Defense Infrastructure: Full Costs and Security Implications of
Cheyenne Mountain Realignment Have Not Been Determined
(21-MAY-07, GAO-07-803R).
The Department of Defense (DOD) built the Cheyenne Mountain
Operations Center located near Colorado Springs, Colorado, in the
early 1960s to withstand a multimegaton-yield-weapon strike and
to provide protection against chemical and biological warfare.
The mission of the Cheyenne Mountain Directorate is to monitor,
process, and interpret air, missile, and space events that could
threaten North America or have operational effects on U.S. forces
or capabilities. This mission is conducted at five major
centers--the Command Center, Air Warning, Missile Correlation,
Operations Intelligence Watch, and Space Control--all currently
located within Cheyenne Mountain. Elements of United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and Air Force Space Command are
also located in Cheyenne Mountain. The Air Force's modernization
of the attack warning systems within Cheyenne Mountain will cost
more than $700 million from fiscal years 2000 through 2006. DOD
officials have stated that they no longer need to continue
operating in this hardened facility considering that the threat
of an intercontinental ballistic missile strike in today's
environment is low. In July 2006, the former Commander of NORAD
and USNORTHCOM announced plans to move certain functions from
Cheyenne Mountain and create an integrated command center at
Peterson Air Force Base, which he projected at that time would
save between $150 million and $200 million per year.
Additionally, USSTRATCOM announced plans to relocate its missile
warning mission from Cheyenne Mountain to Schriever Air Force
Base, Colorado, and Air Force Space Command is in the process of
moving the Space Control Center from Cheyenne Mountain to
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) and USNORTHCOM officials told us that
after these functions have been moved, Cheyenne Mountain will be
used as an alternate command center, a continuity of operations
relocation facility, and a training center. You asked us to
determine (1) the estimated costs, savings, and benefits
associated with moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain to other
locations; and (2) how DOD evaluated the security implications
associated with moving the functions, and what these implications
are.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-803R
ACCNO: A69806
TITLE: Defense Infrastructure: Full Costs and Security
Implications of Cheyenne Mountain Realignment Have Not Been
Determined
DATE: 05/21/2007
SUBJECT: Base realignments
Cost analysis
Defense cost control
Defense procurement
Facility transfer
Military facilities
Military forces
National defense operations
Reporting requirements
Risk assessment
Security assessments
Strategic planning
Cost estimates
Cheyenne Mountain (WY)
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GAO-07-803R
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May 21, 2007
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
Chairman
The Honorable Jo Ann Davis
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Subject: Defense Infrastructure: Full Costs and Security Implications of
Cheyenne Mountain Realignment Have Not Been Determined
The Department of Defense (DOD) built the Cheyenne Mountain Operations
Center^1 located near Colorado Springs, Colorado, in the early 1960s to
withstand a multimegaton-yield-weapon strike and to provide protection
against chemical and biological warfare. The mission of the Cheyenne
Mountain Directorate is to monitor, process, and interpret air, missile,
and space events that could threaten North America or have operational
effects on U.S. forces or capabilities. This mission is conducted at five
major centers--the Command Center, Air Warning, Missile Correlation,
Operations Intelligence Watch, and Space Control--all currently located
within Cheyenne Mountain. Elements of United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM)^2 and Air Force Space Command^3 are also located in Cheyenne
Mountain. The Air Force's modernization of the attack warning systems
within Cheyenne Mountain will cost more than $700 million from fiscal
years 2000 through 2006.^4
Peterson Air Force Base, also located in Colorado Springs, Colorado, is
the headquarters of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD is a binational
U.S. and Canadian organization staffed by both U.S. and Canadian
personnel. The Commander of USNORTHCOM is also the Commander of NORAD and
he currently has command of two fixed command centers.^5 The NORAD and
USNORTHCOM Command Center is located at Peterson Air Force Base and
conducts air, land, maritime, and homeland defense operations, as well as
defense support of civil authorities. The command center in Cheyenne
Mountain is a NORAD and USNORTHCOM command center that provides air,
missile, and space warning, characterization, and assessment for NORAD,
USNORTHCOM, and USSTRATCOM as well as command and control for the
ground-based mid-course missile defense program.
^1The Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center is now known as the Cheyenne
Mountain Directorate. It is one of several tenants that compose the
Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station near Colorado Springs, Colorado.
^2USSTRATCOM conducts the missile warning mission for North America.
^3Air Force Space Command conducts the space control mission for North
America.
^4GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Further Management and Oversight Changes
Needed for Efforts to Modernize Cheyenne Mountain Attack Warning Systems,
GAO-06-666 (Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2006).
DOD officials have stated that they no longer need to continue operating
in this hardened facility considering that the threat of an
intercontinental ballistic missile strike in today's environment is low.
In July 2006, the former Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM^6 announced
plans to move certain functions from Cheyenne Mountain and create an
integrated command center at Peterson Air Force Base, which he projected
at that time would save between $150 million and $200 million per year.
Additionally, USSTRATCOM announced plans to relocate its missile warning
mission from Cheyenne Mountain to Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, and
Air Force Space Command is in the process of moving the Space Control
Center from Cheyenne Mountain to Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials told us that after these functions have
been moved, Cheyenne Mountain will be used as an alternate command center,
a continuity of operations relocation facility, and a training center.
You asked us to determine (1) the estimated costs, savings, and benefits
associated with moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain to other
locations; and (2) how DOD evaluated the security implications associated
with moving the functions, and what these implications are. On March 13,
2007, we provided your office with a briefing on our preliminary
observations regarding the proposed relocation. This report summarizes the
results of that briefing and provides updated information as a result of
additional work we have performed since that time.
To determine the costs, savings, and benefits associated with the proposed
relocation of functions from Cheyenne Mountain, we reviewed and analyzed
reports and studies conducted by NORAD and USNORTHCOM, Sandia National
Laboratories^7 and Lockheed Martin^8 on the costs and implications of
relocating functions from Cheyenne Mountain, and we interviewed NORAD and
USNORTHCOM officials to identify the expected benefits of the relocation.
We also interviewed USSTRATCOM and Air Force Space Command officials to
identify the costs, savings, and benefits associated with the relocation
of their functions from Cheyenne Mountain. We also interviewed USNORTHCOM
and Air Force budget analysts to determine how the cost estimates were
developed and validated. Based on these interviews, we believe that the
cost data are sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To determine the
security implications of the relocation and how they were evaluated by
DOD, we reviewed vulnerability assessments and risk assessments conducted
by USNORTHCOM and a security analysis conducted by Sandia National
Laboratories for the proposed relocation of NORAD and USNORTHCOM
functions, and we discussed these assessments and others that are ongoing
and their potential effect on operations with NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Air
Force Space Command officials, and the Joint Staff. We conducted our
review from January 2007 through May 2007 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
^5The Commander also has a mobile consolidated command center based at
F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming.
^6The new NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander was sworn in on March 23, 2007.
^7Sandia National Laboratories, a federally funded research center, was
tasked to study the security implications of four options for moving
missions from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base.
^8Lockheed Martin conducted this study under contract with the Electronic
Systems Center. The Electronic Systems Center, a component of Air Force
Materiel Command, manages the development and acquisition of electronic
command and control systems for the Air Force.
Summary
NORAD and USNORTHCOM could not provide documentation to support the $150
million to $200 million savings projected by the former Commander from
moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base. As of
April 2007, NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials have identified at least $41.7
million in onetime costs and $5.5 million in recurring costs related to
the move; however, the full costs will not be determined until the
completion of ongoing security assessments. NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials
stated that they expect increased unity of effort and operational
efficiencies as a result of the integration. Although there is no
requirement for it, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have not done an analysis of the
operational effects--both positive and negative--of the move. In fiscal
years 2006 and 2007, NORAD and USNORTHCOM allocated $26.7 million for
conducting studies, purchasing needed equipment related to the relocation,
and renovating the command center at Peterson Air Force Base. Renovation
of the command center is scheduled to begin in June 2007 and be completed
in December 2007. NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials are planning to allocate
$15 million in fiscal year 2008 to purchase the remaining equipment for
the integrated command center and program management support. Additional
costs will likely be incurred based on the results of ongoing studies
related to security requirements. Moreover, Air Force Space Command
officials estimate that it will cost about $13 million to move their
functions to Vandenberg Air Force Base, but USSTRATCOM has not yet
developed a cost estimate for relocating their functions from Cheyenne
Mountain to Schriever Air Force Base.
The Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM decided to accept the risk of
integrating the command centers based on initial risk and vulnerability
assessments, but the full security implications will not be known until
ongoing security assessments are completed and a protection level is
designated for the integrated command center.^9 While initial security
assessments provided information on vulnerabilities based on current and
projected threats, further assessments were needed to evaluate the cost of
hardening computer terminals against electromagnetic pulse and to evaluate
the physical security requirements of protecting the integrated command
center. Before the Air Force can designate a protection level for the new
command center, the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM must decide whether
key computer terminals will move to Peterson Air Force Base or remain in
Cheyenne Mountain. According to NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials, this
decision will be made after a study on electromagnetic pulse hardening
requirements is completed in late May 2007. Moreover, a System
Effectiveness Assessment, scheduled for completion in September 2007, will
provide information on the physical security needed to protect the
Cheyenne Mountain systems that may be replicated at Peterson Air Force
Base. According to NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials, it could take up to 24
months to obtain the resources needed to meet the designated protection
level requirements. If requirements for the designated protection level
cannot be met because of funding and resource constraints, waivers will be
needed to begin operations or specific systems may remain in Cheyenne
Mountain.
^9 The Air Force must designate a protection level for the functions
moving into the integrated command center pursuant to Air Force
Instruction 31-101, The Air Force Installation Security Program (Mar. 1,
2003).
We believe Congress should consider restricting DOD's authority to use
funds to renovate all proposed locations to accept functions designated to
move out of Cheyenne Mountain until such time as all security analyses are
complete, the full costs of the move are determined, and DOD provides
Congress with an analysis of the operational effects of the proposed
realignments.
Background
Currently, there is a NORAD and USNORTHCOM command center located at
Peterson Air Force Base and a NORAD and USNORTHCOM command center located
inside Cheyenne Mountain. Command staff are presently located in each of
the separate command centers. Cheyenne Mountain's mission is to monitor,
process, and interpret air, missile, and space events that could threaten
North America or have operational effects on U.S. forces or capabilities,
using air, ground, and space-based sensors that link to the complex's
computer systems located more than 2,000 feet under ground. This mission
is conducted at five major centers within Cheyenne Mountain--the Command
Center, Air Warning, Missile Correlation, Operations Intelligence Watch,
and Space Control--by approximately 658 people, including support
personnel. These personnel belong to NORAD, USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, and
Air Force Space Command, as shown in table 1.
Table 1: Realignment of U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel in Cheyenne
Mountain
Number of personnel
Moving
to
Moving to other
Currently Peterson Air
in Remaining AirForce Force Positions
Command mountain in mountain Base Bases eliminated
NORAD^a 112 TBD TBD 0 0
Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM)^b 42 24 18 0 0
Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM)^c 81 TBD 17 TBD TBD
Air Force Space
Command 160 0 12 138 10
Air Force Space
Command support
personnel 263 263 0 0 0
Total^d 658 TBD TBD TBD TBD
Source: USNORTHCOM, NORAD, USSTRATCOM, Air Force, and GAO calculation.
Notes: TBD = to be determined.
^aNORAD has not yet determined the number of personnel that are remaining
in the mountain and those moving to Peterson Air Force Base.
^bUSNORTHCOM positions remaining in Cheyenne Mountain are for Nuclear
Command and Control.
^cNORAD and USNORTHCOM have formally requested that USSTRATCOM transfer 17
positions to Peterson to support NORAD's correlation of potential missile
and space threats to North America.
^dContractor personnel are not included in the table. There are also 28
Canadian personnel currently working in Cheyenne Mountain.
No final decisions have been made as to how many personnel will remain in
the mountain, move to Peterson Air Force Base, or move to other locations.
There are also approximately 500 contractors in Cheyenne Mountain
providing support to each of the major centers. It has not been determined
how many of these contractors will be retained in the mountain after the
relocation.
During a series of major exercises conducted in 2005, the Commander of
NORAD and USNORTHCOM attempted to direct planning, operations, and command
and control from two separate command centers. In the course of the
exercises, the Commander identified shortcomings in unity of effort due to
the geographic separation of the command centers and negatively affecting
critical, time-sensitive decisions. As a result, in late 2005, the
Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM directed a senior command official to
analyze options for correcting these shortcomings and to determine the
limitations and costs of duplicating Cheyenne Mountain capabilities within
the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center at Peterson Air Force Base. This
analysis concluded that it would be cost-prohibitive to duplicate Cheyenne
Mountain capabilities at Peterson Air Force Base. The Commander then
tasked the official to analyze options to "replicate," rather than
duplicate, capabilities of the two command centers in a single
location.^10 This analysis considered the following four options: a single
command center at Peterson, a single command center at Cheyenne Mountain,
a Net-centric battle cab, or two separate command centers. The analysis
concluded that a single command center at Peterson Air Force Base was the
only option that provided the physical space required and strengthened
unity of effort between the commands.
^10USNORTHCOM officials told us that in this context, replicating
capabilities means leaving computer servers, equipment, and infrastructure
in the mountain and digitally sending the information to the NORAD and
USNORTHCOM Command Center at Peterson. Duplicating capabilities would
involve moving the servers, equipment, and infrastructure.
In February 2006, the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander ordered a study to
determine how best to establish a NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center at
Peterson Air Force Base and place the Cheyenne Mountain Directorate in
"warm standby" status. The completed study^11 outlined a plan to move the
air warning, missile correlation, and command center functions out of
Cheyenne Mountain but to leave the core computer systems there, from which
they would transmit their data to Peterson Air Force Base. The Air Force
must designate a protection level for the functions moving into the
integrated command center. The protection level system identifies specific
requirements for each security level and recognizes that the users must
accept varying degrees of risk. If resources are not available to meet the
assigned protection level requirements, the Commander must request waivers
from the security requirements until corrections can be made.^12
Renovation of the integrated command center at Peterson is scheduled to
begin in June 2007 and be completed in December 2007. Full operational
capability is planned for May 2008.
Once the functions and their associated personnel are moved, NORAD and
USNORTHCOM officials told us that they plan to use Cheyenne Mountain as an
alternate command center that could become fully functional within
approximately 1 hour, with adequate warning, if a threat situation so
dictated. Additionally, the nuclear command and control function for
USNORTHCOM will remain in the mountain and the computer systems remaining
will be used to train and certify personnel.
According to Joint Staff officials, the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM
has the authority under Title 10 of the United States Code to make
decisions affecting his command--including changing the location of
command and control--as long as he performs his mission as described in
the Unified Command Plan. Our review of Title 10 confirms that a commander
of a combatant command, unless otherwise directed by the President or the
Secretary of Defense, has the authority to perform such command functions
as organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers
necessary to carry out the missions assigned to the command.^13 According
to USNORTHCOM officials, the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM consulted
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff about his plan to move certain
functions out of Cheyenne Mountain, and he received their verbal
concurrence. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense stated in a February 2006
memo to the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM that he liked the
Commander's approach to place the mountain in "warm standby" and achieve a
range of cost savings.
^11U.S. Northern Command, The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Transformation Analysis
Report (Colorado Springs, Colo.: July 2006).
^12 Air Force Instruction 31-101, The Air Force Installation Security
Program, S6.3.2 (Mar. 1, 2003).
^1310 U.S.C. S164.
USSTRATCOM and Air Force Space Command also have functions in Cheyenne
Mountain that are moving to other locations. USSTRATCOM has about 81
people in Cheyenne Mountain for its missile warning mission. Of these 81
people, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have formally requested that USSTRATCOM
transfer 17 positions to Peterson to provide some missile warning
continuity, while an undetermined number of personnel will move to
Schriever Air Force Base in early 2008. Likewise, Air Force Space Command
officials told us that they are in the process of moving about 138 people
in the space control center and unified space vault to Vandenberg Air
Force Base. This move is scheduled to be completed by October 2007.
No Savings Result from Proposed Relocation and Estimated Costs Have Not
Been Fully Determined
NORAD and USNORTHCOM could not provide documentation to support the $150
million to $200 million savings projected by the previous Commander by
moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base. As of
April 2007, NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials have identified $41.7 million
in onetime and $5.5 million in recurring costs related to the move so far;
however, the full costs will not be determined until the completion of
ongoing security assessments. NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials stated that
they expect the relocation to result in increased unity of effort and,
consequently, improved operational efficiencies. Although there is no
requirement for it, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have not done an analysis of the
operational effects--both positive and negative--of the move. While Air
Force Space Command has identified approximately $13 million in costs to
move its mission to Vandenberg Air Force Base, USSTRATCOM has not yet
determined the costs to move its mission to Schriever Air Force Base.
NORAD and USNORTHCOM Relocation
NORAD and USNORTHCOM do not know the full costs of moving functions from
Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base because two security
assessments that will determine the recommended security upgrades are
still underway. As of April 2007, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have identified
about $41.7 million in onetime costs needed to integrate the two command
centers at Peterson Air Force Base, comprising
o $8.1 million in fiscal year 2006 for various studies related to
the relocation and for purchasing equipment needed to replicate
some computer systems;
o $18.6 million in fiscal year 2007 for renovating the existing
command center at Peterson Air Force Base to accommodate the
functions being relocated from Cheyenne Mountain, for additional
study costs, and for completing computer purchases; and
o $15 million for fiscal year 2008 to complete communications and
systems equipment purchases and program management support.
In addition, NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials estimate that approximately
$5.5 million will be needed annually to operate and maintain the computer
systems and to provide help desk support once the integrated command
center is operational.
There are no short-term cost savings from relocating functions from
Cheyenne Mountain. However, NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials stated that
certain transformational benefits, such as increased unity of effort and
improved operational efficiencies and effectiveness, are the main reasons
for integrating the command centers. Specifically, officials stated that
having one unified command center will increase the situational awareness
across all NORAD and USNORTHCOM missions and will provide a single voice
to decision makers. However, officials noted that they have not done an
analysis of the operational effects--both positive and negative--of the
move. Furthermore, the officials stated that they have not thus far
effectively communicated and documented the anticipated benefits and plan
to improve communications both within the command and with outside
entities.
Air Force Space Command Relocation
The projected cost for relocating the Space Control Center and the Unified
Space Vault from Cheyenne Mountain to the Joint Space Operations Center at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, is approximately $13 million. Of
this amount, $4.5 million was allocated in fiscal year 2006 for studies,
renovation of facilities, and relocation of equipment to Vandenberg, and
$5.4 million was allocated in fiscal year 2007 for training, temporary
duty to Vandenberg, and relocation of equipment. An additional $2.9
million has been requested to complete the move, but at the time of our
review, Air Force Space Command officials did not know from which fiscal
year these additional funds would be allocated. Moreover, costs for any
needed security upgrades at Vandenberg have not yet been determined,
pending a security assessment that is scheduled to be completed in August
2007. According to Air Force Space Command officials, the first phase of
the equipment move has been completed, and the equipment is operating at
Vandenberg. The remaining equipment is scheduled to be moved by October
2007. Air Force Space Command officials expect that the relocation will
enable them to reduce future costs for systems modernization and
maintenance and for contractor operations. Moreover, these officials
stated that the space mission does not require "hardening" from nuclear
attack and does not have to be located in Cheyenne Mountain.
U.S. Strategic Command Relocation
The costs to relocate the missile warning mission from Cheyenne Mountain
to Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, have not yet been developed.
According to USSTRATCOM officials, an ongoing site survey scheduled for
completion in late May 2007 will determine the security requirements, and
a subsequent engineering study will develop the estimated costs of the
planned relocation. USSTRATCOM decided to move its missile warning mission
to get away from the mountain's legacy computer systems and acquire a more
modern net-centric system using distributed nodes.
Security Implications and Associated Risks of the Proposed Relocation
Have Not Been Fully Determined
After reviewing initial risk and vulnerability assessments conducted by
USNORTHCOM in early 2006, the Commander accepted the risk of integrating
the two command centers, but the full security implications and the
associated risks of the proposed relocation will not be known until at
least September 2007, following the completion of ongoing security
assessments and the designation of a protection level for the new command
center. An electromagnetic pulse hardening assessment, a physical security
assessment of the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters building, and the
designation of a protection level for the new command center are in
progress. If the protection level designation requirements cannot be met
for replicating the desired systems due to resource or funding
constraints, waivers will be needed to proceed with the planned
integration or specific systems may remain in Cheyenne Mountain.
Initial Security Assessments
In January 2006, USNORTHCOM conducted a classified risk assessment^14 on
the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters building at Peterson Air Force Base.
As a result of this risk analysis, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have taken some
steps to mitigate known vulnerabilities to the headquarters building from
potential threats, which exist regardless of the command center
integration. For example, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have limited the access to
backup generators and the garage of the headquarters building.
Additionally, in March 2006, USNORTHCOM conducted a classified risk
assessment^15 that compared the vulnerability of the Cheyenne Mountain
Operations Center to the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters building. After
seeing these initial security assessments based on current and projected
threats, the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander deemed that the risk incurred
by integrating the two command centers was acceptable.
USNORTHCOM also contracted with Sandia National Laboratories to determine
the security implications of moving assigned missions to Peterson Air
Force Base. Sandia's December 2006 classified report^16 analyzed four
different options for moving the missions. Sandia's report recommended
replicating some of the computer systems in Cheyenne Mountain because this
solution would require a lower protection level than moving all computer
systems and would cost less. However, a USNORTHCOM official told us that
the Commander is still considering other options and additional security
assessments are ongoing.
Ongoing Security Assessments
Two security assessments related to moving functions from Cheyenne
Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base are underway. First, Sandia National
Laboratories is assessing the cost associated with hardening computer
terminals used to track air, missile, and space events, and examining the
methods needed to protect those terminals against man-made and natural
threats. The results of this assessment, which is scheduled to be
completed in May 2007, will enable the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander to
assess the feasibility of moving these terminals. Second, according to an
Air Force Space Command official, the Air Force is conducting a Systems
Effectiveness Assessment that will determine the effectiveness of the
security system at NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters to detect, delay,
deny, and neutralize a threat; however, the assessment will not
specifically examine procedures for protecting against a
chemical/biological attack. After the completion of this assessment, the
leadership will be able to develop an actionable plan with cost estimates
to build a system to protect the building at those levels through the
conceptual design process. USNORTHCOM officials expect the results of this
assessment in September 2007.
^14U.S. Northern Command, Risk Assessment Report (Peterson Air Force Base,
Colo.: January 2006).
^15U.S. Northern Command, Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center/Building 2
Vulnerability Assessment against Terrorist Attacks (Peterson Air Force
Base, Colo.: March 2006).
^16Sandia National Laboratories, Phase 2: Security Assessment Results and
Conceptual Security Designs for North American Aerospace Defense Command
and United States Northern Command, (Albuquerque, N.Mex.: December 2006).
According to a USNORTHCOM official, a complete protection level study has
never been conducted on the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters building.
USNORTHCOM is in the process of completing a Protection Level Designation
Matrix that includes information on the threat to the headquarters
building and its significance to the United States' warfighting
capability. This tool will help the Department of the Air Force determine
a protection level for the building. An Air Force Space Command official
said that if NORAD and USNORTHCOM cannot meet the protection level
requirements for the integrated command center due to resource or funding
constraints, they will have to request waivers and develop a mitigation
strategy. He added that it could take up to 24 months to get the completed
security system in place if it was fully funded.
According to the Deputy Director of Operations of the NORAD and USNORTHCOM
Command Center, the renovation of the command center is not dependent upon
the decision regarding the appropriate protection level. This official
stated the protection level requirements are focused on external
vulnerabilities and address issues such as cameras, bollards for stand-off
distances, and additional security forces personnel. Nonetheless, one
component of the renovation will depend on the results of the ongoing
electromagnetic pulse hardening assessment, but this will affect only two
of the many systems in the command centers. The Deputy Director of
Operations stated that he does not anticipate having to delay the
renovation to await any report results but will incorporate all accepted
recommendations into the renovation of the integrated command center. He
said that the contractor has been given the authority to proceed with
renovation on June 11, 2007. It is scheduled for completion in December
2007.
Conclusions
The proposed realignment of functions from Cheyenne Mountain represents a
major transformation for NORAD and USNORTHCOM. Without benefit of an
analysis of operational effects of the proposed moves, the completed
security assessments, and final protection level designation to inform
him, it is unclear what level of risk the Commander is accepting in
integrating the two command centers. Furthermore, the costs associated
with any needed security upgrades are not known and it is unclear whether
resources and funding are available to meet the protection level
requirements. Without knowing the complete security effects and cost to
replicate the functions, neither DOD nor Congress has adequate information
to assess the risks in relation to the costs of moving functions from
Cheyenne Mountain.
Matters for Congressional Consideration
GAO is not making any recommendations for executive action. However,
Congress should consider restricting DOD's authority to use funds to
renovate new locations to accept functions designated to move out of
Cheyenne Mountain until such time as all security analyses are complete,
the full costs of the move are determined, and DOD provides Congress with
an analysis of the operational effects of the proposed realignments.
Agency Comments
We received technical comments from DOD, which we incorporated as
appropriate. In their technical comments, NORAD and USNORTHCOM noted that
the new commander clarified that the relocation was initiated by mission
inefficiencies, not cost savings, and is required to increase unity of
effort and operational effectiveness. Further, USNORTHCOM noted that the
synergies gained through consolidation of missions into a single command
center are essential for an effective response to the full spectrum of
threats to the United States. Nevertheless, our review showed that NORAD
and USNORTHCOM did not fully analyze the costs and operational effects of
the proposed move, and, therefore, we are including a matter for
congressional consideration.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Secretary of the Air Force; and the
Commanders of NORAD and USNORTHCOM and USSTRATCOM. We will make copies
available to others upon request. This report will be available at no
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