U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic Planning Efforts Have Improved, 
but Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges 	 
(26-APR-07, GAO-07-795T).					 
                                                                 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, polling data have generally 
shown that anti-Americanism has spread and deepened around the	 
world, and several groups have concluded that this trend may have
harmed U.S. interests in significant ways. U.S. public diplomacy 
activities undertaken by the State Department (State) and the	 
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which totaled almost $1.5 
billion in fiscal year 2006, are designed to counter such	 
sentiments. Based on our prior reports, this testimony addresses 
(1) the negative consequences various groups have associated with
rising anti-American sentiments; (2) strategic planning,	 
coordination, and performance measurement issues affecting U.S.  
public diplomacy efforts; and (3) key challenges that hamper	 
agency activities.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-795T					        
    ACCNO:   A68765						        
  TITLE:     U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic Planning Efforts Have   
Improved, but Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges
     DATE:   04/26/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Foreign languages					 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     International broadcasting 			 
	     International relations				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Program management 				 
	     Public diplomacy					 
	     Radio						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Propaganda 					 

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GAO-07-795T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Background
     * [3]Widespread Concern Exists about the Impact of Anti-American

          * [4]Anti-Americanism May Have Negative Effects on U.S. Economic
          * [5]Anti-Americanism May Limit Ability to Pursue U.S. Foreign Po
          * [6]Anti-Americanism May Be Linked to Decreased Security of Amer

     * [7]Strategic Planning, Coordination, and Performance Measuremen

          * [8]Government Lacks an Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy

               * [9]Private Sector Engagement Strategy Not Yet Developed

          * [10]State Has Established a Public Diplomacy Strategic Framework
          * [11]Posts Lack a Campaign-Style Approach to Communications
          * [12]State Is Making a Concerted Effort to Better Measure Program
          * [13]BBG Has Strategy for International Broadcasting, but Audienc

     * [14]A Number of Internal and External Challenges Hamper U.S. Pub

          * [15]Insufficient Staff and Lack of Staff Time Hinders Public Dip
          * [16]Language Deficiencies Continue, Especially in the Muslim Wor
          * [17]Embassies Must Balance Security and Public Outreach
          * [18]Disparate Structure and Management Concerns Challenge the Br

     * [19]Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
     * [20]GAO's Mission
     * [21]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [22]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [23]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [24]Congressional Relations
     * [25]Public Affairs

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight, House Committee on Foreign Affairs

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 1:30 p.m. EDT
Thursday, April 26, 2007

U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Strategic Planning Efforts Have Improved, but Agencies Face Significant
Implementation Challenges

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director
International Affairs and Trade

GAO-07-795T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work on U.S. public
diplomacy efforts. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
polling data have generally shown that anti-Americanism has spread and
intensified around the world and many groups have concluded that this
trend may have harmed U.S. national security and business interests in
significant ways. U.S. public diplomacy activities designed to counter
such negative sentiments are largely divided between the State Department
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).1 In the past 4 years, we
have issued a series of reports on these agencies' public diplomacy
efforts (see enclosure). At the request of the ranking minority member of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, we are currently reviewing how
research is used to inform and direct U.S. government efforts to
communicate with foreign audiences. We plan to issue a final report this
summer.

The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and
influence overseas audiences. State's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs oversees an annual budget of nearly $800 million, which
funds the activities of program bureaus in Washington and the activities
of nearly 700 public diplomacy officers located at more than 260 posts
around the world and domestically. Program efforts include academic and
professional exchanges, English language teaching, information programs,
and news management activities. The BBG, as the overseer of U.S.
international broadcasting efforts, aims to support U.S. public diplomacy
objectives by broadcasting fair and accurate information, while
maintaining its journalistic independence as a news organization. The BBG
manages a budget of nearly $650 million that funds multiple discrete
broadcast entities that broadcast in 57 foreign languages to 125 media
markets around the world.

Mr. Chairman, you asked us to discuss key findings from the reports we
have issued over the past several years, particularly regarding our
government's public diplomacy strategy and the challenges faced in
implementing these activities in the field. Today, I will talk about (1)
the negative consequences various groups have associated with rising
anti-American sentiments; (2) strategic planning, coordination, and
performance measurement issues affecting U.S. public diplomacy efforts;
and (3) the key challenges that hamper agency efforts.

1The U.S. Agency for International Development participates in U.S. public
diplomacy efforts by seeking to tell America's assistance story to the
world. The Department of Defense has established an office to provide
military support for public diplomacy to better coordinate its
communication activities with those of the State Department.

As part of our reviews of public diplomacy, we have met with officials
from the Department of State, the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Broadcasting Board
of Governors. We have also observed U.S. public diplomacy efforts in a
range of countries including Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and Pakistan;
conducted a worldwide poll of public diplomacy officials in 2003 and more
limited surveys of field activity in recent reviews; and have met with
public diplomacy counterparts in the United Kingdom and Germany. Finally,
we convened roundtables of key agency staff and experts on public
relations and the Muslim world to obtain their key insights and
recommendations for improvement. The work used to support this testimony
was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

Summary

Public opinion polls of foreign audiences have generally shown that
negative attitudes toward the United States continue to rise. For example,
the Pew Global Attitudes Project has found increasing anti-American
sentiment throughout the world. Numerous experts, policymakers, and
business leaders have identified a variety of potential negative
consequences of this growing anti-Americanism. According to these sources,
anti-Americanism may have a negative impact on American economic interests
around the world, the ability of the United States to pursue its foreign
policy goals and succeed in foreign military operations, and the security
of Americans at home and abroad. Although we cannot draw a direct causal
link between negative foreign public opinion toward our country and
specific outcomes in these areas, it is clear that growing
anti-Americanism does not help the United States achieve its economic,
foreign policy, and security goals. Therefore, U.S. public diplomacy
efforts, which seek to counter negative foreign public opinion, have a
critical role to play in supporting U.S. interests.

Key problems identified in our prior reports include a general lack of
strategic planning, inadequate coordination among agency efforts, and
problems with measuring performance and results. Beginning in 2003, we
reported that the government lacked an interagency communications
strategy. Four years later, a strategy still has not been released,
although State officials told us that this will happen soon. Last month,
we also reported on challenges in marking and publicizing U.S. foreign
assistance that may result in missed opportunities to increase public
awareness of U.S. foreign aid activities. Accordingly, we recommended that
State develop strategies and establish interagency agreements to better
coordinate and assess the impact of U.S. marking and publicity programs.
We also reported that State did not have a strategy to integrate its
diverse public diplomacy activities. State began to address this
shortcoming in 2005 when the current Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs developed a strategic framework to focus State's
efforts on three priority goals: offer foreign publics a vision of hope
and opportunity rooted in basic U.S. values, isolate and marginalize
violent extremists, and nurture common interests and values. However,
State has not issued guidance on how its assorted public diplomacy
activities will be coordinated to achieve these goals. In addition, posts'
public diplomacy efforts generally lack important strategic communication
elements found in the private sector, which GAO recommended that State
adopt as a means to better communicate with target audiences. Key steps in
this approach include defining core messages, identifying target
audiences, developing detailed communication strategies and tactics, and
using research and evaluation to inform and re-direct efforts as needed.
Finally, we and others have recommended that State develop more rigorous
measures of effectiveness to better document the impact of its public
diplomacy efforts. State has taken several steps towards this goal,
including establishing a centralized office to better coordinate and
direct the collection of performance data. Regarding the BBG, we have
noted that the Board launched a new strategic approach in 2001 that
included a focus on supporting the U.S. war on terror. The BBG made this
support tangible through several key initiatives, including the creation
of Radio Sawa in 2002 and the Alhurra TV network in 2004, which are run by
the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN). While these are noteworthy
attempts to help turn the tide of negative opinion in the Muslim world
toward the United States, our August 2006 report on MBN recommended that
several steps be taken to correct methodological concerns which could
impact the accuracy of its audience research data. MBN continues to
evaluate possible solutions to these concerns.

We also have reported that State and the BBG face multiple challenges in
managing and implementing their public diplomacy programs. Several embassy
officials indicated that insufficient numbers of staff and the lack of
staff time for public diplomacy activities hinder outreach efforts. To
help address these concerns, the Secretary of State has repositioned some
staff to posts with the greatest perceived shortages; however, significant
shortfalls remain. In May 2006, we reported that approximately 15 percent
of State's worldwide public diplomacy positions were vacant. Updated
information provided by State shows that this problem has worsened and
approximately 22 percent of such positions are now vacant. We reported
that the State Department continues to experience significant shortfalls
in foreign language proficiency in countries around the world. In our May
2006 report, we noted that this problem is particularly acute in the
Muslim world, where 30 percent of language-designated public diplomacy
positions are filled by officers without the level of language proficiency
required for their positions, thus hampering their ability to engage with
foreign publics. State has taken steps to address language deficiencies by
bolstering its language training activities. In addition, security
concerns have forced embassies to close publicly accessible facilities and
curtail certain public outreach efforts, sending the unintended message
that the United States is unapproachable. The department has attempted to
compensate for the lack of public presence in high threat posts through a
variety of means, including the use of small-scale external facilities.
The BBG faces the primary challenge of managing a disparate collection of
multiple discrete broadcast entities. In addition, MBN faces several
managerial challenges involving program review and evaluation, editorial
oversight, internal control issues, and staff training.

Background

The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and
influence overseas audiences. Public diplomacy is carried out through a
wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print,
broadcast, and electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, the State
Department's efforts have focused on foreign elites--current and future
overseas opinion leaders, agenda setters, and decision makers. However,
the dramatic growth in global mass communications and other trends have
forced a rethinking of this approach, and State has begun to consider
techniques for communicating with broader foreign audiences. Since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public
diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly on countries in the
Muslim world considered to be of strategic importance in the war on
terror. In May 2006, we reported that this trend continued with funding
increases of 25 percent for the Near East and 39 percent for South Asia
from 2004 to 2006.

The BBG supports U.S. public diplomacy's key objectives by broadcasting
news and information about the United States and world affairs and serving
as a model of how a free press should operate. The BBG manages and
oversees the Voice of America (VOA), Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio Farda, Radio Sawa, and the
Alhurra TV Network.

As shown in figure 1, State and the BBG spent close to $1.5 billion on
public diplomacy programs in fiscal year 2006.

Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Public Diplomacy Budget Resources for State
Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2006

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Widespread Concern Exists about the Impact of Anti-American Sentiment

As others have previously reported, in recent years anti-American
sentiment has spread and intensified around the world. For example, the
Pew Global Attitudes Project has found that the decline in favorable
opinion of the United States is a worldwide trend. For instance, favorable
attitudes toward the United States in Indonesia declined from 75 percent
in 2000 to 30 percent in 2006 and from 52 percent to 12 percent over the
same time period in Turkey. While individual opinion polls may reflect a
snapshot in time, consistently negative polls may reflect the development
of more deeply seated sentiments about the United States.

Numerous experts, expert groups, policymakers, and business leaders have
expressed concerns that anti-Americanism may harm U.S. interests in
various ways. In its 2004 report on strategic communication, the Defense
Science Board states that "damaging consequences for other elements of
U.S. soft power are tactical manifestations of a pervasive atmosphere of
hostility." Similarly, the Council on Foreign Relations has claimed that
the loss of goodwill and trust from publics around the world has had a
negative impact on U.S. security and foreign policy. Anti-American
sentiments may negatively affect American economic interests, U.S. foreign
policy and military operations, and the security of Americans.

Anti-Americanism May Have Negative Effects on U.S. Economic Interests Around the
World

According to Business for Diplomatic Action,2 anti-Americanism can hurt
U.S. businesses by causing boycotts of American products, a backlash
against American brands, increased security costs for U.S. companies,
higher foreign opposition to U.S. trade policies, and a decrease in the
U.S.'s ability to attract the world's best talent to join the American
workforce. Additionally, a report from the Princeton-based Working Group
on Anti-Americanism3 generally echoes the possibility that
anti-Americanism may harm U.S. business interests in these same areas.

Further, as reported by the Travel Business Roundtable during previous
hearings before this subcommittee, the U.S. travel industry has reported
significant declines in the U.S. market share of the worldwide travel
market and a decline in overseas visitors to the United States since 9/11.
Further, the State Department's 2003 report on Patterns of Global
Terrorism recorded 67 attacks on American business facilities and 7
business casualties. In 2006, the Overseas Security Advisory Council noted
that more threats against the private sector occurred in 2006 than in 2004
or 2005 in most of the industries it reports on. Finally, the Working
Group on Anti-Americanism also indicated that threats to American private
property and personnel working overseas have become constant in some
regions, especially the Middle East, and have resulted in significantly
increased security costs.

2Incorporated in January 2004 by interested private sector leaders,
Business for Diplomatic Action seeks to counter anti-American sentiments
that can harm U.S. business interests by helping to coordinate the
outreach efforts of U.S. multinational companies.

3This working group is part of a larger effort called "The Princeton
Project on National Security," which was established by the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University in
2004. Members of the project come from the government, academia, business,
and the non-profit sector.

Anti-Americanism May Limit Ability to Pursue U.S. Foreign Policy

According to the Defense Science Board, the Brookings Institution, and
others, anti-Americanism around the world may reduce the U.S.'s ability to
pursue its foreign policy goals, including efforts to foster diplomatic
relationships with other foreign leaders and to garner support for the
global war on terror. For instance, in October 2003, the Advisory Group on
Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World reported that "hostility
toward the U.S. makes achieving our policy goals far more difficult."
Specifically, according to a paper from the Working Group on
Anti-Americanism, foreign leaders may seek to leverage anti-American
sentiment in pursuit of their own political goals, which may then limit
their future support for U.S. foreign policy. As these leaders achieve
personal political successes based on their opposition to the United
States, they may then be less likely to support U.S. foreign policy going
forward.

Further, the 9/11 Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, and others
have reported on the possibility that anti-Americanism may also serve as a
barrier to success in the global war on terror and related U.S. military
operations. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission report of July 2004 stated
that perceptions of the United States' foreign policies as anti-Arab,
anti-Muslim, and pro-Israel have contributed to the rise in extremist
rhetoric against the United States. Further, the Council on Foreign
Relations has argued that increasing hostility toward America in Muslim
countries facilitates recruitment and support for extremism and terror.

Anti-Americanism May Be Linked to Decreased Security of Americans Around the
World

The Council on Foreign Relations also has identified potential
consequences of anti-Americanism on the security of individual Americans,
noting that Americans now face an increased risk of direct attack from
individuals and small groups that wield increasingly more destructive
power. According to State's Country Reports on Terrorism for 2005,4 56
private U.S. citizens were killed as a result of terrorism incidents in
2005. The Working Group on Anti-Americanism suggests that there is some
correlation between anti-Americanism and violence against Americans in the
greater Middle East but notes that the relationship is complex. For
example, they note that while increased anti-Americanism in Europe or
Jordan has not led to violence against Americans or U.S. interests in
those areas, it does seem to play a role in fueling such violence in Iraq.
Other factors, such as the visibility of Americans overseas, particularly
in Iraq; the role of the media in supporting anti-Americanism; and the
absence of economic security may also contribute to this violence.

4Beginning in 2004, the State Department replaced its Patterns of Global
Terrorism reports with annual publications titled Country Reports on
Terrorism.

While all of the topics discussed here represent areas in which
anti-Americanism may have negative consequences, the empirical evidence to
support direct relationships is limited. As such, we cannot confirm any
causal relationships between negative foreign public opinion and specific
negative outcomes regarding U.S. interests. Despite the fact that we
cannot draw a direct causal link between anti-Americanism and specific
outcomes in these areas, it is clear that growing negative foreign public
opinion does not help the United States achieve its economic, foreign
policy, and security goals, and therefore U.S. public diplomacy efforts,
which seek to counter anti-Americanism sentiment, have a critical role to
play in supporting U.S. interests throughout the world.

Strategic Planning, Coordination, and Performance Measurement Remain Areas of
Concern

Over the past 4 years, we have identified and made recommendations to
State and the BBG on a number of issues related to a general lack of
strategic planning, inadequate coordination of agency efforts, and
problems with measuring performance and results. Among other things, we
have recommended that (1) communication strategies be developed to
coordinate and focus the efforts of key government agencies and the
private sector, (2) the State Department develop a strategic plan to
integrate its diverse efforts, (3) posts adopt strategic communication
best practices, and (4) meaningful performance goals and indicators be
established by both State and the BBG. Currently, the U.S. government
lacks an interagency public diplomacy strategy; however, such a plan has
been drafted and will be released shortly. While the department has
articulated a strategic framework to direct its efforts, comprehensive
guidance on how to implement this strategic framework has not yet been
developed. In addition, posts generally do not pursue a campaign-style
approach to communications that incorporates best practices endorsed by
GAO and others. State has begun to take credible steps towards instituting
more systematic performance measurement practices, consistent with
recommendations GAO and others have made. Finally, although the BBG has
added audience size as a key performance measure within its strategic
plan, our latest review of MBN's operations call into question the
potential value of this measure due to various methodological concerns.

Government Lacks an Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy

In 2003, we reported that the United States lacked a governmentwide,
interagency public diplomacy strategy, defining the messages and means for
communication efforts abroad. We reported since then that the
administration has made a number of unsuccessful attempts to develop such
a strategy. The lack of such a strategy complicates the task of conveying
consistent messages and therefore increases the risk of making damaging
communication mistakes. State officials have said that it also diminishes
the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public diplomacy
efforts, while several reports have concluded that a strategy is needed to
synchronize agencies' target audience assessments, messages, and
capabilities.

On April 8, 2006, the President established a new Policy Coordination
Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. This
committee, led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs, intends to better coordinate interagency activities, including
the development of an interagency public diplomacy strategy. We have been
told this strategy is still under development and will be issued soon.

The U.S. government also lacks a governmentwide strategy and meaningful
methods to ensure that recipients of U.S. foreign assistance are
consistently aware that the aid comes from the United States. In March
2007, we reported that most agencies involved in foreign assistance
activities had established some marking and publicity requirements in
their policies, regulations, and guidelines, and used various methods to
mark and publicize their activities. However, we identified some
challenges to marking and publicizing U.S. foreign assistance, including
the lack of a strategy for assessing the impact of marking and publicity
efforts on public awareness and the lack of governmentwide guidance for
marking and publicizing U.S. foreign aid. To better ensure that recipients
of U.S. foreign assistance are aware that the aid is provided by the
United States and its taxpayers, we recommended that State, in
consultation with other U.S. government agencies, (1) develop a strategy
to better assess the impact of marking and publicity programs on public
awareness and (2) establish interagency agreements for marking and
publicizing all U.S. foreign assistance. State indicated that the
interagency public diplomacy strategy will address assessment of marking
and publicity programs and will include governmentwide marking and
publicity guidance.

  Private Sector Engagement Strategy Not Yet Developed

In 2005, we noted that State's efforts to engage the private sector in
pursuit of common public diplomacy objectives had met with mixed success
and recommended that the Secretary develop a strategy to guide these
efforts. Since then, State has established an Office of Private Sector
Outreach, is partnering with individuals and the private sector on various
projects, and hosted a Private Sector Summit on Public Diplomacy in
January 2007. However, State has not yet developed a comprehensive
strategy to guide the Department's efforts to engage the private sector.

State Has Established a Public Diplomacy Strategic Framework but Lacks
Implementing Guidance

In 2005, the Under Secretary established a strategic framework for U.S.
public diplomacy efforts, which includes three priority goals: (1) offer
foreign publics a vision of hope and opportunity rooted in the U.S.'s most
basic values; (2) isolate and marginalize extremists; and (3) promote
understanding regarding shared values and common interests between
Americans and peoples of different countries, cultures, and faiths. The
Under Secretary noted that she intends to achieve these goals using five
tactics--engagement, exchanges, education, empowerment, and
evaluation--and by using various public diplomacy programs and other
means, including coordinating outreach efforts with the private sector.
This framework partially responds to our 2003 recommendation that State
should develop and disseminate a strategy to integrate its public
diplomacy efforts and direct them toward achieving common objectives.
State has not yet developed written guidance that provides details on how
these five tactics will be used to implement the Under Secretary's
priority goals. However, it should be noted that the Under Secretary has
issued limited guidance regarding the goal of countering extremism to 18
posts selected to participate in a pilot initiative focusing on this
objective.

Posts Lack a Campaign-Style Approach to Communications

We have recommended that State, where appropriate, adopt strategic
communication best practices (which we refer to as the "campaign-style
approach") 5 and develop country-specific communication plans6 that
incorporate the key steps embodied in this approach. As shown in figure 2,
these steps include defining the core message, identifying and segmenting
target audiences, developing detailed communication strategies and
tactics, and using research and evaluation to inform and re-direct efforts
as needed. As noted in our May 2006 report, our review of public diplomacy
operations in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt in 2006 found that this
approach and corresponding communication plans were absent. Rather, post
public diplomacy efforts constituted an ad hoc collection of activities
designed to support such broad goals as promoting mutual understanding.

5In contrast to State, we believe that these key elements have been
largely adopted by both the Department of Defense and the U.S. Agency for
International Development to help guide their thematic communication
efforts directed at foreign audiences.

6Prior to 1999, when public diplomacy efforts were managed by the former
U.S. Information Agency, detailed communication plans were developed on a
country-by-country basis. These plans included details on core messages
and themes, target audiences, and research on key opinion leaders,
audience attitudes, and the local media environment.

Figure 2: Key Elements of Campaign-style Communication Efforts

In a recent development, 18 posts participating in the department's pilot
countries initiative have developed country-level plans focusing on the
countering extremism goal.7 These plans were developed on the basis of a
template issued by the Under Secretary that requires each post to provide
a list of supporting objectives, a description of the media environment,
identification of key target audiences, and a list of supporting programs
and activities. We reviewed most of the plans submitted in response to
this guidance. Although useful as a high-level planning exercise, these
plans do not adhere to the campaign-style approach, which requires a level
of rigor and detail that normally exceeds the three- to four-page plans
produced by posts in pilot countries. The plans omit basic elements, such
as specific core messages and themes or any substantive evidence that
proposed communication programs were driven by detailed audience
research--one of the key principles embodied in the campaign-style
approach. In the absence of such research, programs may lack important
information about appropriate target audiences and credible messages and
messengers.

State Is Making a Concerted Effort to Better Measure Program Performance and
Impact

Based on prior reports by GAO and others, the department has begun to
institute a more concerted effort to measure the impact of its programs
and activities. The department created (1) the Office of Policy, Planning,
and Resources within the office of the Under Secretary; (2) the Public
Diplomacy Evaluation Council to share best practices; and (3) a unified
Public Diplomacy Evaluation Office. The Department established an expanded
evaluation schedule that is designed to cover all major public diplomacy
programs. The department also has called on program managers to analyze
and define their key inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impact to
help identify meaningful performance goals and indicators. Finally, the
department recently launched a pilot public diplomacy performance
measurement data collection project that is designed to collect, document,
and quantify reliable annual and long-term outcome performance measures to
support government reporting requirements.

7This exercise has now been broadened, and posts around the world are
developing similar country-level plans targeting their key public
diplomacy objectives.

BBG Has Strategy for International Broadcasting, but Audience Data May be
Misleading

In 2001, the BBG introduced a market-based approach to international
broadcasting that sought to "marry the mission to the market." This
approach was designed to generate large listening audiences in priority
markets that the BBG believes it must reach to effectively meet its
mission. Implementing this strategy has focused on markets relevant to the
war on terrorism, in particular in the Middle East through such key
initiatives as Radio Sawa and the Alhurra TV network. The Board's vision
is to create a flexible, multimedia, research-driven U.S. international
broadcasting system.

We found that the BBG's strategic plan to implement its new approach did
not include a single goal or related program objective designed to gauge
progress toward increasing audience size, even though its strategy focuses
on the need to reach large audiences in priority markets. The BBG
subsequently created a single strategic goal to focus on the key objective
of maximizing impact in priority areas of interest to the United States
and made audience size a key performance measure. However, in our August
2006 review of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, we found that
methodological concerns call into question the potential accuracy of this
key performance measure with regard to Radio Sawa's listening rates and
Alhurra's viewing rates. Specifically, we found that weaknesses in the
BBG's audience surveys create uncertainty over whether some of Radio
Sawa's or Alhurra's performance targets for audience size have been met.
We recommended that the BBG improve its audience research methods,
including identifying significant methodological limitations. The BBG
accepted our recommendation and has informed us that it is currently
considering how it will do so.

A Number of Internal and External Challenges Hamper U.S. Public Diplomacy
Activities

Public diplomacy efforts in the field face several other challenges.
Beginning with our September 2003 report on State's public diplomacy
efforts, post officials have consistently cited several key challenges,
including a general lack of staff, insufficient administrative support,
and inadequate language training. Furthermore, public diplomacy officers
struggle to balance security with public access and outreach to local
populations. Finally, the BBG's disparate organizational structure has
been viewed as a key management challenge that significantly complicates
its efforts to focus and direct U.S. international broadcasting efforts.

Insufficient Staff and Lack of Staff Time Hinders Public Diplomacy Activities

Although several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended an
increase in U.S. public diplomacy program spending, several embassy
officials stated that, with current staffing levels, they do not have the
capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. According to State, the
Department had 887 established public diplomacy positions (overseas and
domestic) as of March 31, 2007, but 199, or roughly 22 percent, were
vacant. Compounding this challenge is the loss of public diplomacy
officers to temporary duty in Iraq, which, according to one State
official, has drawn down field officers even further. Staffing shortages
may also limit the amount of training public diplomacy officers receive.
State is repositioning several public diplomacy officers as part of its
transformational diplomacy initiative. However, this effort represents
shifting existing public diplomacy officers and does not increase the
overall number of officers, which we have noted were generally the same in
fiscal years 2004 and 2006.

In addition, public diplomacy officers at posts are burdened with
administrative tasks, and thus have less time to conduct public diplomacy
outreach activities than they did previously. One senior State official
said that administrative duties, such as budget, personnel, and internal
reporting, compete with officers' public diplomacy responsibilities.
Another official in Egypt stated that she rarely had enough time to
strategize, plan, or evaluate her programs. These statements echo comments
we heard during overseas fieldwork and in a survey for our 2003 report. In
that survey, officers stated that, although they manage to attend public
outreach and other functions within their host country capitals, it was
particularly difficult to find time to travel outside the capitals to
interact with other communities. This challenge is compounded at posts
with short tours of duty, including many tours in the Muslim world, as
officials stated that it is difficult to establish the type of close
working relationships essential to effective public diplomacy work when
they are in country for only a short time. In our May 2006 report, we
reported that the average length of tour at posts in the Muslim world is
about 22 percent shorter than tour lengths elsewhere. Noting the
prevalence of 1-year tours in the Muslim world, a senior official at State
said that public affairs officers who have shorter tours tend to produce
less effective work than officers with longer tours.

To address these challenges, we recommended in 2003 that the Secretary of
State designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs
sections to reduce the administrative burden. Officials at State said that
the Management bureau is currently considering options for reducing the
administrative burden on posts, including the development of centralized
administrative capabilities offshore.

Language Deficiencies Continue, Especially in the Muslim World

In August 2006, GAO reported that the State Department continued to
experience significant foreign language proficiency shortfalls in
countries around the world.8 Our May 2006 report noted this problem was
particularly acute at posts in the Muslim world where Arabic--classified
as a "superhard" language by State--predominates. In countries with
significant Muslim populations, we reported that 30 percent of
language-designated public diplomacy positions were filled by officers
without the requisite proficiency in those languages, compared with 24
percent elsewhere. In Arabic language posts, about 36 percent of
language-designated public diplomacy positions were filled by staff unable
to speak Arabic at the designated level. In addition, State officials said
that there are even fewer officers who are willing or able to speak on
television or engage in public debate in Arabic. The information officer
in Cairo stated that his office does not have enough Arabic speakers to
engage the Egyptian media effectively. Figure 3 shows the percentage of
public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world staffed by officers meeting
language requirements.

8GAO, Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls
Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps, [26]GAO-06-894 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 4, 2006).

Figure 3: Percentage of Filled Language-Designated Public Diplomacy
Positions in the Muslim World Staffed by Officers Meeting Language
Requirements (as of August 2005)

State has begun to address these language deficiencies by increasing its
overall amount of language training and providing supplemental training
for more difficult languages at overseas locations. State has also made
efforts to ensure that its public diplomacy staff receive appropriate
language training. For example, State's Foreign Service Institute recently
offered a week of intensive media training for language-qualified officers
that provided guidance on how to communicate with Arabic-speaking
audiences.

Embassies Must Balance Security and Public Outreach

Security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public access,
forcing public diplomacy officers to strike a balance between safety and
mission. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
then-Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, "Safety is one of our top
priorities...but it can't be at the expense of the mission." In our May
2006 reported we noted that security concerns are particularly elevated in
countries with significant Muslim populations, where the threat level for
terrorism is rated as "critical" or "high" in 80 percent of posts.

Security and budgetary concerns have led to the closure of publicly
accessible facilities around the world, such as American Centers and
Libraries. In Pakistan, for example, all American Centers have closed for
security reasons; the last facility, in Islamabad, closed in February
2005. These same concerns have prevented establishing a U.S. presence
elsewhere. As a result, embassies have had to find other venues for public
diplomacy programs, and some activities have been moved onto embassy
compounds, where precautions designed to improve security have had the
ancillary effect of sending the message that the United States is
unapproachable and distrustful, according to State officials. Concrete
barriers and armed escorts contribute to this perception, as do
requirements restricting visitors' use of cell phones and pagers within
the embassy. According to one official in Pakistan, visitors to the
embassy's reference library have declined to as few as one per day because
many visitors feel humiliated by the embassy's rigorous security
procedures.

Other public diplomacy programs have had to limit their publicity to
reduce the risk of becoming a target. A recent joint USAID-State report
concluded that "security concerns often require a `low profile' approach
during events, programs or other situations, which, in happier times,
would have been able to generate considerable good will for the United
States." This constraint is particularly acute in Pakistan, where the
embassy has had to reduce certain speaker and exchange programs.

State has responded to security concerns and the loss of publicly
accessible facilities through a variety of initiatives, including American
Corners, which are centers that provide information about the United
States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local employees.
According to State data, there are currently 365 American Corners
throughout the world, including more than 200 in the Muslim world, with
another 31 planned (more than 20 of which will be in the Muslim world).
However, two of the posts we visited in October 2005 were having
difficulty finding hosts for American Corners, as local institutions fear
becoming terrorist targets.

Disparate Structure and Management Concerns Challenge the Broadcasting Board of
Governors

The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy
challenges, including trying to gain large audiences in priority markets
while dealing with a disparate organizational structure that contains
multiple discrete broadcasters (see fig. 4). As noted in the BBG's
strategic plan, "the diversity of the BBG--diverse organizations with
different missions, different frameworks, and different
constituencies--makes it a challenge to bring all the separate parts
together in a more effective whole." As we reported in July 2003, the
Board hoped to address this key challenge through two primary means.
First, it planned to treat the component parts of U.S. international
broadcasting as a single system with the Board in the position of actively
managing resources across broadcast entities to achieve common broadcast
goals. Second, it intended to realign the BBG's organizational structure
to reinforce the Board's role as CEO with a host of responsibilities,
including taking the lead role in shaping the BBG's overall strategic
direction, setting expectations and standards, and creating the context
for innovation and change.

Figure 4: Organization of the BBG

Note: RFE/RL and VOA jointly produce Radio Farda, a Persian language
service broadcast to Iran.

In addition, in 2006, we found that MBN, which received $79 million in
funding in fiscal year 2006, faces several managerial and editorial
challenges that may hinder the organization's efforts to expand in their
highly competitive market. While MBN has taken steps to improve its
process of program review and evaluation, it has not yet implemented our
recommendations to improve its system of internal control or develop a
comprehensive staff training plan.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have
at this time.

Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T. Ford at
(202) 512-4128 or [email protected]. Individuals making key contributions to
this statement include Audrey Solis, Assistant Director; Michael ten Kate;
Eve Weisberg; Kate France Smiles; and Joe Carney.

Related GAO Products

Foreign Assistance: Actions Needed to Better Assess the Impact of
Agencies' Marking and Publicizing Efforts. [27]GAO-07-277 . Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 12, 2007.

U.S. International Broadcasting: Management of Middle East Broadcasting
Services Could Be Improved. [28]GAO-06-762 . Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4,
2006.

Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist
Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps. [29]GAO-06-894 . Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 4, 2006.

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences
Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges.
[30]GAO-06-535 . Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006.

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack Certain Communication
Elements and Face Persistent Challenges. [31]GAO-06-707T . Washington,
D.C.: May 3, 2006.

International Affairs: Information on U.S. Agencies' Efforts to Address
Islamic Extremism. [32]GAO-05-852 . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2005.

U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the
Lack of a National Communication Strategy. [33]GAO-05-323 . Washington,
D.C.: April 4, 2005.

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and Broadcasting Board of
Governors Expand Post- 9/11 Efforts but Challenges Remain.
[34]GAO-04-1061T . Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2004.

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant
Challenges. [35]GAO-04-435T . Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2004.

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces
Significant Challenges. [36]GAO-03-951 . Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2003.

U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on
Reaching Large Audiences but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives.
[37]GAO-03-772 . Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003.

(320507)

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-795T .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128,
[email protected].

Highlights of [45]GAO-07-795T , a testimony to the Subcommittee on
International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, House Committee
on Foreign Affairs

April 26, 2007

U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Strategic Planning Efforts Have Improved, but Agencies Face Significant
Implementation Challenges

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, polling data have generally shown
that anti-Americanism has spread and deepened around the world, and
several groups have concluded that this trend may have harmed U.S.
interests in significant ways. U.S. public diplomacy activities undertaken
by the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG),
which totaled almost $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2006, are designed to
counter such sentiments. Based on our prior reports, this testimony
addresses (1) the negative consequences various groups have associated
with rising anti-American sentiments; (2) strategic planning,
coordination, and performance measurement issues affecting U.S. public
diplomacy efforts; and (3) key challenges that hamper agency activities.

[46]What GAO Recommends

We have made a number of recommendations in the past 4 years to the
Secretary of State and the Chairman of the BBG to address strategic
planning issues and administrative and staffing concerns. Both agencies
agreed with our recommendations and have made some progress in
implementing them.

Numerous experts, policymakers, and business leaders have identified
various potential negative consequences of growing anti-Americanism.
According to these sources, anti-Americanism may have a negative impact on
American economic interests, the ability of the United States to pursue
its foreign policy and military goals, and the security of Americans
worldwide.

Our reports and testimonies have highlighted the lack of a governmentwide
communication strategy, as well as the need for an integrated State
Department strategy, enhanced performance indicators for State and the
BBG, and improvements in the BBG's audience research methodology. We also
reported in March 2007 that U.S. foreign assistance activities were not
being consistently publicized and branded, and we recommended that State
help develop governmentwide guidance for marking and publicizing these
efforts. State has responded to our recommendations and has taken actions
to develop a more strategic approach and measure the effectiveness of its
programs. Likewise, the BBG has adapted its strategic plan to include
additional performance indicators and is beginning to address our
recommendations to adopt management improvements at its Middle East
Broadcasting Networks (MBN).

Nevertheless, State and the BBG continue to face challenges in
implementing public diplomacy and international broadcasting. State has
shortages in staffing and language capabilities, and security issues
continue to hamper overseas public diplomacy efforts. For example, in 2006
we reported that State continued to experience significant foreign
language proficiency shortfalls, particularly at posts in the Muslim
world. The BBG faces challenges in managing a disparate collection of
broadcasters. Also, MBN faces several managerial challenges involving
program review, internal control, and training.

U.S. Public Diplomacy Resources for State Department and the Broadcasting
Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2006

References

Visible links
  26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-894
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-277
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-762
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-894
  30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-535
  31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-707T
  32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-852
  33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-323
  34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1061T
  35. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-435T
  36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-951
  37. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-772
  45. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-795T
*** End of document. ***