation, and development of a similar
capability for a seaport of debarkation has begun.^24 Joint Task
Force-Port Opening bypassed the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System process initially but is now going through an
accelerated review.^25 U.S. Transportation Command's goal is to have three
Joint Task Force-Port Opening units, each comprised of an air and a
surface element, which would facilitate a cycle allowing for an active, a
training, and a reconstituting unit at any given time. Currently, there is
one surface element at Fort Dix, New Jersey, that is staffed by
individuals from multiple Army Reserve units and filled through a request
for forces that was originally set to expire in June 2007. The air element
is provided by the Air Force's existing Contingency Response Groups, and
the current group is located at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, near
the surface element at Fort Dix.
^22 [42]GAO-04-305R and [43]GAO-05-775 .
^23A distribution node exists wherever materiel arrives in the
distribution system via transportation assets such as air, surface, or
ground transport.
^24According to U.S. Transportation Command, the Joint Task Force-Port
Opening seaport of debarkation team is in the final stages of staffing its
concept of operations for U.S. Transportation Command components, U.S.
Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff, and the services. The concept has
also been briefed to the geographic combatant commanders' staffs. U.S.
Transportation Command officials stated that planning and development of
the seaport of debarkation training concept and force sourcing activities
began in April 2007, with a goal of having forces to train by late summer
of 2007.
^25DOD uses the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System as
an analytical process to identify, assess, and prioritize joint military
requirements in support of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and
its Functional Capabilities Boards. The purpose of the analysis process is
to identify capability gaps and redundancies, determine the attributes of
a capability or combination of capabilities that would resolve the gaps,
identify approaches for implementation, and assess the cost and
operational effectiveness of the joint force for each of the identified
approaches.
Army Officials Have Raised Concerns About the Port Opening Unit
During our field visits with combatant commands and the military services,
we found that while there was agreement on the need for an effective
port-opening capability, DOD components had differing views on how to
address the shortfall in this capability that became apparent during
Operation Iraqi Freedom. In particular, senior Army officials we
interviewed--to include officials at the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics, Army Reserve, and Army Combined Arms Support
Command--expressed concerns regarding (1) the potential redundancy between
the Joint Task Force-Port Opening initiative and their own service-led
efforts, (2) the personnel resources devoted to the task force, and (3)
command and control issues. Until the challenges associated with
implementing this initiative are resolved, DOD will continue to struggle
to develop and implement an effective and integrated port opening
capability.
Army officials questioned the need for Joint Task Force-Port Opening in
view of existing and emerging capabilities within the Army. Some Army
officials we interviewed asserted that the Army already has an adequate
port opening capability but it was not deployed properly during the
initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom.^26 These officials consider
Joint Task Force-Port Opening to be redundant of existing capabilities.
Other Army officials stated that while DOD's port opening capability has
been deficient, the Army's ongoing efforts to enhance its expeditionary
theater opening capability will address this shortfall. Military officials
have said that the Army's expeditionary theater opening capability extends
beyond the early entry capability of Joint Task Force-Port Opening, and
includes a range of key capabilities critical to larger theater opening
efforts. In the view of Army officials, port opening is a subset of this
larger effort, and consequently Joint Task Force-Port Opening will
ultimately fall short of the capability they believe is required and will
need to be integrated into a larger theater opening framework. Army
officials also had some concerns about the effectiveness of Joint Task
Force-Port Opening across the range of military operations. Some officials
noted that Joint Task Force-Port Opening could become quickly overwhelmed
by a large operation and that additional Army logistics personnel would
have to be deployed to supplement the task force's operations.
^26Marine Corps officials noted that their service has its own port
opening capability through its special purpose Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces.
A second area of concern to Army officials is the personnel requirements
to staff the Joint Task Force-Port Opening surface element. Army officials
told us they were unable to use active duty personnel to fill the surface
element due to commitments to other operations, so they turned to the
reserve component to fill these positions. However, Army Reserve officials
have questioned the sustainability of the task force using reservists.
These officials noted that placing Army Reserve personnel on standby for
potential Joint Task Force-Port Opening deployment uses up the
mobilization time of these reservists without actually deploying the
force. The Secretary of Defense recently extended the provisional status
of Joint Task Force-Port Opening due to competing priorities for funding
and personnel. As a result, the Army Reserve will continue the interim
manning arrangement of the task force until the summer of 2008 rather than
the summer of 2007 as initially planned.
A final area of concern that emerged from our discussions with Army
officials was command and control over Joint Task Force-Port Opening. Army
officials raised questions about who would have the authority to deploy
the task force and who would direct its operations once it deploys.
According to Army officials, such command and control issues must be
resolved before Joint Task Force-Port Opening can be effectively
integrated into military operations. A theater opening exercise conducted
by the Army in November 2006 revealed that these issues had not been
resolved. U.S. Transportation Command officials, however, do not identify
command and control as an issue regarding the task force. They have stated
that the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, would have the authority
to direct the Joint Task Force-Port Opening into the theater and that the
joint force commander may exert command and control while the unit is
deployed.
DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Supply Distribution, but Asset Visibility and
Container Management Challenges Remain
DOD has taken steps to improve the management of supplies moving across
the distribution system, particularly through the creation of Joint
Deployment Distribution Operations Centers, but challenges remain in
achieving asset visibility across the theater and in managing containers.
We have previously reported that the defense logistics systems used by
various components to order, track, and account for supplies are not well
integrated and do not provide the information needed to effectively manage
theater distribution and provide asset visibility.^27 Limitations in these
capabilities have led to difficulties in the logistics planning process
and the creation of potential double orders for the same supply part, and
could impact readiness of forces.
^27 [44]GAO-05-775 .
DOD Has Established Joint Operations Centers in the Geographic Combatant
Commands
To address deficiencies in the management of theater supply distribution,
DOD has created Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers within
the geographic combatant commands. The mission of the operations centers
is to improve intertheater and intratheater supply distribution by
integrating the flow of military forces and supplies and materiel to
sustain U.S. forces. The operations centers are designed to incorporate
representatives from DOD components, such as U.S. Transportation Command,
DLA, and the military services, who can provide a knowledgeable connection
to logistics supply centers in the United States and facilitate the
distribution of supplies to the theater. According to DOD officials, the
Joint Staff and U.S. Joint Forces Command are currently working to
incorporate the operations centers into joint doctrine, which will result
in updating numerous existing DOD publications.
Initiated by U.S. Transportation Command, the first Joint Deployment
Distribution Operations Center was established in Kuwait under U.S.
Central Command. In addition to managing the coordination between services
and logistics agencies and improving asset visibility as supplies enter
the theater, operations center personnel also analyze distribution
problems, identify causes, and propose solutions. DOD officials have
stated that the operations center was successful at improving the
management of supplies moving across the distribution system and achieving
cost savings. For example, U.S. Transportation Command officials said the
operations center was responsible for shifting from the use of airlift to
sealift to transport supplies, which reduces costly airlift requirements
and frees up airlift capacity; coordinating the movement of personnel from
their point of origin to final destination rather than through
intermediate locations with time-consuming layovers (a concept referred to
as "single ticket"); and improving distribution management by facilitating
the use of pure-packed pallets and containers,^28 developing a container
management plan, and improving the return of Army materiel from the
theater. According to data provided by U.S. Transportation Command, the
activities of the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center have
resulted in total cost avoidance and savings of $343 million between
fiscal years 2004 and 2007.
^28Pure-packing is the consolidation of cargo for shipment to a single
user.
On the basis of the successes attributed to the Joint Deployment
Distribution Operations Center in Kuwait, DOD established new operations
centers in the other geographic combatant commands. The size, structure,
and organizational placement of these operations centers vary across the
combatant commands. For example, the U.S. Central and European Commands
have the largest operations centers, with approximately 60 and 55
personnel, respectively. The other centers are considerably smaller with a
core staff ranging from 7 to 12 personnel. However, the operations centers
are considered "scaleable"--that is, they can be increased in size as
needed to support a military exercise or operation.
Lack of System Interoperability Has Impeded Asset Visibility
Senior military commanders in Kuwait told us that despite the benefits
obtained from the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center,
effective management of supply distribution across the theater has been
hindered by ongoing challenges in achieving asset visibility. They
attributed these challenges to a lack of interoperability among
information technology systems, making it difficult to obtain timely and
accurate information on assets in the theater. Interoperability refers to
the ability of different systems to communicate effectively, including
sharing information. Interoperable systems providing effective asset
visibility can enable commanders and logisticians to have a common
operating picture concerning the location, status, and identity of
equipment and supplies across a theater. According to DOD doctrine, asset
visibility across the supply chain and a common operating picture are both
key enablers for joint theater logistics. In our previous reports, we
stated that DOD lacks the systems integration necessary to provide total
asset visibility because of the duplicative and stovepiped nature of DOD's
systems environment.^29
During our field visit to Kuwait, officials from the 377th Theater Support
Command and 143rd Transportation Command said they must use manual
workarounds to overcome the problems caused by noninteroperable
information systems. These officials estimate that their staff spends half
their time pulling data from information systems, e-mailing it around for
validation or coordination, consolidating it on a spreadsheet, and
analyzing it to make management decisions. In January 2007, a joint
assessment conducted by several DOD components at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait,
found that information technology capabilities need to be improved to
achieve visibility of materiel in transit and of transportation resources
required to optimize distribution. The assessment reported that separate
movement control battalions in Kuwait and Iraq use both automated and
handwritten transportation movement requests to track air and ground
movements. Consequently, to capture the total theater movement picture,
both movement control battalions must consolidate manual and automated
data into spreadsheets. Neither movement battalion has total visibility
over what is occurring in both Kuwait and Iraq. Nor do they have total
visibility of the surface transportation resources necessary to optimize
the distribution of resources. The movement control battalions use e-mail
on a daily basis to coordinate each other's projected movement requests
and planned commitment of transportation assets.
^29GAO, Defense Inventory: Improvements Needed in DOD's Implementation of
Its Long-Term Strategy for Total Asset Visibility of Its Inventory,
[45]GAO-05-15 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2004) and GAO, DOD Business
Systems Modernization: Billions Being Invested without Adequate Oversight,
[46]GAO-05-381 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005).
Problems With Container Management Have Continued
DOD also has challenges with container management that hinder asset
visibility and impede its ability to effectively manage logistics
operations and costs. These challenges include (1) the application of
radio frequency identification technology on containers in the supply
chain, (2) compliance with container management processes, and (3) the
return of commercial containers to maritime carriers. We discussed some of
these same problems in a prior report.^30
Most supply items shipped by surface ships, excluding large end items such
as vehicles, are consolidated and packed into 20- or 40-foot sea-land
containers (such as those shown in fig. 2) that are owned by the
government or commercial maritime carriers.
^30 [47]GAO-04-305R .
Figure 2: Military Storage Containers in Kuwait (October 2006)
In 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics) directed the use of active radio frequency identification
technology^31 on all consolidated shipments moving to, from, or between
overseas locations. These shipments are to be tagged in order to provide
global in-transit visibility. U.S. Central Command has emphasized the need
to use radio frequency technology to improve asset visibility in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In January 2005, the Commander, Coalition Forces Land
Component Command, directed that all containers moving to, from, and
within the theater have active radio frequency tags written with complete
contents detail. However, more than a year later, inadequately tagged
containers continued to move throughout the theater. Consequently, the
Commander issued an updated radio frequency tag policy in October 2006,
instituting a phased-in approach for compliance according to the following
timeline: 50 percent compliance by November 1, 2006; 75 percent by
December 1, 2006; and 100 percent by January 1, 2007. However, despite
this updated policy, inadequate radio frequency tagging of containers
continues to be a problem.
^31Radio frequency identification technology is a data input system that
consists of (1) a transponder, generally referred to as a tag; (2) a tag
reader, also known as an interrogator, that reads the tag using a radio
signal; (3) centralized data processing equipment; and (4) a method of
communication between the reader and the computer. The interrogator sends
a signal to the tag, prompting the tag to respond. The battery-powered tag
sends a signal to the interrogator with information about the container,
pallet, or item to which it is attached. The information is forwarded to
the central data processing equipment where it is stored and can be used
to provide visibility over inventory items as they move throughout the
supply chain.
U.S Central Command officials, including general officers, identified a
number of reasons why DOD continues to struggle with the application of
radio frequency identification technology in the theater supply chain.
Some problems include shipping containers without radio frequency tags or
with tags that are broken, tags with incorrect information, or tags that
are rewritten but not cross-referenced to the original shipping
information. Based on tracking charts from the Container Management
Element,^32 from the period of August 15, 2006, to April 9, 2007, 15
percent of the containers that passed northbound through the NAVISTAR^33
distribution point had no radio frequency tag. Another 20 percent of the
containers had broken tags or tags that did not match the container
contents.^34 In addition, a radio frequency tag must be created to have
the container's shipping information and contents entered into an
inventory software system that then uploads the information to the DOD
in-transit visibility server. When a container moves between
transportation nodes--the airport, seaport, Army general support
warehouse, Consolidation Receiving and Shipping Point, Defense
Distribution Depot, Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point, NAVISTAR, or
forward-located nodes in Iraq--it might require creating a new tag to
upload new information to the in-transit visibility server. A container
may require a new tag if its current tag is broken or found to contain
inaccurate data or when a container is opened and repacked. The problem
arises when the new radio frequency tag, with its newly generated number
that is assigned by the local inventory software system, does not
reference back to the original tag number. As a result, the requesting
customer might look up the original tracking number in the in-transit
visibility server and no longer have visibility of the shipment.
^32This element is under the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations
Center.
^33NAVISTAR is the point of crossing from Kuwait into Iraq.
^34These averages exclude a gap from November 13 through November 30,
2006, for which no data are available.
Noncompliance with container management processes established by U.S.
Central Command can limit asset visibility of supplies. Officials in U.S.
Central Command's Container Management Element use an Army Web-based
central database to track container ownership, location, condition, and
use, and to provide visibility of all containers in theater. For the
system to effectively track containers, the containers must be properly
"in-gated"--recorded entering a transportation node--and
"out-gated"--recorded leaving a transportation node. In a process similar
to the commercial shipper tracking systems used by United Parcel Service
or Federal Express, a container is in-gated when it first arrives at a
location to document that it has been received, according to Container
Management Element officials. Upon departure from that location, the
container is out-gated to indicate that it has been shipped. Container
Management Element officials stated that the failure of transportation
nodes to properly in-gate and out-gate containers as they pass through
distribution channels is a significant problem hampering asset visibility
in theater because tagged containers can become "lost" in theater, with no
one able to track the location of the container or its contents. In
addition, if the container is commercially owned and not returned to the
carrier within a specified time period, detention charges begin
accumulating.
In the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, commercial containers were
flowing into the theater but were not always tracked once in Iraq, and
many of the commercial containers moving into Iraq were not quickly
returned to maritime carriers.^35 In July 2005, the Army Audit Agency
reported that container detention charges were continuing to accrue at
about $15 million per month. ^36 To improve management and accountability
over containers and to address the growing detention charges, U.S.
Transportation Command and the Military Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command developed a theater container management process and
established the Container Management Element--a unit responsible for
tracking and providing management oversight of containers in the theater.
In addition, the Army decided to purchase ("buy out") commercial
containers to reduce monthly detention charges. According to information
provided by the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, the
Army had purchased approximately 28,832 containers at a total cost of
approximately $203 million, as of December 2006. Container Management
Element officials told us that through a combination of container buyouts
and increased oversight, detention charges decreased from approximately
$10.7 million per month in December 2005 to $3.7 million per month in
October 2006.
^35Containers were not returned for a number of reasons, primarily because
the military's resources were dedicated to tactical operations and because
soldiers resourcefully made use of empty containers for such purposes as
storage, perimeter barriers, and housing.
^36U.S. Army Audit Agency: Asset Visibility and Container
Management--Operation Iraqi Freedom, Audit Report: A-2005-0197-ALE
(Alexandria, Va.: July 5, 2005). As of May 2004, only 6 of the 37
transportation nodes in Iraq could read radio frequency tags.
Although DOD has been able to reduce monthly detention charges on
commercial containers, it is still experiencing problems with retaining
visibility over containers. As of April 30, 2007, the central container
database showed that 54,390 containers--or more than one-third of all
containers in the U.S. Central Command theater--were considered to be
lost. Furthermore, according to container management officials, DOD's
problem with commercial container detention charges is shifting from Iraq
to Afghanistan. Efforts to curtail the movement of commercial containers
into Iraq have been largely successful, according to information provided
by container management officials. For example, of the 13,440 containers
sent to Iraq from June 6, 2006, to October 17, 2006, only 19 were
commercially owned. However, 4,901 (85 percent) of the 5,752 containers
sent into Afghanistan during the same period were commercial containers.
Container buyout data for December 2006--the most recent data
available--show that 4,748 (67 percent) of the 7,038 containers purchased
were in Afghanistan. According to container management officials, this
problem stems from a general shortage of government-owned containers in
the theater and the lack of a container transloading operation for
materiel shipped into Afghanistan that would be similar to the one at the
port of Kuwait for materiel going to Iraq.^37 Items being shipped by sea
to Afghanistan enter through the port of Karachi in Pakistan since
Afghanistan is landlocked. According to container management officials,
establishing a transloading operation in Pakistan would be difficult
because of restrictions placed on U.S. military personnel in Pakistan.
These officials said that commercial containers en route to Afghanistan
begin to accumulate detention charges prior to reaching their final
destination because of the time required for trucks to cover the difficult
inland route.
^37Transloading is the unloading of a commercially owned container and
repacking its contents into a government-owned container.
Separate Organizations Are Being Established to Coordinate Surface
Transportation
DOD components have initiatives underway to better coordinate the surface
transportation of supply items that are distributed across a military
theater of operations, but these efforts face challenges to their
implementation and may duplicate some functions. During the initial phase
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD faced problems with prioritizing and
managing its transportation assets across the theater. According to a 2005
RAND study,^38 U.S. forces suffered from both a shortage of transportation
assets--primarily trucks--and the fragmented control and management of
these assets across the different echelons of theater command. While RAND
reported that exact data on the total truck shortage were not available,
the estimated ratio of Army personnel to medium truck equivalents was 194
to 1 at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom compared to approximately
73 to 1 in Operation Desert Storm. In addition, the distances from
logistics operating bases to support combat operations were greater--344
miles to Baghdad, versus 210 miles to the farthest incursion during
Operation Desert Storm. The Army Division Support Command, Corps Support
Command, Area Support Group, and Theater Support Command each controlled a
portion of the truck assets within the theater. Consequently, there was no
single distribution organization to advocate for truck assets during the
force planning process, which may account for the shortage of trucks, and
no single organization deployed in theater with the authority to rebalance
transportation assets across the theater and integrate and synchronize the
surface deployment and distribution movements in support of the
commander's priorities.
Sustainment Commands and Surface Mobility Directorate Are Aimed at
Coordinating Surface Transportation
The Army and U.S. Transportation Command have separate initiatives aimed
at addressing these surface transportation problems. As part of its
modular transformation, the Army is creating new organizations--Theater
Sustainment Commands and Expeditionary Sustainment Commands--that are
aimed in part at centralizing control over Army surface transportation
assets within a theater of operations. Under the Army's emerging
sustainment doctrine, the objective of the Theater Sustainment Command is
to provide the Army with a single headquarters responsible for operational
command and control of logistics operations throughout the theater. Its
functions include theater opening, materiel management, and distribution.
This command would typically operate in a rear area away from frontline
military operations. Theater Sustainment Commands replace the Army's
existing Theater Support Commands and are designed to plan, prepare,
rapidly deploy, and execute operational logistics within the theater of
operations.^39 Expeditionary Sustainment Commands, a forward extension of
the Theater Sustainment Commands, have a primary role of managing regional
logistics operations in support of the joint task force commander.
According to U.S. Central Command officials, the 1st Theater Sustainment
Command and the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command are scheduled to
deploy to Kuwait and Iraq, respectively, in the summer of 2007. In
addition, the 8th Theater Sustainment Command has been established in U.S.
Pacific Command, Hawaii, and the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command is
operational in Korea.
^38RAND Corporation, Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi
Freedom: Battlefield Logistics and Effects on Operations, Contract No.
DASW01-C-0003 (Santa Monica, Calif.: 2005).
In a separate initiative, U.S. Transportation Command created a new
organization, the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface, to integrate
surface deployment and distribution priorities set by the joint force
commander. According to U.S. Transportation Command, this initiative will
enable DOD to better synchronize and direct the movement and coordination
of surface transportation resources to ensure uninterrupted distribution
of materiel from air and sea ports of debarkation to destinations within
the theater. In addition, U.S. Transportation Command officials believe
that theater surface distribution will benefit from establishing an
organization that has a capability similar to that provided by the
Director of Mobility Forces-Air for theater air distribution.^40 The
proposed responsibilities of the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface
include coordinating, prioritizing, and executing surface transportation
movement requests. In Kuwait, U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Central
Command established a pilot Director of Mobility Forces-Surface in August
2006 and completed an initial assessment of the pilot in February 2007. In
addition, this initiative has been tested during exercises in Korea, most
recently in March 2007.
^39Certain subordinate command elements under the replaced Theater Support
Command also will be eliminated, such as the Transportation Command,
Transportation Command Element, and Transportation Group. The Division
Support Command, Corps Support Command, and Area Support Group have also
been eliminated from the Army force structure.
^40According to U.S. Transportation Command officials, after Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm the Air Force realized that it did not have the
right mix of skills and capabilities to integrate the air mobility mission
into the combined air operations center of the combined joint forces air
component command. In response, the Air Force developed the air mobility
division and its command structure, including the Director of Mobility
Forces-Air, to provide this strategic-to-theater integration of
distribution.
Initiatives Face Implementation Challenges
The Army and U.S. Transportation Command face a number of challenges in
the implementation of their initiatives. While the Army's Theater and
Expeditionary Sustainment Commands were designed to be the single
headquarters responsible for operational command and control of logistics
operations throughout the theater, the fragmentation of logistics
operations in theater may hinder it from achieving this objective. More
specifically, according to U.S. Central Command officials, the 1st Theater
Sustainment Command will be placed under the Commander, Coalition Forces
Land Component, in Kuwait. As the forward extension to Theater Sustainment
Commands, Expeditionary Sustainment Commands are designed to operate under
the command and support of the Theater Sustainment Command in order to
provide a single command for logistics theaterwide. However, according to
U.S. Central Command officials, the deployment order for the 316th
Expeditionary Sustainment Command has placed it under the operational
control of the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq. While still attached
to the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, the placement of the 316th
Expeditionary Sustainment Command under Multi-National Forces-Iraq will
likely continue the fragmentation of logistics operations like surface
distribution that the new command structure was designed to eliminate. The
Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component, is a (Three Star) Lieutenant
General, and the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, is a (Four Star)
General and the highest ranking officer in the theater, responsible for
U.S. operations in Iraq. As a result, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command
will likely be responsible for logistics operations in Kuwait and the rest
of the theater, while the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command will be
responsible for logistics operations in Iraq. In addition, the 19th
Expeditionary Sustainment Command in Daegu, South Korea, is under the
operational control of the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, rather than the
8th Theater Sustainment Command in U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii. The
deployment of these new Army logistics support units under command and
control structures that differ from their original design raises questions
about the efficacy of the emerging Army sustainment command doctrine and
its general applicability to joint military operations conducted within a
combatant command theater.
Army officials also raised concerns about whether the sustainment commands
would have the information technology tools and personnel necessary to
effectively and efficiently carry out their mission. They said these
commands were designed to be smaller than their predecessors based on an
assumption that certain information technology tools would be available to
enable the commands to operate with fewer personnel. However, some of
these information technology tools have experienced problems during their
development that have limited their capability or have delayed their
fielding. For example:
o The next generation Mobile Tracking System is a satellite
tracking system for trucks that in its most advanced configuration
is also able to read and relay information from radio frequency
identification tags attached to containers and pallets traveling
in a supply convoy. This technology could provide near real-time
visibility and location data on supplies moving through the
theater by surface transportation. However, the technology is
expensive and few trucks are equipped with this latest
configuration.
o Battle Command Sustainment Support System processes a large
amount of logistics data and can facilitate decision making by
providing a means for commanders to determine the sustainability
of current and planned operations. The system provides a
capability for tracking supply convoys moving through an area of
operation. However, it lacks the integration to produce and send a
cargo manifest that can be linked to an in-transit visibility
device for tracking.
o TransLog Web was designed to serve as the single point of entry
for transportation movement requests. This Web-based program could
serve as a transportation planning and movement tracking tool to
assist movement managers in coordinating supplies and
transportation assets. However, the system (1) is not used by all
movement control teams, (2) does not provide visibility of the
cargo's description beyond the supply class, and (3) does not feed
information to the Global Transportation Network.^41
o Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movements
System II is expected to enhance and improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of support planning needed to deploy and redeploy
forces and equipment; improve the visibility of assets; and
enhance cargo and passenger receiving, controlling, and shipping.
However, the system is not scheduled to be fully operational until
around 2010, and while the Army justified the system based on its
joint service application, two services (the Air Force and the
Marine Corps) have stated that they do not intend to use it.^42
^41The Global Transportation Network is DOD's designated in-transit
visibility system that collects, integrates, and distributes
transportation information to combatant commanders, the military services,
and other DOD customers and provides U.S. Transportation Command with the
ability to perform command and control operations, planning and analysis,
and business operations in tailoring customer requirements throughout the
requirements process.
According to Army officials, the shortcomings in available
information tools have resulted in the need for additional staff
in the sustainment commands. They explained that problems with
data and a lack of system interoperability have required the
commands to use manual, ad hoc techniques to validate, coordinate,
and analyze data for decision making, and these efforts are
cumbersome and manpower intensive. In Kuwait, the 377th Theater
Support Command, including subordinate commands such as the 143rd
Transportation Command, controlled an organization of several
thousand personnel. By comparison, the Theater Sustainment Command
that will replace it was designed to be staffed with several
hundred people. According to Army officials, if the Army had all
the information technology tools in place that have been promised
and factored into the design of the new sustainment commands, it
might be possible to accomplish its mission with the smaller
staff. To meet the additional personnel requirements of the
sustainment commands, U.S. Central Command issued a request for
additional forces, which increased Theater Sustainment Command
staffing from 155 to 461 personnel and Expeditionary Sustainment
Command staffing from 254 to 378 personnel. Furthermore, Army
officials noted that the leaner staffing of the new commands
places a premium on obtaining personnel with the right expertise
and skills. For example, assigned staff will need to be fully
networked with the national inventory control points, able to
quickly develop support relationships, and determine the best
method of meeting requirements. They must be proficient in tapping
into the Army's standard supply system, prepositioned stocks, host
nation support, and contracting. The officials expressed some
concern about the probability of getting personnel with those
skills and expertise on a recurring rotational basis.
The Director of Mobility Forces-Surface has also faced
implementation challenges. During exercises in Korea, the new
organization has had difficulty establishing its position within
the U. S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command structure. In
each exercise, the directorate has been placed under a different
organization. For example, it has been tested under the
operational control of the Joint Force Support Component Command
and in the Joint Operations Fusion Center. U.S. Forces Korea
officials said that finding the proper niche for Director of
Mobility Forces-Surface is further complicated because the South
Korean military is responsible for surface mobility of the
Combined Forces on the Korean peninsula. During the 2007 exercise,
the directorate was placed in the Combined Transportation Movement
Center, which is co-chaired by the South Korean military.
^42GAO, DOD Systems Modernization: Uncertain Joint Use and Marginal Expected
Value of Military Asset Deployment System Warrant Reassessment of Planned
Investment, GAO-06-171 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).
Moreover, the initial assessment of the Director of Mobility
Forces-Surface pilot in Kuwait by U.S. Transportation Command and
U.S. Central Command indicated that the initiative faces a number
of challenges related to (1) command and control, (2) availability
of information technology tools, (3) securing personnel with the
expertise and knowledge to use the information technology tools
that are available, and (4) potential duplication of
responsibilities with other Army organizations. More specifically,
the assessment found that while the pilot had made progress, the
Director of Mobility Forces-Surface:
o was assigned to the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander,
whose authority is currently restricted to the Kuwait Joint
Operations Area, which impedes a U.S. Central Command-wide focus
on surface distribution;
o lacked adequate information technology tools to ensure the
visibility of materiel in transit and availability of surface
transportation assets required to optimize surface distribution
across the theater;
o lacked personnel with the right skill sets or training to take
advantage of the technology tools that were available; and
o provided functions that could overlap with those of the Army's
1st Theater Sustainment Command.
Regarding this last point, an Army analysis also showed a
potential for duplication of efforts. Specifically, the Army
reviewed 123 proposed responsibilities of the Director of Mobility
Forces-Surface and found that most of the responsibilities are
covered by the Army's sustainment commands and service component
commands. The Army's analysis showed that most other proposed
Director of Mobility Forces-Surface responsibilities were covered
by the geographic combatant command.
The U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Central Command's
assessment also noted that "unity of effort" with regard to the
Director of Mobility Forces-Surface was lacking and that some key
senior leaders had not yet embraced the initiative's capabilities.
In response to the assessment, U.S. Central Command discontinued
the pilot in May 2007, until some of these issues are resolved.
Consolidated Storage and Shipping Arrangements Have Been
Implemented on a Limited Scale
DOD components have begun several initiatives to consolidate
storage and shipping sites located in a joint theater, but these
efforts have been implemented on a limited scale and we found
potential opportunities for further consolidation during our
fieldwork in Kuwait. DOD currently uses multiple storage and
shipping sites within a theater to supply items to its customers.
In some cases, these sites may carry the same supply items and
ship to the same customers. Operating multiple sites requires
additional facilities, personnel, contract services, and
inventories and also results in extra movements of stock,
inefficient use of surface and air distribution assets, increased
opportunities for information processing errors, and the loss of
asset visibility. Consolidating storage and shipping arrangements
can help address these supply chain problems while at the same
time reducing DOD's logistics footprint.
Consolidated Storage and Shipping Initiatives
DOD has developed initiatives to consolidate and improve storage
and shipping of materiel, including Node Management and Deployable
Depot, Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management, and
Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point. Node Management and
Deployable Depot is a DLA initiative to develop a small-scale,
rapidly deployable distribution center that has the capability to
provide consolidated shipping, receiving, cross-docking, storage,
communication, and order processing. The initiative, which is in
the early stages of development and testing, is aimed at improving
the flow of logistics information along the supply chain and also
providing efficient physical management of materiel in the theater
of operations. To deploy this capability to a theater, DLA would
send trained personnel, information technology systems, portable
structures, and materiel handling equipment. DLA is collaborating
with U.S. Transportation Command to establish a close association
between Node Management and Deployable Depot and Joint Task
Force-Port Opening. Supply items off-loaded by the port opening
unit could be moved to the DLA depot located within 10 kilometers
away. The two organizations plan to write this relationship into
the concepts of operations for both initiatives. U.S. Pacific
Command is the operational manager for Node Management and
Deployable Depot, providing the location for upcoming exercises to
prepare for operations that would be carried out in an austere
location. The initiative is currently undergoing tests of both its
information technology and materiel management capabilities.
A second consolidation initiative is Joint Regional Inventory and
Material Management, which is aimed at streamlining the storage
and distribution of common items for multiple military service
locations in a region from a DLA hub. The objectives of Joint
Regional Inventory and Material Management include eliminating
duplicate materiel handling and inventory layers. The pilot
program for the Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management
initiative in Hawaii has been completed and shows promise to
improve joint theater logistics, but some funding and metrics
issues are still being addressed. DOD has met key milestones in
this initiative, and officials in U.S. Pacific Command reported
that they had reduced redundant service-managed inventories, the
number of times they handle parts, and customer wait times over
the course of the pilot. When the services stock fewer items, they
also have more efficiency in storage, and U.S. Pacific Command
officials estimated that the services had reduced their inventory
levels by more than $10 million.^43 A related activity included in
the initiative is the development of a Web site for hazardous
materials that would allow the services to share and view data on
available hazardous inventories, enabling them to make
arrangements with the other services to reuse items and save on
waste disposal costs. Another related activity is an ongoing
effort to establish a joint shipment manager to provide expedited
and scheduled deliveries to move items from the DLA hub to the
requesting units. U.S. Pacific Command officials told us that they
plan to roll out Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management
to other DLA depots in the command's area of operations, and they
plan to establish this arrangement next in Okinawa and Guam. U.S.
Pacific Command has established a working group that is addressing
some issues such as tracking demand histories for multiple
requests and deployed units and determining appropriate metrics to
ensure that DLA has the assets available when the services require
them. Officials we spoke with believe Joint Regional Inventory and
Material Management has the potential to improve joint theater
logistics by having common assets available close to where they
are needed and under the control of DLA, freeing military service
personnel to focus on service-specific assets and their
warfighting missions.
43Stockage levels for Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management are
based on the number of demands placed on a part per year, and a minimum of
four demands was required for an item to be included in the pilot.
A third consolidation initiative we found during our review is the
establishment of Theater Consolidation and Shipping Points. DLA,
in coordination with the Army, has opened Theater Consolidation
and Shipping Points within the U.S. European Command and U.S.
Central Command geographic regions. The goal for these
consolidated facilities is to improve the overall efficiency and
interoperability of materiel consolidation and shipping
activities. The Theater Consolidation and Shipping Points operate
under memoranda of agreement between DLA and each of these
combatant commands. DLA is validating its template for the Theater
Consolidation and Shipping Point, which is the first step in
creating a doctrinal organization, according to DLA officials.
The Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point in the U.S. European
Command opened in October 2006, and is collocated at DLA's Defense
Distribution Depot-Europe in Germersheim, Germany. The creation of
this consolidated activity was part of the Army's plan for
managing a reduction in personnel in Europe, which included
divesting itself of noncore activities and focusing on its
warfighting functions. The DLA organization took over distribution
functions that had been performed by the Theater Distribution
Center, which was operated by the Army's 21st Theater Support
Command at Panzer Kaserne, Germany. These functions include
breaking bulk materiel for multiple customers, consolidating
materiel for shipment to individual units, marking pallets and
containers with radio frequency identification tags, and preparing
them for onward shipment to customers. The Army agreed to fund the
realignment of the Theater Distribution Center's functions to DLA
by transferring $1.6 million each fiscal year for fiscal years
2007 and 2008, and then realigning funding directly to DLA
beginning in fiscal year 2009. According to the Commander of the
Defense Distribution Depot-Europe, the Theater Consolidation and
Shipping Point will serve as the primary conduit for theater
sustainment distribution from multiple sources, including materiel
entering the theater at Ramstein Air Base and the Germersheim
Rhine River terminal. He said collocating the Theater
Consolidation and Shipping Point with the DLA Defense Distribution
Depot will improve the overall efficiency of theater distribution
activities by making better use of DLA's existing distribution
infrastructure, including its information technology systems, and
will capitalize on DLA's core competencies of receiving, storing,
and shipping materiel. According to the Commander, specific
benefits have included estimated annual cost savings of
approximately $700,000 and a reduction in full-time equivalent
employees from 56 to 19. At the time of our visit, the activity
had been operating for less than a week; consequently, our review
was limited to briefings and a tour of the operations and
processes at the facilities in Germersheim, Germany. Therefore, we
did not validate the claimed benefits.
In U.S. Central Command, the Theater Consolidation and Shipping
Point was established in February 2006 when DLA took over theater
distribution functions from an Army-operated Theater Distribution
Center in Kuwait. The Theater Distribution Center had previously
been relocated to Camp Arifjan from just outside Camp Doha when
Camp Doha closed in 2005. According to DLA officials, the Army and
DLA agreed to transfer operations to DLA in December 2005, and DLA
began operations in February 2006. The facility is
contractor-operated at an annual cost of approximately $7.9
million. The transfer of operations to DLA was aimed at
capitalizing on the agency's materiel consolidation and shipping
expertise, streamlining the distribution process by linking the
distribution depot and the consolidation and shipping operations
under DLA management, and improving asset visibility by installing
DLA's standard distribution information system at the
consolidation and shipping point.
Additional Opportunities for Consolidating Shipping and Storage
During our fieldwork in Kuwait, we found that additional
opportunities may exist for consolidating storage and shipping
activities. Unlike the consolidation and shipping point in Europe,
the Kuwait activity is not collocated with the DLA Defense
Distribution Depot and therefore lacks the efficiencies from
combining operations available at the European activity. Moreover,
the Army continues to operate a general support warehouse at Camp
Arifjan that is separate from the DLA Theater Consolidation and
Shipping Point. Based on our visits to these facilities and
discussions with officials, we believe there are potential
opportunities to improve joint theater distribution processes and
sustainment operations through further consolidation, relocation,
and streamlining of distribution operations and processes. Some
potential improvements that might be achieved are:
o reducing contract and contract administration costs;
o maximizing use of pure pallets, thereby making more efficient
use of airlift capability and reducing customer wait time;
o eliminating redundant warehouse functions and substandard
warehouse facilities;
o freeing up government-owned containers for use in repacking
materiel intended for units in Iraq; and
o consolidating materiel processing points, thereby reducing the
potential for errors in information technology and the loss of
asset visibility.
The DLA Defense Distribution Depot is a contractor-owned and
operated facility located in the Mina Abdullah Complex, a private
industrial park located approximately 14 kilometers outside Camp
Arifjan. The current annual contract cost for the distribution
depot is approximately $37.1 million. The distribution depot
carries out similar receiving, storage, packing, and shipping
functions as the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point, and
these facilities serve the same customer base. For example, each
facility pure packs air pallets to be flown out of Ali Al Salem
Air Base to units in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.
According to the distribution depot director, the depot is having
difficulty packing pure pallets to capacity and consequently is
not maximizing use of airlift capability. The depot's goal is to
hold air pallets for up to 24 hours in hopes of packing a pure
pallet. However, if the pallet is not completely pure packed
within the 24-hour hold period, it must be airlifted anyway in
order to meet customer wait time standards. DLA officials told us
that by collocating the consolidation and shipping point with the
distribution depot, they could more quickly build fewer and larger
air pallets, which would maximize the use of airlift capacity and
reduce customer wait time.
The Army's general support warehouse at Camp Arifjan also performs
materiel receiving, storage, and shipping functions. The Army
warehouse is in poor condition, is poorly lighted, and has little
climate-controlled space. It operates at capacity and has some of
its inventory stored outside in government-owned containers or on
the bare ground and exposed to the elements (see fig. 3). The DLA
Defense Distribution Depot, in contrast, appears to be a modern
warehouse with approximately a million square feet of covered
warehouse space, much of which is climate controlled, and another
million square feet of hard surface (asphalt) outside storage
space for containers (see fig. 4).
Figure 3: Views of Container and Yard Storage at Army General
Support Warehouse, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (October 2006)
Figure 4: Exterior and Interior Views of Warehouses at the DLA
Distribution Depot, Kuwait (October 2006)
According to DLA officials, the distribution depot has sufficient capacity
to absorb the Army general support warehouse workload and already manages
920 Army-specific items. Consolidating the Army warehouse inventory at the
DLA distribution depot would likely produce efficiencies through economies
of scale, reducing the overall cost of receiving, storage, and shipping,
and also eliminate the need to upgrade the substandard Army warehouse on
Camp Arifjan. Consolidating the Army general support inventory at the DLA
depot would also free up government-owned containers currently used for
general warehouse storage. Government-owned containers are needed to
support seaport operations for repacking materiel to send to Iraq from
commercial containers, and they are in short supply in Kuwait.
U.S. Central Command has directed that only government-owned containers be
sent into Iraq to prevent the accumulation of detention charges on
commercial containers. According to 831st Transportation Battalion
officials responsible for port operations, government-owned containers
sent to Camp Arifjan are seldom returned to the port to support container
cross-loading operations. Army general support warehouse officials told us
that when they are directed to give up government-owned containers to
support port operations, they often have no place to put the materiel
stored inside the container, which forces them to store some inventory on
the bare ground. Having adequate space to store inventory at the DLA
distribution depot would reduce the need to use government-owned
containers as storage space, thereby supporting container cross-loading
operations at the port, and would reduce the need to place inventory on
the ground and exposed to the elements.
The Army general support warehouse, DLA Theater Consolidation and Shipping
Point, and DLA Defense Distribution Depot, Kuwait all exist to support
essentially the same units in Iraq with regard to receiving, storing, and
shipping sustainment materiel. According to DLA officials, consolidating
these operations at the DLA Defense Distribution Depot would help to
improve asset visibility by reducing the number of materiel processing
points, and thereby the potential for errors in inputting data into
information technology systems. Under such a consolidation, only one
organization would be applying radio frequency identification tags to
containers and entering data into the joint in-transit visibility systems,
which are tasks that DLA officials consider to be among the agency's core
competencies.
In discussing our observations with Coalition Forces Land Component
Command officials, they generally agreed about the potential for
consolidating storage and shipping arrangements and stated that the
conditions needed to be thoroughly assessed and workable recommendations
developed. These officials noted two obstacles that would have to be
overcome. First, the Army had already purchased its general support
inventory and wanted to be reimbursed for inventory transferred back to
DLA. Second, the Directorate of Security Plans and Operations, within the
Army's Area Support Group in Kuwait, had assessed the Mina Abdullah
Complex as too great a security risk for relocating the operations from
Camp Arifjan. In January 2007, subsequent to our visit to Kuwait, the
directorate completed a new force protection assessment of the Mina
Abdullah Complex. According to DLA officials, this new assessment leaves
open the possibility of moving the Theater Consolidation and Shipping
Point and the Army general support warehouse to the distribution depot if
certain deficiencies are adequately addressed. In March 2007, the DLA
Defense Distribution Center directed a study team to conduct an analysis
of major theater receipt, storage, and distribution nodes and processes in
U.S. Central Command. In April 2007, the study team briefed the
Distribution Process Owner Executive Board on the results of its
assessment, which included recommendations to terminate the Theater
Consolidation and Shipping Point contract and assume these functions at
the defense distribution depot and to draw down inventory and operations
at the Army general support warehouse at Camp Arifjan.
Command and Control Over Joint Logistics Functions Remains Unresolved
Command and control over joint logistics functions has been a concern due
to past challenges with directing and coordinating logistics resources and
systems within a theater of operations. In past combat operations, joint
forces dispersed over a large area of operations placed significant
demands on the ability of the joint force commander to provide, manage,
and prioritize logistics support. For example, although the combatant
commander has directive authority for logistics, existing capabilities and
processes limit the ability to exercise this authority. In 1997, DOD
identified command and control as a key focus area of joint theater
logistics in order to prioritize and allocate scarce resources, determine
how services can share existing assets and capabilities in theater, and
eliminate redundancies and excess capabilities. Additionally, officials at
U.S. Pacific Command explained that senior military leaders have indicated
that they want a single point of contact for all logistics information in
theater. Officials at U.S. Central Command stated that clear lines of
command and control, in addition to improved asset visibility, are
currently needed to advance joint theater logistics.
Several Command and Control Options Have Emerged
The joint theater logistics initiatives we reviewed all include
organizational structures intended to provide command and control over all
or part of logistics functions under the combatant commander's control. In
addition to the initiatives discussed earlier in this report, U.S. Joint
Forces Command is coordinating the Joint Experimental Deployment and
Support initiative.^44 The objective of this initiative is to experiment
with a range of command and control options that can provide logistics
coordination, integration, and synchronization to meet the combatant
commander's priorities. The initiative builds upon DOD's Joint Deployment
Distribution Operations Center concept and progresses along a continuum to
include more robust organizational options. According to U.S. Joint Forces
Command, the different options in the continuum would allow a combatant
commander to select a flexible capability and tailor it to suit the size
and complexity of a mission. The options along this continuum are
displayed in figure 5.
^44U.S. Joint Forces Command is the DOD executive agent for joint
warfighting experimentation, making it responsible for conducting joint
experimentation on new warfighting concepts and disseminating the results
of these activities to the joint concept community.
Figure 5: Continuum of Logistics Command and Control Options Included in
the Joint Experimental Deployment and Support Initiative
Note: Scalability refers to the breadth, depth, numbers of nations, and
size of the joint operations areas. Complexity is determined by the
geography of the theater, number of distribution nodes, and rapid
deployment, among other factors.
The Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center Plus, which is on the
lower end of the Joint Experimental Deployment and Support continuum, is
being tested in U.S. European Command. The command's Joint Deployment
Distribution Operations Center currently has day-to-day responsibilities
that it handles with a staff of 55. For a contingency operation, this
organization could be upgraded to the Joint Deployment Distribution
Operations Center Plus, with additional staff augmentation from the
command's logistics directorate, military services, and other DOD
components. U.S. European Command is drafting standard operating
procedures for the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center Plus.
According to command officials, the Joint Deployment Distribution
Operations Center Plus may be included in DOD's updated template for the
Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center, which is due in August
2007.
The Enabled/Enhanced J4,^45 which is being tested and developed in U.S.
Pacific Command, is the next organizational option on the Joint
Experimental Deployment and Support continuum. According to command
officials, the Enhanced J4 is activated during contingencies and includes
U.S. Pacific Command's Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center and
a fusion cell, which is a 4-person group that pulls together and filters
information for the J4. While U.S. Pacific Command's Joint Deployment
Distribution Operations Center is run by a staff of 5 for day-to-day
operations, during a contingency the organization would be augmented to
support the Enhanced J4 with a staff of up to 64. U.S. Pacific Command is
currently developing standard operating procedures and joint
mission-essential tasks for this new capability.
The Joint Force Support Component Command is the most robust continuum
option being evaluated. This organization is designed to provide a single
theater logistics command with enhanced joint capabilities to identify
theater logistics shortfalls, prioritize shortfalls, and direct theater
logistics resources. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, has stated that the
Joint Force Support Component Command will be the logistics command and
control structure for any future contingency operations in Korea. The
Army's 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command in Korea serves as the
headquarters for the Joint Force Support Component Command, which will be
augmented by integrating staff from other components in Korea, the Pacific
Command's Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center-Korea, DLA, and
the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface. The Joint Force Support Component
Command has been tested in two exercises--Reception, Staging, Onward
Movement and Integration and Ulchi Focus Lens--and U.S. Forces Korea
officials are currently involved in the Senior Leader Seminar as part of
the high-level process to discuss the next iteration and iron out the
roles and responsibilities of the Joint Force Support Component Command.
U.S. military officials in Korea explained that the future goal is to
merge the Joint Force Support Component Command into a joint logistics
command.
The Joint Experimental Deployment and Support continuum shows two other
command and control options that could support more complex operations.
These options are the Combined Logistics Coordination Center and the
Combined/Coalition Joint Force Support Component Command. However, DOD has
not defined, developed, or tested these options.
^45J4 designates the logistics directorate or section of a joint staff.
U.S. Joint Forces Command refers to this option as the Enabled J4, and
U.S. Pacific Command calls it the Enhanced J4.
Command and Control Issues Have Not Been Resolved
Despite the development of these new organizations designed to offer
robust logistics command and control capabilities, our discussions with
officials from the combatant commands and the military services revealed
unresolved issues related to exercising joint command and control over
logistics functions in a theater of operations. For example, some military
services have indicated that they would not support the establishment of a
Joint Force Support Component Command in other geographic combatant
commands, leaving the future of this initiative in question. A number of
officials had concerns about how organizations such as the Joint Force
Support Component Command would be staffed and what roles and authorities
it would have. Specifically, they mentioned (1) statutory requirements for
logistics support, (2) directive authority for logistics, and (3)
operational and financial considerations.
Although the Joint Force Support Component Command is still in an
experimentation phase, there has been resistance from the services to its
future implementation. The Air Force, for example, has stated that, while
the Joint Force Support Component Command might work for the size and
scale of operations in the Korean theater, DOD should be cautious about
adopting it as a model across all combatant commands. The services have
expressed concerns about mandating that they provide staff to the Joint
Force Support Component Command, while also fulfilling their Title 10
responsibilities to man, train, and equip their forces.^46 The Marine
Corps said this would hinder its ability to provide logistics support to
its own tasked missions and to deploy in a "lean" condition. Officials
from military service components in the geographic combatant commands also
raised the issue of having a service component take direction from a
separate component command at the same level, rather than from a higher
level command, and they were resistant to losing personnel to such an
organization because the service component commands still have tactical
logistics responsibilities to fulfill. While the Navy has not provided an
official position on the Joint Force Support Component Command, Navy
officials told us they did have some concerns with the initiative and that
one disadvantage of a single logistics command is that it separates
logistics from operations instead of keeping both functions under the same
operational commander they are designed to support.
^46See 10 U.S.C. SS 3013, 5013, and 8013.
Some military service officials we interviewed raised questions about the
effectiveness of a Joint Force Support Component Command that lacked an
ability to exercise directive authority for logistics. Directive authority
for logistics gives the combatant commander the ability to shift logistics
resources within the theater in order to accomplish a mission.^47 While
DOD doctrine states that directive authority for logistics may be
delegated to a subordinate commander, such as a joint force commander or
service component commander,^48 officials we interviewed did not believe
directive authority for logistics could be delegated below that level of
command to an entity such as the Joint Force Support Component Command.
Without this authority, some military service officials question how the
Joint Force Support Component Command differs from other logistics command
and control organizations if the organization can make recommendations to
the joint force commander but not actually direct the transfer of assets
across the service components, known as cross-leveling. For example,
officials in U.S. Pacific Command stated that the Joint Force Support
Component Command faced challenges when trying to release joint logistics
tasking orders during the exercises because it could not resolve issues
with the service components. They believed that the role of the
organization should be to coordinate with the services to deconflict and
prioritize support to the next campaign rather than address problems at
the tactical level. Since directive authority for logistics still resides
with the joint force commander, the Joint Force Support Component Command
does not provide any additional authorities; therefore, some officials
argued that its functions could be accomplished with an organization such
as U.S. Pacific Command's Enhanced J4.
There are also readiness and financial considerations related to
exercising directive authority for logistics. In this process, the
component commanders provide input as to what they can support. There are
military operational risks and trade-offs associated with cross-leveling,
because assets diverted from one unit to support another unit may affect
the giving organization's ability to conduct a future operation. Officials
raised concerns that logisticians in a separate logistics command may not
fully understand the impact of cross-leveling on the next military
mission. Additionally, because the services obtain funding for their own
assets, several officials told us that some form of financial
reconciliation must be considered when exercising directive authority for
logistics. Thus, any assets provided from one service to another must be
accounted for and later replaced or reimbursed. Because of these financial
considerations, some military service component officials believed that
joint funding is necessary to support joint operations.
^47Under 10 U.S.C. S164, unless otherwise directed by the President or the
Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the
commander of a combatant command with respect to the commands and forces
assigned to that command include giving authoritative direction to
subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned
to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of
military operations, joint training, and logistics.
^48JCS Pub 4-0 (Apr. 6, 2000), p. I-3.
Issues related to joint command and control over logistics in theater are
not limited to the Joint Force Support Component Command organization. For
example, another joint theater logistics initiative, the Theater
Sustainment Command, also faces some logistics command and control
challenges. As discussed earlier in this report, the Theater Sustainment
Command is an Army logistics command and control organization that is
being developed to streamline logistics support as part of Army
modularity. The Theater Sustainment Command, however, is also being
developed as a "joint-capable" headquarters that becomes a joint
organization in a theater of operations with the addition of augmentees
from the military services and other DOD agencies. Its joint-capable
designation raises the same issues as the Joint Force Support Component
Command regarding staffing, roles, and authorities. In addition to the
current uncertainty over who exercises control over the Theater and
Expeditionary Sustainment Commands, there would be added the question of
where these organizations would fit into the theater. Further, some
military service component officials questioned whether using these Army
organizations in their joint command and control capacities would lessen
their ability to perform Army-specific tasks. Until lines of command and
control are clearly defined for these new organizations, joint force
commanders will continue to face challenges in directing and coordinating
logistics resources within a theater of operations.
Conclusions
Joint theater logistics has the potential to address long-standing issues
associated with visibility and distribution of assets within a theater of
operations, which is a critical step toward overall improvements in supply
chain management and support to the warfighter. While several initiatives
developed by different DOD components show promise in improving the joint
force commander's ability to see emerging logistics requirements and
rapidly respond to them, these initiatives have been fragmented across the
department due to the lack of a coordinated and comprehensive management
approach. Moreover, the diffused organization of DOD's logistics
operations, including separate funding and management of resources and
systems, complicates DOD's ability to adopt such an approach to developing
and implementing joint theater logistics capabilities. Transformational
changes in DOD's organization--such as those proposed by a number of
organizations that believe DOD should move toward a more integrated
logistics system and change how it controls and allocates logistics
funding--could potentially require changes to existing laws, such as Title
10. Another factor that has hindered adoption of a more coordinated and
comprehensive approach to joint theater logistics has been changes with
respect to DOD's overall logistics transformation strategy. Without a
coordinated and comprehensive management approach, DOD may have difficulty
addressing the challenges discussed in this report, including determining
roles and responsibilities for DOD's port opening capability, addressing
asset visibility issues caused by noninteroperable information technology
systems, resolving disagreements on roles for coordinating surface
transportation, making more use of opportunities to consolidate storage
and shipping activities in Kuwait, and clarifying command and control over
theater logistics functions. Moreover, without a coordinated and
comprehensive management approach, DOD is not in a position to effectively
coordinate the initiatives across the department, guard against potential
duplication of effort, and prioritize initiatives to make decisions on how
best to target its resources.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve logistics and supply chain operations, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics), in his capacity as the Defense Logistics
Executive, to develop and implement a coordinated and comprehensive
management approach to guide and oversee efforts across the department to
improve distribution and supply support for U.S. forces in a joint
theater. This approach should encompass sound management principles,
including developing specific strategies and goals, assigning
accountability for achieving results, and using outcome-oriented
performance measures, and should be aligned with the results of the
ongoing joint capabilities portfolio management test, the proposed
realignment of focused logistics capabilities, and the development of a
"to be" roadmap. In considering options for implementing this
recommendation, the Under Secretary should determine whether any changes
should be made to DOD's organizational structure and control of resources
for joint logistics support and identify the steps needed to make these
changes, including changes to existing laws, such as Title 10.
To make more economical and efficient use of shipping and storage
facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Director, DLA, to evaluate existing storage and shipping arrangements
within the geographic combatant commands and identify opportunities for
consolidation.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with both
of our recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments that we
incorporated as appropriate. The department's response is reprinted in
appendix I.
In response to our recommendation for developing and implementing a
coordinated and comprehensive management approach to improving
distribution and supply support in a joint theater, DOD stated that the
Deputy Secretary of Defense is leading initiatives in portfolio
management, the Defense Logistics Executive (DLE) is focusing on Joint
Logistics portfolio management, Joint Staff (J4) is updating the Joint
Logistics Joint Functional Concept, and the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness) is developing the logistics
strategy and roadmap, which are to be completed by summer 2008. While we
acknowledge these steps that DOD is taking to improve distribution and
supply support for U.S. forces in a joint theater as a good start, we
continue to believe that as DOD develops and implements a comprehensive
management approach that is coordinated across the department, DOD needs
to incorporate the sound management principles we describe in this report.
Again, in considering options for implementing this recommendation, the
Under Secretary should determine whether any changes should be made to
DOD's organizational structure and control of joint logistical support,
and identify steps needed to make these changes, including changes to
existing laws, such as Title 10. We are reemphasizing these two matters
because DOD did not specifically address them in its comments to our
recommendations.
Regarding our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Director, Defense Logistics Agency, to evaluate existing storage and
shipping arrangements within the geographic combatant commands and
identify opportunities for consolidation, DOD stated that it plans to
complete such an evaluation by the summer of 2008. We believe this action,
if implemented, will be responsive to our recommendation.
Scope and Methodology
To assess DOD's approach to managing joint theater logistics, we
identified sound management principles based on prior work on
organizational transformation and federal agency implementation of the
Government Performance and Results Act.^49 We also reviewed doctrine,
regulations, guidance, plans, briefings, status reports, and other
documents related to the development of joint theater logistics, logistics
strategic planning, and supply chain management. This review included
reports by various audit and non-audit organizations that have assessed
DOD's logistics organization. While we examined the recommendations
proposed by these organizations, the scope of our review did not include
an assessment of these proposals or what changes, if any, would require
congressional action. Additionally, we interviewed officials from the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics) and the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate who are involved in
joint theater logistics and logistics transformation. Over the course of
these visits and interviews, we obtained pertinent information on the
status of DOD's efforts in support of joint theater logistics, such as the
"as is" Focused Logistics Roadmap, the "to be" roadmap, and the supply
chain management improvement plan. We reviewed the draft joint theater
logistics white paper, implementation plan, and capability process
analyses. We also examined DOD's overall efforts to institute a long-term
logistics strategy, reviewing strategic planning documents such as vision
statements, joint doctrine, campaign plans, and roadmaps that have
addressed DOD's future logistics systems. We discussed the capabilities
portfolio management test case with OSD and Joint Staff personnel.
Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, U.S.
Transportation Command, combatant commands, DLA, the military services,
and selected reserve components to get their perspectives on joint theater
logistics.
To obtain information on DOD's progress in implementing joint theater
logistics initiatives, we reviewed DOD, Joint Staff, and military service
guidance, concepts, directives, briefings, status reports, and other
pertinent documentation related to the development of these initiatives.
To identify the status of initiatives DOD is working on to address joint
theater logistics, we focused on the four initiatives highlighted in the
"as is" roadmap in support of joint theater logistics: Joint Deployment
Distribution Operations Center, Director of Mobility Forces-Surface, Joint
Experimental Deployment and Support, and Theater Sustainment Commands. We
conducted interviews and obtained information on these initiatives from
U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the Army's G-4
logistics directorate. In addition, we also looked at four other
initiatives related to providing support to the joint force commander:
Joint Task Force-Port Opening, Node Management and Deployable Depot,
Theater Consolidation and Shipping Points, and Joint Regional Inventory
and Material Management. Because these initiatives have been recently
implemented or are still in the testing stages, in some cases we were able
to obtain only limited data on their effectiveness, and we did not
independently validate these data. To obtain information on specific
initiatives, we interviewed officials from U.S. Transportation Command and
two of its components, Air Mobility Command and the Military Surface
Deployment and Distribution Command; U.S. Joint Forces Command; DLA; U.S.
Army Combined Arms Support Command; the military services; and selected
reserve components. Additionally, we visited and interviewed officials in
the five geographic combatant commands: U.S. Central Command, U.S.
European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S.
Southern Command. We also met with military service component commands in
U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Pacific Command and
with operational units in Germany, Korea, and Kuwait. Because several of
the newly developed initiatives are being tested in the Korean theater of
operations, we visited the subordinate unified command in Korea to discuss
their experiences and challenges in implementing joint theater logistics.
We attended the out-brief for an Army conference on theater opening,
reviewed after-action reports from exercises that tested the initiatives,
and analyzed lessons learned reports from Operation Iraqi Freedom. To
assess the reliability of the container management system data, we
interviewed Container Management Element officials at Camp Arifjan,
Kuwait, about the internal controls and reliability of the system. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We
conducted our review from July 2006 to April 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
^49See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [49]GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003), and GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That
Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies,
[50]GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, DLA; the Director,
Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. This report
will also be available at no charge at our Web site at
[51]http://www.gao.gov . Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [52][email protected] . Key contributors to
this report are listed in appendix II.
William M. Solis
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
William M. Solis (202) 512-8365
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report
were Karyn Angulo, Alissa Czyz, Maria Gomez, Thomas Gosling, Brian Howell,
and Larry Junek.
(350907)
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[59]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-807 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202) 512-8365 or
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Highlights of [60]GAO-07-807 , a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight
of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of
Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate
June 2007
DEFENSE LOGISTICS
Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply Support for Joint Military
Operations Could Benefit from a Coordinated Management Approach
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army and the Marine Corps experienced
problems with the delivery of supplies to the warfighter. Such problems
highlight long-standing weaknesses in the Department of Defense's (DOD)
supply chain management. DOD has identified joint theater logistics as a
key effort aimed at improving distribution and supply support. GAO was
asked to examine DOD's efforts to develop and implement joint theater
logistics. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which DOD's approach to managing
joint theater logistics departmentwide encompasses sound management
principles and (2) the progress DOD has made in implementing joint theater
logistics initiatives. GAO reviewed DOD documents and interviewed
officials from the Joint Staff, services, agencies, and geographic
combatant commands.
[61]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD develop and implement a coordinated and comprehensive
management approach to guide and oversee efforts across the department to
improve distribution and supply support to U.S. forces in a joint theater.
GAO also recommends that DLA assess opportunities to consolidate storage
and shipping activities within all geographic combatant commands. DOD
concurred with GAO's recommendations.
DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management approach
to guide and oversee implementation of joint theater logistics across the
department. Efforts to develop and implement joint theater logistics
initiatives have been fragmented among various DOD components due largely
to a lack of specific goals and strategies, accountability for achieving
results, and outcome-oriented performance measures--key principles of
sound management. Further complicating DOD's ability to adopt a
coordinated and comprehensive management approach to joint theater
logistics are the diffused organization of DOD's logistics operations,
including separate funding and management of resources and systems, and
changes in DOD's overall logistics transformation strategy. DOD is
currently testing a new approach to managing joint capabilities and is
considering a realignment of capabilities in its long-term logistics
strategy, which could affect the future of joint theater logistics.
Without a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to managing joint
theater logistics, DOD lacks assurance that it is on the right path toward
achieving this capability and that individual initiatives will
collectively address gaps in logistics capabilities. Further, DOD will
have difficulty achieving improvements in theater distribution and asset
visibility associated with joint theater logistics.
DOD components have made progress developing and implementing joint
theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and supply
support, but the department faces challenges that hinder its ability to
realize the full benefits of these efforts. For example,
o While Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers have been
established in each geographic combatant command to help manage
supplies moving across the distribution system, senior commanders
in Kuwait said achieving asset visibility has been difficult
because of a lack of interoperability among information technology
systems.
o Initiatives being developed to improve the coordination of
surface transportation assets theaterwide also face challenges
with issues of command and control, the availability of
information technology tools, and potential duplication of
responsibilities with other organizations.
Unless DOD successfully addresses these and other challenges GAO
identified, the initiatives are not likely to significantly improve the
ability of a joint force commander to effectively and efficiently direct
logistics functions, including distribution and supply support activities,
across the theater of operations to accomplish an assigned mission.
Moreover, without addressing such challenges, DOD is likely to continue to
experience some of the same types of distribution and asset visibility
problems that have occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
References
Visible links
35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-305R
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-275
37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-775
38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-775
39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-234
40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-229T
41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-325SP
42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-305R
43. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-775
44. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-775
45. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-15
46. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-381
47. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-305R
48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-171
49. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669
50. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
51. http://www.gao.gov/
52. mailto:[email protected]
53. http://www.gao.gov/
54. http://www.gao.gov/
55. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
56. mailto:[email protected]
57. mailto:[email protected]
58. mailto:[email protected]
59. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-807
60. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-807
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