    Defense Logistics: Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply
    Support for Joint Military Operations Could Benefit from a
    Coordinated Management Approach (29-JUN-07, GAO-07-807).

    During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army and the Marine Corps
    experienced problems with the delivery of supplies to the
    warfighter. Such problems highlight long-standing weaknesses in
    the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chain management. DOD
    has identified joint theater logistics as a key effort aimed at
    improving distribution and supply support. GAO was asked to
    examine DOD's efforts to develop and implement joint theater
    logistics. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which DOD's approach to
    managing joint theater logistics departmentwide encompasses sound
    management principles and (2) the progress DOD has made in
    implementing joint theater logistics initiatives. GAO reviewed
    DOD documents and interviewed officials from the Joint Staff,
    services, agencies, and geographic combatant commands.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-807
        ACCNO:   A71767
      TITLE:     Defense Logistics: Efforts to Improve Distribution and
    Supply Support for Joint Military Operations Could Benefit from a
    Coordinated Management Approach
         DATE:   06/29/2007
      SUBJECT:   Best practices
    	     Combat readiness
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Defense operations
    	     Interoperability
    	     Iraq War and reconstruction
    	     Logistics
    	     Management reengineering
    	     Military forces
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Program management
    	     Property and supply management
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Supply chain management
    	     Program goals or objectives
    	     Program implementation

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    GAO-07-807

         * [1]Results in Brief
         * [2]Background
         * [3]DOD Has Not Developed a Coordinated and Comprehensive Manage

              * [4]DOD's Approach to Joint Theater Logistics Is Not Consistent
              * [5]Changes in DOD's Overall Logistics Strategy Hinder Developme

         * [6]DOD Has Made Progress on Joint Theater Logistics Initiatives

              * [7]New Port Opening Capability Faces Implementation Challenges

                   * [8]DOD Has Established a New Port Opening Unit
                   * [9]Army Officials Have Raised Concerns About the Port
                     Opening U

              * [10]DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Supply Distribution, but Asse

                   * [11]DOD Has Established Joint Operations Centers in the
                     Geograph
                   * [12]Lack of System Interoperability Has Impeded Asset
                     Visibility
                   * [13]Problems With Container Management Have Continued

              * [14]Separate Organizations Are Being Established to Coordinate S

                   * [15]Sustainment Commands and Surface Mobility Directorate
                     Are Ai
                   * [16]Initiatives Face Implementation Challenges

              * [17]Consolidated Storage and Shipping Arrangements Have Been Imp

                   * [18]Consolidated Storage and Shipping Initiatives
                   * [19]Additional Opportunities for Consolidating Shipping and
                     Stor

              * [20]Command and Control Over Joint Logistics Functions Remains U

                   * [21]Several Command and Control Options Have Emerged
                   * [22]Command and Control Issues Have Not Been Resolved

         * [23]Conclusions
         * [24]Recommendations for Executive Action
         * [25]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * [26]Scope and Methodology
         * [27]GAO Contact
         * [28]Acknowledgments
         * [29]GAO's Mission
         * [30]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

              * [31]Order by Mail or Phone

         * [32]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
         * [33]Congressional Relations
         * [34]Public Affairs

    Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
    Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
    Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    June 2007

    DEFENSE LOGISTICS

    Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply Support for Joint Military
    Operations Could Benefit from a Coordinated Management Approach

    Defense Logistics Defense Logistics Defense Logistics ense Logistics

    GAO-07-807

    Contents

    Letter 1

    Results in Brief 3
    Background 6
    DOD Has Not Developed a Coordinated and Comprehensive Management Approach
    to Joint Theater Logistics 9
    DOD Has Made Progress on Joint Theater Logistics Initiatives but Faces
    Challenges That Hinder Its Ability to Fully Realize the Benefits of These
    Efforts 19
    Conclusions 51
    Recommendations for Executive Action 52
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 53
    Scope and Methodology 54
    Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 57
    Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 59

    Table

    Table 1: Challenges Hindering DOD's Ability to Fully Implement Joint
    Theater Logistics Initiatives 19

    Figures

    Figure 1: Recent Strategic Planning Documents Addressing DOD Logistics 15
    Figure 2: Military Storage Containers in Kuwait (October 2006) 27
    Figure 3: Views of Container and Yard Storage at Army General Support
    Warehouse, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (October 2006) 42
    Figure 4: Exterior and Interior Views of Warehouses at the DLA
    Distribution Depot, Kuwait (October 2006) 43
    Figure 5: Continuum of Logistics Command and Control Options Included in
    the Joint Experimental Deployment and Support Initiative 47

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office
    Washington, DC 20548

    June 29, 2007

    The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka
    Chairman
    The Honorable George V. Voinovich
    Ranking Member
    Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
      Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia
    Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
    United States Senate

    The Department of Defense (DOD) experienced problems with logistics
    support and supply chain management during military operations in Iraq
    that impeded the timely delivery of supplies and contributed to shortages
    of items critical to the warfighter.^1 These problems--which affected both
    Army and Marine Corps ground forces--included an insufficient capability
    to provide support to combat forces during the early stages of the
    conflict, difficulties in distributing supplies within the theater of
    operations, and limitations in asset visibility.^212 Such problems also
    occurred during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991. During the
    1990s, following the end of the Cold War, DOD reexamined the future threat
    environment that U.S. military forces could face and identified logistics
    capabilities that would be needed to support future military operations.
    One of these identified capabilities, joint theater logistics, is aimed at
    improving the ability of a joint force commander to direct various
    logistics functions, including distribution and supply support activities,
    across the theater of operations to accomplish an assigned mission. The
    Department of Defense (DOD) experienced problems with logistics support
    and supply chain management during military operations in Iraq that
    impeded the timely delivery of supplies and contributed to shortages of
    items critical to the warfighter. These problems--which affected both Army
    and Marine Corps ground forces--included an insufficient capability to
    provide support to combat forces during the early stages of the conflict,
    difficulties in distributing supplies within the theater of operations,
    and limitations in asset visibility. Such problems also occurred during
    Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991. During the 1990s, following
    the end of the Cold War, DOD reexamined the future threat environment that
    U.S. military forces could face and identified logistics capabilities that
    would be needed to support future military operations. One of these
    identified capabilities, joint theater logistics, is aimed at improving
    the ability of a joint force commander to direct various logistics
    functions, including distribution and supply support activities, across
    the theater of operations to accomplish an assigned mission.

    Under DOD doctrine for conducting joint military operations, the joint
    force commander is ultimately responsible for synchronizing all aspects of
    Under DOD doctrine for conducting joint military operations, the joint
    force commander is ultimately responsible for synchronizing all aspects of
    logistics necessary to support the mission.^3 However, the joint force
    commander relies on various DOD components, including the military
    services, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and U.S. Transportation Command,
    to provide the logistics resources and systems needed to support U.S.
    forces. Various provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code establish
    responsibilities and authorities for supplying and equipping the armed
    forces.^4 These and other Title 10 functions are promulgated by DOD
    through directives.^5 Implementing joint theater logistics involves
    harnessing these diffuse resources and systems, which are not integrated
    but rather separately funded and managed across DOD's components.

    ^1DOD defines logistics as the science of planning and carrying out the
    movement and maintenance of forces. Logistics includes six broad
    functional areas: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering,
    health services, and other services. Supply chain management consists of
    processes and activities to purchase, produce, and deliver
    materiel--including ammunition, spare parts, fuel, food, water, clothing,
    personal equipment, and other items--to a force that is highly dispersed
    and mobile.

    ^2DOD describes asset visibility as the ability to provide timely and
    accurate information on the location, quantity, condition, movement, and
    status of equipment and supplies.

    The Joint Staff Logistics Directorate is DOD's lead proponent for joint
    theater logistics, and this effort involves developing and implementing a
    number of initiatives across the department. DOD believes joint theater
    logistics will improve the distribution and visibility of assets in a
    theater of operations. For this reason, DOD has listed joint theater
    logistics as one of several key initiatives in its supply chain management
    improvement plan. Because of long-standing systemic weaknesses that have
    been identified in our previous reports, we have designated DOD's supply
    chain management as a high-risk area. In 2005, DOD developed the supply
    chain management improvement plan to place it on a path toward removing
    supply chain management from our high-risk list.

    At your request, we have examined DOD's efforts to develop and implement
    joint theater logistics as part of its plans for improving logistics
    support and supply chain management. Specifically, this report assesses
    (1) the extent to which DOD's approach to managing joint theater logistics
    departmentwide encompasses sound management principles and (2) the
    progress DOD has made in implementing joint theater logistics initiatives
    in the areas of distribution and supply support.

    ^3Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic
    Support of Joint Operations (Apr. 6, 2000), p. I-3. (Hereafter cited as
    JCS Pub 4-0 (Apr. 6, 2000), p. XX).

    ^4See 10 U.S.C. SS 3013, 3062, 5013, 5062, 5063, 8013, and 8062.

    ^5DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its
    Major Components (Aug. 1, 2002) states that the military services are
    responsible for providing logistic support for service forces. DOD
    Directive 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency (May 17, 2006), directs DLA,
    among other responsibilities and functions, to provide materiel
    commodities and supply chain management for items of supply and services.
    DOD Directive 5158.4, United States Transportation Command (Jan. 8, 1993),
    states that the command shall have combatant command over all
    transportation assets of the military departments, except for
    service-unique or theater-assigned assets.

    To assess DOD's approach to managing joint theater logistics, we
    identified sound management principles based on prior work on
    organizational transformation and federal agency implementation of the
    Government Performance and Results Act.^6 We reviewed doctrine,
    regulations, guidance, plans, briefings, status reports, and other
    documents related to the development of joint theater logistics, logistics
    strategic planning, and supply chain management, to include reports by
    various audit and non-audit organizations that have assessed DOD's
    logistics operations. We also interviewed officials from the Joint Staff
    and the Office of the Secretary of Defense who are involved with joint
    theater logistics and logistics transformation. To assess DOD's progress
    in implementing joint theater logistics initiatives, we visited the five
    geographic combatant commands, the subordinate unified command in Korea,
    military service component commands in three theaters, and operational
    units in Germany, Korea, and Kuwait. We met with military service
    officials at headquarters offices, as well as at selected commands and
    reserve components. We also visited U.S. Transportation Command, U.S.
    Joint Forces Command, and DLA to obtain information on specific
    initiatives. In addition, we attended the out-brief for an Army conference
    on theater opening, reviewed after-action reports from exercises testing
    the initiatives, and analyzed lessons learned reports from Operation Iraqi
    Freedom. We determined that the data we used were sufficiently reliable
    for our purposes. Additional information on our scope and methodology is
    provided at the end of this letter. We conducted our review from July 2006
    to April 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards.

    Results in Brief

    DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management approach
    to guide and oversee implementation of joint theater logistics across the
    department. Efforts to develop and implement joint theater logistics
    initiatives have been fragmented among various DOD components due largely
    to a lack of specific goals and strategies, accountability for achieving
    results, and outcome-oriented performance measures--key principles of
    sound management. While DOD has broadly defined joint theater logistics as
    an adaptive ability to anticipate and respond to emerging theater
    logistics and support requirements, it has not developed specific goals
    and strategies linked to this vision. In addition, DOD has not assigned
    accountability for achieving results under joint theater logistics and has
    not developed outcome-oriented performance measures that would enable the
    department to know whether its efforts are fully and effectively achieving
    a joint theater logistics capability. Furthermore, the diffused
    organization of DOD's logistics operations, including separate funding and
    management of resources and systems, complicates DOD's ability to adopt a
    coordinated and comprehensive management approach to developing and
    implementing joint theater logistics capabilities. A number of studies
    that have assessed DOD's logistics operations have recommended changes to
    DOD's organizational structure and control of resources for providing
    joint logistics support to military operations. Moreover, changes in DOD's
    overall logistics transformation strategy have hampered its ability to
    adopt a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to joint theater
    logistics. Over the years, DOD has made a number of attempts to articulate
    a long-term strategy to guide logistics transformation, including joint
    theater logistics, but progress on these efforts has been hindered by
    differing visions within the department. DOD is currently testing a new
    approach to managing joint capabilities and is considering a realignment
    of capabilities in its long-term logistics strategy--efforts that could
    affect the future of joint theater logistics. Under this realignment,
    joint theater logistics may cease to exist as a stand-alone capability
    area; however, the tenets of joint theater logistics would be retained,
    and the functional areas associated with joint theater logistics would be
    integrated within the broader joint logistics portfolio. Without a
    coordinated and comprehensive approach to managing joint theater
    logistics, DOD lacks assurance that it is on the right path toward
    achieving this capability and that individual initiatives will
    collectively address gaps in logistics capabilities. Further, DOD will
    have difficulty achieving the desired improvements in distribution and
    asset visibility associated with joint theater logistics as portrayed in
    the supply chain management improvement plan. We are recommending that DOD
    develop a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to guide and
    oversee efforts across the department to improve distribution and supply
    support in a joint theater. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD
    concurred with our recommendation.

    ^6Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).

    Although a coordinated and comprehensive management approach does not
    exist, DOD components have made progress developing and implementing joint
    theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and supply
    support; however, the department faces a number of challenges that hinder
    its ability to fully realize the benefits of these efforts. A notable
    improvement has been the establishment of Joint Deployment Distribution
    Operations Centers that can help joint force commanders synchronize the
    arrival of supplies into a theater and assist in other aspects of
    distribution and supply support. However, officials we interviewed said
    these operations centers alone will not resolve distribution and supply
    support problems. Other initiatives are at various stages of development
    and implementation as DOD experiments with new organizational
    arrangements, writes new concepts of operations, and revises doctrine.
    Despite this progress, DOD faces a number of challenges in fully
    developing and implementing joint theater logistics initiatives in the
    areas of distribution and supply support. Some of the challenges are as
    follows:

               o DOD has established an expeditionary organization to manage the
               arrival of supplies moving into a theater during the early stages
               of a military operation, but Army officials have raised questions
               about the need for this new organization and the resources devoted
               to it, as well as about the command and control over this
               organization.

               o While Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers have been
               established in each geographic combatant command to help manage
               supplies moving across the distribution system, senior commanders
               in Kuwait said achieving asset visibility has been difficult
               because of a lack of interoperability among information technology
               systems. We also found continuing problems with container
               management, although improvements have been made.

               o Initiatives to improve the coordination of surface
               transportation assets theaterwide also face challenges with issues
               of command and control, the availability of information technology
               tools, and potential duplication of responsibilities with other
               organizations.

               o Efforts to consolidate multiple storage and shipping activities
               in a theater have been implemented on a limited scale and
               additional consolidation opportunities may exist. During our site
               visits to Kuwait, we found that DLA and the Army were operating
               separate facilities that have the potential for consolidation,
               which could result in more efficient use of resources. Since our
               fieldwork was completed, DLA assessed ways to improve theater
               distribution and made recommendations to consolidate and relocate
               existing operations. Because this study was focused on the U.S.
               Central Command area of operations, we are recommending DLA
               undertake similar assessments within all the geographic combatant
               commands. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred
               with this recommendation.

               o Finally, various options have emerged for improving the ability
               of a joint force commander to exercise command and control over
               joint theater logistics functions. However, the military services
               have raised concerns about how their own roles and
               responsibilities for providing logistics support might be affected
               and have opposed expansion of the most robust command and control
               option that has emerged.

               Unless DOD successfully addresses these challenges, the
               initiatives are not likely to significantly improve the ability of
               a joint force commander to harness the diffuse logistics resources
               and systems that exist within the department and effectively and
               efficiently direct logistics functions, including distribution and
               supply support activities, across the theater of operations to
               accomplish an assigned mission. Moreover, without addressing such
               challenges, DOD is likely to continue to experience some of the
               same types of distribution and asset visibility problems that
               occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

    			  Background

               We have identified weaknesses in DOD's supply and distribution
               support in prior reports.^7 These weaknesses have affected the
               department's ability to meet its goal of delivering the "right
               items to the right place at the right time" to support the
               deployment and sustainment of military forces. One problem with
               logistics support has been an insufficient capability to support
               combat forces during the early stages of a conflict. In Operation
               Iraqi Freedom, for example, DOD's priority was to move combat
               forces into the theater first, with logistics personnel arriving
               later in the deployment. Because of the shortage of support
               personnel in theater, the forces experienced delays in receiving,
               storing, and distributing supplies. For example, early in
               Operation Iraqi Freedom, inefficient packaging and palletizing of
               air shipments created supply backlogs in Kuwait that delayed the
               delivery of supplies shipped by air to units in Iraq. Once in
               theater, mixed shipments had to be manually opened, sorted, and
               re-palletized at theater distribution points, causing additional
               delays in getting repair parts to their end users. Another problem
               has been limited visibility of assets within the distribution
               system. Incomplete radio frequency identification tags required
               logistics personnel to spend time opening and sorting the
               shipments, significantly increasing processing time. Additionally,
               logistics systems used to order, track, and account for supplies
               were not well integrated and could not provide the essential
               information to effectively manage theater distribution. Thus, we
               have indicated that materiel distribution and asset visibility are
               two key focus areas critical to resolving these supply and
               distribution problems.

    ^7GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of
    Logistics Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom, [35]GAO-04-305R
    (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003); Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to
    Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future
    Operations, [36]GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005); and Defense
    Logistics: DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution Operations, but
    Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain These Efforts, [37]GAO-05-775
    (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2005).

               Joint theater logistics is one of seven future logistics
               capabilities that DOD has grouped under the term "focused
               logistics." DOD has broadly defined joint theater logistics as an
               adaptive ability to anticipate and respond to emerging theater
               logistics and support requirements. In addition to joint theater
               logistics, focused logistics capabilities include joint
               deployment/rapid distribution, agile sustainment, operational
               engineering, force health protection, multinational logistics, and
               logistics information fusion. Together, these capabilities are
               intended to support an overall joint logistics capability, which
               DOD defines as "the capability to build effective, responsive, and
               efficient capacity into the deployment and sustainment pipeline;
               exercise control over the pipeline from end to end; and provide
               certainty to the supported joint force commander that forces,
               equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive where needed and
               on time." According to DOD, focused logistics can be achieved by
               transforming logistics capabilities. To succeed, these focused
               logistics capabilities must be fully integrated, expeditionary,
               networked, decentralized, adaptable, and capable of decision
               superiority. Further, they must support future joint operations
               that are continuous and distributed across the full range of
               military operations.

               Since the 1990s, DOD has developed various strategic planning
               documents, such as Joint Vision 2010, which included focused
               logistics as a needed capability. In 2000, DOD incorporated joint
               theater logistics and other focused logistics capabilities in
               joint warfighting doctrine. In 2003, the department approved the
               joint functional concept for focused logistics.^8 In 2005, DOD
               issued its Focused Logistics Roadmap, presenting an "as is"
               compendium of programs and initiatives associated with the fiscal
               year 2006 President's Budget and aligned under the focused
               logistics capabilities. The "as is" roadmap was intended to
               complement previously published logistics strategies and to
               represent the portfolio of programs and initiatives for which the
               Focused Logistics Functional Capabilities Board^9 and Joint Staff
               Logistics Directorate have primary oversight responsibility. In
               2006, DOD approved the Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint
               Integrating Concept,^10 which complements the joint functional
               concept and calls for a joint deployment and distribution
               enterprise that is capable of providing joint force commanders
               with the ability to rapidly and effectively move and sustain
               forces in support of major combat operations or other joint
               operations. This document describes the enterprise as an
               integrated system of assets, materiel, personnel, leaders,
               organizations, procedures, tools, training, facilities, and
               doctrine that is expected to enable the joint force commander to
               minimize seams in the distribution pipeline. The joint deployment
               and distribution enterprise is expected to complement and augment
               service or joint force commander-unique distribution
               responsibilities and capabilities.

    ^8Joint functional concepts describe, and are used as a basis to shape,
    joint capabilities across the department.

               Distribution is part of the process and activities for managing
               the supply chain. According to joint doctrine, distribution is the
               process of synchronizing all elements of the logistics system to
               deliver the "right things" to the "right place" at the "right
               time." DOD's distribution system has two segments:
               strategic-national and theater. The strategic segment of this
               pipeline involves the movement of supplies from points outside a
               theater of military operations into the theater. The theater
               segment consists of distribution that occurs within a theater of
               military operations. The military services have the responsibility
               to organize, train, equip, and provide logistics support to their
               respective forces.^11 The military services and DLA manage
               supplies and provide for asset visibility. U.S. Transportation
               Command is responsible for providing transportation support,
               primarily strategic airlift and sealift, as well as in-transit
               asset visibility.^12 The geographic combatant commands are
               responsible for logistics in their theaters, to include managing
               and directing the theater distribution system.^13

    ^9DOD has eight Functional Capabilities Boards that support the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council and lead the capabilities assessment
    process.

    ^10Whereas a joint functional concept is a broad description of joint
    force functions, a joint integrating concept is a description of narrowly
    focused operations or functions and is used to identify, describe, and
    apply specific capabilities.

    ^11See 10 U.S.C. SS 3013, 3062, 5013, 5062, 5063, 8013, and 8062.

    ^12DOD defines in-transit visibility as the near-real-time capability to
    track logistic resources and transportation assets while they are mobile
    and underway.

               In September 2003, the Secretary of Defense assigned new
               organizational responsibilities in the logistics area, including
               designating the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
               Technology, and Logistics) as the Defense Logistics Executive, and
               the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, as the Distribution
               Process Owner. The Defense Logistics Executive has authority to
               address logistics and supply issues. The role of the Distribution
               Process Owner is to improve the efficiency and interoperability of
               the end-to-end distribution system. Prior to these new
               organizational designations, the Secretary of Defense designated
               U.S. Joint Forces Command as the Joint Deployment Process Owner,
               responsible for improving joint deployment and redeployment
               processes. The commanders of U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S.
               Transportation Command--recognizing that many deployment and
               distribution processes are common and that both commands serve a
               common customer: the supported joint force commander--signed a
               joint vision statement in September 2006 to help guide their
               partnership as they work together to improve DOD's joint
               deployment and distribution.

    			  DOD Has Not Developed a Coordinated and Comprehensive Management
    			  Approach to Joint Theater Logistics

               DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management
               approach for guiding and overseeing the implementation of joint
               theater logistics across the department. While DOD intends joint
               theater logistics to improve the distribution and visibility of
               assets in theater, its current approach is not consistent with
               sound management principles that have been shown to be effective
               in accomplishing organizational transformation, and has led to
               fragmented efforts across components. In addition, changes in
               DOD's overall logistics transformation strategy have hampered
               DOD's ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive management
               approach to joint theater logistics. Without a coordinated and
               comprehensive approach, DOD will continue to face difficulties
               achieving improvements in theater distribution and asset
               visibility, which impair its ability to improve overall supply
               chain management.

    ^13Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-01.4, Joint Tactics,
    Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution (Aug. 22, 2000),
    p. II-6.

    DOD's Approach to Joint Theater Logistics Is Not Consistent With Sound
    Management Principles and Has Led to Fragmented Efforts

               Our review of DOD's efforts to develop joint theater logistics
               showed that the department has taken a piecemeal approach rather
               than a coordinated and comprehensive approach that is consistent
               with sound management principles. DOD's current approach has led
               to fragmented efforts among components to develop and implement
               initiatives. Sound management principles, such as those used by
               leading organizations to transform their culture and embodied in
               the Government Performance and Results Act, include (1) specific
               goals and strategies, (2) accountability for achieving results,
               and (3) outcome-oriented performance measures. We have previously
               reported that organizations that have progressed toward the
               results-oriented framework of the Government Performance and
               Results Act have established performance goals for which they will
               be held accountable, determined strategies and resources to
               effectively accomplish the goals, and measured progress towards
               those goals. A focus on results, as envisioned by the Government
               Performance and Results Act, implies that collaboration is
               important to ensure that consistent and complementary goals and
               strategies for achieving results are developed and implemented
               across the enterprise. Performance metrics are critical for
               demonstrating progress toward achieving results and providing
               information on which to base organizational and management
               decisions. Further, outcome-focused performance metrics show
               results or outcomes related to an initiative or program in terms
               of its effectiveness, efficiency, or impact. When combined with
               effective leadership, these principles provide a framework to
               guide program efforts in a coordinated and comprehensive fashion
               and allow leadership to determine if these efforts are achieving
               the desired results. In contrast, an insufficient articulation of
               program goals and inadequate information on performance may be
               impediments to improving program efficiency and effectiveness.

               DOD's approach to joint theater logistics is not consistent with
               these principles of sound management. First, while DOD has a broad
               definition of joint theater logistics, it has not articulated
               specific goals and strategies linked to this vision. For example,
               DOD's Focused Logistics Roadmap, supply chain management
               improvement plan, and other documents we reviewed do not contain
               specific goals and strategies for achieving joint theater
               logistics. DOD also has yet to identify the resources and time
               frames for fully implementing joint theater logistics. Moreover,
               DOD's description of joint theater logistics has not been
               consistent over time, which may affect its ability to develop
               specific goals and strategies. This issue is discussed later in
               this report.

               Second, DOD has not assigned accountability for achieving results
               under joint theater logistics. Although the Joint Staff Logistics
               Directorate has been designated the lead proponent for joint
               theater logistics, no one entity within DOD has responsibility for
               coordinating and overseeing programs and initiatives related to
               joint theater logistics. In addition, while DOD has designated
               executive agents and process owners aimed at addressing logistics
               challenges that cut across the department, the roles and
               responsibilities among DOD components have not always been clearly
               delineated and may overlap. We have previously reported on
               problems DOD has experienced in defining accountability and
               authority for addressing supply distribution problems.^14 For
               example, although the Secretary of Defense in 2003 designated the
               Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, as DOD's Distribution
               Process Owner--with responsibilities for overseeing the overall
               effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of DOD-wide distribution
               activities--DOD has yet to issue a directive defining the process
               owner's authority, accountability, resources, and
               responsibility.^15 Additionally, during our current review,
               service and combatant command officials had concerns with U.S.
               Transportation Command expanding beyond its traditional roles and
               responsibilities for strategic distribution, believing that there
               should be a hand-off of responsibilities once assets arrive in
               theater.

               Furthermore, the diffused organization of DOD's logistics
               operations, including separate funding and management of resources
               and systems, complicates DOD's ability to adopt a coordinated and
               comprehensive management approach to developing and implementing
               joint theater logistics capabilities. Since 2003, a number of
               studies that have assessed DOD's logistics organization have
               recommended changes to DOD's organizational structure for
               providing joint logistics and supply support to military
               operations.^16 Some of these organizations have noted that control
               over resources is a critical issue to be addressed. For example,
               the Defense Science Board recommended creation of a Joint
               Logistics Command that would combine the missions of U.S.
               Transportation Command, DLA, and service logistics commands. The
               Center for Strategic and International Studies also suggested the
               creation of a departmentwide logistics command responsible for
               end-to-end supply chain operations. Regarding resource allocation,
               it further stated that resources should be organized, managed, and
               budgeted largely along military service lines, but in those
               instances where joint capability needs are not being met with
               service-centric processes, the Secretary must turn to joint
               processes and entities for their realization. The Lexington
               Institute, which also recommended creation of a U.S. Logistics
               Command at the four-star level, concluded that Title 10 can be
               used to prevent joint logistics transformation and
               interoperability and may need to be amended in order to create a
               Logistics Command. The Lexington Institute also concluded that
               existing funding mechanisms act as disincentives for joint
               logistics transformation and interoperability. The Defense
               Business Practice Implementation Board, while not agreeing with
               the idea of combining U.S. Transportation Command and DLA,
               recommended that DOD elevate leadership for supply chain
               integration by designating a new Under Secretary of Defense who
               would have authority to direct integration activities, including
               control over budget decisions affecting these two components and
               the military services. While we noted that transformational
               changes such as those proposed by these organizations may not be
               possible without amending existing laws, the scope of our review
               did not include an assessment of these proposals or what changes,
               if any, would require congressional action.

    ^14 [38]GAO-05-775 .

    ^15In May 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense redesignated the
    Commander, U.S. Transportation Command as DOD's Distribution Process
    Owner. Under this redesignation, the mission of the Distribution Process
    Owner is to oversee the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment
    of DOD-wide distribution activities and to establish concepts and
    operational frameworks relating to the planning and execution of DOD
    transportation operations.

    ^16For more information on these recommendations, see GAO, DOD's High-Risk
    Areas: Progress Made Implementing Supply Chain Management Recommendations,
    but Full Extent of Improvement Unknown, [39]GAO-07-234 (Washington, D.C.:
    Jan. 17, 2007).

               On the basis of our prior work on DOD's approach to business
               transformation,^17 we have stated that DOD needs to establish a
               chief management official at an appropriate level with the
               authority to be responsible and accountable for enterprisewide
               business transformation, including business operations related to
               supply chain management. Also, in our report on 21st century
               challenges confronting the federal government,^18 we stated that
               DOD faces significant challenges in accomplishing its
               transformation goals and making improvements in key business areas
               such as supply chain management. We also suggested in that report
               that decision makers may need to reexamine fundamental aspects of
               DOD's programs by considering issues such as whether current
               organizations are aligned and empowered to meet the demands of the
               new security environment as efficiently as possible and what kinds
               of economies of scale and improvements in delivery of support
               services would result from combining, realigning, or otherwise
               changing selected support functions, including logistics.

    ^17GAO, Defense Business Transformation: A Comprehensive Plan, Integrated
    Efforts, and Sustained Leadership Are Needed to Assure Success,
    [40]GAO-07-229T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2006).

    ^18GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
    Government, [41]GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2005).

               Third, DOD has not developed outcome-oriented performance measures
               for either joint theater logistics in general or for its specific
               initiatives. The supply chain management improvement plan lists
               potential metrics for joint theater logistics, but these have not
               been made into quantifiable, outcome-oriented measures. For
               example, the plan names visibility of logistics capabilities,
               logistics footprint,^19 and joint logistics and distribution
               planning improvement as three potential metrics that could be
               developed to track results and show the impact of joint theater
               logistics implementation. Other documents we reviewed, including a
               joint theater logistics implementation plan that was drafted in
               2006 but not finalized, recognize a need to identify metrics for
               the specific tasks required to achieve the joint processes
               supporting joint theater logistics. However, these metrics have
               not been identified as yet.

               Because DOD has lacked a coordinated and comprehensive approach to
               managing joint theater logistics, efforts to advance joint theater
               logistics across the department have been fragmented. While DOD
               has developed a series of initiatives to improve joint theater
               logistics, leadership on individual initiatives is dispersed among
               various DOD components. Many of these initiatives have been
               introduced by individual services, combatant commanders, and other
               DOD components without an overarching management approach for
               coordinating efforts. For example, of the four initiatives
               identified in the Focused Logistics Roadmap as supporting joint
               theater logistics, two have been submitted by U.S. Transportation
               Command, one has been developed by the Army, and another has been
               created by U.S. Joint Forces Command. During our field visits, DOD
               officials identified a number of other initiatives they had under
               way which they regarded as joint theater logistics. Specific
               examples of DOD's fragmented efforts to develop and implement
               joint theater logistics initiatives are discussed later in this
               report. This fragmented approach could lead to duplication of
               effort as well as capability gaps, diminishing the potential
               benefits of joint theater logistics. Without a coordinated and
               comprehensive approach that embodies sound management principles,
               DOD may be unable to fully implement initiatives and achieve this
               capability. As a result, DOD will have difficulty improving supply
               chain management in the areas of distribution and asset visibility
               associated with joint theater logistics.

    ^19Logistics footprint is the amount of personnel, spare parts, resources,
    and capabilities physically present and occupying space at a deployed
    location.

               Changes in DOD's Overall Logistics Strategy Hinder Development
    			  of Joint Theater Logistics

               Changes in DOD's overall logistics strategy have hampered the
               department's ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive
               management approach to joint theater logistics. These changes
               indicate that DOD has lacked a consistent vision and strategy
               regarding its efforts to transform logistics. Over the course of
               the last 10 years, DOD has made multiple alterations to its
               overall logistics strategy that have reflected differing visions
               about the future of the department's logistics system. Figure 1
               shows several of the strategic planning documents, including
               vision statements, doctrine, campaign plans, and roadmaps, that
               have addressed the future of DOD's logistics systems.

    Figure 1: Recent Strategic Planning Documents Addressing DOD Logistics

    Many of the strategic planning documents shown in figure 1 have addressed
    joint theater logistics, but the description of this concept has varied
    over time. For example, a strategic planning document derived from Joint
    Vision 2010 refers to "joint theater logistics command and control,"
    describing this focused logistics capability primarily as a concept to
    clarify lines of authority through a single entity responsible for
    logistics support in a joint warfighting environment. However, the Focused
    Logistics Joint Functional Concept appeared to change the focus of joint
    theater logistics from command and control to management. This document
    identified joint theater logistics as a capability aimed at developing
    tools to allow the joint force commander to effectively oversee management
    of logistics through the range of military operations and did not focus on
    clarifying lines of authority through a single logistics command and
    control organization. As part of this continuing evolution of DOD
    logistics strategies, the most recent efforts include (1) the "to be"
    roadmap, (2) the revision of the Focused Logistics Joint Functional
    Concept, and (3) the capabilities portfolio management test for joint
    logistics.

               o "To Be" Roadmap. As a follow-on to the 2005 "as is" Focused
               Logistics Roadmap, DOD is developing a "to be" roadmap. Because
               the "as is" roadmap indicated that key focused logistics
               capabilities would not be achieved by 2015, the Under Secretary of
               Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) directed the
               department to prepare a more rigorous "to be" roadmap that would
               identify the scope of logistics problems and capability gaps to be
               addressed, including joint theater logistics. According to DOD
               officials, the roadmap is intended to portray where the department
               is headed in the logistics area and how it will get there, monitor
               progress toward achieving its objectives, and institutionalize a
               continuous assessment process that links ongoing capability
               development, program reviews, and budgeting. The first edition of
               the "to be" roadmap was scheduled for completion in February 2007,
               in conjunction with the submission of the President's Budget for
               Fiscal Year 2008. However, DOD put the roadmap on hold pending the
               completion of other strategic initiatives. As of March 2007, DOD
               estimated it would complete the roadmap by March of 2008, after
               completion of its capabilities portfolio management test.
               Capabilities portfolio management is discussed below.

               o Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept. DOD is revising the
               Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, which could affect the
               future of joint theater logistics. In August 2006, Joint Staff
               officials told us that they no longer believe that the Focused
               Logistics Joint Functional Concept approved in 2003 accurately
               captures the capabilities needed by the warfighter, as they found
               it difficult to delineate the relationships among the seven
               focused logistics capabilities, including joint theater logistics.
               Consequently, the Joint Staff is currently rewriting the Focused
               Logistics Joint Functional Concept, which they expect to be
               finalized in the fall of 2007. According to Joint Staff officials,
               the revision will likely realign focused logistics capabilities,
               reducing the number of capabilities supporting joint logistics
               from seven to five. They have stated that joint theater logistics
               may cease to exist as a stand-alone capability area under the
               proposed realignment. However, they have said that the tenets of
               joint theater logistics would be retained in the remaining
               capability areas addressing the supply chain, and the functional
               areas associated with joint theater logistics would be integrated
               within the broader joint logistics portfolio. Once the Focused
               Logistics Joint Functional Concept paper is rewritten, DOD intends
               to complete the "to be" roadmap in alignment with the new joint
               logistics capability areas. Additionally, DOD's key joint doctrine
               document for joint logistics operations, Joint Publication 4-0, is
               being rewritten to reflect these changes.

               Prior to these changes, the Joint Staff's Joint Theater Logistics
               working group had begun developing an implementation plan for
               joint theater logistics. As part of this plan, the working group
               identified 13 capability areas in support of joint theater
               logistics.^20 For each capability, the working group planned to
               evaluate different processes used by the services and merge the
               common parts of these individual processes into a joint process to
               meet the commander's requirements. The working group finished
               identifying the joint processes for 3 of these potential
               capability areas that were considered most readily
               joint--ammunition, fuels, and mortuary affairs-- and began
               drafting the joint tasks and metrics associated with each. Drafts
               of these documents were completed prior to the summer of 2006, and
               the goal was to have the tasks identified for the 3 capability
               areas by July 2006. All the services have agreed to these three
               joint processes, and officials said that the next step is to
               complete task identification for all 13 capabilities. However,
               these efforts have been placed on hold pending DOD's realignment
               of the joint capability areas.

    ^20The 13 joint theater logistics capabilities areas identified in this
    process were: engineering; joint reception, staging, onward movement, and
    integration; joint expeditionary theater opening; joint contracting; joint
    deployment and distribution management; joint petroleum management; joint
    service support; joint financial management visibility; joint repair and
    maintenance; joint subsistence, food service support, and water
    management; mortuary affairs; joint theater conventional munitions
    management; and health service support.

               o Capabilities Portfolio Management. In a separate but related
               effort, the department has begun testing a new approach to
               managing the development of joint capabilities DOD-wide. This new
               approach is known as joint capabilities portfolio management. In
               September 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense selected joint
               logistics as one of four capability areas for testing capabilities
               portfolio management.^21 These experiments were initiated in
               response to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review that emphasized
               DOD's need to build on capabilities-based planning and management.
               According to DOD officials, the purpose of this test is to
               determine if DOD can make better leadership decisions by managing
               a portfolio of capabilities instead of managing systems and
               capabilities individually. Thus, this portfolio test is intended
               to enable senior leaders to consider trade-offs across previously
               stovepiped areas and to better understand the implications of
               investment decisions across competing priorities. The Joint Staff
               Director for Logistics is the test director for the joint
               logistics test case, which will include all capabilities required
               to project and sustain joint force operations, including supply
               chain operations. DOD will examine the capabilities and their
               initiatives in order to identify gaps or redundancies or determine
               where initiatives complement one another. According to Office of
               the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff officials, the
               initial results of the joint logistics capability portfolio
               management test were expected to be available in late spring 2007.
               The officials told us that these results will then be used to
               write the revision to the Focused Logistics Joint Functional
               Concept, which they said will enable them to complete the "to be"
               roadmap. Joint Staff officials are also awaiting the completion of
               the test prior to updating their joint theater logistics
               implementation plan.

               As DOD continues its attempt to articulate an overall strategy to
               guide logistic transformation, the development of the "to be"
               roadmap and other activities related to implementing joint theater
               logistics have been delayed due to these changes. In addition, the
               initiation of the capabilities portfolio management experiment has
               the potential to fundamentally alter the management of joint
               logistics. Until DOD decides on its vision and aligns its
               strategic direction, it will be unable to develop a coordinated
               and comprehensive approach to joint theater logistics. Moreover,
               it will be unable to ensure that it is achieving its desired
               improvements in theater distribution and asset visibility
               associated with joint theater logistics.

    ^21The other three test cases are Joint Command and Control, Joint Network
    Operations, and Battlespace Awareness.

               DOD Has Made Progress on Joint Theater Logistics Initiatives but
    			  Faces Challenges That Hinder Its Ability to Fully Realize the
    			  Benefits of These Efforts

               DOD components have several initiatives under way that are aimed
               at developing a joint theater logistics capability in the area of
               distribution and supply support. Our analysis showed that the
               current initiatives generally address five areas of distribution
               and supply support to a joint force commander. Some of the
               initiatives have been specifically designated by DOD as supporting
               joint theater logistics, and other initiatives supporting this
               capability were identified during our field visits with DOD
               components. Although progress has been made on some initiatives,
               DOD faces challenges in fully developing and implementing these
               initiatives. Table 1 summarizes the five areas of distribution and
               supply support, the related joint theater logistics initiatives,
               and the challenges we identified during our review.

    Table 1: Challenges Hindering DOD's Ability to Fully Implement Joint
    Theater Logistics Initiatives

    Area of distribution    Related joint theater    Challenges hindering full
    and supply support      logistics initiatives    implementation
    Receiving and           Joint Task Force-Port       o Potential redundancy
    processing a large      Opening                     of efforts
    influx of supplies at                               o Sourcing and use of
    the beginning of a                                  personnel
    military operation                                  o Command and control
                                                           issues
    Management of supplies  Joint Deployment            o Noninteroperable
    moving across the       Distribution Operations     information technology
    distribution system     Center                      systems
                                                           o Container management
    Theaterwide             Theater and                 o Fragmented theater
    coordination of surface Expeditionary               logistics operations
    transportation assets   Sustainment Commands,       o Lack of information
                               Director of Mobility        technology tools
                               Forces-Surface              o Insufficient numbers
                                                           of skilled personnel
                                                           o Unclear position in
                                                           command structure
                                                           o Command and control
                                                           issues
                                                           o Potential
                                                           duplication of efforts
    Consolidation of supply Node Management and         o Funding of
    storage and shipping    Deployable Depot, Joint     inventories
    activities              Regional Inventory and      o Security concerns
                               Material Management,
                               Theater Consolidation
                               and Shipping Point
    Exercise of command and Joint Experimental          o Statutory
    control over joint      Deployment and Support      requirements for
    logistics functions                                 logistics support
                                                           o Exercising directive
                                                           authority for
                                                           logistics
                                                           o Operational and
                                                           financial
                                                           considerations

    Source: GAO analysis.

    Unless DOD successfully addresses these challenges, the initiatives are
    not likely to significantly improve the ability of a joint force commander
    to harness the diffuse logistics resources and systems that exist within
    the department and effectively and efficiently direct logistics functions,
    including distribution and supply support activities, across the theater
    of operations to accomplish an assigned mission. Moreover, without
    addressing such challenges, DOD is likely to continue to experience some
    of the same types of distribution and asset visibility problems that have
    occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

    New Port Opening Capability Faces Implementation Challenges

    DOD has developed an initiative to improve its port opening capability but
    faces implementation challenges because of concerns with potential
    redundancy of efforts, staffing, and command and control issues. The
    capability to rapidly open a new port in a theater to receive and process
    a large influx of equipment and supplies is critical during the initial
    stages of a military operation, ranging from humanitarian missions to
    major combat operations. A rapid port opening capability provides the
    joint force commander with an expeditionary force to conduct an airfield
    or distribution assessment, establish initial command and control, set up
    critical in-transit visibility and communications systems, and establish
    movement control over distribution operations. However, in the early
    stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. forces did not deploy a sufficient
    port opening capability that was needed in Kuwait to successfully
    establish initial supply and distribution operations. For example, we have
    previously reported that because DOD's priority was for combat forces to
    move into the theater first, logistics support forces to establish an
    initial theater distribution system were either deleted from the
    deployment plan or shifted back in the deployment timeline.^22 As a
    result, logistics personnel could not effectively support the increasing
    numbers of combat troops moving into theater, and the shortage of
    logistics support resulted in delays in the processing of supplies as well
    as backlogs. According to Army officials, these early decisions regarding
    port opening capabilities led to problems in sustaining a large influx and
    flow of materiel during early operations. The Army's deployed port opening
    capability could not support more than a brigade-sized element, which
    resulted in a number of theater distribution problems.

      DOD Has Established a New Port Opening Unit

    To improve DOD's rapid port-opening capability, U.S. Transportation
    Command began developing the Joint Task Force-Port Opening initiative in
    2005, and the Secretary of Defense approved a standing Execution Order for
    the initiative in May 2006. As the Distribution Process Owner, U.S.
    Transportation Command wanted a capability to rapidly extend the
    distribution network into a theater and facilitate theater distribution.
    The mission of the joint task force is to rapidly open a port and manage
    initial distribution operations. Joint Task Force-Port Opening is
    comprised of air and surface elements that train and work together, are
    deployable in 12 hours, and are to be deployed for approximately 45-60
    days before being replaced by follow-on forces. According to U.S.
    Transportation Command, Joint Task Force-Port Opening is designed to
    rapidly establish and initially operate a port, facilitating more
    effective movement of materiel within the theater by arranging cargo just
    off the airfield in a logical pattern and creating a forward distribution
    point, or node,^23 within 10 kilometers. The capability was initially
    validated for an aerial port of debarkation, and development of a similar
    capability for a seaport of debarkation has begun.^24 Joint Task
    Force-Port Opening bypassed the Joint Capabilities Integration and
    Development System process initially but is now going through an
    accelerated review.^25 U.S. Transportation Command's goal is to have three
    Joint Task Force-Port Opening units, each comprised of an air and a
    surface element, which would facilitate a cycle allowing for an active, a
    training, and a reconstituting unit at any given time. Currently, there is
    one surface element at Fort Dix, New Jersey, that is staffed by
    individuals from multiple Army Reserve units and filled through a request
    for forces that was originally set to expire in June 2007. The air element
    is provided by the Air Force's existing Contingency Response Groups, and
    the current group is located at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, near
    the surface element at Fort Dix.

    ^22 [42]GAO-04-305R and [43]GAO-05-775 .

    ^23A distribution node exists wherever materiel arrives in the
    distribution system via transportation assets such as air, surface, or
    ground transport.

    ^24According to U.S. Transportation Command, the Joint Task Force-Port
    Opening seaport of debarkation team is in the final stages of staffing its
    concept of operations for U.S. Transportation Command components, U.S.
    Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff, and the services. The concept has
    also been briefed to the geographic combatant commanders' staffs. U.S.
    Transportation Command officials stated that planning and development of
    the seaport of debarkation training concept and force sourcing activities
    began in April 2007, with a goal of having forces to train by late summer
    of 2007.

    ^25DOD uses the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System as
    an analytical process to identify, assess, and prioritize joint military
    requirements in support of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and
    its Functional Capabilities Boards. The purpose of the analysis process is
    to identify capability gaps and redundancies, determine the attributes of
    a capability or combination of capabilities that would resolve the gaps,
    identify approaches for implementation, and assess the cost and
    operational effectiveness of the joint force for each of the identified
    approaches.

      Army Officials Have Raised Concerns About the Port Opening Unit

    During our field visits with combatant commands and the military services,
    we found that while there was agreement on the need for an effective
    port-opening capability, DOD components had differing views on how to
    address the shortfall in this capability that became apparent during
    Operation Iraqi Freedom. In particular, senior Army officials we
    interviewed--to include officials at the Office of the Deputy Chief of
    Staff for Logistics, Army Reserve, and Army Combined Arms Support
    Command--expressed concerns regarding (1) the potential redundancy between
    the Joint Task Force-Port Opening initiative and their own service-led
    efforts, (2) the personnel resources devoted to the task force, and (3)
    command and control issues. Until the challenges associated with
    implementing this initiative are resolved, DOD will continue to struggle
    to develop and implement an effective and integrated port opening
    capability.

    Army officials questioned the need for Joint Task Force-Port Opening in
    view of existing and emerging capabilities within the Army. Some Army
    officials we interviewed asserted that the Army already has an adequate
    port opening capability but it was not deployed properly during the
    initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom.^26 These officials consider
    Joint Task Force-Port Opening to be redundant of existing capabilities.
    Other Army officials stated that while DOD's port opening capability has
    been deficient, the Army's ongoing efforts to enhance its expeditionary
    theater opening capability will address this shortfall. Military officials
    have said that the Army's expeditionary theater opening capability extends
    beyond the early entry capability of Joint Task Force-Port Opening, and
    includes a range of key capabilities critical to larger theater opening
    efforts. In the view of Army officials, port opening is a subset of this
    larger effort, and consequently Joint Task Force-Port Opening will
    ultimately fall short of the capability they believe is required and will
    need to be integrated into a larger theater opening framework. Army
    officials also had some concerns about the effectiveness of Joint Task
    Force-Port Opening across the range of military operations. Some officials
    noted that Joint Task Force-Port Opening could become quickly overwhelmed
    by a large operation and that additional Army logistics personnel would
    have to be deployed to supplement the task force's operations.

    ^26Marine Corps officials noted that their service has its own port
    opening capability through its special purpose Marine Air-Ground Task
    Forces.

    A second area of concern to Army officials is the personnel requirements
    to staff the Joint Task Force-Port Opening surface element. Army officials
    told us they were unable to use active duty personnel to fill the surface
    element due to commitments to other operations, so they turned to the
    reserve component to fill these positions. However, Army Reserve officials
    have questioned the sustainability of the task force using reservists.
    These officials noted that placing Army Reserve personnel on standby for
    potential Joint Task Force-Port Opening deployment uses up the
    mobilization time of these reservists without actually deploying the
    force. The Secretary of Defense recently extended the provisional status
    of Joint Task Force-Port Opening due to competing priorities for funding
    and personnel. As a result, the Army Reserve will continue the interim
    manning arrangement of the task force until the summer of 2008 rather than
    the summer of 2007 as initially planned.

    A final area of concern that emerged from our discussions with Army
    officials was command and control over Joint Task Force-Port Opening. Army
    officials raised questions about who would have the authority to deploy
    the task force and who would direct its operations once it deploys.
    According to Army officials, such command and control issues must be
    resolved before Joint Task Force-Port Opening can be effectively
    integrated into military operations. A theater opening exercise conducted
    by the Army in November 2006 revealed that these issues had not been
    resolved. U.S. Transportation Command officials, however, do not identify
    command and control as an issue regarding the task force. They have stated
    that the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, would have the authority
    to direct the Joint Task Force-Port Opening into the theater and that the
    joint force commander may exert command and control while the unit is
    deployed.

    DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Supply Distribution, but Asset Visibility and
    Container Management Challenges Remain

    DOD has taken steps to improve the management of supplies moving across
    the distribution system, particularly through the creation of Joint
    Deployment Distribution Operations Centers, but challenges remain in
    achieving asset visibility across the theater and in managing containers.
    We have previously reported that the defense logistics systems used by
    various components to order, track, and account for supplies are not well
    integrated and do not provide the information needed to effectively manage
    theater distribution and provide asset visibility.^27 Limitations in these
    capabilities have led to difficulties in the logistics planning process
    and the creation of potential double orders for the same supply part, and
    could impact readiness of forces.

    ^27 [44]GAO-05-775 .

      DOD Has Established Joint Operations Centers in the Geographic Combatant
      Commands

    To address deficiencies in the management of theater supply distribution,
    DOD has created Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers within
    the geographic combatant commands. The mission of the operations centers
    is to improve intertheater and intratheater supply distribution by
    integrating the flow of military forces and supplies and materiel to
    sustain U.S. forces. The operations centers are designed to incorporate
    representatives from DOD components, such as U.S. Transportation Command,
    DLA, and the military services, who can provide a knowledgeable connection
    to logistics supply centers in the United States and facilitate the
    distribution of supplies to the theater. According to DOD officials, the
    Joint Staff and U.S. Joint Forces Command are currently working to
    incorporate the operations centers into joint doctrine, which will result
    in updating numerous existing DOD publications.

    Initiated by U.S. Transportation Command, the first Joint Deployment
    Distribution Operations Center was established in Kuwait under U.S.
    Central Command. In addition to managing the coordination between services
    and logistics agencies and improving asset visibility as supplies enter
    the theater, operations center personnel also analyze distribution
    problems, identify causes, and propose solutions. DOD officials have
    stated that the operations center was successful at improving the
    management of supplies moving across the distribution system and achieving
    cost savings. For example, U.S. Transportation Command officials said the
    operations center was responsible for shifting from the use of airlift to
    sealift to transport supplies, which reduces costly airlift requirements
    and frees up airlift capacity; coordinating the movement of personnel from
    their point of origin to final destination rather than through
    intermediate locations with time-consuming layovers (a concept referred to
    as "single ticket"); and improving distribution management by facilitating
    the use of pure-packed pallets and containers,^28 developing a container
    management plan, and improving the return of Army materiel from the
    theater. According to data provided by U.S. Transportation Command, the
    activities of the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center have
    resulted in total cost avoidance and savings of $343 million between
    fiscal years 2004 and 2007.

    ^28Pure-packing is the consolidation of cargo for shipment to a single
    user.

    On the basis of the successes attributed to the Joint Deployment
    Distribution Operations Center in Kuwait, DOD established new operations
    centers in the other geographic combatant commands. The size, structure,
    and organizational placement of these operations centers vary across the
    combatant commands. For example, the U.S. Central and European Commands
    have the largest operations centers, with approximately 60 and 55
    personnel, respectively. The other centers are considerably smaller with a
    core staff ranging from 7 to 12 personnel. However, the operations centers
    are considered "scaleable"--that is, they can be increased in size as
    needed to support a military exercise or operation.

      Lack of System Interoperability Has Impeded Asset Visibility

    Senior military commanders in Kuwait told us that despite the benefits
    obtained from the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center,
    effective management of supply distribution across the theater has been
    hindered by ongoing challenges in achieving asset visibility. They
    attributed these challenges to a lack of interoperability among
    information technology systems, making it difficult to obtain timely and
    accurate information on assets in the theater. Interoperability refers to
    the ability of different systems to communicate effectively, including
    sharing information. Interoperable systems providing effective asset
    visibility can enable commanders and logisticians to have a common
    operating picture concerning the location, status, and identity of
    equipment and supplies across a theater. According to DOD doctrine, asset
    visibility across the supply chain and a common operating picture are both
    key enablers for joint theater logistics. In our previous reports, we
    stated that DOD lacks the systems integration necessary to provide total
    asset visibility because of the duplicative and stovepiped nature of DOD's
    systems environment.^29

    During our field visit to Kuwait, officials from the 377th Theater Support
    Command and 143rd Transportation Command said they must use manual
    workarounds to overcome the problems caused by noninteroperable
    information systems. These officials estimate that their staff spends half
    their time pulling data from information systems, e-mailing it around for
    validation or coordination, consolidating it on a spreadsheet, and
    analyzing it to make management decisions. In January 2007, a joint
    assessment conducted by several DOD components at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait,
    found that information technology capabilities need to be improved to
    achieve visibility of materiel in transit and of transportation resources
    required to optimize distribution. The assessment reported that separate
    movement control battalions in Kuwait and Iraq use both automated and
    handwritten transportation movement requests to track air and ground
    movements. Consequently, to capture the total theater movement picture,
    both movement control battalions must consolidate manual and automated
    data into spreadsheets. Neither movement battalion has total visibility
    over what is occurring in both Kuwait and Iraq. Nor do they have total
    visibility of the surface transportation resources necessary to optimize
    the distribution of resources. The movement control battalions use e-mail
    on a daily basis to coordinate each other's projected movement requests
    and planned commitment of transportation assets.

    ^29GAO, Defense Inventory: Improvements Needed in DOD's Implementation of
    Its Long-Term Strategy for Total Asset Visibility of Its Inventory,
    [45]GAO-05-15 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2004) and GAO, DOD Business
    Systems Modernization: Billions Being Invested without Adequate Oversight,
    [46]GAO-05-381 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005).

      Problems With Container Management Have Continued

    DOD also has challenges with container management that hinder asset
    visibility and impede its ability to effectively manage logistics
    operations and costs. These challenges include (1) the application of
    radio frequency identification technology on containers in the supply
    chain, (2) compliance with container management processes, and (3) the
    return of commercial containers to maritime carriers. We discussed some of
    these same problems in a prior report.^30

    Most supply items shipped by surface ships, excluding large end items such
    as vehicles, are consolidated and packed into 20- or 40-foot sea-land
    containers (such as those shown in fig. 2) that are owned by the
    government or commercial maritime carriers.

    ^30 [47]GAO-04-305R .

    Figure 2: Military Storage Containers in Kuwait (October 2006)

    In 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics) directed the use of active radio frequency identification
    technology^31 on all consolidated shipments moving to, from, or between
    overseas locations. These shipments are to be tagged in order to provide
    global in-transit visibility. U.S. Central Command has emphasized the need
    to use radio frequency technology to improve asset visibility in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. In January 2005, the Commander, Coalition Forces Land
    Component Command, directed that all containers moving to, from, and
    within the theater have active radio frequency tags written with complete
    contents detail. However, more than a year later, inadequately tagged
    containers continued to move throughout the theater. Consequently, the
    Commander issued an updated radio frequency tag policy in October 2006,
    instituting a phased-in approach for compliance according to the following
    timeline: 50 percent compliance by November 1, 2006; 75 percent by
    December 1, 2006; and 100 percent by January 1, 2007. However, despite
    this updated policy, inadequate radio frequency tagging of containers
    continues to be a problem.

    ^31Radio frequency identification technology is a data input system that
    consists of (1) a transponder, generally referred to as a tag; (2) a tag
    reader, also known as an interrogator, that reads the tag using a radio
    signal; (3) centralized data processing equipment; and (4) a method of
    communication between the reader and the computer. The interrogator sends
    a signal to the tag, prompting the tag to respond. The battery-powered tag
    sends a signal to the interrogator with information about the container,
    pallet, or item to which it is attached. The information is forwarded to
    the central data processing equipment where it is stored and can be used
    to provide visibility over inventory items as they move throughout the
    supply chain.

    U.S Central Command officials, including general officers, identified a
    number of reasons why DOD continues to struggle with the application of
    radio frequency identification technology in the theater supply chain.
    Some problems include shipping containers without radio frequency tags or
    with tags that are broken, tags with incorrect information, or tags that
    are rewritten but not cross-referenced to the original shipping
    information. Based on tracking charts from the Container Management
    Element,^32 from the period of August 15, 2006, to April 9, 2007, 15
    percent of the containers that passed northbound through the NAVISTAR^33
    distribution point had no radio frequency tag. Another 20 percent of the
    containers had broken tags or tags that did not match the container
    contents.^34 In addition, a radio frequency tag must be created to have
    the container's shipping information and contents entered into an
    inventory software system that then uploads the information to the DOD
    in-transit visibility server. When a container moves between
    transportation nodes--the airport, seaport, Army general support
    warehouse, Consolidation Receiving and Shipping Point, Defense
    Distribution Depot, Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point, NAVISTAR, or
    forward-located nodes in Iraq--it might require creating a new tag to
    upload new information to the in-transit visibility server. A container
    may require a new tag if its current tag is broken or found to contain
    inaccurate data or when a container is opened and repacked. The problem
    arises when the new radio frequency tag, with its newly generated number
    that is assigned by the local inventory software system, does not
    reference back to the original tag number. As a result, the requesting
    customer might look up the original tracking number in the in-transit
    visibility server and no longer have visibility of the shipment.

    ^32This element is under the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations
    Center.

    ^33NAVISTAR is the point of crossing from Kuwait into Iraq.

    ^34These averages exclude a gap from November 13 through November 30,
    2006, for which no data are available.

    Noncompliance with container management processes established by U.S.
    Central Command can limit asset visibility of supplies. Officials in U.S.
    Central Command's Container Management Element use an Army Web-based
    central database to track container ownership, location, condition, and
    use, and to provide visibility of all containers in theater. For the
    system to effectively track containers, the containers must be properly
    "in-gated"--recorded entering a transportation node--and
    "out-gated"--recorded leaving a transportation node. In a process similar
    to the commercial shipper tracking systems used by United Parcel Service
    or Federal Express, a container is in-gated when it first arrives at a
    location to document that it has been received, according to Container
    Management Element officials. Upon departure from that location, the
    container is out-gated to indicate that it has been shipped. Container
    Management Element officials stated that the failure of transportation
    nodes to properly in-gate and out-gate containers as they pass through
    distribution channels is a significant problem hampering asset visibility
    in theater because tagged containers can become "lost" in theater, with no
    one able to track the location of the container or its contents. In
    addition, if the container is commercially owned and not returned to the
    carrier within a specified time period, detention charges begin
    accumulating.

    In the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, commercial containers were
    flowing into the theater but were not always tracked once in Iraq, and
    many of the commercial containers moving into Iraq were not quickly
    returned to maritime carriers.^35 In July 2005, the Army Audit Agency
    reported that container detention charges were continuing to accrue at
    about $15 million per month. ^36 To improve management and accountability
    over containers and to address the growing detention charges, U.S.
    Transportation Command and the Military Surface Deployment and
    Distribution Command developed a theater container management process and
    established the Container Management Element--a unit responsible for
    tracking and providing management oversight of containers in the theater.
    In addition, the Army decided to purchase ("buy out") commercial
    containers to reduce monthly detention charges. According to information
    provided by the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, the
    Army had purchased approximately 28,832 containers at a total cost of
    approximately $203 million, as of December 2006. Container Management
    Element officials told us that through a combination of container buyouts
    and increased oversight, detention charges decreased from approximately
    $10.7 million per month in December 2005 to $3.7 million per month in
    October 2006.

    ^35Containers were not returned for a number of reasons, primarily because
    the military's resources were dedicated to tactical operations and because
    soldiers resourcefully made use of empty containers for such purposes as
    storage, perimeter barriers, and housing.

    ^36U.S. Army Audit Agency: Asset Visibility and Container
    Management--Operation Iraqi Freedom, Audit Report: A-2005-0197-ALE
    (Alexandria, Va.: July 5, 2005). As of May 2004, only 6 of the 37
    transportation nodes in Iraq could read radio frequency tags.

    Although DOD has been able to reduce monthly detention charges on
    commercial containers, it is still experiencing problems with retaining
    visibility over containers. As of April 30, 2007, the central container
    database showed that 54,390 containers--or more than one-third of all
    containers in the U.S. Central Command theater--were considered to be
    lost. Furthermore, according to container management officials, DOD's
    problem with commercial container detention charges is shifting from Iraq
    to Afghanistan. Efforts to curtail the movement of commercial containers
    into Iraq have been largely successful, according to information provided
    by container management officials. For example, of the 13,440 containers
    sent to Iraq from June 6, 2006, to October 17, 2006, only 19 were
    commercially owned. However, 4,901 (85 percent) of the 5,752 containers
    sent into Afghanistan during the same period were commercial containers.
    Container buyout data for December 2006--the most recent data
    available--show that 4,748 (67 percent) of the 7,038 containers purchased
    were in Afghanistan. According to container management officials, this
    problem stems from a general shortage of government-owned containers in
    the theater and the lack of a container transloading operation for
    materiel shipped into Afghanistan that would be similar to the one at the
    port of Kuwait for materiel going to Iraq.^37 Items being shipped by sea
    to Afghanistan enter through the port of Karachi in Pakistan since
    Afghanistan is landlocked. According to container management officials,
    establishing a transloading operation in Pakistan would be difficult
    because of restrictions placed on U.S. military personnel in Pakistan.
    These officials said that commercial containers en route to Afghanistan
    begin to accumulate detention charges prior to reaching their final
    destination because of the time required for trucks to cover the difficult
    inland route.

    ^37Transloading is the unloading of a commercially owned container and
    repacking its contents into a government-owned container.

    Separate Organizations Are Being Established to Coordinate Surface
    Transportation

    DOD components have initiatives underway to better coordinate the surface
    transportation of supply items that are distributed across a military
    theater of operations, but these efforts face challenges to their
    implementation and may duplicate some functions. During the initial phase
    of Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD faced problems with prioritizing and
    managing its transportation assets across the theater. According to a 2005
    RAND study,^38 U.S. forces suffered from both a shortage of transportation
    assets--primarily trucks--and the fragmented control and management of
    these assets across the different echelons of theater command. While RAND
    reported that exact data on the total truck shortage were not available,
    the estimated ratio of Army personnel to medium truck equivalents was 194
    to 1 at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom compared to approximately
    73 to 1 in Operation Desert Storm. In addition, the distances from
    logistics operating bases to support combat operations were greater--344
    miles to Baghdad, versus 210 miles to the farthest incursion during
    Operation Desert Storm. The Army Division Support Command, Corps Support
    Command, Area Support Group, and Theater Support Command each controlled a
    portion of the truck assets within the theater. Consequently, there was no
    single distribution organization to advocate for truck assets during the
    force planning process, which may account for the shortage of trucks, and
    no single organization deployed in theater with the authority to rebalance
    transportation assets across the theater and integrate and synchronize the
    surface deployment and distribution movements in support of the
    commander's priorities.

      Sustainment Commands and Surface Mobility Directorate Are Aimed at
      Coordinating Surface Transportation

    The Army and U.S. Transportation Command have separate initiatives aimed
    at addressing these surface transportation problems. As part of its
    modular transformation, the Army is creating new organizations--Theater
    Sustainment Commands and Expeditionary Sustainment Commands--that are
    aimed in part at centralizing control over Army surface transportation
    assets within a theater of operations. Under the Army's emerging
    sustainment doctrine, the objective of the Theater Sustainment Command is
    to provide the Army with a single headquarters responsible for operational
    command and control of logistics operations throughout the theater. Its
    functions include theater opening, materiel management, and distribution.
    This command would typically operate in a rear area away from frontline
    military operations. Theater Sustainment Commands replace the Army's
    existing Theater Support Commands and are designed to plan, prepare,
    rapidly deploy, and execute operational logistics within the theater of
    operations.^39 Expeditionary Sustainment Commands, a forward extension of
    the Theater Sustainment Commands, have a primary role of managing regional
    logistics operations in support of the joint task force commander.
    According to U.S. Central Command officials, the 1st Theater Sustainment
    Command and the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command are scheduled to
    deploy to Kuwait and Iraq, respectively, in the summer of 2007. In
    addition, the 8th Theater Sustainment Command has been established in U.S.
    Pacific Command, Hawaii, and the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command is
    operational in Korea.

    ^38RAND Corporation, Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi
    Freedom: Battlefield Logistics and Effects on Operations, Contract No.
    DASW01-C-0003 (Santa Monica, Calif.: 2005).

    In a separate initiative, U.S. Transportation Command created a new
    organization, the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface, to integrate
    surface deployment and distribution priorities set by the joint force
    commander. According to U.S. Transportation Command, this initiative will
    enable DOD to better synchronize and direct the movement and coordination
    of surface transportation resources to ensure uninterrupted distribution
    of materiel from air and sea ports of debarkation to destinations within
    the theater. In addition, U.S. Transportation Command officials believe
    that theater surface distribution will benefit from establishing an
    organization that has a capability similar to that provided by the
    Director of Mobility Forces-Air for theater air distribution.^40 The
    proposed responsibilities of the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface
    include coordinating, prioritizing, and executing surface transportation
    movement requests. In Kuwait, U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Central
    Command established a pilot Director of Mobility Forces-Surface in August
    2006 and completed an initial assessment of the pilot in February 2007. In
    addition, this initiative has been tested during exercises in Korea, most
    recently in March 2007.

    ^39Certain subordinate command elements under the replaced Theater Support
    Command also will be eliminated, such as the Transportation Command,
    Transportation Command Element, and Transportation Group. The Division
    Support Command, Corps Support Command, and Area Support Group have also
    been eliminated from the Army force structure.

    ^40According to U.S. Transportation Command officials, after Operation
    Desert Shield/Desert Storm the Air Force realized that it did not have the
    right mix of skills and capabilities to integrate the air mobility mission
    into the combined air operations center of the combined joint forces air
    component command. In response, the Air Force developed the air mobility
    division and its command structure, including the Director of Mobility
    Forces-Air, to provide this strategic-to-theater integration of
    distribution.

      Initiatives Face Implementation Challenges

    The Army and U.S. Transportation Command face a number of challenges in
    the implementation of their initiatives. While the Army's Theater and
    Expeditionary Sustainment Commands were designed to be the single
    headquarters responsible for operational command and control of logistics
    operations throughout the theater, the fragmentation of logistics
    operations in theater may hinder it from achieving this objective. More
    specifically, according to U.S. Central Command officials, the 1st Theater
    Sustainment Command will be placed under the Commander, Coalition Forces
    Land Component, in Kuwait. As the forward extension to Theater Sustainment
    Commands, Expeditionary Sustainment Commands are designed to operate under
    the command and support of the Theater Sustainment Command in order to
    provide a single command for logistics theaterwide. However, according to
    U.S. Central Command officials, the deployment order for the 316th
    Expeditionary Sustainment Command has placed it under the operational
    control of the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq. While still attached
    to the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, the placement of the 316th
    Expeditionary Sustainment Command under Multi-National Forces-Iraq will
    likely continue the fragmentation of logistics operations like surface
    distribution that the new command structure was designed to eliminate. The
    Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component, is a (Three Star) Lieutenant
    General, and the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, is a (Four Star)
    General and the highest ranking officer in the theater, responsible for
    U.S. operations in Iraq. As a result, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command
    will likely be responsible for logistics operations in Kuwait and the rest
    of the theater, while the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command will be
    responsible for logistics operations in Iraq. In addition, the 19th
    Expeditionary Sustainment Command in Daegu, South Korea, is under the
    operational control of the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, rather than the
    8th Theater Sustainment Command in U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii. The
    deployment of these new Army logistics support units under command and
    control structures that differ from their original design raises questions
    about the efficacy of the emerging Army sustainment command doctrine and
    its general applicability to joint military operations conducted within a
    combatant command theater.

    Army officials also raised concerns about whether the sustainment commands
    would have the information technology tools and personnel necessary to
    effectively and efficiently carry out their mission. They said these
    commands were designed to be smaller than their predecessors based on an
    assumption that certain information technology tools would be available to
    enable the commands to operate with fewer personnel. However, some of
    these information technology tools have experienced problems during their
    development that have limited their capability or have delayed their
    fielding. For example:

               o The next generation Mobile Tracking System is a satellite
               tracking system for trucks that in its most advanced configuration
               is also able to read and relay information from radio frequency
               identification tags attached to containers and pallets traveling
               in a supply convoy. This technology could provide near real-time
               visibility and location data on supplies moving through the
               theater by surface transportation. However, the technology is
               expensive and few trucks are equipped with this latest
               configuration.

               o Battle Command Sustainment Support System processes a large
               amount of logistics data and can facilitate decision making by
               providing a means for commanders to determine the sustainability
               of current and planned operations. The system provides a
               capability for tracking supply convoys moving through an area of
               operation. However, it lacks the integration to produce and send a
               cargo manifest that can be linked to an in-transit visibility
               device for tracking.

               o TransLog Web was designed to serve as the single point of entry
               for transportation movement requests. This Web-based program could
               serve as a transportation planning and movement tracking tool to
               assist movement managers in coordinating supplies and
               transportation assets. However, the system (1) is not used by all
               movement control teams, (2) does not provide visibility of the
               cargo's description beyond the supply class, and (3) does not feed
               information to the Global Transportation Network.^41

               o Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movements
               System II is expected to enhance and improve the efficiency and
               effectiveness of support planning needed to deploy and redeploy
               forces and equipment; improve the visibility of assets; and
               enhance cargo and passenger receiving, controlling, and shipping.
               However, the system is not scheduled to be fully operational until
               around 2010, and while the Army justified the system based on its
               joint service application, two services (the Air Force and the
               Marine Corps) have stated that they do not intend to use it.^42

    ^41The Global Transportation Network is DOD's designated in-transit
    visibility system that collects, integrates, and distributes
    transportation information to combatant commanders, the military services,
    and other DOD customers and provides U.S. Transportation Command with the
    ability to perform command and control operations, planning and analysis,
    and business operations in tailoring customer requirements throughout the
    requirements process.

               According to Army officials, the shortcomings in available
               information tools have resulted in the need for additional staff
               in the sustainment commands. They explained that problems with
               data and a lack of system interoperability have required the
               commands to use manual, ad hoc techniques to validate, coordinate,
               and analyze data for decision making, and these efforts are
               cumbersome and manpower intensive. In Kuwait, the 377th Theater
               Support Command, including subordinate commands such as the 143rd
               Transportation Command, controlled an organization of several
               thousand personnel. By comparison, the Theater Sustainment Command
               that will replace it was designed to be staffed with several
               hundred people. According to Army officials, if the Army had all
               the information technology tools in place that have been promised
               and factored into the design of the new sustainment commands, it
               might be possible to accomplish its mission with the smaller
               staff. To meet the additional personnel requirements of the
               sustainment commands, U.S. Central Command issued a request for
               additional forces, which increased Theater Sustainment Command
               staffing from 155 to 461 personnel and Expeditionary Sustainment
               Command staffing from 254 to 378 personnel. Furthermore, Army
               officials noted that the leaner staffing of the new commands
               places a premium on obtaining personnel with the right expertise
               and skills. For example, assigned staff will need to be fully
               networked with the national inventory control points, able to
               quickly develop support relationships, and determine the best
               method of meeting requirements. They must be proficient in tapping
               into the Army's standard supply system, prepositioned stocks, host
               nation support, and contracting. The officials expressed some
               concern about the probability of getting personnel with those
               skills and expertise on a recurring rotational basis.

               The Director of Mobility Forces-Surface has also faced
               implementation challenges. During exercises in Korea, the new
               organization has had difficulty establishing its position within
               the U. S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command structure. In
               each exercise, the directorate has been placed under a different
               organization. For example, it has been tested under the
               operational control of the Joint Force Support Component Command
               and in the Joint Operations Fusion Center. U.S. Forces Korea
               officials said that finding the proper niche for Director of
               Mobility Forces-Surface is further complicated because the South
               Korean military is responsible for surface mobility of the
               Combined Forces on the Korean peninsula. During the 2007 exercise,
               the directorate was placed in the Combined Transportation Movement
               Center, which is co-chaired by the South Korean military.

    ^42GAO, DOD Systems Modernization: Uncertain Joint Use and Marginal Expected
    Value of Military Asset Deployment System Warrant Reassessment of Planned
    Investment, GAO-06-171 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).

               Moreover, the initial assessment of the Director of Mobility
               Forces-Surface pilot in Kuwait by U.S. Transportation Command and
               U.S. Central Command indicated that the initiative faces a number
               of challenges related to (1) command and control, (2) availability
               of information technology tools, (3) securing personnel with the
               expertise and knowledge to use the information technology tools
               that are available, and (4) potential duplication of
               responsibilities with other Army organizations. More specifically,
               the assessment found that while the pilot had made progress, the
               Director of Mobility Forces-Surface:

               o was assigned to the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander,
               whose authority is currently restricted to the Kuwait Joint
               Operations Area, which impedes a U.S. Central Command-wide focus
               on surface distribution;

               o lacked adequate information technology tools to ensure the
               visibility of materiel in transit and availability of surface
               transportation assets required to optimize surface distribution
               across the theater;

               o lacked personnel with the right skill sets or training to take
               advantage of the technology tools that were available; and

               o provided functions that could overlap with those of the Army's
               1st Theater Sustainment Command.

               Regarding this last point, an Army analysis also showed a
               potential for duplication of efforts. Specifically, the Army
               reviewed 123 proposed responsibilities of the Director of Mobility
               Forces-Surface and found that most of the responsibilities are
               covered by the Army's sustainment commands and service component
               commands. The Army's analysis showed that most other proposed
               Director of Mobility Forces-Surface responsibilities were covered
               by the geographic combatant command.

               The U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Central Command's
               assessment also noted that "unity of effort" with regard to the
               Director of Mobility Forces-Surface was lacking and that some key
               senior leaders had not yet embraced the initiative's capabilities.
               In response to the assessment, U.S. Central Command discontinued
               the pilot in May 2007, until some of these issues are resolved.

    			  Consolidated Storage and Shipping Arrangements Have Been
    			  Implemented on a Limited Scale

               DOD components have begun several initiatives to consolidate
               storage and shipping sites located in a joint theater, but these
               efforts have been implemented on a limited scale and we found
               potential opportunities for further consolidation during our
               fieldwork in Kuwait. DOD currently uses multiple storage and
               shipping sites within a theater to supply items to its customers.
               In some cases, these sites may carry the same supply items and
               ship to the same customers. Operating multiple sites requires
               additional facilities, personnel, contract services, and
               inventories and also results in extra movements of stock,
               inefficient use of surface and air distribution assets, increased
               opportunities for information processing errors, and the loss of
               asset visibility. Consolidating storage and shipping arrangements
               can help address these supply chain problems while at the same
               time reducing DOD's logistics footprint.

    			  Consolidated Storage and Shipping Initiatives

               DOD has developed initiatives to consolidate and improve storage
               and shipping of materiel, including Node Management and Deployable
               Depot, Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management, and
               Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point. Node Management and
               Deployable Depot is a DLA initiative to develop a small-scale,
               rapidly deployable distribution center that has the capability to
               provide consolidated shipping, receiving, cross-docking, storage,
               communication, and order processing. The initiative, which is in
               the early stages of development and testing, is aimed at improving
               the flow of logistics information along the supply chain and also
               providing efficient physical management of materiel in the theater
               of operations. To deploy this capability to a theater, DLA would
               send trained personnel, information technology systems, portable
               structures, and materiel handling equipment. DLA is collaborating
               with U.S. Transportation Command to establish a close association
               between Node Management and Deployable Depot and Joint Task
               Force-Port Opening. Supply items off-loaded by the port opening
               unit could be moved to the DLA depot located within 10 kilometers
               away. The two organizations plan to write this relationship into
               the concepts of operations for both initiatives. U.S. Pacific
               Command is the operational manager for Node Management and
               Deployable Depot, providing the location for upcoming exercises to
               prepare for operations that would be carried out in an austere
               location. The initiative is currently undergoing tests of both its
               information technology and materiel management capabilities.

               A second consolidation initiative is Joint Regional Inventory and
               Material Management, which is aimed at streamlining the storage
               and distribution of common items for multiple military service
               locations in a region from a DLA hub. The objectives of Joint
               Regional Inventory and Material Management include eliminating
               duplicate materiel handling and inventory layers. The pilot
               program for the Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management
               initiative in Hawaii has been completed and shows promise to
               improve joint theater logistics, but some funding and metrics
               issues are still being addressed. DOD has met key milestones in
               this initiative, and officials in U.S. Pacific Command reported
               that they had reduced redundant service-managed inventories, the
               number of times they handle parts, and customer wait times over
               the course of the pilot. When the services stock fewer items, they
               also have more efficiency in storage, and U.S. Pacific Command
               officials estimated that the services had reduced their inventory
               levels by more than $10 million.^43 A related activity included in
               the initiative is the development of a Web site for hazardous
               materials that would allow the services to share and view data on
               available hazardous inventories, enabling them to make
               arrangements with the other services to reuse items and save on
               waste disposal costs. Another related activity is an ongoing
               effort to establish a joint shipment manager to provide expedited
               and scheduled deliveries to move items from the DLA hub to the
               requesting units. U.S. Pacific Command officials told us that they
               plan to roll out Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management
               to other DLA depots in the command's area of operations, and they
               plan to establish this arrangement next in Okinawa and Guam. U.S.
               Pacific Command has established a working group that is addressing
               some issues such as tracking demand histories for multiple
               requests and deployed units and determining appropriate metrics to
               ensure that DLA has the assets available when the services require
               them. Officials we spoke with believe Joint Regional Inventory and
               Material Management has the potential to improve joint theater
               logistics by having common assets available close to where they
               are needed and under the control of DLA, freeing military service
               personnel to focus on service-specific assets and their
               warfighting missions.

    43Stockage levels for Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management are
    based on the number of demands placed on a part per year, and a minimum of
    four demands was required for an item to be included in the pilot.

               A third consolidation initiative we found during our review is the
               establishment of Theater Consolidation and Shipping Points. DLA,
               in coordination with the Army, has opened Theater Consolidation
               and Shipping Points within the U.S. European Command and U.S.
               Central Command geographic regions. The goal for these
               consolidated facilities is to improve the overall efficiency and
               interoperability of materiel consolidation and shipping
               activities. The Theater Consolidation and Shipping Points operate
               under memoranda of agreement between DLA and each of these
               combatant commands. DLA is validating its template for the Theater
               Consolidation and Shipping Point, which is the first step in
               creating a doctrinal organization, according to DLA officials.

               The Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point in the U.S. European
               Command opened in October 2006, and is collocated at DLA's Defense
               Distribution Depot-Europe in Germersheim, Germany. The creation of
               this consolidated activity was part of the Army's plan for
               managing a reduction in personnel in Europe, which included
               divesting itself of noncore activities and focusing on its
               warfighting functions. The DLA organization took over distribution
               functions that had been performed by the Theater Distribution
               Center, which was operated by the Army's 21st Theater Support
               Command at Panzer Kaserne, Germany. These functions include
               breaking bulk materiel for multiple customers, consolidating
               materiel for shipment to individual units, marking pallets and
               containers with radio frequency identification tags, and preparing
               them for onward shipment to customers. The Army agreed to fund the
               realignment of the Theater Distribution Center's functions to DLA
               by transferring $1.6 million each fiscal year for fiscal years
               2007 and 2008, and then realigning funding directly to DLA
               beginning in fiscal year 2009. According to the Commander of the
               Defense Distribution Depot-Europe, the Theater Consolidation and
               Shipping Point will serve as the primary conduit for theater
               sustainment distribution from multiple sources, including materiel
               entering the theater at Ramstein Air Base and the Germersheim
               Rhine River terminal. He said collocating the Theater
               Consolidation and Shipping Point with the DLA Defense Distribution
               Depot will improve the overall efficiency of theater distribution
               activities by making better use of DLA's existing distribution
               infrastructure, including its information technology systems, and
               will capitalize on DLA's core competencies of receiving, storing,
               and shipping materiel. According to the Commander, specific
               benefits have included estimated annual cost savings of
               approximately $700,000 and a reduction in full-time equivalent
               employees from 56 to 19. At the time of our visit, the activity
               had been operating for less than a week; consequently, our review
               was limited to briefings and a tour of the operations and
               processes at the facilities in Germersheim, Germany. Therefore, we
               did not validate the claimed benefits.

               In U.S. Central Command, the Theater Consolidation and Shipping
               Point was established in February 2006 when DLA took over theater
               distribution functions from an Army-operated Theater Distribution
               Center in Kuwait. The Theater Distribution Center had previously
               been relocated to Camp Arifjan from just outside Camp Doha when
               Camp Doha closed in 2005. According to DLA officials, the Army and
               DLA agreed to transfer operations to DLA in December 2005, and DLA
               began operations in February 2006. The facility is
               contractor-operated at an annual cost of approximately $7.9
               million. The transfer of operations to DLA was aimed at
               capitalizing on the agency's materiel consolidation and shipping
               expertise, streamlining the distribution process by linking the
               distribution depot and the consolidation and shipping operations
               under DLA management, and improving asset visibility by installing
               DLA's standard distribution information system at the
               consolidation and shipping point.

    			  Additional Opportunities for Consolidating Shipping and Storage

               During our fieldwork in Kuwait, we found that additional
               opportunities may exist for consolidating storage and shipping
               activities. Unlike the consolidation and shipping point in Europe,
               the Kuwait activity is not collocated with the DLA Defense
               Distribution Depot and therefore lacks the efficiencies from
               combining operations available at the European activity. Moreover,
               the Army continues to operate a general support warehouse at Camp
               Arifjan that is separate from the DLA Theater Consolidation and
               Shipping Point. Based on our visits to these facilities and
               discussions with officials, we believe there are potential
               opportunities to improve joint theater distribution processes and
               sustainment operations through further consolidation, relocation,
               and streamlining of distribution operations and processes. Some
               potential improvements that might be achieved are:

               o reducing contract and contract administration costs;

               o maximizing use of pure pallets, thereby making more efficient
               use of airlift capability and reducing customer wait time;

               o eliminating redundant warehouse functions and substandard
               warehouse facilities;

               o freeing up government-owned containers for use in repacking
               materiel intended for units in Iraq; and
               o consolidating materiel processing points, thereby reducing the
               potential for errors in information technology and the loss of
               asset visibility.

               The DLA Defense Distribution Depot is a contractor-owned and
               operated facility located in the Mina Abdullah Complex, a private
               industrial park located approximately 14 kilometers outside Camp
               Arifjan. The current annual contract cost for the distribution
               depot is approximately $37.1 million. The distribution depot
               carries out similar receiving, storage, packing, and shipping
               functions as the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point, and
               these facilities serve the same customer base. For example, each
               facility pure packs air pallets to be flown out of Ali Al Salem
               Air Base to units in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.
               According to the distribution depot director, the depot is having
               difficulty packing pure pallets to capacity and consequently is
               not maximizing use of airlift capability. The depot's goal is to
               hold air pallets for up to 24 hours in hopes of packing a pure
               pallet. However, if the pallet is not completely pure packed
               within the 24-hour hold period, it must be airlifted anyway in
               order to meet customer wait time standards. DLA officials told us
               that by collocating the consolidation and shipping point with the
               distribution depot, they could more quickly build fewer and larger
               air pallets, which would maximize the use of airlift capacity and
               reduce customer wait time.

               The Army's general support warehouse at Camp Arifjan also performs
               materiel receiving, storage, and shipping functions. The Army
               warehouse is in poor condition, is poorly lighted, and has little
               climate-controlled space. It operates at capacity and has some of
               its inventory stored outside in government-owned containers or on
               the bare ground and exposed to the elements (see fig. 3). The DLA
               Defense Distribution Depot, in contrast, appears to be a modern
               warehouse with approximately a million square feet of covered
               warehouse space, much of which is climate controlled, and another
               million square feet of hard surface (asphalt) outside storage
               space for containers (see fig. 4).

               Figure 3: Views of Container and Yard Storage at Army General
               Support Warehouse, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (October 2006)

    Figure 4: Exterior and Interior Views of Warehouses at the DLA
    Distribution Depot, Kuwait (October 2006)

    According to DLA officials, the distribution depot has sufficient capacity
    to absorb the Army general support warehouse workload and already manages
    920 Army-specific items. Consolidating the Army warehouse inventory at the
    DLA distribution depot would likely produce efficiencies through economies
    of scale, reducing the overall cost of receiving, storage, and shipping,
    and also eliminate the need to upgrade the substandard Army warehouse on
    Camp Arifjan. Consolidating the Army general support inventory at the DLA
    depot would also free up government-owned containers currently used for
    general warehouse storage. Government-owned containers are needed to
    support seaport operations for repacking materiel to send to Iraq from
    commercial containers, and they are in short supply in Kuwait.

    U.S. Central Command has directed that only government-owned containers be
    sent into Iraq to prevent the accumulation of detention charges on
    commercial containers. According to 831st Transportation Battalion
    officials responsible for port operations, government-owned containers
    sent to Camp Arifjan are seldom returned to the port to support container
    cross-loading operations. Army general support warehouse officials told us
    that when they are directed to give up government-owned containers to
    support port operations, they often have no place to put the materiel
    stored inside the container, which forces them to store some inventory on
    the bare ground. Having adequate space to store inventory at the DLA
    distribution depot would reduce the need to use government-owned
    containers as storage space, thereby supporting container cross-loading
    operations at the port, and would reduce the need to place inventory on
    the ground and exposed to the elements.

    The Army general support warehouse, DLA Theater Consolidation and Shipping
    Point, and DLA Defense Distribution Depot, Kuwait all exist to support
    essentially the same units in Iraq with regard to receiving, storing, and
    shipping sustainment materiel. According to DLA officials, consolidating
    these operations at the DLA Defense Distribution Depot would help to
    improve asset visibility by reducing the number of materiel processing
    points, and thereby the potential for errors in inputting data into
    information technology systems. Under such a consolidation, only one
    organization would be applying radio frequency identification tags to
    containers and entering data into the joint in-transit visibility systems,
    which are tasks that DLA officials consider to be among the agency's core
    competencies.

    In discussing our observations with Coalition Forces Land Component
    Command officials, they generally agreed about the potential for
    consolidating storage and shipping arrangements and stated that the
    conditions needed to be thoroughly assessed and workable recommendations
    developed. These officials noted two obstacles that would have to be
    overcome. First, the Army had already purchased its general support
    inventory and wanted to be reimbursed for inventory transferred back to
    DLA. Second, the Directorate of Security Plans and Operations, within the
    Army's Area Support Group in Kuwait, had assessed the Mina Abdullah
    Complex as too great a security risk for relocating the operations from
    Camp Arifjan. In January 2007, subsequent to our visit to Kuwait, the
    directorate completed a new force protection assessment of the Mina
    Abdullah Complex. According to DLA officials, this new assessment leaves
    open the possibility of moving the Theater Consolidation and Shipping
    Point and the Army general support warehouse to the distribution depot if
    certain deficiencies are adequately addressed. In March 2007, the DLA
    Defense Distribution Center directed a study team to conduct an analysis
    of major theater receipt, storage, and distribution nodes and processes in
    U.S. Central Command. In April 2007, the study team briefed the
    Distribution Process Owner Executive Board on the results of its
    assessment, which included recommendations to terminate the Theater
    Consolidation and Shipping Point contract and assume these functions at
    the defense distribution depot and to draw down inventory and operations
    at the Army general support warehouse at Camp Arifjan.

    Command and Control Over Joint Logistics Functions Remains Unresolved

    Command and control over joint logistics functions has been a concern due
    to past challenges with directing and coordinating logistics resources and
    systems within a theater of operations. In past combat operations, joint
    forces dispersed over a large area of operations placed significant
    demands on the ability of the joint force commander to provide, manage,
    and prioritize logistics support. For example, although the combatant
    commander has directive authority for logistics, existing capabilities and
    processes limit the ability to exercise this authority. In 1997, DOD
    identified command and control as a key focus area of joint theater
    logistics in order to prioritize and allocate scarce resources, determine
    how services can share existing assets and capabilities in theater, and
    eliminate redundancies and excess capabilities. Additionally, officials at
    U.S. Pacific Command explained that senior military leaders have indicated
    that they want a single point of contact for all logistics information in
    theater. Officials at U.S. Central Command stated that clear lines of
    command and control, in addition to improved asset visibility, are
    currently needed to advance joint theater logistics.

      Several Command and Control Options Have Emerged

    The joint theater logistics initiatives we reviewed all include
    organizational structures intended to provide command and control over all
    or part of logistics functions under the combatant commander's control. In
    addition to the initiatives discussed earlier in this report, U.S. Joint
    Forces Command is coordinating the Joint Experimental Deployment and
    Support initiative.^44 The objective of this initiative is to experiment
    with a range of command and control options that can provide logistics
    coordination, integration, and synchronization to meet the combatant
    commander's priorities. The initiative builds upon DOD's Joint Deployment
    Distribution Operations Center concept and progresses along a continuum to
    include more robust organizational options. According to U.S. Joint Forces
    Command, the different options in the continuum would allow a combatant
    commander to select a flexible capability and tailor it to suit the size
    and complexity of a mission. The options along this continuum are
    displayed in figure 5.

    ^44U.S. Joint Forces Command is the DOD executive agent for joint
    warfighting experimentation, making it responsible for conducting joint
    experimentation on new warfighting concepts and disseminating the results
    of these activities to the joint concept community.

    Figure 5: Continuum of Logistics Command and Control Options Included in
    the Joint Experimental Deployment and Support Initiative

    Note: Scalability refers to the breadth, depth, numbers of nations, and
    size of the joint operations areas. Complexity is determined by the
    geography of the theater, number of distribution nodes, and rapid
    deployment, among other factors.

    The Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center Plus, which is on the
    lower end of the Joint Experimental Deployment and Support continuum, is
    being tested in U.S. European Command. The command's Joint Deployment
    Distribution Operations Center currently has day-to-day responsibilities
    that it handles with a staff of 55. For a contingency operation, this
    organization could be upgraded to the Joint Deployment Distribution
    Operations Center Plus, with additional staff augmentation from the
    command's logistics directorate, military services, and other DOD
    components. U.S. European Command is drafting standard operating
    procedures for the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center Plus.
    According to command officials, the Joint Deployment Distribution
    Operations Center Plus may be included in DOD's updated template for the
    Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center, which is due in August
    2007.

    The Enabled/Enhanced J4,^45 which is being tested and developed in U.S.
    Pacific Command, is the next organizational option on the Joint
    Experimental Deployment and Support continuum. According to command
    officials, the Enhanced J4 is activated during contingencies and includes
    U.S. Pacific Command's Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center and
    a fusion cell, which is a 4-person group that pulls together and filters
    information for the J4. While U.S. Pacific Command's Joint Deployment
    Distribution Operations Center is run by a staff of 5 for day-to-day
    operations, during a contingency the organization would be augmented to
    support the Enhanced J4 with a staff of up to 64. U.S. Pacific Command is
    currently developing standard operating procedures and joint
    mission-essential tasks for this new capability.

    The Joint Force Support Component Command is the most robust continuum
    option being evaluated. This organization is designed to provide a single
    theater logistics command with enhanced joint capabilities to identify
    theater logistics shortfalls, prioritize shortfalls, and direct theater
    logistics resources. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, has stated that the
    Joint Force Support Component Command will be the logistics command and
    control structure for any future contingency operations in Korea. The
    Army's 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command in Korea serves as the
    headquarters for the Joint Force Support Component Command, which will be
    augmented by integrating staff from other components in Korea, the Pacific
    Command's Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center-Korea, DLA, and
    the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface. The Joint Force Support Component
    Command has been tested in two exercises--Reception, Staging, Onward
    Movement and Integration and Ulchi Focus Lens--and U.S. Forces Korea
    officials are currently involved in the Senior Leader Seminar as part of
    the high-level process to discuss the next iteration and iron out the
    roles and responsibilities of the Joint Force Support Component Command.
    U.S. military officials in Korea explained that the future goal is to
    merge the Joint Force Support Component Command into a joint logistics
    command.

    The Joint Experimental Deployment and Support continuum shows two other
    command and control options that could support more complex operations.
    These options are the Combined Logistics Coordination Center and the
    Combined/Coalition Joint Force Support Component Command. However, DOD has
    not defined, developed, or tested these options.

    ^45J4 designates the logistics directorate or section of a joint staff.
    U.S. Joint Forces Command refers to this option as the Enabled J4, and
    U.S. Pacific Command calls it the Enhanced J4.

      Command and Control Issues Have Not Been Resolved

    Despite the development of these new organizations designed to offer
    robust logistics command and control capabilities, our discussions with
    officials from the combatant commands and the military services revealed
    unresolved issues related to exercising joint command and control over
    logistics functions in a theater of operations. For example, some military
    services have indicated that they would not support the establishment of a
    Joint Force Support Component Command in other geographic combatant
    commands, leaving the future of this initiative in question. A number of
    officials had concerns about how organizations such as the Joint Force
    Support Component Command would be staffed and what roles and authorities
    it would have. Specifically, they mentioned (1) statutory requirements for
    logistics support, (2) directive authority for logistics, and (3)
    operational and financial considerations.

    Although the Joint Force Support Component Command is still in an
    experimentation phase, there has been resistance from the services to its
    future implementation. The Air Force, for example, has stated that, while
    the Joint Force Support Component Command might work for the size and
    scale of operations in the Korean theater, DOD should be cautious about
    adopting it as a model across all combatant commands. The services have
    expressed concerns about mandating that they provide staff to the Joint
    Force Support Component Command, while also fulfilling their Title 10
    responsibilities to man, train, and equip their forces.^46 The Marine
    Corps said this would hinder its ability to provide logistics support to
    its own tasked missions and to deploy in a "lean" condition. Officials
    from military service components in the geographic combatant commands also
    raised the issue of having a service component take direction from a
    separate component command at the same level, rather than from a higher
    level command, and they were resistant to losing personnel to such an
    organization because the service component commands still have tactical
    logistics responsibilities to fulfill. While the Navy has not provided an
    official position on the Joint Force Support Component Command, Navy
    officials told us they did have some concerns with the initiative and that
    one disadvantage of a single logistics command is that it separates
    logistics from operations instead of keeping both functions under the same
    operational commander they are designed to support.

    ^46See 10 U.S.C. SS 3013, 5013, and 8013.

    Some military service officials we interviewed raised questions about the
    effectiveness of a Joint Force Support Component Command that lacked an
    ability to exercise directive authority for logistics. Directive authority
    for logistics gives the combatant commander the ability to shift logistics
    resources within the theater in order to accomplish a mission.^47 While
    DOD doctrine states that directive authority for logistics may be
    delegated to a subordinate commander, such as a joint force commander or
    service component commander,^48 officials we interviewed did not believe
    directive authority for logistics could be delegated below that level of
    command to an entity such as the Joint Force Support Component Command.
    Without this authority, some military service officials question how the
    Joint Force Support Component Command differs from other logistics command
    and control organizations if the organization can make recommendations to
    the joint force commander but not actually direct the transfer of assets
    across the service components, known as cross-leveling. For example,
    officials in U.S. Pacific Command stated that the Joint Force Support
    Component Command faced challenges when trying to release joint logistics
    tasking orders during the exercises because it could not resolve issues
    with the service components. They believed that the role of the
    organization should be to coordinate with the services to deconflict and
    prioritize support to the next campaign rather than address problems at
    the tactical level. Since directive authority for logistics still resides
    with the joint force commander, the Joint Force Support Component Command
    does not provide any additional authorities; therefore, some officials
    argued that its functions could be accomplished with an organization such
    as U.S. Pacific Command's Enhanced J4.

    There are also readiness and financial considerations related to
    exercising directive authority for logistics. In this process, the
    component commanders provide input as to what they can support. There are
    military operational risks and trade-offs associated with cross-leveling,
    because assets diverted from one unit to support another unit may affect
    the giving organization's ability to conduct a future operation. Officials
    raised concerns that logisticians in a separate logistics command may not
    fully understand the impact of cross-leveling on the next military
    mission. Additionally, because the services obtain funding for their own
    assets, several officials told us that some form of financial
    reconciliation must be considered when exercising directive authority for
    logistics. Thus, any assets provided from one service to another must be
    accounted for and later replaced or reimbursed. Because of these financial
    considerations, some military service component officials believed that
    joint funding is necessary to support joint operations.

    ^47Under 10 U.S.C. S164, unless otherwise directed by the President or the
    Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the
    commander of a combatant command with respect to the commands and forces
    assigned to that command include giving authoritative direction to
    subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned
    to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of
    military operations, joint training, and logistics.

    ^48JCS Pub 4-0 (Apr. 6, 2000), p. I-3.

    Issues related to joint command and control over logistics in theater are
    not limited to the Joint Force Support Component Command organization. For
    example, another joint theater logistics initiative, the Theater
    Sustainment Command, also faces some logistics command and control
    challenges. As discussed earlier in this report, the Theater Sustainment
    Command is an Army logistics command and control organization that is
    being developed to streamline logistics support as part of Army
    modularity. The Theater Sustainment Command, however, is also being
    developed as a "joint-capable" headquarters that becomes a joint
    organization in a theater of operations with the addition of augmentees
    from the military services and other DOD agencies. Its joint-capable
    designation raises the same issues as the Joint Force Support Component
    Command regarding staffing, roles, and authorities. In addition to the
    current uncertainty over who exercises control over the Theater and
    Expeditionary Sustainment Commands, there would be added the question of
    where these organizations would fit into the theater. Further, some
    military service component officials questioned whether using these Army
    organizations in their joint command and control capacities would lessen
    their ability to perform Army-specific tasks. Until lines of command and
    control are clearly defined for these new organizations, joint force
    commanders will continue to face challenges in directing and coordinating
    logistics resources within a theater of operations.

    Conclusions

    Joint theater logistics has the potential to address long-standing issues
    associated with visibility and distribution of assets within a theater of
    operations, which is a critical step toward overall improvements in supply
    chain management and support to the warfighter. While several initiatives
    developed by different DOD components show promise in improving the joint
    force commander's ability to see emerging logistics requirements and
    rapidly respond to them, these initiatives have been fragmented across the
    department due to the lack of a coordinated and comprehensive management
    approach. Moreover, the diffused organization of DOD's logistics
    operations, including separate funding and management of resources and
    systems, complicates DOD's ability to adopt such an approach to developing
    and implementing joint theater logistics capabilities. Transformational
    changes in DOD's organization--such as those proposed by a number of
    organizations that believe DOD should move toward a more integrated
    logistics system and change how it controls and allocates logistics
    funding--could potentially require changes to existing laws, such as Title
    10. Another factor that has hindered adoption of a more coordinated and
    comprehensive approach to joint theater logistics has been changes with
    respect to DOD's overall logistics transformation strategy. Without a
    coordinated and comprehensive management approach, DOD may have difficulty
    addressing the challenges discussed in this report, including determining
    roles and responsibilities for DOD's port opening capability, addressing
    asset visibility issues caused by noninteroperable information technology
    systems, resolving disagreements on roles for coordinating surface
    transportation, making more use of opportunities to consolidate storage
    and shipping activities in Kuwait, and clarifying command and control over
    theater logistics functions. Moreover, without a coordinated and
    comprehensive management approach, DOD is not in a position to effectively
    coordinate the initiatives across the department, guard against potential
    duplication of effort, and prioritize initiatives to make decisions on how
    best to target its resources.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    To improve logistics and supply chain operations, we recommend that the
    Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics), in his capacity as the Defense Logistics
    Executive, to develop and implement a coordinated and comprehensive
    management approach to guide and oversee efforts across the department to
    improve distribution and supply support for U.S. forces in a joint
    theater. This approach should encompass sound management principles,
    including developing specific strategies and goals, assigning
    accountability for achieving results, and using outcome-oriented
    performance measures, and should be aligned with the results of the
    ongoing joint capabilities portfolio management test, the proposed
    realignment of focused logistics capabilities, and the development of a
    "to be" roadmap. In considering options for implementing this
    recommendation, the Under Secretary should determine whether any changes
    should be made to DOD's organizational structure and control of resources
    for joint logistics support and identify the steps needed to make these
    changes, including changes to existing laws, such as Title 10.

    To make more economical and efficient use of shipping and storage
    facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
    Director, DLA, to evaluate existing storage and shipping arrangements
    within the geographic combatant commands and identify opportunities for
    consolidation.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with both
    of our recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments that we
    incorporated as appropriate. The department's response is reprinted in
    appendix I.

    In response to our recommendation for developing and implementing a
    coordinated and comprehensive management approach to improving
    distribution and supply support in a joint theater, DOD stated that the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense is leading initiatives in portfolio
    management, the Defense Logistics Executive (DLE) is focusing on Joint
    Logistics portfolio management, Joint Staff (J4) is updating the Joint
    Logistics Joint Functional Concept, and the Deputy Under Secretary of
    Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness) is developing the logistics
    strategy and roadmap, which are to be completed by summer 2008. While we
    acknowledge these steps that DOD is taking to improve distribution and
    supply support for U.S. forces in a joint theater as a good start, we
    continue to believe that as DOD develops and implements a comprehensive
    management approach that is coordinated across the department, DOD needs
    to incorporate the sound management principles we describe in this report.
    Again, in considering options for implementing this recommendation, the
    Under Secretary should determine whether any changes should be made to
    DOD's organizational structure and control of joint logistical support,
    and identify steps needed to make these changes, including changes to
    existing laws, such as Title 10. We are reemphasizing these two matters
    because DOD did not specifically address them in its comments to our
    recommendations.

    Regarding our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the
    Director, Defense Logistics Agency, to evaluate existing storage and
    shipping arrangements within the geographic combatant commands and
    identify opportunities for consolidation, DOD stated that it plans to
    complete such an evaluation by the summer of 2008. We believe this action,
    if implemented, will be responsive to our recommendation.

    Scope and Methodology

    To assess DOD's approach to managing joint theater logistics, we
    identified sound management principles based on prior work on
    organizational transformation and federal agency implementation of the
    Government Performance and Results Act.^49 We also reviewed doctrine,
    regulations, guidance, plans, briefings, status reports, and other
    documents related to the development of joint theater logistics, logistics
    strategic planning, and supply chain management. This review included
    reports by various audit and non-audit organizations that have assessed
    DOD's logistics organization. While we examined the recommendations
    proposed by these organizations, the scope of our review did not include
    an assessment of these proposals or what changes, if any, would require
    congressional action. Additionally, we interviewed officials from the
    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics) and the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate who are involved in
    joint theater logistics and logistics transformation. Over the course of
    these visits and interviews, we obtained pertinent information on the
    status of DOD's efforts in support of joint theater logistics, such as the
    "as is" Focused Logistics Roadmap, the "to be" roadmap, and the supply
    chain management improvement plan. We reviewed the draft joint theater
    logistics white paper, implementation plan, and capability process
    analyses. We also examined DOD's overall efforts to institute a long-term
    logistics strategy, reviewing strategic planning documents such as vision
    statements, joint doctrine, campaign plans, and roadmaps that have
    addressed DOD's future logistics systems. We discussed the capabilities
    portfolio management test case with OSD and Joint Staff personnel.
    Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, U.S.
    Transportation Command, combatant commands, DLA, the military services,
    and selected reserve components to get their perspectives on joint theater
    logistics.

    To obtain information on DOD's progress in implementing joint theater
    logistics initiatives, we reviewed DOD, Joint Staff, and military service
    guidance, concepts, directives, briefings, status reports, and other
    pertinent documentation related to the development of these initiatives.
    To identify the status of initiatives DOD is working on to address joint
    theater logistics, we focused on the four initiatives highlighted in the
    "as is" roadmap in support of joint theater logistics: Joint Deployment
    Distribution Operations Center, Director of Mobility Forces-Surface, Joint
    Experimental Deployment and Support, and Theater Sustainment Commands. We
    conducted interviews and obtained information on these initiatives from
    U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the Army's G-4
    logistics directorate. In addition, we also looked at four other
    initiatives related to providing support to the joint force commander:
    Joint Task Force-Port Opening, Node Management and Deployable Depot,
    Theater Consolidation and Shipping Points, and Joint Regional Inventory
    and Material Management. Because these initiatives have been recently
    implemented or are still in the testing stages, in some cases we were able
    to obtain only limited data on their effectiveness, and we did not
    independently validate these data. To obtain information on specific
    initiatives, we interviewed officials from U.S. Transportation Command and
    two of its components, Air Mobility Command and the Military Surface
    Deployment and Distribution Command; U.S. Joint Forces Command; DLA; U.S.
    Army Combined Arms Support Command; the military services; and selected
    reserve components. Additionally, we visited and interviewed officials in
    the five geographic combatant commands: U.S. Central Command, U.S.
    European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S.
    Southern Command. We also met with military service component commands in
    U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Pacific Command and
    with operational units in Germany, Korea, and Kuwait. Because several of
    the newly developed initiatives are being tested in the Korean theater of
    operations, we visited the subordinate unified command in Korea to discuss
    their experiences and challenges in implementing joint theater logistics.
    We attended the out-brief for an Army conference on theater opening,
    reviewed after-action reports from exercises that tested the initiatives,
    and analyzed lessons learned reports from Operation Iraqi Freedom. To
    assess the reliability of the container management system data, we
    interviewed Container Management Element officials at Camp Arifjan,
    Kuwait, about the internal controls and reliability of the system. We
    determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We
    conducted our review from July 2006 to April 2007 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    ^49See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
    Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [49]GAO-03-669 (Washington,
    D.C.: July 2, 2003), and GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That
    Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies,
    [50]GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
    Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, DLA; the Director,
    Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. This report
    will also be available at no charge at our Web site at
    [51]http://www.gao.gov . Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
    Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.
    Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [52]solisw@gao.gov . Key contributors to
    this report are listed in appendix II.

    William M. Solis
    Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

    Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact

    William M. Solis (202) 512-8365

    Acknowledgments

    In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report
    were Karyn Angulo, Alissa Czyz, Maria Gomez, Thomas Gosling, Brian Howell,
    and Larry Junek.

    (350907)

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    [59]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-807 .

    To view the full product, including the scope
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    For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202) 512-8365 or
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    Highlights of [60]GAO-07-807 , a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight
    of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of
    Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
    Senate

    June 2007

    DEFENSE LOGISTICS

    Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply Support for Joint Military
    Operations Could Benefit from a Coordinated Management Approach

    During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army and the Marine Corps experienced
    problems with the delivery of supplies to the warfighter. Such problems
    highlight long-standing weaknesses in the Department of Defense's (DOD)
    supply chain management. DOD has identified joint theater logistics as a
    key effort aimed at improving distribution and supply support. GAO was
    asked to examine DOD's efforts to develop and implement joint theater
    logistics. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which DOD's approach to managing
    joint theater logistics departmentwide encompasses sound management
    principles and (2) the progress DOD has made in implementing joint theater
    logistics initiatives. GAO reviewed DOD documents and interviewed
    officials from the Joint Staff, services, agencies, and geographic
    combatant commands.

    [61]What GAO Recommends

    GAO recommends DOD develop and implement a coordinated and comprehensive
    management approach to guide and oversee efforts across the department to
    improve distribution and supply support to U.S. forces in a joint theater.
    GAO also recommends that DLA assess opportunities to consolidate storage
    and shipping activities within all geographic combatant commands. DOD
    concurred with GAO's recommendations.

    DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management approach
    to guide and oversee implementation of joint theater logistics across the
    department. Efforts to develop and implement joint theater logistics
    initiatives have been fragmented among various DOD components due largely
    to a lack of specific goals and strategies, accountability for achieving
    results, and outcome-oriented performance measures--key principles of
    sound management. Further complicating DOD's ability to adopt a
    coordinated and comprehensive management approach to joint theater
    logistics are the diffused organization of DOD's logistics operations,
    including separate funding and management of resources and systems, and
    changes in DOD's overall logistics transformation strategy. DOD is
    currently testing a new approach to managing joint capabilities and is
    considering a realignment of capabilities in its long-term logistics
    strategy, which could affect the future of joint theater logistics.
    Without a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to managing joint
    theater logistics, DOD lacks assurance that it is on the right path toward
    achieving this capability and that individual initiatives will
    collectively address gaps in logistics capabilities. Further, DOD will
    have difficulty achieving improvements in theater distribution and asset
    visibility associated with joint theater logistics.

    DOD components have made progress developing and implementing joint
    theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and supply
    support, but the department faces challenges that hinder its ability to
    realize the full benefits of these efforts. For example,

               o While Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers have been
               established in each geographic combatant command to help manage
               supplies moving across the distribution system, senior commanders
               in Kuwait said achieving asset visibility has been difficult
               because of a lack of interoperability among information technology
               systems.

               o Initiatives being developed to improve the coordination of
               surface transportation assets theaterwide also face challenges
               with issues of command and control, the availability of
               information technology tools, and potential duplication of
               responsibilities with other organizations.

    Unless DOD successfully addresses these and other challenges GAO
    identified, the initiatives are not likely to significantly improve the
    ability of a joint force commander to effectively and efficiently direct
    logistics functions, including distribution and supply support activities,
    across the theater of operations to accomplish an assigned mission.
    Moreover, without addressing such challenges, DOD is likely to continue to
    experience some of the same types of distribution and asset visibility
    problems that have occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

    References

    Visible links
      35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-305R
      36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-275
      37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-775
      38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-775
      39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-234
      40. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-229T
      41. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-325SP
      42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-305R
      43. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-775
      44. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-775
      45. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-15
      46. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-381
      47. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-305R
      48. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-171
      49. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669
      50. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15
      51. http://www.gao.gov/
      52. mailto:solisw@gao.gov
      53. http://www.gao.gov/
      54. http://www.gao.gov/
      55. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
      56. mailto:fraudnet@gao.gov
      57. mailto:JarmonG@gao.gov
      58. mailto:AndersonP1@gao.gov
      59. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-807
      60. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-807
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