Military Personnel: DOD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo Data and  
Needs Quality Controls to Improve Data Accuracy (17-JUL-07,	 
GAO-07-780).							 
                                                                 
Congress has repeatedly expressed concerns about the pace of	 
military operations and 10 U.S.C. 487 requires that the 	 
Department of Defense (DOD) annually report on personnel	 
tempo--the time servicemembers spend away from home. Section 345 
of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2007 directed GAO to report on a number of Army and Marine  
Corps issues. For this report GAO addresses the extent to which  
(1) changes in mobilization and deployment policies have affected
reserve component availability and provided an approach to meet  
the requirements for the global war on terrorism; and, (2) DOD,  
the Army, and the Marine Corps have collected, maintained, and	 
reported complete and accurate personnel tempo data. To address  
these objectives, GAO analyzed data from DOD's Personnel Tempo	 
and Contingency Tracking System databases, and interviewed agency
officials.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-07-780 					        
    ACCNO:   A72827						        
  TITLE:     Military Personnel: DOD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo   
Data and Needs Quality Controls to Improve Data Accuracy	 
     DATE:   07/17/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Armed forces reserves				 
	     Data centers					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Military personnel deployment			 
	     Military policies					 
	     Military reserve personnel 			 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Quality control					 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     Global War on Terrorism				 

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GAO-07-780

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background

          * [3]Reserve Mobilization
          * [4]Personnel Tempo

     * [5]Virtually All Reserve Component Personnel Are Available Unde

          * [6]Virtually All Reserve Component Members Are Available for De
          * [7]Mobilization Policy Changes Establish a Long-Term Approach f

     * [8]Since 2001, DOD Has Submitted Personnel Tempo Reports but th

          * [9]Since 2001, DOD Has Reported Personnel Tempo Data to the Pre
          * [10]The Army and Marine Corps Lack Quality Controls to Accuratel
          * [11]DOD Has Focused on Deployment and Activation Data Rather tha

     * [12]Conclusions
     * [13]Recommendations for Executive Action
     * [14]Agency Comments
     * [15]Service Retention and Attrition Tracking

          * [16]Enlisted Occupational Specialties with Unusually High or Low
          * [17]Active Component Retention Rates
          * [18]Reserve Component Attrition Rates

     * [19]GAO Comments
     * [20]GAO Contact
     * [21]Acknowledgements
     * [22]GAO's Mission
     * [23]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [24]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [25]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [26]Congressional Relations
     * [27]Public Affairs

Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate and Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

July 2007

MILITARY PERSONNEL

DOD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo Data and Needs Quality Controls to
Improve Data Accuracy

GAO-07-780

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4
Background 7
Virtually All Reserve Component Personnel Are Available Under DOD's
Revised Policies that Provide a Long-Term Approach to Meet Mobilization
Requirements 11
Since 2001, DOD Has Submitted Personnel Tempo Reports but the Army and
Marine Corps Lack Quality Controls to Ensure the Accuracy of Underlying
Data 14
Conclusions 17
Recommendations for Executive Action 18
Agency Comments 18
Appendix I Army and Marine Corps Personnel Tempo Trends Based on Available
Data 20
Appendix II Retention/Attrition Rates for Enlisted Occupational
Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment Rates 22
Service Retention and Attrition Tracking 22
Appendix III Scope and Methodology 30
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 35
GAO Comments 40
Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 42

Tables

Table 1: Mobilization Authorities 8
Table 2: Army and Marine Corps Personnel Tempos 20
Table 3: GAO Calculations of Army and Marine Corps Personnel Tempos 21
Table 4: Retention Rates for Active Component Army and Marine Corps
Enlisted Occupational Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment
Rates 23
Table 5: Attrition Rates for Reserve Component Army and Marine Corps
Enlisted Occupational Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment
Rates 26

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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

July 17, 2007

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Congress has repeatedly expressed concerns about the pace of military
operations; and since 2001, approximately 931,000 U.S. Army and Marine
Corps servicemembers have deployed for military operations abroad in
support of the Global War on Terrorism, including approximately 312,000
Guard and Reserve members. Prior to the Global War on Terrorism, concerns
about the negative effects on individual servicemembers or service
readiness led Congress to place statutory limits on the numbers of reserve
component personnel who could be involuntarily called to active duty under
various mobilization authorities, as well as time limits on involuntary
activations. Recently, in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000 (FY 2000 NDAA), Congress enacted several provisions
addressing personnel tempo.^1 Title 37 of the U.S. Code was amended with
the addition of a section requiring the secretaries of the military
services to pay high-deployment compensation payments to servicemembers
for lengthy or numerous deployments in excess of set limits.^2 A section
was added to Title 10 of the U.S. Code requiring management of deployments
of servicemembers in danger of exceeding high-deployment days
thresholds.^3 Sections were added to Title 10 of the U.S. Code requiring
the Secretary of Defense to include personnel tempo information in his
annual report to the President and Congress^4 and making the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OSD P&R) responsible for
monitoring personnel tempo and establishing related standards and
policies, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary
of Defense.^5

^1Pub. L. No. 106-65, S923 (1999) defined personnel tempo as "the amount of
time members of the armed forces are engaged in their official duties, at
a location or under circumstances that make it infeasible for a member to
spend off-duty time in the housing in which the member resides when on
garrison duty at the member's permanent duty station." This is codified at
10 U.S.C. S487.

^2Pub. L. No. 106-65, S586 (1999), codified at 37 U.S.C. S436 with
subsequent amendments.

The provisions requiring high-deployment compensation payments and
management of servicemember deployments allow the waiver of those sections
if necessary for the national security interests of the United States. In
October 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that
waived those two provisions due to the national emergency declared by the
President following the September 11th attacks on the Pentagon and the
World Trade Center. The memorandum stated that the requirements for
tracking and reporting of personnel tempo information would not be waived,
and explained that past operations have shown the value of collecting this
type of data to develop after-action reports, reply to queries, or
accomplish analyses relating to the scope of operations.

Since then, the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued a variety of
policies that directly and indirectly affect personnel tempo and on
January 19, 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that
contained revised policies for managing the total active and reserve
component force. DOD has also proposed that Congress approve a change to
the definition of deployment, which would impact the days of service that
could be counted for purposes of calculating personnel tempo, and has said
that if the definitional change is approved it will work with the military
departments to develop high-deployment thresholds and compensation
proposals that are more closely tailored to the individual services'
deployment cycles rather than having a single set of thresholds for all
services.

^3 Pub. L. No. 106-65, S586 (1999), codified at 10 U.S.C. S991 with
subsequent amendments. Initially, this section required general or flag
officer management of members who had been deployed 182 days or more out
of the preceding 365 days, to ensure that they were not deployed for more
than 220 days out of the preceding 365 without special approval. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 amended this
section to require management of servicemembers to ensure that the they
were not deployed for more than 220 days out of the preceding 365 or more
than 400 days out of the preceding 730 days without approval of the
Secretary of Defense. The Secretary could delegate his approval authority
to certain civilian officers and to a general or flag officer in that
member's chain of command.

^4Pub. L. No. 106-65, S923 (1999), codified at 10 U.S.C. S487 with
subsequent amendments.

^5Pub. L. No. 106-65, S923 (1999), codified at 10 U.S.C. S136.

In the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007,^6 Congress required that the Comptroller General issue one or more
reports assessing the readiness of Army and Marine Corps ground forces due
to the significant deployments under current operational commitments and
other demands. Specifically, the act required that the Comptroller
General's reports include analyses of Army and Marine Corps reported
readiness trends, the ability of the Army and Marine Corps to provide
trained and ready forces for ongoing operations and other commitments, the
availability of equipment for training, current and projected requirements
for equipment repair and replacement and the effects on training,
personnel tempos including trends and retention data for enlisted
occupations with unusually high or low deployment rates, efforts to
mitigate the impact of high operational tempo, and the effect of current
mobilization policies on reserve component force availability. This report
assesses (1) the extent to which changes in mobilization and deployment
policies have affected reserve component availability and provided an
approach to meet the requirements for the global war on terrorism, and (2)
the extent to which DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have collected,
maintained, and reported complete and accurate personnel tempo data. We
are also providing information on trends in personnel tempo (see app. I),
and retention/attrition rates for Army and Marine Corps personnel in
enlisted occupational specialties that are experiencing unusually high or
low deployment rates (see app. II). We are not drawing any conclusions
concerning relationships between deployment and retention because
deployment rates are not the only factor that can affect retention or
attrition. Appendix II identifies some of the other factors that influence
servicemember retention decisions, or attrition. We are reporting
separately on the other readiness reporting requirements included in the
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.

To assess the extent to which changes in mobilization and deployment
policies have affected reserve component availability and provided an
approach to meet the requirements for the global war on terrorism, we
reviewed and analyzed past and present DOD mobilization and deployment
policies as well as requirements for the global war on terrorism,
comparing the effects of policies before and after Secretary Gates'
January 19, 2007, memorandum regarding the utilization of the total force.
We also interviewed officials who are responsible for the implementation
of personnel policies. To assess the extent to which DOD, the Army, and
the Marine Corps have collected, maintained, and reported complete and
accurate personnel tempo data, we interviewed and obtained data from
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Army, Marine Corps, and Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) officials who collect and track personnel
tempo and deployment data. To provide the data in the appendices on trends
in personnel tempo and retention rates for Army and Marine Corps personnel
in enlisted occupational specialties that are experiencing unusually high
or low deployment rates, we analyzed data from three DMDC data
systems--the PERSTEMPO, Contingency Tracking System (CTS), and end
strength data systems (Active Duty Military Personnel Master File and the
Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System). For the personnel tempo
analyses, we used PERSTEMPO and end strength data to identify the yearly
end strength population, the population of deployed personnel, and
cumulative days deployed. Additionally, we reviewed inspection reports
related to personnel tempo and DOD's Annual Reports to Congress and the
President. To determine retention rates for Army and Marine Corps
personnel in enlisted occupational specialties that are experiencing
unusually high or low deployment rates, we used the CTS and end strength
data to determine the enlisted occupational specialties that had unusually
high or low deployment rates. We then obtained retention data on these
occupations from DMDC. We assessed the reliability of the three DMDC data
systems and determined that the CTS and end strength data we used were
reliable for our purposes. We determined the PERSTEMPO data was not
producing reliable personnel tempo summaries and trends. Consequently, we
did not use PERSTEMPO data to support findings or recommendations, and in
order to meet legislative requirements, we report these data only in
appendix I, along with the associated data reliability caveats. For more
information on our scope and methodology, see appendix III. We conducted
this performance audit from June 2006 through May 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

^6Pub. L. No. 109-364, S345 (2006).

Results in Brief

On January 19, 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum which
changed mobilization and deployment policies and increased reserve
component availability, making virtually all reserve component personnel
available on an indefinitely recurrent basis under a long-term approach
for meeting the requirements for the global war on terrorism. Prior to
this memorandum, servicemember availability was restricted by a DOD policy
which limited involuntary mobilizations for the global war on terrorism to
24 cumulative months. The Secretary's memo and the implementing guidance
that followed in March 2007 rescinded the 24-cumulative-month limitation
and provided the services with much greater access to their reserve
component personnel for the long-term requirements of the global war on
terrorism. For example, as of August 31, 2006, almost 421,000 reserve
component personnel had been activated and had limited availability for
future involuntary mobilizations under the 24-cumulative-month policy, but
when the policy was rescinded, previously mobilized personnel became
available for future involuntary mobilization without any limitations on
their cumulative service. As a result of the new policy, involuntary
mobilizations, which will generally be limited to 12 months,^7 can now
recur indefinitely. In addition, the new implementing guidance replaces
the prior policies that were issued in a piecemeal fashion to address
short-term requirements with an integrated set of policies that governs
access to active as well as reserve component personnel. The previous
policies had emphasized the use of volunteers, but the new policies
emphasize the importance of maintaining unit cohesion and deployment
predictability. The new policies contain rotation goals which differ
between the active and reserve components. While the new policies provide
a long-term approach for meeting requirements, both the Secretary's memo
and the implementing guidance acknowledge that the services will not be
able to immediately achieve the rotation goals, due to global demands.
Therefore, the Secretary's memo directed the establishment of a program to
compensate or incentivize servicemembers who are required to mobilize or
deploy early or often, or to extend beyond the established rotation policy
goals.

Since 2001, DOD has reported personnel tempo data in its "Annual Defense
Report to the President and the Congress", but the reports have not been
complete and accurate because the Army and Marine Corps do not have
quality controls to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the reports'
underlying data. In October 2001, DOD waived two provisions related to
personnel tempo due to national security interests, but the requirement to
report personnel tempo data to the President and Congress remained in
place. As permitted by 37 U.S.C. S436 and 10 U.S.C. S991, DOD waived the
high-deployment compensation requirement and the requirement to manage
servicemember deployments which approach or exceeded high-deployment
thresholds. When these provisions were waived, two of the mechanisms for
identifying faulty personnel tempo data were no longer in place, and the
services lacked any other quality control procedures to effectively ensure
the accuracy of the data they were collecting and sending to DOD. Despite
DOD guidance which requires personnel tempo data to be complete and
accurate, several reviews have found that service collection and tracking
of personnel tempo data have not been complete or accurate. For example,
in 2005 the Army Human Resources Command reported that personnel tempo was
not properly recorded for 72 percent of forward-deployed soldiers, and
Marine Corps inspection teams found that 43 percent of the 326 active and
reserve units they inspected in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 had not
consistently or accurately reported personnel. Furthermore, DOD officials
expressed a low level of confidence in the data and said that they relied
on an alternative set of data to examine tempo trends. Shortly after the
September 11, 2001, attacks, DOD shifted its attention away from
collecting and maintaining personnel tempo data and began focusing on
collecting and maintaining data to track activations and deployments
related to ongoing operations.^8 In addition, DOD recently sent a proposal
to Congress requesting a modification to the deployment definition, which
if approved would modify personnel tempo calculations and allow DOD to
develop revised high-deployment thresholds and compensation programs that
are tailored to individual service deployment cycles. However, DOD
officials have stated that neither DMDC nor the services have the complete
and accurate data needed to effectively implement a personnel tempo
compensation program. Without quality control procedures, personnel tempo
data could not be used as an accurate basis to determine eligibility for
the high-deployment payment program under 37 U.S.C. S436, or for the
revised high-deployment compensation program that DOD has recently
proposed to Congress. Until the Army and Marine Corps establish quality
control procedures for the collection of their personnel tempo data,
Congress and other users of DOD's personnel tempo data need to be cautious
when using the data because they cannot be assured that the data fully and
accurately reflect servicemembers' actual tempos.

^7At service discretion, this period may exclude individual skill training
required for deployments and postmobilization leave.

^8However, this data collection for Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring
Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom does not include the full range of personnel
tempo events that are listed in 10 U.S.C. S487.

To improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the personnel tempo data
that DOD reports to Congress and the President, we are recommending that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to provide guidance which directs the Army and
Marine Corps to develop quality control procedures for ensuring the
accuracy of the personnel tempo data they collect and report, whether
under the existing personnel tempo definition or under any revised
definitions that Congress may approve. In its comments on a draft of this
report, DOD concurred with our recommendation. DOD also provided technical
comments, which we have incorporated in the report as appropriate. DOD's
comments and our evaluation are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IV
of this report.

Background

Reserve Mobilization

Reserve forces may be called to active duty under a number of authorities.
Most reserve component members who have been called to active duty for
other than normal training since September 11, 2001, have been activated
under one of the three legislative authorities^9 listed in table 1.

^910 U.S.C. S12304 was used to support ongoing operations in Bosnia and
Kosovo and has not been utilized since 2004.

Table 1: Mobilization Authorities

                                    Maximum number of Ready                   
                        Type of     Reserve members who can Maximum length of 
Statute              activation  be activated at once    activation        
10 U.S.C. S12301 (d) Voluntary   Unlimited               Unlimited         
                                                                              
"With members                                                              
consent"                                                                   
10 U.S.C. S12302     Involuntary 1,000,000               730 days / 24     
                                                            consecutive       
"Partial                                                 months            
Mobilization"                                                              
10 U.S.C. S12304     Involuntary 200,000                 365 days / 12     
                                                            consecutive       
"Presidential                                            months            
Reserve Call-up"                                                           

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Code provisions.

On September 14, 2001, the President declared that a national emergency
existed as a result of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and he invoked
10 U.S.C. S12302, the partial mobilization authority. When DOD issued
subsequent guidance concerning the partial mobilization authority,^10 it
limited mobilization orders to 12 months but allowed the secretaries of
the military departments to extend the orders for an additional 12 months
or remobilize reserve component members, as long as an individual member's
cumulative service under the partial mobilization authority did not exceed
24 cumulative months. The guidance also allowed the services to keep
members on active duty after they had served 24 months under the partial
mobilization authority if the member volunteered to stay on active duty
under 10 U.S.C. S 12301(d).

In 2004, we reported^11 that the 24-cumulative-month approach and other
policies developed at the war's outset had affected the availability of
Army and Marine Corps reservists for second involuntary mobilizations.^12
The report concluded that adhering to the 24-cumulative-month policy amid
persistently high requirements could result in the services running out of
reservists eligible and available for a second involuntary mobilization.
Moreover, we stated that DOD's policies, many of which emphasized the use
of volunteers, were implemented in piecemeal fashion, responding to the
short-term requirements of the services and the needs of reserve component
members, and were not developed within an overall strategic framework to
meet the department's long-term requirements for the global war on
terrorism. We concluded that given the duration of operational commitments
to date (2004) and the likelihood for persistently high force-level
requirements into the future, the department needed to develop an
integrated set of policies to address both the long-term requirements for
reserve component forces and individual reserve component members' needs
for predictability. After assessing DOD's policies regarding the
management and deployment of reserve component service members, the
Secretary of Defense enacted changes to reserve mobilization policy with
his January 19, 2007, total force policy memorandum.

^10OSD Personnel and Readiness, "Mobilization / Demobilization Personnel
and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in
Response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks" (Sept. 20, 2001);
"Addendum to the Mobilization / Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy
for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the
World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks" (July 19, 2002).

^11GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force
Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues,
[28]GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004).

^12 [29]GAO-04-1031 .

Personnel Tempo

Personnel tempo is currently defined as the amount of time members of the
armed forces are engaged in their official duties, at a location or under
circumstances that make it infeasible for a member to spend off-duty time
in the housing in which the member resides when on garrison duty at the
member's permanent duty station.^13 Title 10 of the U.S. Code contains a
number of provisions related to personnel tempo including a provision
which requires the secretary of each military department to establish a
system for tracking and recording the number of days that each member of
the armed forces under that secretary's jurisdiction is deployed.^14 There
is also a provision that requires management of servicemembers'
deployments which approach or exceed high-deployment thresholds.^15 In
addition, since October 1, 2000, the Secretary of Defense has been
required to include personnel tempo information in his annual report to
the President and Congress.^16

1310 U.S.C. S487.

^1410 U.S.C. S991.

^1510 U.S.C. S991.

^1610 U.S.C. S487.

Title 37 of the U.S. Code contains a requirement for DOD to compensate
servicemembers who exceed legislatively established deployment
thresholds.^17 At the time the provision was created by the FY 2000 NDAA,
the services were to pay a per diem allowance of $100 to members who
deployed for more than 250 days out of the previous 365. Later, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (FY 2004 NDAA^18)
modified the high-deployment thresholds and pay provisions, replacing the
per diem allowance with a monthly allowance of up to $1,000, payable for
any month in which a member is beyond the new high-deployment
thresholds^19 by at least 1 day.

In May 2001, OSD P&R issued a military personnel record instruction which
updated responsibilities, procedures, and information-reporting
requirements including personnel tempo reporting.^20 According to the
instruction, all services are to submit personnel tempo data to the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), which serves as the central
repository and archive for automated manpower and personnel information
for DOD. The instruction requires that the services report timely,
accurate, and complete personnel tempo data. The Army and Marine Corps
each issued further implementing guidance based on the OSD instruction.

On October 8, 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum in
accordance with waiver provisions found in 10 U.S.C. S991 and 37 U.S.C.
S436, suspending the requirement to compensate servicemembers who exceeded
the personnel tempo threshold due to the existence of a national emergency
declared by the President. Additionally, the memorandum suspended the
statutory requirement for management of servicemember deployments which
approached or exceeded high-deployment thresholds. The memorandum did not
suspend the requirement for services to collect and submit personnel tempo
data, and stated that past operations have proven that collection of these
data is valuable in developing after action-reports, replying to queries,
or accomplishing analyses relating to the scope of operations.

^1737 U.S.C. S436.

^18Pub. L. No. 108-136, S541 (2003).

^19Initially, 37 U.S.C. S436 allowed for a $100 per diem allowance to be
paid to servicemembers who had been deployed 251 days or more out of the
preceding 365 days. In 2003, this section was amended by the FY 2004 NDAA
to allow a monthly allowance of up to $1,000 for servicemembers who had
been deployed for 191 or more consecutive days or 401 or more days out of
the preceding 730 days. The act created additional provisions for
determining compensations eligibility for members of the reserve
components on active duty.

^20Department of Defense Instruction 1336.5, Automated Extract of Active
Duty Military Personnel Records (May 2, 2001).

Virtually All Reserve Component Personnel Are Available Under DOD's Revised
Policies that Provide a Long-Term Approach to Meet Mobilization Requirements

On January 19, 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that
changed mobilization and deployment policies and increased reserve
component availability, making virtually all reserve component personnel
available on an indefinitely recurrent basis. The memorandum and
subsequent implementing guidance also established a long-term approach for
meeting the requirements for the global war on terrorism while striving to
provide servicemembers with increased predictability. Additionally, DOD
recently established a program to compensate servicemembers who are
required to mobilize or deploy early or often, or to extend beyond
established rotation policy goals.

Virtually All Reserve Component Members Are Available for Deployment Under New
Mobilization Policies

The Secretary of Defense's January 19, 2007, total force policy memorandum
and the subsequent March 15, 2007, implementation policy guidance made
virtually the entire reserve component force available for mobilization
and deployment.^21 Prior to the Secretary's memorandum, servicemember
availability was restricted by a DOD policy which limited involuntary
mobilizations for the global war on terrorism to 24 cumulative months.
Under the prior policy, any servicemember who had been involuntarily
mobilized for 24 months was no longer available to the services for
involuntary mobilization. According to DOD data, almost 421,000 reserve
component personnel were currently activated or had been previously
activated as of August 31, 2006. These personnel would not have been
available for involuntary mobilizations, or would have had limited
availability under the prior policy.^22 However, when the Secretary's memo
and the implementing guidance rescinded the 24-cumulative-month limitation
all of these personnel became available for involuntary mobilizations. The
revised policies provide the services with much greater access to their
reserve component personnel for the long-term requirements of the global
war on terrorism because they allow for repeat involuntary mobilizations,
without limitations on the cumulative time a servicemember is mobilized.
The new guidance allows DOD to mobilize reserve component individuals for
a period of time--generally no more than 12 months at a time, send them
home, and then remobilize them, repeating this cycle indefinitely and
providing an essentially unlimited flow of forces, within the 1 million
servicemember and 730 consecutive day limitations of the partial
mobilization authority.^23

21A few minor or temporary restrictions prevented the whole force from
being available. For example, personnel are temporarily not available
until they complete their initial training and pregnant servicemembers are
not permitted to be involuntarily activated, though they may volunteer to
be activated under 10 U.S.C. S12301(d).

^22The data showed that more than 160,000 of these personnel were not
available for mobilizations of 12 months or more. The remainder had been
mobilized but still had between 12 and 23 months of availability before
they would have reached the 24-cumulative-month limitation.

Mobilization Policy Changes Establish a Long-Term Approach for Meeting the
Global War on Terrorism Requirements

DOD's current mobilization policies differ from prior policies because the
Secretary's memorandum and the corresponding implementation guidance
provide DOD with an integrated approach for managing the use of active and
reserve component personnel in meeting the long-term requirements of the
global war on terrorism. In 2004 GAO reported^24 that DOD's mobilization
and personnel policies had been implemented in a piecemeal fashion to
address short-term requirements and as a result reserve component
personnel were uncertain about the likelihood of mobilizations, the length
of service commitments, the length of overseas rotations, and the types of
missions they would perform.

The Secretary's January 2007 memorandum and the March 2007 implementing
guidance helped address the need for predictability while giving the
services flexibility to meet long-term requirements. For example, the
documents specified that future mobilizations of ground combat, combat
support, and combat services support would be managed on a unit basis to
allow greater cohesion and deployment predictability. The implementing
guidance also indicated that the secretaries of the military departments
would determine the best method for filling unit shortfalls. This
decentralized decision authority represents a departure from the previous
centralized policy guidance that called for using volunteers before
involuntarily mobilizing Individual Ready Reserve members or remobilizing
previously mobilized Selected Reserve members.^25 The current guidance
states that options for filling unit shortfalls could include, but would
not be limited to, using volunteers including retirees, involuntary
call-ups of Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard, or
integrating active component members.

^2310 U.S.C. S12302.

^24 [30]GAO-04-1031 .

Overall, the memorandum and implementation guidance presented a
substantial revision to preceding reserve mobilization policies, stating
that the services would plan for a protracted war on terrorism by
effectively managing their manpower resources. The single set of guidance
provided an integrated approach for meeting long-term requirements and
addressed the full range of policy issues that had previously been
addressed in a piecemeal fashion. For example, the issues addressed in the
March 2007 policy guidance included the length of mobilization orders,
extensions, early releases from orders, the use of the Individual Ready
Reserve, and exemptions from training following deployments.

The new guidance specifies that future involuntary mobilizations will
generally be limited to 12 months, with possible service exceptions for
individual skill training required for deployment and postmobilization
leave, and other exceptions if approved by the Secretary of Defense. The
documents also set rotation policy goals for both reserve and active
component personnel. These goals can differ between the active and reserve
components and among services.^26 While these rotation policies provide a
long-term approach for meeting requirements, both the Secretary's memo and
the implementing guidance acknowledge that the services will not be able
to immediately achieve the rotation goals, due to global demands. The
Secretary's memo explicitly states that global demands will require some
units to be remobilized sooner than the standard. Therefore, the memo
directed the establishment of a program to compensate or incentivize
servicemembers who are required to mobilize or deploy early or often, or
to extend beyond the established rotation policy goals.

^25The Selected Reserve includes individual mobilization augmentees who
train regularly with active component units as well as members who train
regularly with National Guard or Reserve units. Individual Ready Reserve
members are servicemembers who have completed the active duty or Selected
Reserve portions of their military contracts but who have not reached the
end of their military service obligation. Although they were previously
trained during periods of active duty service they do not participate in
regular training.

^26The rotation goals in the memorandum and implementing guidance
generally called for reserve component personnel to be involuntarily
mobilized for no more than 1 year and then demobilized for 5 years, but
the guidance allowed the services to implement the 1:5 ratio with tour and
demobilization periods of less than 1 and 5 years based on Secretary of
Defense-approved force generation models. Marine Corps deployments are
typically 7 months rather than 1 year. Under the new policies, active
component personnel are to be deployed for 1 year and then at home station
for 2 years.

On April 18, 2007, DOD announced that administrative absences would be
awarded to servicemembers who are required to mobilize or deploy with a
frequency that exceeds established rotation policy goals. The absences
will be distinct from normal leave accrued by servicemembers. They will be
awarded when servicemember deployments exceed mobilization and deployment
planning objectives---that is, twice as much time at home as deployed for
the active component, and five times as much time at home as mobilized for
the reserve component.^27 In addition to the administrative absences, some
servicemembers could eventually receive monetary compensation for these
deployments or mobilizations if they cause the servicemember to exceed
certain thresholds under broader personnel tempo definitions.

Since 2001, DOD Has Submitted Personnel Tempo Reports but the Army and Marine
Corps Lack Quality Controls to Ensure the Accuracy of Underlying Data

Since 2001, DOD has reported personnel tempos in its "Annual Defense
Report to the President and the Congress", but the reports have not been
complete or accurate because the Army and Marine Corps do not have quality
controls in place to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the reports'
underlying data. In addition, DOD's focus on collecting deployment and
activation data for ongoing operations has shifted attention away from
personnel tempo tracking and reporting.

^27Creditable deployment time will be based on participation in Operation
Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), Operation Iraqi Freedom, or time with
theater units in nearby areas. The secretaries of the military departments
will be able to add other operational commitments discretionally.

Since 2001, DOD Has Reported Personnel Tempo Data to the President and Congress

As directed by 10 U.S.C. S991, the services began collecting personnel
tempo data in fiscal year 2000; and since 2001, DOD has published
personnel tempo data in an appendix to "The Annual Defense Report to the
President and the Congress" as required by 10 U.S.C. S487. The reported
data covered fiscal years 2001 through 2005 and the personnel tempo
appendixes have generally included the types of figures that are required
by the law--service and component end strengths, the populations of
deployed personnel, and average personnel tempos (in days) among the
deployed populations or the total end strength populations. Other
information related to personnel tempos has also been reported on a
sporadic basis. For example, in 2001 and 2002, the appendices included the
number of days "high demand/low density" units deployed but this
information was not included in unclassified versions in later years.

The Army and Marine Corps Lack Quality Controls to Accurately Collect Personnel
Tempo Data

With the suspensions of the high-deployment compensation requirement and
the requirement for management of servicemember deployments that approach
or exceed high-deployment thresholds, no servicemembers have received
personnel tempo payments and a key quality control mechanism has been
missing for more than 5 years.^28 The suspensions have removed two
mechanisms that could have identified faulty personnel tempo data and the
Army and Marine Corps lack other quality control procedures for
effectively ensuring the accuracy of the data they collect and send to
DOD. According to various DOD and service officials, quality checks on the
data only occur if servicemembers check the accuracy of their own
personnel tempo data. Servicemembers have several opportunities to review
their personnel tempo records, such as when they transfer between commands
or separate from the service, but the likelihood that they will actually
do so is low because there is no incentive to do so. A 2005 III Corps
Inspector General report found that fewer than 25 percent of the units
inspected included personnel tempo reporting and tracking procedures as
part of their in- and out-processing procedures. Furthermore, the
Inspector General report found that the office responsible for personnel
policy did not publish personnel tempo management guidance in a timely
manner.

^28Because the services were required to begin collecting data under 10
U.S.C. S991 on October 1, 2000, and the initial per diem payment
provision, 37 U.S.C. S436, required that servicemembers be deployed for
250 days out of the previous 365 in order to be eligible for per diem
payments, the first time servicemembers would have been eligible to
receive per diem payments was October 1, 2001. The payment provision was
waived 7 days later, on October 8, 2001, and according to DOD officials,
no payments were ever issued.

Since the suspension of the high-deployment compensation and deployment
management provisions, several reviews have found that the services'
collection and tracking of personnel tempo data have not been complete or
accurate, even though the requirement to report tempo data to the
President and Congress has remained in place. For example, in 2005 the
Army Human Resources Command reported that for 72 percent of
forward-deployed soldiers, personnel tempo was not properly recorded in
the Electronic Military Personnel Office, the Army's online integrated
personnel reporting system. In addition, Marine Corps inspection teams
recently concluded that inspected commands did not have procedures in
place to ensure that personnel tempo information was reported. Of the 326
active and reserve units inspected in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, 43
percent had not consistently or accurately reported personnel tempo in the
Marine Corps Total Force System, the service's integrated personnel
database.^29

DOD Has Focused on Deployment and Activation Data Rather than on Personnel Tempo
Data

Shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks, DOD shifted its focus away
from collecting and maintaining personnel tempo data and began focusing on
collecting and maintaining data to track activations and deployments
related to major operations.^30 This data collection for Operations Noble
Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom does not include the full range
of personnel tempo events that are listed in 10 U.S.C. S487. The increased
priority on data related to global war on terrorism deployments diminished
the level of effort given to personnel tempo data collection and the
quality of the data collected.

The October 2001 memorandum that suspended the high-deployment
compensation and deployment management provisions did not suspend the
requirement for the services to collect and submit personnel tempo data.
It stated that deployment data tracking and reporting remained a priority,
as previous operations had proven that such efforts were valuable for
developing after-action reports and completing analyses related to the
scope of operations.

Subsequent DOD and service guidance reiterated the requirement to continue
reporting personnel tempo information for servicemembers mobilized or
deployed in support of the global war on terrorism, and the DOD guidance
required that personnel tempo data reporting be timely, accurate, and
complete. Despite this guidance, DOD officials expressed a low level of
confidence in the quality of the personnel tempo data that have been
collected. They told us that they routinely rely on an alternative set of
data from DMDC to examine tempo trends and they noted that DMDC can
conduct only limited quality control on personnel tempo data, because DMDC
is responsible only for compilation and does not have the resources to
identify anomalies in data provided by the services. The services are
responsible for collecting personnel tempo data and although both the Army
and Marine Corps issued implementing guidance based on the OSD
instruction, which required timely, accurate, and complete reporting of
personnel tempo data, the implementing guidance did not contain quality
control procedures to ensure complete and accurate personnel tempo data
are collected and transmitted to DMDC.

^29Marine Corps inspection teams were focused primarily on financial
inspections and personnel tempo was only a part of the inspections. The
inspections were not comprehensive and covered only a portion of the
Marine Corps.

^30These data are tracked in DMDC's Contingency Tracking System.

In February 2007, DOD submitted a proposal to Congress to modify the
deployment definition.^31 The proposal would maintain the basic definition
of deployments but would narrow the scope to exclude non-operational
temporary duty including absences for conferences and training and
participation in training or exercises designated by the secretaries of
the military departments. A change in the definition of deployment would
impact personnel tempo calculations by changing the days that could be
counted for purposes of personnel tempo. If the proposal is approved, DOD
will work with the military departments to develop revised high-deployment
thresholds and compensation proposals that are more closely tailored to
individual service deployment cycles. However, without quality controls on
the collection of Army and Marine Corps data, DOD officials have stated
that neither DMDC nor the services have the complete and accurate data
needed to effectively implement a personnel tempo compensation program.

Conclusions

Since the onset of the global war on terrorism, the Army and Marine Corps
have deployed approximately 931,000 of their servicemembers for military
operations abroad. Facing limitations on its available reserve component
forces, DOD recently instituted an integrated set of policies that
provides it with increased access to its reserve component forces as it
plans for a long-term global war on terrorism. Although the new policies
will better position the services to meet their long-term requirements,
current global demands are making it difficult for the services to meet
rotation goals in the short term. Faced with these challenges, the
management of personnel tempo is critical as DOD strives to retain a
quality force for the future. However, the Army and Marine Corps have not
maintained complete and accurate personnel tempo data and they do not have
quality control procedures in place to ensure the accuracy of their
personnel tempo data. Furthermore, the high-deployment compensation and
deployment management provisions which could have helped to identify
faulty data have been waived for national security reasons since 2001.
Without quality control procedures to ensure the completeness and accuracy
of personnel tempo data, the data could not be used as an accurate basis
to determine eligibility for the current high-deployment compensation
programs found in Title 37 of the U.S. Code or for an alternative
compensation program based on DOD's recent legislative proposal. Until the
Army and Marine Corps establish quality control procedures for the
collection of their personnel tempo data, Congress and others need to be
cautious when using DOD's personnel tempo data because they cannot be
assured that the data fully and accurately reflect servicemembers' actual
tempos.

^31This proposal was part of the legislative package submitted for
consideration as part of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense
Authorization Bill.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the personnel tempo data
that DOD reports to Congress and the President, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness to provide guidance which directs the Army and Marine Corps
to develop quality control procedures for validating the accuracy of the
personnel tempo data they collect and report to DMDC, whether under the
existing personnel tempo definition or under any revised definitions that
Congress may approve.

Agency Comments

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) provided written
comments on a draft of this report. The department concurred with the
recommendation. The department's comments and our evaluation are reprinted
in their entirety in appendix IV. In addition, the department provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies
available to other interested parties upon request. In addition, the
report is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-9619 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
V.

Sharon L. Pickup
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Army and Marine Corps Personnel Tempo Trends Based on
Available Data 

According to the 2005 Annual Defense Report to the President and the
Congress, personnel tempos for the Army and the Marine Corps increased
significantly between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2003 and then the
rates declined slightly in fiscal year 2004. At the time of our report,
the Department of Defense (DOD) had not released the 2006 Annual Defense
Report to the President and the Congress, which would have contained 2005
personnel tempo data.

DOD has reported two measures of personnel tempo. The first divides the
total number of days deployed under the personnel tempo definition by the
total end strength of each service or service component. The second also
begins with the total number of days deployed under the personnel tempo
definition but divides this figure only by the number of personnel who
were actually deployed during the fiscal year. Table 2 shows Army and
Marine Corps personnel tempo figures as reported in the 2005 Annual
Defense Report to the President and the Congress. However, as discussed
earlier in this report, we determined that DOD's personnel tempo
(PERSTEMPO) data may not produce reliable personnel tempo summaries and
trends because the Army and Marine Corps lack quality control procedures
for collecting these data and reporting them to Defense Manpower Data
Center (DMDC).

Table 2: Army and Marine Corps Personnel Tempos

                                                Tempo       Tempo       Tempo 
                                           (days) for  (days) for  (days) for 
           Personnel     Tempo (days) for fiscal year fiscal year fiscal year 
Service tempo measure fiscal year 2001        2002        2003        2004 
Army    (by end                                                            
           strength)                 14.9        24.9        55.7        54.8 
Marine  (by end                                                            
Corps   strength)                 24.8        34.7        64.8        49.6 
Army    (by deployed                                                       
           personnel                                                          
           only)                     34.1        60.2       124.6       119.4 
Marine  (by deployed                                                       
Corps   personnel                                                          
           only)                     63.0        82.9       130.7       102.1 

Source: 2005 Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress.

We also performed our own analysis of DMDC's PERSTEMPO data. This analysis
of PERSTEMPO data shows that the Army personnel tempo average rose
substantially from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2004 and then rose more
slowly in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006. In contrast, the Marine
Corps personnel tempo average peaked in fiscal year 2003. Table 3 shows
the results of our analysis.

Table 3: GAO Calculations of Army and Marine Corps Personnel Tempos

                                                    Tempo     Tempo     Tempo 
                                          Tempo    (days)    (days)    (days) 
           Personnel    Tempo (days) (days) for       for       for       for 
           tempo          for fiscal     fiscal    fiscal    fiscal    fiscal 
Service measure         year 2002  year 2003 year 2004 year 2005 year 2006 
Army    (by deployed         28.3       77.1      92.5      97.6     104.9 
           personnel                                                          
           only)                                                              
Marine  (by deployed         34.6       63.9      49.3      57.5      60.1 
Corps   personnel                                                          
           only)                                                              

Source: GAO analysis of DMDC PERSTEMPO data.

Note: The PERSTEMPO data that support these analyses are unreliable.

Our analysis shows similar trends to the trends from the 2005 Annual
Defense Report to the President and the Congress. However, there are
differences in figures, which may be attributed to differences in data
analysis assumptions. (See app. III for additional information concerning
the methodology for our analysis.) In addition, our analysis includes
fiscal years 2005 and 2006 but it does not include fiscal year 2001 data.
Finally, our analysis is subject to the same major limitation as the trend
information from the Annual Defense Report because our data were drawn
from the same source that was found to be incomplete or inaccurate because
the Army and Marine Corps lack quality control procedures for collecting
these data and reporting them to DMDC.

Appendix II: Retention/Attrition Rates for Enlisted Occupational
Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment Rates

This appendix responds to the requirement that we identify enlisted
occupational specialties that are experiencing unusually high or low
deployment rates and analyze retention rates for those occupational
specialties.^1 The Department of Defense (DOD) collects and tracks
retention data for its active component forces but it uses attrition
rather than retention data in managing its reserve component forces. This
appendix contains retention/attrition rate data for enlisted occupational
specialties that have experienced unusually high or low deployment rates,
but it does not attempt to make any conclusions concerning relationships
between deployment and retention or attrition rates because other factors,
beyond deployment, can affect retention. Specifically, previous studies
and surveys have indicated that in addition to deployments, a wide variety
of other factors influence servicemembers' decisions regarding whether or
not to stay in the military. Some of these factors include basic pay,
reenlistment bonuses, family medical care, quality of leadership, and
civilian career opportunities.

Service Retention and Attrition Tracking

The Army tracks retention rates by initial term (first enlistment,
regardless of length), mid-career (second or subsequent enlistments up to
10 years of service), and career (10 or more years of service). The Marine
Corps tracks retention by first enlistment and second or subsequent
enlistment. DOD tracks National Guard and Reserve attrition rates, which
are defined as the number of service members who leave those components in
a given year divided by the components' average strength as measured at
the beginning of the fiscal year and at the end of that fiscal year.

Enlisted Occupational Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment Rates

To determine which enlisted occupational specialties had unusually high or
low deployment rates, we used several steps. First we obtained fiscal year
2001 to fiscal year 2006 data from the Defense Manpower Data Center's
(DMDC) end strength files and from its Contingency Tracking System
Deployment file. We then analyzed these files by military occupational
specialty (MOS), and for each MOS we determined the yearly end strength
population, the population of deployed personnel, the number of days the
deployed population could have possibly served, and the number of days the
deployed population actually served.

^1Pub. L. No. 109-364, S345 (2006).

We then calculated two deployment measures for each occupational
specialty. First we calculated a days-served ratio by dividing the total
number of days the deployed population actually served in fiscal year 2006
by the number of days they could have possibly served in fiscal year 2006.
Second we calculated a population ratio by dividing the deployed MOS
population in fiscal year 2006 by the total MOS population in fiscal year
2006. We then calculated the quartiles for both the days-served ratio and
the population ratio. If both the days-served ratio and the population
ratio for an occupational specialty were in the highest quartile, then the
occupational specialty was classified as having an unusually high
deployment rate. If both measures were in the bottom quartile then the
occupational specialty was classified as having an unusually low
deployment rate. After we identified the occupational specialties with
unusually high and low deployment rates, we requested and DMDC provided
retention/attrition data for each of those specialties for fiscal years
2001 through 2006.

Active Component Retention Rates

Table 4 shows active component Army and Marine Corps retention rates for
personnel in occupational specialties with unusually high or unusually low
deployment rates. For purposes of this table, a person is considered
retained if, at the end of the year, the person is on active duty and
holds a primary MOS with the same two first digits as the first two digits
of the MOS that the person held at the beginning of the year.

Table 4: Retention Rates for Active Component Army and Marine Corps
Enlisted Occupational Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment
Rates

                                                    Retention 
                                    Occupation        rates   
                                    population      (percent) 
        Occupational                                             FY   FY    FY    FY    FY    FY 
Service specialty              Code    FY 2001        FY 2006  2001 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
        Unusually high                                                                           
        deployment rates                                                                         
Army    Cannon Crewmember       13B       9987 9487      79.3  77.9 85.3  82.8  79.3  83.7       
Army    Combat Engineer         21B          0 9109       0.0   0.0  0.0  88.1  81.5  82.1       
Army    Bridge Crewmember       21C          0  781       0.0   0.0  0.0  84.6  80.6  77.7       
Army    Artillery Mechanic      63D        621  650      85.5  83.1 87.5  78.1  81.2  85.2       
Army    Field Artillery                                                                          
        Firefinder Radar                                                                         
        Operator                13R        466  586      77.5  82.6 86.1  83.1  79.4  79.5       
Army    Technical Engineer      21T          0  261       0.0   0.0  0.0  84.6  77.7  87.7       
Army    Cannon Fire                                                                              
        Direction Specialist    13E       1603  258      80.4  79.7 84.5  78.7  69.1  79.5       
Army    Interior Electrician    21R          0  157             0.0  0.0   0.0 100.0  72.7  84.1 
Army    Tactical Automated                                                                       
        Fire Control Systems                                                                     
        Specialist              13C        746   52            81.1 82.6  85.9  69.7  74.5  88.5 
USMC    Digital Wideband                                                                         
        Transmission                                                                             
        Equipment Operator     0622          2  576           100.0 79.1  79.8  81.0  69.3  70.3 
USMC    Fire Support Man       0861        382  430            76.7 79.0  76.5  81.2  82.9  86.0 
USMC    Unit Level Circuit                                                                       
        Switch (ULCS)                                                                            
        Operator/Maintainer    0614          3  386           100.0 81.5  86.1  82.5  78.4  77.2 
USMC    SHF Satellite                                                                            
        Communicators                                                                            
        Operator/Maintainer    0627          0  208             0.0 84.1  74.8  80.8  77.5  68.8 
USMC    Tactical Data                                                                            
        Systems Equipment                                                                        
        (TDSE) Repairer        5962        111  124            84.7 83.5  78.3  81.7  73.8  74.2 
USMC    Aviation Radio                                                                           
        Repairer               5937        139  103            74.8 82.5  86.4  76.7  65.5  80.6 
USMC    Field Artillery                                                                          
        Radar Operator         0842         92  100            84.8 75.2  76.9  82.1  77.0  72.0 
USMC    Tactical Air                                                                             
        Operations Module                                                                        
        Repairer               5963         80   78            70.0 78.7  81.3  85.5  69.0  71.8 
        Unusually low                                                                            
        deployment rates                                                                         
Army    Microwave Systems                                                                        
        Operator-Maintainer     25P          0 1054             0.0  0.0   0.0   0.0  78.8  79.2 
Army    Watercraft Operator     88K        729  538            87.1 80.5  75.7  74.6  82.8  87.7 
Army    Mortuary Affairs                                                                         
        Specialist              92M        412  445            85.4 86.8  85.6  81.6  85.3  88.5 
Army    Combat                                                                                   
        Documentation/                                                                           
        Production                                                                               
        Specialist              25V        487  371            86.2 84.2  86.3  84.1  82.5  88.7 
Army    Watercraft Engineer     88L        410  330            85.6 84.1  83.6  79.8  75.4  83.0 
Army    Senior                                                                                   
        Non-Commissioned                                                                         
        Logistician             92Z        145  159            84.8 74.5  76.0  77.8  72.0  71.1 
Army    Satellite/Microwave                                                                      
        Systems Chief         25T^a          0   73             0.0  0.0   0.0   0.0  70.4  68.5 
Army    Health Care                                                                              
        Specialist            68W^a          0   10             0.0  0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 100.0 
USMC    Basic Motor                                                                              
        Transport Marine       3500        215  768            93.5 87.6  90.7  87.9  92.8  89.1 
USMC    Corrections                                                                              
        Specialist             5831        683  615            83.0 78.3  78.7  81.1  84.4  79.3 
USMC    Basic Aircraft                                                                           
        Maintenance Marine   6000^a        293  486            92.8 91.8  91.2  94.0  89.6  88.5 
USMC    Basic                                                                                    
        Data/Communications                                                                      
        Maintenance Marine     2800        554  459            86.1 84.8  83.2  82.7  79.7  81.7 
USMC    Basic Ground                                                                             
        Ordnance Maintenance                                                                     
        Marine                 2100        178  310            86.0 83.3  83.5  91.5  90.8  89.0 
USMC    Basic Electronics                                                                        
        Maintenance Marine     5900        119  246            85.7 63.3  73.5  41.4  48.0  35.4 
USMC    Basic Logistics                                                                          
        Marines                0400         26  237            88.5 96.9  88.2  94.9  89.0  92.8 
USMC    Basic Tank and                                                                           
        Assault Amphibious                                                                       
        Vehicle Crewman        1800         60  177            83.3 77.4  34.8  83.7  88.0  74.0 
USMC    Tiltrotor Mechanic,                                                                      
        MV-22                6116^a          0  138             0.0 88.0  79.1  93.6  98.8  92.0 
USMC    Basic Food Service                                                                       
        Marine                 3300         45  123            88.9 91.3  82.7  88.7  91.2  87.0 
USMC    Criminal                                                                                 
        Investigator CID                                                                         
        Agent                  5821         73  107            87.7 87.1  88.3  81.3  94.9  86.0 
USMC    CASS EO                                                                                  
        Configuration                                                                            
        Operator/Maintainer/                                                                     
        Technician/IMA       6466^a         69   75            88.4 84.3  87.0  89.2  80.9  77.3 
USMC    Combat Illustrator     4611         57   50            89.5 83.6  79.1  80.3  80.3  72.0 
USMC    Basic Legal Services                                                                     
        Marine                 4400         21   41            95.2 83.3 100.0  95.7  86.4  92.7 
USMC    Tactical Air                                                                             
        Operations                                                                               
        Module/Air Defense                                                                       
        Technician             5979         35   32            80.0 80.0  84.4  82.1  96.4  84.4 
USMC    Basic Meteorology                                                                        
        and Oceanography                                                                         
        (METOC) Marine       6800^a         13   15           100.0 80.0  88.9  93.3  93.3  86.7 
USMC    Small Ensemble                                                                           
        Leader                 5522          0   13             0.0  0.0   0.0 100.0 100.0  76.9 
USMC    Basic Marine Air                                                                         
        Ground Task Force      0500          1   11           100.0  0.0  66.7  66.7  80.0 100.0 

Source: GAO analysis based on DMDC data.

aSeveral factors can lead to wide fluctuations in retention rates. For
example, some new occupational specialties have been introduced while
other specialties have been phased out. In addition, some specialties
include recruits, trainees, or officer candidates. Retention rates for
those specialties are very low because personnel generally graduate from
the programs and are given different occupational specialty codes. For
clarity in reporting, we are not reporting retention rates for these
occupational codes or for occupations that have been phased out or which
had less than 10 personnel in fiscal year 2006.

Reserve Component Attrition Rates

Table 5 shows reserve component Army and Marine Corps attrition rates for
personnel in enlisted occupational specialties with unusually high or
unusually low deployment rates. For purposes of this table, a person is
generally considered attrited if, at the end of the year, the person is no
longer in the Selected Reserve or if the person holds a primary MOS where
the first two digits differ from the first two digits of the MOS that the
person held at the beginning of the year.

Table 5: Attrition Rates for Reserve Component Army and Marine Corps
Enlisted Occupational Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment
Rates

                                      Occupation         
                                      population      Attrition rates (percent)
                                                      FY    FY                      
Service   Occupational                   FY    FY                FY   FY    FY   FY 
component specialties            Code  2001  2006   2001  2002 2003 2004  2005 2006 
          Unusually high                                                            
          deployment rates                                                          
USAR      Civil Affairs                                                             
          Specialist (RC)         38A 1,630 2,515   22.6  22.5 14.2 22.2  16.1 19.4 
USAR      Psychological                                                             
          Operations                                                                
          Specialist              37F 1,032 1,410   21.2  20.4 15.1 27.8  20.6 20.3 
USAR      Cable Systems                                                             
          Installer-Maintainer  25L^a     -   769      -     -    -    -  16.7 20.9 
USAR      CH-47 Helicopter                                                          
          Repairer              15U^a     -   298      -     -    - 18.3  19.6 25.2 
USAR      Human Intelligence                                                        
          Collector               97E   232   272   30.6  21.6 18.7 26.8  30.0 21.0 
USAR      Visual Information                                                        
          Equipment                                                                 
          Operator-Maintainer     25R    50    55   24.0  25.5 24.6 23.2  18.5 25.5 
USAR      Personnel Services                                                        
          Specialist            75H^a 5,613    29   20.1  20.4 18.0 99.9  80.6 79.3 
USAR      Land Combat                                                               
          Electronics Missile                                                       
          System Repairer       35A^a     -    12      -     -    -    -     - 75.0 
USAR      Radar Repairer          35M     6    10   83.3  25.0 40.0 52.9  41.7 60.0 
ARNG      Multiple Launch                                                           
          Rocket System (MLRS)                                                      
          Crewmember              13M 1,985 1,957   20.2  19.6 16.7 15.8  24.0 15.4 
ARNG      Multiple Launch                                                           
          Rocket System (MLRS)                                                      
          Operational Fire                                                          
          Direction Specialist    13P   691   894   20.1  21.6 17.9 15.2  26.2 14.7 
ARNG      Electronic                                                                
          Maintenance Chief     35W^a   226   230   16.4  16.7 13.2 10.1  20.9 79.1 
ARNG      Special Forces                                                            
          Engineer Sergeant       18C   237   196   13.9  10.2 11.0 20.0  21.4  8.7 
ARNG      Land Combat                                                               
          Electronics Missile                                                       
          System Repairer       35A^a     -   159      -     -    -    - 100.0 91.2 
ARNG      Army Bandperson       02A^a     -   147      -     -    -    -  40.0 99.3 
ARNG      CH-47 Helicopter                                                          
          Repairer              67U^a   894    96   16.4  15.7 14.5 77.6  67.9 86.5 
ARNG      AVENGER System                                                            
          Repairer              35T^a     -    86      -     -    -    -     - 95.3 
ARNG      Utility Airplane                                                          
          Repairer (RC)         67G^a   119    72   16.0  17.7 20.0 28.6  36.4 44.4 
ARNG      Construction                                                              
          Engineering                                                               
          Supervisor            51H^a   793    71   14.8  14.9 16.5 50.3  85.7 90.1 
ARNG      Special Forces                                                            
          Assistant Operations                                                      
          and Intelligence                                                          
          Sergeant                18F    85    66   16.5   8.5 11.6 23.4  11.3 12.1 
ARNG      Interior Electrician  51R^a   671    63   24.6  22.1 17.2 52.4  83.7 90.5 
ARNG      Integrated Family of                                                      
          Test Equipment                                                            
          Operator/Maintainer   35Y^a    51    62   21.6  17.6 16.2 25.0  33.3 93.5 
ARNG      Information Systems                                                       
          Chief                 74Z^a    64    36   14.1  14.7  8.5 15.4  72.4 97.2 
ARNG      Plumber               51K^a   393    35   26.0  20.8 16.8 50.5  86.1 82.9 
ARNG      General Engineering                                                       
          Supervisor            51Z^a   231    20   15.6  15.4 16.2 50.0  87.6 90.0 
ARNG      Communications                                                            
          Interceptor/Locator   98H^a    41    20   31.7  36.6 32.4 37.2  45.9  5.0 
ARNG      APACHE Attack                                                             
          Helicopter Systems                                                        
          Repairer              35K^a     -    13      -     -    -    - 100.0 92.3 
USMCR     Field Artillery                                                           
          Cannoneer              0811   791   821   19.0  20.0 19.5 25.4  21.6 21.0 
USMCR     Basic Field                                                               
          Artillery Man          0800   142   113   34.5  21.8 33.6 30.5  14.7 31.0 
USMCR     Artillery                                                                 
          Meteorological Man     0847     8    33   37.5  14.3 15.8  6.1  16.2 18.2 
USMCR     Ground Radio                                                              
          Repairer             2841^a   310    32   24.5  21.8 21.5 36.6  25.5 59.4 
          Unusually low                                                             
          deployment rates                                                          
USAR      Recruiter               79R 1,628 1,548   12.0  11.6 11.9 18.9  15.4 14.7 
USAR      Army Bandperson       42R^a     -   649      -     -    -    -     -  9.4 
USAR      Field Artillery                                                           
          Automated Tactical                                                        
          Data System                                                               
          Specialist            13D^a     -    76      -     - 50.0 44.4  55.0 42.1 
USAR      M1 ABRAMS Tank                                                            
          System Maintainer     63A^a     1    71  100.0 100.0 62.5 30.0  42.9 47.9 
USAR      Optical Laboratory                                                        
          Specialist            91H^a     -    56      -  66.7 16.0 19.0  23.5 30.4 
USAR      Transmission &                                                            
          Distribution                                                              
          Specialist (RC)       21Q^a     -    17      -     -    - 31.6  20.0 23.5 
USAR      UH-1 Helicopter                                                           
          Repairer (RC)         15M^a     -    11      -     -    - 36.4  66.7 54.5 
USAR      Electronic                                                                
          Maintenance Chief     94W^a     -    10      -     -    -    -     - 20.0 
ARNG      Recruiter               79R   101    34   34.7  28.4 31.3 38.0  26.3 52.9 
ARNG      Satellite                                                                 
          Communications                                                            
          Systems                                                                   
          Operator-Maintainer   25S^a     -    25      -     -    -    - 100.0 12.0 
ARNG      CID Special Agent     31D^a     -    22      -     -    -    -  45.8 22.7 
ARNG      Career Counselor        79S   104    15   29.8  35.3 27.0 30.4  12.5 40.0 
ARNG      Transmission &                                                            
          Distribution                                                              
          Specialist (RC)       21Q^a     -    10      -     -    -    -     - 20.0 
USMCR     Engineer Equipment                                                        
          Mechanic               1341   334   370   21.6  26.9 17.8 26.4  20.4 20.5 
USMCR     Aviation Supply                                                           
          Specialist             6672   252   221   23.4  19.7 21.1 22.7  23.5 21.7 
USMCR     Water Support                                                             
          Technician             1171   185   203   25.9  29.5 22.8 15.5  18.8 25.6 
USMCR     Aviation Information                                                      
          Systems (AIS)                                                             
          Specialist           6694^a     -    53      -     - 11.1  9.4  20.7 15.1 
USMCR     METOC Observer         6821    30    48   26.7  51.6 18.2 13.3   8.3 10.4 
USMCR     Helicopter Airframe                                                       
          Mechanic, CH-53        6153    20    28   25.0  28.6 13.6 12.5   7.7 14.3 
USMCR     Individual Material                                                       
          Readiness List                                                            
          (IMRL) Asset Manager   6042    14    26   14.3  11.8 21.7  8.7  23.1 38.5 
USMCR     Legal Services                                                            
          Specialist             4421    47    25   42.6  36.8 30.3 37.5  29.6 40.0 
USMCR     Aircraft Maintenance                                                      
          Chief                  6019    36    25   22.2  29.0 32.0 25.9  40.0 16.0 
USMCR     Aviation Radar                                                            
          Repairer               5942     3    20   33.3  14.3 33.3 21.4  17.6 10.0 
USMCR     Aircraft                                                                  
          Communications /                                                          
          Navigation /                                                              
          Electrical Systems                                                        
          Technician, CH-53      6323    17    20   11.8  28.6  4.3 20.0  27.3 35.0 
USMCR     Aircraft                                                                  
          Communications                                                            
          Systems Technician,                                                       
          IMA                    6412    18    19    5.6  22.2 17.6 23.5   6.7 15.8 
USMCR     Fixed-Wing Aircraft                                                       
          Power Plants                                                              
          Mechanic, F-404        6227    13    18   30.8     - 25.0    -  20.0 16.7 
USMCR     Aircraft Electronic                                                       
          Countermeasures                                                           
          Systems Technician,                                                       
          Helicopter, IMA        6483     9    15   22.2     - 14.3  7.1   7.7 13.3 
USMCR     Helicopter Power                                                          
          Plants Mechanic,                                                          
          T-64                   6123    11    11    9.1   6.7 26.7 27.3  27.3 27.3 

Source: GAO analysis based on DMDC data.

aSeveral factors can lead to wide fluctuations in attrition rates. For
example, some new occupational specialties have been introduced while
other specialties have been phased out. In addition some specialties
include recruits, trainees, or officer candidates. Attrition rates for
those specialties are very high because personnel generally graduate from
the programs and are given different occupational specialty codes. For
clarity in reporting, we are not reporting attrition rates for these
occupational codes or for occupations that have been phased out or which
had less than 10 personnel in fiscal year 2006.

In examining tables 4 and 5, it is important to note that personnel in
some high-deploying occupational specialties may not be deploying for
their chosen specialty. For example, many personnel with field artillery
occupational specialties have been deployed to perform military police or
security functions. For these personnel, retention decisions may be
influenced not only by the factors previously cited (basic pay,
reenlistment bonuses, family medical care, quality of leadership, and
civilian career opportunities) but also by the fact that they have been
deployed and are working outside of their chosen occupational specialties.
For individual servicemembers these other factors may have a larger impact
on retention decisions than their deployment rates.

Appendix III: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the extent to which changes in mobilization and deployment
policies have affected reserve component availability and provided an
approach to meet the requirements for the global war on terrorism, we
reviewed and analyzed past and present Department of Defense (DOD)
mobilization and deployment policies as well as requirements for the
global war on terrorism, comparing the effects of policies before and
after Secretary Gates' January 19, 2007, memorandum regarding the
utilization of the total force. Specifically, we discussed the
implementation of mobilization authorities and the effects of various
personnel policies with responsible officials from the (1) Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Arlington, Virginia; (2) Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Arlington, Virginia; (3)
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arlington, Virginia; (4) Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Arlington, Virginia; and (5)
Commandant, Marine Corps (Manpower, Plans, and Policy), Quantico Marine
Corps Base, Virginia.

In meetings with the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff,
and service officials, we discussed the effects of reserve mobilization
and deployment policies enacted following the September 11, 2001, attacks;
the advantages and disadvantages of those policies when compared to the
policies implemented on and after the January 19, 2007, when the Secretary
of Defense issued a total force policy memorandum; and, the impact of
policies on the availability of reserve component members for future
mobilizations and deployments. We also discussed the use of special pays
and bonuses as instruments that could encourage reserve component members
to volunteer for mobilizations that exceeded the prior 24-cumulative-month
time limitation on involuntary mobilizations. Finally, we collected and
reviewed data regarding the population of previously mobilized reserve
component members to determine reserve component availability under the
prior 24-cumulative-month limitation.

To assess the extent to which DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have
collected, maintained, and reported complete and accurate personnel tempo
data, we reviewed legislation and DOD policies regarding personnel tempo;
Army, Marine Corps, and DOD systems and procedures for collecting and
reporting personnel tempo data; and previous inspections and reviews of
the personnel tempo data.

We examined legislation to identify the definition of personnel tempo and
related terms; the reporting requirements for DOD and the military
departments; the assignment of roles and responsibilities; the thresholds
for identifying high-deploying personnel and the corresponding provisions
for compensation; and the conditions for modifying the personnel tempo
provisions or issuing waivers to those provisions. We also examined
corresponding DOD and service policies concerning the collection and
management of personnel tempo data. We also reviewed DOD's Annual Reports
to the President and the Congress, which congressional legislation
identified as the means for transmitting personnel tempo data. We compared
and contrasted the DOD guidance on personnel tempo and deployment data
collection that was issued before the personnel tempo oversight and
compensation provisions were waived in October 2001 to guidance that was
issued after the waiver.

We also discussed the implementation and efficacy of DOD and service
personnel tempo and deployment and activation data collection policies
with responsible officials from the (1) Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, Arlington, Virginia, including Military Personnel
Policy, Arlington, Virginia and Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC West),
Seaside, California; (2) Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs,
Arlington, Virginia; (3) Department of the Army, Human Resources Command,
including Alexandria, Virginia (Active) and St. Louis, Missouri (Reserve);
(4) United States Marine Corps, Manpower Plans and Policy Division,
Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia; (5) United States Marine Corps,
Inspection Division, Office of the Inspector General, Quantico Marine
Corps Base, Virginia; and (6) National Guard Bureau, G-1, Selected Reserve
Branch, Arlington, Virginia.

We compiled and reviewed documentation on DOD and service evaluations,
inspections, and reviews of personnel tempo data. In addition, we reviewed
documentation on the DMDC and service systems used to collect, process,
and archive personnel tempo and deployment data. Furthermore, we reviewed
the personnel tempo proposal submitted by OSD to Congress for
consideration in the upcoming national defense authorization act and
conferred with our Office of General Counsel regarding its status and
potential impact.

Although not part of our reporting objectives, in order to meet the
reporting requirements of the John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007 we provide data on personnel tempo trends in
appendix I, and retention rates for enlisted occupational specialties that
have experienced unusually high or low deployment rates in appendix II.

To develop personnel tempo trends, we analyzed fiscal year 2001 to fiscal
year 2006 data from the DMDC Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) database using
statistical analysis software (SAS). We also obtained and analyzed fiscal
year 2001 to fiscal year 2006 data from the DMDC end strength
databases---the Active Duty Military Personnel Master File and the Reserve
Components Common Personnel Data System. Using the PERSTEMPO and end
strength data, we completed an analysis identifying the yearly end
strength population, the population of deployed personnel, and the total
number of cumulative days deployed. Because of known limitations in the
PERSTEMPO database, we completed a comparative analysis with fiscal years
2001-2006 data from the DMDC Contingency Tracking System (CTS) Deployment
and Activation File datasets. Using the CTS and end strength data, we
completed an analysis identifying the yearly end strength population, the
population of deployed personnel, and the total number of cumulative days
deployed. From these three figures, we calculated the yearly personnel
tempo average for each database---PERSTEMPO, CTS Deployment File, and CTS
Activation File. We compared the resulting calculations as well as the
corresponding trends as one measure of the reliability of the PERSTEMPO
data. To assess the reliability of the PERSTEMPO data, we spoke with
knowledgeable DMDC officials about data quality issues and the internal
controls on the system, and we reviewed prior GAO work on the PERSTEMPO
data and system. Based on this information, we determined the PERSTEMPO
data were not reliable indices of personnel tempo trends. We did not use
PERSTEMPO data to support findings or recommendations and present
PERSTEMPO data only in appendix I, with the associated data reliability
caveats, because of the known limitations in the reliability of the data.
These data are included in appendix I because of the legislative mandate
to provide personnel tempo trends, and despite the known limitations, they
are the only data DOD maintains on personnel tempo for all global war on
terrorism contingencies.

To determine retention rates for enlisted occupational specialties that
have experienced unusually high or low deployment rates, we obtained
fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2006 data from the DMDC CTS Deployment
File, and active and reserve end strength files. Using these data, we
calculated deployment statistics and defined the occupational specialties
experiencing unusually high or low deployment rates based on quartile
analysis. The identified occupational specialties were then transmitted to
DMDC, and DMDC provided retention or attrition data for each occupation
specialty for the fiscal years 2001-2006 period. To assess the reliability
of CTS and end strength data, we spoke with DMDC officials who were
knowledgeable of the data and systems, reviewed data system documentation,
obtained written responses to questions regarding the internal controls on
the systems, reviewed previous GAO work on the data and systems, and
performed electronic data tests for anomalous and missing data. We
determined the CTS and end strength data we used were reliable for the
purposes of this report. To ensure the accuracy of GAO's analysis, all
programs were verified for logic and accuracy by an independent reviewer.

We discussed our methodology for calculating and tabulating these data
with officials from the (1) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, Arlington, Virginia, including Military Personnel Policy,
Arlington, Virginia and Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC West), Seaside,
California; (2) Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs,
Arlington, Virginia; (3) Department of the Army, Human Resources Command,
Alexandria, Virginia (Active); (4) National Guard Bureau, G-1, Selected
Reserve Branch, Arlington, Virginia; and (5) United States Marine Corps,
Manpower Plans and Policy Division, Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia.
The following list contains details about the methods and assumption we
used in analyzing DMDC data files:

           1. End-of-September End Strength files were used to represent the
           end strength for the preceding fiscal year for both active and
           reserve servicemembers.
           2. For the yearly analysis, the number of days activated/deployed
           includes both the day the activation or deployment started and the
           day it ended.
           3. For activations or deployments that extend across fiscal years,
           the days for each year are counted through September 30 of that
           year and subsequent days are attributed to the following year.
           4. Activations or deployments that began in fiscal years 2005-2006
           and had "unknown" end dates were included in the yearly analysis
           because the missing dates could indicate ongoing activations or
           deployments.
           5. Activations or deployments that began in fiscal years 2001-2004
           and had "unknown" end dates were excluded from the yearly analysis
           based on the assumption that activations or deployments do not
           typically extend for 2 years and the dates more likely represent
           "missing" data.
           6. The MOS analysis was based on Primary Service Military
           Occupational Specialty (PMOS) codes.
           7. In instances of data anomalies, we communicated with DMDC and
           incorporated their suggestions for resolution.
           8. The data we received from DMDC contained no PERSTEMPO events
           that began in fiscal year 2001.

Because there are a variety of factors affecting retention for which we
were not able to account in our analysis, we did not attempt to make any
conclusions concerning the relationship between deployment and retention
or attrition rates. However, we collected and reviewed information about
some of these other factors that affect retention.

We conducted our work from June 2006 to May 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 4.

See comment 3.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

See comment 3.

See comment 8.

See comment 1.

See comment 9.

GAO Comments

           1. We revised the numbers as suggested to reflect additional data
           provided by DOD.
           2. We disagree with DOD's assertion that several disparate issues
           are being addressed in the original paragraph as written and have
           not changed the report text in response to that assertion. The
           entire paragraph supports the initial clause of our topic
           sentence-- "Congress has repeatedly expressed concerns about the
           pace of military operations." The sentences that follow the topic
           sentence all document ways that Congress has expressed its concern
           through legislation over the years. We note both the recent
           concerns that have been addressed through personnel tempo
           provisions and the long-standing concerns that were addressed
           through restrictions on the numbers of personnel who can be
           mobilized and the allowable lengths of mobilizations. However, in
           order to clarify the timing of the actions taken by Congress, we
           have made minor adjustments to the text. Furthermore, we note
           that, contrary to DOD's assertion that none of the involuntary
           recall authorities have been modified, in 2006, the Presidential
           Reserve Call-up authority found in 10 U.S.C. S12304 was amended^1
           with an extension of the number of days members could be called
           under the authority and the addition of criteria to be used to
           ensure fair treatment of reserve personnel before mobilizing them
           under this authority.
           3. We revised the numbers as suggested to reflect additional data
           provided by DOD.
           4. We have adjusted the text as suggested to provide additional
           clarification. Throughout the report we had used the term
           mobilization as it is commonly used to include personnel
           activations as well as the assembling of equipment. However, we
           acknowledge that activation is the more technically appropriate
           term and have thus changed "mobilization" to "activation" as
           suggested in this and other comments.
           5. We have made the changes to the table as suggested.
           6. We have added the suggested text as a footnote prior to the
           table.
           7. We have adjusted the text as suggested to provide additional
           clarification.
           8. We have adjusted the text as suggested.
           9. We have adjusted the text as suggested.

^1Pub. L. No. 109-364, S522 (2006).

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Ms. Sharon Pickup (202) 512-9619 or [31][email protected]

Acknowledgements

In addition to the contact named above, Michael Ferren, (Assistant
Director), Sara Hackley, Molly Whipple, Rebecca Shea, Lynn Milan, Laurie
Hamilton, William Bates, Nicole Harms, Cheryl Weissman, Alissa Czyz, and
Ricardo Marquez made major contributions to this report.

(350868)

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[38]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-780 .

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Highlights of [39]GAO-07-780 , a report to the Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives

July 2007

MILITARY PERSONNEL

DOD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo Data and Needs Quality Controls to
Improve Data Accuracy

Congress has repeatedly expressed concerns about the pace of military
operations and 10 U.S.C. S487 requires that the Department of Defense
(DOD) annually report on personnel tempo--the time servicemembers spend
away from home. Section 345 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directed GAO to report on a number
of Army and Marine Corps issues. For this report GAO addresses the extent
to which (1) changes in mobilization and deployment policies have affected
reserve component availability and provided an approach to meet the
requirements for the global war on terrorism; and, (2) DOD, the Army, and
the Marine Corps have collected, maintained, and reported complete and
accurate personnel tempo data. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed
data from DOD's Personnel Tempo and Contingency Tracking System databases,
and interviewed agency officials.

[40]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army and Marine
Corps to develop quality control procedures for validating the accuracy of
service member personnel tempo data. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DOD concurred with the recommendation.

On January 19, 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum which
changed mobilization and deployment policies and increased reserve
component availability, making virtually all reserve component personnel
available on an indefinitely recurrent basis under a long-term approach
for meeting the requirements for the global war on terror.  Previously,
involuntary reserve component mobilizations for the global war on
terrorism were limited to 24 cumulative months; there is no cumulative
time limit on involuntary mobilizations under the new policy. DOD's new
policies provide for an integrated approach to manage the long-term
requirements for the global war on terrorism while addressing issues that
had previously been addressed in a piecemeal fashion. The new policies
emphasize the importance of deployment predictability and unit cohesion
and they contain deployment rotation goals, which differ between the
active and reserve components. In taking this long-term approach, DOD has
recognized that it will not be able to immediately achieve its rotation
goals and some units will be remobilized sooner than the standard.
Therefore, the Secretary also directed that a program be established to
compensate servicemembers who are required to mobilize or deploy early or
often or extend beyond the established rotation policy goals.

DOD has reported personnel tempo data to Congress and the President since
2001, but the reports have not been complete and accurate because the Army
and Marine Corps do not have quality controls in place to ensure the
accuracy and completeness of the reports' underlying data. In October
2001, DOD waived two statutory personnel tempo requirements due to
national security interests. As permitted by the statutes, DOD waived the
high-deployment payment provision and the management of servicemember
deployments which approach or exceeded certain thresholds. With the
provisions waived, two mechanisms that would identify faulty personnel
tempo data were no longer in place, and the services lacked any other
quality control procedures to ensure the accuracy of the data they were
collecting and sending to DOD. Despite DOD guidance requiring complete and
accurate personnel tempo data, service reviews have found that the
collection and tracking of tempo data have not been accurate. In 2005, the
Army Human Resources Command reported that personnel tempo was not
properly recorded for 72 percent of forward-deployed soldiers. In fiscal
years 2005 and 2006, Marine Corps inspection teams found that inspected
commands did not have procedures in place to ensure that personnel tempo
information was accurately reported. DOD's focus on collecting deployment
data for ongoing operations has shifted its attention away from personnel
tempo reporting and DOD recently sent a proposal to Congress to modify the
definition of deployments. If approved, the new definition would be used
to revise personnel tempo thresholds and related compensation. Until DOD
establishes quality control procedures, Congress and users of DOD's
personnel tempo data need to use caution because they cannot be assured
that the data fully and accurately reflect servicemembers' actual tempos.

References

Visible links
  28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1031
  29. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1031
  30. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1031
  31. mailto:[email protected]
  32. http://www.gao.gov/
  33. http://www.gao.gov/
  34. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
  35. mailto:[email protected]
  36. mailto:[email protected]
  37. mailto:[email protected]
  38. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-780
  39. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-780
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