Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of the	 
Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System (09-MAY-07,  
GAO-07-784T).							 
                                                                 
The nation's current air traffic control system is reaching its  
capacity limits as demand for air transportation grows. The Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) represents a new  
system that will use state-of-the-art technologies and		 
procedures. Transitioning to NextGen will require the Federal	 
Aviation Administration (FAA) to continue to sustain the current 
air traffic control system while acquiring new systems on	 
schedule and on budget. In 2003, Congress authorized the creation
of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), housed	 
within FAA, to plan NextGen and coordinate the transition. GAO's 
testimony focuses on the progress FAA is making in implementing  
businesslike operations that could provide a foundation for	 
managing the transition to NextGen, the status of JPDO's planning
and facilitation of NextGen, and some key challenges that FAA and
JPDO need to address in moving toward NextGen. This statement is 
based on GAO's November 2006 report and recent testimonies as	 
well as ongoing work. GAO's November report recommended that FAA 
study its technical and contract management expertise and that	 
JPDO take actions to institutionalize its collaborative 	 
practices. FAA and JPDO said they would consider our		 
recommendations.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-784T					        
    ACCNO:   A69385						        
  TITLE:     Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of the 
Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System		 
     DATE:   05/09/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Air traffic control systems			 
	     Air traffic controllers				 
	     Air transportation 				 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Concept of operations				 
	     Enterprise architecture				 
	     Future budget projections				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Systems conversions				 
	     Transportation planning				 
	     Next Generation Air Transportation 		 
	     System						 
                                                                 

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GAO-07-784T

   

     * [1]Improved, Businesslike Operations Should Better Position FAA

          * [2]Progress Has Been Made but Further Work Remains to Instituti
          * [3]FAA Has Reported Cost Savings through Outsourcing and Facili
          * [4]Mitigating Remaining Risks and Institutionalization of Impro
          * [5]Institutionalizing Changes Within FAA Will Require Continued

     * [6]JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning NextGen, but Continues to

          * [7]JPDO Has Made Progress Toward Releasing Key Planning Documen
          * [8]Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Will Continue t

     * [9]FAA and JPDO Continue to Face a Number of Challenges in Movi

          * [10]FAA Needs to Explore Whether It Has the Technical and Contra
          * [11]Although FAA Is Now Focusing on NextGen, It Must Continue to
          * [12]FAA and JPDO Have Begun to Release Early Cost Estimates for
          * [13]JPDO's Lack of Stable Leadership and the Authority to Enforc
          * [14]Human Factors Research Is Critical to Some Fundamental NextG
          * [15]JPDO Faces A Continuing Challenge in Ensuring the Involvemen

     * [16]GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment
     * [17]GAO's Mission
     * [18]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [19]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [20]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [21]Congressional Relations
     * [22]Public Affairs

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Wednesday, May 9, 2007

NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

Status of the Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues

GAO-07-784T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity
to testify before you today to discuss the future of air traffic control
modernization. The nation's current air traffic control system is reaching
its capacity limits as demand for air transportation continues to grow
each year. The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)
represents a transformation to a new system that will use satellite-based
technologies and state-of-the-art procedures to handle the increasing
volume of air traffic, while further improving safety and security.
Transitioning to NextGen, however, will require the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to continue to operate and sustain the current air
traffic control system while simultaneously acquiring and deploying the
new NextGen systems on budget and on schedule.

In December 2000, President Clinton signed an executive order, and
Congress passed supporting legislation that, together, provided FAA with
the authority to create the performance-based1 Air Traffic Organization
(ATO) to administer and improve FAA's management of its current air
traffic control modernization efforts. In 2003, Congress authorized the
creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), housed
within FAA, to plan for and coordinate a transition to NextGen--envisioned
as a move from largely ground-based radars to precision satellite-based
navigation and including digital, networked communications; an integrated
weather system; layered, adaptive security; and more. In addition to FAA,
JPDO operates in conjunction with multiple federal partner agencies and
with the private sector to collaboratively conceptualize and plan the
NextGen system.2

The reauthorization of FAA provides an opportunity to examine how the
agency is managing the transformation to NextGen. My testimony today
focuses on the following questions: (1) What progress is FAA making in
implementing initiatives that could provide a solid foundation for
managing the transition to NextGen? (2) What is the status of JPDO's
planning and facilitation of the transition to NextGen? and (3) What are
some key challenges that FAA and JPDO need to address in moving toward
NextGen? My statement is based on our November 2006 report3 and recent
testimonies4 as well as on-going work. We conducted this work in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

1Performance-based organizations are discrete units, led by a chief
operating officer, that commit to clear objectives, specific measurable
goals, customer service standards, and targets for improved performance.

2JPDO's partner agencies include the Departments of Transportation,
Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy.

In summary:

           o During the last few years, FAA has made significant progress in
           implementing businesslike operations and procedures for acquiring
           and managing air traffic control systems which have improved FAA's
           management of the current system and should better position the
           agency to manage the enormously complex transition to NextGen.
           However, further work remains to fully address past problems in
           acquiring systems and to institutionalize changes throughout the
           agency. By creating the Air Traffic Organization and appointing a
           chief operating officer, FAA established a new management
           structure and adopted more leading practices of private sector
           businesses to address the cost, schedule, and performance
           shortfalls that have plagued air traffic control acquisitions. One
           outcome of these changes is that for the past 3 fiscal years, FAA
           has reported exceeding its system acquisition goals. For fiscal
           year 2006, FAA reported that its critical acquisitions were 100
           percent on budget and over 97 percent on schedule. FAA has also
           improved its management of the air traffic control system through
           increased efforts to achieve cost savings by outsourcing and
           consolidating facilities. Currently, FAA is seeking savings
           through outsourcing its planned nationwide deployment of a
           critical NextGen surveillance technology. To help sustain progress
           in managing acquisitions and address remaining program risks, FAA
           is working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
           develop goals and milestones for FAA to meet in further reducing
           acquisition risks. Despite FAA's progress, however, the FAA
           administrator's term ends in September 2007 and the chief
           operating officer left in February 2007, after serving 3 years.
           Thus, FAA will have lost two of its significant agents for change
           by the end of September. FAA's new leaders will need to
           demonstrate the same commitment to improvement as the outgoing
           leaders.
		   
3GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges
Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System,
[23]GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).

4GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Key Issues in Ensuring the
Efficient Development and Safe Operation of the Next Generation Air
Transportation System, [24]GAO-07-636T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2007)
and GAO, Joint Planning and Development Office: Progress and Key Issues in
Planning the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System,
[25]GAO-07-693T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2007).

           o JPDO has made progress in furthering its key planning documents,
           but continues to face challenges in institutionalizing its
           collaborative practices. JPDO is developing several key
           documents--a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise Architecture,
           and an Integrated Work Plan--that together form the foundation of
           NextGen planning. JPDO has missed earlier milestones regarding the
           release of its Concept of Operations and Enterprise Architecture.
           JPDO currently plans to release initial versions of all three
           documents by July 2007. As we noted in November 2006, JPDO is
           fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that lacks
           authority over the key human and technological resources of its
           partner agencies. Thus, institutionalizing the collaborative
           process between these partner agencies will continue to be
           critical to JPDO's success. However, JPDO still does not have in
           place a formal, long-term agreement among its partner agencies on
           their roles and responsibilities in planning and facilitating the
           transition to NextGen. JPDO has been working since 2005 to
           establish a memorandum of understanding between the partner
           agencies, although as of May 4, 2007, the memorandum had been
           signed by the Departments of Transportation and Commerce and NASA;
           the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security had not yet
           signed.5 It will also be important for institutionalizing
           collaboration to incorporate NextGen goals and activities into the
           partner agencies' key planning documents, as FAA is currently
           doing with its Operational Evolution Partnership--FAA's new
           implementation plan for NextGen. JPDO is also working with OMB to
           establish mechanisms to identify NextGen-related projects across
           the partner agencies and consider NextGen as a unified,
           cross-agency program for funding decisions.

           o FAA and JPDO continue to face a number of challenges in moving
           toward NextGen, including determining whether the organizations
           have the adequate and appropriate technical and contract
           management expertise, managing and sustaining the current system,
           identifying who will conduct necessary research and development
           activities, obtaining stable leadership, conducting needed human
           factors research, and ensuring the involvement of all key
           stakeholders. In November 2006, we recommended that FAA examine
           its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the technical and
           contract management expertise that will be required to define,
           implement, and integrate the numerous complex programs inherent in
           the transition to NextGen. In response to our recommendation, FAA
           is working with the National Academy of Public Administration to
           explore these issues. JPDO recently estimated that the total
           federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range
           between $15 billion and $22 billion. However, questions remain
           over which entities will fund and conduct some of the necessary
           research, development, and demonstration projects that will be key
           to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. According to officials
           at FAA and JPDO, they are currently studying these issues and
           trying to assess how much research and development FAA can assume.
           Of critical importance in the area of NextGen research is human
           factors research given the fundamental changes that NextGen
           envisions in the roles of air traffic controllers and pilots due
           to automation and changes in surveillance technologies and
           communications. JPDO has suffered from a lack of stable leadership
           and is now functioning under its third director. This issue is
           exacerbated by JPDO's senior policy committee, which has met only
           four times and has not met at all as a formal body since November
           2005. Finally, JPDO faces a continuing challenge in ensuring the
           involvement of all key stakeholders, such as active air traffic
           controllers and technicians. Our work on past air traffic control
           modernization projects has shown that a lack of stakeholder or
           expert involvement early and throughout a project can lead to
           costly increases and delays.
		   
5According to JPDO, it is not appropriate for the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, as a White House agency, to sign the MOU.		   

           In November 2006, we recommended that the Secretary of
           Transportation direct FAA to undertake a formal exploration of the
           agency's strengths and weaknesses with regard to the technical
           expertise and contract management expertise that will be required
           to define, implement, and integrate the numerous complex programs
           and systems inherent in the transition to NextGen. We recommended
           that the Secretary direct JPDO to take actions to institutionalize
           the partner agencies' collaboration in supporting NextGen,
           including action on a memorandum of understanding among the
           partner agencies, actions to finalize procedures to leverage
           partner agency resources, and actions to develop procedures for
           dispute resolution. We also recommended that the Secretary direct
           JPDO to determine whether key stakeholders and expertise are not
           currently represented in JPDO planning efforts. FAA and JPDO
           officials neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations,
           but said they would consider them.
		   
		   Improved, Businesslike Operations Should Better Position FAA to
		   Implement and Manage NextGen, but Further Work Remains

           During the last few years, FAA has made significant progress in
           implementing businesslike processes and procedures for managing
           and acquiring air traffic control systems. This contrasts with the
           previous decade's air traffic control modernization program which
           was characterized by chronic cost and schedule difficulties with
           systems acquisitions. The implementation of these businesslike
           operations has improved FAA's management of the current system and
           should better position the agency to manage the enormously complex
           transition to NextGen. However, further work remains to fully
           address past problems and institutionalize these changes
           throughout the agency, especially given the changing leadership
           within both FAA and ATO.
		   
		   Progress Has Been Made but Further Work Remains to
		   Institutionalize Recent Improvements in Management and
		   Acquisition Processes
		   
           A successful transition to NextGen will depend, to a great extent,
           on FAA's ability to manage the acquisition and integration of
           multiple NextGen systems. In recent years, FAA has made
           significant progress toward improving its management of
           acquisitions. However, FAA's air traffic control modernization
           program remains on our list of high risk programs because of its
           history of systemic management and acquisition problems that
           contributed to cost growth, schedule slippages, and performance
           shortfalls and the relative recentness of the turnaround in the
           program's performance. The realization of NextGen goals could be
           severely compromised if FAA's improved program management and
           outcomes are not institutionalized and carried over into the
           implementation of NextGen, which is an even more complex and
           ambitious undertaking than past modernization efforts.

           By creating ATO and appointing a chief operating officer (COO) to
           head ATO, FAA established a new management structure and adopted
           more leading practices of private sector businesses to address the
           cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls that have plagued air
           traffic control acquisitions. ATO has worked to create a flatter
           organization, with fewer management layers, and has reported
           reducing executive staffing by 20 percent and total management by
           16 percent. In addition, FAA uses a performance management system
           to hold managers responsible for the success of ATO. More
           specifically, to better manage its acquisitions and address
           problems we have identified,6 FAA has

           o undertaken human capital initiatives to improve its acquisition
           workforce culture and build towards a results-oriented,
           high-performing organization;
           o developed and applied a process improvement model to assess the
           maturity of its software and systems capabilities resulting in,
           among other things, enhanced productivity and greater ability to
           predict schedules and resources; and
           o reported that it has established a policy and guidance on using
           earned value management (EVM) in its acquisition management system
           and that 19 of its major programs are currently using EVM.7

           One outcome of the implementation of the changes in program
           management and operations is that for the past three fiscal years,
           FAA has reported exceeding system acquisition goals. FAA's goals
           for fiscal year 2006 were to have 85 percent of critical
           acquisition programs within 10 percent of budget, as reflected in
           its capital investment plan, and to have 85 percent of critical
           acquisition programs on schedule. For fiscal year 2006, FAA
           reported that its critical acquisitions were 100 percent on budget
           and over 97 percent on schedule.
		   
   		   FAA Has Reported Cost Savings through Outsourcing and Facility
		   Consolidations

           FAA has also improved its management of its air traffic control
           program through increased efforts to achieve cost savings by
           outsourcing and consolidating facilities. For example, FAA is
           outsourcing flight service stations and estimates a $2.2 billion
           savings over 12 years. Similarly, FAA is seeking savings through
           outsourcing its planned nationwide deployment of Automatic
           Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), a critical NextGen
           surveillance technology. FAA is planning to implement ADS-B
           through a performance-based contract in which FAA will pay
           "subscription" charges for the ADS-B services and the vendor will
           be responsible for building and maintaining the infrastructure.
           (FAA also reports that the ADS-B rollout will allow the agency to
           remove 50 percent of its current secondary radars, saving money in
           the program's baseline. The remaining radars will serve as a
           back-up system to ADS-B.) As for consolidating facilities, FAA is
           currently restructuring ATO's administrative service areas from
           nine offices to three offices, which FAA estimates will save up to
           $460 million over 10 years.
		   
6GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program
Needed to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts, [26]GAO-05-266 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005); Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities
Improved, but More can be Done to Institutionalize Improvements,
[27]GAO-04-901 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004); and Information
Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management Capabilities in Place, but
More Oversight of Operational Systems is Needed, [28]GAO-04-822
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004).

7EVM is a project management technique that combines measurements of
technical performance, schedule performance, and cost performance with the
intent of providing an early warning of problems while there is time for
corrective action.

           We previously reported that FAA should pursue further cost control
           options, such as exploring additional opportunities for
           contracting out services and consolidating facilities. However, we
           recognize that FAA faces challenges with consolidating facilities,
           an action that can be politically sensitive. In recognition of
           this sensitivity, the administration's reauthorization proposal
           presents an initiative in which the Secretary of Transportation
           would be authorized to establish an independent, five-member
           Commission, known as the Realignment and Consolidation of Aviation
           Facilities and Services Commission, to independently analyze FAA's
           recommendations to realign facilities or services. The Commission
           would then send its own recommendations to the President and
           Congress. In the past, we noted the importance of potential cost
           savings through facility consolidations; however, any such
           consolidations must be handled through a process that solicits and
           considers stakeholder input throughout and fully considers the
           safety implications of both proposed facility closures and
           consolidations.
		   
		   Mitigating Remaining Risks and Institutionalization of
		   Improvements Will Continue to Be a Challenge for FAA

           Sustaining the acquisition progress achieved to date and
           addressing the remaining program risks remains a challenge for
           FAA. FAA's air traffic control modernization program has been on
           GAO's high-risk list since 1995. In recent years the agency has
           made measurable improvements in its acquisition processes. GAO
           acknowledged those improvements in its 2007 high risk report.8 In
           2005, FAA submitted a plan to OMB for reducing the risks of cost
           overruns, schedule slippages, and performance shortfalls with
           goals and milestones for FAA to meet in further reducing
           acquisition risks. FAA expects to complete the risk mitigation
           plan by the end of calendar year 2008.
		   
8GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, [29]GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).

           Additionally, we have an ongoing study that is examining FAA's
           performance and reporting on its critical acquisitions, including
           applicable performance measures. We are exploring FAA's use of the
           most recently approved cost and schedule baselines, which may have
           changed significantly since the start of an acquisition, to
           measure and report on program performance. Rebaselining
           acquisitions is an accepted practice and there can be valid
           reasons for doing so, such as when changes in a program's
           requirements fundamentally alter the acquisition and make the
           originally approved schedule unrealistic. Because rebaselining
           resets the cost and schedule variances to zero, however, we want
           to verify that FAA's practice is not masking acquisition
           performance problems and is providing full disclosure to the
           Congress. We expect to issue a report on these issues later this
           year.
		   
		   Institutionalizing Changes Within FAA Will Require Continued Strong
		   Leadership

           It will be important, as FAA begins to implement NextGen systems,
           to maintain critical acquisitions on schedule and on budget to
           meet the goal of transitioning to NextGen by 2025 and to prevent
           escalation of the costs of NextGen. While FAA has implemented many
           positive changes to its management and business processes in
           recent years, it currently faces the loss of key leaders. We
           reported that the experiences of successful transformations and
           change management initiatives in large public and private
           organizations suggest that it can take 5 to 7 years or more until
           such initiatives are fully implemented and cultures are
           transformed in a sustainable manner.9 Such changes require
           focused, full-time attention from senior leadership and a
           dedicated team. However, FAA will have lost two of its significant
           agents for change--the FAA administrator and the COO--by the end
           of September 2007. The administrator's term ends in September
           2007; the COO left in February 2007, after serving 3 years. For
           the financial, management, and acquisition improvements to further
           permeate the agency, and thus provide a firm foundation upon which
           to implement NextGen, FAA's new leaders will need to demonstrate
           the same commitment to improvement as the outgoing leaders.
           Because this is a critical time for FAA, the agency needs to move
           expeditiously to find a new COO for ATO. A COO who could commit to
           the current statutory 5-year term also would be useful in
           providing stable leadership at ATO as foundational NextGen systems
           begin to be implemented.
		   
9GAO, National Airspace System: Transformation will Require Cultural
Change, Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available Management
Tools, [30]GAO-06-154 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2005).

           JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning NextGen, but Continues to Face
		   Challenges with Its Organization

           JPDO has continued to make progress in furthering its key planning
           documents, but still faces challenges in institutionalizing its
           collaborative practices.
		   
		   JPDO Has Made Progress Toward Releasing Key Planning Documents,
		   although Further Work Remains

           JPDO's authorizing legislation requires the office to create a
           multi-agency research and development plan for the transition to
           NextGen. To comply, JPDO is developing several key documents that
           together form the foundation of NextGen planning. These documents
           include a NextGen Concept of Operations, a NextGen Enterprise
           Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan.

           The Concept of Operations is the most fundamental of JPDO's key
           planning documents, as the other key documents flow from it.
           Although an earlier version was delayed so that stakeholder
           comments could be addressed, Version 1.2 of the Concept of
           Operations is currently posted on JPDO's Website for review and
           comment by the aviation community. This 226-page document provides
           written descriptions of how the NextGen system is envisioned to
           operate in 2025 and beyond, including highlighting key research
           and policy issues that will need to be addressed.10 For example,
           some key policy issues are associated with automating the air
           traffic control system, including the need for a backup plan in
           case automation fails, the responsibilities and liabilities of
           different stakeholders during an automation failure, and the level
           of monitoring needed by pilots when automation is ensuring safe
           separation between aircraft. Over the next few months, JPDO plans
           to address the public comments it receives and issue a revised
           version of the Concept of Operations.
		   
10Following an introductory section, the Concept of Operations has eight
sections covering air traffic management operations, airport operations
and infrastructure services, net-centric infrastructure services, shared
situational awareness services, security services, environmental
management framework, safety management services, and performance
management services.

           In addition to the Concept of Operations, JPDO is working on an
           Enterprise Architecture for NextGen--that is, a technical
           description of the NextGen system, akin to blueprints for a
           building. The Enterprise Architecture is meant to provide a common
           tool for planning and understanding the complex, interrelated
           systems that will make up NextGen. According to JPDO officials,
           the Enterprise Architecture will provide the means for
           coordinating among the partner agencies and private sector
           manufacturers, aligning relevant research and development
           activities, and integrating equipment. JPDO plans to issue an
           early version of its Enterprise Architecture next month, although
           three previous release dates--March 2006, June 2006, and September
           2006--were not met. According to JPDO officials, until the
           Enterprise Architecture is released, precise cost estimates cannot
           be developed and the partner agencies' research plans cannot be
           coordinated.

           Finally, JPDO is developing an Integrated Work Plan that will
           describe the capabilities needed to transition to NextGen from the
           current system and provide the research, policy and regulation,
           and acquisition timelines necessary to achieve NextGen by 2025.
           The Integrated Work Plan is akin to a project plan and will be
           critical for fiscal year 2009 partner agency budget and program
           planning. According to a JPDO official, the office intends to
           issue its initial draft of the Integrated Work Plan in July 2007.

           Figure 1: Key NextGen Planning Documents

           We have discussed JPDO's planning documents with JPDO officials
           and examined both an earlier version of JPDO's Concept of
           Operations11 and the current version that is out for public
           comment.12 As we previously testified, JPDO is focusing on the
           right types of key documents for the foundation of NextGen
           planning.13 As for the Concept of Operations, the current version
           is improved from the prior version due to additional detail.
           Nonetheless, we believe that it still does not include key
           elements such as scenarios illustrating NextGen operations, a
           summary of NextGen's operational impact on users and other
           stakeholders, and an analysis of the benefits, alternatives, and
           trade-offs that were considered for NextGen. In addition, it lacks
           an overall description that ties together the eight key areas that
           the document covers. As noted earlier, JPDO does plan to release
           another version of the Concept of Operations later this year.

           In fact, JPDO plans further versions of all of its key planning
           documents. We see the development of all three of JPDO's key
           documents as part of an iterative and evolutionary process. Thus,
           it is unlikely that any of these documents will ever be truly
           "finalized," but rather will continue to evolve throughout the
           implementation of NextGen to reflect, for example, the development
           of new technologies or problems uncovered during research and
           development of planned technologies.
		   
11Concept of Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation System,
version 0.2, July 24, 2006.

12We reviewed JPDO's current Concept of Operations for the Next Generation
Air Transportation System, version 1.2, dated February 28, 2007, by
comparing it with the IEEE Standard 1362-1998 for concept of operations
documents.

13 [31]GAO-07-693T .

           Finally, while each of the three key documents has a specific
           purpose, the scope and technical sophistication of these documents
           makes it difficult for some stakeholders to understand the basics
           of the NextGen planning effort. To address this issue, JPDO is
           currently drafting what the office refers to as a "blueprint" for
           NextGen, meant to be a short, high-level, non-technical
           presentation of NextGen goals and capabilities. We believe that
           such a document could help some stakeholders develop a better
           understanding of NextGen and the planning effort to date.
		   
		   Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Will Continue to be
		   Critical to JPDO's Facilitating NextGen

           In our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a
           planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key
           human and technological resources of its partner agencies.
           Consequently, institutionalizing the collaborative process with
           its partner agencies will be critical to JPDO's ability to
           facilitate the implementation of NextGen. JPDO, however, has not
           established some practices significant to institutionalizing its
           collaborative process. For example, at a fundamental level, JPDO
           does not have formal, long-term agreements among its partner
           agencies on their roles and responsibilities in creating NextGen.
           There is no mechanism that assures that the partner agencies'
           commitment will continue over the 20-year timeframe of NextGen or
           that ensures accountability to JPDO. According to JPDO officials,
           they are working to establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU),
           signed by the Secretary or other high-ranking official from each
           partner agency, which will broadly define the partner agencies'
           roles and responsibilities. JPDO first informed us of the
           development of this MOU in August 2005; in November 2006 we
           recommended that JPDO finalize the MOU and present it to JPDO's
           senior policy committee for its consideration and action.
           Nonetheless, according to a JPDO official, as of May 4, 2007, the
           MOU has been signed by the Departments of Transportation and
           Commerce and NASA, but remains unsigned by the Departments of
           Defense and Homeland Security.

           Another key method for institutionalizing the collaborative effort
           is incorporating NextGen goals and activities into the partner
           agencies' key planning documents. For example, we noted in
           November 2006 that NASA and FAA had incorporated NextGen goals
           into their strategic plans. These types of efforts will be
           critical to JPDO's ability to leverage its partner agency
           resources for continued JPDO planning efforts. Even more
           importantly, these efforts will be critical to helping ensure that
           partner agencies--given competing missions and resource
           demands--dedicate the resources necessary to support the
           implementation of NextGen research efforts or system acquisitions.

           Recognizing that JPDO does not have authority over partner agency
           resources, FAA and JPDO have initiated several efforts to
           institutionalize NextGen. First, JPDO is working with FAA to
           refocus one of FAA's key planning documents on the implementation
           of NextGen--an effort that also appears to be improving the
           collaboration and coordination between JPDO and ATO. FAA has
           expanded and revamped its Operational Evolution Plan
           (OEP)--renamed the Operational Evolution Partnership--to become
           FAA's implementation plan for NextGen.14 The OEP is being expanded
           to apply to all of FAA and is intended to become a comprehensive
           description of how the agency will implement NextGen, including
           the required technologies, procedures, and resources. (Figure 2
           shows the new OEP framework.) An ATO official told us that the new
           OEP is to be consistent with JPDO's key planning documents and its
           budget guidance to the partner agencies. According to FAA, the new
           OEP will allow it to demonstrate appropriate budget control and
           linkage to NextGen plans and help ensure that FAA's research and
           development is relevant to NextGen's requirements. According to
           FAA documents, the agency plans to publish a new OEP in June 2007.
		   
14Prior to expansion of the OEP, the document centered around plans for
increasing capacity and efficiency at 35 major airports.

           Figure 2: New OEP Framework

           Note: The concentric rings indicate the nature of initiative
           development from the outer ring (NextGen strategic initiatives),
           in which new programs and concepts are analyzed and demonstrated;
           to the second ring, where decisions are made regarding safety,
           operating policy, performance standards, and certification
           requirements; to the third ring (technical development), where
           concepts are prototyped and investment analysis decisions are
           made. The progression through the rings is not necessarily linear,
           and a program may be in more than one ring at a time. Data
           communications, for example, is in the technical development ring
           and also in the middle ring as policy and rulemaking is
           considered. The core is divided into three sections, which
           indicate the FAA offices that implement the final NextGen program.

           In addition, to further align FAA's efforts with JPDO's plans for
           NextGen, FAA has created a NextGen review board to oversee the
           OEP. This review board is co-chaired by JPDO's director and ATO's
           vice president of operations planning services. Initiatives, such
           as concept demonstrations or research, proposed for inclusion in
           the OEP now need to go through the review board for approval.
           These efforts are assessed for relation to NextGen requirements,
           concept maturity, and risk. An ATO official told us that the new
           OEP process should also help identify some smaller programs that
           might be inconsistent with NextGen and which could be
           discontinued. Additionally, as a further step towards integrating
           ATO and JPDO, the administration's reauthorization proposal calls
           for the JPDO director to be a voting member of FAA's joint
           resources council and ATO's executive council.

           While progress is being made in incorporating NextGen initiatives
           into FAA's strategic and planning documents, more remains to be
           done with FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies. For example,
           one critical activity that remains in this area will be
           synchronizing the NextGen enterprise architecture--once JPDO
           releases and further refines it--with the partner agencies'
           enterprise architectures. Doing so should help align agencies'
           current work with NextGen while simultaneously identifying gaps
           between agency plans and NextGen plans. Also, while FAA is making
           significant progress toward creating an implementation plan for
           NextGen with its OEP, the other partner agencies are less far
           along or have not begun such efforts. JPDO's lack of authority
           over partner agency resources will be minimized as a challenge if
           the partner agencies commit to NextGen goals and initiatives at a
           structural level. By further incorporation of NextGen efforts into
           strategic planning documents, the partner agencies will better
           institutionalize their commitments to JPDO and the NextGen
           initiative.

           Finally, JPDO has made progress in establishing mechanisms for
           leveraging partner agency resources--another important practice
           for institutionalizing JPDO's collaborative effort. As we noted in
           our November 2006 report, JPDO is working with OMB to develop a
           process that would allow OMB to identify NextGen-related projects
           across the partner agencies and consider NextGen as a unified,
           cross-agency program. We recommended that JPDO develop written
           procedures that formalize agreements with OMB regarding the
           leveraging of partner agency resources and the identification of
           NextGen-related programs within agency budgets. We recently met
           with OMB officials who said that they felt there has been
           significant progress with JPDO over the last year. JPDO is now
           working on an OMB Exhibit 300 form for NextGen that will allow
           JPDO to present OMB a joint business case for the NextGen-related
           efforts within the partner agencies and will be used as input to
           funding decisions for NextGen research and acquisitions across the
           agencies.15 This Exhibit 300 will be due to OMB in September 2007
           to inform decisions about the partner agencies' 2009 budget
           submissions.

           Ultimately, the success of JPDO will have to be measured in the
           efforts of its partner agencies to implement policies and
           procedures, conduct research, and acquire systems that support
           NextGen. For example, JPDO is currently working to establish a
           joint weather office involving FAA and the Departments of Defense
           and Commerce. The goal of this joint office is to eliminate
           redundancies in weather research and leverage the resources of
           these partner agencies to implement a joint weather product by
           2012, according to a senior JPDO official. Similarly, JPDO has
           secured a commitment from the Departments of Defense and Homeland
           Security and FAA to jointly fund the developmental testing of
           scenarios for network enabled operations.

           With regard to implementation of NextGen technologies, JPDO can
           point to its success in collaborating with FAA to fund and speed
           FAA's rollout of two systems considered cornerstone technologies
           for NextGen: ADS-B and System Wide Information Management (SWIM).
           ADS-B will replace many existing radars with less costly
           ground-based transceivers. SWIM will provide an initial network
           centric capability to all the users of the air transportation
           system. This means that the FAA and the Departments of Homeland
           Security and Defense will eventually share a common, real-time,
           secure picture of aviation operations across the airspace system.
           Identifying such NextGen programs across the partner agencies and
           establishing implementation plans for them in JPDO's Integrated
           Work Plan will be critical going forward to creating performance
           metrics for JPDO.
		   
15Section 300 of OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and
Execution of the Budget (Nov. 2, 2005), sets forth requirements for
federal agencies for planning, budgeting, acquiring, and managing
information technology capital assets.

           FAA and JPDO Continue to Face a Number of Challenges in Moving
		   Toward NextGen

           FAA and JPDO continue to face a number of challenges as they move
           toward the implementation of NextGen systems and procedures,
           including assessing FAA's technical and contract management
           expertise, sustaining the current air traffic control system,
           identifying which entities will handle necessary research and
           development, addressing JPDO's leadership challenges, conducting
           human factors research, and ensuring the involvement of all key
           stakeholders.
		   
		   FAA Needs to Explore Whether It Has the Technical and Contract
		   Management Expertise Necessary to Implement NextGen

           In the past, a lack of expertise contributed to weaknesses in
           FAA's management of air traffic control modernization efforts, and
           industry experts with whom we spoke questioned whether FAA will
           have the technical expertise needed to implement NextGen. In
           addition to technical expertise, FAA will need contract management
           expertise to oversee the systems acquisitions and integration
           involved in NextGen.

           Recognizing the complexity of the NextGen implementation effort
           and the possibility that FAA may not have the in-house expertise
           to manage it without assistance, we have identified potential
           approaches for supplementing FAA's capabilities. One of these
           approaches is for FAA to contract with a lead systems integrator
           (LSI). Generally, an LSI is a prime contractor that would help to
           ensure that the discrete systems used in NextGen will operate
           together and whose responsibilities may include designing system
           solutions, developing requirements, and selecting major system and
           subsystem contractors. The government has used LSIs before for
           programs that require the integration of multiple complex systems.
           Our research indicates that although LSIs have certain advantages,
           such as the knowledge, understanding, skills, and ability to
           integrate functions across various systems, their use also entails
           certain risks.16 For example, because an LSI may have
           significantly more responsibility than a prime contractor usually
           does, careful oversight is necessary to ensure that the
           government's interests are protected and that conflicts of
           interest are avoided. Providing the oversight that is needed,
           however, can be compromised when government expertise is lacking.
           Consequently, selecting, assigning responsibilities to, and
           managing an LSI could pose significant challenges for JPDO and
           FAA.
		   
16GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat System Risks Underscore the
Importance of Oversight, [32]GAO-07-672T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27,
2007).

           Another approach that we have identified involves obtaining
           technical advice from federally funded research and development
           corporations to help the agency oversee and manage prime
           contractors. These nonprofit corporations are chartered to provide
           long-term technical advice to government agencies in accordance
           with various statutory and regulatory rules to ensure independence
           and prevent conflicts of interest.

           In November 2006, we recommended that FAA examine its strengths
           and weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and contract
           management expertise that will be required to define, implement,
           and integrate the numerous complex programs inherent in the
           transition to NextGen.17 In response to our recommendation, FAA
           has contracted with the National Academy of Public Administration
           (NAPA) to determine the needed skill mix and the number of those
           skilled persons, such as technical personnel and program managers,
           that would be necessary to implement the new OEP and to compare
           those requirements with current FAA staff resources. According to
           FAA, the next step in this process would be to contract with NAPA
           or another organization for advice on how best to fill any skills
           gaps and how to proceed with management and oversight of the
           implementation of NextGen. We believe this is a reasonable
           approach that should help FAA begin to address this challenge.
		   
		   Although FAA Is Now Focusing on NextGen, It Must Continue to
		   Manage and Sustain the Current System

           While FAA works to acquire and deploy NextGen technologies, it
           will be equally important that FAA maintain many existing systems
           and, for those systems that FAA determines should be phased out,
           that the agency do so using a risk-based approach. The adequacy of
           FAA's maintenance of existing systems was raised following a power
           outage and equipment failures in Southern California that caused
           hundreds of flight delays during the summer of 2006.
           Investigations by FAA and the Department of Transportation
           Inspector General into these incidents identified a number of
           underlying issues, including the age and condition of equipment.
           Nationwide, the number of scheduled18 and unscheduled outages of
           air traffic control equipment and ancillary support systems has
           been increasing. Increases in the number of unscheduled outages
           indicate that systems are failing more frequently. It will be
           critical for FAA to monitor and address equipment outages to
           ensure the safety and efficiency of the legacy systems, since they
           will be the core of the national airspace system for a number of
           years and, in some cases, will become part of NextGen.
		   
17 [33]GAO-07-25 .

18Scheduled outages occur for scheduled maintenance.

           FAA and JPDO Have Begun to Release Early Cost Estimates for
		   NextGen, but Questions Remain Over Who Will Conduct Necessary
		   Research and Development

           In our November report, we noted that JPDO had not yet developed a
           comprehensive estimate of the costs of NextGen. Since then, in its
           recently released 2006 Progress Report,19 JPDO reported some
           estimated costs for NextGen, including specifics on some early
           NextGen programs. JPDO believes the total federal cost for NextGen
           infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22
           billion. JPDO also reported that a preliminary estimate of the
           corresponding cost to system users, who will have to equip with
           the advanced avionics that are necessary to realize the full
           benefits of some NextGen technologies, produced a range of $14
           billion to $20 billion. JPDO noted that this range for avionics
           costs reflects uncertainty about equipage costs for individual
           aircraft, the number of very light jets that will operate in
           high-performance airspace, and the amount of out-of-service time
           required for installation.

           FAA, in its capital investment plan for fiscal years 2008-2012,
           includes estimated expenditures for 11 line items that are
           considered NextGen capital programs.20 The total 5-year estimated
           expenditures for these programs is $4.3 billion. In fiscal year
           2008, only 6 of the line items are funded for a total of roughly
           $174 million; funding for the remaining 5 programs would begin
           with the fiscal year 2009 budget. According to FAA, in addition to
           capital spending for NextGen, the agency will spend an estimated
           $300 million on NextGen-related research and development from
           fiscal years 2008 through 2012. The administration's budget for
           fiscal year 2008 for FAA includes a total of $17.8 million to
           support the activities of JPDO.
		   
19JPDO, Making the NextGen Vision a Reality: 2006 Progress Report to the
Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Plan (Washington,
D.C.; Mar. 14, 2007).

20FAA has six capital investment programs that it considers
transformational NextGen programs slated to receive funding in fiscal year
2008: ADS-B nationwide implementation, System Wide Information Management
(SWIM), NextGen Data Communications, NextGen Network Enabled Weather,
National Airspace System Voice Switch, and NextGen Technology
Demonstration. In addition, five other programs are slated to begin
funding in 2009: NextGen System Development, NextGen High Altitude
Trajectory Based Operations, NextGen High Density Airports, NextGen
Networked Facilities, and NextGen Cross-Cutting Infrastructure.

           While FAA and JPDO have begun to release estimates for FAA's
           NextGen investment portfolio, questions remain over which entities
           will fund and conduct some of the necessary research, development,
           and demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain
           NextGen capabilities. In the past, a significant portion of
           aeronautics research and development, including intermediate
           technology development, has been performed by NASA. To its credit,
           NASA plans to focus its research on the needs of NextGen. However,
           NASA is also moving toward a focus on fundamental research and
           away from developmental work and demonstration projects, which
           could negatively impact NextGen if these efforts are not assumed
           by others.

           In addition, JPDO will need to conduct modeling for NextGen and
           may look to its partner agencies to provide modeling capabilities
           and support. For example, NASA's NAS-wide modeling platform, the
           Airspace Concepts Evaluation System (ACES),21 permits JPDO to,
           among other things, evaluate alternative research ideas and assess
           the performance of competing vendors. According to a JPDO
           official, this capability, which is critical to NextGen research,
           is eroding as JPDO's investment simulation requirements are
           expanding. As part of its fundamental research mission, NASA
           intends to upgrade to ACES-X (a more sophisticated representation
           of the national airspace system), but not for another two years.
           Until then, JPDO's investment modeling capability will be
           constrained unless the office or another partner agency can assume
           the modeling work. For example, the Department of Defense has
           detailed aircraft models and the Department of Homeland Security
           has detailed models of airport terminals that are relevant for
           JPDO's simulations. This is an issue that needs to be addressed in
           the short-term.

           JPDO faces the challenge of determining the nature and scope of
           the research and technology development necessary to begin the
           transition to NextGen, as well as identifying the entities that
           can conduct that research and development. According to officials
           at FAA and JPDO, they are currently studying these issues and
           trying to assess how much research and development FAA can assume.
           An FAA official recently testified that the agency proposes to
           increase its research and development funding by $280 million over
           the next 5 years. However, a draft report by an advisory committee
           to FAA stated that FAA would need at least $100 million annually
           in increased funding to assume NASA's research and development
           work, and establishing the necessary infrastructure within FAA
           could delay the implementation of NextGen by 5 years.22 JPDO's
           Integrated Work Plan will permit NASA and the other partner
           agencies to assess the research and development needs of NextGen,
           determine funding, and conduct the necessary initiatives. The
           Integrated Work Plan is critical for the timely completion of
           research and testing of proposed NextGen systems and keeping
           NextGen on schedule.

21ACES provides a detailed flight simulation environment and an open
framework to integrate the results of other simulations. This allows JPDO
to test concepts well before they have to be demonstrated with real
hardware and people. This platform provides a basis for evaluating the
timing of many agencies' current budget requests and is a method for
comparing competitive ideas.

           JPDO's Lack of Stable Leadership and the Authority to Enforce
		   Accountability Threaten the Credibility of Organization
		   
           While basic organizational structure of JPDO has been in place for
           several years (see app. 1), it has suffered from a lack of stable
           leadership. As JPDO begins its fourth year in operation, it is
           functioning under its third director and operated for much of 2006
           under the stewardship of an acting director. The current director
           of JPDO has held the position since August 2006. The Next
           Generation Air Transportation System Institute (the Institute),
           created to facilitate the participation of nonfederal stakeholders
           in the NextGen effort, noted in its recent annual report that
           JPDO's leadership turnover had made it a challenge for JPDO to
           move out more aggressively on many goals and objectives, as the
           office waited on a full-time director. The Institute also stated
           that JPDO's leadership turnover had limited the ability of the
           Institute's executive committee23 to forge a stronger relationship
           with JPDO leadership and work jointly on strategic issues and
           challenges. These fundamental leadership issues are exacerbated by
           the lack of meetings of JPDO's senior policy committee. Although
           JPDO has been functioning for just over 3 years, the senior policy
           committee has met only four times, and has not met at all as a
           formal body since November 2005.
		   
22Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee, Draft Report
on Financing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (Washington,
D.C.; April 2006).

23The Institute's executive committee is a subset of the Institute's
governing body, the Institute Management Council. The Institute Management
Council members represent commercial airline operations, commercial
pilots, air traffic control technology, air traffic controllers, airport
operators, business aircraft operations, federal advisory committees,
universities, and non-profit research organizations, small aircraft
general aviation, helicopter operations, manufacturers of air vehicles and
airborne/space-borne and ground based equipment, and regional commercial
airline operations. The JPDO director is an ex-officio member and there
are two at-large members.

           In addition to the lack of stable leadership, JPDO's management
           lacks the authority to hold much of JPDO's staff accountable for
           their performance. As we noted in November 2006, JPDO has staffed
           the various levels of its organization with employees from its
           partner agencies and this practice helps to leverage partner
           agency human resources. However, a drawback of such staffing is a
           lack of real or perceived accountability to JPDO. According to
           JPDO officials, the JPDO workforce consists largely of part-time
           partner agency personnel who have been detailed to JPDO and
           part-time private sector volunteers. Only a few
           permanently-assigned FAA staff have their performance appraised by
           JPDO management, although the director does provide input to the
           performance appraisals of some of the managers detailed to JPDO
           from partner agencies. We have noted in previous studies that
           improved performance has been linked to accountability.24

           Similarly, although the organizational structure of the Institute
           has been in place for 2 years, the Institute is currently led by
           an acting director while a search is being conducted for the
           Institute's third executive director. Some Institute Management
           Council (IMC) members with whom we spoke believed that this
           turnover might be indicative of problems with the structure of the
           Institute and a need for greater clarity in roles and
           responsibilities. For example, these IMC members noted that there
           were stresses placed on the Institute's executive director
           resulting from the need to meet the competing demands of the IMC,
           the IMC executive committee, and JPDO management. Other IMC
           members attributed the stresses on the executive director to the
           lack of clarity in the Institute's role. These members noted that
           while the Institute is clearly charged with selecting private
           sector participants for JPDO's work groups, the Institute's role
           of conducting research for the JPDO could be viewed as overlapping
           with other advisory organizations such as RTCA.25 Two IMC members
           believed that the Institute's award of only two research contracts
           in two years illustrates that the Institute is not yet functioning
           as intended. Some IMC members also pointed out that a formal
           mechanism for providing industry input to JPDO on NextGen concepts
           and issues has not yet been fully established, even though this is
           one of the missions of the Institute. Although the Institute is
           currently seeking a new executive director, some IMC members felt
           that the IMC would do better to first try and gain a better
           understanding of the factors that have led to the turnover in the
           executive director position.
		   
24GAO, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Status of the Current Program
and Planning for the Next Generation Air Transportation System,
[34]GAO-06-653T (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006)

25Organized in 1935 and once called the Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics, RTCA is today known by its acronym. RTCA is a private,
not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based performance
standards for ATC systems. RTCA serves as a federal advisory committee,
and its recommendations are the basis for a number of FAA's policy,
program, and regulatory decisions.

           Human Factors Research Is Critical to Some Fundamental NextGen
		   Capabilities

           Among the central assumptions of the NextGen system is a concept
           of operations that envisions an increased reliance on automation,
           which dramatically changes the roles and responsibilities of both
           the air traffic controllers and the pilots. In such an automated
           environment some of the controller's responsibilities will shift
           from air traffic control to air traffic management and pilots will
           take on a greater share of the responsibility for maintaining safe
           separation and other tasks currently performed by controllers.
           These changes in roles and responsibilities raise significant
           human factors issues for the safety and efficiency of the national
           airspace system.

           Although JPDO has begun to model how shifts in air traffic
           controllers' workloads would affect their performance, it has not
           yet begun to model the effect of how this shift in workload to
           pilots would affect pilot performance. According to a JPDO
           official, modeling the effect of changes in pilot workload has not
           yet begun because JPDO has not yet identified a suitable model to
           incorporate into its suite of modeling tools. According to a JPDO
           official, the evolving roles of pilots and controllers is the
           NextGen initiative's most important human factors issue, but will
           be difficult to research because data on pilot behavior are not
           readily available for use in creating models. In addition to the
           study of changing roles, JPDO has not yet studied the training
           implications of various systems or solutions proposed for NextGen.
           For example, JPDO officials said they will need to study the
           extent to which new air traffic controllers will have to be
           trained to operate both the old and the new equipment as the
           concept of operations and enterprise architecture mature.
		   
		   JPDO Faces A Continuing Challenge in Ensuring the Involvement
		   of All Key Stakeholders

           Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers and
           technicians, will play critical roles in NextGen, and their
           involvement in planning for and deploying the new technology will
           be important to the success of NextGen. In November 2006, we
           reported that active air traffic controllers were not involved in
           the NextGen planning effort and recommended that JPDO determine
           whether any other key stakeholders and expertise were not
           represented on its integrated product teams, divisions, or
           elsewhere within the office. Since then, the head of the
           controllers' union has taken a seat on the IMC. However, no active
           controllers are yet participating at the more detailed group
           planning level. Also, aviation technicians do not participate in
           NextGen efforts. Input from current air traffic controllers who
           have recent experience controlling aircraft and current
           technicians who will maintain NextGen equipment is important when
           considering human factors and safety issues. Our work on past air
           traffic control modernization projects has shown that a lack of
           stakeholder or expert involvement early and throughout a project
           can lead to costly increases and delays.

           In addition, we found that some private sector stakeholders have
           expressed concerns that participation in the Institute might
           either preclude bidding on future NextGen acquisitions or pose
           organizational conflicts of interest. FAA's acquisition process,
           generally, precludes bids from organizations that have
           participated in, materially influenced, or had prior knowledge of
           the requirements for an acquisition. The Institute was aware of
           this concern and attempted to address it through an amendment to
           its governing document that strengthened the language protecting
           participants from organizational conflicts of interest for
           participation in the NextGen initiative. However, while the
           amendment language currently operates to protect stakeholders, the
           language has never been tested or challenged. Thus, it is unclear
           at this time whether any stakeholder participation is being
           chilled by conflict of interest concerns.

           Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
           respond to any questions from you or other Members of the
           Subcommittee.
		   
		   GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment

           For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr.
           Gerald L. Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected].
           Individuals making key contributions to this statement include
           Kevin Egan, Jessica Evans, Colin Fallon, Ed Menoche, Faye
           Morrison, Taylor Reeves, and Richard Scott.
		   
		   Appendix I: JPDO's Organizational Structure Facilitates
		   Collaboration, but Continues to Evolve

           In November 2006, we reported that the Joint Planning and
           Development Office's (JPDO) organizational structure incorporated
           some of the practices that we have found to be effective for
           federal interagency collaborations--an important point given how
           critical such collaboration is to the success of JPDO's mission.
           For example, the JPDO partner agencies have worked together to
           develop key strategies for the Next Generation Air Transportation
           System (NextGen) and JPDO has leveraged its partner agency
           resources by staffing various levels of its organization with
           partner agency employees. Also, our work has shown that involving
           stakeholders can, among other things, increase their support for a
           collaborative effort.

           Vision 100 includes requirements for JPDO to coordinate and
           consult with its partner agencies, private sector experts, and the
           public. JPDO's approach has been to establish an organizational
           structure that involves federal and nonfederal stakeholders
           throughout the organization. This structure includes a federal
           interagency senior policy committee. JPDO's senior policy
           committee is headed by the Secretary of Transportation (as
           required in Vision 100) and includes senior-level officials from
           JPDO's partner agencies. The JPDO board is an adjunct to the
           senior policy committee and is composed of at least one senior
           representative from each of the partner agencies.

           The Next Generation Air Transportation System Institute (the
           Institute) was created by an agreement between the National Center
           for Advanced Technologies1 and the Federal Aviation Administration
           to meet Vision 100's requirement that JPDO coordinate and consult
           with the public. The Institute incorporates the expertise and
           views of stakeholders from private industry, state and local
           governments, and academia. In addition, the Institute arranges for
           the participation of nonfederal stakeholders in JPDO's planning
           efforts, reviews and selects private sector organizations to
           conduct research studies needed by JPDO, and holds public meetings
           to obtain the views of the aviation community. The Institute held
           its first public meeting in March 2006 and plans to hold another
           public meeting in May 2007. The Institute is directed by an
           Institute Management Council (IMC), which consists of top
           officials and representatives from the aviation community. The IMC
           oversees the policy, recommendations, and products of the
           Institute and provides a means for advancing consensus positions
           on critical NextGen issues. An executive committee, consisting of
           the IMC's two co-chairs and three members selected by them,
           conducts business on behalf of the IMC. The Institute is managed
           on a day-to-day basis by an executive director, who reports to the
           IMC and the executive committee, and works closely with JPDO
           management.
		   
1The National Center for Advanced Technologies is a nonprofit unit
established by the Aerospace Industries Association.

           Recently, JPDO announced they are in the process of implementing
           several structural and operational changes to improve the
           efficiency of the organization (see fig. 3). JPDO's structure used
           to include eight integrated product teams (IPT), which was where
           the federal and nonfederal experts came together to plan for and
           coordinate the development of capabilities for NextGen. The eight
           IPTs were linked to eight key strategies that JPDO developed early
           on for guiding its NextGen planning work. The IPTs were headed by
           representatives of JPDO's partner agencies and include more than
           200 nonfederal stakeholders from over 100 organizations.

           JPDO recently converted each IPT into a "working group" with the
           same participants as the former IPT, but with each working group
           led by a joint government and industry steering committee. These
           steering committees will oversee the creation of small, ad hoc
           subgroups that will be tasked with short-term projects exploring
           specific issues and delivering discrete work products. Under this
           arrangement, working group members will be free of obligations to
           the group when not engaged in a specific project. According to
           JPDO officials, they believe the working groups will be more
           efficient and output- or product-focused than the former IPTs.
           JPDO officials noted that they are also in the process of staffing
           a new, ninth working group to address avionics issues.

Figure 3: JPDO New Organizational Chart

Note: There are nine working groups covering aircraft, air navigation
services, airports, environment, global harmonization, net-centric
operations, safety, security, and weather.

We believe that these changes could help address concerns that we have
heard from some stakeholders about the productivity of some IPTs and the
pace of the planning effort at JPDO. However, it will be important to
monitor these changes to ensure that the participation of stakeholders is
neither decreased nor adversely affected. Maintaining communications
within and among work groups could increase in importance if, as work
group members focus on specific projects, they become less involved in the
overall collaborative planning effort. The effectiveness of the changes to
JPDO's organizational structure will need to continue to be evaluated over
time. Currently, we have on-going study examining the views and
concerns of JPDO's federal and nonfederal stakeholders about the office
and its performance. We expect to issue a report on our findings later
this year.

(540151)

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Highlights of [42]GAO-07-784T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives

May 9, 2007

NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

Status of the Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System

The nation's current air traffic control system is reaching its capacity
limits as demand for air transportation grows. The Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen) represents a new system that will use
state-of-the-art technologies and procedures. Transitioning to NextGen
will require the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to continue to
sustain the current air traffic control system while acquiring new systems
on schedule and on budget. In 2003, Congress authorized the creation of
the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), housed within FAA, to
plan NextGen and coordinate the transition. GAO's testimony focuses on the
progress FAA is making in implementing businesslike operations that could
provide a foundation for managing the transition to NextGen, the status of
JPDO's planning and facilitation of NextGen, and some key challenges that
FAA and JPDO need to address in moving toward NextGen. This statement is
based on GAO's November 2006 report and recent testimonies as well as
ongoing work. GAO's November report recommended that FAA study its
technical and contract management expertise and that JPDO take actions to
institutionalize its collaborative practices. FAA and JPDO said they would
consider our recommendations.

During the last few years, FAA has made significant progress in implementing
businesslike operations and procedures for managing and acquiring air traffic
control systems. These operations and procedures have improved FAA's management
of the current system and should better position the agency to manage the
enormously complex transition to NextGen. One outcome of these changes is that
FAA has reported exceeding its system acquisition goals for the past 3 fiscal
years. However, further work remains to fully address past problems in acquiring
systems and institutionalizing changes throughout the agency.

JPDO has continued to make progress in furthering its key planning documents.
JPDO has experienced delays in the release of key documents, but currently plans
to have initial versions of these documents released by July 2007. JPDO has been
working since 2005 to establish a memorandum of understanding between its
partner agencies, although as of May 4, 2007, the memorandum had been signed by
the Departments of Transportation and Commerce and NASA, but was not yet signed
by the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. JPDO is also working with
the Office of Management and Budget to establish mechanisms to identify
NextGen-related  projects across the partner agencies and consider NextGen as a
unified, cross-agency program for funding decisions.

FAA and JPDO continue to face a number of challenges in moving toward
NextGen, including questions about FAA's technical and contract management
expertise; FAA's ability to maintain a number of existing systems,
including monitoring and addressing equipment outages to ensure the safety
of these existing systems as it transitions to NextGen; and conducting
necessary human factors research. In addition, while JPDO recently
estimated that the total federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through
2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 billion, questions remain
about which entities will fund and conduct the necessary research,
development, and demonstration projects that will be key to achieving
certain NextGen capabilities. Also, JPDO faces a continuing challenge in
ensuring the involvement of all key stakeholders, such as active air
traffic controllers and system technicians, in its NextGen planning
efforts.

References

Visible links
  23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-25
  24. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-636T
  25. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-693T
  26. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-266
  27. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-901
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-822
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-310
  30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-154
  31. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-693T
  32. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-672T
  33. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-25
  34. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-653T
  42. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-784T
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