Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues
for Congressional Oversight (24-MAY-07, GAO-07-801SP).
Since 2001, the United States has appropriated over $15 billion
to help secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Afghanistan. In
February 2007, the administration requested $12.3 billion in
additional funding to accelerate some of these efforts to prevent
the conflict-ridden nation from once again becoming a safe haven
for terrorists and from devolving into a narco-state. More than
50 nations, including the United States, and several multilateral
organizations are engaged in securing, stabilizing, and
reconstructing Afghanistan. Progress has been made in areas such
as economic growth, infrastructure development, and training of
the Afghan army and police, but after more than 5 years of U.S.
and international efforts, the overall security situation in this
poor and ethnically diverse country has not improved and,
moreover, has deteriorated significantly in the last year. The
lack of security limits the success of efforts to stabilize and
rebuild Afghanistan. Direct challenges to these efforts include a
resurgence of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan
security forces, inadequate infrastructure, limited government
capacity, corruption, a largely illiterate and untrained labor
force, a dramatic increase in drug production, and a lack of
viable licit economic opportunities. Since 2003, we have issued
five reports on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan--one on food and
agricultural assistance, two on reconstruction assistance, one on
efforts to establish Afghan national security forces, and one on
drug control programs. We identified programmatic improvements
that were needed, as well as many obstacles that limited success
and should be taken into consideration in program design and
implementation. A key improvement we identified in most of the
U.S. efforts was the need for improved planning, including the
development of strategic plans with elements such as measurable
goals, specific time frames, cost estimates, and identification
of external factors that could significantly affect efforts. Some
additional needed improvements we identified include better
coordination among the United States and other donor nations,
more flexible options for program implementation, and timelier
project implementation. We also concluded that several obstacles,
especially deteriorating security and the limited institutional
capacity of the Afghan government, challenge the effectiveness of
U.S. efforts.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-801SP
ACCNO: A69907
TITLE: Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan:
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight
DATE: 05/24/2007
SUBJECT: Congressional oversight
Drug trafficking
Economic stabilization
International cooperation
International organizations
International relations
Police training
Program evaluation
Schedule slippages
Strategic planning
Cost estimates
Afghanistan
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GAO-07-801SP
* [1]Demographics and Development Indicators
* [2]Natural Resources
* [3]Economy
* [4]Prior Recommendations
* [5]Oversight Questions
* [6]Oversight Questions
* [7]Prior Recommendation
* [8]Oversight Questions
* [9]Prior Recommendation
* [10]Oversight Questions
* [11]Prior Recommendations
* [12]Oversight Questions
* [13]GAO Contacts
* [14]Staff Acknowledgments
* [15]GAO's Mission
* [16]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [17]Order by Mail or Phone
* [18]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [19]Congressional Relations
* [20]Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Committees
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
May 2007
SECURING, STABILIZING, AND RECONSTRUCTING AFGHANISTAN
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight
GAO-07-801SP
Contents
Letter 1
Enclosure I Afghanistan Facts and Figures 9
Demographics and Development Indicators 10
Natural Resources 10
Economy 11
Enclosure II U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip the Afghan National Security
Forces Face Several Challenges 13
Prior Recommendations 16
Oversight Questions 17
Enclosure III International Security Forces Limited by Several Factors 19
Oversight Questions 22
Enclosure IV Worsening Security and Other Factors Hinder U.S.
Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan 23
Prior Recommendation 25
Oversight Questions 25
Enclosure V Progress Establishing a Working Judicial System Lags behind
the Other Security Pillars 26
Prior Recommendation 27
Oversight Questions 27
Enclosure VI Reconstruction Efforts Have Lacked Strategic Focus and Are
Constrained by Security Concerns 28
Prior Recommendations 31
Oversight Questions 32
Enclosure VII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 33
Tables
Table 1: Summary of Prior GAO Findings on Afghanistan 3
Table 2: Growth of Afghanistan's Economy, 2000-2005 11
Table 3: Defense and State Support for Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal
Years 2002-2008 13
Table 4: USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Fiscal Years
2002-2008, by Program Category 29
Figures
Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan 9
Figure 2: Trucks Purchased for the Afghan National Army 16
Figure 3: PRTs and Regional Commands in Afghanistan 20
Figure 4: AEF Using a U.S.-Provided Tractor to Eradicate Opium Poppy 24
Figure 5: Cash-for-Work Cobblestone Road Project 30
Abbreviations
AEF Afghan Eradication Force
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
CERP Commanders' Emergency Response Program
Defense Department of Defense
GDP gross domestic product
IG Inspectors General
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODA official development assistance
PEP Poppy Elimination Program
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
State Department of State
UN United Nations
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
May 24, 2007
Congressional Committees
As the United States reviews plans to accelerate its efforts to secure,
stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan, I have enclosed a series of issue
papers for your consideration. These papers are based on the continuing
and prior work of GAO on Afghanistan, which we have provided to the
Congress since June 2003.
Since 2001, the United States has appropriated over $15 billion to help
secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Afghanistan.^1 In February 2007, the
administration requested $12.3 billion in additional funding to accelerate
some of these efforts to prevent the conflict-ridden nation from once
again becoming a safe haven for terrorists and from devolving into a
narco-state. More than 50 nations, including the United States, and
several multilateral organizations are engaged in securing, stabilizing,
and reconstructing Afghanistan. Progress has been made in areas such as
economic growth, infrastructure development, and training of the Afghan
army and police, but after more than 5 years of U.S. and international
efforts, the overall security situation in this poor and ethnically
diverse country has not improved and, moreover, has deteriorated
significantly in the last year. The lack of security limits the success of
efforts to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Direct challenges to these
efforts include a resurgence of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of
Afghan security forces, inadequate infrastructure, limited government
capacity, corruption, a largely illiterate and untrained labor force, a
dramatic increase in drug production, and a lack of viable licit economic
opportunities. Furthermore, these efforts are complicated by regional
influences, and the recent transfer of the security mission to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF).
Since 2003, we have issued five reports on U.S. efforts in
Afghanistan--one on food and agricultural assistance, two on
reconstruction assistance, one on efforts to establish Afghan national
security forces, and one on drug control programs.^2 We identified
programmatic improvements that were needed, as well as many obstacles that
limited success and should be taken into consideration in program design
and implementation (see table 1). A key improvement we identified in most
of the U.S. efforts was the need for improved planning, including the
development of strategic plans with elements such as measurable goals,
specific time frames, cost estimates, and identification of external
factors that could significantly affect efforts. Some additional needed
improvements we identified include better coordination among the United
States and other donor nations, more flexible options for program
implementation, and timelier project implementation. We also concluded
that several obstacles, especially deteriorating security and the limited
institutional capacity of the Afghan government, challenge the
effectiveness of U.S. efforts.
^1This does not include the cost of U.S. military operations.
^2GAO, Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to
Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability, [21]GAO-03-607
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003); Afghanistan Reconstruction:
Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress;
Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed, [22]GAO-04-403 (Washington, D.C.:
June 2, 2004); Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress,
Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten
Achievement of U.S. Goals, [23]GAO-05-742 (Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2005); Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have
Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, [24]GAO-05-575
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005); Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite
Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals,
[25]GAO-07-78 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2006).
Table 1: Summary of Prior GAO Findings on Afghanistan
Key programmatic improvements
Areas of focus needed Obstacles
Emergency food (1) Develop joint U.S.-Afghan (1) Unstable security
assistance Interagency strategic focus and situation.
plan.
(2) Control by warlords
(2) Consider more flexible of much of the country.
procurement and distribution
options. (3) Growth of opium
production.
(3) Improve coordination.
(4) Inadequate
international resources.
Afghanistan (1) Develop comprehensive (1) Deteriorating
reconstruction operational strategy/strategic security.
plan.
(2) Growth of opium
(2) Improve financial data. production.
(3) Improve coordination. (3) Inadequate
resources.
(4) Develop performance
management plan for USAID in (4) Delayed funding.
Afghanistan.
(5) Poor contractor
(5) Require performance performance and limited
management plans from capacity.
contractors.
(6) Communicate performance
information.
Afghan army and (1) Develop detailed plans for (1) Deteriorating
police completing the training and security.
equipping of the Afghan army and
police. (2) Limited Afghan
capacity.
(2) Help ensure congruent
progress in all security pillars. (3) Lack of an effective
judiciary.
(4) Growth of opium
production.
(5) Continued presence
of armed militias.
Drug control (1) Minimize project delays. (1) Deteriorating
security.
(2) Limited Afghan
capacity.
(3) Lack of
infrastructure, educated
populace, and
functioning governmental
institutions.
Source: GAO.
Responsiveness to our recommendations for programmatic improvements
varied. For example, officials from the Departments of Defense (Defense)
and State (State) generally concurred with the recommendation in our 2005
report on efforts to establish an Afghan army and police that detailed
plans would facilitate more effective management of resources and promote
better long-term planning. As of May 2007, however, the departments had
not provided us with such plans. On the other hand, in response to
recommendations in our 2004 and 2005 Afghanistan reconstruction reports,
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) developed a
strategic plan and performance management plans and the agency's planning
and performance management for Afghanistan are now more thorough.
Progress to date has been mixed in all areas we have reported on,
including reform of Afghanistan's security sector. We reported that
progress needs to be congruent in all five pillars of the security reform
agenda established by the United States and several coalition partners.
These pillars included: creating a national army, reconstituting the
police, establishing a working judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, and
demobilizing the Afghan militias. The United States has been involved to
some degree with each of the five pillars and initially was charged with
taking the lead in establishing the Afghan army, but has since allocated
significant resources to reconstituting the police and countering the
illicit drug trade. While some progress has been made in each pillar, the
United States and its coalition partners continue to face challenges.
Although some army and police units have been trained and equipped,
Defense reports that none are capable of independent operations,
Afghanistan still has no formal national judicial system for the police to
rely upon, opium poppy cultivation is at record levels, and the Afghan
police often find themselves facing better armed drug traffickers and
militias.
In the absence of national security forces capable of independently
providing security for the country, ISAF is helping to provide security
for Afghanistan. However, ISAF's ability to do so is limited by a number
of factors, such as national restrictions on its component forces and
shortages in troops and equipment. Lastly, though reconstruction
assistance helped Afghanistan elect its first president, return millions
of children to school, and repatriate millions of refugees, Afghanistan
continues to face reconstruction challenges, which are exacerbated by the
security-related concerns described above.
Defense, State, and USAID officials have suggested that securing,
stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan will take at least a decade
and require continuing international assistance. If the recent
administration budget proposals for Afghanistan are approved, the United
States will increase funding for Afghanistan well beyond earlier
estimates. Until recently, Defense's plans for training and equipping the
Afghan army and police, called the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),
were based on the assumption that the insurgency in Afghanistan would
decline and the overall security situation would improve. However, Defense
revised its plans to adapt to the deteriorating security situation and to
rapidly increase the ability of the ANSF to operate with less coalition
support. These modified plans call for a total of $7.6 billion for the
ANSF in 2007, which is over a threefold increase compared with fiscal year
2006 and represents more than all of the U.S. assistance for the ANSF in
fiscal years 2002 through 2006 combined. The costs of these and other
efforts will require difficult trade-offs for decision makers as the
United States faces competing demands for its resources, such as securing
and stabilizing Iraq, in the years ahead.
Significant oversight will be needed to help ensure the Congress has
visibility over the cost and progress of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The
enclosures that follow provide background information on Afghanistan and
discuss suggested areas for additional oversight on the following topics:
o efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces,
o international security forces,
o counternarcotics,
o Afghanistan's judicial system, and
o reconstruction.
These enclosures are based on our completed Afghanistan related
work and incorporate updated information from current budget and
program documents. We also discussed these topics with cognizant
Defense, State, and USAID officials involved in securing,
stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan. Additionally, we met
with U.S. Central Command officials, who provided the current
status of (1) their efforts to train and equip the ANSF and (2)
the recent transition of the security mission from U.S. to ISAF
control. Moreover, we met with experts from various academic and
research institutions and reviewed their reports related to
Afghanistan. Finally, we provided a draft of this report to the
relevant agencies for advanced review. Each agency informed us
that they were not providing formal comments. However, each
provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as
appropriate. We conducted our review from January through May 2007
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
We are sending copies of this report to Members of Congress and
cognizant congressional committees. We will also make copies
available to others on request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, Managing Director,
International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-3031 or
[email protected] , or Charles Michael Johnson at
(202) 512-7331 or [email protected]. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in enclosure VII.
David M. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States
Enclosures
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Richard D. Lugar
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
The Honorable Daniel Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Patrick Leahy
Chairman
The Honorable Judd Gregg
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Chairman
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey
Chairwoman
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable John F. Tierney
Chairman
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with
limited natural resources. It is bordered by Pakistan to the east
and south; Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the
north; and Iran to the west (see fig. 1). Afghanistan's land area
is about 647,500 square kilometers, which is slightly smaller than
the state of Texas.
Enclosure I: Afghanistan Facts and Figures
Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan
Conflict has ravaged Afghanistan for nearly three decades. The Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and withdrew only after waging a
prolonged war against Afghan resistance groups. Following a protracted
civil war, by 1998, most of Afghanistan was under the control of the
fundamentalist Taliban group. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan became a
haven for terrorists. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the
United States, several allies, and Afghanistan's Northern Alliance
forcibly removed the Taliban regime from Afghanistan for providing a safe
haven to al Qaeda terrorists. In late 2001, a conference in Bonn, Germany
established a process for political reconstruction that included the
adoption of a new constitution and called for democratic elections. On
December 7, 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected
president of Afghanistan. The National Assembly was inaugurated on
December 19, 2005.
Demographics and Development Indicators
Afghanistan's population, estimated at over 31 million, is ethnically and
linguistically diverse. Afghanistan's largest ethnic groups include the
Pashtun (42 percent), Tajik (27), Hazara (9), Uzbek (8), Aimak (4), and
Turkmen (3). Although some ethnic groups are predominant in specific
regions, such as the Pashtun along much of the border with Pakistan, many
regions are populated by multiple ethnic groups. Over 30 languages are
spoken in Afghanistan, but most of the population speaks either
Dari/Persian (46 percent) or Pashtu (42). The population is largely rural
and mostly uneducated. Almost half of the population is under the age of
15. Islam is the predominant religion--80 percent of the population is
Sunni and 19 percent is Shi'a.
Development indicators published by the World Bank and the United Nations
(UN) rank Afghanistan at the bottom of virtually every category. Life
expectancy at birth is 43 years of age. More than 20 percent of all Afghan
children die before the age of 5, of which a third die soon after birth.
The per capita income for Afghanistan is estimated to be about $200 per
year, excluding income from illicit drug production and trafficking, and
over 70 percent of Afghan adults are illiterate. According to the World
Bank, limited available data suggest that more than a third of rural
households face chronic or temporary shortages of food.
Natural Resources
Resource limitations pose constraints on development in Afghanistan. Only
12 percent of the land in Afghanistan is arable, the country has limited
access to fresh water, and potable water supplies are inadequate. Unlike
some other countries in the region, Afghanistan does not produce oil or
have substantial oil reserves. Instead, much of the population relies on
wood for fuel, which has led to rapid deforestation and soil degradation.
In addition, much of the country is prone to damaging natural hazards,
including earthquakes in the Hindu Kush mountains, flooding, and droughts.
Economy
After the fall of the Taliban government in late 2001, the Afghan economy
grew rapidly as a new government was established and international aid
flowed into the country. While limited economic statistics are available,
the World Bank estimates that the Afghan economy grew approximately 16
percent in 2003, 8 percent in 2004, and 14 percent in 2005 (see table 2).
Inflation has fluctuated, from around 10 percent in 2004 and 2005 to as
low as 4 percent in December 2006 due to a decline in international energy
prices, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).^1 According to
IMF and private economic consulting firms, while the economy is expected
to grow rapidly over the next few years, Afghanistan is still a very poor
country attempting to recover from decades of warfare and economic
neglect.
Table 2: Growth of Afghanistan's Economy, 2000-2005
Indicator 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Gross domestic product (GDP) (billions of
constant 2000 U.S. dollars) N/A 2.7 4.4 4.9 6.1 7.3
GDP growth (annual percent) N/A N/A 29 16 8 14
Official development assistance (ODA)
(billions of constant 2000 U.S. dollars) 0.2 0.4 1.4 1.7 2.3 2.8
Ratio of ODA to GDP (percent) N/A 17 32 35 37 38
N/A = data unavailable
Source: GAO analysis of World Development Indicators data from the World
Bank.
Note: GDP is based on nondrug output. GDP growth is calculated based on
constant (inflation-adjusted) local currency (Afghani) values, not U.S.
dollars. ODA consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms
(net of repayments of principal) and grants.
^1In July 2006, IMF reported that substantial shortcomings continue to
affect Afghanistan's national accounts, balance of payments, monetary, and
social sector data. Given the security environment in Afghanistan and the
ongoing development of the statistical system's capacity, statistics
presented here for context and background should not be considered
completely reliable.
Since 2001, the Afghan economy has received large amounts of foreign
assistance. In 2005, the most recent year for which data are available,
official development assistance (foreign grants and concessional loans)
from international donors was $2.8 billion, or over a third the size of
the national economy. In addition, about 60 countries attended a January
2006 conference in London on the Afghanistan Compact, which maps out how
the international community will contribute to Afghanistan's future
development. Afghanistan has also received substantial reduction in its
external debt, which had totaled over $11 billion. However, according to
IMF, Afghanistan's ability to assume additional debt for development
purposes is limited due to Afghanistan's remaining debt and limited export
revenues.
In terms of international trade, Afghanistan's exports are dominated by
illicit narcotics (opium and its products, morphine and heroin), which
have an estimated total value of $2.7 billion to $2.8 billion per year,
according to the World Bank.^2 By contrast, officially recorded exports
are estimated at several hundred million dollars. The country is highly
import dependent for basic goods like petroleum products; construction
materials; machinery and equipment; medicines; textiles; and, in bad
harvest years, food, with imports financed largely by aid and (to a
considerable extent) illicit drug proceeds. According to the World Bank,
growth and diversification of legal exports will be critical for the
country's longer-term development success.
^2The World Bank reports that data are limited on the extent of production
and export of opium, given its illicit nature.
Enclosure II: U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip the Afghan National Security
Forces Face Several Challenges
In the wake of decades of war that left Afghanistan without an army or a
functioning police force, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and other coalition nations have been working to
develop the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police--referred
to as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)--to provide security for
Afghanistan. After several years of relative calm since the ousting of the
Taliban, security deteriorated significantly in 2006. The use of
improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings increased fourfold, with
approximately 130 suicide attacks launched by militants. This
deterioration in security has been blamed in part on the weakness of the
ANSF.
The United States has provided over $6 billion through fiscal year 2006 to
train and equip the Afghan army and police. Citing deteriorating security
in Afghanistan and the need to rapidly establish independent security
forces, the administration has requested $7.6 billion and $2.9 billion for
fiscal years 2007 and 2008, respectively, to accelerate efforts to train
and equip the ANSF (see table 3).
Table 3: Defense and State Support for Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal
Years 2002-2008
Dollars in
millions
Fiscal years
Assistance 2007
program 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 request^a 2008request Total
Afghan $76.9 $372.6 $723.7 $1,736.6 $768.0 $4,883.2 $1,903.7 $10,464.7
army^b
Afghan 25.5 5.0 223.9 813.9 1,293.7 2,730.6 948.9 6,041.5
police
Total $102.4 $377.6 $947.6 $2,550.5 $2,061.7 $7,613.8 $2,852.6 $16,506.2
Sources: Departments of Defense and State.
^aFiscal year 2007 includes approximately $1.6 billion that has been
appropriated and approximately $6 billion as requested by Defense in the
2007 Global War on Terror Supplemental Request.
^bAfghan army includes detainee operations.
According to Defense documents and discussions with Defense officials, the
2007 and 2008 budget requests, as well as the provision of sufficient
mentors and trainers, would allow Defense and State^1 to complete the
training and equipping of the ANSF by December 2008--almost a year
ahead of previous plans--at which time the United States would transition
its efforts to sustaining the ANSF. According to Defense progress reports
from March 2007, 21,600 combat troops^2 and 62,500^3 police officers and
patrolmen and women have been trained, equipped, and assigned. Therefore,
over the next 2 years,
o Defense plans to complete the training and equipping of 70,000
army personnel, including an additional 29,045 new combat troops
(for a total of 50,645), and complete the establishment of an
Afghan Ministry of Defense and military sustaining institutions;^4
and
o Defense and State plan to complete the training and equipping of
82,000 police personnel--an increase of 20,000 over previous
plans--including at least 19,500 new recruits, and complete the
reform of Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior, which oversees the
police.
^1Defense is responsible for training and equipping the Afghan army.
Defense and State share responsibility for police training.
These plans are ambitious and require both the rapid expansion of
efforts to train and equip new recruits and substantial
improvements in the current forces' capabilities to operate
independently. According to Defense progress reports from March
2007, no army combat units are fully capable of operating
independently and less than 20 percent are fully capable of
leading operations with coalition support. Defense reports that no
Afghan police units are fully capable of operating independently
and that only 1 of 72 police units is fully capable to lead
operations with coalition support.^5 Moreover, according to
Defense officials, due to attrition and absenteeism, the number of
forces on hand is less than those trained. For example, although
20,400 combat troops had been assigned to combat units as of
mid-January 2007, Defense officials stated that approximately
15,000 were actually present for duty.^6
^2We note that in early 2005, Defense reported that it had provided basic
training for 18,300 combat troops and projected that it could train an
additional 27,700 combat troops by the fall of 2007, for a total of 46,000
combat troops (see [28]GAO-05-575 ).
^3Defense officials indicated that Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior
reports the number of police assigned and that these numbers may not be
reliable. The Ministry of Interior Forces include, among others: uniformed
police, border police, counternarcotics police, and personnel for
sustaining purposes, such as training, education, and procurement.
^4Sustaining institutions include medical, logistics, intelligence, and
recruiting units.
^5Although Defense reports that no army or police units are fully capable
of operating independently of coalition forces, Defense officials stated
that some units of the Afghan army have conducted successful operations
and State officials provided examples of successful police operations.
^6Defense officials state that approximately 40 percent of the absences
were authorized and 60 percent were unauthorized.
Furthermore, efforts to equip the Afghan security forces have
faced problems since their inception. In 2004 and 2005, Defense
planned to equip the Afghan army with donated and salvaged Soviet
weapons and armored vehicles. However, much of this equipment
proved to be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other
equipment. In 2006, Defense began providing the forces with U.S.
equipment--an effort that faces challenges.^7 As security has
deteriorated, equipment needs have changed, and their associated
costs have increased. For example, the Afghan army was initially
provided with pickup trucks, such as those in figure 2, and
9-millimeter pistols; more recently, Defense has begun providing
more protective equipment, such as Humvees, and more lethal
weapons, such as rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.
Moreover, procedures to ensure that the intended recipients
receive, retain, and use their equipment as intended have lagged.
For example, the Defense and State Inspectors General (IG)
reported that when the United States first began training the
police, State's contractor provided trainees with a one-time issue
of uniforms and nonlethal equipment upon graduation. However, many
students sold their equipment before they reached their duty
stations, and the program was terminated. The IGs reported that
most equipment is now distributed from Kabul to police units'
provincial headquarters, but hoarding equipment is reportedly a
large problem, maintenance is insufficient, and end-user
accountability of distributed equipment is limited.^8
^7These efforts began in 2005; however, the equipment did not arrive until
2006.
^8U.S. Departments of Defense and State Inspectors General, Interagency
Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness (Washington, D.C.,
Nov. 14, 2006).
Figure 2: Trucks Purchased for the Afghan National Army
In addition, the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which is responsible
for managing the country's national police force, faces a number
of problems that have required reform or restructuring. According
to officials from State and its police training contractor, these
problems include pervasive corruption; an outdated rank structure
overburdened with senior-level officers; lack of communication and
control between central command and the regions, provinces, and
districts; pay disparity between the army and police; and a lack
of professional standards and internal discipline. According to
State, the Ministry of Interior is in the process of implementing
pay and rank reforms. Reforms to date include removal of over
2,000 high-ranking officers (colonel and above) and steps to make
pay for rank-and-file police officers more equitable. Additional
planned reforms include establishing parity between the salaries
of police and military and selecting police officers based on
merit rather than loyalty and local influence.
Prior Recommendations
In our 2005 report on the Afghan security forces, we recommended
that, because of Afghanistan's prolonged conflict and its limited
financial resources, the Secretaries of Defense and State develop
detailed plans for proposed the plans include clearly defined
objectives and performameasures; milestones for achieving stated
objectives; future funding requirements; and a strategy for
sustaining the results achieved, inclutransitioning program
responsibility to Afghanistan. We suggested that the Secretaries
provide this information to the Congress when the executive branch
next requests funding for the Afghan army or police forces.
In addition, because reform in the other pillars of the Afghan
security sector--building an effective judiciary, curbing the
production and trafficking of illicit narcotics, and disarming and
reintegrating militiafighters--is critical to the success of the
army and police programs, wrecommended that the Secretaries of
Defense and State work with the other nations to help ensure that
progress in the other pillars is congruewith the progress made in
the army and police programs. We suggested that the Secretaries
regularly report to the Congress--no less than annually--on the
progress made in addressing these other security
recommendations, both suggested that existing reportingaddressed
the need to report their plans for completing and sustaining
thAfghan army and police forces. Our analysis of Defense and State
reporting to the Congress, however, indicated that the
departmentshave the detailed plans as we recommended. In recent
months, we again asked Defense and State for plans that are
responsive to the recommendation. Though both Defense and State
officials asdetailed plans for fielding fully functioning Afghan
army and police forceby a stated end date have been done, they
have not provided them to us. We continue to believe that
developing and following such plans and ensuring concurrent
progress in the other security pillars is essential tthe overall
future success of the Afghan security effort.
Oversight Questions
oWhat is the overall strategic plan for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan?
What is the operational concept for the ANSF? How are U.S. plans to train
and equip the ANSF incorporated into the strategic plan for
Afghanistan?
oHow much funding has the United States provided to train and equip
the ANSF? How do Defense and State track funding for the ANSF,
including obligations and expenditures? What equipment, training,
and services hasthe United States provided through drawdowns and
as excess defense articles?
o How much funding, training, equipment, or other services have
the other coalition partners provided to train and equip the ANSF?
o What is the anticipated total cost to fully train and equip the
ANSF? What is the estimated annual cost to sustain these forces,
and who will pay for it? What are the plans for Afghanistan to
take program and financial responsibility for its army and police?
o What have been the results to date of efforts to train and equip
the ANSF? What and how much equipment has been provided? How does
the United States track where it is and how it is used? How many
troops have been trained and equipped? Of those, how many are
available for duty? What are the capabilities of these troops to
operate independently of coalition troops?
o What performance measures are used to assess progress in
developing Afghan army sustaining institutions? What progress has
been made? What is the desired end state, and what is the
anticipated time frame for completion?
o What performance measures are used to assess progress in
reforming the Afghan Ministry of Interior? What progress has been
made? What is the desired end state, and what is the anticipated
time frame for completion?
Enclosure III: International Security Forces Limited by Several
Factors
Pending the creation of functioning Afghan army and police forces,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), with approximately 35,000 troops from 37
nations,^1 was formed to assist the government of Afghanistan in
creating a safe and secure environment to enable reconstruction.
ISAF was formed in December 2001 under a United Nations (UN)
mandate to provide security in Kabul and its surrounding area, and
to assist Afghanistan in creating a safe and secure environment.
In 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to
(1) assume command and control for the ISAF mission and (2) assume
responsibility for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in
northern and western Afghanistan. Although NATO had difficulty
persuading nations to provide the resources needed for these
teams, as of November 2006, it oversees 25 PRTs throughout
Afghanistan, which are structured around five regional commands,
as shown in figure 3. Twelve PRTs are led by the United States.
The PRTs' mission is to assist the government of Afghanistan to
extend its authority; to facilitate the development of a stable
and secure environment; and, through military presence, enable
security-sector reform and reconstruction efforts. Each PRT has a
lead country assigned, but PRTs are joint military-civilian
organizations and often include representatives from other ISAF
member states. For example, the United States has officials from
the Departments of State and Agriculture and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) at many of the PRTs to observe
and assist in reconstruction efforts.
1These include about 14,000 U.S. troops and 21,000 troops from the 36 other
coalition member countries. In January 2007, several NATO countries pledged
to send additional troops.
Figure 3: PRTs and Regional Commands in Afghanistan
ISAF's responsibilities and efforts in Afghanistan are increasing.
However, its ability to provide security for the country is limited by a
number of factors. Although NATO has command over ISAF troops, control is
ultimately exercised by each nation. ISAF's rules of engagement are
heavily influenced by limitations imposed by national governments
(referred to as national caveats) that, for example, prevent troops from
some countries from performing certain tasks or missions, or moving
between geographic areas of operation. As a result, the burden of combat,
when it arises, falls disproportionately on the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Romania, Australia, and Estonia, which
have forces in or lead PRTs in the more hostile regions of Afghanistan.
Furthermore, some ISAF troops are limited by shortages of certain types of
critical equipment, and most do not have strategic capacity, such as
airlift.
Only the military elements of PRTs are integrated into the ISAF chain of
command. Therefore, each lead nation can have its own concept, priorities,
and, in some cases, national caveats that guide specific PRT operations.
For some PRTs, particularly in the more volatile south and east, providing
security is the priority, but for others in more secure areas,
reconstruction is the highest priority. Overall, PRTs aim to contribute to
stability and facilitate reconstruction via activities such as patrolling,
monitoring, influence, and mediation. Many have also participated to some
extent in specific reconstruction projects by providing funding or other
assistance, particularly in areas where nongovernmental organizations have
been unable to operate.
The U.S.-led PRTs facilitate reconstruction by providing security but also
devote substantial resources to reconstruction projects that are designed
to advance U.S. security objectives. U.S. commanders, including those
leading PRTs, have access to funds provided under Defense's Commanders'
Emergency Response Program (CERP). According to Defense officials, in
fiscal years 2005 and 2006, CERP funds for Afghanistan totaled $391
million, and the requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 are $231 million
and $210 million, respectively. According to the U.S. Central Command,
CERP-funded projects are intended to gain the confidence of local
residents and leaders and discourage them from cooperating with
insurgents. U.S. CERP funds have been used by PRT commanders for rapid
implementation of small-scale projects, such as providing latrines for a
school or a generator for a hospital, and do not require prior approval or
coordination at the federal level.
Oversight Questions
o How do the national caveats placed on the various ISAF forces
affect ISAF's ability to provide security for Afghanistan and the
operations of the PRTs? What equipment shortages and capability
limitations exist among the ISAF-member nations and how are they
being addressed?
o What reconstruction programs and projects do the various PRTs
engage in? How do PRT lead nations manage their programs to ensure
accountability?
o How much funding has Defense provided for CERP-funded projects
in Afghanistan? How are CERP funds being used in Afghanistan? How
does Defense track CERP projects and ensure accountability for the
use of these funds?
o How does the United States coordinate its PRTs with those run by
other coalition partners? How does the United States coordinate
its CERP-funded PRT reconstruction projects with USAID and other
donors (including nongovernmental organizations) who may be
providing reconstruction assistance in the area?
Enclosure IV: Worsening Security and Other Factors Hinder U.S.
Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan
Combating illicit narcotics in Afghanistan is one of the five
security pillars. Since 2002, the United States has provided over
$1.5 billion to stem the production and trafficking of illicit
drugs--primarily opiates--in Afghanistan. Despite U.S. and
international efforts in these areas, the UN estimated that the
number of hectares of opium poppy under cultivation grew by 50
percent in 2006, and a record 6,100 metric tons of opium was
produced. The UN estimated that the export value of opium and its
derivatives--morphine and heroin--equaled about a third of
Afghanistan's licit economy, with drug profits reportedly funding
terrorists and other antigovernment entities. Initial estimates
for 2007 indicate that the amount of opium poppy under cultivation
will remain the same or possibly increase. The continued
prevalence of opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking
throughout Afghanistan imperils efforts to secure and stabilize
the country.
To combat opium poppy cultivation, drug trafficking, and their
negative effects on Afghan institutions and society, the United
States, working with allied governments, in 2005 developed a
five-pillared counternarcotics strategy addressing (1) alternative
livelihoods, (2) elimination and eradication, (3) interdiction,
(4) law enforcement and justice reform, and (5) public
information. USAID and State initiated a number of projects under
each of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy's five pillars, but
delays in implementation--due to the security situation, poor
infrastructure, and other factors--limited progress. Many projects
have not been in place long enough to fully assess progress toward
the overall goal of significantly reducing poppy cultivation, drug
production, and drug trafficking.
Alternative livelihoods. USAID implemented projects to provide
economic alternatives to poppy production and thus reduce the
amount of Afghanistan's economic activity attributable to the drug
industry. Results varied in the three principal alternative
livelihoods regions, in part because of the differing security
risks and access to infrastructure.
Elimination and eradication. State supported the Afghan
government's efforts to prevent poppy planting and eradicate poppy
crops if prevention failed. State provided support for central and
provincial eradication efforts (see fig. 4). Central government
eradication efforts improved with the reorganization of the Afghan
Eradication Force (AEF) into smaller, more mobile units and the
addition of purchased and leased transport and logistical-support
aircraft. However, in 2006, AEF's fielding was delayed because of
coordination problems, reducing the amount of eradication
possible. In addition, not all Poppy Elimination Program (PEP)
teams, which were designed to help governors discourage farmers
from growing poppy, were fully fielded.
Figure 4: AEF Using a U.S.-Provided Tractor to Eradicate Opium
Poppy
Interdiction. State and Defense assisted Drug Enforcement
Administration-led efforts to help build Afghan capacity to
destroy drug labs, seize precursor chemicals and opiates, and
arrest major traffickers. State and Defense also provided support
for border security enhancements in neighboring countries and the
counternarcotics police. In the neighboring countries of Pakistan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, State began border security
projects.
Law enforcement and justice reform. State supported the Afghan
government's efforts to increase its capacity to arrest,
prosecute, and punish traffickers and corrupt officials. State
provided support for Department of Justice prosecutors, who helped
develop and implement a new counternarcotics law; corrections
reform, including training guards and refurbishing courthouses;
and a planned justice center.
Public information. State led a public information campaign
intended to convince the Afghan populace to reject poppy
cultivation and trade. However, because of delays with the PEP
team implementation, the campaign was not able to rely on planned
support from the teams.
Prior Recommendation
In our 2005 report on U.S. assistance for the Afghan army and
police, we concluded that progress in the other security pillars
was critical to eventually sustaining and maximizing the
effectiveness of the army and police.^1 As we note in enclosure
II, Defense and State have not specifically reported on progress
in the counternarcotics or other security pillars, as we
recommended.
Oversight Questions
o What is the current status of U.S. funding provided for
counternarcotics in Afghanistan, and how much has been expended?
What has this funding supported?
o What is the status of the State- and USAID-funded
counternarcotics programs? What has been accomplished in each of
the five counternarcotics pillars?
o What counternarcotics assistance have the Departments of Defense
and Justice, including the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration,
provided?
o How will the Afghan counternarcotics strategy be adjusted if, as
is expected, the 2007 poppy cultivation figures show no decrease?
^1 [29]GAO-05-575 .
Enclosure V: Progress Establishing a Working Judicial System Lags
behind the Other Security Pillars
Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule
of law is a prerequisite for effective policing. It is one of the
five security pillars. However, according to donor officials, few
linkages exist in Afghanistan between the Afghan judiciary and
police, and the police have little ability to enforce judicial
rulings. In addition, judges and prosecutors are not being exposed
to police training and practices.
Supported by the United States, other donors, and international
organizations, Italy--initially the lead nation for reforming the
judiciary--followed a three-pronged strategy: (1) developing and
drafting legal codes, (2) training judges and prosecutors, and (3)
renovating the country's physical legal infrastructure. However,
according to Italian and U.S. government officials, the reform
program was underfunded and understaffed.
Nevertheless, Italy and the other donors made some progress in
promoting reform. This included drafting a new criminal procedure
code, training several hundred judges, and renovating courthouses.
USAID officials indicated that they continue to have projects to
develop a judicial code of conduct and to train both sitting and
new judges. They also have projects to develop and implement
uniform procedures and rules for courts and to establish a common
curriculum for law courses. Also, as noted in enclosure IV, the
United States has supported the Afghan government's efforts to
increase its capacity to arrest, prosecute, and punish illicit
drug traffickers and corrupt officials.
However, these accomplishments and current efforts address only a
portion of Afghanistan's overall need for judicial reform.
Afghanistan's judicial sector is characterized by a conflicting
mix of civil, religious, and customary laws, with too few trained
judges, prosecutors, or other justice personnel. Furthermore, its
penal system is nonfunctioning, and its buildings, official
records, and essential office equipment and furniture have been
damaged extensively. U.S. and other donor officials informed us
that progress in rebuilding the judicial sector lags behind the
other security pillars and that the reform effort is being
undermined by systemic corruption at key national and provincial
justice institutions.
Prior Recommendation
Although we did not specifically examine U.S. assistance efforts
to help establish a working judiciary in Afghanistan, in our 2005
report on U.S. assistance for the Afghan army and police, we
concluded that progress in the other security pillars is critical
to eventually sustaining and maximizing the effectiveness of the
army and police.^1 As we note in enclosure II, Defense and State
have not specifically reported on progress in the judicial or
other security pillars, as we recommended.
Oversight Questions
o What is the status of efforts to develop a working judicial
system in Afghanistan?
o How much funding has the United States provided for
Afghanistan's judicial system, and how much of that has been
expended? What has this funding been used for?
o What are the key obstacles to judicial reform, and how will they
be addressed?
o To what extent have the United States, its coalition partners,
and the government of Afghanistan developed a strategy, clear
objectives, and an estimate of the time and resources needed to
complete justice sector reforms?
^1 [30]GAO-05-575 .
Enclosure VI: Reconstruction Efforts Have Lacked Strategic Focus
and Are Constrained by Security Concerns
To date, the United States has provided about $4.4 billion for
reconstruction in Afghanistan, and the administration has
requested an additional $2.4 billion for fiscal years 2007 and
2008. Reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, largely led by
USAID with support from international donors and other U.S.
government entities, helped Afghanistan elect its first president,
return millions of children to school, and repatriate millions of
refugees. However, the reconstruction needs of Afghanistan are
immense, and reconstruction efforts face a number of challenges.
Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest countries and ranks near
the bottom of virtually every development indicator category, such
as life expectancy; literacy; nutrition; and infant, child, and
maternal mortality (see encl. I). Nearly three decades of war and
extended drought have destroyed Afghanistan's infrastructure,
economy, and government.
U.S. reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan has taken place in
three stages since the ouster of the Taliban. In 2002 and 2003,
USAID initially focused on humanitarian and short-term assistance,
such as assistance to displaced persons and food assistance, which
helped avert widespread famine. Although USAID continues to
provide some humanitarian assistance, this assistance is now a
much smaller part of its program.
In 2004, USAID expanded assistance to include quick impact
projects, such as infrastructure projects. At that time, due to a
variety of obstacles, especially security and limited Afghan
capacity, USAID had not met all of its reconstruction targets in
areas such as health, education, and infrastructure. The largest
component of these reconstruction efforts was the construction of
roads, which, after decades of neglect, were in disrepair or
lacking altogether. The United States, Afghanistan, and
international donors deemed road construction critical to economic
growth and security.
In recent years, USAID expanded Afghan reconstruction assistance
to a comprehensive development package that focuses more on
increasing Afghan capacity and aims to address a wide range of
needs, such as agriculture, education, health, road construction,
power generation, and others. As shown in table 4, USAID has
allocated reconstruction assistance to 12 primary program
categories, with more than $1.8 billion, or about 27 percent of
U.S. reconstruction assistance, to roads.
Table 4: USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Fiscal Years
2002-2008, by Program Category
Dollars in
millions
Fiscal years
Percent
Program 2008 of
category 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007request request Total^a total^a
Roads $51 $142 $354 $276 $255 $446 $338 $1,862 27
Power
generation 3 0 77 286 61 135 203 765 11
Alternative
livelihoods 3 1 5 185 121 211 121 647 9
Elections,
governance,
rule of law,
Office of
Transition
Initiatives 25 42 153 103 23 124 56 526 8
Support to
government of
Afghanistan 41 40 103 117 60 47 62 470 7
Health and
clinics 8 56 83 111 51 72 66 447 7
Education and
schools 19 21 104 86 49 62 54 395 6
Food
assistance 159 51 49 57 60 22 10 408 6
Economic
growth 21 12 84 91 46 68 61 382 6
Agriculture 27 56 50 77 27 55 31 324 5
Provincial
Reconstruction
Teams 0 11 56 85 20 117 30 319 5
Internally
displaced
persons 108 23 10 0 0 0 0 141 2
Other^b 7 7 45 37 5 15 16 131 2
Total $471 $462 $1,173 $1,511 $778 $1,374 $1,048 $6,817 100
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
^aTotals may not add due to rounding.
^bIncludes water, information technology, and program support.
USAID's road construction efforts include primary roads, including parts
of Afghanistan's ring road, and secondary and urban roads, some of which
connect to the ring road, as depicted in figure 5.
Figure 5: Cash-for-Work Cobblestone Road Project
Road reconstruction and construction has attracted considerable donor
assistance. As of January 2007, about $5.2 billion for transportation
infrastructure projects had been provided or promised by the United States
and more than 10 other donors. Nearly $4 billion of this was for 366
completed projects, including most of the ring road. The ring road
connects Kabul to Kandahar in the south, Herat in the east, and
Mazar-e-Sharif in the north, completing a circle or ring. The portion of
the ring road from Kabul to Kandahar was a signature project for
USAID--opening in December 2003 to much fanfare. The Kabul-Kandahar road
reduced travel time between the two cities from several days to 6 hours.
However, the U.S. Embassy has restricted official U.S. travel on the road
because of heightened security risks.
Because most reconstruction project evaluation has not yet taken place, it
is not clear whether the broad range of USAID's reconstruction programs in
Afghanistan has led to improved results in many sectors or whether, given
the obstacles USAID faces, the breadth of its efforts limits USAID's
ability to achieve significant results in a smaller set of priority areas.
In addition, many of USAID's reconstruction programs target specific
geographic areas. In 2005, we reported that two-thirds of obligated fiscal
year 2004 funds supported local projects in Afghanistan's 34 provinces,
but Kabul and Kandahar provinces received approximately 70 percent of
these funds, mainly for roads. More recently, alternative livelihood
programs have focused on providing economic alternatives in opium
poppy-growing areas. Further, the administration's proposed budget for
fiscal year 2008 specifies that some of the funding be provided for roads
in areas targeted by insurgents and for rural development in
poppy-producing regions. Focusing assistance on such targeted geographic
regions has resulted in some complaints that regions only receive
assistance if they have problems such as opium poppy cultivation or
heightened security concerns.
Prior Recommendations
In 2004, we recommended that the Administrator of USAID revise USAID's
strategy for its assistance program to Afghanistan.^1 Specifically, we
suggested that, among other things, the strategy should contain measurable
goals, specific time frames, and resource levels. We also recommended that
the Secretary of State produce an annual consolidated budget report and
semiannual obligation and expenditure reports. In response, USAID agreed
and has revised its operational strategy for Afghanistan much as we
suggested. State, on the other hand, disagreed and noted that it already
keeps the Congress informed through briefings, hearings, and mandated
reports. We disagreed at the time and continue to believe that regular
reporting of both obligations and expenditures for U.S. assistance to
Afghanistan would provide the Congress with a more complete picture of
what funds actually have been spent.
In 2005, we recommended that the Administrator of USAID (1) establish a
performance management plan that complies with USAID directives, (2)
clearly stipulate in all future reconstruction contracts that contractors
are to develop performance management plans specific to the work they are
conducting, and (3) more completely communicate the performance
information from the plans to executive decision makers in Kabul and
Washington, D.C.^2 Overall, USAID concurred and has developed the
performance management plans we suggested. However, USAID's plans are
ambitious and assume that security in Afghanistan will improve, which has
not happened.
^1 [31]GAO-04-403 .
^2 [32]GAO-05-742 .
Oversight Questions
o How much funding has the United States provided for
Afghanistan's reconstruction, and how much of that has been
expended? What has been achieved to date? What obstacles have been
encountered? How has USAID taken these obstacles, such as the
worsening security situation, into account in planning for future
reconstruction efforts?
o What are USAID's reconstruction priorities? How have USAID funds
been allocated? How are USAID's programs prioritized and
sequenced? What is the current geographic distribution of
obligated funds for local programs? How do USAID's reconstruction
priorities align with the overall U.S. strategy for securing and
stabilizing Afghanistan?
Enclosure VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts
Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, (202) 512-3031 or
[email protected] , or Charles Michael Johnson at
(202) 512-7331 or [email protected]
Staff Acknowledgments
Key contributors to this report include Al Huntington (Assistant
Director), David Bruno, Joe Carney, Miriam Carroll, Thomas Costa,
Martin de Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, David Gootnick,
Elizabeth Guran, Laura Holliday, John Hutton, Ernie Jackson, Hynek
Kalkus, Reid Lowe, Elizabeth Repko, George Taylor, Phil Thomas,
Pierre Toureille, Adam Vodraska, Tim Wedding, Eve Weisberg,
Christina Werth, and Loren Yager.
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References
Visible links
21. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-607
22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-403
23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-742
24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575
25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-78
28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575
29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575
30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575
31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-403
32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-742
*** End of document. ***