Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues
for Congressional Oversight (24-MAY-07, GAO-07-801SP).		 
                                                                 
Since 2001, the United States has appropriated over $15 billion  
to help secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Afghanistan. In	 
February 2007, the administration requested $12.3 billion in	 
additional funding to accelerate some of these efforts to prevent
the conflict-ridden nation from once again becoming a safe haven 
for terrorists and from devolving into a narco-state. More than  
50 nations, including the United States, and several multilateral
organizations are engaged in securing, stabilizing, and 	 
reconstructing Afghanistan. Progress has been made in areas such 
as economic growth, infrastructure development, and training of  
the Afghan army and police, but after more than 5 years of U.S.  
and international efforts, the overall security situation in this
poor and ethnically diverse country has not improved and,	 
moreover, has deteriorated significantly in the last year. The	 
lack of security limits the success of efforts to stabilize and  
rebuild Afghanistan. Direct challenges to these efforts include a
resurgence of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan	 
security forces, inadequate infrastructure, limited government	 
capacity, corruption, a largely illiterate and untrained labor	 
force, a dramatic increase in drug production, and a lack of	 
viable licit economic opportunities. Since 2003, we have issued  
five reports on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan--one on food and	 
agricultural assistance, two on reconstruction assistance, one on
efforts to establish Afghan national security forces, and one on 
drug control programs. We identified programmatic improvements	 
that were needed, as well as many obstacles that limited success 
and should be taken into consideration in program design and	 
implementation. A key improvement we identified in most of the	 
U.S. efforts was the need for improved planning, including the	 
development of strategic plans with elements such as measurable  
goals, specific time frames, cost estimates, and identification  
of external factors that could significantly affect efforts. Some
additional needed improvements we identified include better	 
coordination among the United States and other donor nations,	 
more flexible options for program implementation, and timelier	 
project implementation. We also concluded that several obstacles,
especially deteriorating security and the limited institutional  
capacity of the Afghan government, challenge the effectiveness of
U.S. efforts.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-801SP					        
    ACCNO:   A69907						        
  TITLE:     Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan:   
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight				 
     DATE:   05/24/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Congressional oversight				 
	     Drug trafficking					 
	     Economic stabilization				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International organizations			 
	     International relations				 
	     Police training					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     Afghanistan					 

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GAO-07-801SP

   

     * [1]Demographics and Development Indicators
     * [2]Natural Resources
     * [3]Economy
     * [4]Prior Recommendations
     * [5]Oversight Questions
     * [6]Oversight Questions
     * [7]Prior Recommendation
     * [8]Oversight Questions
     * [9]Prior Recommendation
     * [10]Oversight Questions
     * [11]Prior Recommendations
     * [12]Oversight Questions
     * [13]GAO Contacts
     * [14]Staff Acknowledgments
     * [15]GAO's Mission
     * [16]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [17]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [18]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [19]Congressional Relations
     * [20]Public Affairs

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

May 2007

SECURING, STABILIZING, AND RECONSTRUCTING AFGHANISTAN

Key Issues for Congressional Oversight

GAO-07-801SP

Contents

Letter 1

Enclosure I Afghanistan Facts and Figures 9
Demographics and Development Indicators 10
Natural Resources 10
Economy 11
Enclosure II U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip the Afghan National Security
Forces Face Several Challenges 13
Prior Recommendations 16
Oversight Questions 17
Enclosure III International Security Forces Limited by Several Factors 19
Oversight Questions 22
Enclosure IV Worsening Security and Other Factors Hinder U.S.
Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan 23
Prior Recommendation 25
Oversight Questions 25
Enclosure V Progress Establishing a Working Judicial System Lags behind
the Other Security Pillars 26
Prior Recommendation 27
Oversight Questions 27
Enclosure VI Reconstruction Efforts Have Lacked Strategic Focus and Are
Constrained by Security Concerns 28
Prior Recommendations 31
Oversight Questions 32
Enclosure VII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 33

Tables

Table 1: Summary of Prior GAO Findings on Afghanistan 3
Table 2: Growth of Afghanistan's Economy, 2000-2005 11
Table 3: Defense and State Support for Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal
Years 2002-2008 13
Table 4: USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Fiscal Years
2002-2008, by Program Category 29

Figures

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan 9
Figure 2: Trucks Purchased for the Afghan National Army 16
Figure 3: PRTs and Regional Commands in Afghanistan 20
Figure 4: AEF Using a U.S.-Provided Tractor to Eradicate Opium Poppy 24
Figure 5: Cash-for-Work Cobblestone Road Project 30

Abbreviations

AEF Afghan Eradication Force
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
CERP Commanders' Emergency Response Program
Defense Department of Defense
GDP gross domestic product
IG Inspectors General
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODA official development assistance
PEP Poppy Elimination Program
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
State Department of State
UN United Nations

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

May 24, 2007

Congressional Committees

As the United States reviews plans to accelerate its efforts to secure,
stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan, I have enclosed a series of issue
papers for your consideration. These papers are based on the continuing
and prior work of GAO on Afghanistan, which we have provided to the
Congress since June 2003.

Since 2001, the United States has appropriated over $15 billion to help
secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Afghanistan.^1 In February 2007, the
administration requested $12.3 billion in additional funding to accelerate
some of these efforts to prevent the conflict-ridden nation from once
again becoming a safe haven for terrorists and from devolving into a
narco-state. More than 50 nations, including the United States, and
several multilateral organizations are engaged in securing, stabilizing,
and reconstructing Afghanistan. Progress has been made in areas such as
economic growth, infrastructure development, and training of the Afghan
army and police, but after more than 5 years of U.S. and international
efforts, the overall security situation in this poor and ethnically
diverse country has not improved and, moreover, has deteriorated
significantly in the last year. The lack of security limits the success of
efforts to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Direct challenges to these
efforts include a resurgence of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of
Afghan security forces, inadequate infrastructure, limited government
capacity, corruption, a largely illiterate and untrained labor force, a
dramatic increase in drug production, and a lack of viable licit economic
opportunities. Furthermore, these efforts are complicated by regional
influences, and the recent transfer of the security mission to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF).

Since 2003, we have issued five reports on U.S. efforts in
Afghanistan--one on food and agricultural assistance, two on
reconstruction assistance, one on efforts to establish Afghan national
security forces, and one on drug control programs.^2 We identified
programmatic improvements that were needed, as well as many obstacles that
limited success and should be taken into consideration in program design
and implementation (see table 1). A key improvement we identified in most
of the U.S. efforts was the need for improved planning, including the
development of strategic plans with elements such as measurable goals,
specific time frames, cost estimates, and identification of external
factors that could significantly affect efforts. Some additional needed
improvements we identified include better coordination among the United
States and other donor nations, more flexible options for program
implementation, and timelier project implementation. We also concluded
that several obstacles, especially deteriorating security and the limited
institutional capacity of the Afghan government, challenge the
effectiveness of U.S. efforts.

^1This does not include the cost of U.S. military operations.

^2GAO, Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to
Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability, [21]GAO-03-607
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003); Afghanistan Reconstruction:
Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress;
Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed, [22]GAO-04-403 (Washington, D.C.:
June 2, 2004); Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress,
Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten
Achievement of U.S. Goals, [23]GAO-05-742 (Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2005); Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have
Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, [24]GAO-05-575
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005); Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite
Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals,
[25]GAO-07-78 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2006).

Table 1: Summary of Prior GAO Findings on Afghanistan

                   Key programmatic improvements                              
Areas of focus  needed                            Obstacles                
Emergency food  (1) Develop joint U.S.-Afghan     (1) Unstable security    
assistance      Interagency strategic focus and   situation.               
                   plan.                                                      
                                                     (2) Control by warlords  
                   (2) Consider more flexible        of much of the country.  
                   procurement and distribution                               
                   options.                          (3) Growth of opium      
                                                     production.              
                   (3) Improve coordination.                                  
                                                     (4) Inadequate           
                                                     international resources. 
Afghanistan     (1) Develop comprehensive         (1) Deteriorating        
reconstruction  operational strategy/strategic    security.                
                   plan.                                                      
                                                     (2) Growth of opium      
                   (2) Improve financial data.       production.              
                                                                              
                   (3) Improve coordination.         (3) Inadequate           
                                                     resources.               
                   (4) Develop performance                                    
                   management plan for USAID in      (4) Delayed funding.     
                   Afghanistan.                                               
                                                     (5) Poor contractor      
                   (5) Require performance           performance and limited  
                   management plans from             capacity.                
                   contractors.                                               
                                                                              
                   (6) Communicate performance                                
                   information.                                               
Afghan army and (1) Develop detailed plans for    (1) Deteriorating        
police          completing the training and       security.                
                   equipping of the Afghan army and                           
                   police.                           (2) Limited Afghan       
                                                     capacity.                
                   (2) Help ensure congruent                                  
                   progress in all security pillars. (3) Lack of an effective 
                                                     judiciary.               
                                                                              
                                                     (4) Growth of opium      
                                                     production.              
                                                                              
                                                     (5) Continued presence   
                                                     of armed militias.       
Drug control    (1) Minimize project delays.      (1) Deteriorating        
                                                     security.                
                                                                              
                                                     (2) Limited Afghan       
                                                     capacity.                
                                                                              
                                                     (3) Lack of              
                                                     infrastructure, educated 
                                                     populace, and            
                                                     functioning governmental 
                                                     institutions.            

Source: GAO.

Responsiveness to our recommendations for programmatic improvements
varied. For example, officials from the Departments of Defense (Defense)
and State (State) generally concurred with the recommendation in our 2005
report on efforts to establish an Afghan army and police that detailed
plans would facilitate more effective management of resources and promote
better long-term planning. As of May 2007, however, the departments had
not provided us with such plans. On the other hand, in response to
recommendations in our 2004 and 2005 Afghanistan reconstruction reports,
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) developed a
strategic plan and performance management plans and the agency's planning
and performance management for Afghanistan are now more thorough.

Progress to date has been mixed in all areas we have reported on,
including reform of Afghanistan's security sector. We reported that
progress needs to be congruent in all five pillars of the security reform
agenda established by the United States and several coalition partners.
These pillars included: creating a national army, reconstituting the
police, establishing a working judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, and
demobilizing the Afghan militias. The United States has been involved to
some degree with each of the five pillars and initially was charged with
taking the lead in establishing the Afghan army, but has since allocated
significant resources to reconstituting the police and countering the
illicit drug trade. While some progress has been made in each pillar, the
United States and its coalition partners continue to face challenges.
Although some army and police units have been trained and equipped,
Defense reports that none are capable of independent operations,
Afghanistan still has no formal national judicial system for the police to
rely upon, opium poppy cultivation is at record levels, and the Afghan
police often find themselves facing better armed drug traffickers and
militias.

In the absence of national security forces capable of independently
providing security for the country, ISAF is helping to provide security
for Afghanistan. However, ISAF's ability to do so is limited by a number
of factors, such as national restrictions on its component forces and
shortages in troops and equipment. Lastly, though reconstruction
assistance helped Afghanistan elect its first president, return millions
of children to school, and repatriate millions of refugees, Afghanistan
continues to face reconstruction challenges, which are exacerbated by the
security-related concerns described above.

Defense, State, and USAID officials have suggested that securing,
stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan will take at least a decade
and require continuing international assistance. If the recent
administration budget proposals for Afghanistan are approved, the United
States will increase funding for Afghanistan well beyond earlier
estimates. Until recently, Defense's plans for training and equipping the
Afghan army and police, called the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),
were based on the assumption that the insurgency in Afghanistan would
decline and the overall security situation would improve. However, Defense
revised its plans to adapt to the deteriorating security situation and to
rapidly increase the ability of the ANSF to operate with less coalition
support. These modified plans call for a total of $7.6 billion for the
ANSF in 2007, which is over a threefold increase compared with fiscal year
2006 and represents more than all of the U.S. assistance for the ANSF in
fiscal years 2002 through 2006 combined. The costs of these and other
efforts will require difficult trade-offs for decision makers as the
United States faces competing demands for its resources, such as securing
and stabilizing Iraq, in the years ahead.

Significant oversight will be needed to help ensure the Congress has
visibility over the cost and progress of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The
enclosures that follow provide background information on Afghanistan and
discuss suggested areas for additional oversight on the following topics:

           o efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces,
           o international security forces,
           o counternarcotics,
           o Afghanistan's judicial system, and
           o reconstruction.

           These enclosures are based on our completed Afghanistan related
           work and incorporate updated information from current budget and
           program documents. We also discussed these topics with cognizant
           Defense, State, and USAID officials involved in securing,
           stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan. Additionally, we met
           with U.S. Central Command officials, who provided the current
           status of (1) their efforts to train and equip the ANSF and (2)
           the recent transition of the security mission from U.S. to ISAF
           control. Moreover, we met with experts from various academic and
           research institutions and reviewed their reports related to
           Afghanistan. Finally, we provided a draft of this report to the
           relevant agencies for advanced review. Each agency informed us
           that they were not providing formal comments. However, each
           provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as
           appropriate. We conducted our review from January through May 2007
           in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
           standards.

           We are sending copies of this report to Members of Congress and
           cognizant congressional committees. We will also make copies
           available to others on request. In addition, this report will be
           available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
           http://www.gao.gov .

           If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
           contact Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, Managing Director,
           International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-3031 or
           [email protected] , or Charles Michael Johnson at
           (202) 512-7331 or [email protected]. Contact points for our
           Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found
           on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
           are listed in enclosure VII.

           David M. Walker
		   Comptroller General of the United States

           Enclosures

           List of Congressional Committees
		   
		   The Honorable Carl Levin
           Chairman
           The Honorable John McCain
           Ranking Member
           Committee on Armed Services
           United States Senate

           The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.
           Chairman
           The Honorable Richard D. Lugar
           Ranking Member
           Committee on Foreign Relations
           United States Senate

           The Honorable Daniel Inouye
           Chairman
           The Honorable Ted Stevens
           Ranking Member
           Subcommittee on Defense
           Committee on Appropriations
           United States Senate

           The Honorable Patrick Leahy
           Chairman
           The Honorable Judd Gregg
           Ranking Member
           Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
           Committee on Appropriations

           United States Senate
           The Honorable Ike Skelton
           Chairman
           The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
           Ranking Member
           Committee on Armed Services
           House of Representatives

           The Honorable Tom Lantos
           Chairman
           The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
           Ranking Member
           Committee on Foreign Affairs
           House of Representatives

           The Honorable John P. Murtha
           Chairman
           The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
           Ranking Member
           Subcommittee on Defense
           Committee on Appropriations
           House of Representatives

           The Honorable Nita M. Lowey
           Chairwoman
           The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
           Ranking Member
           Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
           Committee on Appropriations
           House of Representatives

           The Honorable John F. Tierney
           Chairman
           Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
           Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
           House of Representatives

           Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with
           limited natural resources. It is bordered by Pakistan to the east
           and south; Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the
           north; and Iran to the west (see fig. 1). Afghanistan's land area
           is about 647,500 square kilometers, which is slightly smaller than
           the state of Texas.

Enclosure I: Afghanistan Facts and Figures

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan

Conflict has ravaged Afghanistan for nearly three decades. The Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and withdrew only after waging a
prolonged war against Afghan resistance groups. Following a protracted
civil war, by 1998, most of Afghanistan was under the control of the
fundamentalist Taliban group. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan became a
haven for terrorists. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the
United States, several allies, and Afghanistan's Northern Alliance
forcibly removed the Taliban regime from Afghanistan for providing a safe
haven to al Qaeda terrorists. In late 2001, a conference in Bonn, Germany
established a process for political reconstruction that included the
adoption of a new constitution and called for democratic elections. On
December 7, 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected
president of Afghanistan. The National Assembly was inaugurated on
December 19, 2005.

Demographics and Development Indicators

Afghanistan's population, estimated at over 31 million, is ethnically and
linguistically diverse. Afghanistan's largest ethnic groups include the
Pashtun (42 percent), Tajik (27), Hazara (9), Uzbek (8), Aimak (4), and
Turkmen (3). Although some ethnic groups are predominant in specific
regions, such as the Pashtun along much of the border with Pakistan, many
regions are populated by multiple ethnic groups. Over 30 languages are
spoken in Afghanistan, but most of the population speaks either
Dari/Persian (46 percent) or Pashtu (42). The population is largely rural
and mostly uneducated. Almost half of the population is under the age of
15. Islam is the predominant religion--80 percent of the population is
Sunni and 19 percent is Shi'a.

Development indicators published by the World Bank and the United Nations
(UN) rank Afghanistan at the bottom of virtually every category. Life
expectancy at birth is 43 years of age. More than 20 percent of all Afghan
children die before the age of 5, of which a third die soon after birth.
The per capita income for Afghanistan is estimated to be about $200 per
year, excluding income from illicit drug production and trafficking, and
over 70 percent of Afghan adults are illiterate. According to the World
Bank, limited available data suggest that more than a third of rural
households face chronic or temporary shortages of food.

Natural Resources

Resource limitations pose constraints on development in Afghanistan. Only
12 percent of the land in Afghanistan is arable, the country has limited
access to fresh water, and potable water supplies are inadequate. Unlike
some other countries in the region, Afghanistan does not produce oil or
have substantial oil reserves. Instead, much of the population relies on
wood for fuel, which has led to rapid deforestation and soil degradation.
In addition, much of the country is prone to damaging natural hazards,
including earthquakes in the Hindu Kush mountains, flooding, and droughts.

Economy

After the fall of the Taliban government in late 2001, the Afghan economy
grew rapidly as a new government was established and international aid
flowed into the country. While limited economic statistics are available,
the World Bank estimates that the Afghan economy grew approximately 16
percent in 2003, 8 percent in 2004, and 14 percent in 2005 (see table 2).
Inflation has fluctuated, from around 10 percent in 2004 and 2005 to as
low as 4 percent in December 2006 due to a decline in international energy
prices, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).^1 According to
IMF and private economic consulting firms, while the economy is expected
to grow rapidly over the next few years, Afghanistan is still a very poor
country attempting to recover from decades of warfare and economic
neglect.

Table 2: Growth of Afghanistan's Economy, 2000-2005

Indicator                                    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (billions of                                  
constant 2000 U.S. dollars)                   N/A  2.7  4.4  4.9  6.1  7.3 
GDP growth (annual percent)                   N/A  N/A   29   16    8   14 
Official development assistance (ODA)                                      
(billions of constant 2000 U.S. dollars)      0.2  0.4  1.4  1.7  2.3  2.8 
Ratio of ODA to GDP (percent)                 N/A   17   32   35   37   38 

N/A = data unavailable

Source: GAO analysis of World Development Indicators data from the World
Bank.

Note: GDP is based on nondrug output. GDP growth is calculated based on
constant (inflation-adjusted) local currency (Afghani) values, not U.S.
dollars. ODA consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms
(net of repayments of principal) and grants.

^1In July 2006, IMF reported that substantial shortcomings continue to
affect Afghanistan's national accounts, balance of payments, monetary, and
social sector data. Given the security environment in Afghanistan and the
ongoing development of the statistical system's capacity, statistics
presented here for context and background should not be considered
completely reliable.

Since 2001, the Afghan economy has received large amounts of foreign
assistance. In 2005, the most recent year for which data are available,
official development assistance (foreign grants and concessional loans)
from international donors was $2.8 billion, or over a third the size of
the national economy. In addition, about 60 countries attended a January
2006 conference in London on the Afghanistan Compact, which maps out how
the international community will contribute to Afghanistan's future
development. Afghanistan has also received substantial reduction in its
external debt, which had totaled over $11 billion. However, according to
IMF, Afghanistan's ability to assume additional debt for development
purposes is limited due to Afghanistan's remaining debt and limited export
revenues.

In terms of international trade, Afghanistan's exports are dominated by
illicit narcotics (opium and its products, morphine and heroin), which
have an estimated total value of $2.7 billion to $2.8 billion per year,
according to the World Bank.^2 By contrast, officially recorded exports
are estimated at several hundred million dollars. The country is highly
import dependent for basic goods like petroleum products; construction
materials; machinery and equipment; medicines; textiles; and, in bad
harvest years, food, with imports financed largely by aid and (to a
considerable extent) illicit drug proceeds. According to the World Bank,
growth and diversification of legal exports will be critical for the
country's longer-term development success.

^2The World Bank reports that data are limited on the extent of production
and export of opium, given its illicit nature.

Enclosure II: U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip the Afghan National Security
Forces Face Several Challenges

In the wake of decades of war that left Afghanistan without an army or a
functioning police force, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and other coalition nations have been working to
develop the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police--referred
to as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)--to provide security for
Afghanistan. After several years of relative calm since the ousting of the
Taliban, security deteriorated significantly in 2006. The use of
improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings increased fourfold, with
approximately 130 suicide attacks launched by militants. This
deterioration in security has been blamed in part on the weakness of the
ANSF.

The United States has provided over $6 billion through fiscal year 2006 to
train and equip the Afghan army and police. Citing deteriorating security
in Afghanistan and the need to rapidly establish independent security
forces, the administration has requested $7.6 billion and $2.9 billion for
fiscal years 2007 and 2008, respectively, to accelerate efforts to train
and equip the ANSF (see table 3).

Table 3: Defense and State Support for Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal
Years 2002-2008

Dollars in                                                                        
millions                                                                          
                                   Fiscal years                                   
Assistance                                             2007                       
program      2002   2003   2004     2005     2006 request^a 2008request     Total 
Afghan      $76.9 $372.6 $723.7 $1,736.6   $768.0  $4,883.2    $1,903.7 $10,464.7 
army^b                                                                            
Afghan       25.5    5.0  223.9    813.9  1,293.7   2,730.6       948.9   6,041.5 
police                                                                            
Total      $102.4 $377.6 $947.6 $2,550.5 $2,061.7  $7,613.8    $2,852.6 $16,506.2 

Sources: Departments of Defense and State.

^aFiscal year 2007 includes approximately $1.6 billion that has been
appropriated and approximately $6 billion as requested by Defense in the
2007 Global War on Terror Supplemental Request.

^bAfghan army includes detainee operations.

According to Defense documents and discussions with Defense officials, the
2007 and 2008 budget requests, as well as the provision of sufficient
mentors and trainers, would allow Defense and State^1 to complete the
training and equipping of the ANSF by December 2008--almost a year
ahead of previous plans--at which time the United States would transition
its efforts to sustaining the ANSF. According to Defense progress reports
from March 2007, 21,600 combat troops^2 and 62,500^3 police officers and
patrolmen and women have been trained, equipped, and assigned. Therefore,
over the next 2 years,

           o Defense plans to complete the training and equipping of 70,000
           army personnel, including an additional 29,045 new combat troops
           (for a total of 50,645), and complete the establishment of an
           Afghan Ministry of Defense and military sustaining institutions;^4
           and
           o Defense and State plan to complete the training and equipping of
           82,000 police personnel--an increase of 20,000 over previous
           plans--including at least 19,500 new recruits, and complete the
           reform of Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior, which oversees the
           police.

^1Defense is responsible for training and equipping the Afghan army.
Defense and State share responsibility for police training.

           These plans are ambitious and require both the rapid expansion of
           efforts to train and equip new recruits and substantial
           improvements in the current forces' capabilities to operate
           independently. According to Defense progress reports from March
           2007, no army combat units are fully capable of operating
           independently and less than 20 percent are fully capable of
           leading operations with coalition support. Defense reports that no
           Afghan police units are fully capable of operating independently
           and that only 1 of 72 police units is fully capable to lead
           operations with coalition support.^5 Moreover, according to
           Defense officials, due to attrition and absenteeism, the number of
           forces on hand is less than those trained. For example, although
           20,400 combat troops had been assigned to combat units as of
           mid-January 2007, Defense officials stated that approximately
           15,000 were actually present for duty.^6
		   
^2We note that in early 2005, Defense reported that it had provided basic
training for 18,300 combat troops and projected that it could train an
additional 27,700 combat troops by the fall of 2007, for a total of 46,000
combat troops (see [28]GAO-05-575 ).

^3Defense officials indicated that Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior
reports the number of police assigned and that these numbers may not be
reliable. The Ministry of Interior Forces include, among others: uniformed
police, border police, counternarcotics police, and personnel for
sustaining purposes, such as training, education, and procurement.

^4Sustaining institutions include medical, logistics, intelligence, and
recruiting units.

^5Although Defense reports that no army or police units are fully capable
of operating independently of coalition forces, Defense officials stated
that some units of the Afghan army have conducted successful operations
and State officials provided examples of successful police operations.

^6Defense officials state that approximately 40 percent of the absences
were authorized and 60 percent were unauthorized.		   

           Furthermore, efforts to equip the Afghan security forces have
           faced problems since their inception. In 2004 and 2005, Defense
           planned to equip the Afghan army with donated and salvaged Soviet
           weapons and armored vehicles. However, much of this equipment
           proved to be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other
           equipment. In 2006, Defense began providing the forces with U.S.
           equipment--an effort that faces challenges.^7 As security has
           deteriorated, equipment needs have changed, and their associated
           costs have increased. For example, the Afghan army was initially
           provided with pickup trucks, such as those in figure 2, and
           9-millimeter pistols; more recently, Defense has begun providing
           more protective equipment, such as Humvees, and more lethal
           weapons, such as rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.

           Moreover, procedures to ensure that the intended recipients
           receive, retain, and use their equipment as intended have lagged.
           For example, the Defense and State Inspectors General (IG)
           reported that when the United States first began training the
           police, State's contractor provided trainees with a one-time issue
           of uniforms and nonlethal equipment upon graduation. However, many
           students sold their equipment before they reached their duty
           stations, and the program was terminated. The IGs reported that
           most equipment is now distributed from Kabul to police units'
           provincial headquarters, but hoarding equipment is reportedly a
           large problem, maintenance is insufficient, and end-user
           accountability of distributed equipment is limited.^8
		   
^7These efforts began in 2005; however, the equipment did not arrive until
2006.

^8U.S. Departments of Defense and State Inspectors General, Interagency
Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness (Washington, D.C.,
Nov. 14, 2006).

           Figure 2: Trucks Purchased for the Afghan National Army

           In addition, the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which is responsible
           for managing the country's national police force, faces a number
           of problems that have required reform or restructuring. According
           to officials from State and its police training contractor, these
           problems include pervasive corruption; an outdated rank structure
           overburdened with senior-level officers; lack of communication and
           control between central command and the regions, provinces, and
           districts; pay disparity between the army and police; and a lack
           of professional standards and internal discipline. According to
           State, the Ministry of Interior is in the process of implementing
           pay and rank reforms. Reforms to date include removal of over
           2,000 high-ranking officers (colonel and above) and steps to make
           pay for rank-and-file police officers more equitable. Additional
           planned reforms include establishing parity between the salaries
           of police and military and selecting police officers based on
           merit rather than loyalty and local influence.
		   
		   Prior Recommendations

           In our 2005 report on the Afghan security forces, we recommended
           that, because of Afghanistan's prolonged conflict and its limited
           financial resources, the Secretaries of Defense and State develop
           detailed plans for proposed the plans include clearly defined
           objectives and performameasures; milestones for achieving stated
           objectives; future funding requirements; and a strategy for
           sustaining the results achieved, inclutransitioning program
           responsibility to Afghanistan. We suggested that the Secretaries
           provide this information to the Congress when the executive branch
           next requests funding for the Afghan army or police forces.
		   
		   In addition, because reform in the other pillars of the Afghan
		   security sector--building an effective judiciary, curbing the
		   production and trafficking of illicit narcotics, and disarming and
           reintegrating militiafighters--is critical to the success of the
           army and police programs, wrecommended that the Secretaries of
           Defense and State work with the other nations to help ensure that
           progress in the other pillars is congruewith the progress made in
           the army and police programs. We suggested that the Secretaries
           regularly report to the Congress--no less than annually--on the
           progress made in addressing these other security
           recommendations, both suggested that existing reportingaddressed
           the need to report their plans for completing and sustaining
           thAfghan army and police forces. Our analysis of Defense and State
           reporting to the Congress, however, indicated that the
           departmentshave the detailed plans as we recommended. In recent
           months, we again asked Defense and State for plans that are
           responsive to the recommendation. Though both Defense and State
           officials asdetailed plans for fielding fully functioning Afghan
           army and police forceby a stated end date have been done, they
           have not provided them to us. We continue to believe that
           developing and following such plans and ensuring concurrent
           progress in the other security pillars is essential tthe overall
           future success of the Afghan security effort.

           Oversight Questions
		   
		   oWhat is the overall strategic plan for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan?
		   What is the operational concept for the ANSF? How are U.S. plans to train
           and equip the ANSF incorporated into the strategic plan for
           Afghanistan?
		   
		   oHow much funding has the United States provided to train and equip
		   the ANSF? How do Defense and State track funding for the ANSF,
           including obligations and expenditures? What equipment, training,
           and services hasthe United States provided through drawdowns and
           as excess defense articles?
           
		   o How much funding, training, equipment, or other services have
           the other coalition partners provided to train and equip the ANSF?
           
		   o What is the anticipated total cost to fully train and equip the
           ANSF? What is the estimated annual cost to sustain these forces,
           and who will pay for it? What are the plans for Afghanistan to
           take program and financial responsibility for its army and police?
           
		   o What have been the results to date of efforts to train and equip
           the ANSF? What and how much equipment has been provided? How does
           the United States track where it is and how it is used? How many
           troops have been trained and equipped? Of those, how many are
           available for duty? What are the capabilities of these troops to
           operate independently of coalition troops?
           
		   o What performance measures are used to assess progress in
           developing Afghan army sustaining institutions? What progress has
           been made? What is the desired end state, and what is the
           anticipated time frame for completion?
           
		   o What performance measures are used to assess progress in
           reforming the Afghan Ministry of Interior? What progress has been
           made? What is the desired end state, and what is the anticipated
           time frame for completion?
		   
		   Enclosure III: International Security Forces Limited by Several
		   Factors

           Pending the creation of functioning Afghan army and police forces,
           the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security
           Assistance Force (ISAF), with approximately 35,000 troops from 37
           nations,^1 was formed to assist the government of Afghanistan in
           creating a safe and secure environment to enable reconstruction.
           ISAF was formed in December 2001 under a United Nations (UN)
           mandate to provide security in Kabul and its surrounding area, and
           to assist Afghanistan in creating a safe and secure environment.
           In 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to
           (1) assume command and control for the ISAF mission and (2) assume
           responsibility for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in
           northern and western Afghanistan. Although NATO had difficulty
           persuading nations to provide the resources needed for these
           teams, as of November 2006, it oversees 25 PRTs throughout
           Afghanistan, which are structured around five regional commands,
           as shown in figure 3. Twelve PRTs are led by the United States.
           The PRTs' mission is to assist the government of Afghanistan to
           extend its authority; to facilitate the development of a stable
           and secure environment; and, through military presence, enable
           security-sector reform and reconstruction efforts. Each PRT has a
           lead country assigned, but PRTs are joint military-civilian
           organizations and often include representatives from other ISAF
           member states. For example, the United States has officials from
           the Departments of State and Agriculture and the U.S. Agency for
           International Development (USAID) at many of the PRTs to observe
           and assist in reconstruction efforts.
		   
1These include about 14,000 U.S. troops and 21,000 troops from the 36 other
coalition member countries. In January 2007, several NATO countries pledged
to send additional troops.		   

Figure 3: PRTs and Regional Commands in Afghanistan

ISAF's responsibilities and efforts in Afghanistan are increasing.
However, its ability to provide security for the country is limited by a
number of factors. Although NATO has command over ISAF troops, control is
ultimately exercised by each nation. ISAF's rules of engagement are
heavily influenced by limitations imposed by national governments
(referred to as national caveats) that, for example, prevent troops from
some countries from performing certain tasks or missions, or moving
between geographic areas of operation. As a result, the burden of combat,
when it arises, falls disproportionately on the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Romania, Australia, and Estonia, which
have forces in or lead PRTs in the more hostile regions of Afghanistan.
Furthermore, some ISAF troops are limited by shortages of certain types of
critical equipment, and most do not have strategic capacity, such as
airlift.

Only the military elements of PRTs are integrated into the ISAF chain of
command. Therefore, each lead nation can have its own concept, priorities,
and, in some cases, national caveats that guide specific PRT operations.
For some PRTs, particularly in the more volatile south and east, providing
security is the priority, but for others in more secure areas,
reconstruction is the highest priority. Overall, PRTs aim to contribute to
stability and facilitate reconstruction via activities such as patrolling,
monitoring, influence, and mediation. Many have also participated to some
extent in specific reconstruction projects by providing funding or other
assistance, particularly in areas where nongovernmental organizations have
been unable to operate.

The U.S.-led PRTs facilitate reconstruction by providing security but also
devote substantial resources to reconstruction projects that are designed
to advance U.S. security objectives. U.S. commanders, including those
leading PRTs, have access to funds provided under Defense's Commanders'
Emergency Response Program (CERP). According to Defense officials, in
fiscal years 2005 and 2006, CERP funds for Afghanistan totaled $391
million, and the requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 are $231 million
and $210 million, respectively. According to the U.S. Central Command,
CERP-funded projects are intended to gain the confidence of local
residents and leaders and discourage them from cooperating with
insurgents. U.S. CERP funds have been used by PRT commanders for rapid
implementation of small-scale projects, such as providing latrines for a
school or a generator for a hospital, and do not require prior approval or
coordination at the federal level.

Oversight Questions

           o How do the national caveats placed on the various ISAF forces
           affect ISAF's ability to provide security for Afghanistan and the
           operations of the PRTs? What equipment shortages and capability
           limitations exist among the ISAF-member nations and how are they
           being addressed?
           o What reconstruction programs and projects do the various PRTs
           engage in? How do PRT lead nations manage their programs to ensure
           accountability?
           o How much funding has Defense provided for CERP-funded projects
           in Afghanistan? How are CERP funds being used in Afghanistan? How
           does Defense track CERP projects and ensure accountability for the
           use of these funds?
           o How does the United States coordinate its PRTs with those run by
           other coalition partners? How does the United States coordinate
           its CERP-funded PRT reconstruction projects with USAID and other
           donors (including nongovernmental organizations) who may be
           providing reconstruction assistance in the area?
		   
		   Enclosure IV: Worsening Security and Other Factors Hinder U.S.
		   Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan

           Combating illicit narcotics in Afghanistan is one of the five
           security pillars. Since 2002, the United States has provided over
           $1.5 billion to stem the production and trafficking of illicit
           drugs--primarily opiates--in Afghanistan. Despite U.S. and
           international efforts in these areas, the UN estimated that the
           number of hectares of opium poppy under cultivation grew by 50
           percent in 2006, and a record 6,100 metric tons of opium was
           produced. The UN estimated that the export value of opium and its
           derivatives--morphine and heroin--equaled about a third of
           Afghanistan's licit economy, with drug profits reportedly funding
           terrorists and other antigovernment entities. Initial estimates
           for 2007 indicate that the amount of opium poppy under cultivation
           will remain the same or possibly increase. The continued
           prevalence of opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking
           throughout Afghanistan imperils efforts to secure and stabilize
           the country.

           To combat opium poppy cultivation, drug trafficking, and their
           negative effects on Afghan institutions and society, the United
           States, working with allied governments, in 2005 developed a
           five-pillared counternarcotics strategy addressing (1) alternative
           livelihoods, (2) elimination and eradication, (3) interdiction,
           (4) law enforcement and justice reform, and (5) public
           information. USAID and State initiated a number of projects under
           each of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy's five pillars, but
           delays in implementation--due to the security situation, poor
           infrastructure, and other factors--limited progress. Many projects
           have not been in place long enough to fully assess progress toward
           the overall goal of significantly reducing poppy cultivation, drug
           production, and drug trafficking.

           Alternative livelihoods.  USAID implemented projects to provide
           economic alternatives to poppy production and thus reduce the
           amount of Afghanistan's economic activity attributable to the drug
           industry. Results varied in the three principal alternative
           livelihoods regions, in part because of the differing security
           risks and access to infrastructure.

           Elimination and eradication.  State supported the Afghan
           government's efforts to prevent poppy planting and eradicate poppy
           crops if prevention failed. State provided support for central and
           provincial eradication efforts (see fig. 4). Central government
           eradication efforts improved with the reorganization of the Afghan
           Eradication Force (AEF) into smaller, more mobile units and the
           addition of purchased and leased transport and logistical-support
           aircraft. However, in 2006, AEF's fielding was delayed because of
           coordination problems, reducing the amount of eradication
           possible. In addition, not all Poppy Elimination Program (PEP)
           teams, which were designed to help governors discourage farmers
           from growing poppy, were fully fielded.

           Figure 4: AEF Using a U.S.-Provided Tractor to Eradicate Opium
           Poppy

           Interdiction. State and Defense assisted Drug Enforcement
           Administration-led efforts to help build Afghan capacity to
           destroy drug labs, seize precursor chemicals and opiates, and
           arrest major traffickers. State and Defense also provided support
           for border security enhancements in neighboring countries and the
           counternarcotics police. In the neighboring countries of Pakistan,
           Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, State began border security
           projects.

           Law enforcement and justice reform. State supported the Afghan
           government's efforts to increase its capacity to arrest,
           prosecute, and punish traffickers and corrupt officials. State
           provided support for Department of Justice prosecutors, who helped
           develop and implement a new counternarcotics law; corrections
           reform, including training guards and refurbishing courthouses;
           and a planned justice center.

           Public information. State led a public information campaign
           intended to convince the Afghan populace to reject poppy
           cultivation and trade. However, because of delays with the PEP
           team implementation, the campaign was not able to rely on planned
           support from the teams.
		   
		   Prior Recommendation

           In our 2005 report on U.S. assistance for the Afghan army and
           police, we concluded that progress in the other security pillars
           was critical to eventually sustaining and maximizing the
           effectiveness of the army and police.^1 As we note in enclosure
           II, Defense and State have not specifically reported on progress
           in the counternarcotics or other security pillars, as we
           recommended.
		   
		   Oversight Questions

           o What is the current status of U.S. funding provided for
           counternarcotics in Afghanistan, and how much has been expended?
           What has this funding supported?
           o What is the status of the State- and USAID-funded
           counternarcotics programs? What has been accomplished in each of
           the five counternarcotics pillars?
           o What counternarcotics assistance have the Departments of Defense
           and Justice, including the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration,
           provided?
           o How will the Afghan counternarcotics strategy be adjusted if, as
           is expected, the 2007 poppy cultivation figures show no decrease?
		   
^1 [29]GAO-05-575 .

           Enclosure V: Progress Establishing a Working Judicial System Lags
		   behind the Other Security Pillars

           Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule
           of law is a prerequisite for effective policing. It is one of the
           five security pillars. However, according to donor officials, few
           linkages exist in Afghanistan between the Afghan judiciary and
           police, and the police have little ability to enforce judicial
           rulings. In addition, judges and prosecutors are not being exposed
           to police training and practices.

           Supported by the United States, other donors, and international
           organizations, Italy--initially the lead nation for reforming the
           judiciary--followed a three-pronged strategy: (1) developing and
           drafting legal codes, (2) training judges and prosecutors, and (3)
           renovating the country's physical legal infrastructure. However,
           according to Italian and U.S. government officials, the reform
           program was underfunded and understaffed.

           Nevertheless, Italy and the other donors made some progress in
           promoting reform. This included drafting a new criminal procedure
           code, training several hundred judges, and renovating courthouses.
           USAID officials indicated that they continue to have projects to
           develop a judicial code of conduct and to train both sitting and
           new judges. They also have projects to develop and implement
           uniform procedures and rules for courts and to establish a common
           curriculum for law courses. Also, as noted in enclosure IV, the
           United States has supported the Afghan government's efforts to
           increase its capacity to arrest, prosecute, and punish illicit
           drug traffickers and corrupt officials.

           However, these accomplishments and current efforts address only a
           portion of Afghanistan's overall need for judicial reform.
           Afghanistan's judicial sector is characterized by a conflicting
           mix of civil, religious, and customary laws, with too few trained
           judges, prosecutors, or other justice personnel. Furthermore, its
           penal system is nonfunctioning, and its buildings, official
           records, and essential office equipment and furniture have been
           damaged extensively. U.S. and other donor officials informed us
           that progress in rebuilding the judicial sector lags behind the
           other security pillars and that the reform effort is being
           undermined by systemic corruption at key national and provincial
           justice institutions.
		   
		   Prior Recommendation

           Although we did not specifically examine U.S. assistance efforts
           to help establish a working judiciary in Afghanistan, in our 2005
           report on U.S. assistance for the Afghan army and police, we
           concluded that progress in the other security pillars is critical
           to eventually sustaining and maximizing the effectiveness of the
           army and police.^1 As we note in enclosure II, Defense and State
           have not specifically reported on progress in the judicial or
           other security pillars, as we recommended.
		   
		   Oversight Questions

           o What is the status of efforts to develop a working judicial
           system in Afghanistan?
           o How much funding has the United States provided for
           Afghanistan's judicial system, and how much of that has been
           expended? What has this funding been used for?
           o What are the key obstacles to judicial reform, and how will they
           be addressed?
           o To what extent have the United States, its coalition partners,
           and the government of Afghanistan developed a strategy, clear
           objectives, and an estimate of the time and resources needed to
           complete justice sector reforms?
		   
^1 [30]GAO-05-575 .	

           Enclosure VI: Reconstruction Efforts Have Lacked Strategic Focus
		   and Are Constrained by Security Concerns
	   
           To date, the United States has provided about $4.4 billion for
           reconstruction in Afghanistan, and the administration has
           requested an additional $2.4 billion for fiscal years 2007 and
           2008. Reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, largely led by
           USAID with support from international donors and other U.S.
           government entities, helped Afghanistan elect its first president,
           return millions of children to school, and repatriate millions of
           refugees. However, the reconstruction needs of Afghanistan are
           immense, and reconstruction efforts face a number of challenges.
           Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest countries and ranks near
           the bottom of virtually every development indicator category, such
           as life expectancy; literacy; nutrition; and infant, child, and
           maternal mortality (see encl. I). Nearly three decades of war and
           extended drought have destroyed Afghanistan's infrastructure,
           economy, and government.

           U.S. reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan has taken place in
           three stages since the ouster of the Taliban. In 2002 and 2003,
           USAID initially focused on humanitarian and short-term assistance,
           such as assistance to displaced persons and food assistance, which
           helped avert widespread famine. Although USAID continues to
           provide some humanitarian assistance, this assistance is now a
           much smaller part of its program.

           In 2004, USAID expanded assistance to include quick impact
           projects, such as infrastructure projects. At that time, due to a
           variety of obstacles, especially security and limited Afghan
           capacity, USAID had not met all of its reconstruction targets in
           areas such as health, education, and infrastructure. The largest
           component of these reconstruction efforts was the construction of
           roads, which, after decades of neglect, were in disrepair or
           lacking altogether. The United States, Afghanistan, and
           international donors deemed road construction critical to economic
           growth and security.

           In recent years, USAID expanded Afghan reconstruction assistance
           to a comprehensive development package that focuses more on
           increasing Afghan capacity and aims to address a wide range of
           needs, such as agriculture, education, health, road construction,
           power generation, and others. As shown in table 4, USAID has
           allocated reconstruction assistance to 12 primary program
           categories, with more than $1.8 billion, or about 27 percent of
           U.S. reconstruction assistance, to roads.
		   

Table 4: USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Fiscal Years
2002-2008, by Program Category

 Dollars in                                                                      
 millions                                                                        
                                  Fiscal years                                   
                                                                         Percent 
 Program                                                    2008              of 
 category       2002 2003   2004   2005 2006 2007request request Total^a total^a 
 Roads           $51 $142   $354   $276 $255        $446    $338  $1,862      27 
 Power                                                                           
 generation        3    0     77    286   61         135     203     765      11 
 Alternative                                                                     
 livelihoods       3    1      5    185  121         211     121     647       9 
 Elections,                                                                      
 governance,                                                                     
 rule of law,                                                                    
 Office of                                                                       
 Transition                                                                      
 Initiatives      25   42    153    103   23         124      56     526       8 
 Support to                                                                      
 government of                                                                   
 Afghanistan      41   40    103    117   60          47      62     470       7 
 Health and                                                                      
 clinics           8   56     83    111   51          72      66     447       7 
 Education and                                                                   
 schools          19   21    104     86   49          62      54     395       6 
 Food                                                                            
 assistance      159   51     49     57   60          22      10     408       6 
 Economic                                                                        
 growth           21   12     84     91   46          68      61     382       6 
 Agriculture      27   56     50     77   27          55      31     324       5 
 Provincial                                                                      
 Reconstruction                                                                  
 Teams             0   11     56     85   20         117      30     319       5 
 Internally                                                                      
 displaced                                                                       
 persons         108   23     10      0    0           0       0     141       2 
 Other^b           7    7     45     37    5          15      16     131       2 
 Total          $471 $462 $1,173 $1,511 $778      $1,374  $1,048  $6,817     100 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.

^aTotals may not add due to rounding.

^bIncludes water, information technology, and program support.

USAID's road construction efforts include primary roads, including parts
of Afghanistan's ring road, and secondary and urban roads, some of which
connect to the ring road, as depicted in figure 5.

Figure 5: Cash-for-Work Cobblestone Road Project

Road reconstruction and construction has attracted considerable donor
assistance. As of January 2007, about $5.2 billion for transportation
infrastructure projects had been provided or promised by the United States
and more than 10 other donors. Nearly $4 billion of this was for 366
completed projects, including most of the ring road. The ring road
connects Kabul to Kandahar in the south, Herat in the east, and
Mazar-e-Sharif in the north, completing a circle or ring. The portion of
the ring road from Kabul to Kandahar was a signature project for
USAID--opening in December 2003 to much fanfare. The Kabul-Kandahar road
reduced travel time between the two cities from several days to 6 hours.
However, the U.S. Embassy has restricted official U.S. travel on the road
because of heightened security risks.

Because most reconstruction project evaluation has not yet taken place, it
is not clear whether the broad range of USAID's reconstruction programs in
Afghanistan has led to improved results in many sectors or whether, given
the obstacles USAID faces, the breadth of its efforts limits USAID's
ability to achieve significant results in a smaller set of priority areas.

In addition, many of USAID's reconstruction programs target specific
geographic areas. In 2005, we reported that two-thirds of obligated fiscal
year 2004 funds supported local projects in Afghanistan's 34 provinces,
but Kabul and Kandahar provinces received approximately 70 percent of
these funds, mainly for roads. More recently, alternative livelihood
programs have focused on providing economic alternatives in opium
poppy-growing areas. Further, the administration's proposed budget for
fiscal year 2008 specifies that some of the funding be provided for roads
in areas targeted by insurgents and for rural development in
poppy-producing regions. Focusing assistance on such targeted geographic
regions has resulted in some complaints that regions only receive
assistance if they have problems such as opium poppy cultivation or
heightened security concerns.

Prior Recommendations

In 2004, we recommended that the Administrator of USAID revise USAID's
strategy for its assistance program to Afghanistan.^1 Specifically, we
suggested that, among other things, the strategy should contain measurable
goals, specific time frames, and resource levels. We also recommended that
the Secretary of State produce an annual consolidated budget report and
semiannual obligation and expenditure reports. In response, USAID agreed
and has revised its operational strategy for Afghanistan much as we
suggested. State, on the other hand, disagreed and noted that it already
keeps the Congress informed through briefings, hearings, and mandated
reports. We disagreed at the time and continue to believe that regular
reporting of both obligations and expenditures for U.S. assistance to
Afghanistan would provide the Congress with a more complete picture of
what funds actually have been spent.

In 2005, we recommended that the Administrator of USAID (1) establish a
performance management plan that complies with USAID directives, (2)
clearly stipulate in all future reconstruction contracts that contractors
are to develop performance management plans specific to the work they are
conducting, and (3) more completely communicate the performance
information from the plans to executive decision makers in Kabul and
Washington, D.C.^2 Overall, USAID concurred and has developed the
performance management plans we suggested. However, USAID's plans are
ambitious and assume that security in Afghanistan will improve, which has
not happened.

^1 [31]GAO-04-403 .

^2 [32]GAO-05-742 .

Oversight Questions

           o How much funding has the United States provided for
           Afghanistan's reconstruction, and how much of that has been
           expended? What has been achieved to date? What obstacles have been
           encountered? How has USAID taken these obstacles, such as the
           worsening security situation, into account in planning for future
           reconstruction efforts?
           o What are USAID's reconstruction priorities? How have USAID funds
           been allocated? How are USAID's programs prioritized and
           sequenced? What is the current geographic distribution of
           obligated funds for local programs? How do USAID's reconstruction
           priorities align with the overall U.S. strategy for securing and
           stabilizing Afghanistan?
		   
		   Enclosure VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
		   
		   GAO Contacts	   
		   
           Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, (202) 512-3031 or
           [email protected] , or Charles Michael Johnson at
           (202) 512-7331 or [email protected]
		   
		   Staff Acknowledgments

           Key contributors to this report include Al Huntington (Assistant
           Director), David Bruno, Joe Carney, Miriam Carroll, Thomas Costa,
           Martin de Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, David Gootnick,
           Elizabeth Guran, Laura Holliday, John Hutton, Ernie Jackson, Hynek
           Kalkus, Reid Lowe, Elizabeth Repko, George Taylor, Phil Thomas,
           Pierre Toureille, Adam Vodraska, Tim Wedding, Eve Weisberg,
           Christina Werth, and Loren Yager.
		   
		   GAO's Mission
		   
		   The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
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References

Visible links
  21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-607
  22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-403
  23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-742
  24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575
  25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-78
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575
  30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575
  31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-403
  32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-742
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